Our So-Called Foreign Policy: So JFK on Cuba Should be Trump’s North Korea Model?

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Bay of Pigs, Cold War, Cuba, Cuban Missile Crisis, Fidel Castro, John F. Kennedy, Kim Jong Un, Michael Dobbs, Nikita Khrushchev, North Korea, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Robert E. Kelly, Soviet Union, The National Interest, Trump, Turkey, Vienna summit

The race for this year’s foreign policy chutzpah award couldn’t be tighter. Just when I thought political scientist Robert E. Kelly had grabbed an insurmountable lead with his new National Interest article downplaying the horror of a possible North Korean nuclear strike on the United States, along came Michael Dobbs with a jaw-dropping venture into fake history-land masquerading as an op-ed in yesterday’s Washington Post.

Dobbs’ achievement? An article comparing President Trump’s performance in the North Korea crisis so far with former President John F. Kennedy’s in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis that failed to mention either the April, 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion: the June, 1961 U.S.-Soviet summit in Vienna: or the way in which the October, 1962 U.S.-Soviet showdown in the Caribbean actually ended.

According to Dobbs, a former Post correspondent turned historian (chiefly of the Cuban crisis), Kennedy was a model of reasonableness and restraint whose unique, “overarching sense of history” led him “to consider the interests of future generations of Americans, and ultimately all of humanity” and thus deserves much credit for preventing the showdown from turning into an apocalyptic nuclear war.

As Dobbs put it (employing terminology used in a contemporary letter from Kennedy’s wife, Jackie), the former president acted like a “big man” who knows “the needs for self-control and restraint.” Mr. Trump, however, has “indulgently” decided to “play chicken” and respond in kind to North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un’s “explosive rhetoric” – a dangerous effort to “out-crazy” Pyongyang that reflects a “little man” outlook “moved more by fear and pride.”

But the Bay of Pigs invasion is kind of important because Kennedy’s support for this disastrously failed attempt by CIA-supported Cuban exiles to overthrow Fidel Castro persuaded Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to reach a secret deal with Havana to deploy medium-range missiles in Cuba in the first place – in part to deter another attack either by Cubans or by the United States. So the former President’s actions (which, to be sure, continued a policy of his predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower) were largely responsible for creating the Soviet gambit in the first place.

Just as bad, as Kennedy admitted, his failure to order nearby American forces to come to the overwhelmed exile army’s rescue “no doubt” convinced “his superpower rival…that ‘I’m inexperienced. Probably thinks I’m stupid. Maybe most important, he thinks that I had no guts.'” The source for this passage? Dobbs’ own missile crisis history.

Has President Trump approved any similarly reckless blunders that sent such dangerous messages? No.

The Vienna conference is kind of important because this first meeting between the American and Soviet leaders reinforced Khrushchev’s impression of his Cold War counterpart as a weakling. According to one account of the summit and its aftermath:

“‘Roughest thing in my life,’ Kennedy had told James Reston of The New York Times, after it was all over. ‘He just beat the hell out of me.’ Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson was contemptuous of his boss’s performance. ‘Khrushchev scared the poor little fellow dead,’ he told his cronies. British prime minister Harold Macmillan, who met with Kennedy shortly after he left Vienna, was only slightly more sympathetic. He thought that the president had been ‘completely overwhelmed by the ruthlessness and barbarity of the Russian Chairman.'”

The source for this passage? That same Dobbs missile crisis history.

Have any of President Trump’s exercise in personal diplomacy failed so utterly? No.

Finally, the Cuban crisis’ resolution is kind of important because Kennedy had a relatively easy out: an offer to remove U.S. missiles stationed in neighboring Turkey that Moscow (understandably) viewed as too close for comfort. This central element of crisis-ending deal struck by Kennedy and Khrushchev was kept secret (at Washington’s insistence), but it’s importance is now recognized by the historical community – including Dobbs.

Does President Trump have a comparable option? Evidently not – unless you count my proposal to pull American troops out of South Korea, which would remove any remotely plausible reason for North Korea to threaten U.S. territory, and turn the problem of handling North Korea’s nuclear forces over to its powerful and wealthy neighbors. Yet no American political leaders on any point on the political spectrum have expressed any support.

Dobbs of course has every right to idolize Kennedy and slight Trump. What he has no right to do after this piece of propaganda is to present himself as anything but a hack.

Following Up: Why the U.S. Still Faces a (South) Korea Problem

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Asia, China, comfort women, Following Up, free-riding, Japan, Kim Jong Un, missile defense, Moon Jae-in, North Korea, nuclear weapons, South Korea, THAAD, Trump

Three days into his presidency, new South Korean leader Moon Jae-In seems determined to prove me wrong in warning that his election could further undermine an American grand strategy toward Asia, and North Korea in particular, that’s already in big trouble.

