(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Good Economic News that Trump Has Missed

Tags

bubble, bubble decade, business spending, CNBC, Commerce Department, Financial Crisis, GDP, gross domestic product, housing, inflation-adjusted growth, investment, Jeff Cox, personal consumption, real GDP, Trump, Wilbur Ross, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s how badly the latest figures on U.S. economic growth (for the first quarter of this year) have been misunderstood: Even the Trump administration, which has displayed no hesitation to take credit for good economic news even when undeserved, failed to note a big possible silver lining.

As noted in last week’s coverage of these figures on gross domestic product (GDP), the inflation-adjusted growth figure reported by the Commerce Department in its initial read for the first quarter was a measly 0.69 percent. That’s the worst such performance since the 1.19 percent annualized contraction in the first quarter of 2014.

So it’s not entirely surprising that Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross seized on this discouraging news to emphasize that “We need the President’s tax plan, regulatory relief, trade renegotiations and the unleashing of American energy sector to overcome the dismal economy inherited by the Trump Administration. Business and consumer sentiment is strong, but both must be released from the regulatory and tax shackles constraining economic growth.”

But especially given the rise in sentiment noted by Ross, it’s at least somewhat surprising that he didn’t make more of the strong rise in business spending revealed in the new GDP report. For it lends significant support to President Trump’s claim that his election is already liberated many of the “animal spirits” – i.e., a surge in business optimism – often needed to spur more hiring and especially more corporate spending on new plant and equipment.

For example, in absolute terms, such business spending rose sequentially by 9.1 percent at an annualized rate in the first quarter. That’s the fastest rate since the fourth quarter of 2013, when it jumped by 9.2 percent.

At the same time, back at the end of 2013, the economy expanded at a 3.90 percent real annual rate. In the first quarter of this year, after-inflation growth was only 0.69 percent annualized. So business spending punched far above its weight as a growth engine. As RealityChek regulars know, that’s an encouraging indication that the nation’s growth recipe is becoming more production oriented, and therefore healthier and more sustainable in the long run.

In fact, higher business spending accounted for all of the first quarter’s growth. (Other sectors of the economy contributed to and subtracted from the overall result, too, but their net effect was zero.) As a result, its relative contribution to expansion was its strongest since the first quarter of 2014, when such investment boosted real GDP by 0.84 percentage points but the economy actually contracted at a 1.19 percent annual rate.

And on a standstill basis, business investment in the first quarter represented its highest share of real GDP (13.34 percent) since the third quarter of 2015 (13.48 percent).

Not that one quarter’s results – which will be revised twice more in the next two months alone – are anywhere close to definitive. But the Trump administration had much more to crow about than it seemed to realize.

At the same time, the new GDP data showed that the economy remains way too personal consumption- and housing-heavy – the toxic combination whose bloat so powerfully inflated the bubbles that produced the previous decade’s global financial crisis.

As previously reported on RealityChek, at their pre-crisis peak, in the second quarter of 2005, the combined consumption and housing share of real GDP hit 73.27 percent. The comparable first quarter total was 73 percent even – not much lower. And that share was up slightly from the fourth quarter’s 72.95 percent.

So the United States is still a long way from achieving former President Obama’s goal of creating “an economy that’s built to last.” But from what we know of the first quarter’s growth this year, the economy made some progress that’s worth noting.

P.S. Partial credit for this post goes to CNBC’s Jeff Cox, whose report here first called my attention to the good business spending results.

Those Stubborn Facts: From the World’s New Champion of Free Trade

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China, free markets, free trade, investment, state-owned enterprises, Those Stubborn Facts

Annual investment growth by Chinese state-owned companies,

2016: + c. 25%

 

Annual investment growth by Chinese “private” companies,

2016: + c. 3%

 

(Source: “Beijing Revs Up State Inc.,” by Ian Talley, The Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2017, http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2017/03/20/beijing-revs-up-state-inc/)

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Latest Trade Deficit Scuffles Still Missing Lessons of 2008

Tags

bubbles, finance, Financial Crisis, free trade agreements, G20, Germany, Global Imbalances, investment, Japan, manufacturing, offshoring, tax reform, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade policy, trade surpluses, Trump, Wall Street, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Roughly ten years after it broke out, it’s still incredibly rare to see economists or pundits link U.S. and resulting global trade imbalances with the financial crisis. So I’m always thrilled – as I tweeted this past week – to see it ever happen. All the same, even this insightful column by Reuters’ Edward Hadas simply dances around the crucial link between these imbalances and American trade policies, and in particular, their offshoring-friendly nature.

In a March 15 essay, Hadas commented on the German (and other countries’) trade surpluses that have attracted such attention this past week for two main reasons: German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s first-ever meeting with President Trump, and a conclave taking place at the same time of the finance chiefs of the world’s 20 leading economies (the so-called G20). The author’s main contention is indisputable as far as it goes. According to Hadas, the real problem with these imbalances is financial:

“The euros, pounds and dollars which Germany, Korea et al accumulate inevitably land in the global financial system. There would be no problem – only gains all round – if these monies funded valuable infrastructure, productive factories and other assets which can generate a reasonable economic return.

“Too often, though, though, the extra currency winds up supporting counterproductive finance. It backs ultimately ruinous property speculation, lends support to chronically weak governments, encourages unsustainable consumer spending and destabilises developing economies, not to mention enriching banks and bankers and stimulating corruption. A typical example: the recycled dollars from the U.S. trade deficit helped fund the American housing bubble whose pop created the 2008 crisis.”

