(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Greatest Presidential Job Creator Ever?

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Biden, Bureau of Labor Statistics, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, Employment, Jobs, lockdowns, NFP, non-farm payrolls, reopening, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

However unwittingly, President Biden rendered the nation a major public service on Friday with his remarks on his administration’s achievements in boosting American job creation. Specifically, he provided a good indication of how many ways and how dramatically economic data can be spun.

According to the President, “we have added 6.4 million new jobs since January of last year — in one year. And that’s one of the most — that’s the most jobs in any calendar year by any president in history.”

A look at the data provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) shows that Mr. Biden actually slightly understated calendar 2021 overall net new job creation. Non-farm payrolls (BLS’ definition of the American employment universe) increased by 6.448 million during this period.

Mr. Biden’s focus on the calendar year, however, means that he’s taking credit for January. Not only wasn’t he inaugurated until January 20, but each month’s BLS job increase numbers cover the period between the middles of each month. (See the “Technical Note” section of each month’s report.) So the January job creation he’s claiming as his own stopped days before he entered office.

If it’s assumed that the current administration’s impact on employment (and the rest of the economy) didn’t start until the President took the Oath of Office – on a monthly basis, in February – then the employment increase that’s taken place on his watch so far is 6.215 million. That’s nearly 200,000 less than he claimed.

There’s no question that the employment picture orders of magnitude better than that of the last calendar year of the Trump administration – when non-farm payrolls cratered by 9.416 million.

At the same time, that calendar year includes the depths of the steep economic downturn induced by the CCP Virus’ arrival in the United States. In March and April, American employment levels crashdove by a sickening 22.362 million. And as should be remembered, including by those who view the Trump response to the pandemic itself as disastrously bad, this employment calamity mainly stemmed not from Trump economic policy decisions that presumably were inferior to their Biden administration counterparts. They mainly stemmed from health-related economic and behavioral restrictions that the former President supported only belatedly and reluctantly.

In fact, once the economy began reopening (raggedly, to be sure), job creation skyrocketed. From April, 2020 through January. 2021 – bringing the story up to just about the end of Trump’s presidency – NFP rose 12.575 million. That’s twice as much in absolute terms in nine months as in Mr. Biden’s 11 months in office.

As implied, though, this rapid improvement wasn’t mainly Trump’s doing. Clearly, economic stimulus measures helped. But far more important was a reopening and highly uneven return to economic normality. Moreover, because of the federal government’s limited authority over issues such as whether businesses closed altogether, or operate during limited hours, or how their customers should behave, the reopening decisions were overwhelmingly taken at the state and local level.

But as known by RealityChek regulars, President Biden’s remarks ignore a more fundamental concern: The kinds of absolute increases touted by President Biden are far from the whole story when it comes to judging economic performance, and can profoundly mislead even factoring out the whopping distortions of the economy created by the CCP Virus. At least as important are relative increases (or decreases) – in this case, because the size of the American workforce keeps changing.

And when the Biden job creation record is presented in terms of percentage increase, it doesn’t look so extraordinary at all. The Washington Post‘s Andrew Van Dam put it perfectly yesterday:

“The 6.4 million jobs gained this year, while a record in absolute terms, represents only a 4.5 percent increase in the workforce. That’s smaller than the 5.0 percent growth seen in 1978, when a much smaller labor force added 4.3 million jobs. In fact, relative to the size of the workforce, it’s only the 11th best calendar year since record-keeping began in 1939.”

Biden’s boasts about the economy certainly aren’t the first issuing from the Oval Office. Indeed, they’re no more exaggerated than TrumpWorld’s repeated claims that, pre-virus, he “helped America build its strongest economy in history.” But they’re also a needed reminder that whoever’s in office – a Democrat or Republican, an establishmentarian or a disrupter – their economic pronouncements are bound to deserve some Pinocchios.       

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Job Creation Stands Out Again

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aerospace, aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, CCP Virus, chemicals, coronavirus, COVID 19, Employment, Jobs, machinery, manufacturing, medical supplies, NFP, non-farm jobs, non-farm payrolls, non-metallic mineral products, Omicron variant, paper and paper products, personal protective equipment, pharmaceuticals, plastics and rubber products, PPE, private sector, semiconductor shortage, semiconductors, surgical equipment, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Make that twice in a row. Just as in its November counterpart, the December official U.S. jobs data revealed sluggish overall American employment growth but better numbers for manufacturing. Even better, the gains were broad-based and the revisions of previous solid results were nicely positive.

A glass-half-empty type could rightly point out that industry’s 26,000 sequential payrolls gain last month was its weakest monthly result since April’s 35,000 employment drop. But the sector’s previously reported 31,000 sequential employment improvement is now pegged at 35,000. And after being downgraded from 60,000 to a (still-not-too shabby) 48,000, October’s increase has now been upgraded to 52,000.

For comparison’s sake, industry’s employment improvement came to 0.21 percent – as opposed to 0.17 percent for the private sector as a whole and 0.13 percent for “non-farm payrolls” (the U.S. Labor Department’s definition of the American employment universe).    

In fact, the December results continued a record of job out-performance that’s been consistent throughout the pandemic period.

As of December, manufacturers had replaced 84.19 percent (1.166 million) of the 1.385 million employees they’d shed during the short but steep CCP Virus-induced downturn of March and April, 2020. That figure’s 3.01 percent higher the 81.73 percent of regained jobs calculable from last month’s jobs report. Consequently, manufacturing payrolls are within 1.71 percent of their levels in February, 2020 – the last full data month before the pandemic began hammering and distorting the entire economy.

As for non-farm payrolls, they’ve now regained 84.02 percent (18.790 million) of the 22.362 million jobs lost during the worst of the pandemic. That’s 1.84 percent better than the 82.50 percent share calculable from last month’s jobs report. And there are now just 2.34 percent fewer non-farm U.S. jobs than in February, 2020.

As in the recent past, at first glance today it looks like the U.S. private sector has outdone manufacturing jobs-wise since the current economic rebound began. It’s recovered 87.61 percent (18.708 million) of its 21.353 million job loss during the spring of 2020. That’s 1.80 percent higher than the 86.06 percent figure calculable from the November jobs report. So it’s workforce is now 2.04 percent smaller than just before the pandemic.

