(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Manufacturing’s Out of its (Short Term) Jobs and Wages Doldrums

Tags

Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment, inflation adjusted wages, Jobs, manufacturing, non-farm payrolls, recession, recovery, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

American domestic manufacturing created 16,000 net new jobs in July on month, its best such performance since February’s 22,000. Coupled with a major (11,000) upward revision for June, the figures demonstrated that U.S. industry has for now emerged from a springtime slump. On an annual basis, manufacturing’s July 66,000 employment improvement was its strongest since February, 2016’s 69,000.

But since the current recovery began, private net job creation has topped manufacturing’s by a factor of nearly 2.5. The same story characterized pre-inflation manufacturing wages. In July, they improved sequentially faster than the private sector’s (0.53 percent to 0.34 percent) but lagged year-on-year (2.42 percent to 2.53 percent) and trailed the previous Julys’ 3.13 percent. And during the current recovery, the private sector’s current dollar wages have increased nearly 20 percent faster than manufacturing’s, although the gap has narrowed year-on-year. But despite its good last two months, manufacturing’s share of total nonfarm employment remained at a record low of 8.47 percent.

Here’s my analysis of the latest monthly (July) manufacturing figures contained in this morning’s employment report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics:

>U.S. domestic manufacturing net new job creation and wage gains both accelerated sequentially in July, pulling the sector out of a sluggish spring on both fronts.

>Industry’s monthly July jobs gain of 16,000 was its best such performance by far since the 22,000 payrolls improvement in February. Moreover, June’s initially reported 1,000 employment increase is is now judged to have been more than ten times greater (12,000).

>Fiurther, the July figures showed that manufacturing payrolls swelled by 66,000 year-on-year in July – the best annual gains since February, 2016’s 69,000.

>Monthly pre-inflation manufacturing wages growth picked up notably as well in July, from an upwardly revised 0.19 percent in June to 0.53 percent. In May, manufacturing paychecks actually fell on a current dollar basis – by an upwardly revised 0.26 percent.

>Manufacturing’s June sequential pre-inflation wage gains equaled those of the overall private sector, and beat the private sector’s 0.34 percent performance in July.

>Over the longer term, however, manufacturing lagged the overall private sector in both respects, although the paycheck gap has been narrowing slightly recently.

>During the current economic recovery, which began in mid-2009, manufacturing employment is now up by 5.96 percent. Private sector jobs as a whole are up by 14.58 percent during this period.

>Since the late-2007 onset of the last recession, manufacturing’s performance is equally poor. From that time to the early 2010 troughs, manufacturing lost 2.293 million jobs and private sector payrolls shrank by 8.801 million.

>Since then, manufacturing has regained just 42.39 percent of those lost jobs (a total of 972,000). The private sector as a whole has boosted employment by 17 million.

>As a result, total private sector employment is now 7.08 percent higher than at the recession’s late-2007 onset, but manufacturing employment is still 9.61 percent lower.

>Therefore, it’s no surprise that manufacturing’s share of total nonfarm employment in July stayed stuck at its all-time low level of 8.47 percent.

>Wage trends reveal the same manufacturing relative weakness. Industry’s July annual current dollar wage gains of 2.42 percent were lower than the overall private sector’s 2.53 percent. They were also much lower than the 3.13 percent increase recorded for manufacturing during the previous Julys.

>Manufacturing wages before inflation have fared little better during the recovery. As of July, they were up by 15.99 percent since the economy resumed expanding in mid-2009. But overall private sector wage increased by 19.06 percent – 19.20 percent faster.

>Last July, though, the gap was bigger – 23.24 percent.

>Manufacturing generally performs even worse on an inflation-adjusted basis. The latest figures are for June, and show a sequential manufacturing gain of 0.18 percent versus a 0.28 percent read for the private sector overall.

>Year-on-year, real manufacturing wages have risen by only 0.55 percent. That’s both slower than the private sector’s 0.94 percent and manufacturing’s own 2.46 percent constant dollar rise between July, 2015 and July, 2016.

>During the entire recovery, overall private sector real wages are up 4.56 percent as of June – 2.87 times faster than the manufacturing real wage improvement (1.59 percent).

>As bad as that comparison looks, it’s actually narrower than the gap last year – when overall private sector wages had increased 3.48 times faster after inflation than manufacturing wages.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Real Promise – & Pitfalls – of Foxconn’s New US Manufacturing Plan

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assembly, Carrier, components, flat panel displays, Foxconn, incentives, innovation, Jobs, manufacturing, Paul Ryan, productivity, regulatory reform, Scott Walker, subsidies, tariffs, tax breaks, tax reform, Terry Gou, Trade, trade policy, Trump, Wisconsin, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Sorry for the recent absence – and during an incredibly newsworthy period!  There’s been lots of important economic data released recently, which I’ll be reporting on in upcoming days.  So what to focus on in this return offering?  One recent story that seems to reflect many of the biggest developments and trends of the Trump administration’s first six months is the announcement this past week that the Taiwanese electronics giant Foxconn will be spending $10 billion to build a new factory for flat panel displays in southeastern Wisconsin. 

