(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Trump Effect on U.S. Manufacturing Workers

Tags

blue-collar workers, election 2020, inflation-adjusted wages, Jobs, manufacturing, Obama, real wages, Trump, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

There’s no question that President Trump has compiled a solid record when it comes to boosting American manufacturing employment, and the numbers look especially good compared with that of his predecessor, Barack Obama.

Wages, though? They remain another story entirely, and keep raising the question of how convincingly during his reelection campaign the President will be able to portray himself as a godsend to U.S. industry’s workers.

According to the most valid comparison that can be made to date, during the 29 months since Mr. Trump settled into the Oval Office (February, 2017), overall manufacturing employment and blue-collar manufacturing employment are both up considerably faster than during the last 29 months of the Obama administration. Here are the specific percentage gains for the manufacturing sector overall, and for industry’s non-supervisory and production workers – often informally dubbed “blue-collar workers”:

                                                Last 29 Obama months        First 29 Trump months

Manufacturing:                            +1.31 percent                        +3.86 percent

Blue-collar manufacturing:         +0.92 percent                         +3.40 percent

But the average hourly wage figures adjusted for inflation actually flip these results on their head:

                                              Last 29 Obama months          First 29 Trump months

Manufacturing:                           +3.05 percent                           -0.09 percent

Blue-collar manufacturing:         +3.22 percent                          +2.31 percent

It’s true that manufacturing’s blue-collar workers during the Trump era so far have been faring far better than their supervisors (who remain better paid in absolute terms). But the price-adjusted paychecks are growing significantly more slowly than they were during the final Obama years.

Of course, this politics-centric post on manufacturing wouldn’t be complete without discussing how President Trump’s tariffs have affected the picture. And here the script is arguably flipped once again to some extent, at least during the Trump years alone. The table below shows the average monthly jobs gains recorded for manufacturing and blue-collar manufacturing before the first metals tariffs were imposed (March, 2018) and after. Since the time frames differ somewhat, I thought the monthly averages would illustrate the trends more clearly.

                                                   Pre-tariffs                                  Post-tariffs

Manufacturing:                            17.38K                                       15.07K

Blue-collar manufacturing:         11.54K                                           8.6K

After the tariffs, the pace of manufacturing employment increases slowed somewhat, but it slowed much faster for blue-collar manufacturing workers.

Now for the wages results, presented as the average monthly changes in absolute (dollars and cents) terms:

                                               Pre-tariffs                                     Post-tariffs

Manufacturing                        -3 cents                                         +2 cents

Blue-collar manufacturing    +8 cents                                          +5 cents

In sum, after-inflation hourly pay rose slightly after the trade curbs came on after having fallen beforehand. Real wages for blue-collar manufacturing workers rose during both periods, but more slowly after the tariffs.

These results indicate that the President can make a decent case that his administration, and even his tariffs, have helped manufacturing workers on balance. But on the pay front in particular, the story gets complicated – and the kind of rhetorical precision Mr. Trump will need to display to date in order to tout these achievements credibly doesn’t seem to be one of his strong suits.

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Making News: A National Radio Update of the Trade War…& More!

Tags

China, Clare Goldsberry, CNBC.com, Gordon G. Chang, IndustryToday.com, Jake Novak, Jobs, Making News, manufacturing, Plastics Today, tariffs, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, trade war, Trump

I’m pleased to announce that last night, I was interviewed on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show, where John, co-host Gordon G. Chang, and I updated the U.S.-China conflict – which now includes not only a trade war and a tech war, but a currency war (all closely related of course).

As usual, if you couldn’t tune in (and apologies for not being able to post a heads up last night), I’ll put up a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

In addition this morning, Industrytoday.com republished my post from August 2 detailing the mixed trade war-related results from the latest (July) U.S. jobs report.  Here’s the link.

Also, it was great to see economic analyst Jake Novak’s Monday column for CNBC.com reference my views on Trump tariffs’ (so far marginal) impact on the U.S. economy.  You can access it here.

That same day, a piece by Plastic Today‘s Clare Goldsberry spotlighted more evidence from RealityChek showing that America’s manufacturers are withstanding the trade conflict just fine.  Click here to read.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Jobs Fog of Trade War

Tags

aluminum, China, Jobs, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Domestic U.S. manufacturing turned in a mixed job creation performance in July, with this morning’s figures containing fodder both for the optimists and the pessimists. And the ambiguousness extended to interpreting the results of President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies – which is not entirely surprising, especially given the nature of the China duties, which have been imposed in phases, and where threats have displayed an on-again-off-again nature.

Overall, the optimists could point out that the new Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data showed a fourth straight sequential gain for manufacturing employment, as industry added 16,000 net new jobs in July. Moreover, the monthly rate of payroll increases is up from 3,000 in April. In fact, the July sequential gain was the sector’s best since January, when manufacturers grew net employment by 17,000.

Nonetheless, the revisions were decidedly negative, with May’s increases being downgraded from 4,000 to 2,000, and June’s all the way down from 17,000 to 12,000. Moreover, July’s 157,000 year-on-year manufacturing employment improvement was the lowest in absolute terms since October, 2017’s 146,000.

