(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Some New Trump-Friendly Data on Manufacturing Productivity

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Barack Obama, Labor Department, manufacturing, metals tariffs, multi-factor productivity, productivity, tariffs, total factor productivity, Trade, trade wars, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If I had a list of twenty top wishes, more timely U.S. government publication of the multifactor productivity statistics wouldn’t make the cut. All the same, I’d like to see the posting of this data sped up for several reasons, including:

>Multi-factor productivity (also called total factor productivity) is the broadest of the measures of economic efficiency tracked by Washington, purporting to show how much in the way of all kind of inputs are needed to produce a unit of economic output in a given time period; and

>although even stalwarts of the rarely humble economics profession agree that productivity is challenging to measure precisely, they also mainly tend to agree that the stronger a country’s productivity performance, the likelier that country’s population will be living standards rise on a sustainable, not bubbly, basis.

So even though the new detailed multi=factor productivity statistics released by the Labor Department late last week only bring us through 2018, they’re worth contemplating anyway – and even for those focused tightly on politics in this presidential election year. For these latest numbers somewhat further undercut widespread claims that President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade policies have been weakening American domestic manufacturing (which is strongly affected by trade), and indeed add to those overall economic metrics for which the Trump years have seen better performance than the Obama years. (As known by RealityChek regulars, the Obama administration holds an edge here.)

Let’s start with what the new Labor Department release says about how many of the industries it follows achieved multi-factor productivity growth during the last two Obama years and the first two Trump years (the best basis for comparison, since it examines time spans closest together in the same – expansionary – business cycle). Here are the numbers:

2015: 21 of 86

2016: 37 of 86

2017: 32 of 86

2018: 44 of 86

On average, these gains were considerably more widespread under the Trump administration. Also noteworthy: Although the number of multi-factor productivity growers dipped between the final year of the Obama administration and the first year of the Trump administration, that first Trump year featured no tariff increases. These moves didn’t begin until the early spring of 2018 – a year in which the numbers of productivity growers rose significantly.

Such figures by no means clinch the case that the tariffs helped domestic manufacturers – because a single year can’t make or break an argument; because trade policy was far from the only development influencing manufacturing; because none of the developments that do influence productivity work their magic in ways convenient for calendar-watchers; and because the 2018 tariffs only covered aluminum and steel.

Still, it’s hard to look at these productivity numbers and see any harm done to U.S.-based manufacturing by the tariffs – or by the very good reasons at the time for assuming that many more were on the way, with all their implications for business plans.

But what about actual multi-factor productivity throughout the entire manufacturing sector. Here’s what separate Labor Department data reveal:

last two Obama years combined:  -2.15 percent

first two Trump years combined: +0.84 percent

Another Trump edge, and another reason for doubting the “tariff-mageddon” claims concerning manufacturing.

The multi-factor productivity reports also handily present the numbers of manufacturing sectors that enjoyed overall output growth year in and out. These data make the Trump years look superior, too, and cast further doubt on the tariff opponents’ credibility:

2015: 50 of 86

2016: 31 of 86

2017: 44 of 86

2018: 55 of 86

Unfortunately, even if the multi-factor productivity data for 2019 (a slower growth year for domestic industry) were available, robust conclusions about the Trump manufacturing record on this front per se, and especially about the effects of the tariffs would be difficult for the fair-minded to draw. After all, that’s the year when major tariffs on Chinese goods were imposed, and therefore when the inevitable inefficiencies they created began. In other words, U.S.-based manufacturers were just at the start of efforts to make supply chain and other adjustments to the levies, not at the end of this process. And the CCP Virus’ arrival and all the economic distortions it’s produced will complicate analysis going forward.

Moreover, although it should be “needless to say,” I’ll make the point again anyway: Major changes in U.S. trade policy toward China and overall were vital both for economic, national security, and – as has become clear this year – health security reasons.

As a result, here’s the firmest conclusion I can draw: The stronger U.S. manufacturing’s performance in improving multi-factor productivity remains, the easier these needed trade wars will be to win at acceptable prices.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Rosier May U.S. Jobs Picture – Including for Manufacturing

Tags

CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, nonfarm jobs, private sector, reopening, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As of this morning’s stunning U.S. employment report from the Labor Department (for May), it looks like I’m wrong on the strength and speed of the recovery from the nation’s CCP Virus-induced recession. And I couldn’t be happier. (See here for my most recent forecast.)

What’s also critically important to note is that the announcement that the economy last month created a net new 2.51 million jobs over April’s levels seems to belie warnings that reopening the economy sooner rather than later would bring disastrous public health consequences – even with considerable social distancing, mask-wearing, and other protective measures. But the economic shutdowns began to be lifted in late April, and here it is early June, and no new spikes in virus infections, hospitalizations, and deaths have been recorded.

Further, strong reasons can be cited for believing that payrolls improvement will continue, at least until the arrival of a notable second wave, assuming one’s coming. For as usual, the May jobs report is based on the mid-month situation. One possible cause for concern, though: The response rates of the businesses and households surveyed remain lower than they were before the pandemic struck. So it’s possible that considerable economic distress is being missed.by the Labor Department’s canvassers.

All the same, let’s not pretend that the employment picture is anywhere close to good or even acceptable. The unemployment rate remains at an horrendous 13.3 percent, and non-farm payrolls (the Labor Department’s definition of the U.S. jobs universe) are still down by fully 17.67 million year-on-year.