But what Hadas – and so many others – fail to do is explain adequately why deficit countries (like the United States) make such dangerously shortsighted choices with their windfalls. Three main (and not mutually exclusive) reasons have been served up. First, financial systems in the deficit countries (especially the United States, which runs the biggest deficits) have over-rewarded uses of capital that produce the fastest possible payoffs, and under-reward longer-term projects. The result is too much investment that encourages speculation, financial monkey business, and simple consumption, and too little investment that builds factories and laboratories and funds other activities that create wealth more slowly, but on a more sustainable basis.

Second, such irresponsible uses of capital have become practically inevitable if only because the deficits have been so enormous, and so much money has become available. When anything is in such abundance, and therefore costs so little, most economists would agree that there’s little reason to use it carefully. After all, it looks like a sure bet that more of that thing at very attractive prices will be readily available.

A somewhat different version of this argument has to do with what economists call “moral hazard.” It argues that the American financial system used over-abundant money so recklessly at least partly because investors felt certain that they’d get bailed out of most or all of their mistakes by government. So why not take maximum advantage of what seems to be a “heads, we win; tails, we lose” proposition?

The third explanation for the irresponsible use of resources focuses on the consumption-heavy nature of the economies of the deficit countries. (This argument also tends to note that the surplus countries frequently try to limit and even depress consumption.) The more capital they take in, in other words, the more such spending (as opposed to productive investment) is likeliest to result either because such behavior is encouraged by government, because a “live for today” has been produced by that country’s culture, or because of some combination of the two.

Whenever something as a big as a global financial crisis strikes, many culprits are responsible. And all of the above explanations should be taken very seriously (along with others, like lax financial regulation). But what Hadas and all the rest continue to miss is how the world trade system, national trade policies, and the trade flows they have fostered have actively fostered in deficit countries like the United States a neglect of productive activities like manufacturing (which is so heavily traded).

Specifically, as Washington in the 1990s and 2000s signed more and more trade agreements structured to encourage multinational companies from all over the world to supply U.S. consumers from locations in super low-cost and virtually unregulated developing countries like China and Mexico, American leaders and other elites (e.g., in the media) naturally sought to rationalize their decisions by spreading the message that sectors of the economy like manufacturing (and the income loss produced by the accelerated offshoring that rippled throughout so much of the Main Street economy) could be neglected with impunity. And the administration of George W. Bush (along with Congress of course) and the Federal Reserve chaired by Alan Greenspan underwrote America’s spendthrift ways with big budget deficits and ultra-low interest rates, respectively.

Even worse, these destructive trends fed on themselves. The more offshoring seemed to pay off, and the more domestic manufacturing operations looked like losing — or at least anachronistic — propositions, the less interested financiers became in investing in them. So the amount of productive activity on which to use incoming capital to start with began shriveling. And the less productive activity available to sustain Main Street living standards responsibly (i.e., mainly through earnings), the greater the political establishment needed to prop up those living standards by providing more easy money — at least if it wanted to stay in power while maintaining the offshoring status quo.

Ironically, even though Hadas emphasizes regulation as the answer to global imbalances, his particular focus has big trade implications:

“Regulation can do more than strengthen bank capital ratios. It can reform the system, so trade surplus funds are not directed to economically counterproductive uses. That will be tough, both politically and practically. But it should be easier – and will be far more helpful – to solidify finance than to try to change the national characters of Germany or Korea.”

I’m all in favor of channeling the use of trade surplus funds by deficit countries into productive activity. In fact, I strongly support requiring such uses by U.S. multinational companies if much-discussed tax reform finally succeeds in persuading them to bring home the vast amounts of earnings they’re currently stashing abroad to avoid paying higher U.S. corporate rates. 

But this requirement needs to be accompanied by (at the very least) strong measures to keep out foreign-made goods that benefit from predatory trade practices like dumping, subsidization, and intellectual property theft. Otherwise, foreign competitors will be able to keep undercutting their domestic American competition in the U.S. market, and these new productive investments will fail. It’s also entirely likely, however, that more sweeping trade curbs will be needed – to offset the scale economy disadvantages created by U.S.-based firms’ inability to sell into so many important markets and their rivals’ ability to sell freely in their home countries and the United States.

And this is in fact where recognition is needed that the trade problem created by American policy concerns not simply inducements to offshore, but the coddling of protectionism in high income countries like Japan and Germany.

The bottom line: As indicated in a post last week, the United States may have to accept that even reasonably balanced foreign trade is not achievable with competitors holding radically different economic priorities (as I argued last week was precisely the case with Germany), and that reducing trade flows is a more than acceptable price to pay for preventing financial crises caused by imbalanced trade. When you add in America’s great capacity for much more self-sufficiency in a wide range of manufactured good, that seems like a more than acceptable trade-off to me. More important, it’s where the Trump administration, admittedly in fits and starts, could be leading us.

Im-Politic: GE’s New Gift to the Trade Populists

Tags

2016 election, Bernie Sanders, Canada, China, Donald Trump, GE, General Electric, Im-Politic, India, investment, Jeffrey Immelt, Jobs, manufacturing, multinational companies, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, protectionism, reshoring, Saudi Arabia, scale, Trade

The maverick presidential campaigns of Donald Trump and Senator Bernie Sanders just got a major boost from an unexpected source: General Electric CEO Jeffrey Immelt.