As I’ve written repeatedly on RealityChek, well before South Korea’s snap presidential election this past Tuesday, the nuclear umbrella extended by Washington for decades over the South and Japan had started creating an unacceptable risk of nuclear attack on the American homeland. The reason: Chinese and North Korean nuclear forces were rapidly becoming able to survive even an attack by America’s own strategic warheads and retaliate by striking the United States.

Moon’s victory seemed bound to make the American position in the region even less tenable by placing in power in Seoul an opponent of the U.S. decision to de-nuclearize the North through a combination of military threats and economic pressure.

So even recognizing that politicians don’t always govern like they campaign, I’ve been surprised to read about several instances in recent days of Moon staying on the reservation. To be sure, President Trump lent a helping hand, making the first call by a foreign head of state to congratulate Moon on his win and inviting him to the United States for an official visit. For his part, Moon declared that “The U.S.-South Korea alliance is the foundation of our foreign policy, and will continue to be so.”

But independent of this conversation came some Moon moves apparently aimed at calming fears of a major rift with the United States. Even before speaking with Mr. Trump, Moon declined explicitly to blame him for the recent escalation of tensions on the Korean peninsula, preferring to describe his predecessor in Seoul’s Blue House as the main culprit. The new president also passed up a chance to demand an apology from the United States for supporting a bloody South Korean crackdown on dissidents in the city of Gwangju in 1980 – a distinct sore point with many Koreans today.

Perhaps most strikingly, right after North Korea unleashed a strident criticism of a new U.S.-supplied missile defense system in the South that’s viewed by Moon and many of his compatriots with major reservations, a Moon spokesperson stated that the new president had told China that resolving this controversy depended on the North refraining from further “provocation.”

All the same, Washington should still remain worried about Moon and South Korea going rogue. According to Stanford University Korea specialist Daniel Sneider, Moon hasn’t closed the door completely on reopening the issue of the missile system (known as THAAD) – which is partly aimed at protecting American military forces helping to defend South Korea from North Korean attack. More seriously, Sneider writes, Moon is contemplating building alongside THAAD “an indigenous Korean Air and Missile Defense system, which would not be linked to the U.S. and Japanese missile defense architecture….”

That possibility surely would be unacceptable to the United States, as it would at the least complicate the cooperation between the U.S. and South Korean militaries that would be vital in order to defeat the North in a conflict. Even more stunning, says Sneider, Moon favors creating “a preemptive-strike system armed with South Korean ballistic missiles” – a total nonstarter with Americans, as it would make the security of U.S. forces, and by extension that of the American homeland, dangerously dependent on the decisions of a foreign government.

Nevertheless, a greater role for South Korea in dealings with the volatile and unpredictable North is a centerpiece of Moon’s platform. His objective of enabling his country to “take the initiative” on this front is entirely understandable, given its location right next door to the dictator Kim Jong Un’s fearsome arsenal of nuclear and conventional arms. Moon has also tried to reassure Washington that he would never “approach or unilaterally open talks with North Korea without fully consulting the U.S. beforehand.” Yet it’s all too easy to foresee serious disputes opening up between the two governments over when diplomacy has or hasn’t reached an impasse.

Moon’s aim of raising South Korea’s diplomatic profile also could clash with the Trump administration’s plan to rely heavily on economic muscle flexing by China, by far the North’s leading trade partner, to weaken Pyongyang’s capacity to defy its neighbors demands. On the one hand, he fears that this approach could produce an outcome to the nuclear crisis that neglects South Korean interests. On the other, however, it’s inconsistent with his more fundamental views on the economic dimensions of North Korea diplomacy.

For the United States has long hoped that potent enough sanctions would help force Pyongyang into negotiating an end to its nuclear program, and the Trump administration has ratcheted up military threats as well. In fact, sanctions on North Korea have repeatedly been approved by the entire international community. Moon has said he recognizes the need for continued sanctions of some kind, but was a top aide to one of the South Korean presidents of the 1990s who pursued a so-called “Sunshine Policy” of economic engagement with the North. Not surprisingly, he’s spoken much more often about promoting North Korean reform by expanding his country’s trade with and investment in his Stalinist neighbor than about the role of economic clamps.

Finally, the United States has struggled to shore up the anti-North Korea front by persuading South Korea and Japan to overcome deep and historic animosities and cooperate more extensively in security affairs. But in this respect, Moon has been quite the hard-liner. Specifically, he has opposed even the limited intelligence sharing with Tokyo begun by his predecessor out of unhappiness with the 2015 bilateral agreement to resolve a dispute triggered by Japan’s colonial and wartime practices of forcing Korean women to serve Japanese soldiers and officials as prostitutes (who were euphemistically called “comfort women).

The point here is not to criticize (or praise) Moon’s positions or priorities. As I emphasized in this post’s forerunner, there are any number of reasons for taking South Koreans’ views in general on North Korea with the utmost seriousness. After all, they live right next door. If mistakes are made in handling the North, they’ll suffer the worst consequences by far.