Identifying a clear bottom line from the trade war-specific manufacturing employment results is just as difficult. First, let’s look at the performance of the major metals-using sectors, which have faced varying levels of tariffs on steel and aluminum since spring, 2018. (April was the first full month in which they were in place.) Here’s the comparison between their employment changes since then, and those of manufacturing overall and the American private sector overall. Also included are the figures for home appliances (where producers of large household laundry machines have been dealing not only with the metals tariffs but with separate, product-specific levies that began that February). It’s also important to note that figures for these goods and for aerospace products and parts are one month behind the rest. So for those two sectors, the results are for (from left to right), the previously reported May figures, the latest May figures, and the June figures.

An optimist could observe that two of the durable goods sectors, fabricated metals products and automotive, have increased their hiring momentum versus the broader economy, the overall manufacturing sector, and even the durable goods super-sector (where the main metals-using industries are found).

The pessimists, however, could say that through the end of 2018, the metal users in general were clearly besting all of their counterparts in job creation, and that their relative strength has faded since.

                                                       Old thru June     New thru June     Thru July

entire private sector:                     +2.14 percent      +2.13 percent   +2.25 percent

overall manufacturing:                 +1.74 percent      +1.69 percent   +1.82 percent

durable goods:                              +2.11 percent      +2.10 percent   +2.25 percent

fabricated metals products:          +1.49 percent      +1.71 percent   +1.74 percent

non-electrical machinery:            +2.92 percent      +2.73 percent   +2.40 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:       +0.27 percent      +0.33 percent   +1.06 percent

household appliances*:                -4.73 percent        -4.89 percent    -6.15 percent

aerospace products & parts*:      +7.46 percent       +7.44 percent   +7.64 percent

*data are one month behind

And two final complications: First, the low (in absolute terms) hiring gains for the automotive sector surely in large measure reflect not only tariffs on metals, but the slow decline of auto and light truck sales that began back in the summer of 2015 after a strong post-recessionary comeback – and well before any metals duties. And with the automotive sector such a big consumer of machinery and fabricated metals products, its troubles undoubtedly bleed into those industries and have dragged down their results for equally non-trade-related reasons.

Second, the aerospace industry is another big purchaser of inputs from throughout domestic manufacturing, and especially from other metals-using industries. So although its employment levels appear to have held up exceedingly well, they might be better still if not for the safety problems encountered by Boeing.

The case for optimism looks much stronger for those industries that seem to be most greatly affected by the China tariffs. But as usual, the results are surrounded by much greater uncertainties – mainly because the scope and level of these levies has changed so significantly since the first batch went into effect in July, 2018; because the use of Chinese inputs in domestic manufacturing is so widespread but also varies so considerably; and because the list of products hit by China tariffs uses a manufacturing classification system different from that used by the BLS to track jobs.

So the following China figures – presenting employment changes for what look like some of the main China-affected industries since July, 2018, plus those for broader parts of the economy to provide some context – should still be viewed with extreme caution. (I’ve added the results for non-durables, too, since the use of Chinese inputs is so widespread.) Moreover, as indicated below, the results for those main China-affected sectors are always one month late.

                                      July-May       Old July-June     New July-June   July-July

private sector:           +1.45 percent    +1.46 percent     +1.59 percent +1.71 percent

overall mfg:              +1.02 percent    +1.16 percent     +1.11 percent +1.24 percent

durable goods:          +1.22 percent     not available     +1.36 percent +1.51 percent

non-durable goods:  +0.67 percent     not available    +0.70 percent  +0.80 percent 

aircraft engines &     +1.51 percent    not available     +1.86 percent   not available

  engine parts:

industrial heating      +1.12 percent    not available     +2.24 percent   not available

  equip:

oil & gas drilling      +4.88 percent     not available    +5.56 percent    not available

  platform parts:

farm machinery        -1.00 percent     not available         0 percent      not available

  & equip

ball bearings:           +2.39 percent     not available    +3.16 percent    not available

At least through June, however, all of the apparent China tariff-specific industries have displayed much stronger recent hiring strength relative to industry and the economy as a whole. This greater momentum, moreover, is especially noteworthy given that the scale of the China duties has broadened so dramatically since July, 2018, and the tariff rates for so many products have been increased a second time.

Nonetheless, the China-related data are especially dodgy. And of course, President Trump just yesterday threatened a big new set of tariffs on the imports from China not already hit with duties. Which may or may not actually be imposed. And that may contain plenty of exemptions. All good reasons for analysts to remain data dependent – and prudent in the extreme – when judging how the U.S. economy is faring as the trade wars rage on.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Job Quality Takes a Turn for the Worse

Tags

Employment, healthcare services, Jobs, private sector, public sector, recovery, subsidized private sector, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s how bad America’s employment performance has been so far this year. Not only has job creation lagged quantitatively. But by one key measure that RealityChek has followed for years, job quality worsened, too. Specifically, after falling significantly during the first two years of the Trump administration as a share of total hiring, job creation in what I call the subsidized private sector of the economy is up sharply.

To review, the subsidized private sector – dominated by healthcare services – consists of those industries that are typically classified (including by federal government statisticians) as private sector industries, but whose levels of activity (including job creation) are determined largely by politicians’ decisions about levels of government support, not market forces.