But as known by RealityChek regulars, manufacturing’s jobs decline during that terrible spring of 2020 was smaller proportionately than that of the private or non-farm sectors. So even though it’s had less ground to make up, U.S.-based industry has been creating new employment at nearly the pace of the economy as a whole.

Indeed, just before the CCP Virus struck, manufacturing jobs represented 8.45 percent of total non-farm employment and 9.87 percent of private sector employment. As of December, these shares had risen to 8.45 percent and 9.90 percent, respectively.

The list of biggest jobs winners among the major manufacturing sub-sectors tracked by the Labor Department was headed by machinery – where payrolls rose by 7,000 on month in December. That was its biggest advance since July’s 8,700, and especially encouraging both because this industry lost 6,000 jobs in November (slightly better than the 7,000 decrease previously reported), and because its products are used throughout both manufacturing and big non-manufacturing industries like agriculture and construction.

Therefore, if machinery makers are adding strongly to their headcounts, they’re probably expecting demand for their goods to grow further. December’s hiring surge brought machinery employment to within 2.14 percent of its February, 2020 level.

Another major manufacturing employment gainer – automotive, where employment increased by 4,200 sequentially in December, and where the terrible 10,100 job loss reported last month for November is now judged to be just 5,900. As a result, payrolls in automotive – which remains dogged by the global semiconductor shortage – are now 5.28 percent lower than their immediate pre-pandemic levels.

Good December results were reported as well in the very big chemicals sector, which added 2,300 positions on month, and whose November performance was upgraded from no change to a 400-worker increase. Consequently, chemicals employment is now 1.30 percent greater than in February, 2020.

Other significant December manufacturing jobs winners included non-metallic mineral products (2,100) and plastics and rubber products (2,000).

The only manufacturing jobs loser that saw payrolls down by more than 1,000 was paper and paper products, where employment was off by 1,500. Even here, though, there was a somewhat bright side, as the decline was its first since July, and followed an upwardly revised 2,800 gain – its best since September, 2020’s 3,200. And this sub-sector’s employment levels are off just 1.84 percent since pre-pandemic-y February, 2020.

Given the aforementioned semiconductor shortage, however, it’s worth noting that December saw the semiconductors and electronic components industries (which, as the name suggests, includes more than just microchips), suffer their first back-to-back employment decline since March and April, 2020. The job reductions of 200 in November (upgraded from the previously reported 600) and 800 in December left employment levels 0.08 percent below those just before the CCP Virus struck.

As always, the most detailed employment data for pandemic-related industries are one month behind those in the broader categories, and their November job creation was mixed.

The surgical appliances and supplies sector, which contains personal protective equipment and similar goods, added 1,400 workers sequentially in November. And even though October net hiring remained unrevised at a small 100, these industries have now increased employment by 9.60 percent since February, 2020.

Yet the overall pharmaceuticals and medicines industry lost 600 jobs in November, after boosting employment by a downwardly revised 1,400 in October. Its workforce is now 5.27 percent larger than in February, 2020.

Much better results were turned in by the medicines subsector containing vaccines. October’s hiring gain was revised up from 700 to 800, and payrolls rose by another 1,400 in November. These advances have pushed these companies’ payrolls 14.66 higher than just before the pandemic’s arrival.

The mixed pattern continued in the aviation cluster, which has suffered both from aerospace giant Boeing’s manufacturing and safety problems and the pandemic’s restrictions on travel. Good news like the prospect of China allowing the troubled 737 Max model to return to its huge market reportedly have spurred the company to speed up a production rebound, and interestingly, U.S. aircraft employment climbed by 1,000 in November – the best monthly performance since July’s 4,700 jump.

But October’s previously reported small 300 jobs gain was revised down to 200, and with its workforce still 7.75 percent smaller than in February, 2020, aircraft employment’s comeback remains far from complete.

Moreover, the improving aircraft jobs picture doesn’t yet extend to aircraft suppliers. In aircraft engines and engine parts industry, October’s previously reported 100 job decline is now judged to be an increase of 100. But payrolls resumed shrinking in November (by 300), and employment in this sector is now off 13.93 percent since February, 2020.

In non-engine aircraft parts and equipment, employment was unchanged sequentially in November, but a jobs gain of 100 previously reported for October has now been downgraded to a job loss of 100. The bottom line? Its workforce is now 15.74 percent smaller than in February, 2020.

As has been so often the case, and like the rest of the economy, U.S. manufacturing faces perplexing – and in fact unprecedented crosswinds – going forward. And the uncertainties look all the more mysterious since these December jobs results pre-date the arrival of the wildly infectious Omicron variant of the CCP Virus – which could well lead to more health-related restrictions and behavioral changes, even tighter labor markets, and slower economic growth.

But unless Omicron prompts major, protracted shutdowns, manufacturing’s performance during the pandemic so far seems to justify optimism that industry will keep overcoming whatever obstacles come its way — whether policy or pathogens.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Could the “Great Resignation” be Ending?

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CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Employment, Great Resignation, Jobs, JOLTS, labor market, labor shortages, quits, quits rate, transitory, workers, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Labor Department’s monthly “JOLTS” report is one of the official U.S. economic data series that I stopped covering during the CCP Virus era. After all, the results seemed to be so overwhelmingly driven by pandemic-specific disruptions, and therefore so unrelated to the fundamental state of the U.S. economy.

I’m still wary of putting too much stock in JOLTS, which stands for Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey. As the name suggests, it tracks how many positions at American businesses (including in government) are vacant, how many workers are quitting, how many are getting fired or laid off, and how many are getting hired, and it’s one of the key sets of statistics that have revealed both the extent of the labor shortages marking the economy and of what’s been called the “Great Resignation” – a major and indeed record increase in the numbers and percentages of workers voluntarily leaving their employers.

Yet since this development has so clearly (at least to me) stemmed from pandemicky circumstances, I assumed that it would turn out to be largely “transitory” (to use the Federal Reserve’s now “retired” description of elevated inflation).

So why this JOLTS-y post? Because this morning’s latest report, which takes the story through November, does show signs of normalization in those jobs quits. To be sure, the absolute numbers of quits hit yet another record – 4.527 million. In fact, that total represents the seventh straight month in which this quits level topped the pre-CCP Virus high of 3.627 million, set in July, 2019.

As known by RealityChek regulars, though, absolute numbers don’t provide the entire, or even the most important parts of, a picture. In this case, that’s because the numbers of employed Americans have grown substantially since the JOLTS series began at the end of 2000. What matters more is the quits rate – the percentage of the employed leaving their positions.

