Im-Politic: After Mueller/Barr, Can Trump Be Trump?

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America First, Attorney General, Betsy de, budgets, conservatism, conservatives, establishment Republicans, foreign policy, globalism, healthcare, Im-Politic, Immigration, impeachment, Kevin McCarthy, Obamacare, Populism, Republicans, Robert Mueller, Ross Douthat, seasonal workers, Special Counsel, Special Olympics, tax cuts, The New York Times, Trade, Trump, Trump-Russia, visas, William P. Barr

A week ago, I posted on the likely political impact of the end of Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation of what have become known as the Trump-Russia scandals and of the release of Attorney General William P. Barr’s summary of its principal conclusions – which appear to put these charges and the threat of presidential impeachment they created behind Mr. Trump.

Now it’s time to think about a related and at least equally important subject: the policy effects. They could be profound enough to redefine the Trump presidency and the chief executive’s chances for reelection – even though the early indications seem to be saying exactly the opposite in ways that are sure to disappoint much of Mr. Trump’s political base. Here’s what I mean.

Ever since his administration’s opening months, I’ve believed that Mr. Trump’s policy choices have been strongly influenced by impeachment fears. Specifically, (and I have zero first-hand knowledge here) because President Trump feared that the Democrats and many mainstream Republicans were after his scalp, he concluded that he needed to appease his remaining allies in the latter’s ranks with policy initiatives they’ve long supported even though they broke with his own much less conventional and more populist campaign promises. 

In other words, it was the Russia and related scandal charges that were preventing “Trump from being Trump.”  

Moreover, this reasoning makes sense even if the President was certain that he faced no legal jeopardy. For impeachment ultimately is a political process, and although establishing criminal guilt is clearly helpful, it’s not essential.

The main evidence for my proposition has been the early Trump decision to prioritize Obamacare repeal over trade policy overhaul and infrastructure building; his almost libertarian-like initial budget proposal (at least when it comes to non-defense discretionary federal pending); his business-heavy tax cut; and numerous foreign policy moves that more closely resembled the globalist approaches he decried while running for the White House than the America First strategy his promised.

But although President Trump now seems certain to finish out his first term in office, he still seems to be currying favor with the Republican establishment. Just look at his latest budget proposal, and decision to go after Obamacare again – the healthcare move reportedly made despite the pleas of establishment Republicans like House GOP Leader Kevin McCarthy to move on from an issue now stamped as a major loser politically and threat to the party’s 2020 election prospects across the board.

It’s true that many of Mr. Trump’s trade and immigration policies still clash with the donor-driven agenda of the Republican establishment, and especially the party’s Congressional leaders. But even on these signature issues, the President arguably could be breaking even more sharply with the longstanding Republican and conservative traditions.

For example, Mr. Trump continues to keep suspended his threat of higher tariffs on many imports from China in apparent hopes of reaching a successful trade deal even though Beijing still seems determined to avoid significant concessions on “structural issues” (like intellectual property theft and technology extortion) and on enforcement.

On immigration, the President has just raised the 2019 cap on visas for unskilled largely seasonal foreign guest workers to levels never reached even during the Obama years. His administration also has permitted visas for farm workers to hit record levels and done little to stem the growth of work permits for foreign graduates of U.S. college and universities that critics charge suppress wages for high skill native-born workers.

One intriguing explanation for this continuing policy schizophrenia comes from New York Times columnist Ross Douthat. In a piece this past weekend, Douthat made the case that, although President Trump’s actual record has been largely heretical in mainstream conservative terms, when it comes to staffing (and especially key staff positions)

“there are effectively two Trump presidencies. One offers something like what the president promised on the campaign trail — a break with Paul Ryan’s green-eyeshade approach to entitlement reform, a more moderate tack on health care, an indifference to Obama-era conservative orthodoxies on fiscal and monetary policy.

“The other offers a continuation of the Tea Party’s insistence on spending cuts and Obamacare repeal, and appropriately its present leader is a former Tea Party congressman — Mick Mulvaney, the Zelig of the administration, whose zeal is apparently the main reason that the Obamacare lawsuit now has administration support.”

And the main reason for this confusing mix? The President has relied “on personnel who are associated with 2010-era G.O.P. orthodoxy, rather than elevating the kind of conservatives who have actively theorized for a more populist right.”

It’s so hard to argue with Douthat’s facts that I won’t. But they still leave the main puzzle unexplained – why so many of the President’s personnel picks have been so un-Trumpian. And much of the answer points to a problem that was clear to me ever since Mr. Trump’s presidential candidacy achieved critical mass and momentum, and that doesn’t seem solvable for the foreseeable future.

Specifically, as I’ve previously noted, conservative populists (I’m never been thrilled with this description of “Trumpism,” but for the time being it’s convenient) have never created the institutions and therefore cohorts of first-rate policy specialists remotely capable of staffing a conservative populist administration. Even if you want to identify immigration as an exception – where organizations like the Center for Immigration Studies put out top-flight studies – it’s clear that nothing of the kind has ever existed on the trade and foreign policy fronts.

