(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why China Really is Like Nazi Germany

Tags

Albert O. Hirschman, allies, Biden, China, dumping, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, intellectual property theft, Japan, multilateralism, NATO, Nazi Germany, nuclear umbrella, Robert D. Atkinson, sanctions, South Korea, tariffs, tech industry, technology extortion, Trade, tripwire, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Because Nazi references can be so irresponsibly inflammatory, and therefore have been so often abused, I haven’t yet compared the threat posed by China to the rest of the world to that posed by Nazi Germany. (In my view, these comparisons have been used even more recklessly lately in U.S. domestic politics, chiefly to describe former President Trump and his views and policies.) So even though the People’s Republic, its ambitions, and its burgeoning capabilities do scare the living daylights out of me (and should scare you), I was nonetheless pretty surprised to see precisely this comparison just made by Robert D. Atkinson.

Atkinson is the head of a technology-focused Washington, D.C. think tank who I’ve known since the early 1990s. I’ve admired some of its work and haven’t been so crazy about other examples of its output, but I’ve never, ever considered him a boat-rocker, much less a rhetorical bomb thrower. In fact, my criticisms of the numerous studies and articles issued by his Information Technology and Innovation Foundation stem from my view that they’re way too cautious when it comes to countering China’s wide range of predatory economic practices (which include predatory technology policy practices like the theft and extortion of intellectual property).

And I’ve attributed much of this caution to the Foundation’s donor base – which is dominated by the U.S. and in some cases foreign tech and manufacturing companies that have worked so hard to send so much production and employment, and (voluntarily) so much technology to China for decades. It’s true that many of these firms are now crying foul as Beijing in recent years has aimed to strengthen its own entities’ positions at the foreigners’ expense. Yet their stubborn opposition to the unilateral Trump tariffs and some key sanctions on the Chinese tech outfits that have been major customers made clear their vain hope that they could somehow have their China cake and eat it, too.

Yet here comes Atkinson in the Fall issue of The International Economy (a publication that’s as – proudly – establishment oriented as they come) with a piece titled “A Remarkable Resemblance” likening China’s international economic policies to those of “Germany for the first forty-five years of the twentieth century” – which of course include the twelve Nazi years (1933-1945).

As the author argues, Germany during these decades was:

“a ‘power trader’ that used trade as a key tool to gain commercial and military advantage over its adversaries. Likewise, China’s trade policy is guided neither by free trade nor protectionism, but by power trade, with remarkably similar strategy and tactics to those of 1940s Germany. Understanding how Germany manipulated the global trading system to degrade its adversaries’ capabilities, entrap nations as reluctant allies, and build up its own industries for commercial and military advantage, just as China is doing, can shed light and point the way for solutions to the China challenge.”

Atkinson reports that this description of German policies came from a 1945 book by the important economist Albert O. Hirschman, which concluded that “[I]t’s is possible to turn foreign trade into an instrument of power, of pressure, and even of conquest. The Nazis have done nothing but exploit the fullest possibilities inherent in foreign trade within the traditional framework of international economic relations.”

The author rightly observes that

“Hirschman’s key insight was that some countries— in this case Germany under three very different government regimes from 1900 to 1945—focus not on maximizing free trade or even on protecting their industries, but on changing the relative power of nations through trade to achieve global power. Germany’s policies and programs were designed not only to advance its own economic and military power, but to also degrade its adversaries’ economies, even if that imposed costs on their own economy relative to a free trade regime.”

Germany also consistently sought, as the author points out “to make it more difficult for its trading partners to dispense entirely with trade with Germany, thus creating dependency.” And if that’s not enough to convince you about the comparison with China today, Atkinson himself notes that the German policy recipe also included massive industrial espionage, and Hirschman identified a major element as the equally massive dumping (selling at prices way below production costs) of goods into foreign markets to destroy overseas competition.

Atkinson’s diagnosis of the problem is so spot-on that it makes his recommended solution especially disappointing. Kind of like President Biden, he believes that the best internationally oriented option by far (on top of more effective support for U.S. industry, which I strongly support) is forming a “NATO for trade” that would be

“governed by a council of participating [free trading] countries…if any member is threatened or attacked unjustly with trade measures that inflict economic harm, DATO [the “Democratically Allied Trade Organization] would quickly convene and consider whether to take joint action to defend the member nation.”

I’ve already pointed out that the consensus on standing against China economically among America’s allies is way too weak to enable such multilateral approaches to succeed. But as long as we’re talking in terms of NATO – the military alliance between the United States and much of first Western and now Eastern Europe – and the Cold War, let’s not forget two other big problems. First, NATO (and this also goes for America’s security ties with South Korea and Japan) was never so much an alliance as a protector-protectorate relationship. The vast bulk of the heavy lifting was always done by the United States.

This allied security dependence in turn has produced the second major obstacle to a DATO’s effectiveness. Because the United States coddled allied defense free-ridingcand opened its markets one-sidedly for so long, the allies’ protectorate status was substantially cost-free economically, and even came with trade rewards no other country could remotely offer. (In addition, as I’ve also written, the creation of an American nuclear umbrella combined with the stationining of U.S. “tripwire” forces on the NATO frontlines in Germany also greatly minimized the military risks of siding with Washington.)

Today, however, economic power between the United States and the allies is more evenly distributed, and the allies’ profitable trade with and investment in China has, as noted in my aforementioned writings, greatly increased the economic price they would pay for lining up against China.

Still, by comparing the China threat to the Nazi threat, Atkinson’s article significantly bolsters the case for the United States escalating its response to the “all of society” level – or at least intensifying it qualitatively. Let’s just hope, as the author writes, that this time around the United States fully awakens a lot faster.

Advertisement

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The CCP Virus is Also Killing the Economic Case for Free Trade

Tags

CCP Virus, China, corona virus, COVID 19, economics, economists, free trade, GDP, Goldman Sachs, gross domestic product, health security, inflation-adjusted output, intellectual property theft, Morningstar, offshoring lobby, Oxford Economics, Trade, U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S.-China Business Council, USITC, World Trade Organization, WTO, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

In a nutshell, the mainstream economics case for the freest possible flows of international trade holds that, whatever losses may be suffered by individual parts of the economy and their workers, overall national (and global) wealth will grow – and that that’s an unmistakable good. A logical follow-on is also important: Since overall wealth increases, so does the capacity to compensate those who have lost out from trade expansion.

