(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Inflation Signals Turned (More) Mixed in September

Tags

consumer price index, core inflation, CPI, Federal Reserve, inflation, Labor Department, prices, transitory, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s report from the Labor Department on the September inflation figures contained something for everyone, and unfortunately, that’s not great news for anyone trying to figure out whether current price rises are going to continue worrisomely for the foreseeable future, or whether they’re “transitory.” That’s the term that’s been used by Federal Reserve officials in particular to describe their expectations that these trends result mainly from pandemic-related supply chain and other economic disruptions, and will return to normal territory once the CCP Virus is clearly under control.

The inflation pessimists can point to accelerations in all four main measures of inflation reported today. On a monthly basis, the overall consumer price index (CPI), rose by 0.41 percent on month in September versus 0.27 percent in August, and the so-called core measure – which strips out unusually volatile food and energy prices, increased sequentially by 0.24 percent, versus August’s 0.10 percent

The year-on-year figures, which are more closely followed because they cover a longer time span and therefore are less vulnerable to inevitable random fluctuations – told much the same story. The overall CPI was up 5.38 percent in September as opposed to 5.20 percent in August, and the core climbed from 3.98 percent to 4.04 percent.

Many transitory-istas (who include yours truly) can and no doubt will take some comfort from the lower core figures. But pessimists will rightly observe that, however subject to wide swings, food and energy are vital to all the rest of the economy, and if their prices are on a rapidly moving escalator up, the effects are sure to spread in numerous other sectors.

I’m more impressed by the still-waning momentum in both inflation gauges. It’s evident from the monthly changes in the overall CPI so far this year. Despite the sequential speed up this month, these price increases are still nowhere their spring peaks. In fact, they’re still down on net since July.

Dec-Jan:                           0.26 percent

Jan-Feb:                           0.35 percent

Feb-March:                      0.62 percent

March-April:                   0.77 percent

April-May:                      0.64 percent

May-June:                       0.90 percent

June-July:                        0.47 percent

July-Aug:                        0.27 percent

Aug-Sept:                        0.41 percent

The monthly core changes look very similar:

Dec-Jan:                         0.03 percent

Jan-Feb:                         0.10 percent

Feb-March:                    0.34 percent

March-April:                  0.92 percent

April-May:                     0.74 percent

May-June:                      0.88 percent

June-July:                      0.33 percent

July-Aug:                      0.10 percent

Aug-Sept.                      0.24 percent

The case for acceleration looks stronger based on the year-on-year overall CPI changes, although a plateauing since May can be seen as well.

Jan:                                1.37 percent

Feb:                               1.68 percent

March:                           2.64 percent

April:                             4.15 percent

May:                              4.93 percent

June:                              5.32 percent

July:                               5.28 percent

Aug:                               5.20 percent

Sept:                               5.38 percent

Ditto for the annual core inflation increases:

Jan:                                1.40 percent

Feb:                               1.28 percent

March:                          1.65 percent

April:                            2.96 percent

May:                             3.80 percent

June:                             4.45 percent

July:                              4.24 percent

Aug:                              3.98 percent

Sept:                              4.04 percent

And it’s still true that these strong overall CPI and core inflation results stem partly from abnormally weak inflation in 2020, when the virus dramatically depressed inflation according to both measures. Here are the 2019-20 figures for the overall CPI:

Jan:                               2.47 percent

Feb:                              2.31 percent

March:                         1.51 percent

April:                           0.34 percent

May:                            0.22 percent

June:                            0.73 percent

July:                            1.05 percent

Aug:                            1.32 percent

Sept:                            1.41 percent

And here they are for the core:

Jan:                              2.26 percent

Feb:                             2.36 percent

March:                         2.10 percent

April:                          1.44 percent

May:                           1.24 percent

June:                           1.20 percent

July:                           1.56 percent

Aug:                           1.70 percent

Sept:                           1.72 percent

All the same (and I realize I’m starting to sound like the proverbial two-handed economist), the pessimists can point out that the 2020 annual inflation rates began rebounding once again. And because these “comps” have become harder to beat, the case for troubling, lasting inflation has become more compelling.

I’d agree with the “more compelling” conclusion. But to me, that still doesn’t translate into “particularly compelling.” Until it does, I’ll stay in the transitory camp – keeping in mind all the while that, as noted last month, the likely timeframe for the return to normality keeps getting stretched out.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The New U.S. Inflation Slowdown Still Leaves Lots of Questions

Tags

CCP Virus, core inflation, coronavirus, COVID 19, Immigration, inflation, inflation-adjusted wages, jobs report, Labor Department, New York Fed, productivity, real wages, transitory, wages, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Given how the U.S. economy could still face some major ups and downs in the next few months, largely because no one really knows what will happen with the CCP Virus and the responses from government, business, and consumers, only an idiot would confidently declare that this morning’s official report shows that the recent inflation burst is over. 

So even though I’ve been in that inflation-is-transitory camp – and therefore, that price trends haven’t yet provided the government to use its taxing, spending, and monetary policy tools to slow the economy’s expansion – I’ll just note how the inflation situation has changed in recent months.

