Im-Politic: Why Russiagate Could be a Never-Ending Story

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2016 election, Daniel Coats, Democrats, FBI, Im-Politic, intelligence, intelligence community, James Comey, Mark Warner, Michael S. Rogers, National Security Agency, Russiagate, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Trump

This morning’s Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearings on some of the Russiagate scandal charges preoccupying Washington remind Americans once again how determined most Democrats are to continue what looks like a politically inspired, open-ended fishing expedition.

Don’t get me wrong: Russia’s interference with the 2016 presidential election (and apparently others before it) is a national security threat of the first order. Stronger official U.S. responses than we’ve gotten so far are essential. Moreover, since any Russian cooperation offered on common problems such as fighting terrorism isn’t an act of charity, and serves Russian interests, such sanctions need not upend such joint efforts.

At the same time, the intelligence community issued the public version of what it’s discovered months ago. It’s fine for Congress to conduct its own probes, but it’s unclear what Capitol Hill will find out about Moscow’s meddling that the CIA etc don’t already know.

In addition, of course it’s essential to know if President Trump or anyone connected with him or his campaign “colluded” with the Russians in this election interference, or if the chief executive and/or associates has tried to impede the executive branch probe of this subject that are underway. It’s also clear that not all the facts are in – or at least publicly divulged.

But I’m more convinced than ever that Democrats generally, for the foreseeable future, aren’t likely to take any official “No’s” for answers having just seen Virginia Senator Mark Warner query National Security Agency chief Admiral Michael S. Rogers and Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats on reports that Mr. Trump tried to persuade them, respectively, to deny the existence of any collusion, and to intervene with Trump-fired FBI chief James Comey to “back off” an aspect of the agency’s Russiagate work.

After all, as I’ve written, though the Russiagate uproar has now lasted for months. But although President Trump’s opponents in the intelligence community clearly have absolutely no compunction about leaking the most sensitive national security material to cripple his administration, they’ve produced absolutely nothing in the way of a collusion smoking gun.

Today, Warner directly asked Rogers and Coats to confirm or deny those Trump interference charges – which of course raises the question of whether from now on, taxpayer funds are going to be spent running down every anonymously sourced allegation produced by every organ of the Mainstream Media. But whether you think this is a good use of lawmakers’ time or not, bear in mind how Rogers and Coats answered: Although both refused to disclose the details of any specific conversations they’ve had with the president, both also denied ever in their careers (including this year) having been asked or pressured to do anything improper regarding an investigation in progress.

Warner’s response? (And he’s far from one of the Democratic Party’s Maxine Waters-like yahoos.) “[H]e was ‘disappointed’ with the officials’ answers. He told Rogers the committee had ‘facts’ that other individuals were aware of his conversation with Trump and that a memo had been written about it.” But did Warner then go on to reveal those “facts”? No.

On Thursday of course Comey himself will appear before the Senate Intelligence Committee. In fact, the panel has just released his opening statement. My first read – and the reaction of the Twitterverse, for what it’s worth? No smoking gun confirming obstruction of justice charges – though Comey did describe his view of a key conversation with the president as “very concerning.” No matter. Based on his performance today, I expect Mark Warner and most of the rest of his party to make sure that Russiagate remains the (manufactured) political gift that keeps on giving.

Im-Politic: Trump’s Accusers on Mishandling Intelligence Have Lots to Explain Themselves

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China, Im-Politic, intelligence, James Clapper, leaks, Russia, Stephen A. Hall, The New York Times, Trump, Washington Post

There was a funny article in today’s Washington Post Outlook section – not “ha ha” funny but funny in the sense that life serves up some coincidences that the adjective “embarrassing” doesn’t come close to covering.

The piece in question came from Stephen A. Hall, described as a 30-year veteran of the CIA’s Russia (and presumably Soviet) operations, and it went after President Trump for sharing intelligence information irresponsibly with Russia and thereby going far toward convincing valuable U.S. allies that his administration can’t be trusted with crucial strategic secrets.

Let’s leave aside the indisputable reality that the Soviet operations “run and managed” by Mr. Hall were completely blindsided by the fall of the Soviet Union – arguably the most important geopolitical development of the final half of the twentieth century. Let’s also leave aside that its Soviet operations were the scene of some of America’s most damaging intelligence failures when Hall was around. (Although I’m sure he wasn’t solely or even largely to blame.)

