Im-Politic: In Case You Still Doubt It’s a China Virus

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China, China virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, decoupling, elites, globlalism, Hong Kong, Im-Politic, Iran, Italy, pandemics, Taiwan, The Epoch Times, Trump

Yesterday’s RealityChek post explained why Americans looking for current domestic scapegoats for the sluggish China Virus outbreak response are barking up the wrong tree. But despite the predictable criticisms from globalism- and political correctness-happy elites and the Mainstream Media journalists who follow their cues, the search for foreign scapegoats is absolutely legitimate – primarily because one country above all has unmistakably earned the title: China.

Skeptical? Then check out this editorial from The Epoch Times. As it compellingly demonstrates, “Where Ties With Communist China Are Close, the Coronavirus Follows.”

More specifically, although the editorial writers note that numerous drivers lie behind COVID19’s spread, “the heaviest-hit regions outside China all share a common thread: close or lucrative relations with the communist regime in Beijing.”

One reason I found the editorial especially important was its explanation for the virus’ concentration in Italy. Some convincing explanations for high levels of Italian mortality rates have come out, but I’ve yet to run across any material on why China Virus became so common in Italy to begin with. The Epoch Times spotlights some major reasons:

“Italy, the most heavily affected country outside China as of March 10, was the first (and only) G-7 [“Group of 7” – an official organization of the world’s seven biggest economies] nation to sign onto the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, also known as One Belt, One Road). In an attempt to prop up its weakening economy, Italy has also sought to capture the Chinese market for selling its luxury goods….

“Italy also has signed scores of sister-city agreements with China, with the cities of Milan, Venice, and Bergamo included among them. These are the areas hardest-hit by the virus.”

China ties also seem largely responsible for the coronavirus’ outsize impact on Iran:

“The Iranian regime has had a comprehensive strategic partnership with China since 2016, and its ties with Beijing began years before that. In violation of international sanctions, Iran has imported embargoed materials from China, while continuing to sell oil to the PRC. The Islamic Republic allowed flights in and out of four major Chinese cities until the end of February.”

And reinforcing the case for a vital Iran-China connection is this Wall Street Journal piece. It reports that the Iranian city of Qom, which Iran’s government calls the country’s COVID19 starting point, has been the site of numerous infrastructure projects built by Chinese engineers and technicians as part of that Belt and Road program.

As the Times notes, even South Korea’s government – whose comprehensive and seemingly testing program has garnered widespread global praise – seems to have set itself up for China Virus troubles “for refusing to ban Chinese tourists at large and instead only barring entry for those who recently traveled to Hubei Province, the epicenter of the epidemic in China.”

Don’t forget, moreover, that one big reason surely has concerned South Korea’s long surging economic relations with China – which assembles lots of high-value manufactured goods containing numerous South Korean parts and components. The same goes for Japan, another coronavirus hotspot.

The Epoch Times‘ conclusion is also borne out by the experiences of two other places with extensive economic relations with China that seem to have the disease contained: Hong Kong and Taiwan. (And I don’t mean to suggest that the latter isn’t a “country.”)

The city, located right next to another China Virus epicenter, Guangdong Province, has basically shut its border with the People’s Republic. Taiwan “began to board planes and assess passengers on Dec. 31, 2019, after Wuhan authorities first confirmed the outbreak. In early February, Taiwan banned entry to foreign nationals who have traveled to the PRC.”

Of course, now that the virus has spread far beyond China, government authorities need to focus on more domestically focused strategies – although plugging remaining foreign travel gaps, as President Trump approved in his otherwise unsuccessful Wednesday night Oval Office address, can certainly be justified in many circumstances.

Moreover, China’s primo role in not only the coronavirus outbreak but the previous Bird Flu and ongoing Asian Swine Flu episodes indicates that there’s something about China that makes it particularly (if not uniquely) plague-prone. As a result, further curbs on commerce with the PRC seem imperative even leaving aside (as no one should) Beijing’s recent threat to cut off shipments of vital medicines and their chemical ingredients to the United States. In other words, keeping the focus on China’s responsibility will help American leaders keep and intensify their focus on desirable, broader economic decoupling.

And China’s disgraceful effort to place blame for the virus on the United States amounts to a major additional reason to spotlight the above transnational coronavirus links.

“Blame games” in politics and policy are often condemned, and surely they’re often wrongheaded or overdone. But they also serve the valuable purpose of clarifying thought, accurately identifying problems, and – as suggested above – speeding the discovery of effective solutions. That’s why The Epoch Times editorial gives me more reason than ever to keep calling the coronavirus the China Virus – and why the same should go for all Americans.    

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: How Post-Soleimani, Trump Schooled the Globalists Again

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America First, Bill Clinton, Bosnia, Colin L. Powell, Democrats, deterrence, globalism, Iran, Madeleine Albright, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Soleimani, Trump

I’d hardly call President Trump a foreign policy mastermind. But since his 2016 presidential campaign started gaining strength, it’s been clear to me that his instincts in the field are exactly what a country like the United States needs, and this conviction has been strengthened considerably by a little remarked-on point he made in his announcement last week of the killing of Iranian military and terrorist commander Qassem Soleimani.

Here’s the remark:

“The fact that we have this great military and equipment…does not mean we have to use it.  We do not want to use it.  American strength, both military and economic, is the best deterrent.”

Sounds pretty obvious, right? But it’s been anything but obvious to America’s globalist foreign policy establishment, and especially to many in its liberal wing – which could very well regain the White House if a Democratic candidate like former Vice President Joe Biden or Indianapolis Mayor Pete Buttigieg wins November’s election. And that would be terrible news, as these establishment globalist liberals’ failure to agree indicates that they might return the nation to the days when it plunged into all sorts of foreign crises that had no potential to bolster American security, and much potential to become costly, bloody quagmires.