For non-farm workers (the Labor Department’s U.S. employment universe), this rate, at three percent in November, is still well above the pre-pandemic high of 2.4 percent – which also came in 2019 (in February, July, and August), as well as in April, 2001. But it’s barely risen on net since April’s 2.8 percent.

For private sector workers, the recent quits rates movement is less dramatic, and that’s more important for judging the transitory-ness of the Great Resignation – because the private sector is much bigger than the public, and the trends shaping it are much more reflective of market forces, not politicians’ decisions.

But it still seems worth noting that even though it rose to a record 3.4 percent in November (significantly higher than the pre-pandemic record 2.8 percent, set back in January, 2001, the private sector quits rate has been pretty stable since coming in at 3.3 percent in August.

Two caveats need to be mentioned, though. First, these November results are preliminary. Second, they predate the arrival in the United States of the CCP Virus’ highly infectious Omicron variant, which threatens to roil labor markets once again for the foreseeable future. One thing’s for sure – it’s time for me to renew monitoring these JOLTS reports!

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Steady as She Goes for U.S. Manufacturing Employment

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737 Max, aerospace, aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, appliances, automotive, Biden administration, Boeing, Build Back Better, CCP Virus, China, computer and electronics products, coronavirus, COVID 19, electrical equipment, Employment, fabricated metals products, Federal Reserve, food products, Jobs, Labor Department, machinery, manufacturing, miscellaneous durable goods, miscellaneous non-durable goods, NFP, non-farm payrolls, Omicron variant, personal protective equipment, pharmaceuticals, PPE, private sector, stimulus, surgical equipment, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

However disappointing America’s November economy-wide job creation was, the official U.S. statistics released this morning show that you shouldn’t blame the nation’s manufacturers. Although total non-farm payrolls (NFP – the domestic employment universe of the U.S. Labor Department, which tracks these trends) advanced sequentially by a modest 210,000 (the worst such figure since last December’s 306,000 monthly loss), U.S.-based industry added a solid 31,000 net new positions. And revisions of the previous few months strong numbers were revised downward only moderately.

Speaking of revisions, it’s especially important today to note that the new NFP statistics are still preliminary – and will be for two more months. It’s especially important because recently – and no doubt largely due to the unprecedentedly weird nature of the CCP Virus-era U.S. economy – revisions have been enormous. For example, August’s initially reported NFP increase was just 235,000. Since then, it’s been upgraded all the way up to 483,000. The first September result – 194,000 – is now judged to be 379,000. So there’s no reason yet to conclude that the national economic sky is falling, or even changing much.

At first glance, based on this preliminary November data, manufacturing’s latest monthly employment performance slightly trailed that of the rest of the economy.

As of last month, including the revisions, industry has regained 1.132 million (or 81.73 percent) of the 1.385 million jobs it lost during the worst of the pandemic-induced recession in spring of 2020. So the manufacturing employment recovery improved by 1.53 percent on month.

The private sector overall as of November has now regained 18.376 million of the 21.353 million jobs it shed during peak CCP Virus. That 86.06 percent figure is 1.76 percent higher than October’s.

And the total non-farm sector has now recovered 18.450 million of the 22.362 million jobs it lost during that pandemic-triggered downturn. The resulting 82.50 percent mark is 1.60 percent better than October’s.

But don’t forget – manufacturing’s jobs decline during that terrible spring of 2020 was smaller proportionately than that of the private or non-farm sectors. So even though it’s had less ground to make up, U.S.-based industry has been creating new employment at nearly the pace of the economy as a whole.

November’s manufacturing jobs improvement was also noteworthy because it took place despite job losses of 10,100 in the automotive sector – which accounted for more than 40 percent of October’s advances. In fact, automotive revisions also accounted for 70 percent of the downgrading of that overall manufacturing October monthly manufacturing jobs improvement (from 60,000 to 48,000).

Other important November manufacturing job losers in the larger categories monitored by the Labor Department were computer and electronics products, which contains semiconductors, and which saw employment drop by 1,300 (its worst monthly decline since the 4,900 recorded in July, 2020); and – at least as troublingly, machinery. That latter industry, whose products are used throughout manufacturing and big non-manufacturing industries like agriculture and construction, shed 6,000 positions. That was its biggest month’s worth of job losses since the 861,000 disaster during the dark days of April, 2020.

These losses leave computer and electronics employment levels just 0.85 percent higher than just before the pandemic began distorting the American economy (in February, 2020) and machinery employment levels 2.63 percent lower.

November’s big manufacturing jobs winners were topped by the miscellaneous durable goods sector – which includes the major CCP Virus-related medical goods. Its payrolls surged by 10,000 – the most since July, 2020, during the first post- pandemic economic bounce, when they soared by 15,000. The fabricated metals products industry generated a 7,900 payroll jump that was its biggest since March’s 10,100. Food products added 7,400 employees for its best gain since August, 2020’s 19,000. Miscellaneous non-durable goods manufacturing was up 3,500. And electrical equipment and appliances’ payrolls grew by 3,300.

As always, the most detailed employment data for pandemic-related industries is one month behind those in the broader categories, and their October job creation was generally solid.

On the disappointing side was the surgical appliances and supplies sector. This industry contains personal protective equipment and similar goods, and the miscellaneous durable goods sector in which it’s been classified saw employment rise by a respectable 2,900 sequentially in October. But only 100 of these new positions came in the surgical appliances and supplies sub-sector. At the same time, September’s initially reported 900 jobs increase was revised up to 1,300, so maybe October will be a statistical blip – assuming of course that it’s not substantially revised, too. And as of October, payrolls in this sector have climbed by 8.27 percent over their immediate pre-CCP Virus February, 2020 levels – compared with the 7.79 percent calculable from the previous jobs report.

The overall pharmaceuticals and medicines industry performed better, with payrolls swelling by 1,500 in October. Still, September’s initially reported jobs rise of 1,500 was revised down to 1,200. Therefore, employment in these sectors now stands 5.49 percent higher than in February, 2020 – better than the 4.62 percent calculable last month.

The medicines subsector containing vaccines expanded employment by 700 in October – down from September’s 1,700, but better than August’s 400. These results mean that this industry’s workforce is now 13.25 percent larger than in February, 2020.