This observation doesn’t imply any conclusion that subsidized private sector jobs are merit-less. But it does reflect the understandable and commonly held belief that the genuine private sector is the economy’s main source of productivity growth and innovation, and that therefore it should dominate job creation as well.

The main evidence comes in the form of the figures on the subsidized private sector’s share of total hiring in America, of hiring in the private sector as conventionally defined (which includes the subsidized numbers), and of hiring in the “real private sector” (the total resulting from subtracting the subsidized private sector from the conventionally defined private sector figures). And since we only have data for the first six months of this year (including those for June, which are still preliminary), the time frames compared here will consist of the first six months of each year since the June, 2009 beginning of the current economic recovery).

During the first six months on Mr. Trump’s watch, net new subsidized private sector job creation accounted for 22.29 percent of total job creation (“non-farm” hiring, as the Bureau of Labor Statistics – BLS – defines it), for 23.41 percent of such hiring in the conventionally defined private sector, and of 30.57 percent of the net new jobs in the “real private sector.”

During the first six months of 2018, these shares all declined – to 18.85 percent, 19.75 percent, and 24.61 percent, respectively. At least as important, they were among the lowest recorded during the current recovery. In particular, they were all lower than they were during the first six months of President Obama’s last year in office – when they reached 28.57 percent, 31.57 percent, and 46.13 percent. That is, from January through June of 2016, the increase in subsidized private sector payrolls was nearly half as large as all net new hiring in the rest of the private sector (the “real private sector”) – which is much larger.

But during the first six months of this year, the subsidized private sector made a tremendous comeback.

These industries’ share of total net new U.S. hiring jumped from 18.85 percent to 30.88 percent. Its share of conventionally defined private sector hiring rose from 19.75 percent to 33.06 percent. And net payroll increases in the subsidized private sector compared with “real private sector” payroll increases more than doubled – from 24.61 percent to 49.38 percent.

Even worse, all three results were the highest registered during the current recovery.

The only (mildly encouraging) news on the job quality front in this respect (accepting my assumption that relatively weak job creation in the “real private sector” is a troubling development): On a standstill basis (representing a snapshot, not measuring rate of change), the combined share of total hiring accounted for by the subsidized private sector and the public sector keeps falling. But that’s clearly because job creation in the public sector proper remains weak.

At the onset of the last recession – at the end of 2007 – these jobs amounted to 29.84 percent of all U.S. jobs tracked by the BLS. When the recovery began, this figure had increased to 32.20 percent. By last June, it has dipped to 30.94 percent. And as of this past June (again, preliminarily), it was down to 30.87 percent. That’s still higher than when the last recession began, so it’s possible to argue that the American labor market still hasn’t fully normalized. If the subsidized private sector’s recent job creation resurgence isn’t interrupted, such normalization will become an ever more distant goal.

Following Up: Many (and Maybe Most) U.S. Manufacturers Aren’t Buying the Tariff Fear-Mongering

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capex, Dallas Federal Reserve, exports, Following Up, growth, Jobs, manufacturing, NAM, National Association of Manufacturers, Sikich, tariffs, Trade, trade wars

What a week for polls seeking to shed some light on whether and how much President Trump’s tariffs-heavy trade policies have affected American domestic manufacturing! Monday’s post reported on findings from the Dallas Federal Reserve bank pointing to the answer, “Not nearly as much damage as widely supposed, and some benefits.”

Since then, the results of two more surveys have been published, and they, too, indicate that the situation is much more complicated than portrayed by the gloom and doom claims and predictions from globalization cheerleaders in politics, the media, and the U.S. Offshoring Lobby. And one of them shows that more domestic American manufacturers are expecting net gains, not net losses, from the trade wars – and even that many are coping with more and higher tariffs by boosting their production at home. 

Let’s start with the poll supporting the “tariffmageddon” narrative most strongly. It’s the National Association of Manufacturers’ (NAM) Quarterly Outlook Survey for the second quarter of 2019. The headline number for trade mavens: 56 percent of the 689 respondent companies called “Trade uncertainties” their “primary current business challenge.” This concern trailed only “Attracting and retaining a quality workforce” (68.6 percent). During the first quarter, trade uncertainties were the top concern of only 52.6 percent of respondents – so that number’s up, but not dramatically.

For good measure, along these lines, the expected growth rate for exports over the next year was just 0.4 percent – the lowest such figure provided in eleven quarters (going back to the third quarter of 2016).

In addition, respondents’ expectations of major performance indicators also weakened from the first quarter’s results, including their own company’s outlook, and the growth of sales, production, hiring, and capital spending.

But again, the difference between the first and second quarter responses wasn’t game-changing. Indeed, nearly 80 percent of the companies described their outlooks as positive (down from nearly 90 percent in March, sales growth predictions declined from 4.4 percent to 3.4 percent, ditto for production growth, full-time payroll growth dropped from 2.1 percent to 1.6 percent, and capital spending from 2.8 percent to 2.2 percent. The only indicator that slipped into negative territory was inventories (from 0.4 percent growth to 0.1 percent contraction).