Throughout this political year, the presumptive Republican nominee and the Democratic challenger have drawn scorn from the nation’s intertwined political class and business establishment for promising voters that their administrations will bring back to America significant numbers of manufacturing jobs that have been lost to foreign competition. But in a speech last Friday, Immelt (unwittingly, to be sure) made clear both that their ambitions are eminently realistic, and that his own giant company plans to adjust its production and employment policies in response to just these “protectionist,” “populist” pressures – which he noted are appearing all over the world.

Immelt’s apparent tone and much of his phrasing indicates that he intended his remarks – to the graduating class at New York University’s business school – as a ringing defense of GE’s contributions to both the U.S. and world economies so far; as a grim warning that shortsighted, misguided fears about the costs of trade liberalization and global integration were about to endanger the much greater good done by these developments; and as a defiant declaration that his company was positioned to thrive come what may from the world’s cowardly politicians.

Let’s leave aside for now his claims about the net effects of GE’s operations and about today’s version of globalization – although once more he provided a specific number for GE’s annual exports without revealing how much the company imports into the U.S. market. What was actually most remarkable about Immelt’s speech was how strikingly it contrasted with the picture of U.S. multinational companies that’s emerged and prevailed especially since the debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) more than 20 years ago ushered in the current era of American trade policy.

As Americans and their leaders have constantly heard throughout this period, corporations – especially gigantic ones like GE – had become completely liberated from specific locations and their political authorities. Thanks to dramatic breakthroughs in transportation and communications, these firms could establish any kind of operation anywhere in the world that created a favorable business climate. And if any retrograde national governments tried to interfere, executives could flip them the bird, pick up stakes, and condemn their unfortunate citizens populations to isolation and impoverishment.

The resulting policy conclusion that the multinationals and their mouthpieces in politics and the media obviously have tried to reinforce is that the form of globalization that was emerging is inevitable – a product of progress itself – and that nothing would be more foolish and futile than for the public sector to get in the private sector’s way.

My book on globalization exposed these claims as nonsensical. My research – conducted back in the late-1990s – showed that even the leaders of smallish countries, notably in prospering East Asia, routinely established conditions on in-bound foreign investment from the multinationals as a matter of course. And when faced with requirements to share technology with local partners or use certain levels of domestic content or export specific percentages of their output, the companies routinely complied. And as has just been reported today, these practices are still standard operating procedure the world over.  

The only important economic power that has failed to use its leverage has been the United States, which is why its approach to globalization was forcing its citizens into a “race to the bottom.”

So it’s crucial to understand that what Immelt was telegraphing to his Friday audience was not only that the American political system seemed likely to present the multinationals with comparable requirements, but that GE, for one, had no choice to comply. In his words:

“[T]he globalization I grew up with – based on trade and global integration – is changing.

“As a business leader, it is difficult to decide when to defend the old way (what you were taught) or when to change based on what you see.

“With globalization, it is time for a bold pivot….In the face of a protectionist global environment, companies must navigate the world on their own.

“We must level the playing field, without government engagement. This requires dramatic transformation. Going forward:

“We will localize. In the future, sustainable growth will require a local capability inside a global footprint. GE has 420 factories around the world giving us tremendous flexibility. We used to have one site to make locomotives; now we have multiple global sites that give us market access. A localization strategy can’t be shut down by protectionist politics. …

“We will produce for the U.S. in the U.S., but our exports may decline. At the same time, we will localize production in big end-use markets like Saudi Arabia. And countries with effective export banks, like Canada, will be more attractive for investment. ”

And if GE perceives no choice but to reply “How high?” when governments say “Jump!” it’s likely that similar firms will respond similarly to more demanding American trade policies.

With his suggestion of fewer GE exports, Immelt clearly hopes to convey the idea that although GE may weather this policy storm just fine, Americans as a whole won’t – and that therefore the populist candidates’ promises about returning jobs and achieving other economic gains will backfire big time if they’re kept.

But iron global economic realities have always meant that the main beneficiary of less globalized, more localized production patterns will be the United States. For how many other economies have the scale to support the manufacture of hi value industrial products – like those in which GE specializes – without needing major access to export markets? Obviously, the answer is “Not many.”  The number of economies with the scale to support such production without exporting to the United States is even smaller.

That’s why Immelt’s vow to “localize production in big end-use markets like Saudi Arabia” is so manifestly un-serious. Saudi Arabia isn’t nearly big enough for GE to profit by producing, say, jet engines or turbines for power plants in the kingdom solely for the kingdom. Canada, which his speech also mentioned as an attractive future location for investment, doesn’t qualify, either – despite its “effective” export financing bank. After all, as Immelt has explained, in a world of increasingly localized production, export possibilities by definition shrink substantially.

As for India and China, also touted as ever more important centers of future GE output, the still super-low incomes of their populations will prevent companies like GE from enjoying the kinds of pricing power and margins that remain essential for justifying servicing only those national markets with domestic factories.  To be sure, individual companies might figure out the necessary formula. But even after several decades of record-setting growth, China still needs to export desperately – which explains why such success won’t be possible for most firms.