True, this compensation may not be dispensed. But don’t blame greater trade, most economists would insist (with not inconsiderable justification). Instead, blame national political systems or societies that fail to take advantage.

Let’s assume all these claims for the economic case (as opposed to the longstanding national security or emerging health security cases) for free trade are true. It’s noteworthy, then, that it looks like they’ve been blown out of the water by the almost certain impact of the CCP Virus emergency on the U.S. economy. At least there’s now an impressive case that trade expansion with China, anyway, has started reducing the nation’s GDP (gross domestic product – the standard measure of the economy’s size).

After all, the virus originally broke out in China, and spread to the United States because of the mushrooming of economic ties between the two countries that freer trade and commerce with the People’s Republic has produced. Some might counter that virus impact has nothing to do with trade expansion with China per se, and instead is due to the disease itself. But given the evidence that China is pandemic prone (arguably because of safety and hygiene standards that remain dreadful throughout the country despite its phenomenal recent economic progress, along with its regime’s obsession with secrecy), and the related likelihood that this problem won’t go away, it’s getting harder and harder to argue that the bilateral trade and investment boom and pandemic threats have nothing to do with each others. In other words, it’s at least reasonable to contend that rising pandemic threats have been an integral feature of freer trade and broader commerce with China.

For some specific numbers (uncertain as they inevitably remain), let’s look at a recent examination of the CCP Virus’ likely economic impact from the investment research and analysis firm Morningstar. Its take on the subject is worth highlighting because it’s the most bullish I’ve seen,

According to Morningstar, the virus’ spread as such is going to reduce the U.S. economy’s size by five percent this year in inflation-adjusted terms (the most closely followed GDP figures). That would amount to a loss of nearly $954 billion. The firm doesn’t explicitly quantify the long-term hit to the U.S. economy. But based on its assessment of the long- and short-term tolls on the global economy, and its belief that these short-term losses in percentage terms will be about half those for the United States itself, it appears that Morningstar expects the inflation-adjusted GDP losses to be some two percent. Using 2019 as the pre-virus baseline, that adds up to $381.46 billion during the (unspecified) first year of long-term effects. But since the economy would be in growth mode by then (although from a lower starting point), the yearly losses in absolute terms would grow each year, since they would represent some two percent of an ever larger pie as long as they lasted.

And remember – these forecasts are on the optimistic end. Another financial firm, Goldman Sachs, anticipates that this year, real U.S. GDP will plunge by as much as 3.8 percent this year. If correct, the national output shrinkage would be nearly $725 billion. (Unlike Morningstar, Goldman doesn’t isolate the specific CCP Virus share of these losses, but if its methodology is comparable, it could top $1 trillion.)

So those are (admittedly ballpark) figures for China trade-related losses for the whole economy. Have the claimed or estimated economic gains been greater? Not even close.

During the late-1990s, when it appeared likely that China would enter the World Trade Organization (WTO), and therefore trigger a surge in its trade with the United States and the entire world, Congress asked the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) to model the economic effects of the kinds of major tariff cuts to which China would agree. In its 1999 report, the Commission forecast a “minor” lift to real GDP – meaning an ongoing boost of less than 0.05 percent annually on an ongoing basis.

In 1999, that would’ve meant a $63 billion constant dollar GDP gain for the first year following China’s entry

To be sure, the USITC also tried to estimate the impact of the elimination of the multitude of non-tariff barriers China has long thrown up to the outside world – rules and regulations, often developed and carried out in secret, that can block or slow the growth of imports more effectively than tariffs. The Commission’s findings suggested that success on this crucial front – also predicted by supporters of China’s WTO entry – would double the U.S. GDP gains produced by expected tariff cuts. If correct, the ongoing American yearly output increase would be 0.10 percent of after-inflation GDP, or $126 billion, in the first year after these reforms were made.

Because of subsequent GDP growth, these annual gains would increase in absolute terms, and over the nearly two decades between China’s year-end 2001 WTO entry and today, could easily total trillions annually.

But many of these China tariff and especially China non-tariff barrier promises are still unkept, as even the Obama administration – a strong supporter of U.S. participation in the WTO – admitted in its final report to Congress on the subject. Maybe that’s why the private economic research firm Oxford Economics (in a study for the U.S.-China Business Council, a major pillar of the U.S. corporate Offshoring Lobby) pegged the annual GDP gains of U.S. business with China at $216 billion as of early 2017. That’s not much of a compounding gain.

Moreover, consistent with Offshoring Lobby practices, the Oxford report completely ignores the economic impact of U.S. imports from China – which have greatly exceeded exports for decades. And since China’s WTO entry through last year, the growth of the goods trade deficit has been a vigorous 235.36 percent. Nor did I see anything in its study about China’s massive theft of U.S.-owned intellectual property. Estimates vary, but even these China pollyannas admit it could amount to $600 billion each year. 

As with pandemics, you could argue that intellectual property theft’s growth isn’t a built-in feature of trade with China or any other country.  But since China has been far more theft-prone than it’s been pandemic-prone, and since its thieving ways were well known to Washington as WTO entry was being orchestrated, these costs clearly belong in the “costs of free trade” category – at least with China.      

Finally, of course, these purely economic arguments for free trade overlook non-economic arguments for trade curbs and national self-sufficiency that have always been compelling and that the virus outbreak has now turned into slam-dunk winners. Think “national security” and “healthcare security” – unless you’re thrilled with America’s current dependence on foreign sources of vital medicines, their building blocks, and medical devices.

Predictions understandably are abounding the the CCP Virus emergency will change some lasting behaviors and ideas nationally and globally. If the above, arguably realistic, view of the economic case is correct, free trade practice and ideology belong near the top of this list.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Now What in the U.S.-China Trade War?