What matters most is that the monthly inflation rate has come way down since June. During the first half of this year, the sequential pace of all price increases sped up from 0.3 percen to 0.9 percent. July’s result was down to 0.5 percent and the August figure just released by the Labor Department was just 0.3 percent – right back where it was in January, when the virus’ last powerful winter wave was cresting.

Also important: The so-called core inflation rate (this measure strips out food and energy prices, supposedly because they can be volatile for reasons having nothing to do with the level of overall national economic activity, and how fundamentally inflation-prone it is) has lost major momentum, too. Between January and June the monthly rise in prices increased from 0.1 percent to 0.9 percent . Since then, it fell to 0.3 percent in July and back to 0.1 percent last month.

Inflation pessimists can still point to year-on-year inflation rates that remain elevated by historic standards (5.3 percent for the total measure and four percent for the core). But the statistical curve is bending in the right direction on these two counts also, and as I’ve written previously, the annual numbers are still distorted – and therefore rendered useless – by the unusually weak inflation reads generated by last year’s short but steep virus-induced recession.

Further, that slowing monthly momentum counts for a lot because the biggest fear surrounding inflation is that it could feed on itself and spiral out of control, as higher and higher prices convince all sorts of customers for goods and services that prices will only keep increasing. As a result, they can fuel further inflation by stepping up purchases and pushing prices still higher (because greater demand for anything, all else equal, will enable producers and providers to charge more). Weaker monthly inflation figures indicate that these pressures have been easing lately.

Focusing singlemindedly on the core carries risks, though. Principally, food and energy prices may well belong in their own analytical category when it comes to measuring inflation. But when it comes to living life day-to-day, it’s another story altogether – since it’s hard to imagine living without them. So price trends could still be hammering consumers and businesses, and in turn the broader economy, even though the core inflation rate is signaling that all’s well.

Just as important, food and energy costs are so important that, if they last long enough, they could feed persistent inflationary fires throughout that broader economy.   

Another potential reason to check inflation optimism: The Labor Department also reported today that price-adjusted hourly wages climbed month-to-month by 0.4 percent. That’s the first positive monthly number since December’s 0.8 percent. A single data point proves little, especially in the pandemic era, but if wages begin advancing faster than overall price increases, many businesses will try to respond to these higher costs by hiking their prices – potentially adding new momentum to inflation.

The consistent drop in inflation-adjusted wages, however, between January and July shows that nothing of the kind had been happening, even though most businesses seem to keep complaining about labor shortages (which should be forcing wages – the price workers can command for their services – up strongly).

Moreover, as I’ve repeatedly pointed out, historically, American employers overall have responded to perceived or actual labor shortages by boosting their productivity – that is, using new technologies (like labor-saving equipment or software) or better management, or both, to improve efficiency and better enable themselves to absorb higher prices rather than pass them on to customers.

This scenario may sound bad for workers, and for some over various periods of time it will be. But to me, anyway, the clear lesson of history is that higher productivity does indeed, as the economic conventional wisdom holds, raise living standards (including wages) in general over time by (a) fostering the emergence of wholly new industries (which invariably need new workers); and (b) boosting existing industries’ ability to turn out more goods and services (which invariably creates the need for new workers, too).

At the same time, clearly not all businesses will take this tack. In fact, many are trying to keep wages low for many employees by agitating for more mass immigration. So far, this lobbying hasn’t succeeded, but it’s still way too early to say that workers have now regained enough bargaining leverage to ensure that their after-inflation pay continues rising robustly.

Wage increases (which I believe are long overdue) may also come to an end, or slow significantly, if weaker recent inflation stems from weaker economic growth – which would be bad for just about everyone. Unfortunately, the last monthly jobs report (also for August) and two important growth forecast series indicate that that’s precisely the case. (See here and here.)

But let’s close on a highly revealing note: One of the sources of these forecasts, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, has just decided to suspend releasing these projections until it can figure out how to adequately take into account “The uncertainty around the pandemic and the consequent volatility in the data….” If this august institution, with its legions of Ph.D. economists, is telling us that assessing the economy’s direction and fundamental health is currently a mug’s game, that seems like a pretty good reason for caution in interpreting the new inflation report, too.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Will Government Keep (Indirectly) Driving U.S. Job Creation?

Tags

Employment, healthcare, Jobs, Labor Department, Occupational Outlook Handbook, private sector, social assistance, subsidized private sector, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Predicting almost anything about the economy ten years or so out is a pretty risky business – which is why I rarely make such forecasts and don’t obsessively follow those made by others. But for many years, I’ve been tracking the growth of what I call the subsidized private sector in the U.S. employment picture. And the U.S. government just came out with a study taking the story out to 2030. So my curiosity was piqued, and because the ever greater importance of such employment speaks volumes about the strengths and weaknesses of the American economy, its workers, and their prospects, I hope yours will be, too.

The big takeaway? According to the U.S. Labor Department’s new Occupational Outlook Handbook, jobs in the healthcare and social assistance sectors will keep rising through the end of the decade as a share of all U.S. jobs – and this shouldn’t be seen as good news.