U.S. aerospace giant Boeing’s manufacturing and safety problems have depressed employment in aircraft production along with the pandemic’s restrictions on travel, and payrolls improved by just 300 on month in October following an unrevised drop of 500 in September. But help may be on the way, with China having just decided that its troubled 737 Max model has passed safety inspections and may return to the China market after a two-year ban that greatly reduced the company’s – and overall U.S. – exports.

So although the American aircraft industry’s workforce in October was still 8.12 percent smaller than it was just before the CCP Virus era (down from the 8.24 percent shrinkage calculable last month), look for the sector to start closing the gap meaningfully.

Good news sure could be used by the U.S. aircraft engines and engine parts industry. In October, its employment dipped by 100, and September’s initially reported jobs gain of 600 has been downgraded to 400. This sector’s workforce is now down 13.82 percent since immediate pre-pandemic-y February, 2020 – more than the 13.49 percent calculable last month.

The situation in non-engine aircraft parts and equipment was a good deal better. It grew payrolls by just 100 in October, but September’s initually reported jobs increase of 900 is now pegged at 1,200 – the best such performance since April, 2008. Consequently, whereas employment in this sector as of last month’s data was 15.82 percent less than in February, 2020, the figure is now 15.48 percent.

A significant Boeing comeback would add to the tailwinds identifiable behind the manufacturing jobs scene at this time. Others of course are the expected continued strong growth of the entire economy, a possibly stronger recovery globally, an easing of the supply chain crisis, the prospect of infrastructure bill money starting to be spent, and the seemingly shrinking odds that manufacturers and other U.S.-based businesses will face significant tax increases related to the Biden administration’s Build Back Better legislation.

Not that clouds are gone from the scene completely. Inflation seems to be picking up (although so far, and by the same token, manufacturers in toto have been able to pass on price increases to business and household customers). A defeat or postponement of Build Back Better will reduce the amount of government stimulus supporting consumer spending – and if the Federal Reserve follows through with its decision to start cutting back on some of its own stimulus, contractionary forces will strengthen. And of course there’s the virus wild card that’s just appeared in the form of the Omicron variant.

Still, the tailwinds now seem more impressive than the clouds, so I’m still optimistic about the future of manufacturing’s jobs recovery.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: An October Classic for U.S. Manufacturing Jobs

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aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, chemicals, computer and electronics products, coronavirus, COVID 19, fabricated metals products, Jobs, machinery, manufacturing, non-farm jobs, personal protective equipment, pharmaceuticals, plastics and rubber products, printing, private sector, surgical equipment, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As good as the October U.S. jobs numbers and revisions released this morning were, the manufacturing results were even better. Industry didn’t regain its status as the nation’s post-CCP Virus employment leader, but it managed to narrow the gap with the private sector and the entire non-farm sector (the U.S. government’s definition of the American employment universe, which also includes government jobs) even though those super-categories turned in sparkling performances themselves.

Domestic manufacturers grew their payrolls by 60,000 on month in October – the strongest sequential gain since the 342,000 rocket ride recorded in June, 2020, when the entire economy’s reopening from the CCP Virus’ initial wave and related economic curbs and consumer caution was in full swing.

Moreover, September’s initially reported 26,000 employment increase was upgraded to 31,000, and August’s downwardly revised 31,000 advance was revised all the way back up to 49,000.

As a result, U.S.-based manufacturing has now regained 1.115 million (80.50 percent) of the 1.385 million jobs it lost during the economy’s virus-induced low point of March and April, 2020. As of last month’s jobs report, its recovery rate was 76.17 percent.

The private sector’s jobs recovery rate rose from 81.74 percent as of the previous jobs release to the 84.57 percent reported today, and the non-farm economy’s recovery rate climbed from 78.78 percent to 81.20 percent. So manufacturing’s momentum picked up faster in October.

Industry’s recent record is all the more impressive considering that its CCP Virus jobs crash during the spring of 2020 (when its employment dropped by 10.82 percent) was smaller than that of the private sector (16.46 percent) or the non-farm sector (17.18 percent).

Put differently, since February, 2020 (the last full pre-pandemic data month), manufacturing’s share of non-farm jobs has risen from 8.39 percent to 8.45 percent (up from 8.43 percent reported in the previous jobs release), and its share of private sector jobs is up from 9.87 percent to 9.91 percent (the same number calculable from that previous release).

Unlike manufacturing’s September’s results, its October monthly jobs increase was highly concentrated in the automotive sector. That complex’s 27,700 sequential payroll improvement equalled 46.7 percent of industry’s 60,000 total. Moreover, the total vehicle and parts job losses of 6,300 reported for September are now judged to be only 5,600.

Interestingly, this job growth is consistent with recent signs that automakers have been learning to manage their way through a semiconductor shortage that’s still continuing. (See, e.g., here and here.)

Other big October manufacturing jobs winners among the major sectors broken out in the official jobs releases) were fabricated metals products (5,800), which keeps hiring strongly despite the continuation of metals tariffs that were supposed to be crippling; chemicals (5,600); printing and related support activites, another big jobs creator lately (4,200); computer and electronics products (3,500); and plastics and rubber products (3,000).

Only three broad manufacturing sectors shed workers seqentially in October – nonmetallic mineral products, furniture, and miscellaneous durable goods – and the losses were small in each case.

Machinery employment deserves special attention because its products are used so widely throughout both manufacturing and big non-manufacturing industries (like construction and agriculture), so its meager 200 October jobs gain was surprising and disappointing. But its robust initially reported 6,300 employment increase is now estimated at 6,500, and August’s results were revised up a second time – from 2,600 to 4,300.

As always, the most detailed employment data for pandemic-related industries is one month behind those in the broader categories, but their September job creation was encouraging overall.

Hiring in surgical appliances and supplies (the sector containing personal protective equipment and similar goods) rebounded by 900 in September, offsetting the news that August’s 2,500 jobs loss was revised down to 2,600. With July’s 900 increase remaining unrevised, the sector’s employment is now up 7.79 percent since February, 2020 – that last full pre-pandemic data month – compared with the 7.03 percent calculable from the previous jobs report.

September was a better jobs month than August in the overall pharmaceuticals and medicines industry, too. The August sequential employment decline of 400 remained unrevised, but payrolls rose by 1,500 in September. July’s upwardly revised jobs gain stayed at 500, leaving the sector’s employment now 5.11 percent higher than in February, 2020 – better than the 4.62 percent calculable last month.