Moreover, the new upswing is starting from a lower baseline than originally reported, for March net jobs losses are now pegged at 1.37 million, not the 701,000 first estimated, and April’s decrease has been revised from 20.50 million to 20.69 million.

Just for comparison’s sake, job losses during the Great Recession that followed the 2007-08 financial crisis totaled 8.69 million (from December, 2007 through February, 2010). And pre-recession employment levels weren’t regained until May, 2014. The very speed and strength of the latest jobs nosedive could mean that the employment recovery will be notably faster – as perhaps indicated by this morning’s data. But there’s also much more ground to be made up.

Interestingly, the CCP Virus impact on manufacturing remains smaller than on the rest of the economy. True, on a percentage basis, industry’s month-to-month jobs comeback (225,000 in absolute terms) was less on a percentage basis (1.96 percent) than that of the private sector overall (2.86 percent) – although slighly higher than that of the total economy (1.92 percent, a figure that of course includes hard-hit state and local governments).

But that’s partly because the manufacturing payrolls slump has been somewhat milder. The sector’s March employment losses have been upwardly revised from an originally reported 18,000 to 46,000. But last month’s initial April estimate of a 1.33 million jobs decline is now judged to be a slightly better 1.32 million.

Since February, therefore, whereas the total economy has shed 12.82 percent of its payrolls and the private sector 13.87 percent, manufacturing employment is off by 9.78 percent.

Let’s not be pollyannish, though. From its pre-Great Recession level to the trough, manufacturing lost 2.293 million jobs. And even at their peak during the pre-virus recovery (last December), only 61.71 percent had been regained.

That is, thanks to the CCP Virus, both the U.S. economy overall and its manufacturing sector remain awfully sick on the employment front.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Picking Through the April Jobs Wreckage Details

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Employment, Great Depression, Great Recession, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, NFP, non-farm jobs, non-farm payrolls, private sector, unemployment, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s U.S. jobs report from the Labor Department (for April) is the first that makes fully (so far) clear the historic American employment disaster created by a combination of the CCP Virus and widespread economic shutdown and lockdown orders.

As widely observed already, the 14.9 percent national unemployment rate for the month is the highest suffered since the Great Depression of the 1930s. During this slump, (which, it can never be forgotten, helped pave the way for World War II), the annual jobless rate peaked in 1933 at 24.9 percent. Moreover, as always with these monthly jobs releases, the data only cover mid-month. So the May report will almost surely bring considerably worse new April revisions, just as the April report showed sharp downward revisions for March and even February.

Worse, as the Labor Department employment trackers observed, in April they were able to reach only about 70 percent of the number of households they tried contacting in their standard efforts to calculate that unemployment rate. They pre-virus response rate was 83 percent. And although it’s entirely possible that this weak response rate has overestimated unemployment, it could be producing an underestimate, too.

That big uncertainty aside, the revisions are a good place to start highlighting how the details of today’s numbers underscore what an unprecedented shock the economy is absorbing.

Principally, that March total plunge in non-farm payrolls (NFP, the Labor Department’s U.S. jobs universe) was first reported at 701,000 – a figure that was (sadly) exceeded four times during the Great Recession that followed the 2008-09 financial crisis. Now these March losses are pegged at 870,000 – much higher than the Great Recession peak of 784,000 in January, 2009. April, of course, has blown away such comparisons, as NFP plummeted by 20.50 million. Indeed, that’s the largest monthly decrease in absolute terms in the history of these Labor Department data, which go back to 1939.

As a result, U.S. employment levels are back to where they were in February, 2011 – meaning that more than nine years of jobs gains have just gone up in smoke.

In fact, those 20.500 million net jobs destroyed in April alone (again, this is a preliminary number, which will be re-estimated twice more in the next two months, and then again when Labor issues the next of its standard multi-year revisions) represent more than twice as much employment loss as that experienced during the entire Great Recession (whose jobs dimension lasted from December, 2007 until March, 2010) – 8.698 million.

As for the private sector, the initially reported March jobs collapse of 713,000 was topped five times during the Great Recession. But this morning’s new March jobs wipeout figure of 812,000 now matches that recession’s worst (hit in April, 2009). Tragically, the new April private sector job loss figure of 19.520 million makes even those dreadful numbers look positively quaint.

Oddly, even though its April monthly job loss was 1.33 million, manufacturing has continued to hold up relatively well so far during the CCP Virus crisis. Industry’s March payroll decline was revised down from 18,000 to 34,000. And the April figure was much worse than manufacturing’s worst month during the Great Recession (289,000, recorded for January, 2009). Moreover, the 1.330 million April manufacturing employment nosedive was more than half of the total manufacturing job decrease during the entire Great Recession (2.293 million).

All the same, since February, whereas total U.S. job totals are off by 14.02 percent since February, and private sector employment has fallen by 15.70 percent, manufacturing’s drop has been 11.87 percent.

Once more, this relatively bright picture could change either with next month’s NFP report, or relatively quickly thereafter, as the economy reopens. But it’s also important to keep in mind that the pre-Great Recession total U.S. employment peak of 138.392 million in December, 2007 wasn’t matched again until May, 2014. It took until March, 2014 for the private sector to regain its pre-recession employment peak of 116.060 million. And manufacturing has never regained its pre-recession level of 13.746 million – which itself was far from a peak, because its payrolls had been decreasing for decades. The best it did was to regain 1.413 million (61.62 percent) of the 2.293 million jobs lost during the Great Recession. This level was hit just last December.