So whenever you hear or read some self-appointed expert insist that job reshoring promises are simply cynical political pandering exercises, keep in mind that not only do Trump and Sanders disagree. So does one of America’s biggest industrialists.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Times’ Trade Deficit Pollyannaism

Tags

bubbles, business investment, capital flows, capital spending, China, competitiveness, currency manipulation, global division of labor, global financial system, investment, manufacturing, Neil Irwin, subsidies, The New York Times, Trade, Trade Deficits, U.S. dollar, {What's Left of) Our Economy

At least Neil Irwin’s New York Times article yesterday on the real meaning of trade deficits made two points rarely seen in journalistic examinations of the subject. He acknowledged that these shortfalls subtract from an economy’s size. (And should have added that worsening trade balances slow an economy’s growth – a big problem for the slow-growing United States these days.) And he noted that the foreign investment inflow triggered by deficits should be put to productive uses. Otherwise, it can create dangerously bubbly effects, as with U.S. housing and personal consumption during the last decade.

What Irwin didn’t discuss were the real-world obstacles created by trade deficits to using those capital inflows wisely, and unfortunately, they’re much more important and germane to policymakers and the public.

For example, let’s say that a country’s trade deficit is heavily concentrated in manufacturing (which America’s is). And let’s say that it partly reflects not only the dollar strength resulting from the central role played by the United States in the global financial system, but foreign countries’ policies of artificially undervaluing their currencies. If Washington didn’t respond adequately, wouldn’t many prospective investors balk at pouring money into domestic manufacturing for fear of having to compete not only with foreign companies, but with foreign treasuries? And wouldn’t a turn-the-other-cheek American policy toward other foreign subsidies produce similar effects?

Alternatively, a large manufacturing-centered trade deficit could inhibit productive domestic investment by killing off large numbers of manufacturing jobs – which have long been among the economy’s best-paying. Investors considering building new factories in America could understandably be dissuaded by the resulting reductions in family incomes – which could well ripple far beyond manufacturing as displaced industrial workers began competing for the jobs remaining in the service sector, and undermined its own wage growth.

Another live possibility: If U.S. trade deficits significantly reflected the offshoring activities of multinational companies, and American trade policy encouraged the supply of the high price U.S. market from much lower cost (and lightly regulated) foreign markets, wouldn’t many of these multinationals take the hint and send much of their capital abroad?

Nor are these scenarios hypotheticals. If you look at the business investment share of the U.S. economy, as pointed out by Dean Baker of the Center for Economic Policy Research (in a recent email), it grew steadily between 1950 (when it was 9.99 percent of pre-inflation gross domestic product) to 1980 (when it hit 14.21 percent). By 2007, the last year before the Great Recession struck, it had fallen back to 13.27 percent. Last year, it stood at 12.83 percent. (Unfortunately, the inflation-adjusted data only go back to 1999.)

Of course, such capital spending is driven by many forces. Baker, for example, emphasizes the destructive effects of financial deregulation, which greatly increased the rewards of short-term-focused speculative activity versus the longer-term gains generated by funding production and innovation. But can it be a total coincidence that domestic American business investment peaked just as imports – especially from predatory trading powers like Japan – were starting to make big inroads into U.S. markets?

Even more suggestive: Research published in 2014 by analyst Aaron Ibbotson of Goldman Sachs showed that U.S.-owned multinationals have not simply stopped or slowed investing in new plant and equipment. Instead, they’ve increasingly channeled such investment overseas, especially to emerging market countries like China, in order to supply their industrial needs.

Not that these are the only problems potentially and actually created by running trade deficits – especially big, chronic ones – that Irwin missed. For instance, when foreign interests buy American assets with trade surplus earnings, they buy control over the U.S. economy. This arguably is not a significant issue when the buyers are other private companies, or when they come from countries that are allied or friendly with the United States, or neutral. When a large and growing share of these acquisitions are made by China – which is neither friendly, nor private sector dominated – threats emerge ranging from market distortions (created by heavily subsidized financing arrangements) to national security dangers.

Irwin should have also mentioned that changing trade balances are crucial indicators of global competitiveness, and in fact signal which countries are likely to be major and minor producers of various goods and services. Indeed, the ostensibly most efficient possible global division of labor that results is a principal justification for encouraging trade. If manufacturing, to take one sector, is judged to create no special advantages for the American economy, then it’s fine to be indifferent to trade deficit signals that U.S. industry’s world-class status is at risk. If manufacturing is prized, then the deficit is indeed a valuable scorecard, and one that’s sending a troubling message.

Of course, Irwin’s column also argued that the strong dollar that puts constant upward pressure on the trade deficit creates major diplomatic and national security benefits for the United States, and there are respectable, if not dispositive, arguments to be made along these lines. But when it comes to the domestic growth, employment, and wage impact of trade deficits – not to mention the effects on all the productivity growth and innovation fueled by manufacturing – portrayals of these shortfalls as close-calls or nothing-burgers belong in a set of political talking points, not in a supposed economic primer.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: RIP, Manufacturing Renaissance – & Reshoring – Claims

Tags

Asia, China, competitiveness, Deloitte, investment, local content, Manufacturers Alliance for Productivity and Innovation, manufacturing, manufacturing renaissance, MAPI, Mexico, multinational corporations, North America, Obama, offshoring, reshoring, TPP, Trade, Trans-Pacific Parternship, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Because manufacturers (and others) don’t always do what they say, surveys of their intentions on hiring and investment and the like should always be taken with a big boulder of salt – the more so since the questions are often asked and the answers given in a political and policy context. So when one of these surveys clashes with manufacturing reshoring and renaissance claims that America’s most powerful manufacturers – the offshoring multinationals – have been energetically pushing, they deserve special attention. That’s why it’s worth looking closely at a new sounding on where new factories are likely to be built from a major consulting firm and a leading manufacturers association.