So that’s the glass-half-empty evidence. And now for something if not completely different, pretty substantially so. It’s a survey of manufacturers from Sikich, a Chicago-based accounting and consulting firm, and its headline finding: More executives reported feeling optimistic about the impact of recent and ongoing trade developments (38 percent) than expected a negative impact (35 percent). And the most optimistic respondents came from larger companies (45 percent) and “companies with operations outside the U.S.” (51 percent).

Even better for the Trump administration and its trade policy supporters – Sikich’s findings about how companies are responding to these trade developments: “The action cited most often was manufacturing more products, or components, in the United States (45%).” At the same time, “a substantial portion of companies are looking to diversify procurement by sourcing purchased materials from new countries (36%) and sourcing raw materials from new countries (33%).” (Note: These answers aren’t necessarily mutually exclusive.)

In terms of their overall assessment of the economy, only 27 percent of the Sikich respondents believe that a U.S. recession over the next year is “extremely or very likely.” Interestingly, in light of their above trade-related responses, 49 percent of executives from larger companies – nearly twice as great a percentage – were expecting such a downturn.

And especially encouraging for all Americans: Not only were 63 percent of respondents nonetheless preparing for the possibility of a recession. But 53 percent of the total said they were “increasing the efficiency of production/business processes to reduce costs.” Such productivity-boosting measures are much more constructive – and economically beneficial – actions than whining about an imminent end to access to government-subsidized, artificially cheap inputs from places like China.

Nor do the Dallas Fed and Sikich results look like outliers. Their results are very much in line with those of polls I reported on last September – from the big Swiss-owned investment bank UBS, and Yahoo Finance.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Evidence that Trump’s Trade Wars are Winning for America

Tags

capital spending, Dallas Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve, Jobs, manufacturers, manufacturing, output, production, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s how weird today’s (covering June) Dallas Federal Reserve Bank manufacturing report is. It’s prompted me to write my first ever RealityChek post on an individual regional Fed manufacturing report. And I’m writing this subject instead of my original plan to blog on the Iran/Persian Gulf crisis – which is of course generating lots of headlines.

The main reason? The Dallas findings include considerable evidence that domestic U.S. manufacturing is withstanding President Trump’s trade wars quite well thank you – at worst – and that his tariffs are bringing back a good deal more production to the United States than widely supposed. 

For readers not familiar with such reports, every month, several of the regional branches in the national Federal Reserve system issue results of surveys they conduct on the state of manufacturing in the geographic districts they monitor and whose financial sectors they help regulate. The Dallas Fed’s “jurisdiction” is Texas, northern Louisiana, and southern New Mexico. And because Texas is such an important manufacturing state, the Dallas reports are considered especially important in judging the health of American manufacturing as a whole.

Today’s Dallas Fed report began unusually enough, with a series of seemingly contradictory findings stemming from its usual indicators. For example, the so-called headline figure – which purports to measure district manufacturers’ perceptions of overall industry conditions for a particular month – not only worsened for the second straight month. It sank even deeper into numerical territory that supposedly signals manufacturing contraction.

At the same time, these companies’ reports on their output (like all the regional Fed manufacturing surveys, the Dallas Fed’s gauges “sentiment,” or companies’ descriptions of their activities, rather than measuring the activity itself), rose slightly higher into the numerical territory signaling manufacturing expansion. So did the “new orders” indicator – though it was slightly weaker in absolute terms. (That is, it wasn’t signaling expansion as strongly as the output indicator.)

Dallas Fed district manufacturers also stated that they were continuing to hire, and work their employees more hours per weak – though the growth here slowed from that they reported the previous month. The only indicator which registered a major monthly drop was capital spending. It dropped by double-digits percentage points to a two-year low, but still remained in expansion territory.

Interestingly, the Dallas results roughly mirrored the June report from another closely watched Fed district – Philadelphia’s.

But what was really weird about today’s Dallas Fed report were the answers regional manufacturers gave to a series of “Special Questions” about the impact of President Trump’s tariffs. The responses from 115 companies made clear that they believed that the levies effects were more damaging than last September, when they previously answered these questions (and when Texas and national manufacturing was going great guns).

But the difference was anything but dramatic. By many key measures, strong majorities reported that the tariffs had “no impact” on their fortunes. The companies expected the tariff damage to fade considerably within two years. And many of them were responding to tariff pressures they faced by replacing foreign suppliers with domestic suppliers. In other words, they were replacing imports with domestic orders and production.

For example, between last September and this month, the share of Texas manufacturers stating that the U.S. and foreign retaliatory tariffs had had “no impact” on their production levels fell only from 65.9 percent to 60.9 percent. The share reporting “no impact” on employment dipped from 82.1 percent to a still lofty 78.3 percent, and on capital spending from 69.4 percent to 64.9 percent. I.e., these results don’t exactly scream “Tariffmageddon!”

For those companies that did report tariff-related changes, the gap for each of these indicators between those reporting damage and those reporting benefits definitely widened in favor of damage. But again, the differences – over a nine-month period during which lots of tariffs were actually imposed or increased – were on the limited side. The biggest deterioration, for example, took place in capital spending. In September, 20 percent of the manufacturers responding reported that the tariffs were leading them to cut such investments. This month, that share rose to 27.2 percent. Slightly behind capital spending in this respect was output, with the “decrease” share increasing from 20 percent to 26.1 percent.