Think this is a stretch?  Then consider this:

The announcement, which could become a big win for the American economy – and a big feather in the president’s cap –was completely upstaged by a series of White House personnel shakeups orchestrated by Mr. Trump himself.

Moreover, the Mainstream Media accounts invariably combined their longstanding hostility to the president with their instinctive rejection of the possibility that unconventional economic ideas and policies can have any merit. 

For instance, they uniformly focused on the job-creation effects of the new factory – which, as typical for capital-intensive products and industries, will be relatively modest – to portray the news as ruse by the president to convince voters that he was keeping his campaign promise to revive manufacturing employment.  Their main evidence?  The tax breaks and other subsidies the project would receive, which came to many thousands of dollars per position, which were easy to depict as a first class boondoggle.

Further, the media uniformly depicted employment as the only possible upside to strengthening the nation’s high value manufacturing.  Its major contributions to the economy’s productivity growth – which could use a major helping hand – and to its innovative capacities, were completely ignored. 

At the same time, the reporting overlooked crucial questions that need to be answered to assess whether the new Foxconn factory will live up to its promise.  Principally, will it be engaged in components production – where so much of manufacturing’s value-added comes from?  Or will it simply be assembling final products from imported components, as has been the case with other recent foreign electronics investments?  If the latter, the subsidies it’s garnered will be much more difficult to justify.  And in this vein, have either federal or Wisconsin authorities imposed any conditions that would encourage genuine manufacturing?   

Not that the Foxconn announcement completely vindicates globalization policy critics, either – or at least not those who, like me, have insisted that manufacturing revival that matters will require a thorough recasting of American trade policy.  I’ve been especially skeptical of the idea that jaw-boning a la Trump plus some subsidies could make a real difference – though I’ve insisted since Mr. Trump as president-elect intervened in the Carrier company’s decision to offshore Indiana manufacturing jobs that his use of the bully pulpit could greatly aid the welcome transformation of America’s approach to manufacturing that he seemed to have in mind.  And for the record, I’ve been skeptical that subsidies can be decisive, either – because America’s financial support for manufacturing was so unlikely even to approach the scale of, say, China’s. Finally, I’ve never thought that the kinds of regulatory reform efforts Mr. Trump has launched would matter much, either, given that so many potent American trade rivals are practically regulation-free.  

At this early stage, the jury is still out.  But since the Foxconn announcement has hardly been unique, and no significant changes have taken place in U.S. trade policy other than a withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, the president so far is doing a pretty good job of proving me wrong.

Nonetheless, I’m still confident that, sooner rather than later, the manufacturing needle won’t be moved without imposing trade curbs of some kind.  Although avowed fiscal conservatives like House Speaker Paul Ryan (of Wisconsin) and his state’s governor, Scott Walker, enthusiastically supported the Foxconn incentives package, their appetite for such measures – even when reduced taxes are involved — is likely to be limited for other parts of the country because of their budget-busting effects.  Indeed, it looks like Ryan may wind up accepting a smaller corporate tax cut in Congress’ tax reform package for precisely this reason.  Moreover, these breaks could easily be offset by similar moves by foreign governments – and added to existing predatory practices like currency manipulation and tariffs of their own.  And I remain convinced that a high-income country, first world country like the United States can never rely heavily on deregulation to compete better against very low-income, largely regulation-free third world countries like China or Mexico. Nor should it want to. But no initiatives could match the power of policies that would limit or close off access to the world’s greatest economic and commercial prize by far, the American market.

In fact, as Foxconn’s CEO has strongly suggested, the threat of U.S. tariffs helped persuade him to promise to manufacture much more in America.  And he’s hardly alone in the corporate world, as I’ve reported.  That’s why I’m somewhat worried about the administration’s reluctance actually to impose tariffs, as opposed to threatening them.  If Mr. Trump keeps hemming and hawing about steel tariffs, and if he keeps opposing ideas like the border adjustment tax, which has just been stripped from Congress’ tax reform package, America’s competitors could easily conclude that his trade policy is largely bluff, and that they can keep using Americans as customers and not workers after all.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: What “Retail-pocalypse”?