Tags

agriculture, allies, China, decoupling, Democrats, election 2020, forced technology transfer, Hong Kong, Huawei, impeachment, intellectual property theft, National Basketball Association, Phase One, Steven Mnuchin, subsidies, supply chains, Taiwan, tariffs, Trade, trade talks, Uighurs, verification, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This is the second working day since the United States and China reached what the Trump administration is calling a “Phase One” trade deal with Beijing last Friday, and the questions surrounding the agreement still far outweigh what’s known. That alone should tell you that towering obstacles continue blocking any confident assessment of where the President’s so-called trade war stands, much less where the conflict is likely to go. Even so, here are some observations I hope are useful.  (Teaser:  One major point concerns tonight’s Democratic presidential candidates debate.)

First, the absence of any written statements or documents from the U.S. side describing or even summarizing what’s actually in the agreement justifies big doubts that anything deserving the term “deal” has been reached at all. Further reinforcing legitimate skepticism is China’s long record of broken promises on trade.

Second, especially strong skepticism is warranted about U.S. claims that any meaningful progress has been made on the so-called structural issues focused on from the very beginning by the Trump administration. For it as I’ve long argued, China’s government is so vast and secretive, and leaves such scanty written records of key decisions, that it will simply be impossible for the United States to monitor and enforce even the most promising Chinese commitments on intellectual property theft, technology extortion, discriminatory Chinese government procurement, and Beijing subsidies that shaft U.S.-owned and other foreign businesses vis-a-vis their Chinese rivals.

Third, even if China currently means to keep its alleged promises to binge buy American agricultural products, any number of external events could upset the apple cart. They include the Hong Kong picture becoming uglier (its becoming prettier can’t be totally ruled out, but seems highly unlikely); new Chinese crackdowns on other protests that may emerge (especially among the Uighur Muslim population) or revelations of new Chinese atrocities against the Uighurs or other minorities or other protesters; more attempted Chinese bullying of high-profile U.S. businesses like the National Basketball Association; a major flare-up of tensions over Taiwan or China’s aggressive moves in the South China Sea; a step forward in the Huawei case that increases the chances that the CFO daughter of the founder of this Chinese telecommunications giant will be extradited to the United States from Canada for sanctions-busting; and Chinese moves that persuade Washington that Beijing has no intention of keeping its perceived agriculture or other promises.

Moreover, the longer China takes to ramp up its buys from American farmers, the greater the potential for these kinds of shocks to bring this “Phase One” agreement crashing down.

Fourth, the less impressive the “mini-deal” keeps looking, the more convincing my view that its apparent modesty reflects President Trump’s belief that his domestic political position has weakened significantly – both because of the new impeachment threat and signs of an economic slowdown.

It’s true that Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin has suggested that if the deal hasn’t been finalized by December 15, the Trump administration will go ahead with a previously vowed 15 percent increase on $156 billion worth of levies on Chinese imports. But that’s anything but a concrete threat. In addition, it’s important to note this report suggesting (the specifics are really sloppily described) that China wants the sequencing to work in the opposite way:  First, tariffs get rolled back (or frozen in place?), then the agriculture buys begin. 

Moreover, no one in the administration has said anything about reversing its Phase One-related decision to suspend a big tariff increase (to up to a formidable 30 percent on some products) previously announced to begin on October 15. So even though U.S. duties on some $360 billion worth of Chinese goods would still remain in place if China blows Mr. Trump off, there’s a real chance that Beijing won’t incur any further punishment – doubtless because the President believes that tariffs above and beyond current levels and coverage could panic investors again and further soften economic growth.

Some kind of blow-up in Hong Kong or elsewhere could yet change Mr. Trump’s calculations. But the more important point so far is that events, not the President, are now in charge of the trade talks track of his China policy.

Fifth, at the same time, none of the above means that the United States is devoid of leverage versus China and in particular the kind of clout that can keep advancing its economic as well as closely related technology and national security interests, and this is where a second, arguably more important, track of the Trump China policies needs to be remembered. As I’ve written, the President has sought not only to end the threat of China’s economic predation by forcing Chinese policy changes through tariff pressure. Although he rarely speaks of it, he’s also been trying to repel Chinese threats to U.S. security and prosperity through a series of unilateral measures aimed at decoupling the United States from China economically.

By crimping trade, investment, and technology flows, these decoupling steps are reducing America’s vulnerability to China by significantly reducing the access to the U.S. market so crucial to the success of China’s advanced industries; by shrinking the footprint of China’s state-controlled economy in America’s largely free market system; and by cutting off a Chinese tech sector that could be become highly dangerous from critical supplies of U.S. components.

Decoupling has also been advanced by those tariffs so far imposed on $360 billion worth of Chinese products (amounting to nearly 86 percent of all goods imports from China last year). They haven’t done much to achieve their stated aim of improving China’s behavior, but they have decreased China’s importance to the U.S. economy by prompting an exodus of global manufacturing supply chains out of the People’s Republic.

Further, the Trump decoupling campaign has also helped awaken many foreign governments to the China tech and broader economic threat – though because so many other countries (including major American treaty allies), were profiting so handsomely from the pre-Trump globalization status quo, progress on this front has been uneven and disappointing. (See here for why Germany, for example is so conflicted.) 

Sixth and finally, one major set of actors in this drama, though, hasn’t been very woke on China issues:  most of the Democratic presidential candidates. Sure, many have supported a policy of “doing something” on China (though rarely involving tariffs – or any other concrete measures). But so far, none seems to view China’s multi-dimensional challenge to America as a major concern – and all the top-tier contenders and most others now support impeaching the President. 

Consequently, they could greatly strengthen not only Mr. Trump’s position, but the American position, with firm declarations in tonight’s debate that China will stay squarely in Washington’s cross-hairs if they win the White House, and that therefore there’s no point in stonewalling in hopes of easier post-2020 U.S. policies. Not that any confidence looks well founded that any of them will.        