U.S. aerospace giant Boeing isn’t yet out of the woods when it comes to manufacturing and safety problems, and as a result, American aircraft production employment took another hit in September, falling by 500. The net losses of 1,400 previously reported for August and July were unrevised, and the aircraft workforce is now 8.24 percent smaller than in February, 2020 – as opposed to the 8.04 percent shrinkage calculable last month.

But the jobs pictures for the stuff that makes up aircraft got better. Engines and engines parts makers hired 600 on net in September – their best monthly total since the same increase recorded last September. August’s previously reported job loss of 600 is now pegged at 500 and July’s downgraded employment increase remained at 300. The sector’s jobs total is still down by 13.79 percent since February, 2020, but that’s qn improvement over the 14.04 percent calculable a month ago.

Non-engine aircraft parts and equipment jobs were up 900 on month in September. You’d have to go back to June, 2019 to find a performance that good. But employment levels at these companies are still off by 15.82 percent since February, 2020 – just slightly better than he 16.17 percent loss calculable last month.

Not to sound pollyanish, but it’s now tough to identify significant headwinds that could hold manufacturing back from continued noteworthy employment gains. U.S. economic growth looks set to speed up. The CCP Virus may have begun retreating for good. And, strangely, because manufacturing workers have been quitting jobs at skyrocketing, record-shattering rates, their employers also have record-shattering numbers of positions to fill. (See the U.S. Labor Department’s interactive data bases for jobs turnover for the eye-popping specifics.) Even a soaring manufacturing trade deficit doesn’t seem to be making a difference.

Clearly, there’s a lot of pandemic-related distortion still going on. But for the time being, I can’t help but expect that more excellent manufacturing hiring numbers lie ahead.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Healthcare Jobs Milestone and Real-er U.S. Private Sector Hiring

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CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Employment, healthcare services, Jobs, private sector, subsidized private sector, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s the latest example of how completely weird the CCP Virus has made the U.S. economy, and it’s been confirmed by the latest official monthly jobs report (for September): The pandemic and its various knock-on effects have put a real crimp in hiring in the nation’s healthcare sector, which has been an American employment creation superstar literally for decades.

This period has also seen a reversal in the rise of what I’ve called the subsidized private sector (which is dominated employment-wise by the healthcare services industry, and whose employment levels depend largely on politicians’ decisions, not market forces) in the national employment picture at the expense of the remaining “real” private sector. This shift to date has been small but it’s genuinely historic given how quickly it’s emerged, and given the duration and power of the prior subsidized private sector (SPS) surge.

Regarding recent weakness in hiring in healthcare services and its fellow SPS industries (social services and the for-profit educational institutions), the September jobs report was startling enough. Payrolls in this entire complex fell on-month by 7,000 and in healthcare, the dropoff was 17,500.

Want to know how often that happens? Data are available for the whole SPS sector going back to 1939, and the answer is 45 times leaving out the World War II years. And since then, through September, 936 non-World War II months have passed. So we’re talking 4.81 percent of the time.

Not surprisingly, sequential SPS hiring decreases have been even less frequent since government got into civilian healthcare provision in 1966 with the beginning of Medicare and Medicaid coverage. Since then, 657 months have come and gone, and SPS jobs have declined in 26, or 3.96 percent of them.

But here’s the kicker. Of those 26, five have taken place during the pandemic period (in March, April, and December, 2020, and in this January and September – whose results so far are preliminary).

For healthcare employment alone, the official numbers begin only in 1990, but the picture they draw is even starker. Since then, 369 months have passed, and employment in this sector has fallen on month in eight of them – or 2.17 percent of the time. And five of those eight occasions have occurred during the CCP Virus period (March and April, 2020, and this January, June, and September.

Moreover, as indicated above, the pandemic has produced a major change in the role played by the SPS in U.S. job creation. Between the mid-2009 beginning of the economic recovery from the Great Recession that followed the global financial crisis and the last pre-pandemic data month (February, 2020), the SPS’ share of all U.S. jobs rose from 14.97 percent to 16.37 percent, and the SPS’ share of real private sector employment climbed from 22.08 percent to 23.84 percent.

But since then, through September, the SPS share of all U.S. jobs retreated to 16.04 percent, and of “real” private sector jobs to 23.22 percent.

What’s it all mean for the economy? It’s complicated. The downside is that so many of the subsidized private sector jobs, especially in healthcare services, are urgently needed for the nation’s overall well-being and particularly given how its population keeps aging. And it can’t be good news that employment in this industry is still down 3.18 percent since February, 2020, whether because lots of healthcare workers have become burned out from the pandemic, or because they’re leaving the field because of vaccine mandates.

The possible upside of this recent trend is that real private sector jobs in general are more productive than government jobs or SPS jobs (because the latter are more responsive to changes in economic fundamentals rather than government spending levels). Consequently, if their comparative momentum is growing, then so are the nation’s chances for solidly based prosperity, rather than the bubble-ized kind that’s been too abundant lately.

Indeed, just this kind of momentum shift is clear from the data, too. During the pandemic months, SPS employment is off by considerably more (5.21 percent) than real private sector employment (2.69 percent). During the full post-financial crisis recovery, the former jumped by 27.28 percent versus 19.60 percent for the real private sector.

As with all economic forecasts these days, though, it’s impossible to tell whether any of these trends will hold once the pandemic dust settles. What is clear, though, is that more U.S. labor market history is being made nowadays than generally recognized, and it’s by no means entirely devoid of promising potential.   

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Strong Fall Kickoff for U.S. Manufacturing Employment

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aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, aluminum, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Employment, fabricated metals products, health security, Jobs, machinery, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, metals, metals-using industries, NFP, non-farm payrolls, personal protective equipment, pharmaceuticals, PPE, private sector, semiconductor shortage, steel, supply chains, tariffs, Trade, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although the disappointing official September U.S. jobs figures released this morning might have been depressed significantly by “strange [CCP Virus-related] statistical quirks around school reopening,” it’s still noteworthy that manufacturing employment rose nicely during the month – by 26,000 workers. These results are all the more impressive given all the supply chain and semiconductor shortage headwinds faced by domestic industry, especially in the automotive sector.