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bricks and mortar, electronic retailing, Employment, hiring, job openings, Jobs, JOLTS, on-line shopping, private sector, retail, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Could the evidence be clearer? President Trump constantly bewails job losses in parts of the economy like manufacturing and coal mining. But he’s ignoring the much larger employment bloodbath in the nation’s retail sector. Worse, the contrast shows what a racist and sexist Trump is, since minorities and women make up much larger shares of the workforce in retail than in factories and mines.

Here’s one answer: The evidence for these propositions could be a lot clearer. Indeed, according to the U.S. government’s employment statistics, it doesn’t exist.

I decided to look at the numbers because the JOLTS data for May came out this morning, and I was once again amazed at the results for retail. As known by RealityChek regulars, these data measure turnover in the labor force, and are highly regarded by no less than Fed Chair Janet Yellen – a leading labor economist. The new figures, which are still preliminary, show that American retailers claimed 638,000 job openings in their businesses, and hired 718,000 new workers (the latter data represent total positions filled, not net new hires).

It’s true that the openings numbers in particular can be dicey. But those for this past May seem pretty consistent with the data going back many years. Moreover, they show that over the last eight years (practically the length of the current economic recovery), retail openings have more than doubled, and hires are up by nearly 31 percent. Both indicators are lower than that for the private sector as a whole (where job openings are up 140.14 percent, and hires are up 45.24 percent since May, 2009). But the gap is hardly yawning. Nor is there any indication from the JOLTS data that retail openings or hires have lost major – or any – momentum in the last few years.

The actual net new job-creation numbers don’t reveal any “retail-pocalyse,” either. Since June, 2009 (when the current recovery officially began) retail payrolls have grown by nine percent. That’s slower than the increase overall private sector employment (14.39 percent). But the gap proportionately was actually greater during the previous recovery, when private sector employment rose by 5.83 percent, and the retail sector’s staffing was up by 3.18 percent.

Maybe this is because, as widely reported, jobs are migrating from bricks and mortars retail stores to on-line shopping businesses? Absolutely. And this trend is indeed rising in importance. During the previous recovery (which only lasted six years, from the end of 2001 through the end of 2007), electronic retail employment rose by 64 percent – just about a third as fast as during the current recovery (174.44 percent).

But in absolute terms, the electronic retail sector is hardly a mass employer. Its workforce totaled less than 260,000 as of this May. Retail overall employed just under 15.85 million that month, and during the recovery, bricks and mortars payrolls grew by a not-too-shabby 1.14 million.

At the same time, the actual employment figures do show that retail hiring is running out of steam, at least for the time being. Year-on-year, the sector boosted payrolls by just 0.12 percent. The previous two May-May annual increases? 1.37 percent between 2015 and 2016, and 1.71 percent the year before. By contrast, employment grew by 12.22 percent in electronic retailing from May, 2016 to May, 2017, and by 12.60 percent the year before. So conventional stores are now losing employees on net.

At the same time, these results are a far cry from a blood-letting. And annual job-creation in the overall private sector has been slowing as well. Further, many observers insist that bricks and mortars companies long built way too many stores. So their payrolls (and overall scale) may, at least to some extent, simply be returning to more sustainable levels. These conclusions obviously won’t satisfy the Trump-haters among us. They’re simply consistent with the facts.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Where the Trump Record is Looking Different

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Barack Obama, Bureau of Labor Statitics, Employment, Great Recession, healthcare, Jobs, Mainstream Media, private sector, real private sector, recovery, subsidized private sector, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Since of course there’s no Mainstream Media bubble or echo chamber, it must be a total coincidence that the press last week was filled with articles noting that the U.S. economy today (which President Trump keeps praising) looks pretty similar to the U.S. economy before the last presidential election (which candidate Trump decried).

Generally speaking, these observations are right – with one important exception that’s been universally overlooked: Job creation this year so far has owed significantly more to the “real private sector” of the American economy and less to the “subsidized private sector.” That is, more hiring is coming in the part of the economy in which employment levels generally reflect free market forces, and therefore speak volumes about the whole economy’s fundamentals. And less hiring is taking place in industries like healthcare services, where job creation largely reflects levels of government support that stems from political decisions. Therefore, however worthy their services, employment performance in these sectors says little about the state of the economy.

RealityChek observed the possible start of this trend two months ago. Now that we’re halfway through the year, it looks more solidly established. As usual, the best evidence comes from comparing job creation in the first six months of this year with job creation during the same periods in past years. (Keep in mind, however, that the statistics for May and June, 2017, are still preliminary; that is, they’ll be revised in the next two months – and then revised again early next year along with the results for all of 2017. For good measure, the Bureau of Labor Statistics will recalculate them again further down the road.)

For the first six months of this year, total U.S. net employment gains (in the “non-farm” sector that represents the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ American employment universe) came to 1.079 million. Of these, 20.95 percent came in the subsidized private sector, and 74.05 percent came in the real private sector. (The rest came in government at all levels.)