And all these recoveries were reasonably “V-shaped” (that is rapid), by historical standards. Unfortunately, “V” seems to be a letter going out of style as economists struggle to figure out what the post-CCP Virus recovery will look like.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The State of the Union’s Productivity is Still Gloomy

Tags

Labor Department, labor productivity, manufacturing, productivity, State of the Union, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Hooray! Americans and the world just got a new batch of productivity data. You know – those statistics that everyone knowing anything about economics calls a key to sustainable national prosperity, but that are usually ignored when they’re issued even when impeachments and State of the Union speeches and presidential primaries aren’t dominating the headlines.

But as often been the case recently, the news on the whole discouraging. Non-farm businesses (the national economic universe as defined by the Labor Department, which tracks productivity) registered a better performance according to these preliminary figures for the fourth quarter of last year than for the third quarter. Yet the rate of year-on-year improvement slowed. Manufacturing’s figures, moreover, worsened over both time frames.

No better is the big picture revealed by these results: The U.S. economy remains smack in the middle of a major productivity slowdown, which augurs poorly for its ability to keep growing in a healthy (as opposed to a bubble-ized) way.

This productivity report measures labor productivity – the amount of output any sector of the economy or the entire economy can generate for each hour worked by each of its employees. It’s a narrower gauge of business efficiency than multi-factor productivity – which, as suggested by its name, records production as a function of a wide variety of inputs. But the labor number is reported on a timelier basis, and therefore tends to attract the most attention – when it attracts any attention at all!

According to the new release, labor productivity during the last three months of 2019 advanced by 1.40 percent at an annual rate. The final third quarter figure (which went un-revised)? A 0.20 percent annualized drop.

Moreover, on an annual basis, non-farm business labor productivity rose between 2018 and 2019 by 1.79 percent. That’s considerably faster than the 1.01 percent advance during the previous year.

Unfortunately, that’s where the good news stops. Labor productivity in domestic manufacturing – once the economy’s leader on this score (see the table below) – dropped sequentially for the third straight quarter. And this 1.20 percent annualized decrease was worse than the third quarter’s 0.26 percent annualized decline – which itself was revised down from a 0.10 percent increase.

Even worse is the latest year-on-year comparison. Between 2017 and 2018, manufacturing’s labor productivity rose by 0.60 percent – not terrific, but at least an improvement. Last year, it tumbled by 0.68 percent. That’s its worst such performance since 2014-2015’s 1.45 percent dive.

But if you really want to be bummed, check out the trends over the last three economic recoveries (including the current expansion, whose length, at least, keeps setting records). The ever weaker growth rates are troubling enough. Worse still is the slowdown’s acceleration (even in non-farm businesses if you take into account the length of the ongoing recovery.

                                                                         Non-farm business   Manufacturing

1990s expansion (2Q 91-1Q 01):                       +23.74 percent      +45.86 percent

bubble expansion (4Q 01-4Q 07):                      +16.59 percent     +30.23 percent

current expansion (2Q 09 thru prelim 4Q 19):   +13.19 percent      +5.98 percent

President Trump’s State of the Union address Tuesday night boasted about numerous economic achievement during his administration, and as noted in my analysis of yesterday’s U.S. trade figures, on some scores, he’s entitled to do so. But the speech never mentioned productivity, and given today’s new numbers, it’s easy to understand why.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Productivity Data Further Debunk “Tariffs Hurt” Claims

Tags

aluminum, aluminum tariffs, China, durable goods, fabricated metals products, inputs, Labor Department, labor productivity, manufacturing, metals, metals tariffs, multi-factor productivity, productivity, steel, steel tariffs, tariffs, Trade, trade law, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Trump administration’s announcement last Friday of new tariffs on some metals-using manufactures imports was greeted with the predictable combination of chuckles and gloating from the economists, think tank hacks, and Mainstream Media journalists who keep insisting that all such trade curbs are self-destructive whenever they’re imposed.

If the critics bothered to look at the new official data on multi-factor productivity, however, they’d stop their victory laps in their tracks. For the Labor Department’s latest report on this broadest productivity measure utterly trashes their claims that the tariffs slapped on metals in early 2018 – which unofficially launched the so-called Trump trade wars – have backfired by undercutting most domestic American manufacturing.

In fairness, the Trump administration itself gave the trade and globalization cheerleaders lots of evidence for their triumphalism. Specifically, the levies were justified with statistics showing that various categories of goods made primarily of tariff-ed steel and aluminum had seen major surges of imports since the duties began. The obvious conclusion? Foreign-based producers of these products were capitalizing on their cheaper metals available to their factories to undersell their U.S.-based competition.

As a result, Mr. Trump decided to tariff some of these final products, too – to erase the advantage created for imports from less expensive steel and aluminum.

So in one sense, it’s tough to blame tariff critics for feeling vindicated about predictions that the metals levies might boost the metals-producing sectors themselves, but injure the far larger metals-using sectors. Ditto for their warnings that in an economy with so many connected industries, protection for one or a few would inevitably spur calls for such alleged favoritism by others, threatening a consequent loss of efficiency for all of manufacturing and even the entire economy.