Moreover, revisions of the strong July and August payroll figures for U.S.-based manufacturers were only slightly negative, with the former’s upgraded 52,000 sequential gain now judged to be 57,000, and August’s initially reported 37,000 improvement downgraded to 31,000.

As a result, in September, domestic industry closed still more of the gap that had opened up in its hiring performance versus that of the total American non-farm sector (the government’s definition of the U.S. employment universe, which includes government jobs), although it lost some additional ground against the private sector.

According to this latest jobs report, manufacturing had regained 74.51 percent of the 1.385 million jobs it lost during the steep pandemic-related recession of March and April, 2020 – up from the 72.71 percent reported in the August jobs release. That’s a faster rate of improvement than for the non-farm sector (whose payroll recovery grew from 76.60 percent of jobs lost during that early spring of 2020 to 77.77 percent) but slower than that of the private sector (which has now seen an 80.71 percent employment recovery from the spring, 2020 lows – up from 78.72 percent).

It’s certainly plausible that the non-farm jobs recovery has been most recently held back by those school reopening problems, and therefore manufacturing’s laggard status will resume once they’re cleared up. At the same time, the relatively slow industry employment rebound is also explained by its superior jobs performance during the CCP Virus recession. Specifically, its payroll levels fell then by 10.82 percent, versus 16.46 percent for private employers and 17.18 percent for the non-farm sector.

And indeed, since February, 2020 (the last full data month before the pandemic and related lockdowns and behavior changes began seriously distorting the economy), manufacturing’s share of non-farm jobs has risen from 8.39 percent to 8.43 percent. In addition, it’s increased as a share of private sector jobs fromThe 9.87 percent to 9.91 percent.

Among the manufacturing sector categories broken out in the official monthly U.S. jobs reports, the biggest September employment winners were fabricated metals products (up 8,200 on month – its best performance since March’s 10,100 jump); machinery (a 6,300 sequential advance); printing and related support activities (4,200 – its best since March’s 5,300); and food products (up 3,500).

Strong machinery hiring is always particularly encouraging, as the sector’s products are used so widely in the rest of manufacturing, as well as in big non-manufacturing industries like construction and agriculture. Almost as important, whereas its August monthly job creation was previously reported as having flatlined, now its estimated to have climbed by 2,600. And fabricated metals products good recent jobs increases are noteworthy given the continuing U.S. tariffs on the steel and aluminum on which they rely so heavily – which supposedly are decimating metals-using industries.

The aforementioned U.S. vehicles and parts-makers were by far the biggest monthly jobs losers recorded in the September release, shedding 6,300 positions on month. That sequential drop was their worst since semiconductor shortage-induced layoffs plunged their employment levels down by 41,600 in April. No other major manufacturing category mentioned in the September jobs report lost more than 800 jobs.

The most detailed employment data for pandemic-related industries is one month behind those in the broader categories, but their job creation performance remained mixed in August.

In surgical appliances and supplies (the sector containing PPE – personal protective equipment – and similar goods), payrolls fell by 2,500 – their worst monthly performance since the previous August’s identical number. July’s 500 sequential jobs gain was upgraded to 900 and June’s 500 improvement remained the same, but jobs in these industries are now just 7.03 percent more numerous than in pre-pandemic February, 2020. As of last month’s jobs report, the figure was 9.22 percent.

The overall pharmaceuticals and medicines industry saw hiring dip by 400 in August – its worst monthly result since May’s 300 decrease. July’s job gains were revised up from 400 to 500, but June’s losses remained at a downgraded 2,300.

These sectors’ payrolls, therefore, have now risen by only 4.62 percent since February, 2020 – not the 4.72 percent published last month.

The pharmaceuticals subsector containing.vaccines fared better. Employment rose by 400 sequentially in August, July’s flatline was upgraded to an increase of 200, and June’s 1,000 jobs improvement remained unrevised. Whereas as of last month, this sector’s payrolls had grown by 10.21 percent since just before the pandemic hit, that figure is now 10.82 percent.

U.S. aircraft producer Boeing continues to suffer from manufacturing and quality problems, but jetliner employment inched up on month in August anyway – by 200. But July’s 1,500 sequential jobs decline was revised down to 1,600, while June’s upwardly revised 4,700 jump remained the same. All told, aircraft employment is now down by 8.04 percent since February, 2020 – a bit better than the 8.08 percent shortfall reported in last month’s jobs report.

The story was similar in aircraft engines and engine parts. These industries added 600 workers seqentially in August, and July’s previously reported payroll increase of 200 is now estimated at 300. June’s downgraded 400 jobs gain was unrevised, and so employment in these sectors is now off by 14.04 percent since February, 2020 – some progress over the 14.80 percent reported last month.

Non-engine aircraft parts and equipment are still stuck even deeper in the doldrums. August’s 500 jobs loss drove its payrolls down to 16.60 percent lower than in February, 2020, versus the 16.17 percent drop reported as of last month.

With manufacturing employment still powering ahead even with its supply chain issues (which reportedly don’t seem likely to end till sometime next year), and with the CCP Virus threat still hanging over the economy, betting against more of the same going forward seems foolish. And interestingly, industry’s jobs prospects look bright despite signs that its mammoth trade deficit is heading back up, at least in absolute terms. (We don’t yet have recent enough figures to know whether it’s rising in relation to manufacturing output, which is the much more important measure.)

As they say in the investment world, past performance is no guarantee of future results.  But domestic manufacturing’s recent employment performance has overcome so many obstacles over the past year-plus that it might be the best basis we have right now for prediction.  

Im-Politic: Anti-Pandemic Economy Clamps Could Be Strengthening Just as the Virus Threat is Weakening

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Andrew Jackson, Battle of New Orleans, Biden, CCP Virus, CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, coronavirus, COVID 19, data, hospitalizations, Im-Politic, Jobs, lockdowns, mortality, OurWorldinData.org, stay-at-home, vaccination, vaccine mandates, vaccine passports, vaccines, War of 1812, Washington Post, Wuhan virus

What a stunning and thoroughly depressing point the U.S. fight against the CCP Virus may be at. Governments at all levels, private businesses, and non-profit institutions of all kinds are imposing all sorts of vaccination mandates on employees that could result in significant layoffs for the recalcitrant (including those with natural virus immunity) and equally important damage to the economy. And at the same time, the most reliable data now show that the virus’ destructive impact – recently renewed by the highly infectious Delta variant – is easing once again, and for reasons that look completely unrelated to vaccination rates.