As I’ve pointed out repeatedly (e.g., here), this isn’t to say that healthcare or social assistance aren’t important for any number of reasons that should be obvious. Economically speaking, however, they’re problematic for two related reasons. First, although they’re technically classified as private sector jobs, their employment levels are largely determined by decisions made by politicians to provide funding, not market forces.

And that funding – or subsidization – is massive. A think tank called the Tax Policy Center pegged federal spending on healthcare alone (by far the biggest industry in the subsidized private sector) at $1.2 trillion in fiscal year 2019. A related research organization, the Urban Institute, reported that state and local governments poured $301 billion into health and hospitals during the previous fiscal year. (That’s the latest such data I could find.) If the state and local figure stayed the same in 2019, this public spending would have added up to just over seven percent of the entire U.S. economy and more than 40 percent of all government outlays that year.

The second reason to be concerned about outsized job growth in this subsidized private sector is that typically, the real private sector is the economy’s main source of innovation and productivity growth, which in turn area major foundations of sustainable prosperity – and therefore of the ability to pay for government in a financially responsible way, as opposed to more and more borrowing. A subsidized private sector punching above its job-creation weight is a sign that the real private sector’s economic role is shrinking in relative terms.

And the Occupational Outlook Handbook says that these trends will continue through 2030. Specifically, whereas other Labor Department data show that subsidized private sector jobs accounted for 16.11 percent of all U.S. non-farm jobs (the Labor Department’s definition of the American employment universe, which includes government jobs at all levels as such) in February, 2020 (just before the CCP Virus pandemic arrived in force), the Handbook‘s figures indicate that this figure will rise to 16.86 percent by the end of the decade.

In addition, subsidized private sector jobs will have climbed from 18.94 percent of all real private sector jobs in February, 2020 to 19.80 percent in 2030.

For some perspective, in June, 2009 (the end of the Great Recession that followed the global financial crisis), the subsidized private sector represented only 14.97 percent of jobs in the non-farm sector and 18.09 percent of those in the real private sector.

Conseqently, it should be no surprise that the Handbook‘s projections indicate that real private sector jobs will have fallen from 68.92 percent of all non-farm jobs in February, 2020 to 68.29 percent.

These shifts may look like small beans. But economies and workforces as massive as America’s don’t change much overnight (unless they’re hit by an outside shock like the pandemic). Also, the Labor Department could be wrong, even if the next few years are relatively tranquil. Yet its predictions track well with recent (pre-CCP Virus) trends.

So even though I haven’t been monitoring subsidized private employment developments during the virus period (because like pretty much all other economic statistics, they’ve been so distorted), I’ll resume checking them periodically again and hoping the trend lines start moving in different directions.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Revisions Outshone the New U.S. Manufacturing Jobs Gains

Tags

aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, appliances, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Delta variant, electrical equipment, Employment, fabricated metals products, Jobs, Labor Department, machinery, manufacturing, medicines, metals, miscellaneous durable goods, NFP, non-farm payrolls, personal protective equipment, pharmaceuticals, PPE, recovery, tariffs, Trade, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although U.S. manufacturers grew their payrolls by a solid net 27,000 in July, according to the Labor Department’s new jobs report for the month, the big story for industry lies in the June revisions. As often the case during the CCP Virus era, moreover, these were dominated by the automotive sector.

Specifically, June’s initially reported monthly 15,000 manufacturing jobs increase was boosted all the way up to 39,000. And the automotive numbers for June executed a stunning turnabout – from an estimated loss of 12,300 to a gain of 2,700. By contrast, net hiring in the vehicles and parts sectors for July was a quiet 800.

The May manufacturing employment revisions were less dramatic – from an increase 39,000 to one of 36,000. But that month had already witnessed its own huge revision – from an initially reported 23,000 to that 39,000.

Outside automotive, the June revisions were widespread through manufacturing, led by electrical equipment and appliances, whose employment increase that month was upgraded from 1,700 to 3,600. (Its July net job creation was a mere 200.)

Even with the strong revisions, though, manufacturing’s recent status as a U.S. recovery employment laggard continued. As of July, domestic industry had regained 952,000 (68.74 percent) of the 1.385 million net jobs lost in March and April of 2020. The numbers for the private sector overall are 76.96 percent of the 21.353 million lost jobs that have been recovered, and for the total non-farm economy (the definition of the American employment universe used by the U.S. government, which includes government jobs) 74.50 percent of the 22.362 million jobs lost.

One reason, of course, is that manufacturing employment suffered less than payrolls in the rest of the economy in the early spring of 2020. Its job levels fell by 10.82 percent, compared with 16.46 percent for the private sector and 14.66 for the entire non-farm economy.

At the same time, U.S.-based industry is still benefiting from stiff tariffs on metals and goods from China, and like the entire economy, is being supported by massive government stimulus along with skyrocketing vaccine production. This puzzle may be explained by the bottlenecks and resulting shortages plaguing all industries, and by the introduction of labor-saving equipment and other restructuring to substitute for the workers so many manufacturers claim are so hard to find. But as I wrote in last month’s examination of the June jobs report, I’m not completely convinced yet by either explanation.