Examine the issue in more detail, though, and you see that it’s entirely possible to arrive at radically different conclusions. For example, the new tariffs appear to be imposed on a limited set of products, and none of them (e.g., nails, tacks, wires, cables, even aluminum auto stampings) qualifies as a major industry. In other words, the chief metals-using industries, like motor vehicles and parts overall, aerospace, industrial machinery (many of which have been complaining loudly about the metals tariffs, even though their overall operational costs have been barely affected) were left out.

Finally in this vein, and as the critics imply, the new Trump tariffs also make the case for trade curbs on any final products whose significant inputs receive duties. Why indeed strap otherwise competitive domestic producers with higher prices for materials, parts, and components? This practice has been a major flaw in the U.S. trade law system, which has prioritized legal over economic and industrial considerations, since its founding. And in fact, my old organization, the U.S. Business and Industry Council, has been urging this reform since at least 2008.

Even better – to prevent cronyism from influencing such trade policy decisions, impose a uniform global tariff on all manufactures, or all non-energy goods.

But it’s just as important to point out a gaping hole in the longstanding argument that cheap imported inputs (including subsidized, and therefore artificially cheap imported inputs) are essential for the overall global competitiveness of U.S. domestic manufacturing. And the hole has been opened (or perhaps it’s more accurate to say, reopened, given this previous RealityChek analysis of earlier data) by those new multi-factor productivity statistics.

They only go through 2018 (such time lags explain why multi-factor productivity trends aren’t followed as closely as labor productivity trends). But they’re the broader of the two productivity measures, as they gauge the effect of many inputs other than hours worked. And via the table below, they make clear that even the wide open access domestic manufacturers enjoyed to artificially cheap metals and other imported inputs have played absolutely no evident role in improving industry’s health. In fact, there’s reason to conclude that the more access domestic industry had to such materials, parts, and components, the less productive it became.

                                                               Total mfg   Durable goods   fabr metals

1990s expansion (91-2000):                   +23.40%       +38.76%         +4.79%

bubble decade expansion (02-07):          +11.74%      +16.61%          +7.62%

current expansion (10-present):                -4.84%         -0.84%           -4.51%

pre-China WTO (87-2001):                   +22.18%      +37.72%           -3.32%

post-China WTO (02-present):               +6.72%      +17.17%           -2.05%

As usual, the time periods chosen to illustrate these trends consist (with one exception) of recent economic expansions (because they enable the best apples-to-apples comparisons to be made). And the 1990s expansion is the first one examined because the relevant Labor Department data only go back to 1987. The products chosen consist of all manufactured goods, durable goods industries (the super-category containing most of the big metals users), and fabricated metals products (the most metals-intensive sectors of all).

The table demonstrates that multi-factor productivity growth across-the-board has weakened dramatically from the 1990s expansion through the current – ongoing – expansion. The slowdown between the 1990s expansion and the previous decade’s expansion was moderate (and multi-factor productivity actually grew faster during the second in fabricated metals, though in absolute terms its improvement lagged badly). But during the current recovery, multi-factor productivity growth has been replaced in all three instances by multi-factor productivity decline. And crucially, during none of this time did any of these manufacturing categories face any shortage of imported inputs of any kind – subsidized or not.

Indeed, one event in 2001 greatly increased the supply of subsidized inputs – China’s admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO). For once China joined, the difficulty of using U.S. trade law to keep these Chinese products out of the U.S. economy became much greater.

Yet at the same time, as shown below, productivity growth was considerably weaker after China’s WTO entry than before in manufacturing overall, and in durable goods. And although its performance actually improved in fabricated metals, that industry’s performance was much worse in absolute terms.

Nor does the inclusion of the 2007-2009 Great Recession in the post-2002 China-related data (which violates the “apples-to-apples rule”) seem to have been a game changer – because the worst performances of all in each case, and by a mile, have been registered during the current expansion. Moreover, since the data stop in 2018, those current expansion results are dominated by the period preceding both the Trump metals tariffs and the Trump China tariffs (most of which target industrial inputs, as opposed to final products).

It’s entirely possible that, for various reasons, the multi-factor productivity statistics would have been even worse if not for the widespread availability of cheap imports. Or maybe multi-factor productivity isn’t much of a measure of manufacturing’s health? Both alternative explanations, however, seem pretty far-fetched (especially given the pre- and post-China WTO results).

Much likelier – as I argued in that post linked above – the availability of cheap inputs has helped retard productivity growth by enabling businesses to achieve cost-savings without investing in research and development into new products and especially processes, and without buying more efficient equipment (including software).

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trump’s Real Wage Record Still Needs More Work

Tags

Barack Obama, inflation adjusted wages, Labor Department, manufacturing, private sector, Trump, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The new after-inflation wage figures released this morning by the Labor Department (that bring the story, preliminarily, through November) show that workers’ price-adjusted take home pay remains a feature of President Trump’s economic record that still needs work.

This conclusion comes through loud and clear from the table below. It shows the real hourly wages changes over various periods of time for all private sector workers (Labor doesn’t track public sector wages, since they’re largely set by politicians’ decisions, and therefore say little about the underlying state of the economy), for private sector “production and nonsupervisory” workers (let’s call them “blue-collar” for short) and for all manufacturing and blue-collar manufacturing workers.