Those figures are much different than those for the first six months of 2016 – 28.44 percent and 60.83 percent. In fact, the January-June 2017 results represent the first time since 2014 when the subsidized private sector share of total job creation fell and the real private sector share rose. At the same time, the subsidized private sector’s role in total hiring is way up from January-June, 2013 – when it was only 14.22 percent. And the real private sector’s role is way down (from 92.63 percent that year).

Another way to look at hiring developments: During the first half of 2013, subsidized private sector job creation totaled 13.31 percent of job creation in the private sector as it’s conventionally defined (that is, including the subsidized industries). By the first half of 2016, the subsidized industries’ share of conventionally defined private sector net new employment had more than doubled: to 31.86 percent.

Finally, let’s see how these employment numbers have changed on a stand-still basis.

In December, 2007 – on the eve of the Great Recession – the subsidized private sector accounted for 13.22 percent of all non-farm jobs, the share of the private sector conventionally defined was 83.83 percent, and that of the real private sector was 70.62 percent.

In June, 2009 – when the recovery began – these figures were: subsidized private sector, 14.97 percent; conventional private sector, 82.77 percent; and real private sector, 67.80 percent.

And this June? Subsidized private sector, 15.78 percent; conventional private sector, 84.73 percent; and real private sector, 68.96 percent.

In other words, although the punch has slacked off a bit, the subsidized private sector is still punching above its weight when it comes to job creation. We know this because its share of new hiring for the first six months of this year (20.95 percent) remained greater than its share of total American employment as it stood in June (15.78 percent). The real private sector is outperforming, too, but the gap is much smaller proportionately.  (The – big – slacker has been the public sector.)

Also, eight years into the current economic recovery, the real private sector’s share of total American jobs is smaller, and the subsidized private sector’s share is larger, than they were at the start of the expansion.

There’s no doubt that the American job market today is in much better shape than it was at the start of the recovery – and that most of this progress took place before President Trump took office. Nor is there much reason to doubt that until the economy’s reliance on the subsidized private sector for job creation falls considerably more, it will difficult to claim legitimately that the employment scars of the recession have fully healed. But something else that’s now increasingly clear is that a crucial job quality front, the Trump economy is looking notably different – and better.    

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Manufacturing Job Creation is Stagnating Again

Tags

Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment, inflation-adjusted wages, Jobs, manufacturing, non-farm payrolls, real wages, recovery, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

American domestic manufacturing created 1,000 net new jobs in June, but the figures underscored that the sector’s employment gains have nearly petered out recently. Including modest (3,000) downward revisions, industry’s employment has grown by only 8,000 since March. Largely as a result, manufacturing’s share of total nonfarm jobs hit a new record low – just under 8.47 percent.

Pre-inflation manufacturing wages ticked up sequentially in June (by 0.08 percent) and the pace of annual increases rose from May’s 1.92 percent to 2.08 percent. But these advances remained the lowest since October, 2015 (2.17 percent), and industry pay continued lagging that of the overall private sector, although the gap between their rates of increase narrowed over the past year – from 22.72 percent to 22.43 percent.

Here’s my analysis of the latest monthly (June) manufacturing figures contained in this morning’s employment report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics:

>U.S. domestic manufacturing grew by 1,000 on net in June, but this modest number not only contrasted with the solid employment performance registered by the economy as a whole. It also revealed that industry’s net job creation has nearly ground to a halt.

>Including total negative revisions for April and May of 3,000, domestic manufacturers have increased payrolls by only 8,000 since March.

>Largely as a result, manufacturing’s share of total nonfarm employment sank in June to just under 8.47 percent – a new all-time low.

>After falling on month at an upwardly revised 0.34 percent in May, nominal manufacturing wages edged up sequentially in June by 0.08 percent. Yet evidence persisted of a wage lag suffered by manufacturing workers.

>The current dollar monthly wage gain for private sector workers overall was 0.15 percent – nearly twice as great as that for their manufacturing counterparts.

>The same situation held for annual wage trends. Year-on-year, manufacturing pre-inflation wages rose only 2.08 percent in June. The private sector improvement was 2.46 percent.

>Moreover, the June yearly manufacturing wage advance, along with May’s upwardly revised 1.92 percent rise, were the lowest since October, 2015’s 2.17 percent.

>Between the previous Junes, pre-inflation manufacturing wages increased by 3.47 percent.

>On a pre-inflation basis, manufacturing’s wage increases during the current economic recovery still trail those of the private sector, although the gap has narrowed slightly over the last year.