The biggest July manufacturing employment winners by far of the major industry categories used by the U.S. government were machinery (6,800), miscellaneous durable goods (5,500), and fabricated metals products (4,500).

The performance of the first two is especially encouraging, since machinery’s products are used so widely throughout the entire economy (and since robust hiring therefore signals widespread overall strength and healthy capital spending); and since miscellaneous durable goods includes the personal protective equipment (PPE) and other medical supplies whose importance has been underscored by the pandemic.

Indeed, as a result of their July jobs gains, machinery employment has risen to within 3.30 percent of its immediate pre-pandemic level (in February, 2020), and the comparable figure for miscellaneous durable goods is 1.09 percent higher. (More on the performance of its PPE-including category will be presented below.) Both figures are better than that for manufacturing overall, whose payrolls are still 3.38 percent lower than just before the CCP Virus began significantly affecting the economy.

The only July manufacturing jobs losers suffered overwhelmingly fractional sequential setbacks, led by transportation equipment overall (the category containing automotive, where employment sank by 1,500) and semiconductors and electronic components, where global shortages undoubtedly had much to do with its job loss of 800.

Returning to the pandemic-related industries, where the data are one month behind, the picture in surgical appliances and supplies (the sector containing PPE) is dominated by a big downgrade in the May numbers – from a gain of 1,700 to a loss of 900. And in June, 500 more positions were shed. As a result, employment in this crucial national health security sector has fallen to 7.60 percent above immediate pre-pandemic levels.

In the overall pharmaceuticals and medicines industry, a slightly upgrade of May’s originally reported 400 job loss (to a drop of 300) was followed by a June rise of 2,700 – the biggest monthly advance since September, 2019’s 3,500 (well before the CCP Virus arrived). Its employment levels have consequently climbed to 4.72 percent above their February, 2020 figure.

The pharmaceuticals subsector containing vaccines showed continued good job growth, with May’s unrevised 1,000 improvement followed by an identical June increase. This industry now employs 10.20 percent more workers than just before the pandemic.

Aircraft employment levels have fluctuated wildly recently, due surely to the constant barrage of news both good and bad about Boeing. May’s 5,500 job plunge – the worst such performance since June, 2020’s 5,800 shrinkage – was followed by a June gain of 4,500. That’s its best hiring month since the same number of workers was added in July, 2012. But aircraft employment is still 7.55 percent less than in February, 2020, when the pandemic’s spread globally decimated air travel worldwide. On a more positive note, however, Boeing seems to believe the worst is over.

Aircraft engines and parts employment has been much more stable than aircraft’s, and these industries added 500 workers in total in June. But their payrolls are 14.91 percent smaller than in February, 2020 – nearly twice as big a proportional drop as in aircraft.

What’s next for domestic manufacturing employment? Last month I saw plenty of sources of uncertainty, ranging from bottlenecks to the infrastructure legislation to China tariff policy. Now there’s the virus’ hyper-contagious (but so far less harmful) Delta variant to contend with, and all the resumed lockdowns and other economic activity restrictions it could portend – along with the related likelihood of continued strong and even greater vaccine demand (though the sector isn’t big enough to move the national manufacturing jobs needle much).

I’m still most impressed by how all the national and regional surveys keep showing that manufacturers themselves see a still-brightening future ahead. (See, e.g., here and here.) After all, they’re the ones with skin in the game. Let’s hope they’re right. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A “Gentleman’s C” for the New Manufacturing Jobs Numbers

Tags

aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, electronics, Employment, fabricated metals products, facemasks, food products, furniture, housing, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, masks, metals, pharmaceuticals, ports, PPE, printing, productivity, protective gear, recession, recovery, reopening, semiconductor shortage, tariffs, vaccines, {What's Left of) Our Economy

June’s gains weren’t nearly enough to overcome the latest trend in U.S. manufacturing employment: From a job growth leader earlier during the CCP Virus pandemic, domestic industry has turned into a laggard. It’s not lagging by a big margin, but given significant net headwinds it should still be enjoying, recent results are clearly disappointing.

This morning, the Labor Department reported that U.S.-based manufacturers created 15,000 net new jobs in June – a modest number given the 662,000 increase in total private sector employment on month. At least revisions were positive. May’s initially reported 23,000 monthly improvement is now judged to be 39,000, but April’s already downwardly revised 32,000 sequential job loss is now pegged at 35,000.

In many of the nation’s supposedly prestige colleges, the grade earned by this kind of result would be called a “Gentleman’s C.”

As a result, domestic manufacturing has now regained 904,000 (66.32 percent) of the 1.363 million jobs lost during the pandemic. The numbers for the private sector overall are 72.98 percent of the 21.353 million lost jobs that have been recovered, and for the total non-farm economy (the definition of the American employment universe used by the U.S. government, which includes government jobs) 69.75 percent of the 22.362 million jobs lost.

A manufacturing optimist (and I’ve been one of them) can note that industry took less of an employment hit during the pandemic-loss months of March and April, 2020. Manufacturing employment sank by 10.65 percent, versus 16.46 percent for the private sector and 14.66 percent for the whole non-farm economy.