                                                                           All workers      Blue-collar workers

November m/m private:                                      0 percent           +0.11 percent

November m/m manufacturing:                      +0.09 percent           0 percent

November y/y private:                                   +1.11 percent         +1.72 percent

November y/y manufacturing:                       +1.02 percent        +1.81 percent

private 1^st 33 Trump months:                         +2.62 percent        +3.16 percent

manufacturing 1^st 33 Trump months:             +0.46 percent        +2.54 percent

private last 33 Obama months:                      +3.69 percent        +4.07 percent

manufacturing last 33 Obama months:          +3.35 percent       +3.46 percent

private since current recovery onset:             +6.40 percent       +7.24 percent

manufacturing since recovery onset:             +1.40 percent       +2.77 percent

The short-term trends look pretty good. In particular, the difference between the latest annual increase in constant dollar private sector wages (1.11 percent) and the increase during the first 33 months of the Trump administration (2.62 percent) makes clear that the last year has a greater average monthly rate of improvement (0.93 percent) than the entire period (0.79 percent). Therefore, there’s been a modest acceleration in real wage increases. (I consider February, 2017 the current administration’s start month, since President Trump was inaugurated on January 20.)

The picture has been even brighter for blue-collar workers, with the average monthly rates of increase standing at 1.56 percent over the last year and (0.96 percent) for Mr. Trump’s entire term in office.

Price-adjusted manufacturing wages have grown slower so far during this Trump term than private sector wages, but acceleration is evident here, too. In fact, it’s been even faster. For all manufacturing workers, after-inflation wages have risen over the past year by an average of 0.85 percent per month. Since Mr. Trump’s inauguration, though, this rate has been only 0.14 percent.

And although also at lower absolute levels of increase, the wage increase pickup has been greater for manufacturing’s blue-collar workers as well – an average monthly gain of 1.51 percent over the last year versus one of only 0.77 percent for the President’s entire tenure.

So what’s the problem? It’s that this wage performance for all categories of workers pales before that from the best comparable Obama administration period – its final 33 months. And the biggest gap has been in manufacturing, for both the total and blue-collar workforces.

It’s entirely possible, as I’ve noted, that the worse record during the Trump years could be due to employers of all kinds, including manufacturing, being forced during a time of super-low joblessness to start hiring workers they’d have never considered before – because they’d likely be so unproductive, at least at first. It’s also entirely possible that this development will yield big long-term benefits for the entire economy. And if it’s true, this thesis would be terrific news for those new workers at first.

But such fine points are even more likely to be ignored or downplayed during an election year than they are normally. Which means that without major progress in the months ahead, Mr. Trump had better hope that his Democratic rivals ignore the details of the wage figures as thoroughly as the media typically do.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Trade Wars’ Bite on Manufacturing Jobs Looks Deeper

Tags

2020 elections, aluminum, China, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, private sector, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s U.S. jobs report (for September) contained much better news for President Trump and his supporters in terms of the economy’s overall performance than it did in terms of his trade policies. American employment on net rose by a decent 136,000 sequentially last month, and the revisions (which boosted the July and August numbers by a total of 45,000) were especially encouraging.

But payrolls in domestic manufacturing – a sector heavily exposed to trade – shrank month-to-month by 2,000. That decline was the first such dip since March’s 3,000. And despite the big positive revisions in overall employment, manufacturing’s left its modest recent hiring record virtually unchanged.

Worse for the President, manufacturing’s metals-using industries in September continued their worrisome recent transition from employment out-performers for the first half year or so after the first duties on steel and aluminum were levied to employment laggards.

Moreover, although manufacturing employment does face two obstacles having nothing to do with the Mr. Trump’s trade wars – Boeing’s safety woes and the strike that began last month against General Motors – damage from the former isn’t yet evident in the jobs data, and the latter probably began too recently to be showing up in the numbers yet.

The impact of the much broader China tariffs remained as elusive as ever, largely because of the on-again, off-again nature of the President’s policies, along with changes and threatened changes in tariff rates on so many goods. But even if Mr. Trump was a model of consistency on this score, the China levies’ effects would be fiendishly difficult to gauge because manufacturing inputs from China are used so broadly but so unevenly by domestic manufacturers.

By contrast, the trends for the metals-using industries look clear enough. This time, I’ll present not only their employment changes since April, 2018 (the first full month in which the metals levies were in effect) and September, but the same employment changes for an earlier post-tariff period. First, the latest numbers:

                                                   Old thru Aug     New thru Aug      Thru Sept

entire private sector:                  +2.30 percent    +2.31 percent    +2.40 percent

overall manufacturing:              +1.73 percent    +1.73 percent    +1.71 percent

durable goods:                           +2.10 percent    +2.10 percent    +2.05 percent

fabricated metals products:        +1.58 percent   +1.56 percent    +1.36 percent

non-electrical machinery:          +2.19 percent    +2.20 percent   +1.95 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:        0 percent         -0.23 percent    -0.69 percent

household appliances*:               not available     -6.31 percent    not available

aerospace products & parts*:      not available    +8.38 percent    not available

*data are one month behind

The loss of the metals-using sectors’ employment momentum in relative and absolute terms can be easily seen. But the more important comparison is between the above figures and those below, which present these trends for the first 10 months of the metals tariffs.