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Trump Should Have Hung Tough with China

Tags

Applied Materials, ASM Lithography, Bloomberg, Bloomberg.com, China, electronics, forced technology transfer, Fujian Jinhua, G20 Summit, information technology hardware, intellectual property theft, KLA-Tencor, Lam Research, Made in China 2025, Micron Technology, Netherlands, semiconductors, Taiwan, technology, Trade, trade war, Trump, United Microelectronics Corporation, Xi JInPing, ZTE, {What's Left of) Our Economy

A U.S.-China summit on the sidelines of the global economic conference in Buenos Aires has produced what amounts to a three-month truce in the trade conflict the two countries have been waging since the early months of the Trump administration. I’ll have a detailed reaction coming out in a major newspaper op-ed piece tomorrow, so I don’t want to steal my own thunder here.

For now, it’s worth spotlighting a recent Bloomberg.com piece on America’s latest efforts to fight China’s intellectual property theft, and the dangerous progress and ambitions it’s been largely fueling. It’s so good, and so important, that it illustrates exactly why the President should have hung tough in his China trade diplomacy – and how much more thoroughly America’s China policies need overhauling before they can adequately serve U.S. national interests than even the Trump administration has been indicating.

Just to review, the Trump administration has imposed several rounds of tariffs on literally hundreds of billions of Chinese products typically headed for the American market, largely in response to China’s newly explicit ambition to achieve worldwide technological supremacy – and in the process become the world’s strongest economy and military power.

This Chinese goal – made clear in a program called Made in China 2025 – is anything but entirely new. Indeed, much of the blueprint has been in effect literally for many years, and certainly once Chinese leaders realized that the United States, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Western Europe seemed happy enough to foster their country’s economic development by supplying in various ways the knowhow to make major tech catch-up a realistic goal. So China has long sought to secure such technology as fast as possible, by whatever means were needed – including those that violated various trade commitments it had made.

In the last few years, however, China’s often startling resulting advances, its reversion to a national economic strategy ever more reliant on government dictates and strong-arming and discriminating against foreign investors, and its mounting belligerence in world affairs, have woken up even many pillars of America’s free trade-happy establishment to the threat they’d been creating. And crucially, the crestfallen included many of the very companies that were handing over their crown jewels to China, along with the politicians and think tank shills they funded.

The Bloomberg article is so valuable because in one fell swoop, it illustrates how deeply involved American companies have been involved – and remain – in strengthening China’s tech capabilities, how consequently vulnerable China remains to American inputs of various kinds, and therefore why there is absolutely no reason for the Trump administration to relieve its tariffs’ pressures on China’s economy without major – and completely verifiable – concessions from Beijing.

In the piece, a team of Bloomberg reporters make all these points with a detailed account of a Chinese (government-supported, of course) entity that sought to produce advanced versions of critical pieces of the semiconductors used in smartphones. The explicit goal: Reduce the Chinese electronics’ industry’s dependence on foreign semiconductors.

That objective per se is highly objectionable – that is, for anyone who takes seriously the supposed main purpose of the global trade system, which is to foster the most efficient possible global division of labor by freeing up trade flows to ensure that the output and provision of various products and services is concentrated in those countries that do these jobs best. But defenders of the global trade status quo never seemed to notice that China demonstrated no interest in passively accepting the verdict of market forces.

In fact, as the Bloomberg team makes clear, American technology companies have been all too ready to aid this Chinese ambition, even with Beijing’s ambitions ringing more and more alarm bells. Specifically, this Chinese entity (as usual, I refuse to call these outfits “companies” or “businesses” because Beijing’s effective control over them sharply distinguishes them from groupings in largely free market economy that actually deserve those labels), was being supplied by U.S. semiconductor manufacturing equipment firms KLA-Tencor, Applied Materials, and Lam Research – along with foreign counterparts like the Netherlands’ ASM Lithography and Taiwan’s United Microelectronics Corp.

But at the end of October, the U.S. government placed the Chinese entity – called Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuits – on a list of economic actors whose operations are just to pose “significant risk of becoming involved in activities that are contrary to the national interest of the United States.” Several days later, Washington also indicted the entity for stealing the intellectual property of American semiconductor firm Micron Technology of stealing its intellectual property. As a result of the national security finding, American companies are in effect prohibited from supplying Fujian Jinhua. And since Fujian’s non-U.S. suppliers sell it goods that contain American-made parts, the restrictions cover them, too.

The result of the ban announcement? According to the Bloomberg article, Fujian Jinhua’s “dream is now in tatters with consultants from American suppliers gone, the factories silent and workers rattled.” And lest you think this is just one anecdote, recall that a similar American export ban on selling to Chinese telecommunications manufacturer ZTE would have doomed that entity had President Trump not let it off the hook in hopes of currying some valuable favor and negotiating leverage (so far, in vain) with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

In other words, the United States enjoys decisive leverage over China in the struggle for technological, economic, and military power, and should continue ramping it up to extract whatever concessions it can get from Beijing. In this vein, it’s as shocking as it is disturbing that U.S. tech firms like those mentioned above are still allowed to contribute to China’s technological development months after the Trump administration has literally designated China as a power (along with Russia) that is challenging “American power, influence, and interests, [and] attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” Further, the same national security strategy document declared, more specifically, that “Part of China’s military modernization and economic expansion is due to its access to the U.S. innovation economy, including America’s world-class universities.”

But more important, as I’ve written, since verifiable concessions are so unlikely, this pressure should form one major element of a larger strategy that to disengage America from China economically, and this goal, and the stakes that justify it, should be declared by President Trump soon after his return from Buenos Aires.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The August U.S. Trade Report – All Soybeans Edition!

Tags

agriculture, Census Bureau, China, exports, farming, intellectual property theft, soybeans, tech, Trade, trade war, Trump, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. International Trade Commission, USDA, USITC, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This belated report on last Friday’s U.S. trade figures (for August) focuses on soybeans for what should be glaringly obvious reasons. They make up by far the most important sector of the American economy, and any President, like Donald Trump, who risks its well-being for a trifling objective like preventing China’s domination of the world’s industries of the future – via rampant intellectual property theft, extortion, and other predatory practices – must have rocks in his head.