The share of companies reporting benefits from the tariffs declined, too – but much more modestly. And in June, they still averaged close to ten percent.

By contrast, the companies’ views on their ability to cope successfully over time with the U.S. and foreign retaliatory tariffs brightened through 2021. The share expecting net tariffs damage dropped from 41 percent to 32 percent, and the share expecting net benefits doubled – to 18 percent.

And potentially most interesting of all – many more companies that reported net negative impacts from tariffs were responding by replacing imports with domestic production, not with non-tariff-ed foreign products. The sample size here is small (46 firms), but 17.4 percent said they were “mitigating” the tariff damage by finding new domestic suppliers and another 17.4 percent were bringing “production or processes” back in-house. Only 10.9 percent answered “finding new foreign suppliers.”

When it comes to China, I’ve long maintained that any reduction in Chinese industrial capacity benefits the United States, even if imports from China are replaced by imports from elsewhere. But the Dallas results show that the number of companies responding by bringing production back home in one way or another – as President Trump has promised – could be much higher than many skeptics have claimed and predicted.

Sentiment surveys like the regional Fed reports are no substitute for the actual data (largely for the “survivorship bias” problems I’ve explained in this post). But if more of these institutions could keep track of their manufacturers’ stated experiences with and responses to the Trump trade wars – and on an ongoing, not sporadic, basis – they could help the nation better understand the real consequences.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Jobs Report Again Shows Evidence of Tariffs Damage

Tags

China, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

A speaking engagement yesterday prevented me from posting promptly on that morning’s monthly U.S. jobs report (for May), but after crunching the numbers, two conclusions come through loud and clear. First, the overall results added up to a total stinker. And second, like last month’s release, they contained more evidence that President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies are taking a toll on hiring in manufacturing.

As with economy-wide (“non-farm”) hiring in May, manufacturing employment creation in general grew weakly – and for the fourth straight month. Industry’s payrolls rose by a measly 3,000 on month in May. The revisions, meanwhile, left the discouraging situation basically intact, as April’s previously reported 4,000 net sequential job gain was upgraded to 5,000, but March’s former flatline is now judged to have been a 3,000 net monthly job decrease.

As usual, however, when it comes to the trade policy implications, the results that count are those in manufacturing sectors actually significantly affected by trade policy moves like Mr. Trump’s tariffs. First let’s examine industry’s major metals-using sectors – both the necessary data for these industries goes back to April, 2018 (the first full month when these levies were in effect) and because the industries themselves are much easier to identify.

Here are the figures for these sectors’ employment changes between that month and this past April (both the originally reported numbers and today’s revisions), and between April, 2018 and May, 2019. (All these results, incidentally, are still preliminary.) Serving as control groups are the results for the entire private sector in the United States, for all of manufacturing, and for the durable goods super-sector (where all the main metals-using industries have been found).

                                                    Old thru April   New thru April   April Thru May

entire private sector:                  +1.79 percent     +1.93 percent      +2.00 percent

overall manufacturing:              +1.58 percent     +1.60 percent      +1.62 percent

durable goods:                           +1.92 percent     +1.94 percent      +1.99 percent

fabricated metals products:       +1.82 percent     +1.71 percent      +1.65 percent

non-electrical machinery:         +2.68 percent     +2.52 percent      +2.64 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:    +0.42 percent     +0.20 percent     + 0.48 percent

household appliances:               not available       -4.57 percent       not available

aerospace products & parts:      not available      +7.02 percent       not available

The pattern is clear. Even in metals-using sectors that had been outperforming the overall private sector and overall manufacturing in absolute terms, hiring momentum has waned. Moreover, it’s recently been slackening at a faster rate than evident in those larger sectors. That’s clear from the narrowing of the gap that can generally be seen between the employment increases in the metals-using sectors and the broader parts of the economy.

The impact of the China tariffs remains a puzzle, though, because they’ve been in place for a briefer period of time, and because the industry classification system used by the Trump administration in developing its tariff lists is different from the system used by the Labor Department to track employment changes. In addition, the level of China content of domestic manufactured goods can vary considerably, meaning that the impact of the tariffs can vary just as considerably.

Nevertheless, some exact and reasonably close matches can be identified, and, at least through April (the latest month for which data are available for the specific sectors below, which are narrower than those in the table for metals-using industries), the same relative hiring weakness can be seen. That is, job creation in the China tariffs-affected sectors has been growing more slowly than job creation in the private sector in toto, or in manufacturing overall. This trend is visible even in sectors that have greatly bested the private sector and manufacturing control groups in absolute levels of job creation.