But if Moon, their new leader, is wrong, Americans would suffer fearsome consequences, too – including a retaliatory nuclear strike that could destroy one or more American cities. Even worse, this catastrophe could well stem from South Korea’s failure to spend adequately on its own defense, and consequent heavy reliance on the U.S. commitment – even though it lives in one of the most dangerous regions on earth, and even though it’s exponentially wealthier than the North. And of course, because the United State doesn’t live right next door, or even close, the upside to its own security of its current Korea and broader Asia strategy pales by comparison.

Which is why even had South Koreans chosen a more traditional leader, I would still so strongly favor letting them – and leaders and citizens of even wealthier Japan and other nearby countries – realize Moon-like ambitions, take control of their own destinies, and handle North Korea and other possible threats however they see fit.

But since it’s completely unreasonable – at best – to expect Americans to pay for the Asians’ mistakes if they’re wrong, and war breaks out anyway, Washington should withdraw these forces well before the locals take charge. The end of American military involvement would bring the added and immense benefit of removing the threat of a North Korean nuclear strike – because the United States wouldn’t be taking any actions that would fuel North Korean ire and trigger retaliation.

It’s a clear case of power creating responsibility. Especially if Moon wants more of the former for South Korea, he’ll have to accept more of the latter – for its own security. And if he’s not willing to step up, Washington should make the decision for him. 

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: South Korea’s Elections are Likely to Make America’s Asia Strategy Even Loonier

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allies, Asia, deterrence, East Asia-Pacific, free-riding, Kim Jong Un, Moon Jae-in, North Korea, Northeast Asia, nuclear weapons, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, South Korea, Tim Shorrock

This coming Tuesday will not only see a new presidential election in South Korea. It may also mark the day when a second big wheel flies off of America’s grand strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, and in particular off its approach to addressing the North Korea nuclear weapons threat.

For now on top of the United States’ loss of escalation dominance on the Korean peninsula – which I’ve written about for more than two years and which has needlessly exposed the American homeland to the risk of nuclear attack – the U.S. ally supposedly facing the greatest threat from Kim Jong Un’s heavily armed dictatorship could wind up defecting from the anti-Pyongyang coalition. It would be hard to concoct a scenario that would be less defensible strategically and politically, and more utterly absurd.

Of course, the results of the South Korea election haven’t yet come in. The front-runner, veteran left-of-center politician Moon Jae-in, is by no means anti-American. And as with so many politicians, he may govern very differently from how he’s campaigned. But as made clear by coverage of South Korean politics by my good friend Tim Shorrock – who has written on the country for decades – Moon believes that the United States and North Korea’s neighbors need to start putting much more emphasis on reopening negotiations with the North and much less on threats of military action or more effective economic sanctions. At least as important, many of his compatriots clearly agree.

Moon and his supporters could well be right – if only because they’ve been so close to the situation on the peninsula for so long. (Tim strongly believes this to be the case.) Nevertheless, they could be wrong as well. After all, their very proximity to the North might be denying them valuable perspective. Their views may be influenced too strongly by shared ethnicity. And they may, like classic free-riders, be assuming that the American nuclear umbrella will ultimately bail out the South if they’re wrong.

But although the merits of the Moon case are uncertain, the implications for the United States are anything but. If South Korea’s “doves” are right, a more durable peace could indeed be created in Korea (meaning, specifically, that the Korean War would finally come to an official end more than 60 years after an armistice halted the fighting in 1953). As a result, Northeast Asia, one of the world’s major economic dynamos, would be stabilized. And the prospect of the United States being drawn into a nuclear war with North Korea would be greatly diminished.

But it can’t be forgotten that the (mounting) nuclear risks posed by North Korea to the United States stem entirely from the American commitment to defend South Korea – and more specifically, it stems from the longstanding U.S. decision to try to deter a North Korean invasion of the South by stationing nearly 30,000 troops right at the Demilitarized Zone. They couldn’t possibly halt the North’s conventional forces, but their deaths would almost surely provoke an American nuclear strike on the North. This prospect that has certainly helped keep Pyongyang at bay – which was arguably an acceptable risk to run when Pyongyang lacked any means to hit back at American territory. But soon, pursuing this strategy could result in the North successfully launching a nuclear missile at an American city – or two or three.

Even worse from an American standpoint, a prime reason that the South relies on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for its defense is its failure to field adequate conventional forces itself. Despite living right next door to one of the world’s most heavily armed and unpredictable countries, South Korea only spends 2.7 percent of its entire economy on its armed forces. By comparison, the United States – which has no neighbors that are either powerful or hostile, let alone both – spends 4.3 percent.