As the nation has heard endlessly from the biggest names in American industry and their witting and unwitting political dupes, U.S. domestic manufacturing is either enjoying an historic comeback, or is on the verge of one. These boasts and predictions have become a little less common lately, as manufacturing data keeps disappointing, but they haven’t been recanted or simply dropped because they serve two powerful purposes.

First, at a time of continued U.S. economic weakness, contentions that American-owned manufacturing firms are boosting their U.S. production and employment counter fears and accusations that they have abandoned their home country wholesale. Second, a crucial feature of these renaissance claims – that China’s competitiveness has faltered so dramatically that American industry is actually abandoning the PRC and returning stateside – helps the multinationals defend the offshoring-friendly trade deals they worked so hard to pass by indicating that they did little, if any, long-term harm to the U.S. economy despite critics’ accusations.

It’s hard, however, to read the Footprint 2020 study just released by Deloitte and the Manufacturers Alliance for Productivity and Innovation (MAPI), and take any of the above seriously for one minute longer.

Take the reshoring narrative so central to the renaissance story. According to the Deloitte-MAPI report, “reshoring is a real phenomenon.” But get a load of this kicker: “[A] common misconception is it represents a return of previously offshored operations to US soil. In practicality, reshoring may include returning operations to Mexico. This offers greater access to the US market, but allows companies to maintain advantageous operating cost structures. Sixty-six percent of survey respondents offshored their operations in the past 20 years, and a third are now considering bringing them back to North America. These moves focus on primary production and assembly operations currently located in China, India, and/or Brazil. Mexico is the first choice destination to re-shore operations, followed by the US.”

To be fair, there is a respectable argument made that even reshoring (and other) investment in Mexico helps domestic U.S. industry, too. The supposed reason: Manufactured goods made in Mexican factories, especially if they’re owned or related to American firms, use much more in the way of Made in the USA parts and components than similar products made in Asia and elsewhere.

But this argument overlooks the reality that the U.S. content of America’s imports from Mexico has been falling, and that this trend will accelerate if Congress approves the Pacific Rim trade deal just concluded by the Obama administration. That Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) will make it easier for countries like Japan to send more goods, like automobiles from Mexican assembly plants into the United States that contain more parts and components from outside Mexico and “North America.”

The idea that investing in Chinese manufacturing doesn’t make much sense nowadays also takes a body blow from Footprint 2020. The study found that 98 percent of the companies surveyed plan to expand operations in countries where they’re already in business, either through adding on to existing facilities, or by opening new factories or labs or warehousing and distribution centers. The country that will get the biggest share of this new capital? China. (The United States is second.) Moreover, between the 2002-2007 period (before the financial crisis struck) and the 2010-2015 period (when the American manufacturing renaissance was supposed to have taken off), “North America’s” appeal to American-owned companies increased only slightly, while “Asia’s” (meaning largely China) nearly doubled.

Of course, for literally years, manufacturing renaissance claims have been steadily punctured by the most authoritative data available on production, trade balances, productivity, and wages. With hitherto cheerleading multinational manufacturers themselves now throwing cold water on this idea, too, it’s legitimate to wonder whether domestic industry is closer to suspended animation than to rebirth.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: If Washington Was Serious About the China Economic Challenge….

Tags

aerospace, allies, Boeing, China, Cisco, cyber-security, Edward Snowden, forced technology transfer, imports, investment, lobbying, manufacturing, multinational companies, national security, offsets, offshoring, South China Sea, subsidies, telecommunications, Trade, Xi JInPing, {What's Left of) Our Economy

However understandable, the intense administration and media focus during Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s U.S. visit on Beijing’s cyber-hacking has overshadowed several other major Chinese threats to American national security and economic well-being – and the need to fix U.S. strategies that are failing badly to cope with them. High on the list is China’s widespread practice of extorting corporate investment and technology transfer by threatening to shut uncooperative companies out of its large and potentially bigger market. And this blackmail deserves special attention this week because two big examples of it have made it into the news recently.

The first involves Boeing, which apparently will build its first foreign factory in China – a move that not so coincidentally coincided with China’s announcement that it would buy 300 Boeing jets. The second was Cisco Systems’ decision to start cooperating with a Chinese server company on projects that reportedly could include developing new telecommunications hardware products. This deal has followed several years in which Cisco has encountered big trouble in China due to fall-out from Edward Snowden’s techno-spying revelations and charges, and to Beijing’s policy of punishing American companies after Congress in effect froze China’s version of Cisco out of the U.S. market due to espionage concerns.

Since aerospace and telecommunications are clearly central to military strength, these American corporate cave-ins could easily endanger national security – unless you believe that they’ll forever remain in their current limited form. So more effective responses are urgently needed – unless Washington wants to face ever more harmful Chinese cyber-hacking (see this article of mine on how American firms have undoubtedly shared advanced cyber-war-related technologies with China), or ever better armed Chinese forces in possible future military showdowns in the South China Sea and other disputed Asian waters.