OK, I’m now pulling my tongue from my cheek. But given the massive coverage of U.S. soybean farmers’ woes resulting from Chinese retaliatory tariffs that are ruining their sales in their biggest foreign market by far, it seems appropriate to see what the numbers say. Especially because so far, they’re showing nothing close to a trade-led Soy-Mageddon for American growers.

The latest Census report pegs the August year-to-date current dollar soybeans exports increase at a robust 39.16 percent (from $13.10 billion to $18.75 billion). I’d like to provide the comps for the previous years, but they don’t seem to be terribly consistent with each other.

This rapid growth could well reflect the export front-loading in advance of expected tariffs that’s been widely reported. (For a compelling contrarian view, see here.) As a result, it could disappear completely, or even shift into reverse during the rest of the year. But if soybeans exports do tank between now and year-end, no one would be more surprised than the analysts at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). They keep raising their full-year 2018 export forecasts (measured in quantity, not value, terms). So why are prices so weak? Largely because even though they professed to be worried about China tariffs, America’s farmers just kept planting ever more soybeans. And planting. And planting. In fact, this year’s harvest is expected to be the biggest ever.

And speaking of the Agriculture Department, the soybeans story doesn’t end with the Census reports data. Why not? Because they differ dramatically from those calculable from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s (USITC) interactive Trade Dataweb search engine. And since the USITC statistics are the ones used by USDA, they’re worth looking at, too.

These year-to-date figures only go up to July so far, but they don’t point to any tariffs-led Soy-Mageddon, either. As with the Census data, the numbers are in current dollars, and rates of change are to their right:

2016:  $10.062 billion (+25.67 percent)

2017:  $9.076 billion (-10.86 percent)

2018:  $8.452 billion (-6.87 percent)

So yes, soybeans exports are down this year, according to the USITC. But they fell during the same period last year too – at a faster rate, even though no China tariffs or threats thereof were on the horizon. Moreover, prices this year have been falling faster than in years past for various reasons – including the actual and threatened tariffs, but as made clear above, not solely because of them.

As mentioned, these USITC figures don’t adjust for these changing prices. But the Commission helpfully provides quantity numbers as well. Here they are for the same seven-month time period, in metric tons, along with the percentage changes:

2016:  20,113 (+9.96 percent)

2017:  22,366 (+11.20 percent)

2018:  24,635 (+10.14 percent)

That is, adjusted for falling prices, soybeans exports have been rising a little more slowly this year than last, but faster than in 2016. And the rates of increase haven’t changed markedly. 

Farming is a tough business, and with a genuine U.S.-China trade war having broken out, with no end in sight, no one can legitimately blame American soybean producers for feeling nervous about the fallout.  But the evidence keeps getting clearer and clearer that, even in the mixed U.S. economy, supply and demand still play a big role in determining prices, and that soybean growers jacked up the supply enormously in recent years. If they want to get out of their current fix, they’d do well to stop complaining so much about the Trump tariffs and start getting that message.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: With Allies Like These….

Tags

allies, Asia, auto tariffs, China, Europe, Germany, intellectual property theft, Japan, Robert J. Samuelson, South Korea, steel tariffs, tariffs, The Washington Post, Trade, Trump, value-added taxes, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Nationally syndicated Washington Post columnist Robert J. Samuelson intended this week’s essay to show how foolish, and possibly disastrous, President Trump’s emerging new trade policy will be – including for the national security goals the administration has set. That’s why it’s so ironic that his column instead unwittingly revealed how thin a reed the nation’s long-time security strategy has been, and nowhere more so than in the importance it’s assigned to its long-time security alliances in Europe and Asia.

Samuelson’s piece conveys a warning that the administration’s trade policy moves so far are on course to undermine national security in two related ways: by ignoring the alleged imperative of enlisting its major allies in a multilateral campaign to discipline predatory Chinese intellectual property and related trade and industrial policies that need curbing; and by actually antagonizing these countries and thereby jeopardizing the very existence of those alliances.

This argument conveniently overlooks several big trade and security fundamentals. First, globalist pre-Trump American leaders themselves have insisted that they’ve long tried to create multilateral pressure on China’s rogue economic behavior for years before Mr. Trump became president – though it’s unclear how serious these efforts were. For example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal largely touted by the Obama administration for its potential to curb China’s influence contained a back door for numerous imports with major levels of Chinese content.

Second, it’s anything but obvious that U.S. alliances strengthen American security on net. As I’ve pointed out frequently (including this past week), they continue to expose the American homeland to the risk of nuclear attack even though the Soviet-style kinds of global threats their nuclear guarantees were intended to counter have been (literally) gone for nearly three decades. Moreover, as has been widely reported, the militaries of many of these allies have deteriorated so markedly that their potential as force multipliers for the United States is open to serious doubt.

But Samuelson’s analysis makes no sense even if these considerations are put aside. The key is in his own portrayal of leading U.S. allies – which he describes as livid about recent American steel tariffs, and sure to become even angrier is levies are imposed on their motor vehicle exports to the United States. Indeed, he worries, major auto-exporting countries like Germany, Japan, and South Korea could well become so upset with the United States that they not only retaliate in kind, but unhesitatingly move to supply China with whatever high tech goods and services Washington embargoes or restricts.

In other words, these allies would redouble their efforts to feed the Chinese beast even though all of them face China trade, technology, and/or national security threats of their own, and even though the United States continues to provide them with crucial military protection – including, in the case of Japan and South Korea, from Chinese designs. But these same allies were supposed to be amenable to cooperating with Washington to deal with China? Even more revealing, the allies would choose to intensify confrontation with the United States instead of (finally) proposing concrete steps to deal with the China problem over which they profess concern.

And they would display no interest whatever in meaningfully removing the formidable obstacles they have created to block American automotive exports. (The recently reported German auto-makers’ proposal to eliminate all tariffs in the sector on both sides of the Atlantic would leave in place towering European value-added taxes – e.g., 19 percent in Germany – on motor vehicles and most other imports. No such U.S. equivalent exists either for autos or for light trucks and sport utility vehicles.)