>As of June, 2016, private sector pre-inflation wages were up by 15.72 percent during the expansion (which began in mid-2009) and manufacturing wages were up 12.81 percent. Therefore, private sector wages had risen by 22.72 percent faster than manufacturing wages.

>As of this June, private sector pre-inflation wages were up by 18.56 percent during the recovery, while manufacturing pay was up by 15.16 percent. Therefore, the gap between the rates of increase had shrunk to 22.43 percent.

>Factoring in inflation darkens manufacturing’s wage picture. The latest data are from May, but they show that that month, real manufacturing wages fell sequentially by 0.28 percent while they rose by that amount for the entire private sector.

>Year-on-year in May, the 0.56 percent increase in inflation-adjusted private sector wages was unimpressive. But it beat manufacturing’s performance – which flat-lined. Between May, 2015 and May, 2016, after-inflation manufacturing wages increased by 2.45 percent.

>During the entire recovery, overall private sector real wages are up 4.27 percent. For manufacturing? Less than half that improvement: 1.49 percent.

>Manufacturing’s June year-on-year jobs increase of 49,000 greatly exceeded the previous Junes’ annual increase of 9,000, underscoring the sector’s recent exit from an employment recession.

>Nonetheless, over the longer term, manufacturing has continued to lag the private sector overall on the payroll front.

>During the current economic recovery, which began in mid-2009, manufacturing employment has grown by only 5.71 percent. For the private sector as a whole during the expansion, it’s up by 14.39 percent.

>Since the late-2007 onset of the last recession, manufacturing’s performance is equally poor. From that time to the early 2010 troughs, manufacturing lost 2.293 million jobs and private sector payrolls shrank by 8.801 million.

>Since then, manufacturing has regained just 41.12 percent of those lost jobs (a total of 943,000). The private sector as a whole has boosted employment by 16.794 million.

>As a result, total private sector employment is now 6.91 percent higher than at the recession’s late-2007 onset, but manufacturing employment is still 9.82 percent lower.

Im-Politic: Beyond the (Poll) Numbers on Immigration

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culture, Democrats, economy, Gallup, Im-Politic, immigrants, Immigration, Jobs, polls, Republicans, taxes, Trump, wages

Do apparently clashing poll results on immigration mainly signal that polling companies don’t know what they’re doing? That Americans are fundamentally conflicted on the issue? Or can sensible, and even obvious, reasons be identified for the seeming gap if you just do a little extra thinking? Examining three recent Gallup soundings convinces me that it’s the latter.

On the proverbial one hand, two new Gallup surveys about immigration appear to show that Americans have become much keener on immigrants – possibly including illegal immigrants, though Gallup hasn’t drawn this distinction. On June 29, Gallup reported that a record (post-1993) share of Americans (49 percent) now agree that “immigrants mostly help the U.S. economy by providing low cost labor.” Moreover, except for a drop in the very late 1990s and early 2000s, this number has been rising – though since 2005, the increase has been gradual.

Forty percent of respondents agreed that immigrants “most hurt the economy by driving wages down for many Americans.” In contrast to the trends for those expressing favorable opinions, the share of Americans worried about immigrants’ wage-related economic impact has decreased pretty sharply since 1993 (when it stood at 64 percent), and especially since the early 2000s (when it peaked at 65 percent).

Also encouraging for proponents of more immigration or more lenient policies towards illegal immigrants: a poll the day before showing that the percentages of Americans viewing immigrants as a plus rather than a negative for the country on economic and non-economic grounds had grown impressively between 2007 and 2017. Interestingly, though, even in 2017, the only category in which a majority of Americans emphasized the positive impact of immigration was in “food, music and the arts” (57 percent – up from 40 percent in 2007). Only ten percent of Americans said that immigration had worsened matters on these scores.

On “the economy in general,” only 45 percent in 2017 saw immigrants “making the situation in the country better” (up from 28 percent in 2007). And only 23 percent and 20 percent believed that immigrants had improved the national situation when it comes to “taxes” and “job opportunities for you and your family” – up from 19 and 11 percent, respectively, in 2007.

As for those who believed immigrants’ effects were negative, 30 percent agreed with that proposition regarding the overall economy, 41 percent went along on the subject of taxes, and 28 percent expressed this view on the job issue. (The remainder of respondents stated that immigrants weren’t having much effect in any of these areas.)

As Gallup noted, positive answers to these questions in 2017 were generally at their highest levels since the firm began asking them in 2001. And despite the high negative numbers, a strong argument can be made that the considerable indifference expressed can be seen as an endorsement of immigrants’ growing numbers overall, given the emotional resonance of the issue.