The companies themselves explain their agreement to China’s trade and investment conditions with the “half-a-loaf” argument, and it’s not completely unreasonable. They’re obviously not thrilled to be helping create likely new competitors (whether they care about American security is another matter entirely), but they point out that any China business they preserve or gain via their cooperation is more than they’d have without the China market. In fact, Beijing has used its leverage to string them along effectively enough that they’re reluctant even to complain about their China troubles to Washington – for fear of becoming targets for Chinese retaliation, and of excessively rocking the boat of bilateral economic relations generally.

But although the companies’ behavior may be justifiable from their own individual standpoints, their unavoidably narrow, self-interested perspectives make clear why they can’t be relied to protect or advance broader U.S. interests. Washington needs to take the lead. But can it do so without imposing heavy costs on these firms? To me, the answer clearly is “Yes” – and not just because China’s economy is slowing down. The key to success is understanding that a case-by-case approach inevitably leaves China in the driver’s seat, and that the United States can and should capitalize on position as an export market desperately needed by China to ensure adequate growth.

Severely restricting China’s access to this American market would grab Beijing’s attention not only for economic reasons. Chinese leaders would begin worrying about their political futures – and their own personal well-being – since their hold on power depends so strongly on delivering jobs and rising incomes to the country’s increasingly restive population. Moreover, even keeping in mind that short-term costs for the U.S. economy are inevitable – because policy shifts of this magnitude are always disruptive, and because it may take Beijing a while to get the message – the most obvious objections are surprisingly easy to dismiss.

Where will affected companies find customers to replace those they may temporarily lose in China? In many cases, in the American market, because the smaller U.S. trade deficit with China that would result from import curbs would spur more American growth overall. Moreover, so much U.S.-China trade nowadays is “head-to-head,” (in which the same goods compete with each other), that many American firms could fill the gap left by missing Chinese imports. And when it comes to U.S. companies that can’t make up China losses this way, government compensation seems appropriate.

Given Washington’s willingness to bail out Wall Street and auto-makers for blunders largely of their own making, subsidies look defensible for firms in the line of fire of whatever trade conflict develops. (One possible caveat: Many larger, multinational companies rely on China business heavily because they lobbied so effectively for the U.S. China trade policies that have created their vulnerabilities – and other major damage to the American economy – in the first place. So there’s also a case for letting them take their lumps, at least to some extent.)

If such subsidies don’t pass muster politically in the United States, another alternative is available to Washington: using the power of the American market to dissuade non-Chinese competitors to U.S. firms from seizing the opportunities created by these new American policies to boost their own China sales. Although the American firms’ China sales would remain lost, they at least wouldn’t lose competitve ground to foreign rivals.

Further, giving these third-party companies and countries the choice of doing business with China, or with the far bigger – and more reliable – United States would have the added benefit of adding international support to American efforts to fight Chinese protectionism and economic predation.  Working with Washington would also aid foreign governments and companies by reducing China’s scope to play trade partners off against one another. 

Finally, it’s true that the kind of jobs and even technology extortion used by China are standard operating procedures – especially in aerospace and in military aerospace – for many foreign governments, including those of U.S. allies. So how could Washington justify singling out China for counter-measures? Yet when it comes to allies and their policies (called offsets), the answer couldn’t be more evident: They’re allies and China manifestly is not. It makes no sense whatever to treat all foreign governments and economies the same when their relationships with the United States are so dramatically different, and this kind of foolish consistency certainly shouldn’t hamstring America’s approach to China’s economic transgressions.

There is, however, one obstacle to this kind of revamp of U.S.-China economic relations that I don’t see being overcome anytime soon – the continued domination of China policy-making in Washington by those aforementioned multinational, offshoring-happy business interests. The China policy status quo has undermined the American economy’s productive core, and increasingly threatens national security. But the offshoring lobby believes it’s worked well enough for its members. So until a critical mass of national political leaders decides to reject their lavish campaign contributions, expect China to keep taking America to the cleaners. And when Chinese actions sting enough, expect a few grumbles from the multinationals – no doubt mainly for show.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Reasons to Ignore Those Manufacturing Surveys

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consolidation, emerging markets, Federal Reserve, industrial production index, Industry Week, innovation, Institute for Supply Management, investment, ISM, manufacturing, Markit.com, mergers and acquisitions, Michael Collins, monopoly, offshoring, oligopoly, survivorship bias, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The newest editions of the two big private sector American manufacturing gauges – from Markit.com and the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) came out this morning, which should be a complete non-event given all the data I’ve presented on what a terrible job the ISM in particular does at tracking industry’s real health. (I haven’t closely analyzed Markit’s results, but since they roughly match the ISM’s, they seem about as bad.)

Of course, the Markit and ISM releases are in fact big deals to policy-makers, economists, and investors, so let’s try to turn a sow’s ear into a silk purse and show how the big structural weakness of these surveys can be used as a window into a big reason for domestic manufacturing’s ongoing collective troubles. That weakness, as loyal RealityChek readers know, is survivorship bias. And recently, an important new explanation for this bias, for its resulting distortions, and for manufacturing’s continuing struggles despite all the renaissance claims, has come to light.  