But nowadays, domestic manufacturers are still benefiting from major tariffs plus massive government stimulus on both the fiscal and monetary fronts, and from the huge ramp up in vaccine production. Reopening-related bottlenecks clearly are causing problems, but according to the major national surveys that measure how manufacturers themselves believe they’re faring, production and new orders for their products keep growing strongly. (For the newest ones, see here and here.) Even given equally widespread reports that new workers are hard to find, I expected hiring to remain much more robust than it has.

One explanation may be higher productivity, which enables businesses to turn out more goods with fewer workers. But given the longstanding difficulties of gauging this measure of efficiency, and undoubted pandemic-era distortions, I’m reluctant to put too much stock in this argument.

The shortages issues have been once again illustrated by the dominance of the automotive sector in the June manufacturing jobs picture. Payrolls of vehicles and parts companies fell by 12,300 – the biggest individual sector decreases by far – and surely stem from the continuing global shortage of the computer chips that have become ever more important parts of cars and trucks of all kinds.

One small bright spot in the June figures – the 300 jobs increase in the machinery sector. It’s an important indicator of the overall state of industrial hiring, since its products are used throughout industry (as well as in non-manufacturing sectors like agriculture and construction). At the same time, these new positions represented machinery’s weakest sequential performance since January’s 3,200 employment decrease.

Other big June manufacturing net hiring winners were furniture and related products (up 8,500, no doubt reflecting still strong home sales and remodeling activity), fabricated metals products (up 5,700, which is noteworthy given still widespread whining about the ongoing U.S. tariffs on metals), and miscellaneous durable goods manufacturing (up 3,300 – encouraging since this category includes many pandemic-related medical supplies).

The biggest losers other than automotive were food products (down 4,100 and continuing an employment slump that began in January), electronic instruments (down 2,100 and possibly related to the semiconductor shortage), and printing and related activities (down 1,400).

Pandemic-related industries turned in a mixed hiring performance, according to the latest jobs report. Job creation accelerated significantly in the surgical appliances and supply sector, which contains protective gear like face masks, gloves and surgical goans. Its payrolls grew by 1,700 on month in May (its data are one month behind, as is the case with the other sectors examined below), up from April’s 1,200 and its best monthly total since last July’s 3,000. This surgical category’s workforce is now 11.50 percent bigger than in February, 2020 – the last pre-pandemic month.

But the May figures revealed a job creation setback in the overall pharmaceuticals and medicines industry. April’s hiring was revised down slightly, from 2,700 to 2,500, but the number was still solid. In May, however, its payrolls shrank by 400, its worst such performance since pandemicky April, 2020. And its workforce is only 3.82 percent greater than in February, 2020.

Better news came out of the pharmaceuticals subsector containing vaccines, but not that much better. This industry added one thousand workers on net in May, but April’s initially reported 1,300 jobs increase was revised down to 1,100. Still, this vaccines-heavy sector now employs 9.20 percent more workers than just before the pandemic.

And in aircraft, Boeing’s continuing manufacturing and safety issues surely helped produce this industry’s worst jobs month – consisting of a 5,500 payroll decrease – since June, 2020’s 5,800. This sector has now lost 9.39 percent of its jobs since the final pre-pandemic month.

Interestingly, the aircraft engines and parts, and non-engine parts categories weren’t nearly as hard-hit job-wise in May. (The former even maintained employment levels.) But payrolls in each are down since February, 2020, by roughly twice as much proportionately as in aircraft.

Major uncertainties still hang over the domestic manufacturing jobs scene, and in one important respect – big new backups in Chinese ports – they’ve become murkier. Nor do Boeing’s problems seem ready to end any time soon. I’m still bullish on U.S.-based manufacturing’s employment outlook, at least in the short and medium terms mainly because American policy remains so overwhelmingly stimulative and its effects are still coursing through the economy. But I’m getting a little impatient for the numbers to start backing me up once again.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: March U.S. Manufacturing Job Gains Lagged – For a Good Reason

Tags

aerospace, aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, American Jobs Plan, automotive, Biden, Build Back Better, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, Employment, fabricated metal products, Jobs, Labor Department, lockdowns, machinery, manufacturing, non-farm jobs, pharmaceuticals, PPE, recession, recovery, regulation, semiconductor shortage, semiconductors, tariffs, taxes, Trade, travel services, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning’s figures from the Labor Department show that U.S. domestic manufacturing was a bit of a jobs creation laggard in March – and that was good news. The reason? The employment gains for the rest of the economy were so enormous.

This latest monthly U.S. jobs report showed that non-farm payrolls (the definition of the U.S. jobs universe used by the Labor Department, which tracks these data), rose by 0.64 percent in March – to 144.210 million. Job-creation in the private sector advanced at a virtually identical rate.

Payrolls in manufacturing were up by a lower 0.43 percent – to 12.284 million. But they still increased by 53,000 – their best performance since September’s 55,000. It’s also possible that hiring in the automotive sector was held down by a global shortage of semiconductors – which has led to production cutbacks and even some layoffs.