Let’s focus instead on an article that ran the very same day in The New York Times. It reported that “The Chinese government systematically dismantled C.I.A.spying operations in the country starting in 2010, killing or imprisoning more than a dozen sources over two years and crippling intelligence gathering there for years afterward.”

The reason? An “intelligence breach” that according to The Times was “one of the worst in decades.” Indeed, the article continues, “The number of American assets lost in China, officials said, rivaled those lost in the Soviet Union and Russia during the betrayals of both Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, formerly of the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., who divulged intelligence operations to Moscow for years.”

And when did Beijing manage in effect to destroy the American spy network in China? Reported The Times, “From the final weeks of 2010 through the end of 2012, according to former American officials….” Further, the article adds, this “previously unreported episode shows how successful the Chinese were in disrupting American spying efforts and stealing secrets years before a well-publicized breach in 2015 gave Beijing access to thousands of government personnel records, including intelligence contractors.”

Anyone remember who was in charge of the U.S. government and its intelligence community during those years? Aside from Barack Obama, there was also one James R. Clapper, Jr., who was named Director of National Intelligence in August, 2010, and who of course has emerged as one of President Trump’s chief critics. For good measure, Clapper was promoted to that position from the top intelligence job in the Pentagon.

More important: During his tenure as head of the nation’s espionage establishment – and during Mr. Obama’s in the Oval Office – evidently zero progress was made in identifying the moles and plugging the breach. To add possible insult to injury, Clapper also could well be one of the apparent scores of former intelligence officials who have been leaking oceans of highly classified information intended to damage the Trump administration.

Like most reporting about intelligence matters, The Times account of the CIA’s China disaster may be completely or largely or partly wrong. As a result, it will be interesting to see if there’s any pushback over the next few days. But if and until there is, Americans will be entitled to ask whether anything that the president has shared with the Russians has or is likely to damage the nation’s security or its relations with other intelligence services as the disasters associated with many of his leading attackers.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Sense and Nonsense on Russia’s Hacking

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2016 election, Amy Klochubar, China, cyber-security, cyber-war, defense spending, Democrats, hacking, Hillary Clinton, intelligence, John McCain, Middle East, NATO, Obama, Office of Personnel Management, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Putin, Republicans, Russia, sanctions, terrorism, Trump

What could be more predictable? The growing uproar over charges that Russia’s government waged a cyber-focused disinformation campaign to influence the last U.S. presidential election has let loose a flood of positively inane statements and arguments on both sides that show politics at its absolute worst.

Even worse, unless both Democrats and Republicans – and the various conflicting camps within the two major parties – get their act together quickly, the odds of further attacks and all the damage they can cause to American governance will only keep shooting up.

Let’s start with those who have expressed skepticism about these allegations, including regarding the substance of yesterday’s intelligence community report concluding that “President Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election. Russia’s goals were to undermine confidence in the democratic process, denigrate [former] Secretary [of State Hillary] Clinton [the Democratic nominee], and harm her electability and potential presidency.”

Can they really be serious in contending that the intelligence agencies’ publicly expressed judgments don’t pass the credibility test because no smoking gun or any other compelling evidence has been published? Do they really want the CIA etc to reveal whatever human and technical sources and methods they rely on? Do they really believe that any effective counter-hacking strategy can be developed or continued after disclosing that information?

The insistence on definitive proof, moreover, amounts to terrible advice for making foreign and national security policy generally. It seeks to apply to the jungle realm of international affairs the standards of the American legal system. President Obama’s years in office should have taught Americans how dangerously childish it is to believe that relations among sovereign countries are governed by commonly agreed on rules and norms, that the world is on the verge of this beatific state of affairs, or even that significant progress is being made. And Americans should hold shadowy world of spying and counter-spying to a simon-pure standard?

A more defensible rationale for doubting the intelligence community’s work emphasizes its past major blunders. And from what’s been made public, they have indeed been all too common and all too troubling.  (Please keep in mind, though, that successes often cannot be made public.)

Nevertheless, if a president or president-elect has no faith in a high confidence judgment of this importance from his intelligence agencies, then it’s clearly time to clean house. If the next administration does indeed decisively reject the community’s work on this matter, it will have no legitimate choice but to replace it leaders.