                                                   Old thru Dec    New thru Dec      Thru Jan

entire private sector:                 +1.37 percent   +1.36 percent   +1.60 percent

overall manufacturing:             +1.45 percent   +1.39 percent   +1.49 percent

durable goods:                          +1.67 percent   +1.72 percent   +1.97 percent

fabricated metals products:      +1.75 percent    +1.57 percent   +1.78 percent

non-electrical machinery:        +2.20 percent    +2.33 percent   +2.57 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:  +0.77 percent     +1.07 percent   +1.15 percent

household appliances*:            not available      -2.21 percent     not available

aerospace products & parts*:   not available     +5.51 percent    not available

*data are one month behind

This table shows that except for the household appliances sector (which has faced a separate, product-specific set of tariffs on large household laundry equipment since February, 2018), and automotive, the metals-using sectors were creating new employment at a considerably faster pace than both the overall private economy and overall manufacturing. And automotive was closing the gap.

Aside from trade, the White House, and everyone seeking the best for the U.S. economy, should also be troubled by the drop in September in the year-on-year manufacturing jobs increase to 117,000. That’s the worst such performance since August, 2017’s 112,000 and less than half the rate of the previous September annual improvement (266,000).

Better news for Trump-ers? Manufacturing job creation during the first 31 months of the Trump presidency is still much better (464,000) than during the last 31 months of former President Barack Obama’s administration (198,000).

Matters look better for the President (and manufacturing workers) on the wages front. Although industry’s pre-inflation hourly pay only inched up on month by 0.07 percent, that result beat the 0.04 percent dip for the overall private sector. (The Labor Department, which tracks the employment and wages figures, doesn’t monitor public sector wages since they’re set largely by politicians’ decisions, not largely by market forces. Therefore, they say almost nothing about the state of the labor market or the economic in general.)

Moreover, this relatively good manufacturing’s wage performance continued a slow relative catch up trend that began this year. Since January, current-dollar private sector pay is up 1.92 percent, versus 2.20 percent for manufacturing workers.

All the same, since the current economic recovery began, in mid-2009, private sector wages have risen by 26.87 percent. Manufacturing’s increase? Only 21.03 percent. And these manufacturing wages rose faster during the last 31 months of the Obama presidency (6.04 percent) than during the first 31 months of the Trump administration (5.53 percent). 

The safest economic conclusion seems to be that manufacturing hiring is hardly in the dumps – as suggested by the latest (also September) soft data from the Institute for Supply Management.  Nor does this looks like a “Tariff-mageddon” is upon us. But manufacturing job creation is also well off 2018’s robust pace, and the more so in major trade-affected industries . And its underlying situation will as more difficult to describe the Boeing and General Motors effects become visible (assuming the auto strike isn’t settled quickly).

But as cautious as that analysis is, the political implications as the 2020 presidential campaign heats up are even murkier. For barring a dramatic change in the manufacturing picture, they’ll depend on voters deciding whether the Trump manufacturing, trade, and overall economic record are good enough.   

Im-Politic: Has Trump’s Record on Real Wages Been Good Enough Politically?

Tags

Barack Obama, China, Im-Politic, inflation-adjusted wages, Labor Department, manufacturing, private sector, real wages, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, wages

Given the on-again-off-again nature of President Trump’s tariff policies (which against China went partly off again yesterday in the form of an announced short delay in the imposition of $250 billion worth of levies originally set for October 1), I figured there was no sense in performing my now-standard analysis of this morning’s new monthly U.S. consumer price inflation figures (for August).

Instead, I’ll focus on today’s inflation-adjusted wage data – which is always released by the Labor Department in tandem with the consumer inflation report –  and here there’s definitely some good news for President Trump, his supporters, and for manufacturing workers. One notable qualification: The shorter the memories of Trump working class voters, the better for his political future.

The table below makes clear what I mean. It shows the price-adjusted wage changes for the last three January-thru-August periods for private sector workers overall, for “blue-collar” private sector workers (that is, those not in management or supervisory positions), for manufacturing workers overall, and for blue-collar workers in general and their manufacturing counterparts. (To remind:  The Labor Department doesn’t track wages for public sector employees, since their pay stems mainly from politicians’ decisions, not economic fundamentals.) 

January thru Aug. real wages                  2019                2018                 2017

private sector:                                 +0.55 percent   +0.75 percent    +0.94 percent

private sector blue-collar:               +1.27 percent   +0.76 percent   +0.76 percent

manufacturing:                               +0.65 percent     -0.19 percent   +0.46 percent

manufacturing blue-collar:            +0.23 percent         0 percent      +1.15 percent

As you can see, manufacturing workers in particular have seen January-through-August constant-dollar wage gains in 2019 that were much better than in the comparable last year – but largely because the 2018 results were terrible. Moreover, for blue-collar manufacturing workers, the 2019 improvement was still much weaker than the 2017 increase. Private sector blue-collar after-inflation hourly wages accelerated year-on-year in 2019 as well, but the 2018 gain was at least identical to 2017’s.

Short blue-collar worker memories will also help Trumpworld if the Obama administration’s real wage record is forgotten. For Mr. Trump’s record trails that of his predecessor for all of these major worker categories (although the advance in inflation-adjusted manufacturing blue-collar wages under both Presidents during comparable periods of their terms in office is pretty similar).