The only disappointment in the new manufacturing jobs numbers concerned revisions – which were mostly negative. February’s initially reported 21,000 net employment gain is now estimated at 18,000. January’s 14,000 job loss (already downgraded from an initially judged 10,000) is now pegged at a still greater 18,000. But December’s improvement was upwardly revised again – from 34,000 to 35,000.

As a result, manufacturing has now regained 63.83 percent (870,000) of the 1.363 million jobs the sector shed during the peak CCP Virus lockdowns period of last March and April. That’s fewer relatively speaking than the recovery in private sector employment – 66.88 percent (14.172 million) of the 21.191 million jobs it lost during that period.

But because of continuing weakness in the public sector – which has recovered just 66.42 percent of its 22.362 million job loss last spring – manufacturing’s payrolls’ rebound is still ahead of the entire economy’s. In fact, manufacturing jobs now account for a higher (8.52 percent) of total non-farm employment than during the last full pre-pandemic data month (8.39 percent in February, 2020).

The biggest manufacturing jobs winners in March? Far and away the champ was the big fabricated metals products industry, which expanded employment by 13,700 – more than a quarter of the manufacturing total. Next came two smallish sectors – miscellaneous non-durable goods and printing and related support activities (up 7,400 and 5,900, respectively). Encouragingly, jobs increased by 3,500 in the big machinery sector – whose products are used throughout not only the rest of manufacturing but the entire economy.

The worst performers were transportation equipment – whose 3,000 lost March jobs included 1,000 in the automotive sector, which has been forced into production cutbacks and some layoffs due to the global semiconductor shortage – and furniture (down 1,300).

Unfortunately, these latest figures indicate that employment in many CCP Virus-fighting goods continues to lag. To be sure, their payrolls seem to be up from the last pre-pandemic levels whereas overall manufacturing jobs are down (by 4.02 percent). But given the nature of the emergency, and the shortages it revealed, it’s surprising they’re not higher still.

The relevant numbers only go through February, and in the broad pharmaceuticals sector, employment rose by 1,600 sequentially. And January’s initially reported 700 job loss has been upgraded to a decrease of only 100. But the sector’s payrolls have grown by a mere 2.60 percent since that last pre-pandemic month of February, 2020.

The performance of the pharmaceuticals subsector containing vaccines was considerably better. February payrolls expanded by 1,300 sequentially, and January’s gains are now estimated at 500, not 100. As a result, this vaccine-related sector’s employment levels are now 6.23 percent higher than in February, 2020.

The story, however, has been more discouraging lately in the manufacturing category containing personal healthcare-related protection devices (PPE) like facemasks, gloves, and medical gowns. Payrolls were flat on month in February, and the initially reported January job loss of 800 was only upgraded to a decline of 700. Still, payrolls in this sector have climbed by 7.98 percent since February, 2020.

Interestingly, despite the rebounding orders for Boeing’s popular but previously grounded 737 Max jetliner, the recovery of national and global travel, and the resumption of deliveries of its also-troubled 787 Dreamliner, none of these positive developments has shown up in the aerospace jobs numbers.

For example, aircraft employment in February (also the latest available figures) grew by only 1,000 on month and not only remains down 10.66 percent on year, but substantially lower than all of last year’s safety crisis- and the worst of the CCP Virus-plagued months. Similar trends hold for aircraft engines and engine parts, and non-engine aircraft parts.

The outlook for domestic manufacturing job creation still seem bright, as vaccinations are being administered rapidly, reopenings are spreading, igniting renewed overall economic activity, Boeing does seem to be emerging from its safety and manufacturing-related troubles, and the high, sweeping Trump tariffs keep pricing many Chinese goods out of the U.S. market, thereby creating new opportunities for American producers.

But that global semiconductor shortage, which will eventually affect much more than automotive output, may not end until late next year. It’s tough to know the overall impact of the Biden administration’s American Jobs Plan and other Build Back Better virus recovery proposals on the one hand, and the tax increases proposed to pay for them on the other, as well as the new regulations that will be involved – assuming even that they pass Congress reasonably intact. And vaccines production won’t be booming forever.

So no one concerned about domestic manufacturing’s health and prospects has any excuse not to peruse carefully all the industry-related data and news that are in store in the weeks and months ahead.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Winning Streak Broken But a Still Encouraging Outlook for Manufacturing Jobs

Tags

aerospace, Biden, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, Employment, healthcare goods, Jobs, Labor Department, machinery, manufacturing, NFP, non-farm payrolls, pharmaceuticals, PPE, tariffs, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

U.S. manufacturing’s eight-month streak of hiring gains ended in January, with industry shedding 10,000 jobs from December’s levels. Also dimming the results reported for the sector in this morning’s offiical employment figures were moderately negative revisions. Moreover, despite the CCP Virus emergency, and the vaccine production ramp up, job creation in health care-related manufacturing (where the most detailed figures only go up to December) remained disappointing.

Although the manufacturing jobs revisions for November and December weren’t nearly as great as the unusually large changes for the Labor Department’s overall U.S. jobs universe (called “non-farm payrolls”), they still weakened the employment outperformance recorded by the sector since job levels bottomed out in April.