All of which means that if the South Korea doves are wrong, the American people could pay a fearful price largely because one of the world’s leading economic powers has chosen to skimp on its military, and because its (new) leaders insisted on a diplomacy-first policy that gave Pyongyang yet more time to strengthen its nuclear forces. That’s a heckuva downside. And let’s not forget the chaos that would result from the United States and South Korea splitting in public and pursuing two dramatically different policies toward the North.

Supporters of the strategic status quo in East Asia are right – America’s longstanding policies have brought impressive benefits. But they’re wrong in insisting that the benefits for the United States have even remotely approached those for the East Asians themselves, including South Korea. And the emergence of a credible North Korean nuclear threat to the American homeland has skewed the relationship of costs and benefits much further against the United States.

I can’t think of a more unacceptable situation from America’s vantage point. Even before these South Korean political trends had become so prominent, it was clear to me that the best strategy for the American people was to recognize the North Korean challenge as the responsibility of North Korea’s (very wealthy and powerful) neighbors, and to withdraw the U.S. forces whose presence is bound increasingly to endanger the security of the United States itself.

The election of a South Korean dove would turn current U.S. strategy positively looney and even more dangerous to Americans – clashing strongly with the stated views of the presumed chief beneficiary’s new leader, and less able than ever to turn up the screws on the North.

I hope instead it causes America’s ossified bipartisan foreign policy establishment to realize finally that Washington can’t be placed in a position ostensibly of caring about South Korea’s security more than the South Koreans, and that if their new leaders disagree with U.S. priorities, that’s their sovereign right. By the same token, this ally can’t expect to have its cake and eat it, too. Bottom line? President Trump should let President-to-be Moon and his backers know that if they want to engage with North Korea, they feel free to give it a whirl – and that in the true spirit of an America First diplomacy, the United States will be wishing them the very best from safely on the sidelines.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: America Still Playing Uncle Sucker on Asian Security

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alliances, allies, Asia, China, deterrence, Japan, Kim Jong Un, national security, North Korea, nuclear weapons, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, South Korea, Trump

If you want the clearest possible explanation of why America’s longstanding national security strategy in Asia is increasingly, jaw-droppingly, and – worst of all – needlessly dangerous, check out what China’s foreign minister just said about the growing North Korea nuclear missile threat Washington has been coping with, and then look at a map.

According to top China diplomat (at least by title) Wang Yi, the United States and North Korea “are like two accelerating trains” speeding toward “a head-on collision.” Pyongyang is developing ever more potent nuclear weapons that are ever more capable of hitting American territory. So that – along with the scarily erratic nature of the North Korean regime – explains the “dangerous” part. The map explains the “needless” part.

So take out (or look up) your atlases. You’ll see that the United States and North Korea – the countries on that collision course – are slightly less than 6,900 miles apart. Now look at some of the countries that Wang evidently believes aren’t on a collision course with North Korea leader Kim Jong Un. China itself is right next door. So is South Korea. And Russia. Japan is less than 800 miles away. Why are they, unlike geographically remote America, seemingly lumped into the bystander category?

The (intimately related) reasons: First, the United States has significant military forces stationed nearly along the Demilitarized Zone dividing North from South Korea, along with other major deployments in Japan. And don’t forget their family members! In other words, the Americans in Korea will be sitting right in the way if much stronger North Korean forces invade the south. And the Americans in Japan are exposed to Pyongyang’s missiles, as North Korea’s latest test launches have again made all too clear.

Shocked? You shouldn’t be. That’s the idea. If North Korean aggression kills large numbers of Americans, and showing signs of succeeding, a U.S. president will face strong pressure to respond by using nuclear weapons against Kim’s military and country.

As I’ve written repeatedly, until the last few years, this strategy was defensible. Not only were North Korea’s nuclear forces greatly inferior to America’s, but they lacked the means to hit the United States. So the threat of U.S. nuclear weapons use was, reasonably, judged to be a prudent policy that would deter any North Korean aggression in the first place, and thereby ensure the security of both South Korea and Japan without risk to the American homeland.

But as I’ve also written repeatedly, North Korea’s nuclear program is steadily moving toward being able to strike the United States. So the risks to Americans posed by this strategy are way up – and sure to rise even higher. Worse, the North Korean forces are thought to be increasingly survivable. That is, they’re either mobile and/or well hidden enough to prevent Washington from having much confidence of destroying them all either in a preemptive first strike, or an attack on North Korea launched in response to any invasion. As a result, even if America’s own nukes destroyed North Korea, whichever of the latter’s leaders escaped this fate could order a revenge attack.

And the second reason why the United States alone is (rightly) described as one of the two oncoming trains is that for decades, Washington has actively discouraged Japan and even South Korea from fielding the forces needed to deal with North Korea on their own for fear that one or both countries would build their own nuclear forces in response, and thereby “destabilize” the supposedly crucial East Asia-Pacific region still further. The United States also remains determined to prevent Japan from becoming a serious and independent conventional military power, too, which allegedly would increase the odds of it returning to its aggressive, militaristic past. So U.S. leaders have decided to bear the lion’s share of the burden and danger of keeping North Korea (and China) at bay.