Back to the genuinely ditzy positions: statements that the Russian hacking failed to influence the course of the election. I personally believe this, and shame on those partisans who keep insisting that this interference prevented former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton from winning the White House or that it delegitimizes to any extent Donald Trump’s victory.

But should the United States count on Moscow – or any other actor – continuing to fail? Should it wait to respond forcefully until a U.S. adversary succeeds? Shouldn’t Washington capitalize on its adversaries’ current evident shortcomings in this regard and focus on punishment and deterrence? Simply posing these questions should make clear how obvious the answers are.

A final major objection to hammering the Russians represents another more reasonable judgment call, but it’s still fatally flawed. It’s the argument that Washington needs to softpedal the hack attack because the United States has a vital interest in improving relations with Moscow.

As I’ve written, opportunities for better ties with Russia abound, and they should be pursued. But that’s no reason to let Moscow off lightly for its cyber-aggression. In the first place, in any mutually beneficial relationship, boundaries need to be drawn. This is especially true given how much stronger and wealthier than Russia the United States is. If an effort to subvert America’s democratic processes doesn’t qualify, count on further, even worse provocations by Moscow.

Just as important, this approach overlooks a crucial reality: Clear indications that Russia has an incentive to cooperate with the United States in fighting Islamic extremism and terrorism haven’t appeared because Moscow is in a charitable, or even helpful, mood. They’ve appeared because these are vital interests as well for Russia, which both borders the dysfunctional Middle East and rules over its own Muslim populations.

In other words, Moscow has plenty of incentive to play ball with Washington on the Middle East whether the United States retaliates sharply for the hacking or not. And if the Russians don’t understand that, then there’s little hope of any form of meaningful cooperation.

Yet the actual and potential inconsistencies and hypocrisies of those urging tough retaliatory measures are equally troubling. Some are exclusive to Democrats. For example, the sanctions imposed on Moscow by the Obama administration for the hacking seem pretty modest for actions that it claims “demonstrated a significant escalation” of Russia’s “longstanding” efforts “to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order.”

And at the same time, the outrage voiced at Moscow contrasts conspicuously with reactions to China’s successful attack on the federal Office of Personnel Management, in which the records of some 22 million U.S. government employees – including classified and confidential information – were compromised. Indeed, President Obama never publicly blamed China’s government nor announced any responses.

Most important, however, is the question of whether Russia hardliners in both major parties old and new will act on the logical implications of their views of Russian actions and intentions – including on Moscow’s efforts to expand its influence along its own European borders. If for instance the hacking, as per Arizona Republican Senator John McCain, is truly an “act of war,” then will the call go out to cut off economic and diplomatic relations with Moscow?

If Russia’s moves against Crimea or Ukraine or the Baltics mean, in the words of Minnesota liberal Democratic Senator Amy Klochubar, that “Our commitment to NATO is more important than ever,” will today’s hawks – especially the noveau liberal variety – call for more U.S. defense spending and bigger American military deployments in endangered countries? And will they demand that American treaty allies in Europe finally get serious collectively about contributing to the common defense – which is first and foremost their own defense?

The answers to these questions will speak volumes to the American people as to whether their government is truly determined to defend interests declared to be major against foreign threats. And you can be sure they’ll convey the same vital information to America’s foreign friends and foes, too.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Trump’s Making Sense About NATO & Europe, Too

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2016 election, allies, Brussels attacks, Cold War, defense budget, Donald Trump, Earl C. Ravenal, Europe, intelligence, ISIS, Middle East, military spending, NATO, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, terrorism

Front-running Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has done it again: He’s scandalized the American political and foreign policy (and therefore media) establishments with his charge this week that the United States is spending too much on defending Europe via its membership in the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) alliance. And once again, he’s hit the nail much closer to the head than the nation’s political leaders and self-appointed national security experts.

Most of the responses to Trump make one or both of two main points: First, that the NATO commitment isn’t very expensive at all; and second, the aftermath of yet another major terrorist attack in Europe is the last time when anyone should be questioning this most important of U.S. ties to the Continent – including for America’s own sake.