December’s originally reported on-month manufacturing jobs increase was downgraded from 38,000 to 31,000. And although the November data saw their second upward revision (from 27,000 to 35,000 and now to 41,000), the findings for October fell all the way from 43,000 to 32,000. (They were originally reported as 33,000.)

The January numbers mean that manufacturing has regained 58.91 percent (803,000) of the 1.363 million jobs it lost during the pandemic’s first wave and resulting sweeping lockdowns in March and April.

That pace is now slightly behind that of the total private sector, which since April has recovered 60.34 percent (12.788 million) of the 21.191 million jobs lost last spring.

But manufacturing’s employment is still faring better than the total non-farm sector (which includes hard hit state and local governments). Overall, as of January, the economy has regained just 56.27 percent (12.47 million) of the 12.321 million jobs lost in March and April.

Despite decreasing in toto in January, employment in some manufacturing sectors nonetheless improved. These winners were led by the big chemicals industry (up 10,500), food products (2,200), and miscellaneous durable goods, computer and electronics products, and wood products (up 1,300 each). Within the computer sector, payrolls in semiconductors and related devices rose by 1,800.

January’s biggest losers were non-metallic mineral products (down 6,400), automotive (off by 5,300), fabricated metals products (a 4,100 loss), and electrical equipment and appliances (down 3,200).

Unfortunately, given its importance as an equipment supplier to the manufacturing sector and other important U.S. industries, employment in machinery declined by 700 on month in January, and revisions were deeply negative.

Also discouraging were the most recent jobs figures for healthcare-related manufacturing, especially given the vaccine progress and months of national alarm about dangerously inadequate domestic production of these critical goods.

Generally, employment increases continued, but the pace remains sluggish. For example, the broad pharmaceuticals and medicines sector added 2,200 jobs in December, and revisions were slightly positive. But payrolls here have grown by a mere 2.09 percent since February – the last month before the virus’ health and economic impact began to be fully felt.

Employment advanced again in December in the sub-sector containing vaccines. But about half of the sequential increase of 1,100 was offset by downward revisions for October and November. And this sub-sector’s total headcount is up just 4.35 percent since February.

The opposite pattern was seen in the manufacturing category containing personal healthcare-related protection devices (PPE) like facemasks, gloves, and medical gowns. Its payrolls rose fell by 400 sequentially from November to December, but revisions for the previous two months rose by the same miniscule total. Still, this industry’s 8.08 percent job growth since February led healthcare manufacturing by a wide margin.

Despite January’s setback, a reasonable case can be made that manufacturing’s employment prospects still look bright for several reasons. Progress will surely keep being made on the PPE front. Vaccine production is set to surge. A large aerospace sector long hobbled by Boeing’s safety woes is seeing the company’s troubled 737 Max model being recertified for flight by more and more countries. Any national and global recovery will see demand for air travel revive.  And because President Biden has decided to keep Donald Trump’s steep, sweeping tariffs on imports from China in place for the time being. Consequently, industry can be expected to supply more U.S. demand than usual as the economy returns to normal however quickly or slowly.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Latest on the Virus, Lockdowns, and Jobs

Tags

California, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Jobs, Labor Department, lockdowns, New York, public health, states, stay-at-home, Wallethub.com, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

With the release last week of the Labor Department’s U.S. state-level employment data for December, we have a great new handle on the relationship between the various lockdown and stay-at-home policies mandated throughout the country, and the still horrific toll on job losses during the CCP Virus era.

And as with recent statistics on state-level economic growth (and contraction) rates (see here and here), the numbers seem to point to the economic curbs themselves as the biggest influence on employment levels and changes, as opposed to other factors, like individuals’ virus-induced fear of using various types of in-person services (like travel) and the resulting knock-on effects throughout the entire economy.

One major indication of the mandates’ impact comes, as with the growth figures, from the outsized job losses experienced in New York and California, two states with some of the most severe lockdown regimes imposed over the past year.

In December, 2019, just before the virus began spreading to the United States, New York and California accounted for 18.37 percent of all the nation’s non-farm jobs (the Labor Department’s U.S. jobs universe.) But one year later, their employment losses came to 27.91 percent of the U.S. total.

Additional reasons for blaming the mandates for the employment damage come from comparing the performances the best and worst jobs performers, and the least and most restrictive states. As with the previous post on growth levels, the ranking of mandate strictness comes from the Wallethub.com website. (And sharp-eyed readers will note that the rankings have changed over the last few months, which makes perfect sense since the lockdown regimes’ extent has fluctuated, too.)

First let’s see the Wallethub ranks of the states with the best employment records between December, 2019 and December, 2020. (The lower the rank, the more “open” the state.)