And even worse, because of the long lead-times needed to achieve these goals, Mr. Trump appears doomed to dealing with shortages of competent true-believers as far as the eye can see. In fact, he’ll face a special challenge in the next few months, as the second halves of first presidential terms tend to see the departures of many early, often burned out appointees. And of course, the Trump presidency has already experienced much more than its share of turnover.

So I’m expecting an indefinite continuation of the eye-popping sequence of events of the previous week – in which Trump Education Secretary Betsy deVos announced an end to federal funding of the popular Special Olympics program, a public outcry ensued, and the President abruptly reversed her decision.

It’s hard to imagine that this kind of zigging and zagging can win President Trump reelection. But it’s also conceivable that the post-impeachment situation will “Let Trump be Trump” just enough – especially if the Democrats err in picking an overall strategy for opposing him.  After all, nothing has been more common in recent American political history than completely off-base predictions of Mr. Trump’s demise.

Im-Politic: Bernie Sanders’ All-But Fatal Debate Mistake

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2016 elections, Bernie Sanders, chattering class, Clinton Foundation, Democratic debate, emails, Hillary Clinton, Im-Politic. Democrats, Joe Biden, Kevin McCarthy

Though much more low-key than its Republican counterparts, last night’s Democratic presidential debate wasn’t simply the earnest, policy-focused wonk-fest being portrayed by so much of the chattering class – and the party’s own spinners. (Click on this link for a transcript.) Especially interesting were the clashing views of achieving political change that were voiced by front-runner Hillary Clinton and her leading challenger, Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders.

Clinton made the case for working conventionally through the political system, gridlocked though it seems to be, and securing whatever victories, even if modest, this state of affairs permits. Sanders served up the prospect of “a political revolution when millions of people begin to come together and stand up and say: Our government is going to work for all of us, not just a handful of billionaires.”

But don’t be fooled. None of the policy proposals introduced and debated in Las Vegas last night had anything to do with the only moment of real significance in the debate – and it was not only a game-changer, it looks like a campaign-changer. I’m talking about Sanders’ undoubtedly well-intentioned but bone-headed demand, “Enough of the e-mails. Let’s talk about the real issues facing America.” For Sanders’ belittling of the latest cloud of scandal surrounding the former First Lady, New York Senator, and Secretary of State may well have handed her the nomination on a silver platter.

Sanders allowed that his ostensible pitch for substance “may not be great politics.” That will soon rank as one of the biggest understatement in the last few decades of campaign history. You don’t have to love political mudslinging to recognize that much more often than not, winning political candidates draw sharp distinctions between themselves and their rivals that portray the latter in unflattering lights. And you don’t have to be a shallow, image-obsessed Beltway politico to recognize that voters vote not only on “the issues,” but on character.

So challengers (even with powerful momentum) facing front-runners (even struggling) simply can’t afford to pass up debate-level high profile opportunities to tout their own ethical record and attack their opponents’ – the more so when the policy gap is less than yawning, and when character is the main rival’s greatest weakness by far.

The loud applause Sanders won from the (understandably) partisan crowd strongly suggests that Democrats view the controversies surrounding Clinton as simply the latest smear attempts from the “vast right-wing conspiracy” that they believe has long targeted both Clinton and her husband. (And yes, this narrative has been decisively strengthened by House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy’s breathtakingly stupid apparent confirmation of these suspicions.)

Yet it’s likelier that the doubts inevitably raised are in fact eating at party loyalists. Maybe they have simply undermined confidence about Clinton’s electability next fall. Maybe Democratic voters are more privately troubled than they let on in public by the questions raised by Clinton’s handling of national security-sensitive material, by conflict-of-interest charges stemming from the activities of the Clinton Foundation,  and by the multiple government and private sector jobs held by some of her senior State Department aides. Whatever the reason, or combinations, these Clinton missteps surely help explain her plummeting poll numbers among Democratic loyalists since they started making news.

As a result, Sanders’ priority during his first face-to-face meeting with his chief rival was to feed the party’s doubts about Clinton’s character. And if he was worried about lowering himself to the level of tawdry political hit men (and women!), Sanders could have told himself that the “Email-gate” monicker shamefully trivializes the central charges against Clinton. After all, her use of an unsecured private server for official State Department business practically invited disclosures of communications that could endanger national security. In addition, once Clinton was appointed to President Obama’s cabinet, the Foundation run by her and by Bill Clinton started looking like nothing so much as a machine for soliciting bribes from foreign governments.

It’s true that none of these allegations has been proven – plainly in part because so many thousand of the emails on Clinton’s private system have been destroyed and not yet recovered. But even if her conduct on both fronts stayed within the bounds of the law, the judgment it reflects is so shockingly poor that it does call her presidential qualifications into question. Consequently, Clinton’s troubles were, and remain, fair-game even for the most high-minded politician.