Not that the most reliable CCP Virus data are incredibly reliable. As I’ve previously written, there are some awfully dubious definitions of “Covid-related deaths” being used across the country, and major holes in the coverage achieved by the official record keepers. In addition, serious problems have been revealed even in the hospitalization numbers – which I’d considered the most accurate gauge of the virus’ effects on human health.

All the same, the proverbial statistical curve for both indicators is now bending down for the first time since Delta began dominating the American virus scene in mid-summer.

As often the case, my source for the death and hospitalization figures are the Washington Post‘s very user-friendly CCP Virus databases. For this post, I’m also using some hospitalization figures for the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) website. Unless otherwise mentioned, the specific numbers here are changes in seven-day averages (7DA), which smooth out random fluctuations that tend to occur on a day-to-day basis.

Regarding mortality, the 7DA for daily reported covid-related deaths bottomed out on July 6 at 209 and it had plummeted by nearly 30 percent during the previous week. And through July 27, the 7DA stayed below 300. But by August 16, it hit 651 and thereafter began soaring rapidly.

By the 18^th, the 7DA average had jumped by nearly 32 percent week-on-week, and the rate of increase continued surging until it peaked on the 24^th at an appalling 77.90 percent. But thereafter, these increases dropped dramaticaly. A week later, they were down to just over 21 percent. That is, consistent with the “bend the curve” criteria, the problem kept worsening, but it was worsening much more slowly, which counts as welcome progress.

This encouraging development continued through September 9, by which time the 7DA was rising on a weekly basis by just 3.17 percent. In other words, it nearly stopped rising altogether. But this fall-off proved to be a head fake. Almost immediately, the weekly increases in the 7DA for covid-related mortality bounced back, and reached a discouraging 27.49 percent in less than a week (by the 15^th).

Yet another decline has followed, and this one has been considerably deeper. By September 21, the weekly 7DA increase was back below ten percent, and just four days later, hit zero for the first time since the second half of July.

Since then, and through yesterday, the 7DA has not only been decreasing on a weekly basis. It’s been decreasing faster and faster. Yesterday, the decline stood at 6.74 percent.

The hospitalization story has been somewhat different, and brighter, especially since early September. The 7DA for daily new hospital admissions for CCP Virus-related reasons bottomed out on June 25 at 1,824 and at that point, it was down on week by just under 5.20 percent.

By August 9, the situation had turned around completely – and then some. The 7DA had soared by 34 percent. Afterwards, however, came a consistent decline. By the 20^th, the weekly rate of increase in the 7DA had fallen to ten percent, and by September 1, the increases had stopped. The weekly 7DA registered its first weekly decline on September 6 (down two percent), and its first double-digit decrease on the 21^st (ten percent).

Since then through the 30^th, it’s fallen by ten percent or more twice, and the weekly decrease in the 7DA hasn’t dipped below seven percent.

Given the mushrooming of vaccine mandates and widespread claims – including by President Biden – that the nation is now facing a “pandemic of the unvaccinated,” you’d think that the above improvements stemmed overwhelmingly from increased vaccination rates. But the data – in this case, from the OurWorldinData.org website, provide no support for this conclusion.

Specifically, on August 24, when the 7DA of daily covid-related deaths was skyrocketing at that awful 77.90 percent weekly rate, 51 percent of Americans were fully vaccinated against the CCP Virus, and 9.1 percent were partly vaccinated. By yesterday, these figures were only 55 percent and 8.8 percent, respectively.

On August 9, when the 7DA for covid-related hospitalizations was growing by 34 percent week-on-week, half of Americans were fully vaccinated and 8.5 percent were partly vaccinated. Through yesterday, those numbers hadn’t changed dramatically, either.

Could mask-wearing be responsible? Trouble is, I haven’t seen any figures on how this practice has changed in recent months. (If you have, let me know.) As far as I’m concerned, the real reasons for this good CCP Virus news have to do with rising levels of natural immunity (especially important given Delta’s virulence), the distinct possibility that the CCP Virus is one of those pathogens whose lethality wanes as it mutates (an important Delta consideration, too), and the nation’s better treatment record – due to a combination of more experienced doctors and new therapeutics.

In early 1815, then-General Andrew Jackson led American forces to a great victory over the British in the Battle of New Orleans. But due to that era’s painfully slow communications, the triumph came about two weeks after the United States and Great Britain signed the treaty ending the War of 1812.  It makes me wonder how long the U.S. public and private sectors — which don’t have the communications excuse — will keep threatening the economy’s recovery with redoubled anti-virus measures just as the pandemic tide appears to be turning.   

Im-Politic: In Case You Doubt Biden’s Immigration Plans Will Hammer U.S. Wages

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Biden, Biden border crisis, Breitbart.com, budget reconciliation, chain migration, Council of Economic Advisers, demand, economics, Im-Politic, Immigration, Jobs, labor market, labor shortage, migrants, Neil Munro, supply, wages, workers

We’ve just gotten a bright, flashing sign that, despite some recent stopgap steps (like this and this) obviously meant to convey the impression that the Biden administration hasn’t completely and dangerously lost control of America’s southern border, the President is just as determined as ever to open the floodgates to seemingly unlimited numbers of foreigners.

Worse, the development I’m writing about also makes clear that the President cares not a whit about the likely economic harm his policies will inflict on workers legally in the country at present – too many of whom haven’t exactly been killing it economically for decades now.

That sign consists of a post on the White House’s website by the Chair of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) and three other government economists touting “The Economic Benefits of Extending Permanent Legal Status to Unauthorized Immigrants.” Just so we’re totally clear on their intent, in plain English, the title would read, “The Economic Benefits of Giving Amnesty to Illegal Aliens.” And the strength of the administration’s Open Borders ambitions is clearest from the utterly threadbare manner in which the authors deal with a central question: whether amnesty would drive down the wages of workers who live in America legally now.

This question of course is especially salient now because, due to the labor market turmoil generated by the CCP Virus pandemic and resulting behavior changes and official responses, U.S. employers are experiencing problems hiring enough workers, and consequently, these workers are enjoying major new leverage in bargaining for higher wages.

As pointed out in the CEA post, “Permanent legal status is likely to increase the effective labor supply of unauthorized immigrants” and that, “Given that providing legal status to unauthorized immigrants would increase their effective labor supply, critics of legalization argue there could be adverse labor market consequences for native and other immigrant workers.”