My evidence? An absolutely seminal exchange from the early 1990s between then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright (who went on to become Secretary of State) and Colin L. Powell – then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who would also go on to run Foggy Bottom.

During former President Bill Clinton’s first terms, Albright and Powell disagreed sharply on the merits of the United States intervening militarily in the Bosnia war – one of many civil conflicts in the Balkans triggered by the post-Cold War breakup of Yugoslavia. Albright was a leader of the hawks and Powell had long championed a view that the United States should use its armed forces only when genuinely vital national interests were at stake.

During one of their debates, Albright asked Powell a question that was shockingly moronic even by the dismal standards of globalists generally: “What’s the point of having this superb military you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?”

In his memoirs, Powell wrote that Albright’s question almost gave him “an aneurysm.” And it should be screamingly obvious why. Albright, who has studied international affairs her entire adult life, had apparently never heard of, or forgot, the concept of “deterrence.”

Thank goodness she wasn’t in power during one of the Cold War nuclear crises, like that over Cuba in 1962. Can you imagine any of former President John F. Kennedy’s advisers asking “What’s the point of having these superb nuclear weapons if we can’t use them?” And most worrisomely Albright – who remains influential in top Democratic political circles – has been proudly unrepentant.

Even more important, Albright’s position shows that she’s clueless about a fundamental intellectual key to U.S. foreign policy success – understanding that a superpower is defined first and foremost by what it is (i.e, by the assets it can bring to bear regarding overseas challenges and opportunities) not by what it does (how and how energetically it uses those assets). 

That is, for a country as geopolitically secure and economically self-sufficient as the United States, what matters most is focusing on building the strength (in all dimensions, including the power to deter any aggressors) needed to enable it to survive and prosper in a world certain to remain dangerous, rather than working overtime figuring out ways to keep using that strength – especially when there’s no obvious need.   

Now Powell’s a globalist, too – but he clearly comes from the wing that’s at least recognized that national interests (though he and his ilk invariably define them way too broadly) should be driving the use of foreign policy tools, not the availability of those tools (let alone list of uses of American arms and resources that may be desirable to some extent, to some Americans, but are hardly essential – like the Bosnia mess and other humanitarian tragedies in which the Clinton-ites initially engaged the nation).

Trump’s Iran remarks unmistakably associate him with that far wiser Powell approach – including in situations unlikely to go nuclear. They also signal that he gets it on the real nature of a superpower.

So don’t doubt for a minute that the President’s quasi-America First-type foreign policies will continue to be much less coherent and efficiently implemented than is desirable. But don’t doubt for a minute that his (sort of) Powell-like instincts boost the odds that the United States won’t get bogged down in debilitating and unnecessary quagmires.

In other words, everyone hoping for an American foreign policy displaying some kind of post-Iraq War learning curve should remember that, for all Mr. Trump’s faults, the United States can always do much worse in its presidential choices, in fact has done much worse – and could well again.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: So Far, So Good for Trump on Iran

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America First, globalism, Iran, Middle East, NATO, North Atlantic treaty Organization, oil, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Soleimani, terrorism, Trump

On the one hand, anyone hoping for the success of President Trump’s America First foreign policies (which, as I’ve written, could be a lot more America First-y), would be dumb as a post to jog a victory lap following Mr. Trump’s remarks this morning about the situation in Iran and the Middle East.

On the other hand, any American genuinely hoping for the security of his country and not blinded by Trump Derangement Syndrome can’t help but be impressed by how encouragingly events in the Middle East have unfolded since the killing of Qassem Soleimani, who had commanded Iran’s military efforts to expand its influence throughout the region.

First, all signs indicate that the Soleimani killing has delivered to Iran (and probably its proxies) two messages as vital as they’ve been convincing: If you kill Americans, or attack American embassies and other regional and other foreign assets, the leaders who planned these actions will get the axe. If this interpretation is wrong, then the Trump critics will need to explain why Iran retaliated by “targeting” Iraqi bases with accurate ballistic missiles but then missing the mark – conveniently avoiding striking the U.S. forces housed there.

The Never Trump-ers will also need to explain a stunning statement from an Iranian government that has never displayed any hesitancy about personalizing its conflict with the United States: Foreign Minister Javad Zarif’s claim that the President has been fed misinformation about Soleimani and his country’s foreign policy. If that wasn’t a peace, or de-escalation feeler, I don’t know what could be.

Therefore, the immediate bottom line seems awfully favorable to the United States: Iran lost a leader described as the country’s second most important political figure, and an American ally (for lack of a better term for Iraq) lost some structures.

Moreover, Iran hasn’t even entirely gotten away scot free with last night’s actions. Mr. Trump announced tighter sanctions against an economy that’s already being decimated by U.S.-spearheaded curbs on trade and investment. He announced a pressure campaign to secure more involvement in the Middle East by America’s NATO allies – who defied many Never Trumper predictions and generally lined up with the United States both on the Soleimani killing (over which they shed no tears) and on Iran’s retaliation, and who have a much greater stake in Middle East stability. And the President declared that further U.S. responses haven’t been ruled out (although if they take the form of cyber assaults, we may never hear about them, at least for many years).