Yet a June 7 Gallup survey created a substantially different picture. It reports that the shares of Americans believing that immigration “should be decreased” has kept falling since the mid-1990s (from 65 percent to 35 percent). But it was still bigger than the growing share believing that immigration “should be increased” – which has risen from the high single digits from the mid-1960s to 24 percent nowadays. Thirty five percent of Americans want “immigration to be kept at its present level,” and this number has stayed pretty stable – with some fluctuations – since the mid-1960s.

And here’s a surprise: Over the past year, the share of Democrats and Democratic leaners who favor decreasing immigration has actually risen slightly (from 20 to 23 percent) while that of Republicans and Republican leaners has shrunk from 60 percent to 48 percent. It’s true that the share of Democrats and leaners favoring greater immigration levels rose slightly as well. But it still stands at only 33 percent. (The rest expressed satisfaction with current levels.)

In this survey, Gallup analysts ventured an explanation for the unusual finding for Republicans; the GOP shift:

“could reflect a sense of political victory among Trump supporters who believe the president is fulfilling the immigration-related promises he made on the campaign trail. Republicans could, thus, feel more satisfied with the current status of immigration than they did during the height of the presidential election. Also, some Trump supporters might believe immigrants are being more thoroughly vetted by the Trump administration.”

I wish that Gallup had been as analytically ambitious in interpreting at least some of the growing popularity of the immigrant population according to the many indicators. One explanation that seems pretty obvious to me: It’s been influenced pretty considerably by the phenomenal growth of the country’s immigrant population. Indeed, since 1960, it’s more than quadrupled in absolute terms (to an estimated 41.3 million as of 2013). And from 1970 to 2013, immigrants increased their share of the American population from 4.7 percent to 13.1 percent. So more of the respondents being reached by Gallup are immigrants themselves, or their children.

It’s true that throughout American history, immigrants have shown a striking tendency to oppose more immigration once they’ve become established in their new homeland – usually for fear of facing new economic competition. But one of the most important and distinctive aspects of American immigration policy in recent decades has surely undercut this form of nativism – the focus on family reunification. That is, it’s likely that many recent immigrants favor more immigration because they view it mainly as a chance to bring in not additional low-wage workers, but close relatives. At the same time, we’ve got statistics strongly indicating that Hispanics’ views on immigration don’t necessarily dovetail with this observation.

So it seems that the most useful bottom line is that polls continue to be important sources of information about major political, social, economic, and other trends, but that to gauge public opinion accurately, you need to keep looking beyond the raw numbers.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Will Trump Take Ford’s New China Trade Hint?

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(What's Left of) Our Economy Trump, automotive, border adjustment tax, China, Ford Motor Company, imports, Jobs, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, tariffs, trade agreements, trade balances, Trade Deficits

President Trump and his administration have certainly been active on the trade front in their first months in office, both in word and deed. The question remains whether they’ve been effective, and a breaking news story has just added powerfully to the doubters’ case.

The news has to do with Ford Motor Company’s announcement that it will scrap plans to relocate its remaining small car production from the United States to Mexico and supply the American market from an existing plant in Hermosillo, and instead import the vehicles from a retooled factory in China. The initial Ford production decision came under fire from Mr. Trump, and the company’s reaction – a rejiggered Mexico plan – looked chancy for two main reasons:

First, the president had declared his intention to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in large measure to stop such production offshoring. Second, the staunchly pro-trade Republican leaders of the GOP-controlled House of Representatives had been pushing a border adjustment tax proposal that would have imposed new costs on imports from anywhere.

Ford has now underscored why both opponents and supporters of a transformed, less import-friendly U.S. trade policy have been right in one of their major criticisms of Mr. Trump’s emerging strategy: A tight focus on bilateral trade issues and balances overlooks the ability of multinational companies to shift export-oriented production in order to evade country-specific tariffs or other trade curbs.

Not that business’ ability to hopscotch is unlimited. The massive level of sunk corporate costs in export-focused production in China, for example, won’t always be easy to walk away from. And not all countries offer comparable advantages to manufacturers. So given, for example, that China accounts for more than 43 percent of the American merchandise trade deficit, or that Mexico’s geography makes it such an unusually attractive base for selling to U.S. customers, focusing on individual-country or regional priorities often makes good sense.

It’s also legitimate in principle to base trade preferences on non-economic aims, like national security (e.g., rewarding allies or strengthening third world economies against the appeal of terrorism) – though Mr. Trump has expressed strong skepticism for this approach, notably in his Inaugural Address. And of course, prioritization is often the key to any successful public policy.

But what’s especially strange about the Trump trade strategy so far is the president’s indifference – at best – to the border adjustment tax idea. On top of undercutting corporate tariff arbitrage strategies by levying a tax on all imports (and encouraging exports), the measure would also bring in revenue needed to finance crucial domestic needs like infrastructure and healthcare reform without completely busting the federal budget. And its passage would by no means preclude addressing special trade priorities of all kinds with additional restrictions.