A quick refresher on survivorship bias: Unlike the Federal Reserve’s index of industrial production, the Markit and ISM surveys don’t try to measure how the American manufacturing sector as a whole has grown or shrunk. (Both companies look at other measures of manufacturing performance, too, and this discussion applies to them as well.) Instead, they choose a sample of manufacturing companies and ask key executives to assess their firms’ circumstances. If Markit and ISM asked these businessmen for their actual growth or other figures, for example, this wouldn’t be a big problem. But since they ask instead whether they’ve been growing (or contracting) at all, it’s a huge problem.

With the former methodology, it would be at least reasonable to extrapolate the sample data and draw conclusions about the entire domestic manufacturing complex. But the technique used by these two companies simply tells us how that sample (which is also much smaller than the Fed’s) has been faring in its own judgment. And because so many U.S.-based manufacturing firms have fallen by the wayside in recent decades, the Markit and ISM surveys wind up reporting only on the remaining companies – the survivors.

Individual companies, of course, can often prosper even as their overall sector isn’t (grabbing a larger share of stagnant or even shrinking pies). But that’s exactly why the Markit and ISM results have lost whatever ability they may have once had to describe domestic manufacturing’s overall health when overall industry was much larger.

At the same time, it shouldn’t be forgotten that because of greater efficiencies, a national manufacturing sector with fewer companies can still keep generating more production and employment. That’s why I’m always hesitant to use as evidence of U.S.-based industry’s troubles data on the (significantly) declining number of American manufacturing “establishments” over time. There’s no doubt that these figures reflect many company failures, and resulting factory shutdowns. But there’s also no doubt that they reflect lots of that aforementioned efficiency-enhancing consolidation – and these statistics don’t contain any breakdowns.

Recently, though, some new data have emerged that reveal another angle of the survivorship bias issue – the surge of mergers and acquisitions in manufacturing. These transactions are fundamentally different from the two forms of consolidation described above. Rather than stemming from individual companies deciding that they can do better with, say, one factory rather than two, or from individual companies prospering because rivals have gone bust, this form of consolidation stems from companies acquiring one another.

An important June post from IndustryWeek makes clear how dramatic this increase has been, especially since the early 1980s. As a result, in 200 manufacturing sectors monitored by the Census Bureau, 16 percent were characterized by their four largest companies accounting for at least half the value of shipments. By 2007 (the latest statistics available), this share had jumped to 37 percent.

The post’s author, consultant Michael Collins, notes that “Under [such] oligopoly and monopoly conditions, investment slows down. Because competition is weaker, corporations are better able to raise prices and profits without investing in new technologies and products—and declining investment can lead to declining innovation and economic stagnation.”

He doesn’t say this explicitly, but it shouldn’t be overly difficult to see how such consolidation can undermine production as well. This could be especially important given the huge share of domestic manufacturing that’s engaged in the production of parts, components, and other industrial inputs. They’re the source of considerable innovation in industry, and if manufacturers overall become less interested in better products and processes, then demand for their output is bound to suffer.

Collins also hints at another way that consolidation could depress output – by using oligopoly and monopoly power to reduce wages and increase prices for American consumers. In recent decades, the argument could reasonably be made that new demand in emerging market countries like China, Mexico, and Brazil would compensate – and then some – for lower consumer and industrial purchases in the United States.

But nowadays it should be obvious that this promise has not been realized and remains a distant prospect. Three big reasons: Emerging market growth has slowed dramatically and even shifted into reverse in some instances; the incomes of their consumers have remained so low; and they have made dramatic progress in supplying their own industrial innovation needs themselves. And largely because these emerging markets (enabled by offshoring-friendly investments and trade policies) sapped the growth potential of high income countries like the United States without adequately replacing it, the world has been stuck in low-growth mode ever since recovery from the last recession began – six long years ago.

It’s completely unreasonable to expect Markit or ISM to shed much light on these wide-ranging developments in their monthly reports. But by the same token, it should be clearer than ever that what they don’t show about domestic manufacturing is far more important than what they claim to reveal.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Open Borders, the Goose, and the Golden Eggs

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Bernie Sanders, bubbles, central banks, developed countries, developing countries, Ezra Klein, Financial Crisis, free trade deals, Great Recession, Immigration, imports, incomes, investment, Jobs, New Economy, Open Borders, recovery, Sharing Economy, third world, Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Vox.com, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Since Ezra Klein is still young, he has time to learn what a bad idea it is to try being clever on unfamiliar subjects. Nonetheless, as made painfully clear in a new interview with Democratic presidential hopeful Bernie Sanders, the media wunderkind and Vox.com founder would be well advised to learn this lesson sooner rather than later, at least when it comes to how the global economy works.

Evidently trying to be clever, Klein tried to trip up the Vermont Senator by asking him how he could reconcile his avowed democratic socialism – and its presumed concern about global poverty – with his opposition to “sharply raising the level of immigration we permit, even up to a level of open borders….” Added Klein, “It would make a lot of the global poor richer, wouldn’t it?”

Sanders’ response was good. But he could have really humiliated Klein by reminding him that unlimited immigration would not only slash American living standards, but that it would ultimately backfire on developing countries as well. The reason is the same as that which argues, from a global perspective, against dropping all barriers to imports from the third world, and it springs from a reality as unmistakable as it is apparently unknown to Klein: American consumption is the goose that lays the developing countries’ golden eggs. To paraphrase that immortal adage, it’s “where the money is.”