No one can fault these European and East Asian countries from acting in their own perceived interests – or even for trying to have their cake and eat it, too. Indeed, for decades, globalist American foreign policies have encouraged and actively enabled precisely this kind of free-riding. What these countries should be faulted for is posing as allies (let alone allies with justifiably hurt feelings), and worse, as paragons of sobriety and free market values nobly resisting a wrecking ball of an American President. As for any Americans and U.S. leaders who keep fooled by this act for so long and, more important, failing to take the policy hints – shame on them.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: On Those Latest Trump Tariffs

Tags

aluminum, border adjustment tax, China, European Union, FDI, foreign direct investment, intellectual property theft, Made in China 2025, metals, overcapacity, steel, subsidies, tariffs, tax reform, Trade, Trump, value-added tax, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Never let a good set of talking points go to waste! Earlier this morning, one of the broadcast networks asked if I was available for a segment on the latest Trump administration tariff announcements, and wanted to get an idea of where I came down. Even as I was typing up the following, though, I was told that the plan had changed, and that the program in question had decided to go with a Member of Congress instead.

Yet since they’re still relevant to this latest phase of U.S. trade policy, I thought you might find them useful in this slightly edited form.

1.  If the Europeans and other major economies retaliate vs the new U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs, they’ll make clear their indifference to the government-subsidized Chinese output has flooded global markets with both these metals, and seriously distorted trade flows.  In recent years, these foreign governments have paid lip service to the need to curb Chinese overcapacity, but many have enabled it by transshipping Chinese metals (mainly steel) to the US market or stepping up their own exports to the US to relieve the pressure China has put on their own producers.

2.  As a result, (as I’ve previously documented) during the current global economic recovery, the US is the only major steel producing country that has seen its share of world output fall significantly. 

3. Moreover, (as I’ve also shown), the higher input costs resulting from the new metals and other tariffs pale beside the benefits recently received by U.S.-based businesses (including metals users) due to tax reform and regulatory relief.

4. Re both the steel and China tariffs, I wish that Trump had backed a superior alternative:  the Border Adjustment Tax contained in the original version of the House GOP tax bill.

The BAT would have functioned like a value-added tax (a levy imposed by virtually every other country) — imposing a tax on imports heading for the U.S. market, and providing a subsidy for U.S. exports.  Since the BAT would have been across-the-board, no U.S. industry (e.g., metals-using manufacturers) could have argued that it was going to be disadvantaged because its products would have received the same benefits.

Moreover, the BAT was backed not only by House GOP leaders with staunch pro-free trade records.  It was also supported by many major multinational manufacturers.  In addition, it would have been perfectly legal under the WTO, since it so closely resembles the value-added taxes so many other countries have had in place for decades.  But President Trump – for reasons that remain unclear – never came on board.

5. In the absence of the BAT, though, the metals tariffs are essential for correcting major distortions in global trade flows caused by Chinese overcapacity, and the China-specific tariffs are essential for offsetting the impact of Chinese trade predation (including rampant intellectual property theft and extortion) on high tech industries, exemplified by the “Made in China 2025” program.

6. Nonetheless, re China specifically, I have criticized some of the Trump response as being internally inconsistent.  If for example the United States convinces the Chinese to treat U.S. companies operating in China more equitably, U.S. corporate investment in the PRC could well increase, and the trade deficit that Mr. Trump wants to shrink is likely to grow, as much US investment in China creates products exported to the US.

7. More generally, I’m deeply skeptical that any Chinese promises to halt or reduce these forms of protectionism can be verified — because the Chinese bureaucracy operates so secretively, the Chinese national manufacturing complex is so vast, and because the United States will never be able to send over to China enough officials to monitor compliance effectively.

8. As a result, rather than seeking to improve Chinese behavior, I believe U.S. policy toward the PRC should aim first and foremost to reduce the extensive linkages between the two economies.  In this vein, ever more sweeping U.S. moves and proposals to curb Chinese direct investment in key industries in America is a good first step.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trump’s China Trade Deal May be Even Worse Than it Looks

Tags

China, Financial Times, intellectual property, intellectual property theft, Lucy Hornby, Made in China 2025, manufacturing, national security, subsidies, tech transfer, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

So much is so obviously wrong so far with the trade agreement just reached by the Trump administration and China that even Mainstream Media reporters have correctly identified many major flaws. As the joint statement released by the U.S. and Chinese governments made embarrassingly clear, Beijing has not made a single commitment that’s comprised of any specifics, that creates any time-frames for compliance, or that entails any penalties for non-compliance (although the United States considers the tariffs threatened to punish China for intellectual property theft to have only been “suspended”).

Despite the importance placed by almost everyone involved in America’s China policy inside or outside the government on doing something about that intellectual property theft, and about the Made in China 2025 program aimed at creating Chinese global dominance in numerous high tech industries crucial to prosperity and national security, Beijing pledged exactly nothing concrete on the former, and the only possible reference to the latter was a pledge by both countries “to strive to create a fair, level playing field for competition.”

And the sectoral priorities were discouraging from a U.S. standpoint – at least if you believe (as you should) that manufacturing actually or potentially creates outsized economic (not to mention national security) benefits for the nation in terms of productivity growth, jobs and output multipliers, and capital and technological intensiveness. For whereas “Both sides agreed on meaningful increases in United States agriculture and energy exports,” they simply “discussed expanding trade in manufactured goods and services.”

Possibly worse still: For all the references to “[working] out the details” and “[continuing] to engage at high levels on these issues,” the economic engagement between the two countries is not even being called a “negotiation.” Instead, it’s been termed a “consultation.”

But perhaps most troubling of all about the Trump approach is that even if the President’s core aims remained intact, and tariffs were imposed in order to halt China’s intellectual property theft, combat the Made in China 2025 program, and slash the trade imbalance, it’s unclear at best how effective they would be.

Leave aside the question of whether President Trump could convince affected chunks of the American economy ranging from agriculture to high tech to support any tariffs, and accept any short-term costs and disruptions in order to achieve China trade-related goals that all these industries consider crucially important. In the case of intellectual property and China 2025, how would Beijing’s concessions, or even outright capitulation, be measured? And what difference would actually be made?