Yet the first allegation is nonsense. In large measure it’s based on the costs of maintaining NATO as an organization. This sum is indeed miniscule compared with the overall U.S. military budget or the size of the whole American economy. But it also has virtually nothing to do with the real costs of fielding and deploying the military forces – both nuclear and conventional – that do the actual defending even in peacetime.

Surprisingly, this figure isn’t easy to identify. Why not? Because the Defense Department doesn’t break out most of  its budget by expenditures for major regions of the world. The one major exception: its funding requests for what it calls Overseas Contingency Operations – money used to pay for ongoing missions like Middle East wars (including attacks on ISIS), counter-terrorism campaigns, and the like.

Significantly, one Europe-related category is now listed. It’s called the European Reassurance Initiative, and as the Pentagon openly states, its components – notably increasing the American military presence in Europe – are mainly directed at newly assertive Russia. Last year, this program alone cost more than the U.S. contribution to the NATO budget – $789 million versus $514 million. And the Defense Department wants to quadruple the amount for next year.

At the same time, these totals don’t begin to take into account the full costs of the American military commitment to Europe. A rough idea of how great they could be can be gleaned from one of the few systematic efforts to analyze the geography of the defense budget – by the brilliant and iconoclastic former Pentagon official Earl C. Ravenal. Ravenal’s work unfortunately dates from the Cold War era, but it does provide a sense of the yawning gap between those NATO organization budget figures and truly comprehensive numbers.

According to Ravenal, the NATO commitment accounted fully half ($129 billion) of the 1983 $258 billion proposed Pentagon budget. Critics responded that even without NATO/Europe responsibilities, the nation would still need to maintain many of the forces both stationed on the Continent and assigned to it under various contingencies. But they never explained why. So Ravenal’s statistics look pretty reasonable to me.

The current (fiscal year 2016) Pentagon budget request is $585.2 billion; therefore, using the Ravenal methodology, we’d get just over $300 billion devoted to Europe’s defense. But this figure would also be highly misleading. After all, U.S. priorities have changed dramatically. During the Cold War days, the United States regularly maintained more than 300,000 troops in Europe, along with their families. Today, European deployments are down to about 50,000. Moreover, the United States keeps many fewer nuclear weapons in Europe as well (although these arms have always been relatively cheap.) Today, the region commanding the greatest American military resources is the Middle East. (And to add to the complications, many of the forces and other assets in Europe support Middle East deployments and combat, too).

Nonetheless, even taking these historical changes into account, it must be clear that the American commitment to Europe is costing at least tens of billions of dollars annually, and possibly more. Given these totals, given their likely increase, and given the risks (including nuclear) still run by the United States to help defend the Europeans, it sounds perfectly reasonable to ask whether Americans are getting adequate bang for this national security buck – especially considering how wealthy Europe is today, and how meager its own military spending.

But doesn’t the United States need European cooperation to help fight ISIS and other terrorist threats? Unquestionably, the more assistance the United States can get, the safer it will be. And since Europe seems to be such an important target for ISIS in particular, the ability to access European intelligence about the Islamic States would appear to be invaluable.

Three questions, however, need to be answered by the Establishmentarians. First, why would that intelligence access need to depend on keeping today’s NATO ties fully intact? Why couldn’t Washington and the Europeans be able to keep working together on the terrorism front without Americans underwriting Europe’s nuclear and conventional defense against other threats? Would the allies, for example, withhold this information if the United States drew down its military presence further? Fits of pique of course can never be ruled out. But wouldn’t the Europeans then risk losing their access to U.S. intelligence and other forms of assistance?

Second, just how good is European intelligence? According to this new examination of Belgium’s anti-terrorism efforts, little confidence is justified. In fact, overall European counter-terrorism activity is unimpressive at best. On the one hand, these countries will surely get up to speed in the wake of recent attacks. On the other hand, it’s nothing less than amazing that they’ve dawdled so long considering how much closer they are located to the Middle East than America is. So maybe once the initial outrage at the Brussels attacks fades, Europe will go back to business as usual, with all that implies about how helpful to the United States its countries can actually be.

Third, will the Europeans ever get their military act together?  Of course, these countries are potentially valuable as military allies in the air and ground fighting against ISIS in the Middle East. But there can be no question that the performance has lagged badly. And even though some signs of increased European military spending are finally appearing, they won’t turn into significantly greater capabilities for many years.