Yet just as the United States ultimately can’t responsibly finance the consumption of enough third world imports to spur developing country progress unless its own economy remains truly healthy, it can’t ultimately provide opportunity for third world immigrants without maintaining genuine prosperity. And as Klein and other chattering class advocates of much freer immigration and trade policies should understand – but clearly don’t – the financial crisis demonstrated the heavy costs for everyone of forgetting this truth.

As I’ve written, thanks in large measure to more than a decade of U.S. job- and wage-killing trade deals focused tightly on developing countries, a critical mass of American workers lost the incomes they needed to support acceptable living standards by living within their means. Rather than change course on trade policy, the bipartisan Washington powers-that-be decided to enable the working and middle classes to at least run in place economically by borrowing, instead of earning. The economic meltdown and Great Recession that inevitably ensued inflicted damage worldwide.

Just as important, the historically feeble recovery that’s followed has claimed its share of third world victims, too. Slower American growth has helped crimp imports from China and the rest of Asia, thus sapping the vigor of these export-dependent countries. (Although, as this recent post shows, this phenomenon is easily exaggerated.)  The continuing U.S. malaise has also undermined employment opportunities for current and prospective immigrants from Mexico and the rest of Latin America. Meanwhile, because many global investors have become more risk averse since the last decade’s bubbles burst, and because Wall Street regulations have (necessarily) tightened up some, much international capital has forsaken developing country market and fled to the safety of the United States.

Do Klein and his ilk really believe that admitting a flood of overwhelmingly low-wage, low-skill immigrants will turn this situation around and help anyone, at least for any serious length of time? The only possible justification is a belief, contrary to the evidence and common sense, that the newcomers could rise up the U.S. income ladder as quickly as previous immigrant cohorts. The same question applies to boosting American imports from developing countries – which other supposed experts have touted as a prime reason for supporting President Obama’s Pacific Rim trade deal. Moreover, as I’ve just reported, import- and offshoring-friendly American trade policies could also start victimizing recent immigrants – and choking off opportunities for their successors.

In a perfect world, of course, inhabitants from poor countries could move to wealthier countries any time they wished, and they and the native-born populations would all live happily ever after. Alternatively, in a perfect world, third world populations could supercharge their incomes by providing their first world counterparts with an indefinitely growing supply of increasingly advanced products. Americans (and in principle, Europeans and Japanese) would all support themselves by finding themselves jobs in the New Economy, or the Newer Economy, or the Sharing Economy, or whatever fantasy economic utopians conjure up. Or maybe central banks could keep trying to shatter ever-soaring records for money-printing,

In that perfect world, however, we wouldn’t need economics, or economics. And we certainly wouldn’t need economic journalists like Ezra Klein.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Know-Nothing-ism on Trade from The Wall Street Journal

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Abraham Lincoln, American history, Asia, free trade, George Washington, import substitution, investment, Mark Twain, Obama, protectionism, The Race to the Bottom, Theodore Roosevelt, Trade, Wall Street Journal, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s clearly time for Wall Street Journal editorial writers to start reading more Abraham Lincoln and Mark Twain – specifically the adage (attributed to both) that it’s “Better to keep your mouth shut and be thought a fool than to open it and remove all doubt.” Because the paper’s broadside on trade today makes clear its management doesn’t understand the first thing about American economic or political history, and perhaps even less about Asia.

According to the Journal, opponents of President Obama’s trade liberalization agenda “are invoking the fantasy that buying foreign goods means fewer American jobs. This has become union orthodoxy in the U.S., as it used to be in India and other places that stagnated under ‘import substitution.’ This was the dominant theory of development in the 1950s and 1960s that rejected imports in favor of domestic-made products. East Asia rejected this policy in the 1970s, and India began to do so in the 1990s, with spectacular increases in living standards.”

Even more emphatically, Journal editors conclude that “Candidates who oppose free trade don’t belong in the Oval Office.”

Here’s what these pundits don’t seem to know. First, among the “other places” that have “rejected imports in favor of domestic-made products” was the United States during the 19^th century. Yes, the same 19^th century during which the nation became the greatest industrial, technological and agricultural powerhouse in human history. And living standards became the envy of the world – attracting hitherto unheard of tides of immigrants.

Consequently, the Journal’s criteria for the U.S. presidency would have excluded George Washington, Lincoln, and Theodore Roosevelt, among others.

And has East Asia really rejected protectionism? Not even close. The region’s opening to trade and investment has been highly selective at best – and targeted. The region’s most successful governments have encouraged imports that build up their countries’ productive capacities (like capital goods), and discouraged purchases of foreign consumer goods. As for investment, Asian countries from China to Malaysia have attached conditions on incoming capital ranging from technology transfer to domestic content standards to requirements that certain shares of the resulting output be exported. My book The Race to the Bottom documented these policies exhaustively.

Obviously, this isn’t the 19^th century, and the United States isn’t East Asia. But for interlocking reasons including the energy revolution, the immense size of its domestic market, its own recent economic out-performance, and the heavy net export dependence of most of the world’s leading trading powers, the case for a more discriminating U.S. approach to foreign trade and a greater emphasis on economic self-sufficiency remains compelling today.

Many arguments for further trade liberalization are still compelling, too. But its advocates are better advised to describe domestic and international economic history correctly, rather than traffick in myth and advertise their ignorance.