Since this policy now means that protecting Asian allies could mean the annihilation of American cities, it’s clearly time for Washington to admit the danger, get out of the way, and let the region’s countries handle the North Korea problem. This goes double since Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia are amply capable economically and technologically of building the militaries that can get the job done.

Two closely linked objections that have been raised since this American strategy was born in the aftermath of World War II will surely be raised again. The first is that such a U.S. withdrawal could produce not only reasonable defense buildups by Asian powers, but – because so many have historically fought and mistrusted one another – heated conventional and nuclear arms races. The second is that such competitions would backfire big-time on the United States, largely because Asia is so economically critical to America.

What the stand-patters don’t seem to get, however, is that precisely because American policy looks so positively suicidal – and non-credible – to the allies in particular, a growing chorus in Japan and South Korea is urging nuclear-ization anyway. I’ve reported previously on such developments, and just yesterday came new calls for such capabilities. As the North Korea nuclear forces get better and better, expect further widening of this divide between America’s policy rationale on the one hand, and entirely understandable Asian mistrust on the other.

As for the economics, even if trade and investment with highly protectionist Asia were a winning proposition for the United States (and it’s not by a long shot), it’s going to get increasingly dicey for American leaders to keep insisting that it’s important to risk nuclear attack on the homeland to make sure that U.S. businesses can make some more money in the region.

In that vein, however, it remains troubling that even the most detailed reporting lately on the mounting North Korean threat keeps omitting the fact that the United States faces greater and greater dangers from Pyongyang not because it’s protecting itself. After all, existing U.S. policy of responding with nuclear arms to a direct nuclear attack from North Korea (or any country) on its own territory is as credible a deterrent as is possible (even against arguably lunatic enemies). Instead, the United States faces this nuclear dangers because it’s protecting allies that it’s been encouraging to free-ride on its defense guarantees.

Equally troubling – even though Donald Trump pointed out most of these Asia alliance-related problems during the campaign, he now seems determined to preserve the policy status quo. If I didn’t know better, I’d conclude there’s a conspiracy of silence.

Following Up: Growing Asia Nuclear Policy Risks Remain Hidden from Americans

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"The Interview", alliances, allies, deterrence, Donald Trump, extended deterrence, Following Up, Hillary Clinton, Japan, Kim Jong Un, North Korea, nuclear weapons, Obama, South Korea, Team America: World Police

If a longstanding policy U.S. foreign policy position strongly endorsed by the nation’s bipartisan political leadership was steadily becoming a major nuclear threat to the American homeland, and the mainstream media and chattering classes at best glossed over the threat, wouldn’t you start wondering if they were in cahoots with each other against the interests of the mass public – and dangerously so?

Well it’s hard to read the coverage of North Korea’s latest nuclear weapons tests and reasonably reach any other conclusion.

Over the last month, North Korea has fired missiles and set off underground nuclear explosions that revealed major progress toward the goal of developing nuclear weapons capable of hitting American territory. Yesterday’s bomb test prompted a statement by President Obama that condemned the dictatorship of Kim Jong Un, and did refer to implications for the United States:

“”Today’s test, North Korea’s second this year, follows an unprecedented campaign of ballistic missile launches, which North Korea claims are intended to serve as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons targeting the United States and our allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan. As Commander in Chief, I have a responsibility to safeguard the American people and ensure that the United States is leading the international community in responding to this threat and North Korea’s other provocations with commensurate resolve and condemnation.”

But he didn’t make clear the real reason that the rapidly emerging new North Korean nuclear capabilities endanger America. It’s not, as someone who knows the Pyongyang regime mainly from blackly comedic portrayals in Hollywood films might suppose, because its current leader and his father were homicidal maniacs insanely plotting global conquest or bent on triggering a worldwide nuclear holocaust. (Think Team America: World Police or The Interview.)

Not that anyone can dismiss this possibility with great confidence, given the North’s erratic behavior and how little we know about it. But from a purely strategic standpoint, if Pyongyang really is seeking world domination, unless a preemptive strike is seen as a promising option (and as reported in RealityChek, at least one respected defense consulting firm doesn’t agree), the United States is already doing everything that can plausibly be done to deter the threat. It’s maintained nuclear forces of its own fully able to wipe the North off the map, and whose threatened use would be credible because America’s own survival would be at stake.

And logically, but worrisomely, if Kim really is insane, and harbors suicidal tendencies, there’s literally no deterrence strategy with high odds of succeeding.

So it should be clear that an unprovoked intercontinental bolt from the blue is not what’s on the president’s mind, or those of other foreign policy specialists who are so alarmed by the latest news.