For instance, would the tech companies whose knowhow is being stolen or extorted (via threats to cut off their access to the Chinese market if they don’t cooperate) really start pointing publicly to ongoing Chinese transgressions, after decades of lying low and hoping against all reason that the problem would simply go away or at least not worsen?

Even if they did grow spines and/or believe that the Trump or successor administrations would back them up by imposing prompt and severe punishments, would these companies suddenly become more careful about the technology that they transfer voluntarily? That sounds far-fetched because it would involve these firms backing away substantially from their longstanding strategy of supplying the world with their increasingly sophisticated products and services from China – and sacrificing the immense sunk costs they have already incurred in developing the Chinese supply chains needed to accomplish this goal.

Acquiring cutting edge intellectual property by hook or by crook is also central to the Made in China 2025 program. However unlikely in practice, smart and tough enough U.S. policies can in principle overcome the above obstacles to halting tech theft and extortion. But what about another aspect of this Chinese program – massive government subsidies for the industries involved? Is it the slightest bit realistic to believe that Washington will even be able to track these funds as they make their way from China’s secretive bureaucracies to its equally opaque production entities (which don’t really deserve to be called “companies” or “businesses” because they’re all to varying degrees arms of the state)? How on earth would that work? And when has the United States succeeded in halting subsidization in other Asian countries where the government’s role is equally pervasive?

Moreover, as the Financial Times‘ Lucy Hornby has just pointed out, ending yet another objectionable feature of the Made in China 2025 program – strong preferences for Chinese participants and various forms of harassment and discrimination for their foreign-owned rivals – would kneecap two other major and related Trump administration China goals: reducing the bilateral trade deficit and curbing the offshoring of American production and jobs to the PRC.

For if China becomes an easier place to do business, U.S.- and other foreign-owned multinationals would become that much more likely to use China as their global production bases.

President Trump correctly understood that a critical mass of U.S. voters were fed up with his predecessors’ Offshoring Lobby-dominated China policies and hankering for a strategy that put domestic production and employment first. He was also right in insisting that such a course change would strengthen the nation’s long run economy and its national security. But the latest trade agreement he’s reached with China, however tentative, makes painfully clear either that the President and his main advisers don’t yet know how to achieve these vital goals, or that he hasn’t yet been able to choose between competing approaches with which he’s been presented.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trump Tariffs Evoke Summers Snake Oil

Tags

Al Gore, China, Clinton administration, current account surplus, Emergency Committee for American Trade, exports, FDI, Financial Times, forced technology transfer, foreign direct investment, General Motors, intellectual property theft, Larry Summers, Obama administration, offshoring lobby, tariffs, Trade Deficits, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Larry Summers doesn’t like President Trump’s China trade policies – that’s not news. After all, he served in senior economic policy posts both in the Clinton administration, which proudly championed expanded trade with China and laid the groundwork for the PRC’s entry into the World Trade Organization, and in the Obama administration, which less proudly but nonetheless effectively coddled much of the Chinese trade predation (including intellectual property theft) that even most globalization cheerleaders now admit is a major problem.

Newsier are two arguments Summers made yesterday in the Financial Times that indicate how dishonest years of justification of the China trade policies by globalist U.S. administrations have been, and how clueless they remain.

The dishonesty entails Summers’ dismissive treatment of China’s intellectual property “extraction” (as he calls what is usually and rightly recognized as “extortion”) from U.S. and other foreign companies that are forced by Chinese policy into joint venture partnerships with Chinese entities. According to Summers, this form of theft is no big deal for Americans because these episodes

“typically involve cases where the company in question produces for China in China and so have little impact on US employment. In many cases a substantial number of the company’s shareholders are foreign and it pays taxes to many governments. It is more than a little ironic that an administration that condemns outsourcing should make standing up for those who move production to China so central a priority.”

As should be clear to anyone who has followed U.S. trade policy toward China and other offshoring-friendly countries, that’s a heckuva way to describe the outbound American investment that’s been encouraged by the trade deals and related policy decisions enthusiastically supported by Summers and his White House bosses.

For especially during the Clinton years, when so many of these policies were put in place, the construction of American-owned factories, labs, and similar facilities in China was depicted not as activity that would substitute for American exports, or for U.S.-based production (in the form of goods shipped from these factories to the U.S. market), but as activity that would benefit the domestic American economy and its workers by supercharging U.S. exports – which would comprise much of the content of these foreign-made products.

Here’s a typical example from a 1998 report by the (Offshoring Lobby-funded) Emergency Committee for American Trade:

“American companies with global operations ship the large majority — between 60 percent and 75 percent — of total U.S. exports. Their foreign affiliates are important recipients of these exports; their share has increased to over 40 percent today.”

And let’s not forget one of the showcase examples of such Clinton-era investments – General Motors’ 1997 agreement with a Shanghai-run entity to produce autos in China. GM gushed that the joint venture would generate billions in American auto parts exports to China, and the importance attached by the Clinton administration to such deals was made clear by the decision to send Vice President Gore to the PRC to attend the signing ceremony. (Neither GM Chairman John Smith nor Gore mentioned that the agreement’s provisions mandated that the factory achieve 80 percent Chinese content levels within five years.)

Now, according to Summers, these joint ventures don’t significantly benefit the American domestic economy at all. Of course, there’s still the matter of how this Chinese tech theft – including from world-leading U.S. companies in cutting edge industries – will affect America’s innovation and technology futures. But these critical issues don’t seem to be on Summers’ screen.

The author’s cluelessness is evident from his insistence that

“it is wrong to say nothing has been achieved through negotiation with China. Only a few years ago, China’s current account surplus was the largest relative to GDP among significant countries….Today China’s global surpluses are far below past US negotiating targets of a few years ago….”