Some believe that Trump’s remarks simply represent an attempted bluff, and that his real aim is to convince the allies to bolster their capabilities. If so, the dynamics of free-riding are likely to doom this ploy as they have so often in the past. But if Trump is signaling a belief that U.S.-European security relations need major changes, and that a rigorous, unsentimental look at costs and benefits, risks and rewards could well justify much less U.S. involvement in the Continent’s defense, the result might easily be a much safer America, and a mainstay of foreign policy conventional wisdom that he’s made look just as foolish as the political conventional wisdom.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Preliminary Thoughts About and Lessons of Paris

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2016 elections, Al Qaeda, border security, borders, Charlie Hebdo, civil liberties, Constitution, Donald Trump, France, Immigration, intelligence, ISIS, jihadism, Middle East, migrants, Mumbai attack, Obama, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Paris, Paris attacks, radical Islam, refugees, Robert Jackson, September 11, surveillance, terrorism

Because barely a day has passed since the news first broke of the horrific terrorist attacks in Paris, caution is in order about commenting, especially about the identity of the attackers, and other crucial details of the strikes. Nonetheless, some observations can reasonably and usefully be drawn, and some important implications, including for a range of security and economic policies, can be identified.

> Except for the innocent victims and their families and friends, the Paris attacks weren’t a “tragedy,” as so many good-hearted folks have mistakenly supposed. Whether the aim is intentional or not, that term drains the event of moral content and inhibits clear thinking. In particular, it weakens the public’s determination to establish and enforce accountability – notably over the longer run, as the temptation grows to return psychologically to normality, along with shoulder-shrugging defeatist impulses. Instead, the attacks were an outrage and an atrocity. Making all efforts to prevent repeats are imperative both for self-defense and to create a better, safer world for future generations.

> Another term we need to excise from news coverage and discussion is “senseless.” The Paris attacks clearly were intended to further a political and policy agenda: sowing chaos among ISIS’ enemies the worldwide, including in the United States, and dissuading governments from joining military efforts against the group in the Middle East, or from continuing or strengthening existing efforts. Indeed, these agendas – which are sadly likely to achieve at least some degree of success – are what justify labeling the Paris attacks as acts of terror. As such, they are utterly incomparable to the kinds of mass shootings in America and elsewhere that are carried out by obviously deranged individuals whose heads are filled with heaven knows what delusional “ideas” with no chance of attracting significant support or even sympathy.

> ISIS has now credibly claimed responsibility, and both the French and U.S. (albeit with some apparent reluctance) governments agree. So there can’t be much doubt that the attacks represent the latest instance of Islamic terrorism.

> As widely noted, the Paris attacks could well mean that this Islamic terrorist challenge is entering a new phase even more dangerous than experienced so far. Its scale and intensity more closely resembled the 2008 attacks on Mumbai, India, than the more targeted strikes on the Charlie Hebdo staff and on a kosher grocery store in suburban Paris, both in January. Indeed, the City of Light was literally a war zone for several hours, as both the French military and police were called into battle.

> There’s no reason to think that ISIS – and similar groups – will stop, even for the time being, with Paris. No one should rule out equally deadly follow-on strikes elsewhere in Europe, and – though less likely due to geography – the United States.

> Mumbai, of course, was all too easy for Westerners to ignore, even though many of the victims were Westerners. But because so many were not, and because it took place in a very far away developing country that’s typically dismissed as violence-prone, it hardly amounts to wallowing in liberal guilt to acknowledge that Mumbai’s impact in Europe and North America was orders of magnitude weaker than mass killings in one of the former’s crown jewels.

> Meaning no disrespect to all the dedicated individuals in intelligence and security agencies in France, and all over Europe, but if only because attacks like those in Paris require so many accomplices and so much on-the-scene planning and related activity, it’s clear that anti-terror strategies need to be dramatically improved. For example, it’s already been confirmed that one of the attackers was a French national who had been on a French government terrorism watch list since 2010. No doubt other lapses will be revealed going forward.

> Similarly, there can’t be any reasonable doubt that border security policies in Europe and the United States will need to be strengthened. Near the body of one dead attacker at the Stade de France was found a Syrian passport showing that holder had been admitted as a refugee into Greece in early October. It’s not certain that the passport actually belonged to the attacker – as opposed to a victim – although at least one report says the document was found on the attacker’s person. Further, another report has appeared of a second such passport. And another passport found in the vicinity reportedly comes from Egypt.