Meanwhile, let’s review – for now, anyway – how many Never Trumper talking points stand as truly loony and indeed downright disgraceful:

>that the President is too psychologically unstable and specifically insecure to avoid plunging the United States into an endless cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation;

>that the Soleimani killing was a “wag the dog” effort to distract the nation’s attention from impeachment and even to spark a rally-round-the-flag popular reaction that would aid his reelection campaign; and

>that because of the President’s incompetence, the Trump administration’s foreign policy decision-making apparatus is dangerously chaotic.

This Trump success doesn’t validate the President’s entire Middle East policy by any means. First and foremost, the region remains too dysfunctional and explosive to justify confidence in any optimistic predictions.

More specifically, however, as I’ve complained elsewhere, Mr. Trump still seems wed to the globalist goals of both protecting the Middle East against Iranian aggression, and fostering the region’s “peace and stability” – through a combination of more U.S. forces for the near-term future, anyway; more effective cooperation with regional allies; more of that aforementioned involvement by America’s fellow members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In a phrase, “Not gonna happen.”

Additionally, this conviction is all the more puzzling given the President’s statement today that

“Over the last three years, under my leadership, our economy is stronger than ever before and America has achieved energy independence.  These historic accomplishments changed our strategic priorities.  These are accomplishments that nobody thought were possible.  And options in the Middle East became available.  We are now the number-one producer of oil and natural gas anywhere in the world.  We are independent, and we do not need Middle East oil.”

Even better, the observation was made in the context of seeking a greater regional role for countries remaining highly dependent on these energy supplies.

Yes, a terrorism threat remains. But as I’ve also written, it’s ultimately (meaning ASAP) much better handled by further securing America’s own borders rather than by chasing endlessly mushrooming Jihadist groups around a completely failed region. And if you’re worried about Israel, there can be no legitimate doubt that the Israelis can handle themselves with continued American military aid – especially since Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu just again made clear (if accidentally) that the country has a nuclear arsenal.

In other words, Mr. Trump’s latest Iran-related gambit combined some elements of operational America First-ism (a focus on actions that affected American lives) and of rhetorical globalism. The more closely he hews to the former, and relegates the latter to political cover for an eventual wind-down of decades of often disastrously counterproductive U.S. intervention, the more grateful his countrymen will have cause to be.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Trump’s Record and the Bolton Effect

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Afghanistan, alliances, America First, Asia-Pacific, Barack Obama, China, Europe, extended deterrence, globalism, Iran, Iran deal, Iraq, Israel, Japan, John Bolton, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Kim Jong Un, Middle East, neoconservatives, North Korea, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Palestinians, Republicans, South Korea, Syria, Trump

With John Bolton now out as President Trump’s national security adviser, it’s a great time to review the Trump foreign policy record so far. My grade? Though disappointing in some important respects, it’s been pretty good. Moreover, Bolton’s departure signals that performance could improve significantly, at least from the kind of America First perspective on which Mr. Trump ran during his 2016 campaign. That’s less because of Bolton’s individual influence than because what his (clearly forced) exist tells us about the President’s relationship with the Republican Party and conservative establishment.

There’s no doubt that the Trump foreign policy record is seriously lacking in major, game-changing accomplishments. But that’s a globalist, and in my view, wholly misleading standard for judging foreign policy effectiveness. As I’ve written previously, the idea that U.S. foreign policy is most effective when it’s winning wars and creating alliances and ending crises and creating new international regimes and the like makes sense only for those completely unaware – or refusing to recognize – that its high degrees of geopolitical security and economic self-reliance greatly undercut the need for most American international activism. Much more appropriate measures of success include more passive goals like avoiding blunders, building further strength and wealth (mainly through domestic measures), and reducing vulnerabilities. (Interestingly, former President Obama, a left-of-center globalist, saltily endorsed the first objective by emphasizing – privately, to be sure – how his top foreign policy priority was “Don’t do stupid s–t.”)     

And on this score, the President can take credit for keeping campaign promises and enhancing national security. He’s resisted pressure from Bolton and other right-of-center globalists to plunge the country much more deeply militarily into the wars that have long convulsed Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, and seems determined to slash the scale of U.S. involvement in the former – after nineteen years.

He’s exposed the folly of Obama’s approach to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Although Tehran has threatening to resume several operations needed to create nuclear explosives material since Mr. Trump pulled the United States out of the previous administration’s multilateral Iran deal, it’s entirely possible that the agreement contained enough loopholes to permit such progress anyway. Moreover, the President’s new sanctions, their devastating impact on Iran’s economy, and the inability of the other signatories of Obama’s multilateral Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to circumvent them have both debunked the former President’s assumption that the United States lacked the unilateral power to punish Iran severely for its nuclear program and ambitions, and deprived Tehran of valuable resources for causing other forms of trouble throughout the Middle East.

Mr. Trump taught most of the rest of the world another valuable lesson about the Middle East when he not only recognized the contested city of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, but actually moved the U.S. Embassy there. For decades, American presidential contenders from both parties had promised to endorse what many of Israel’s supporters called its sovereign right to choose its own capital, but ultimately backed down in the face of warnings that opinion throughout the Arab world would be explosively inflamed, that American influence in the Middle East would be destroyed, and U.S. allies in the region and around the world antagonized and even fatally alienated.

But because the President recognized how sadly outdated this conventional wisdom had become (for reasons I first explained here), he defied the Cassandras, and valuably spotlighted how utterly powerless and friendless that Palestinians had become. That they’re no closer to signing a peace agreement with Israel hardly reflects an American diplomatic failure. It simply reveals how delusional they and especially their leaders remain.