                                   July-March    Old July-April   New July-April    July-May

private sector:         +1.23 percent   +1.44 percent    +1.39 percent    +1.46 percent

overall                   +0.98 percent  +1.03 percent     +1.02 percent     +1.04 percent  

   manufacturing:

aircraft engines       +1.39 percent    not available    +1.51 percent    not available

   and engine parts:

industrial heating   +2.46 percent     not available    +1.45 percent    not available

    equipment:

oil & gas drilling   +5.83 percent      not available   +5.02 percent    not available

    platform parts:

farm machinery     +1.67 percent      not available   +0.17 percent     not available

    & equipment:

ball bearings:        +1.82 percent       not available   +1.54 percent     not available

These results don’t mean that the Trump tariffs, as some keep predicting, are going to throw the American economy into recession, much less that if they do start biting significantly, that they won’t be a price worth paying for overhauling decades of boneheaded, offshoring-friendly, national security threatening (especially in the case of China) trade policies. In fact, they don’t even add up to evidence that the levies are biting significantly now.

But empirical evidence of some damage is finally emerging, at least on the jobs front, and it should be seen as a warning to tariff supporters – including the President – to stop insisting that the current trade wars will entail no costs or need for sacrifice whatever.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Are Trump’s Metals Tariffs Starting to Backfire?

Tags

aluminum, China, Jobs, manufacturing, metals, metals-using industries, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Friday’s monthly U.S. jobs report (covering April) not only included the third straight month of weak manufacturing employment gains. It contained the first notable evidence that President Trump’s tariffs (at least on imports of steel and aluminum) contributed to a payroll slowdown.

Industry created only 4,000 new jobs sequentially in April. The February and March revisions were positive (the latter from an increase of 1,000 to 8,000, and the latter from a decrease of 6,000 to no change. But these single-digit (at best) results represented manufacturing’s poorest three-month employment performance stretch (producing a cumulative net gain of 12,000 since January) since the September-December, 2016 period (when the increase was 11,000).

At least as important, the greatest weakness came in those manufacturing sectors that most heavily use the metals for which tariffs have been imposed by Mr. Trump since April, 2018. Whereas until the April, 2019 data, these industries (the main ones are listed in the table below) were generally creating jobs at a faster pace than less metals-reliant manufacturing sectors and even the private sector economy overall, that out-performance came to an end for the industries where April figures are available.

                                                 Old thru March      New thru March      Thru April

entire private sector:                +1.78 percent          +1.79 percent      +1.98 percent

overall manufacturing:            +1.48 percent          +1.58 percent      +1.61 percent

durable goods:                         +1.85 percent          +1.92 percent      +1.92 percent

fabricated metals products:     +1.60 percent          +1.82 percent      +1.80 percent

non-electrical machinery:       +2.76 percent          +2.68 percent      +2.44 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:  +0.40 percent          +0.42 percent     +0.27 percent

household appliances:              not available           -4.10 percent      not available

aerospace products & parts:     not available          +6.56 percent      not available

In other words, as the private sector and manufacturing in general both generated greater employment increases in April than in March (the latter just barely), the metals-using sectors’ April gains were smaller than March’s, and the durable goods super-sector in which they’re all found could only match its March jobs improvement rate.

Further, one point to bear in mind about the numbers for household appliances. This sector includes the large household laundry machines that saw a separate set of tariffs imposed starting in February, 2018.

As usual, the impact of the President’s tariffs on products made in China are more difficult to judge for at least four reasons. First, an enormous number of manufacturing industries use Chinese inputs – and to greatly varying extents. Second, these levies only began in July, and then on a relatively small scale. Third, the list of products tariff-ed beginning in July matches up imperfectly at best with the sectoral classification scheme used by the Labor Department to track manufacturing employment. And fourth, most of the affected products are found in relatively narrow categories of manufactures, where the jobs data is one month behind.

To muddy the waters further, in late February, the President decided to suspend an increase slated to go into effect March 1 on tariffs that began in late September on $200 billion in imports from China. His stated reason: progress in the bilateral trade talks. The levies were to rise from 10 percent to 25 percent.

This morning, however, came another apparent about-face: Mr. Trump announced that the tariff hike suspension would end this coming Friday, and that 25 percent tariffs would go into effect on the remaining $325 billion worth of imports from China “shortly.”

So with all those provisos, here are the latest available employment statistics for some major manufacturing sectors that use the Chinese parts, components, and materials that have been slapped with tariffs since July. As far as I can tell, no clear trend jumps out.

                                July-Feb     Old July-March    New July-March    July-April

private sector:     +1.11 percent   +1.24 percent      +1.25 percent     +1.44 percent

overall mfg:        +1.00 percent   +0.90 percent      +1.00 percent     +1.03 percent

aircraft engines   +0.93 percent    not available       +1.39 percent      not available

  & engine parts:

industrial            +2.46 percent    not available       +2.46 percent      not available 

  heating equip:

oil & gas            +5.83 percent    not available       + 6.11 percent     not available

  drilling platform parts:

farm mach         +1.67 percent     not available       +0.33 percent     not available

   & equipment:

ball bearings:    +1.82 percent     not available       +1.42 percent      not available

Anyone seeking to evaluate the economic effects of the Trump tariffs in a serious manner should recognize that a useful verdict may not be visible for years. But all trends (and their reversals) begin at specific points in time. Further, until the release of the April jobs numbers, tariff supporters could easily demonstrate that the apocalyptic predictions of tariff opponents had not yet come close to appearing. At least for now, that particular case has become somewhat harder to make.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Hold the Gloating on Tariffs and Manufacturing Jobs

Tags

aluminum, China, Jobs, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Even though today’s March U.S. jobs figures overall improved dramatically on their February counterparts, the employment story in domestic manufacturing remained remarkably similar: Generally speaking the results were dismal. But the internals still don’t reveal any connection with President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade policies.