Although some analysts believe these documents to be counterfeit, and carried by the attackers to boost European opposition to admitting large numbers of Middle East refugees, properly screening these migrants is clearly a major challenge because terrorist infiltrators could easily exploit the chaos surrounding many entry points. And once in a country belonging to Europe’s visa-free zone (and Greece is one of these), visitors are free to travel passport-free among 25 others (including France).

It’s also important to note that America’s own borders, especially with Mexico, aren’t exactly hermetically sealed, and that serious mistakes by its own immigration authorities made the September 11, 2001 attacks that much easier to carry out. Indeed, six of the 19 September 11 hijackers had violated various American immigration laws, but were still in the country, including two who had overstayed their visas. As a result, supporters of lenient U.S. and European immigration and refugee policies clearly don’t want to hear this, but tighter restrictions are nothing less than essential.

> In this vein, these policies are bound to become far more controversial throughout the West, and it’s hard to imagine that supporters of stronger immigration controls – especially Republican presidential hopeful Donald Trump – won’t benefit politically.

> Further, since many Islamic terrorists are nationals of victim countries, more aggressive surveillance and related counter-measures are simply unavoidable. For all the vital importance of preserving civil liberties, their preservation, as always, needs to be balanced against national security considerations that clearly have again grown in importance. No freedoms are ever absolute, and in times of emergency like this, it’s crucial to remember Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson’s warning in a 1949 dissent that “if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”

> Calls for escalating the West’s military operations against ISIS have naturally proliferated over the last 24 hours, but the goal of decisively defeating this terrorist group is no more realistic than it was before the Paris attacks. As made clear by the decisive defeat of Al Qaeda following 9/11, the Middle East remains so terminally ill on so many fronts that it will remain a breeding ground for terrorism for the foreseeable future. And since, as I have written repeatedly, America’s allies in the region are too internally weak to “step up” and provide meaningful assistance to a coalition dominated by non-Muslim outsiders, the nation’s best hope for greater security is focusing on what it can plausibly hope to control – access to its own territory.

Im-Politic: An Overlooked Clinton Email Scandal

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2016 elections, Bill Clinton, CIA, classification, David Petraeus, emails, FBI, Hillary Clinton, Im-Politic, intelligence, John Deutch, Justice Department, national security, server, State Department

I’m not a national security lawyer and lack any on-the-job military or intelligence experience. But I can’t help thinking that one of the biggest reasons to be outraged about the scandal stemming from Hillary Clinton’s handling of official emails as Secretary of State is being missed.

There’s no doubt that Clinton’s campaign is on the line here. If the emails already found on her private server or thumb drive, or yet to be found or recovered, have contained classified material, she likely faces legal liabilities and would almost certainly need to bow out of the White House race. Two related, emerging Clinton defenses – that these materials actually weren’t sensitive in real-world terms, and that the government classifies too indiscriminately – should be moot points. Making and acting on such judgments isn’t an individual’s call. Ask retired top U.S. General and former CIA chief David Petraeus, and former Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch.

The former was convicted of sharing classified information with his lover, received a suspended sentence and a hefty fine, and avoided jail time thanks only to a plea bargain. The latter was found to have used inadequately protected computers in his home and while on travel to work with classified materials. An appointee of President Bill Clinton, Deutch avoided criminal prosecution due to a Justice Department decision considered so controversial that the former spy chief was still in legal jeopardy until January, 2001 – when he was spared by a president pardon.

Hillary Clinton, of course, set up an entire private computer system for handling official emails – an offense that’s arguably much more serious legally, and more threatening to national security, than those committed by Petraeus and Deutch.

Politically speaking, however, neither Petraeus nor Deutch was running for office – though Petraeus was often mentioned as a potential political star. Hillary Clinton’s quest for the presidency means that her likely computer problems aren’t only legal. Her judgment has already been called into question, and is sure to be slammed further the more she and her defenders insist that sensitive material wasn’t classified when she received it. Even if true, Clinton’s failure to understand that such memos and emails needed special protection mocks her claim to possess the experience needed to lead effectively.