                                                   Last 30 Obama months       First 30 Trump months

private sector:                                  +3.39 percent                      +2.62 percent

private sector blue-collar:               +3.97 percent                      +2.72 percent

manufacturing:                                +3.25 percent                     +0.37 percent

manufacturing blue-collar:              +3.22 percent                     +3.11 percent

Let’s end on a fairly positive note for Mr. Trump and his backers: The table below shows that overall, price-adjusted wages in manufacturing fared better after his tariffs’ advent in March, 2018 (for the most part) than during the pre-tariff phrase of his presidency. Because the two time periods have been of different lengths, I’m presenting the results in terms of average monthly changes in absolute dollars and cents terms.

                                                         Pre-tariffs                            Post-tariffs

Manufacturing:                               -0.31 cents                           +0.50 cents

Blue-collar manufacturing:           +0.85 cents                            +0.75 cents

Again, what these statistics mean for the future of American workers is anyone’s guess, especially in trade-heavy manufacturing, since trade policy decisions seem so ragged. And politically, the key question remains: Have times been good enough for working class and other voters during the Trump era to offset other concerns about his leadership sufficiently to bring him a second term?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Good U.S. Manufacturing Jobs Report – for Trump Trade War Critics

Tags

aluminum, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning’s August jobs report from the U.S. Labor Department was mediocre news for the American economy as a whole, but it finally brought some good news for opponents of President Trump’s trade policies. For the new monthly numbers, plus the latest set of benchmark revisions, finally revealed some notable damage to hiring in U.S. manufacturing in industries exposed the longest and most consistently to the tariffs he’s imposed.

Although it’s now gotten just about futile to measure the effect of Mr. Trump’s China policies – because of the on-again-off-again nature of his tariff and tariff threats, and because their future is still so cloudy – the President’s levies on steel and aluminum date from March, 2018 and most have stayed in place. Therefore, we have a solid idea over a respectable length of time over how these measures have affected manufacturing overall – as Trump critics have noted, not simply for the industries that have received trade protection, but for those (collectively much larger) sectors that use the two metals to make their final products.

As RealityChek regulars know, for many months following the metals tariffs’ imposition, these sectors had actually been outperforming not only the rest of manufacturing but the rest of the private sector economy on several fronts. (See, e.g., here and here.)

But the August jobs report makes clear that those days are over, at least for now. Below, as usual, are the figures for these main metals-using sectors since April, 2018 (the first full month in which the metals tariffs were in effect), along with the hiring statistics for two control groups: manufacturing overall, and the private sector overall.

                                                        Old thru July      New thru July      Thru August

entire private sector:                      +2.13 percent     +2.22 percent      +2.30 percent

overall manufacturing:                  +1.69 percent     +1.71 percent      +1.73 percent

durable goods:                               +2.10 percent     +2.10 percent      +2.10 percent

fabricated metals products:            +1.71 percent    +1.69 percent      +1.58 percent

non-electrical machinery:              +2.73 percent    +2.34 percent      +2.19 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:         +0.33 percent    -0.01 percent           0 percent

household appliances*:                   not available    -7.57 percent         not available

aerospace products & parts*:          not available   +8.36 percent         not available

*data are one month behind

As these figures demonstrate, except for aerospace (and oddly, because of Boeing’s safety troubles and their impact on this giant manufacturer’s sales and orders), all of the metals-using sectors are now under-performing the rest of industry and the private sector when it comes to net new job creation. And all except aerospace have displayed weaker relative momentum. (Don’t forget that the appliances totals have been affected not only by the metals tariffs, but by a separate set of product-specific tariffs levied on large household laundry equipment the month before.) 

The policy questions raised are whether these results mean either that Trump should rethink his decision to confront China’s economic and technological predation, or whether he should change tactics. My own answer is “No” in each case, since the stakes of countering China are so great, the losses are still small, and since the economy, manufacturing generally, and the metals-using industries could easily be revived – and strongly – with a big domestic infrastructure building and repair program. But the August jobs report does further undercut the President’s claim that “Trade wars are good, and easy to win.”

Meanwhile, the actual August manufacturing numbers and the revisions are worth examining. August’s 3,000 net monthly gain in manufacturing payrolls was the worst such improvement since May’s 2,000. And the revisions for July were nothing less than stunning: An initially reported 16,000 jobs sequential increase has been downgraded to 4,000 (a result that’s still preliminary). June’s downgrade was smaller – from a 12,000 advance to 10,000. But the initial estimate was 17,000, so the trend looks comparably bad.

Moreover, if the new (preliminary) August figure holds, it would produce the worst year-on-year manufacturing jobs performance (up 138,000) since September, 2017 (123,000). Last August’s year-on-year manufacturing employment advance, moreover, was nearly twice as strong – 256,000.

That July revision was so big that it could justify some hope that subsequent reevaluations will generate significantly upside surprises. President Trump, moreover, can still brag that manufacturing job creation during his first thirty months in office (up 467,00, or 3.77 percent since February, 2017) has considerably exceeded that of former President Obama’s final thirty months (up 179,000, or 1.47 percent). But hopes are just that. And many more months like the last few, and the Trump manufacturing jobs record will start looking awfully similar to that of his predecessor – both economically and politically.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Big Fade for Tariffs-Led Consumer Inflation

Tags

aluminum, China, inflation, Labor Department, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Well, that was fast. Last month, when the Labor Department’s consumer price data came out (for June), I observed that they revealed some tariff-led inflation – especially in goods categories that by all rights should be affected by the duties on steel and aluminum that President Trump imposed in March, 2018.

(More such evidence appeared in categories in which tariffs have been placed on Chinese imports. But as continually noted, because of several complications – e.g., shorter duration, great variations in metals-intensity, data classification issues – these results should be considered much less reliable than the metals tariffs statistics.)