Ford’s new production announcement is just the latest in a series of comments from Corporate America that bear out one of President Trump’s central insights: that trade policy changes can decisively influence corporate sourcing decisions to America’s benefit. Now, however, he needs to recognize that his essential goal of using trade restrictions to lure valuable manufacturing production and jobs back to the United States requires policies with global scope. The half- (at best) measures he’s favored so far are just too easily gamed.

Making News: A New USAToday Op-Ed – & More!

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automation, climate change, Germany, Jobs, Lifezette.com, Making News, manufacturing, Paris climate accord, Trade, Trump, USAToday

I’m pleased to announce the publication of my latest op-ed article – a piece that appears in USAToday this morning on President Trump’s criticisms of Germany’s trade policies. Here’s the link.

Incidentally, the article ran as a rejoinder to an unsigned USAToday editorial on the subject that also was published today.  The paper’s editors have been using this “pro-con” format for many years, and I think they deserve great credit for seeking out viewspoints with which they disagree.

In addition, a June 1 post on Lifezette.com included my (skeptical) opinions about claims that Mr. Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris climate change accord will cede global leadership on the issue to China.

Moreover, a May 25 Lifezette article quoted me on a new study finding that trade and offshoring have been responsible for much more manufacturing job loss lately than automation.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming and recent media appearances and other developments.

 

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: May Sees First Manufacturing Jobs Drop in Six Months, but Wages Ride a Roller-Coaster

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Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment, inflation-adjusted wages, Jobs, manufacturing, recession, recovery, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

May’s monthly manufacturing employment drop of 1,000 ended the sector’s five-month string of sequential employment gains – its best such stretch since a near two year-long span between 2013 and 2015. Industry’s wages, though, roller-coastered for the second consecutive month, with May’s 0.45 percent pre-inflation drop (the worst) since last November’s 0.48 percent) following an upwardly revised jump of 0.76 percent in April (the best since October, 2008’s 0.81 percent, when the Great Recession was beginning).

Although manufacturing payrolls shrank in May, they still registered their biggest annual increase (63,000) since February, 2016 (69,000), and reversed the slight (2,000) decline between the previous two Mays. Yet these performances couldn’t change manufacturing’s status as a longer-term job-creation and wages laggard. Indeed, not only did its current dollar wages fall on month, but their annual increase was the slowest (1.86 percent) since July, 2014’s 1.57 percent. Further, the gap between the pre-inflation growth of industry’s paychecks and those of the private sector generally has been widening. March and April manufacturing employment revisions produced a net employment gain of 3,000.

Here’s my analysis of the latest monthly (May) manufacturing figures contained in this morning’s employment report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics:

>May brought an end to manufacturing’s best (five-month) sequential job gains string since 2013-2015, as payrolls dipped 1,000 below April’s levels.

>At the same time, industry’s pre-inflation wages seemed to climb aboard a roller-coaster. May’s 0.45 decline was the biggest since November, 2008’s 0.48 percent decrease. Bt it followed an upwardly revised April 0.76 percent jump – the biggest since October, 2008’s 0.81 percent – which was aided by many companies that perceived the start of the last recession cutting labor costs by laying off mainly less experienced, lower-paid workers.

>Even with May’s monthly employment drop, manufacturing’s year-on-year job gain of 63,000 was still the largest such number since February, 2016’s 69,000. More impressive, between the previous two Mays, manufacturing lost 2,000 jobs on net.

>Nonetheless, over the longer term, manufacturing has continued to lag the private sector overall on the payroll and paycheck fronts.

>During the current economic recovery, which began in mid-2009, manufacturing employment has grown by only 5.73 percent. For the private sector as a whole during the expansion, it’s up by 13.74 percent.

>Since the late-2007 onset of the last recession, manufacturing’s performance is equally poor. From that time to the early 2010 troughs, manufacturing lost 2.293 million jobs and private sector payrolls shrank by 8.801 million.

>Since then, manufacturing has regained just 41.21 percent of those lost jobs (a total of 945,000). The private sector as a whole has boosted employment by 16.574 million.

>As a result, total private sector employment is now 6.72 percent higher than at the recession’s late-2007 onset, but manufacturing employment is still 9.81 percent lower.

>Similar trends have played out in terms of both pre-inflation and after-inflation wages.

>Manufacturing’s 0.45 percent May monthly current dollar wage decline was considerably worse than the private sector’s 0.15 percent improvement.

>Year-on-year, manufacturing pre-inflation wages rose only 1.85 percent – not only much more sluggishly than the 3.46 percent increase between May, 2015 and May, 2016, but the weakest such rate since July, 2014 (1.57 percent).