Here’s the (glaringly obvious) problem. During the current economic recovery, China’s total trade surplus with the United States (including its services deficit) jumped by 75 percent – from $219.47 billion in 2009 to $385 billion in 2016 (the last year for which such figures are available). Can a piece from Summers expressing his astonishment that so many U.S. voters opted in 2016 for a candidate promising to look after “America First” be far behind?

Im-Politic: Trump’s On-Target – & Detailed – China Trade Plan

Tags

2016 election, China, currency manipulation, Democrats, Donald Trump, environmental standards, exports, forced technology transfer, Hillary Clinton, Im-Politic, imports, intellectual property theft, labor standards, Mainstream Media, Obama, offshoring, political classes, Republicans, special interests, subsidies, think tanks, TPP, Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership, World Trade Organization, WTO, yuan

Boy, it’s hard to keep Donald Trump and his campaign for the GOP presidential nomination from dominating my posting. That’s because he remains the only presidential candidate recognizing the need to overhaul both the U.S. trade and immigration policies that have long been gutting the truly productive sectors of the American economy, and kneecapping wages and living standards for the nation’s working and middle classes.

Trump’s on-target priorities have once again been displayed in the new position paper he’s released on handling China – which is key to getting overall American trade policy right as well as getting much of U.S. national security policy right. Also evident from this paper – despite endless claims by the establishment-coddling Mainstream Media that Trump’s campaign is all sizzle and no steak, he’s once again outlined a series of impressively detailed policy positions.

And Trump’s China policies boast strong potential to put Hillary Clinton and other progressives who claim to champion American workers squarely on the spot. The Democratic presidential front-runner has said or posted nothing comparably specific on trade issues other than (for now?) opposing President Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Unless she ups this part of her game, independent voters are sure to take note.

Trump’s China plan starts off by correctly identifying the crux of America’s China problems right away. In the process, he’s sharpened his rhetoric and message. Rather than blame U.S. policy failures on simple “stupidity” on the part of American leaders, he points out that the nation’s economic approach to China has served the interests of “Wall Street insiders that want to move U.S. manufacturing and investment offshore,” not American workers. I’d have broadened that indictment to include most of the nation’s multinational manufacturing companies, but Trump valuably reminds voters that the biggest immediate obstacles to improving their economic prospects are Americans, not “foreigners.”

Trump also understands that many of China’s most harmful trade practices have nothing to do with the kinds of tariffs and quotas that for centuries dominated country’s efforts to keep domestic closed. Moreover, he focuses on the vast array of non-tariff barriers used by Beijing “to keep American companies out of China and to tilt the playing field in [its] favor.” These range from currency manipulation to rampant intellectual property theft to exports subsidies that clash with global trade law to forced technology transfer to “lax labor and environmental standards” that enable China’s “sweatshops [and] pollution havens [to steal] jobs from American workers.”

In addition, the Republican presidential hopeful gets the vital point that the damage done to the American economy by these Chinese practices can’t be ended without forcing China to face some consequences – namely, lost access to a U.S. market that China desperately needs in order to sustain growth and employment rates that can help keep its rulers in power. Trump does express some hope that such threats can lead China to “join the 21^st century.” But he also indicates that, until and unless this goal is achieved, it makes no sense to permit China “to trade with America.”

Trump’s China plan will be slammed by the offshoring-happy, China-coddling Mainstream Media – and surely by nearly all of the policy hacks staffing America’s offshorer-funded think tanks. And let’s not forget many of his fellow Republican candidates, whose campaigns are largely financed by these special interests.

But it will be especially interesting to see the reactions of Trump’s Democratic opponents and the rest of the nation’s liberal and progressive establishment. For most of Trump’s positions mirror those of the party’s mainstream – and can be found in numerous bills their legislators have introduced into Congress and voted for. Will they continue dismissing Trump a charlatan – and worse?

In fact, if Trump’s positions deserve criticism on any score, it’s that they’re too mainstream – and accordingly timid. For example, since, as Trump sees, the United States does enjoy such decisive leverage over China by dint of serving as “the world’s most important economy and consumer of goods,” there’s relatively little need for Washington to negotiate more effectively with Beijing. His positions are better presented as take-it-or-leave-it propositions, with market access turned off, or at least curbed, until strong evidence of China’s compliance is available.

Similarly, Trump is far too deferential to the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose creation spearheaded by the mercantile U.S. trade competitors and American offshoring interests precisely in order to prevent the defense of  U.S. economic interests in a timely, effective – i.e., unilateral – manner. At one point, his China paper (rightly) suggests that U.S. policy need not rely so heavily on the deliberations of “an international body.”

But he also (wrongly) suggests that Washington should continue to rely heavily on using the WTO to resolve its trade problems with China – an approach that is not only pitifully piecemeal, but that keeps an anti-American international kangaroo court in charge of most American international economic interests. If he’s serious about defending these interests – and restoring full American sovereignty – Trump needs to support establishing the United States as judge, jury, and court of appeals over all trade disputes, as well as over whatever enforcement issues arise from existing or future trade agreements.

Further, Trump appears to place excessive emphasis on China’s current currency manipulation. To be sure, there’s still strong evidence that the yuan remains substantially undervalued. It’s also not legitimately deniable that anti-currency manipulation tariffs would be an especially effective response to China’s trade predation. After all, China’s exchange-rate protectionism artificially cheapens the cost of everything produced in and traded by China. Therefore, these Chinese products (and services) receive price advantages over foreign competitors that have nothing to do with free trade or free markets. 

But it’s also undeniable that China’s currency policies have gotten much more complicated in recent months, as Beijing has needed to move to support the yuan in order to stem unprecedented capital flight. So for both political and substantive reasons, Trump would have been much better advised to treat currency manipulation as threat that is all too likely to reemerge if China’s economy keeps slowing, not as today’s leading danger. (The same of course holds for the Asian countries who have just negotiated President Obama’s Pacific Rim trade agreement.)

Yet despite these flaws, Trump’s instincts on trade policy remain much sharper than those of the rest of the nation’s media/political establishment – not least of which entails his understanding that it won’t be possible to “make America great again” unless its trade policy becomes great again, too. And his new China trade blueprint shows that he grasps enough major policy details to make that goal reality.