Nonetheless, Mr. Trump’s Middle East strategy does deserve criticism on one critical ground: missing an opportunity. That is, even though he’s overcome much Congressional and even judicial opposition and made some progress on strengthening American border security, he’s shown no sign of recognizing the vital America First-type insight holding that the nation’s best hope for preventing terrorist attacks emanating from the Middle East is not “fighting them over there” – that is, ever more engagement with a terminally dysfunctional region bound to spawn new violent extremist groups as fast as they can be crushed militarily. Instead, the best hope continues to be preventing the terrorists from coming “over here” – by redoubling border security.

The Trump record on North Korea is less impressive – but not solely or even partly because even after two summits with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, no progress has been made toward eliminating the North’s nuclear weapons or even dismantling the research program that’s created them, or toward objectives such as signing a formal peace treaty to end the Korean War formally that allegedly would pave the way for a nuclear deal. (Incidentally, I’m willing to grant that the peninsula is quieter today in terms of major – meaning long-range – North Korean weapons tests than when the President took office – and that ain’t beanbag.)

Still, the main – and decisive – Trump failure entails refusing to act on his declared instincts (during his presidential campaign) and bolstering American security against nuclear attack from North Korea by withdrawing from the peninsula the tens of thousands of U.S. troops who served as a “tripwire” force. As I’ve explained previously, this globalist strategy aimed at deterring North Korean aggression in the first place by leaving an American president no choice except nuclear weapons use to save American servicemen and women from annihilation by superior North Korean forces.

But although this approach could confidently be counted on to cow the North before Pyongyang developed nuclear weapons of its own capable of striking the United States, and therefore arguably made strategic sense, now that the North has such capabilities or is frighteningly close, such “extended deterrence” is a recipe for exposing major American cities to nuclear devastation. And if that situation isn’t inexcusable enough, the United States is playing such a dominant role in South Korea’s defense largely because the South has failed to field sufficient forces of its own, even though its wealthier and more technologically advanced than the North by orders of magnitude. (Seoul’s military spending is finally rising rapidly, though – surely due at least in part to Trump pressure.) 

Nonetheless, far from taking an America First approach and letting its entirely capable Asian allies defend themselves and incentivizing them plus the Chinese and Russians to deal as they see fit with North Korean nuclear ambitions that are most threatening to these locals, the President seems to be happy to continue allowing the United States to take the diplomatic lead, bear much heavier defense spending burdens than necessary, and incurring wholly needless nuclear risk. Even worse, his strategy toward Russia and America’s European allies suffers the exact same weakness – at best.

Finally (for now), the President has bolstered national security by taken urgently needed steps to fight the Chinese trade and tech predation that has gutted so much of the American economy’s productive sectors that undergird its military power, and that his predecessors either actively encouraged, coddled, or ignored – thereby helping China greatly increase its own strength.

In this vein, it’s important to underscore that these national security concerns of mine don’t stem from a belief that China must be contained militarily in the Asia-Pacific region, or globally, as many globalists-turned-China economic hawks are maintaining. Of course, as long as the United States remains committed to at least counterbalancing China in this part of the world, it’s nothing less than insane to persist in policies that help Beijing keep building the capabilities that American soldiers, sailors, and airmen may one day need to fight.

I’ll be writing more about this shortly, but my main national security concerns reflect my belief that a world in which China has taken the military and especially technological need may not directly threaten U.S. security. But it will surely be a world in which America will become far less able to defend its interest in keeping the Western Hemisphere free of excessive foreign influence, a la the Monroe Doctrine, and in which American national finances and living standards will erode alarmingly.

The question remains, however, of whether a Bolton-less administration’s foreign policy will tilt significantly further toward America First-ism. President Trump remains mercurial enough to make any such forecasting hazardous. And even if he wasn’t, strategic transitions can be so disruptive, and create such short-term costs and even risks, that they’re bound to take place more unevenly than bloggers and think tankers and other scribblers would like to see.

But I see a case for modest optimism: Just as the end of Trump-Russia scandal-mongering and consequent impeachment threat has greatly reduced the President’s need to court the orthodox Republicans and overall conservative community that remain so influential in and with Congress in particular, and throw them some big bones on domestic policy (e.g., prioritizing cutting taxes and ending Obamacare), it’s greatly reduced his need to cater to the legacy Republicans and conservatives on foreign policy.

Not that Mr. Trump has shown many signs of shifting his domestic priorities yet. But I’m still hoping that he learns the (screamingly obvious) lessons of the Republicans’ 2018 midterms losses (e.g., don’t try to take an entitlement like Obamacare away from Americans until you’re sure you can replace it with something better; don’t endorse racist sexual predators like Alabama Republican Senatorial candidate Roy Moore simply for partisan reasons). It’s still entirely possible that the growing dangers of his remaining globalist policies will start teaching the President similar lessons on the foreign policy front.

Im-Politic: Muddled Iran Deal Messages from the Democrats

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allies, Amy Klobuchar, Cory Booker, Democratic Party, Democrats, election 2020, foreign policy, Im-Politic, Iran, Iran deal, Iran nuclear deal, JCPOA, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Kamala Harris, McClatchy News Service, Obama, oil, Persian Gulf, sanctions, Trump

The usual gang of political observers and commentators (apologies to the soon-to-be-departed Mad magazine) seem to agree that this year’s Democratic candidates for President haven’t been paying much attention yet to foreign policy. Here’s my explanation: The more many of them say about the subject, the clearer their ignorance and incoherence will become, and the last few weeks have just provided a splendid example – public positions stake out on whether to rejoin the 2015 international deal aimed at curbing and slowing Iran’s nuclear weapons development.