Let’s start by reviewing the manufacturing-wide March jobs performance. Industry’s payrolls dropped by 6,000 month-to-month – their first such decrease since July, 2017’s 3,000 dip. At least as bad, the weak 4,000 sequential jobs gain initially reported for February was revised down to 1,000.

As a result, March’s 209,000 year-on-year employment increase in manufacturing was the sector’s worst annual advance since February, 2018’s 206,000 net drop.

But the tariff-test effect can only be seen upon examining the results for the manufacturing sectors most heavily affected. The best evidence comes in metals-using industries. That’s partly because Mr. Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs marked their first birthday in March and now we have data (though still preliminary) for eleven months of their first year in effect. But it’s also because the jobs data so precisely tracks trends in those sectors.

The first table below presents the results since last April – the first full month during which the tariffs were imposed – for leading metals-using sector. As has been the case consistently during the metals tariffs era, the latest figures show that most of the metals-using industries (three out of five) have out-hired the manufacturing as a whole (non-electrical machinery, fabricated metals products, and aerospace through February) and two (non-electrical machinery and aerospace through March) have created jobs at a faster pace even than the entire private sector.

The big automotive sector, of course, is a noteworthy laggard on both scores, and suffered an especially bad March. Appliances are dealing with not only metals tariffs, but separate levies on household washing machines. But in terms of momentum, fabricated metals products (whose payrolls exceed automotive’s) have held their own, and non-electrical machinery (which also employs more than motor vehicles and parts makers) has actually picked up the pace.

So because the industries most seriously affected by metals tariffs have generated such disparate employment results, blaming the metals tariffs for whatever problems they’ve been displaying seems unjustified. Clearly, their performance is explained by many other, including many other more important, factors.

                                                     Old thru Feb       New thru Feb       Thru March

entire private sector:                  +1.64 percent      +1.64 percent       +1.78 percent

overall manufacturing:              +1.58 percent      +1.53 percent       +1.48 percent

durable goods:                           +2.04 percent      +1.94 percent      +1.85 percent

fabricated metals products:       +1.60 percent      +1.60 percent      +1.60 percent

non-electrical machinery:         +2.82 percent      +2.71 percent       +2.76 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:   +1.11 percent       +1.04 percent       +0.40 percent

household appliances:               not available        -3.63 percent        not available

aerospace products & parts:      not available      +6.40 percent         not available

The same range of employment results emerges from the manufacturing sectors that seem to be most seriously impacted by the Trump administration’s tariffs on imports from China. But much less confidence should be placed in these figures for three reasons. The first levies imposed have only been in place since last July. The match-ups between the products on that first tariff list and the categories tracked by the Bureau of Labor statistics are much less exact. And statistics for many of these categories are available only through February.

Nonetheless, here’s the best I could come up with. And this month, I’ve added overall private sector data, plus two more items I could identify from that first tariff list, to provide one more point of comparison.

                                                             Old July-Feb   New July-Feb   July-March

entire private sector                           +1.10 percent   +1.10 percent   +1.24 percent

overall manufacturing                       +1.00 percent   +0.94 percent   +0.90 percent

aircraft engines and engine parts:      not available    +0.93 percent    not available

industrial heating equipment:            not available    +2.35 percent    not available

oil and gas drilling platform parts:    not available    +5.97 percent    not available

farm machinery and equipment:        not available    +1.83 percent   not available

ball bearings:                                     not available    +1.54 percent   not available

med/surgical/personal aid devices:   not available    +1.34 percent   not available

X-ray & electro-medical equip:        not available    +2.91 percent   not available 

If anything, when it comes to employment, the China-affected sectors have outperformed the rest of manufacturing and the overall private sector to an even greater extent than the metals-using sectors. (Interestingly, moreover, all these China-affected sectors are heavy metals users as well – so like appliances, they’re impacted by two sets of tariffs.)

So it’s starting to look like President Trump, and the economy as a whole, are looking at diminishing domestic manufacturing jobs mojo. But so far, his trade policy doesn’t belong on the list of culprits.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Politico’s Failed Takedown of Trump’s Auto Jobs Policies

Tags

automotive, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Transportation, domestic content, General Motors, GM, Jobs, Lordstown, manufacturing, Ohio, tariffs, Trade, Trump, Youngstown, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Let’s all hope that Politico doesn’t start a new publication called “Economico.” Because its latest venture into economic policy reporting – yesterday’s examination of President Trump’s trade-centric approach to strengthening America’s automotive industry – had about as much in common with sound economic analysis as Beto O’Rourke’s current talking points have with the Gettysburg Address.

The headline nicely sums up the piece’s theme: “Trump facing failing strategy on auto jobs as he heads to Ohio.” And the news hook is the President’s trip today to Ohio, where the announced closure of a long-time General Motors factory in the northeastern town of Lordstown has understandably attracted national attention given Mr. Trump’s 2016 campaign promise to ensure its survival, and given the importance of Lordstown-type manufacturing workers to his political success.