>On a pre-inflation basis, manufacturing’s wage increases during the current economic recovery still trail those of the private sector, and the gap is widening. As of May, private sector pre-inflation wages were up by 18.43 percent during the expansion, versus a 14.99 percent increase for manufacturing wages. As a result, private sector wages had risen by 22.95 percent more over these nearly eight years than manufacturing wages.

>As of last May, however, recovery-era private sector wages were up by 15.58 percent, and manufacturing wages were up by 12.90 percent – resulting in a smaller, 20.76 percent, difference between the two.

>Adjusting wages for inflation produces a somewhat brighter picture for manufacturing. The latest figures are from April, and the sector’s after-inflation pay has been revised up from a 0.46 percent monthly gain to 0.55 percent – the best since August, 2015′ 0.66 percent. Real private sector wages in May, by contrast, has been revised down from a 0.09 monthly gain to flat.

>Year-on-year, real manufacturing wages have outperformed their private sector counterpart, too, advancing by 0.55 percent (much less, though, than the previous year’s 1.79 percent) versus 0.28 percent for the overall private sector (also much less than the previous annual increase of 1.42 percent).

>But during the current recovery, real manufacturing wages are up only 1.59 percent in toto. That’s less than half as fast as the overall private sector increase of 3.98 percent.

>Manufacturing’s March monthly job gain, which had been revised up from 11,000 to 13,000, has now been downgraded back down to 11,000. April’s previously reported 6,000 sequential employment increase has been revised up – also to 11,000.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Has Subsidized Private Sector Hiring Peaked (Relatively Speaking)?

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CNN.com, Employment, healthcare services, Jobs, Labor Department, non-farm jobs, private sector, real private sector, recession, recovery, subsidized private sector, The New York Times, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Snob’s Manual tells us (often correctly) that you know when the stock market’s peaked when the retail investor rushes in, and that you know when a fad is passe when the mainstream media report it. Could the same maxim be on target for economic trends, like the outsized role played by the U.S. subsidized private sector in job creation during the recovery? I’m not sure yet, but the last few sets of monthly American employment data (including last Friday’s April figures) are certainly food for thought.

As RealityChek regulars know, I’ve been spotlighting this trend since well before RealityChek was born. And it was great to see the theme picked up last month by a major reporter who covers the healthcare sector (the core of that part of the economy dubbed private sector but in fact heavily dependent on government spending). Since then, healthcare hiring’s unusual recent robustness has been covered by The New York Times and CNN.com.

Here’s the rub: So far this year, subsidized private sector job creation has become less important in the overall employment picture, not more. The March and April statistics are still preliminary, but since January, the pace of subsidized private sector hiring has ranged between 7.87 percent of total monthly job creation (in January) to 29.31 percent (in February). The April figure was right in the middle: 19.43 percent.

The subsidized private sector’s waning momentum – at least relatively speaking – comes through more clearly when the first four months of this year are compared with their last few counterparts. From January through April, 2017, subsidized private sector net new job creation (which also includes social assistance agencies and the for-profit education sector) represented 18.43 percent of the non-farm total (the Labor Department’s definition of the American employment universe.

That share is considerably higher than the figure for the first two months of 2013 and 2014 (14.56 percent and 12.53 percent, respectively). But it’s also considerably lower than the 27.68 percent for 2015 and the 23.87 percent for the same time span in 2016. In addition, these numbers show that the subsidized private sector’s importance has not fallen for two straight years.

That’s not to say that the subsidized private sector isn’t still punching above its weight. Its 19.43 percent of net new job creation was still greater than its share of total employment on a standstill basis (15.75 percent). It’s also still higher than the share at the mid-2009 onset of the current recovery (14.97 percent). And it’s much higher than the share at the start of the last recession at the end of 2007 (13.22 percent). But there’s no doubt that this year it’s not punching quite as hard.

The flip side of the equation tells a similar, but not identical, story. The “real private sector” – where job creation is determined largely by market forces, not government decisions – stood at 68.95 percent of total non-farm jobs last month. That’s actually a little higher than its share at the start of the recovery (67.80 percent). But it’s also still a little lower than its share at the start of the last recession – more than nine years ago (70.62 percent).

There’s still a long way to go in figuring out whether these early 2017 results will hold up even through the end of this year, much less whether they represent hiring that’s peaking (again, relatively speaking) in the subsidized private sector. And of course a huge question mark is hanging over this entire chunk of the economy in the form of the healthcare debate. But the real implications are unchanged. Although subsidized private sector jobs serve many valuable purposes, the more the economy leans on them to generate employment and incomes, the less dynamic and productive the nation is bound to be.