You’ll recall that the Iran deal (officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) was signed by the Islamic Republic on the one hand, and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States on the other. Under its terms, Iran agreed to certain restrictions on its nuclear program in return for substantial relief from various, mainly economic, sanctions imposed by some of these individual countries, along with the United Nations as a whole, in retaliation both for Iran’s nuclear and some other activities deemed unacceptable threats to international security.

Even the deal’s backers conceded some serious flaws, but insisted that its terms were the best possible given divisions among the United States, its allies, and Russia and China about how hard to press Iran (generally due to differences over the value of resuming commerce as usual with Iran). I initially bought this line, too. But as I recently wrote, ensuing developments – mainly the devastating impact on Iran’s economy of unilateral U.S. sanctions reimposed by Washington once President Trump withdrew from the agreement in May, 2018 – makes clear that Iran’s interlocutors had much more leverage than they (including then President Obama) claimed, and that a better deal was always possible.

Enter the 2020 Democrats. Understandably, they’re seeking to criticize the Trump foreign policy record whenever they can, and many have attacked his decision to pull out of the JCPOA. But most of these attackers have implicitly expressed agreement with the Trump view that the deal can and must be improved.

Take Flavor of the Month Kamala Harris. According to the first-term California Senator, Mr. Trump deserved the blame for the recent rise in tensions in the Persian Gulf that culminated in alleged Iranian attacks on oil tankers and an American drone because he “put in place a series of events that led to” those moves. By this she of course meant Iran’s apparent decision to follow through on its threats to defend legitimate interests it sees as threatened by (a) the United States’ overall economic “maximum pressure” campaign aimed at ending Tehran’s alleged regional aggression, and (b) more specifically by the Trump administration’s cancellation of sanctions waivers that had permitted other countries to buy some of the oil Iran desperately needs to sell in order to stay afloat economically.

As the Islamic Republic stated, it would seek to press the other signatories to convince the United States to back off the sanctions by pulling out of several provisions of the nuclear deal (chiefly, those limiting its ability to create bomb-grade uranium) and by preventing any other countries from importing any Persian Gulf oil themselves.

How would Harris respond? She told a CBS News reporter, “Well frankly, I believe that we need to get back into the Iran nuclear deal.” That’s certainly logical, since respecting the deal’s terms would require that Washington drop its sanctions, presumably granting Iran the economic support it’s seeking and eliminating any reason for attacking Gulf shipping.

But she then (unwittingly, it seems) endorsed the position of the President and other critics that deal improvements are urgently needed – and possible: “I would strengthen it. I would include ballistic- ballistic missile testing. I think that we can strengthen what we do in terms of monitoring and verification, of progress.” Never mind, of course, that there’s no sign to date that any of the other signatories agree.

And to compound the confusion, Harris proceeded to pivot back to praise for the agreement as-is: “But there’s no question that a lot of negotiation with a great deal of depth took place over a long period of time to reach that agreement, and it was it was an agreement that was being complied with by all parties.”

My head is spinning, and yours should be, too.

But evidently Senators Cory Booker of New Jersey and Amy Klobuchar of Minnesota understand Harris’ message perfectly. Because it’s their message, too.

In their initial presidential debate appearances, both these supporters of the original deal attacked the Trump pull-out but their support for reentry seemed linked to implementing changes.

Said Booker ““It was a mistake to pull out of that deal. Donald Trump is marching us to a far more difficult situation.” But he then promised, “If I have an opportunity to leverage a better deal, I’m going to do it.”

Klobuchar charged that the Trump pullout “made us less safe” because although the agreement “was imperfect…it was a good deal for that moment.” But apparently she now worries that – just a few years later – the moment has passed. For she suggested that (according to the McClatchy News Service summary cited above) “the agreement’s ‘sunset periods’ – caps on Iran’s enrichment and stockpiling of fissile material set to expire five to 10 years from the next inauguration– [are] a potential point of renegotiation.” Of course, the short duration of these caps was cited by deal critics as a major weakness.

A common aphorism holds that it’s “Better to remain silent and be thought a fool than to speak and to remove all doubt.” If these Iran deal stances are any indication, most Democratic candidates are demonstrating major political smarts, at least, by avoiding foreign policy issues.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The Iran Crisis’ Real Lessons on Multilateralism

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allies, America First, Barack Obama, foreign policy, globalism, Iran, Iran deal, Iran nuclear deal, Iran sanctions, JCPOA, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, multilateralism, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, sanctions, Trump, unilateralism

If you think about it seriously, the main sequence of events that’s led up to the latest surge in U.S.-Iran tensions has dealt a hammer blow to the mainstream U.S. foreign policy idea that going it more or less alone is a formula for failure in world affairs, and that closely cooperating with allies is one of the biggest keys to success.

To remind: The mainstream (in the case of Iran, overwhelmingly its left-of-center wing) has been charging that the two countries have moved close to major conflict because, over allies’ objections, an America First-oriented President Trump pulled out of the deal negotiated during President Barack Obama’s administration with the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom, Russia, and China and Iran to restrain Tehran’s nuclear weapons development. And Washington then proceeded to antagonize Iran gratuitously by ramping up its own economic sanctions. As a result, Iranian leaders have threatened to start violating some of its nuclear agreement commitments, and has further protested these actions by lashing out regionally – including (as seems to be the case) attacking tankers transporting vital oil supplies through the Persian Gulf and its narrow Straits of Hormuz.

So if only Mr. Trump had listened to the allies and stayed in the agreement – i.e., if he followed an approach called multilateralism – all would be (reasonably) well in the volatile and oil-rich Gulf region. And to be fair, I myself initially bought the multilateralist reasoning when the nuclear deal (officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) was finally reached, agreeing that without allied buy-in, the United States could never create enough pressure on Iran on its own (i.e., “unilaterally”) to prevent Tehran from going nuclear for any length of time.