Instead, what Mr. Obama and the rest of the foreign policy establishment’s political, policy, and media wings fear is that North Korea’s improving forces threaten America’s decade’s long commitment to defend U.S allies in East Asia with nuclear weapons. Specifically, as RealityChek regulars know, a pledge that was arguably prudent when the North lacked any nuclear weapons, or still showed no potential of reaching the United States proper, has become anything but prudent if it could result in the destruction of an entire American city. Two. Or more.  

Worse, the North – as well as China – also has been making progress in building what strategy specialists call a secure retaliatory capability.  That means nuclear forces standing a good chance of remaining at least partly functional even if the United States tries to take it out. 

Current U.S. policy looks even less defensible given that America’s allies in the region have ample resources to build the militaries needed to repel any conventional attack by North Korea, and that Washington has long maintained its nuclear umbrella in order to prevent South Korea and Japan from going nuclear themselves. Inadequate allied military spending provides ever greater fuel for charges that American leaders are risking their own countrymen’s safety in order to protect defense deadbeats. And as even the establishment media has begun to report, the non-credibility of the United States vowing to incur nuclear risks on behalf of others has voices in allied countries more earnestly talking about their own nuclearization.

According to President Obama, America’s most sensible course of action is to reaffirm existing policy: “I restated to President Park [of South Korea} and Prime Minister Abe [of Japan] the unshakable U.S. commitment….to provide extended deterrence, guaranteed by the full spectrum of U.S. defense capabilities.” Translation into plain English: Despite the mounting threat to America itself, the nuclear umbrella remains up.

Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton believes that the North’s new steps require a “rethinking” of U.S. North Korea policy, but only in the sense of strengthening sanctions aimed at denuclearizing the North, and pursuing the kinds of negotiations that resulted in the deal to delay Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. She made sure to add that she would “back allies in the region, including South Korea and Japan,” an Associated Press account reported.

I would be the last person to insist that these positions are by definition out of bounds. Although I strongly disagree, it’s entirely legitimate to conclude that maintaining the (so far peaceful) status quo in East Asia is worth accepting some degree of risk for the American homeland. What should be out of bounds is Washington’s continuing determination to conceal these risks from the American people – with the cooperation of most of the Mainstream Media.

Even the few reports of the North Korea tests and their implications that both mentioned the increasing threat to the United States, along with some relationship to its alliance policy and to America’s deterrence strategy, did so only the most oblique, abstract ways. (See here and here for examples.) None of them explained that, when the North did develop intercontinental strike capabilities, it would remain American policy literally to risk Los Angeles or San Francisco or Chicago or New York or Washington for Tokyo and Seoul.

Again, the point is not that this risk shouldn’t be taken. It’s that no one has made the nuclear attack realities clear to the American people, and then asked them if they approve.

Of course, there has been one political figure who’s called America’s nuclear commitments to its allies into question. That’s Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump. And of course, thanks to Mainstream Media coverage, we all know what a lunatic loose cannon he is.

Following Up: Events Keep Vindicating Trump – & Discrediting Obama – on Asia

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2016 election, alliances, Asia, China, deterrence, Following Up, foreign policy, Hillary Clinton, Japan, Kim Jong Un, national security, North Korea, Northeast Asia, nuclear weapons, Obama. Donald Trump, South Korea, Stratfor, submarines, The Guardian

President Obama has grown fond of insinuating that presumptive Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump is largely responsible for much of the turmoil or instability spreading throughout major world regions. And as recent Asia-related events keep demonstrating, it’s Trump that has a much better handle on these challenges than a president whose response is little more than whistling in the dark.

Mr. Obama has just continued his attacks on Trump’s foreign policy remarks at a press conference held at a summit in Japan of the leaders of seven of the world’s largest economies, telling reporters that world leaders are “rattled” by Trump, “and for good reason….a lot of the proposals that he’s made display either ignorance of world affairs or a cavalier attitude or an interest in getting tweets and headlines instead of actually thinking through what is required to keep America safe.”

Given the Asian setting, the president – and those world leaders expressing these fears – surely had in mind Trump’s indication that the United States might be better off letting America’s allies in the region (namely Japan and South) provide for their own security, even if that entails developing nuclear weapons.

As I’ve repeatedly written, if implemented, Trump’s suggestion would indeed represent a sea-change in a regional and global strategy pursued by the United States since the end of World War II. But as I’ve also repeatedly written, for all the alarm they’ve expressed about Trump’s comments, Japan and South Korea are already showing signs of determination to develop their own nuclear forces.

The reason? Because Chinese and North Korean nuclear capabilities have become so formidable, that American promises to defend Asian allies with nuclear weapons if necessary now create the risk of exposing the U.S. homeland to nuclear attack. And as a result, the Asians have understandably lost a lot of faith in these American commitments.

Luckily, Mr. Obama will be in office only a few months more, because these developments and dangers seem to be news to him. But recent events are reminding once again that America can’t afford its next leader to be this clueless. For signs keep multiplying that Washington is rapidly losing the ability to solve this problem by knocking out these Chinese and North Korean nuclear weapons in a preemptive strike.