Sanders, however, not only dropped this ball. He all but pinned a seal of character approval on his rival, and in effect denied himself the option of bringing these matters up for the rest of primary season. And if Sanders can no longer even mention these possible Clinton transgressions and mistakes, the heat is now off her in terms of ethics and judgment – unless of course major new revelations emerge, or unless you think any of the three second-tier contenders will attack this dimension of the Clinton record.

In fact, although predictions are always hazardous, especially with the primaries still months off, barring the possibility of Clinton facing legal charges and consequences, the only major question surrounding the Democratic primaries now is whether Vice President Joe Biden joins the race. He’s much closer to Clinton ideologically than Sanders; therefore, he was well-positioned to present himself as “Hillary without the headaches” – of course without even having to voice this slogan. But when Bernie Sanders declared these headaches out of bounds for Democrats, to the full-throated cheers of the Las Vegas audience, chances are he finally sidelined the already ambivalent Biden as well.

Im-Politic: Kevin McCarthy’s Divided Trade Policy Loyalties Could Sink TPP

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agriculture, Congress, Im-Politic, Japan, Kevin McCarthy, Republicans, TPP, Trade

Yes, it’s hard to imagine, but even trade policy activists pushing total overhaul should be grateful to the Cato Institute on at least one count.  The staunchly libertarian think tank, long synonymous with market-extremist positions on trade, has also been usefully tracking votes on the issue by House and Senate members at this website:  http://www.cato.org/research/trade-immigration/congress)  

So thanks to “Free Markets, Free Trade:  Rating the Congress” and its terrific interactive search engine, it’s easy to document that House Republicans have just elected a job-killing trade deal booster – Kevin McCarthy of California  — to replace primaried job-killing trade deal booster Eric Cantor as Leader of the majority caucus. 

Nonetheless, McCarthy could yet shock the trade policy world in his new position.  The key is whether he’ll continue his record (and his influential California predecessor’s tradition) of consistently championing free trade except when such policies jeopardize his own district – which depends heavily on agriculture. 

The new Majority Leader has favored every free trade agreement he’s had the chance to vote on since first winning his seat in 2006 – including the 2012 Korea deal that has supercharged the U.S. overall and manufacturing trade deficits.  For good measure, McCarthy that year also backed legislation that paved the way for granting World Trade Organization membership to Vladimir Putin’s Russia – which could prevent the West from punishing Russia’s aggression in Ukraine with meaningful sanctions.  And in 2010, he joined Cantor, House Speaker John Boehner and only 76 other House Members in opposing a bill passed by the House to create new tools to fight China’s currency manipulation.  (That measure was opposed by President Obama and killed in the Senate.)   

Not that McCarthy hasn’t broken this trade policy mold.  For example, he did favor a law to help Washington offset foreign government subsidies that rig trade markets to America’s disadvantage, and endorsed the ban that through 2011 kept unsafe trucks from Mexico off U.S. roads. 

But the vast majority of his decisions to leave the free trade and offshoring ranch have concerned farm trade.  As with his predecessor in California’s 23d district and former Capitol Hill boss , retired House Ways and Means chair Bill Thomas, McCarthy apparently considers standard trade liberalization (and other free market) policies to be good for all Americans but not necessarily for the agricultural producers at home whose votes he needs, or for the U.S. farm sector in general. 

Thus McCarthy has supported longstanding U.S. subsidies for cotton (a big crop in his district), sugar and farm products in general, along with trade barriers to impede olive oil imports (another district mainstay).  But evidently since the California 23d doesn’t produce any U.S.-brand automotive products, the new Republican leader opposed the General Motors bailout.

Oddly, these single-minded ag loyalties and McCarthy’s new position could yet push him to play a major role in upsetting the U.S. trade policy apple cart.  The farm lobby has long favored conventional trade liberalization policies, especially since most have kept its massive subsidies and other key perks intact.  Indeed, lately its power has made the difference in winning Congressional endorsement of increasingly unpopular agreements and other conventional trade policy positions. 

But because trade deals have been under-performing lately for American agriculture, and its subsidies have often been on the diplomatic chopping block, farm sector disenchantment with trade policy is growing.  Nowadays, its most powerful elements have been strongly opposing any Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal that permits Japan or other prospective members to keep any farm tariffs of their own.  Yet Tokyo has stonewalled Washington’s pleas to eliminate these barriers, and the Obama administration shows every sign of caving in order to save a signature policy achievement. 

If the farm lobby stands firm (still a considerable “if”) McCarthy will need to choose between the ag interests that literally made his career, and that could still torpedo the TPP on their own, and numerous other powerful business lobbies that are pushing hard for the Pacific Rim deal – and that are huge donors to Republican office-seekers.  Just as important, he could try to square the circle by giving an ag-opposed TPP a blessing that his caucus would easily recognize as half-hearted and safely ignored.  Wherever he lands, his decision, along with ag’s backbone, could literally make or break the Obama trade policy agenda.