And yet, as I eventually realized, this narrative held no water whatever. For the United States has proved eminently capable of inflicting major pain on Iran’s economy all by itself – by dint of its ability to deny companies that do business with Iran (including companies from allied and other foreign countries) access to the U.S. dollar-dominated global banking and payments system. America’s unilateral power, in turn, strongly reinforces the argument that the Obama administration (and the allies) could have secured much better terms from Iran than the deal currently contains.

It’s true that weakening Iran economically is no guarantee that it will turn from the nuclear weapons path. But neither is the agreement. The strongest argument made on its behalf is that it pushes back any possible nuclear-ization by roughly fifteen years. Even strong supporters, though, acknowledge it contains important verification loopholes. And had the United States remained in the JCPOA, and imposed none or few of its own sanctions, when Iran did “break out,” it would have surely been much stronger economically than otherwise – which couldn’t serve the interests of anyone worried about the Islamic Republic.       

Even more important than my own evolving views: Iran itself clearly understands the United States’ matchless leverage, too. That’s why it’s been so enraged by the American withdrawal from the nuclear agreement – even though all the other signatories remain part of the pact. Its leaders apparently understand that, in this instance, U.S. allies’ words and even deeds don’t matter much.

And as for the allies augmenting American power and influence in this episode – because their top priority (rightly or wrongly) is preserving the nuclear deal, they’re trying to frustrate American aims nowadays, not support them.

Multilateralism certainly can be a useful, effective U.S. approach to various international challenges. But contrary to the impression created by its staunchest champions, allies need to do their part, too. If consensus among all parties is lacking, multilateralism can too easily become a recipe for paralysis and inaction. In other words, like all other tools or tactics, it’s simply a tool or tactic. It mustn’t be treated as an end in and of itself.

And this caveat, of course, goes double for the United States. For as the Iran situation shows, it’s unique among the world’s major powers in having many, and robust, unilateral options.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Time to “Lead from Behind” on the Gulf?

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allies, America First, Barack Obama, Iran, oil, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Persian Gulf, Straits of Hormuz

It sounds like a global nightmare scenario like those described in Cold War thrillers like “Fail Safe” – Middle East militants from someplace start attacking shipping in the Persian Gulf, through which a third of the world’s oil supplies flow, and the international economy teeters on the brink of total collapse. Except such attacks are happening right now.

So the Trump administration’s counter-moves – sounding alarms, blaming Iran, and seeking to rally global support for some kind of forceful response – seem to make perfect sense.

Actually, however, there’s every reason to think that the global economy can ride out this apparent crisis just fine, and that as a result, the President is missing an opportunity to display the virtues of a genuine America First foreign policy.

Not that the Gulf doesn’t matter for global oil trade. An estimated 30 percent of the globe’s oil exports travel through it, and out to markets the world over through its narrow Straits of Hormuz. Moreover, many of the world’s leading economies depend on such oil for big (though significantly varying) shares of their total energy use.

But these countries so far have displayed no interest in taking military steps to protect the oil flow. Indeed, many have focused their efforts instead on questioning the U.S. claims about Iran’s responsibility.

It’s tempting to view these actions as simply the latest example of such American allies counting on the United States to pull their fat from the fire – and/or a worrisome sign that the Trump administration’s alleged “bullying” on issues ranging from China trade to sharing the burden for the supposedly common defense to dealing with Iran and its nuclear weapons ambitions and other aggressive policies has cost it precious credibility with America’s best foreign friends.

Yet there’s also a strong case to be made that in this case, the allies’ apparent dithering (a charge that would be justified by either of the above narratives) makes perfect sense. The reason? The world literally has been here before – in spades. That is, in recent memory, the Gulf has been a much more violent place, and a much more threatening environment for oil tankers specifically. And as described in this useful Washington Post review, most of the global economic consequences were pretty minor. Those that weren’t – mainly entailing oil price hikes – didn’t last especially long in part because, quite naturally, the higher prices generated more supply, which brought the prices back down after a few years.   

Moreover, even if “this time it’s different” in the Gulf, there’s an equally strong case that the United States should be following the allies’ lead. After all, they’re potentially the countries that are most seriously affected. Therefore, at least theoretically speaking, they have the greatest incentives to behave responsibly. If their economies do run into trouble, the U.S. economy certainly wouldn’t escape unscathed, given its extensive trade and investment with Europe and Asia.

But because thanks to its fracking-led energy production revolution, the United States no longer imports much oil from anywhere any more, the impact would be much less important. Chances are, moreover, that this impact would be far below a level that would warrant military action, much less taking charge of such operations.  And since the allies’ ambivalence indicates that their aid couldn’t be counted on, a major American-dominated military initiative seems even more foolhardy.  

Several years ago, an anonymous Obama administration official created a stir when he described the President’s approach for intervening in the Libya civil war as “leading from behind.” Critics definitely had a point when they charged that such strategies were difficult at best to reconcile with the then prevailing globalist foreign policy strategy that defined vital U.S. interests in sweeping, near-universal terms and emphasized the need for active, practically ceaseless American global engagement. But following the allies’ lead in the current Persian Gulf crisis seems like just the ticket.

Making News: Back Tonight on Nationally Syndicated Radio on the Trade War & Huawei

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China, Huawei, Iran, Making News, national security, sanctions, tech, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, trade war, Trump

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to return tonight to John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show to help provide an update on the U.S.-China trade conflict.  The segment, which is slated to begin at 9 PM EST, will also deal with the arrest in Canada of a senior Chinese technology executive for allegedly violating U.S. national security sanctions on Iran.