Here of course is where you’d expect the highly credentialed experts who wrote this post to respond with reams of evidence (or at least citations of scholarly works), decisively proving that, however commonsensical it seems to conclude that increasing the supply of anything (including labor) all else equal will reduce the supply of that thing, it ain’t so in the case of illegal aliens.

But as initially (at least to me) pointed out by Breitbart.com‘s Neil Munro, nothing of the kind happened. Here’s what the CEA said:

“While there is not a large economics literature on the labor market effects of legalization on other workers, in a well-cited National Academies report on the economic and fiscal impact of immigration, a distinguished group of experts concludes that in the longer run, the effect of immigration on wages overall is very small.”

I could write an entire blog post on what’s jaw-droppingly wrong with this sentence’s methodology. Chiefly, it’s not only an appeal to authority – which logically is an implicit confession that the appealers don’t know much themselves about the subject they’re writing about. It’s an appeal to authorities who themselves don’t seem to know much about their subject, or can’t cite any evidence. Therefore they can only offer an evidently unsupported conclusion.

But what’s most important to me about this CEA point is that it never challenges the wages claim made by those “critics of legalization.” All the authors can counter with is a contention that, at some unknown point, the wage depression resulting from amnesty will become “very small.” That’s some comfort to Americans workers today. And for possibly decades.   

Also crucial to point out is how narrow and thus misleading the post’s analytical framework is. It clearly assumes that amnesty won’t stimulate ever greater inflows of foreign laborers who compete against the domestic worker cohort that exists at any given time – which would include the millions of amnestied illegals. Yet everything known about the impact of looser immigration policies – and even official announcements thereof – demonstrates that they exert a powerful magnet effect on other foreigners. Nor do you need to take my word for it. That’s what many migrants themselves have said about the Biden administration’s approach. (See, e.g., here and here.)

The so-called magnet effect of the Biden roll-back of its predecessor’s immigration policies isn’t the only reason to expect the White House’s current approach to supercharge the supply of American workers. To mention just one example, his immigration reform bill and budget reconciliation bill would ease Trump-era limits on “chain migration” – a policy that enables immigrants into the country legally if a spouse, parent, child, or sibling already lives here legally. Further, once these chain migrants arrive, their own relatives receive the same easy entry. And so on. Special bonus: The restrictions on chain migration-related visas granted for employment reasons will be eased even further.

If a better way to keep a huge share of American workers underpaid (especially those in low-wage portions of the economy, which heavily rely on the kinds of low-skill employees who dominate the illegal alien population), let me know. And of course in the cruelest irony of all, as the CEA post shows, among the leading advocates of these wage-hammering measures are the very liberals and progressives that have for decades claimed to be champions of Americans left behind. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Will Government Keep (Indirectly) Driving U.S. Job Creation?

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Employment, healthcare, Jobs, Labor Department, Occupational Outlook Handbook, private sector, social assistance, subsidized private sector, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Predicting almost anything about the economy ten years or so out is a pretty risky business – which is why I rarely make such forecasts and don’t obsessively follow those made by others. But for many years, I’ve been tracking the growth of what I call the subsidized private sector in the U.S. employment picture. And the U.S. government just came out with a study taking the story out to 2030. So my curiosity was piqued, and because the ever greater importance of such employment speaks volumes about the strengths and weaknesses of the American economy, its workers, and their prospects, I hope yours will be, too.

The big takeaway? According to the U.S. Labor Department’s new Occupational Outlook Handbook, jobs in the healthcare and social assistance sectors will keep rising through the end of the decade as a share of all U.S. jobs – and this shouldn’t be seen as good news.

As I’ve pointed out repeatedly (e.g., here), this isn’t to say that healthcare or social assistance aren’t important for any number of reasons that should be obvious. Economically speaking, however, they’re problematic for two related reasons. First, although they’re technically classified as private sector jobs, their employment levels are largely determined by decisions made by politicians to provide funding, not market forces.

And that funding – or subsidization – is massive. A think tank called the Tax Policy Center pegged federal spending on healthcare alone (by far the biggest industry in the subsidized private sector) at $1.2 trillion in fiscal year 2019. A related research organization, the Urban Institute, reported that state and local governments poured $301 billion into health and hospitals during the previous fiscal year. (That’s the latest such data I could find.) If the state and local figure stayed the same in 2019, this public spending would have added up to just over seven percent of the entire U.S. economy and more than 40 percent of all government outlays that year.

The second reason to be concerned about outsized job growth in this subsidized private sector is that typically, the real private sector is the economy’s main source of innovation and productivity growth, which in turn area major foundations of sustainable prosperity – and therefore of the ability to pay for government in a financially responsible way, as opposed to more and more borrowing. A subsidized private sector punching above its job-creation weight is a sign that the real private sector’s economic role is shrinking in relative terms.

And the Occupational Outlook Handbook says that these trends will continue through 2030. Specifically, whereas other Labor Department data show that subsidized private sector jobs accounted for 16.11 percent of all U.S. non-farm jobs (the Labor Department’s definition of the American employment universe, which includes government jobs at all levels as such) in February, 2020 (just before the CCP Virus pandemic arrived in force), the Handbook‘s figures indicate that this figure will rise to 16.86 percent by the end of the decade.

In addition, subsidized private sector jobs will have climbed from 18.94 percent of all real private sector jobs in February, 2020 to 19.80 percent in 2030.

For some perspective, in June, 2009 (the end of the Great Recession that followed the global financial crisis), the subsidized private sector represented only 14.97 percent of jobs in the non-farm sector and 18.09 percent of those in the real private sector.

Conseqently, it should be no surprise that the Handbook‘s projections indicate that real private sector jobs will have fallen from 68.92 percent of all non-farm jobs in February, 2020 to 68.29 percent.

These shifts may look like small beans. But economies and workforces as massive as America’s don’t change much overnight (unless they’re hit by an outside shock like the pandemic). Also, the Labor Department could be wrong, even if the next few years are relatively tranquil. Yet its predictions track well with recent (pre-CCP Virus) trends.

So even though I haven’t been monitoring subsidized private employment developments during the virus period (because like pretty much all other economic statistics, they’ve been so distorted), I’ll resume checking them periodically again and hoping the trend lines start moving in different directions.