But the article’s treatment of the Lordstown decision and the broader Trump auto industry record is based almost entirely on cherry-picked facts presented in such stark isolation as to produce a thoroughly misleading picture to readers.

First, the piece doesn’t say that, for all the disrupted lives already caused and sure to continue due to GM’s Lordstown decision, Reuters reported the day before that

“GM Chief Executive Officer Mary Barra has said the automaker expects to have 2,700 job openings by early 2020 at other thriving plants, enough to absorb nearly all of those displaced in plants in Maryland, Ohio and Michigan willing or able to uproot for work hundreds of miles away. GM said another 1,200 affected hourly workers are eligible for early retirement.

“Based on a plant-by-plant count provided by GM, if every worker displaced or soon to be displaced volunteers for or accepts a new job – and those eligible to retire do so – that would potentially leave up to 500 GM workers jobless, far fewer than the thousands decried by the UAW [United Auto Workers union] and Trump.”

No one should underestimate the economic and other difficulties of relocation – especially from an economically struggling area like northeastern Ohio, where homes on the market don’t exactly command primo relative prices. And GM’s claims should be closely monitored going forward. But the Politico article, and all the coverage of Lordstown, should have mentioned that, based on what’s been promised, most of the released employees won’t be left on the streets (figuratively speaking).

By contrast, the Politico reporters unquestionably swallowed the claims by GM as well as Ford about the Trump administration’s metals tariffs crippling the auto companies’ prospects. Had they asked the obvious question about how the higher metals prices compared with the auto-makers’ overall costs, they’d have discovered that the tariffs barely moved the needle on overall figures – and that the companies’ could easily have found (and still can find) other economizing options to offset them.

Nor did the authors ask the equally obvious questions about overall trends in Lordstown-area and Ohio automotive and manufacturing employment. A five-minute dive into Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data would have found that, during President Trump’s first 23 data months in office, the state’s manufacturers have added more jobs (20,400) than during the final three years (36 months) of former President Obama’s administration (19,700). The Trump-era gains are especially impressive since they’ve come later in the business cycle, when expansions typically lose momentum. (These time periods are chosen since they’re the stretches of each administration closest to each other during the same business cycle.)

In addition, although the latest figures only go up to September, 2018, the two Ohio counties in which Lordstown and nearby Youngstown (another victim of the GM decision) – Trumbull and Mahoning, respectively), have fared relatively well during the Trump years as well.

Specifically, during the first 19 data months under Trump, Trumbull County lost 569 manufacturing jobs. (BLS doesn’t track automotive employment at the county level.) During the final 19 months of the Obama administration, manufacturing payrolls fell by 1,150. For Mahoning, the comparable numbers are: Trump, up 294, Obama, down 468. Those are hardly gangbuster results during the Trump years. But failure?

In automotive specifically, from the state-level perspective. President Trump’s impact looks more mixed – but hardly failed, either. During his first 23 data months in office, Ohio vehicle makers added only 800 jobs. But during Mr. Obama’s final 23 months in office, they shed 1,300. In parts, the “Obama effect” looks better – Ohio-based facilities increased their payrolls by 3,600 during his last 23 months, whereas they boosted employment by only 800 under the Trump administration so far.

Interesting, a similar mixed picture emerges on a nation-wide basis. During Mr. Obama’s last 23 data months in office, U.S. auto and light truck producers increased employment by 21,400, versus a 23,400 improvement during the first 23 Trump months. But the Obama numbers for auto parts are much better – a gain of 34,900 during his last 23 months versus an 11,900 rise for the first 23 Trump months.

At the same time, are the lagging overall Trump national numbers due entirely or even mainly to his allegedly failed trade policies? Or to the topping out of American light vehicle sales that began in the fall of 2015? The Politico authors never give readers a chance to decide.

In fact, the changing automotive cycle surely accounts for much and maybe all of the declining rate of auto industry investment during the Trump years so far, especially compared with the big numbers racked up during the Obama years. Most of that spending of course came much earlier in the auto and broader economic cycle, when the sector and the rest of the nation were rebounding (with decisive federal aid) from a near-death economic experience.

The Politico article also repeats the canard that “International trade makes it difficult to distinguish between what’s truly American and what’s truly foreign.” Actually, it’s not difficult at all. U.S. Transportation Department data annually presents the U.S./Canadian and foreign content figures for every auto and light truck model sold in America. As reported by a recent analysis of the figures:

“Detroit has the bulk of cars with high domestic content. GM, Ford and Fiat Chrysler Automobiles build 37 of the 57 U.S.-assembled cars with 60 percent or higher domestic content. Foreign-based automakers are responsible for dozens of imported cars with zero percent domestic content, according to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration [NHTSA]. Detroit automakers have just two cars below 5 percent….”

Finally, the authors express puzzlement that despite “the threat of auto tariffs….the foreign automakers who would be targeted by the tariffs are bolstering bolstering manufacturing in the U.S. with investments in auto plants across the Midwest and South.” To which anyone not infected with Trump Derangement Syndrome would respond, “Exactly.”