You can listen live on-line at this link, and as always, if you can’t tune in, I’ll post a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Why Trump Needs to Go Real America First vs the Saudis

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America First, globalism, Iran, Israel, Jamal Khashoggi, Magnitsky sanctions, Middle East, Mohammed bin Salman, oil, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Saudi Arabia, terrorism, Washington Post

Earlier this year, The National Interest published a lengthy article of mine arguing that President Trump seemed to be repeating a mistake that has doomed previous efforts to replace a failed, longstanding globalist strategy with a fundamentally new foreign policy much better suited to the country’s real strengths and weaknesses. And just this morning, this prediction was borne out by the Washington Post‘s editorial writers (best viewed as among the many unofficial spokespeople for globalist approaches that fill the Mainstream Media) in a piece they wrote on Mr. Trump’s approach to the murder of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi authorized at top levels by the Saudi Arabian monarchy.

My article made the case that globalism would never be rejected unless the President made a clean, fully explained, break with the assumptions on which it was based. Instead, it pointed out, he seemed to have settled (wittingly or not) on an approach that might be called “globalism on the cheap.” That is, Mr. Trump’s actions appear to reflect a belief that most and even all of globalism’s supposed economic and security benefits can be realized, and supposed goals achieved (both entailing shaping the entire global environment in ways America allegedly needs in order to be acceptably safe and prosperous) while reducing its costs (e.g., subsidizing the defense of free-riding allies, and their economies with lopsided trade arrangements). The essay also explained that, because similar claims made by globalism critics in the past turned out to be literally too good to be true, numerous chances for genuine and urgently needed foreign policy overhaul have been lost.

That’s why the Post editorial is so revealing. It shows that, because Mr. Trump’s rejection of globalism has been so partial (in this case, when it comes to the Middle East), he’s made himself vulnerable to the kinds of attacks that have vanquished earlier critics and squandered a golden opportunity to stake out a true America First position that would have been strategically sound and politically popular. In fact, the Trump Saudi statements have enabled his critics to slam him in two powerful ways.

First, the Post edit writers have restated the common charge that the President was “craven” in letting Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman off the hook for the Khashoggi murder largely because of economic considerations like the kingdom’s purchases of U.S.-made weapons and its cooperation in keeping oil prices low. As the editorial puts it, Mr. Trump, “cares not a fig for American values….And if he can sell one or two more fighter jets, who cares if a journalist is murdered?”

Small wonder that his decision has been so unpopular even with many of his supporters in Congress. Just as bad, the President’s rationale is so narrow that it’s been easy to undercut on its own terms (e.g., by questioning the actual importance of Saudi Arabia’s imports to the U.S. economy).

But the editorial’s second line of attack is much more important, and is worth presenting in full. The President, according to the Post, is

“undermining the basic understanding that has worked to the United States’ advantage since World War II under presidents both Republican and Democratic.

“Those leaders all accepted that, with less than 5 percent of global population but more than 20 percent of the global economy, the United States, more than any other nation, depends on and benefits from predictable rules. It needs a world where business executives can go forth and come home without fear of kidnapping, where ships can ply the oceans without armed escorts, where contracts are honored and disputes fairly adjudicated. It needs a world where journalists can report and inform Americans on the true conditions on the ground.

“Previous presidents understood that the way to achieve such a world was to enlist allies who would live by the United States’ rules in return for protection — safe in knowledge that the United States would not use its preeminence to squeeze them for every last dollar. They would go along because the United States stood not just for itself but for rules that benefited everyone and for values they cherished, as well: freedom, human dignity, the rule of law. By championing good — albeit imperfectly and inconsistently — the United States did well.”

As my National Interest piece explained, this by-now-standard defense of globalism has the decisive sources of U.S. security and prosperity exactly backward. Far from depending on a placid world largely knit together by alliances and institutions dominated by like-minded countries, the real guarantors of U.S. power and wealth are America’s…power and wealth – i.e., its own assets – along with an unmistakable willingness to use them when advisable.

Further, this power and wealth have been indispensable both in instances when unilateral action has been desirable or unavoidable, and in ensuring that the specific forms taken by various cooperative (“multilateral”) ventures advance American interests – an outcome globalists wrongly take for granted.

These America First-supporting conclusions, by the way, are so valid that it’s become routine for even globalists unknowingly to acknowledge them – as did the Post’s editorialists when they (rightly) accused the President of failing “to see that Saudi Arabia is far more dependent on the United States than the reverse.”

But Mr. Trump’s own failure to recognize the real U.S.-Saudi power balance is far more frustrating for backers of new America First foreign policies. And in a Middle Eastern context, it’s manifested in much more than his views on the Saudi market for American arms exports.

For example, it’s also apparent from his conviction that keeping world and U.S. oil prices relatively low depends on Washington making nice to Riyadh – whereas the Saudis have learned that overly expensive and/or skyrocketing oil prices hurt them (badly) as well. After all, until recently, they’ve reduced American and worldwide economic growth, and therefore reduced the oil revenues on which the kingdom is completely reliant economically. More recently, because of the U.S. energy production revolution (a development vigorously – and correctly – championed by the President), the higher global oil prices rise, the more American oil and natural gas come on stream to the world market, and take market share from the Saudis and other Middle Eastern and foreign exporters.

And, as I’ve written repeatedly, the President’s partial America-First-ism is clear from his belief that it’s vital for U.S. national security to support Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Muslim countries (along with Israel) in order to contain Iran’s regional ambitions.