But as badly as all of these charges reflect on Clinton, the under-appreciated scandal, as I see it, is that her cavalier attitude toward official information and procedures is now diverting valuable government manpower and resources that are urgently needed to handle much more dangerous threats to national security.

With the nation confronted with ISIS and other terrorist groups striking targets overseas and inspiring attacks in the United States, nuclear challenges from Iran and North Korea, and belligerence from China and Russia, it’s appalling that anyone in the intelligence community or the FBI or the State Department is spending any time or money on figuring out whether and to what extent Hillary Clinton broke the rules. And the longer these issues remain unresolved, the longer this unconscionable and dangerous waste of U.S. defense and intelligence wherewithal will continue.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Signs of U.S. Cyber-Security Failure May be More Serious Than Reported

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China, cyber-security, deterrence, forced technology transfer, hacking, intelligence, Michael Rogers, multinational companies, National Security Agency, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, technology transfer

Here’s another noteworthy aspect of the timing of President Obama’s Executive Amnesty announcement last night: It almost completely obscured the at least comparably important hearings held by the House Intelligence Committee about cyber threats to U.S. national security.

The testimony and other statements from Adm. Michael Rogers, head of the National Security Agency and the nation’s cyber-security operations, made so many critical points and raised so many critical questions that I hardly know where to begin.

News reports focused on Rogers’ warning – ostensibly the first by a U.S. government official – that China and other governments are now able to launch truly destructive attacks on America’s energy grid and other vital economic systems, and are currently conducting the electronic snooping needed to pave the way for such assaults.

At the same time, such fears have already become widespread. I’m more interested now in Rogers’ views on policy responses and their implications – some of them confusing, some of them scary.

Principally, I was pleased to see Rogers argue that the United States can’t simply stay on the defensive in this cyber cold war. No security strategy can be entirely passive and reactive unless, as is the case with nuclear weapons, the nation possesses retaliatory capabilities powerful enough to deter effectively.

And this is where I start to worry. Since the United States is widely described as the world’s predominant technology power, I’ve often wondered why Washington hasn’t responded to actual cyber attacks from China and other sources with threats (communicated in private, of course) to respond by, say shutting down major cities for a week or so, and by promising to do worse unless these foreign powers stand down.

One possible conclusion is that this simply isn’t the Obama administration’s style. Rogers actually fed this fear with his proposal for a global cyber “code of conduct” that would ostensibly prevent or damp down conflict in this realm. As with other such proposals in arms control and other sectors, this notion ignores the reality that such agreements can only succeed if a strong enough global consensus on these matters exists in the first place. That foreign cyber attacks are taking place reveals how fanciful that belief is.

But another possibility, which is much more frightening, is that Washington has turned the other cheek because it simply has no choice – i.e., that it lacks that deterrent capability in cyber warfare. Not that I – or anyone outside the American intelligence community – can be certain of such top secret matters. Yet the nation’s inability to turn its technology edge into an effective cyber defense capability or deterrent could mean either that its cyber security strategy has been a dismal failure, or that this edge isn’t so impressive – if it exists at all.

At the same time, it’s important to note that Rogers’ call for creating offensive cyber capabilities and all that it implies about the global cyber security balance has been belied by reports – based on leaked intelligence community documents – that many American cyber attacks have in fact been launched.

That would be reassuring – although it also would reveal that such moves have been inadequate so far to deter many foreign attacks. (In theory, of course, they might be deterring much worse attacks.) Yet I would be feeling much better if Rogers – and other intelligence and security officials – publicly addressed a major shortcoming in America’s cyber security strategy: the pass it’s given to U.S. multinational companies’ huge programs to train foreign technology professionals and to their substantial transfer of hacking-relevant knowhow to foreign economies.

This gaping hole in the bucket isn’t directly to blame for Russian and Iranian hacking prowess – although any such overseas aid becomes that much likelier to find its way to unfriendly countries. But as I’ve reported, it bears substantial blame for boosting China’s capabilities.

Again, because such matters are (righty) classified, it’s difficult to know what, if anything, Washington is doing to address this problem. But the continuation of such tech transfer, both voluntary and extorted, makes clear that any efforts being made need to be strengthened greatly, and that American cyber strategy will remain dangerously deficient if it continues to lack a serious denial dimension.