For example, even as the president was trashing Trump, Britain’s Guardian newspaper was reporting that China – as the U.S. Defense Department has long expected – is on the verge of sending its nuclear missile submarines sailing throughout the vast Pacific Ocean. This matters tremendously because submarine-launched missiles represent a country’s best bet for a secure nuclear deterrent – i.e., nuclear weapons that an enemy can’t knock out before they’re launched or at any point during a nuclear conflict. As a result, they present that enemy with a virtual guarantee that initial nuclear attacks (like those Washington is pledged to launch to protect its Asian allies) will provoke equally destructive retaliation, and therefore make those initial attacks much less likely.

Submarine-launched missile capability per se is nothing new for China. But so far, its effectiveness apparently has been hamstrung by the fact that Chinese subs operate noisily enough for the United States to track them, and by the limited ranges of these vessels, which have made their discovery even less challenging. Moreover, the nuclear-tipped missiles carried by China’s subs still can’t fly far enough to hit American targets unless fired from mid-Pacific locations.

It seems that these problems haven’t been completely solved, but according to The Guardian, Beijing feels that enough progress has been made to be actively planning deep ocean voyages for the subs sooner rather than later. And whatever ongoing and future advances are made on vessel range, missile range, and noise will mean that China’s nuclear submarine force will have more and more of the vast Pacific to hide in and attack from. So an American president believing that nuclear threats can keep China at bay in, say, a South China Sea confrontation, may wind up having his or her bluff called.

North Korea’s nuclear forces may have passed a critical threshold, too, according to an analysis by the consulting firm Stratfor – which is bad news for the United States and all of Northeast Asia given major questions about the rationality of its leader, Kim Jong Un. Stratfor recently examined the question of whether U.S. Military forces could destroy Pyongyang’s nuclear force if need be, and contended that the requisite American firepower certainly exists. But it also pointed to two crucial complications:

“First, we simply do not have a comprehensive or precise picture of the North Korean nuclear program, especially when it comes to the number of weapons and delivery vehicles — we do not know for sure where they are located or how well they are protected.

“Second, we have no way of knowing just how good the U.S. intelligence picture really is when it comes to the North Korean nuclear program. Predicting the likelihood of a U.S. strike is difficult to do when the decision to carry out an attack would depend heavily on the degree of confidence the United States places in its intelligence.”

Stratfor’s overall conclusion: Because the North’s forces are likely to grow in numbers and sophistication, unless U.S. leaders use their own nuclear forces in an strike, “the United States and its allies are already at a point where they cannot guarantee the complete removal of the threat of a North Korean nuclear attack.” And as a result, Washington can no longer guarantee that American territory will remain unscathed if a conflict with the North goes nuclear.

President Obama seems determined to pretend that the dangers created by these developments for U.S. national security simply don’t and can’t ever exist. Judging by her dismissive comments, likely Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton – his former Secretary of State – seems to agree, Trump is facing up to this news and its full implications. And he’s the dangerous one?

Following Up: Obama Offers Bravado, not Leadership, Against Cyber-Hacking

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"The Interview", cyber-security, Following Up, hacking, Kim Jong Un, North Korea, Obama, Sony

The more the Obama administration says about the Sony hacking incident — and the related threats against the company and movie theater chains if it released the comedy film “The Interview” — the less confident Americans should feel about Washington’s ability to deal with cyber-attacks, and to protect the public from its effects and similar attempts at intimidation. In particular, the President confused attempting to reassure with indulging in bravado.

If you think this conclusion is overly harsh, consider the president’s remarks in his year-end press conference. Although he expressed sympathy for Sony’s predicament, he declared that the company “made a mistake” by canceling “The Interview’s” release. “I wish they had spoken to me first,” he continued. “I would have told them do not get into a pattern in which you’re intimidated by these kinds of criminal attacks.”

Yesterday, he elaborated, telling CNN “You know, had they talked to me directly about this decision, I might have called the movie theater chains and distributors and asked them what that story was. Sometimes this is a matter of setting a tone and being very clear that we’re not going to be intimidated by some, you know, cyberhackers. And I expect all of us to remember that and operate on that basis going forward.”

But it’s hard to imagine that Sony’s response – or anyone’s – would have been much different if Mr. Obama told the company everything he said on the matter to the American people in his press conference. First the nature of the problem – which the President described with commendable candor:

>”In this interconnected, digitized world, there are going to be opportunities for hackers to engage in cyber attacks in the public sector and the private sector.”

>”I think all of us have to anticipate that occasionally there are going to be breaches like this. They’re going to be costly. They are going to be serious.”

>”Even as we get better, the hackers are going to get better, too. Some are going to be state actors. Some are going to be non-state actors. All are going to be sophisticated and many will do some damage.”