So what would a real America First approach to the Khashoggi murder have been? Nothing less than the long overdue beginning of a U.S. strategic withdrawal from the hopelessly violent and dysfunctional Middle East based on the (equally long overdue) understanding. This decision would be described an explained in high profile presidential speeches and other declarations that, with the following points, would put the globalists on the defensive for a change: that the United States no longer needs the region’s oil nearly so desperately; that terrorist threats originating in the Middle East are best met by securing America’s own borders, rather than by battling jihadist networks all around the world; and that any Iranian threat to the U.S. homeland is eminently deter-able with U.S. nuclear forces.

P.S. For those concerned about Israel’s security (and that includes me), the Jewish state is more than capable of protecting itself through a combination of its own military strength, its own emerging alliance with the Sunnis – which will also contain any possible headaches from Palestinian radicals – and continuing military and economic assistance from Washington.

In the process, Mr. Trump should announce some painful and specific slaps at the Saudis – like expelling, say, half of their staff from their embassy in Washington and imposing painful so-called Magnitsky sanctions on the personal finances of bin Salman and others at the most senior levels of the Saudi leadership. For nothing is more central to the concept of America First than that, barring truly vital strategic interests to the contrary (the reduction of which itself is a high America First priority), no one gets away with harming American citizens or legal residents (Khashoggi’s status) unjustly.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Why the Khashoggi Incident Really Matters

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Al Qaeda, America First, arms sales, Cold War, energy, globalism, globalists, Iran, ISIS, Islam, Israel, Jamal Khashoggi, jihadism, Middle East, oil, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, September 11, terrorism, Trump

Important though it is, the most important question surrounding the possibility that Saudi Arabia’s monarchy has killed Jamal Khashoggi is not whether the United States responds or how it responds if the kingdom did murder the dissident journalist – who happens to be a legal resident of the United States.

Instead, the most important question is really two-fold. First, do the many U.S. foreign policy traditionalists calling for severe punishment understand how such a move could undercut the decades-long approach toward the Saudis that they themselves have strongly supported? Second, and even more intriguing, do these globalists understand that the Khashoggi affair is simply the latest in a long string of signs that it’s well past time for the United States to adopt a genuine America First approach and leave the hot, dysfunctional mess that is the entire Muslim Middle East?

Given the prominence of maintaining good relations with the Saudis in the strategies of American globalists across the the board, it’s nothing less than jaw-dropping to see how many of them – liberal and conservative alike – are calling for strong counter-measures if Khashoggi is in fact dead at Saudi hands. Here’s a representative example from no less than former CIA chief John Brennan – who’s gone on Never Trump rampage in part because he views Trump’s foreign policy views as anathema. My astonishment, however, is justified even if much of the outrage is no more than outrage-signaling – posturing assumed to be safe because the Trump administration will eventually not upset the felafel cart.

After all, since World War II, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Persian Gulf region has been valued as a prime source of the oil desperately needed for the world economy to function acceptably in peacetime, and crucial to prevailing over ruthless global enemies in hot and cold wars alike. Once the Soviet threat disappeared, the region’s oil retained all of its perceived importance, and the critical mass of the foreign policy establishment gravitated toward seeing first Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and then Iran’s theocracy as the prime threat to the world’s unimpeded access. Crucially, not even evidence of (unofficial?) Saudi support for the Islamic extremists of Al Qaeda who launched the September 11 attacks ever truly threatened the U.S.-Saudi connection. 

Indeed, in recent years, even far left-of-center American politicians joined widespread calls for Washington to create a Middle Eastern-dominated coalition to handle most of the fight against ISIS (a successor group to Al Qaeda). And one of the anchors of this arrangement was expected to be none other than Saudi Arabia.

As I’ve argued for years now, none of the arguments for a close, if informal, U.S.-Saudi alliance holds any more water. North America possesses all the fossil fuels needed by the United States, and thanks to the shale/fracking-led energy technology revolution, the Persian Gulf’s role as key global oil supplier is greatly diminished as well. The terrorist threats likely to keep emanating from the region are best dealt with through much stronger U.S. border controls, not repeated American military interventions or fantasies about the Muslim Middle East’s decrepit (and highly compromised) regimes becoming a strong, reliable bulwark against jihadism.

And those claiming that Israel’s security warrants continuing America’s Middle East policy status quo need to remember that Israel and Saudi Arabia (and most other Sunni monarchies) have now created a tacit alliance to counter Shi’ite Iran. Moreover, Washington can always keep selling or simply giving the Israelis all the weapons they need.

The situation has changed so much that the most compelling argument against steps like cutting off or suspending U.S. arms sales to the Saudis has been advanced by President Trump: a boatload of revenue and jobs would be lost by the American economy, and the Saudis could always turn to alternate suppliers (like the Chinese and, more credibly – because their military equipment is still better – the Russians). In addition, don’t forget this irony: Consistent with its anti-Iran goals, Israel and its own impressive defense-related technologies could also partly fill the vacuum left by a U.S. withdrawal from the Saudi market.

At the same time, there’s no shortage of countries living in dangerous neighborhoods that would remain or could become massive buyers of American weapons. And as pointed out here, the Saudi military has relied on so much U.S. equipment for so long that changing its complexion would be as complicated as it would be expensive. Not to mention the years it would take for a regime that faces imminent threats to complete this task.

As a result, even if Khashoggi miraculously reappears one day, or even if he doesn’t but the Saudis are innocent, here’s hoping that the uproar over his disappearance triggers some major rethinking of America’s Middle East policy. After all, to paraphrase a famous recent remark about governing, a policy firestorm is a terrible thing to waste.