Yet this morning’s new consumer price data, for July, shows a significant fade in tariff pricing pressures for the metals users. Part of the reason no doubt is the lifting of the metals tariffs on imports from Mexico and Canada. But they were removed only in late May, so it’s difficult to believe that this decision deserves most of the credit.

Here are the price increases for metals-using industries between June and July, since April, 2018 (the first full month in which the duties were in place), and the year-on-year figures for this June and July. Also included, as always, are statistics for various control groups of goods, including so-called “core inflation” (which strips out volatile food and energy prices), and for the foods and beverages that are sold in metal cans outside of these containers:

                                 June-July      Since April, 2018      y/y June            y/y July

core inflation:      +0.29 percent      +2.79 percent     +2.13 percent   +2.21 percent

fresh fruits           +0.60 percent      +1.67 percent     +0.86 percent   +0.33 percent

  & vegs:

fresh fruits:             0 percent           -1.55 percent      -1.85 percent    -2.74 percent

fresh vegs:           +1.28 percent       +5.49 percent    +4.09 percent   +3.96 percent

processed             -0.68 percent        +0.04 percent    +1.70 percent   +1.45 percent

  fruits & vegs

canned fruits:       -1.56 percent        +2.30 percent    +3.93 percent   +2.87 percent

  & vegs

canned fruits:       -0.44 percent        +0.99 percent     +2.02 percent  +1.89 percent

canned vegs:         -2.33 percent       +3.28 percent     +5.28 percent  +3.13 percent

soups:                   -0.18 percent       +0.28 percent     +0.30 percent   +0.04 percent

malt bevgs           +0.72 percent       +3.13 percent     +1.69 percent   +2.58 percent

  at home:

alcoholic bevgs   +0.38 percent       +1.90 percent     +1.05 percent   +1.43 percent

  away from home:

non-frozen, non-  -0.05 percent       +2.99 percent     +2.71 percent   +2.33 percent

  carbonated non-

  alcoholic rinks:

carbted drinks:      -0.47 percent      +3.39 percent     +3.15 percent   +3.14 percent 

juices & non-        -0.23 percent      +3.11 percent     +2.86 percent    +2.62 percent

  alcoholic drinks

new cars/trucks:    -0.19 percent     +1.17 percent     +0.58 percent    +0.34 percent

motor vehicle        -0.51 percent     +2.07 percent     +1.91 percent    +1.42 percent

  parts:

appliances:            -0.83 percent      +2.00 percent    +2.56 percent    +0.62 percent

major                     -0.98 percent      +4.13 percent    +2.94 percent     -0.75 percent

  appliances:

laundry                     0 percent          +2.83 percent    -3.98 percent     -4.63 percent

  equipment:

non-electric         -1.78 percent          -5.14 percent    -1.94 percent    -2.94 percent

  cookware & tableware:

tools, hardware,  +0.62 percent        +0.83 percent    +1.06 percent   +1.35 percent

  outdoor equipment:

The waning of inflationary pressures can be seen by comparing the core inflation rate since the advent of the metals tariffs with the inflation rates of the metals-using industries.

The latest data show that prices rose faster than that core rate in only six of the sixteen metals-using categories shown. Moreover, in four of these categories (beer and other malt beverages consumed at home; non-frozen, non-carbonated, non-alcoholic drinks; carbonated drinks; and all juices and non-alcoholic drinks), the results need to be treated with caution, since these products are also sold in non-metal containers.

The previous month’s data showed that prices rose faster than core inflation in ten of these metals-using categories – with the results in three complicated by the use of non-metal containers.

That total in turn was up from the nine of sixteen instances of relatively strong inflation in metals-using industries in both February and March (with the non-metal container issue muddying the waters for four of those nine categories in February and three in March).

As for the China-related evidence, I’m hesitant to examine it for the time being not only because of the aforementioned data issues, but because U.S. policy has changed so dramatically in the last few weeks – with the President in early August threatening ten percent tariffs by September 1 for a $300 billion tranche of imports from China that would have been dominated by consumer goods, and then today postponing their imposition until December 15 (or until a satisfactory bilateral trade deal is struck).

Nonetheless, the metals tariff-related data shows that inflation for these levies so far has never been especially strong (except, for a time, in large household laundry equipment – which had faced separate, product-specific duties since February, 2018), and whatever strength it’s shown, hasn’t lasted very long. (In fact, even for those laundry machines, the table shows that their super-charged price hikes are now turning into super-charged price drops.)

And of course, as Breitbart.com‘s John Carney keeps pointing out, the economy’s overall weak rate of inflation means that even when tariffs have pushed prices up, many other forces have been pushing other prices down.  (Further, these low overall inflation rates almost by definition mean that price pressures from the existing China tariffs can’t be impressive, either.)

That’s not to say that Mr. Trump’s trade policies therefore can’t be hurting the U.S. economy in other ways (although the evidence to date here is also pretty feeble). And it’s entirely possible that the widely tariff-mageddon could still hit Americans on a variety of fronts if the trade war with China in particular lasts long enough. But inflation claims have always been central to the Trump trade critics’ case, as made clear by how quickly #tariffsaretaxes became a hashtag, and how it’s persisted. And if the critics have been wrong on this crucial score, why should anyone be confident in any of their other predictions?