“Right now, it is the Wild West. Part of the problem is you have weak states that can engage in these kinds of attacks. You have non-state actors that can do enormous damage.

“This is not just going to affect movies. This is going to affect our entire economy in ways that are extraordinarily scary.”

And here’s why Mr. Obama apparently thinks Sony should have shown more backbone and why, as he said earlier in the week, Americans in general should be confident that they can “go to the movies.”

>“Our first order of business is to prevent these attacks….But a lot more needs to be done.”

>”[W]e will respond. We will respond proportionally and in a place and time and manner that we choose.”

>”More broadly…this should be cause to work with the international community to start setting up some very clear rules of the road in terms of how the internet and cyber operates.”

The first in this second group of statements confesses that America’s cyber defenses remain all too porous. The second, as I explained on Friday, signals weakness. In fact, yesterday, Pyongyang reacted by threatening “the toughest counteraction” to any U.S. retaliation. Given the North’s penchant for over-the-top rhetoric, this statement per se certainly shouldn’t have the administration of the nation quaking. But it also doesn’t reveal much fear of American responses.

As for the third of the above Obama statements, it’s simply delusional. The North Koreans, like the Chinese and the Iranians and the non-state cyber-hackers, clearly lie outside the “international community” when it comes to hacking – and so much else. They won’t respect rules. They’ll only respect results.

I’m not blaming President Obama for his failure so far to devise effective counter-measures for a relatively new threat like cyber-aggression. I am blaming him for suggesting that Sony – and the rest of the nation – are much more secure than they actually are, and for upbraiding the company for a lack of backbone. It sounds like nothing so much as an unseemly recommendation that “Let’s you and him fight.”

Much better – and genuinely inspiring – would have been a vow to work with Sony and the public to develop a clear, joint campaign of defiance to Pyongyang, and leave no doubt to everyone – including current and future hacking victims – that Americans are all in this fight together.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Why the Sony Hack Really Matters

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"The Interview", China, cyber-war, escalation dominance, hacking, Kim Jong Un, North Korea, Obama, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Sony

The most important lesson we may be learning from the hacking of Sony Corp. is also the most disturbing. From what Americans can know so far (and even officials lacking security clearances probably don’t know close to everything), it seems that the United States lacks cyber-war escalation dominance with North Korea as well as with China.

As I’ve written before, escalation dominance is strategists’ fancy way of describing retaliatory power so great that it puts an intimidating fear of God into any prospective attacker. Washington’s weakfish response to Chinese government hacking activity – mainly an offer to discuss hacking rules of the road with Beijing – certainly suggested strongly a determination that some kind of counter-hack or other punishment created too great a threat of a broader cyber-conflict that America simply could not risk waging.

The Obama administration has made no such suggestion to Pyongyang and the threats made by the hackers against prospective patrons of Sony’s “The Interview.” Indeed, the White House publicly threatened retaliation – which sounds more encouraging. So did the President’s own recommendation “people go to the movies” (albeit with the qualifier “For now).

But other administration remarks were much more disquieting. Chief among them were White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest’s statement that the President believes that “we need a proportional response.” If history teaches anything, it’s that such a tit-for-tat strategy is a sign either of weakness or political uncertainty (see “Vietnam War”), and worse, is interpreted this way by the adversary.

Further reinforcing my fears on escalation dominance are the clear differences between U.S.-China and U.S.-North Korea relations. America’s caution re Beijing’s hacking is at least in theory also justifiable by the myriad strategic and economic interests at stake. China’s aggressive moves in the South and East China Sea, for example, might still be neutralized through diplomacy that in turn could be jeopardized by a strong U.S. hacking response (though I’m skeptical of the former). America’s allies in Asia, moreover, are as reluctant to see anything rock the U.S.-China economic policy boat as are offshoring U.S. multinational companies.

It’s hard, however, to see how North Korea could become more hostile, at least rhetorically. (Any fear of military retaliation by Pyongyang would of course strongly indicate that America has also lost strategic nuclear escalation dominance, as I’ve previously warned.) And although Washington’s regional allies are still pretty conflict-averse regarding Kim Jong Un’s regime, no commercial considerations are complicating American calculations. (For the record, it would be completely unacceptable to let the tail of alliance unity wag the dog of the kinds of core U.S. security interests at risk here.)

And another troubling aspect of American policy: Reports that Mr. Obama “lately has been discussing the issue with aides every day” carry the hint that the Korean actions have Washington by surprise, and that even though cyber-hacking is no longer a new threat, nothing like promising retaliatory plans are yet in place.

I’m not saying that dealing with cyber-hacking is easy, and that goes double for hacking sponsored by foreign governments with formidable militaries. Unquestionably, numerous competing interests need to be balanced, and miscalculations could be disastrous. But America’s responses to date make painfully clear that the administration remains far from sorting out its priorities, and that as a result, the nation remains dangerously vulnerable to cyber-hacks.