Top 10 job performers (by % change)       Wallethub.com rank

1. Idaho: +0.6                                                          14

1. Utah: +0.6                                                             6

2. Mississippi: -1.4                                                  21

3. Alabama: -1.7                                                      12

3. Georgia: -1.7                                                       18

4. Nebraska: -2.3                                                     17

5. South Carolina: -2.4                                            10

6. Arizona: -2.8                                                       30

6. Arkansas: -2.8                                                       4

6. Indiana: -2.8                                                       20

7. Montana: -2.9                                                     13

7. South Dakota: -2.9                                               2

8. Missouri: -3.1                                                       7

9. Tennessee: -3.2                                                  19

10. Texas: -3.3                                                        28

Right off the bat you’ll see that because of ties, the Top 10 is really a Top 15 – which actually serves our purposes even better. And the big takeaway here is that with one exception (Arizona) and one near-exception (Texas), all of these states rank in the top half on the open/closed scale (26 and lower for the 50 states plus the District of Columbia).

And of these 15 states, four were among the ten most open, and twelve were among the twenty most open.

Does the reverse proposition hold? Have the most closed states generally compiled the worst employment records? Here’s what the numbers say:

Bottom 10 job performers (by % change)     Wallethub.com rank

1. Hawaii: -13.8                                                          43

2. Michigan: -10.9                                                      29

3. New York: -10.4                                                     39

4. Massachusetts: -9.1                                                49

5. Vermont: 9.0                                                           45

6. New Hampshire: -8.8                                             23

7. Rhode Island: -8.7                                                  36

8. Minnesota: -8.3                                                      32

9. California: -8.0                                                       51

9. New Jersey: -8.0                                                     34

10. Delaware: -7.8                                                      33

10. Pennsylvania: -7.8                                                35

10. Oregon: -7.8                                                         37

Because of the “tie effect,” this Bottom 10 set is really a Bottom 13. Four of them fall in the category of ten most restrictive states (ranked between 51 and 41 on the Wallethub scale), and seven more are among the next ten most restrictive states. Moreover, only one state (New Hampshire) has been in the top half of most open states. So the relationship between lockdowns and employment performance looks strong from this perspective as well.

The issue can be examined the other way around, too – by examining the employment performance of the most open and least open states. Here are the results for the ten most open states. (As with the list of ten most closed states below, the Top Ten here really is a Top Ten.) They’re presented in descending order of openness.) 

Ten least restrictive on lockdowns         Job creation rank (out of 37)

Oklahoma:                                                                15

South Dakota:                                                            6

Iowa:                                                                         11

Arkansas:                                                                   5                  

Florida:                                                                    14

Utah:                                                                          1

Missouri:                                                                   7

Wisconsin:                                                               25

Alaska:                                                                    24

South Carolina:                                                         4

Revealingly, fully half of these states were among the ten states with the best employment records, three more were in the next ten. Consequently, eight of the ten ranked in the top half on the openness scale. (Because of the “tie effect,” the top half here starts at number 19 – of 37 differing state rankings).

And although Oklahoma looks like something of an exception here (the most consistently open state being only the 15^th best jobs performer), there’s a pretty simple explanation: Oklahoma’s economy is energy-heavy, and that sector has been absolutely slammed the deep recession experienced during the CCP Virus period.

Florida, which relies so heavily on tourism, has an “excuse” as well. (By the same token, though, it’s no coincidence that the worst employment performer, Hawaii, is tourism-dependent as well, along with fellow job laggards California and, to a lesser extent, New York.)

Finally, the table below shows how the most closed states fared in terms of job loss.  These are presented in descending order of “closed-ness.”

Ten most restrictive on lockdowns          Job creation rank (out of 37)

California:                                                                  31

Virginia:                                                                     12

Masschusetts:                                                             34

District of Columbia:                                                 21

New Mexico:                                                             26

Washington:                                                               18

Vermont:                                                                    33

North Carolina:                                                          10

Hawaii:                                                                      37

Illinois:                                                                      24

Fully four of these ten have been among the five worst employment states during the virus period (including tourism-reliant Hawaii and California). Three more (Illinois, New Mexico, and the District of Columbia) joined them in the bottom half. Of the two exceptions, Virginia’s solid employment record surely stems from its status not only as a state with a strongly growing information technology sector and an army of federal workers (many of whose jobs in turn owe to federal contracting).

One last point should be remembered as well: As extensively documented, the lockdowns and stay-at-home orders have generated their own serious healthcare damage . So the states with the relatively limited mandates surely have curbed both these CCP Virus costs as well as economic damage. Meaning that the already compelling case for anti-virus measures targeting the most vulnerable rather than indiscriminately putting the clamps on businesses and other forms of activity has just grown that much stronger.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Evidence of U.S. Manufacturing’s Tariff-Bolstered Resilience

Tags

CCP Virus, China, Commerce Department, coronavirus, COVID 19, imports, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, recession, recovery, tariffs, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, Trump, value added, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I must confess that I’m more than a little confused. On the one hand, I read in The Wall Street Journal two days ago that the Trump administration “used tariffs to try to drive manufacturing back home, although growth in factory jobs stalled once the administration resorted to levies that drove up costs for many factories.”

On the other hand, I read in The Wall Street Journal yesterday that U.S.-based manufacturing is recovering “quicker than expected” from the CCP Virus- and lockdowns-induced American recession. Moreover, this stellar performance is taking place amid “higher costs for materials used in everything from kitchen cabinets to washing machines to automobiles.”

Stranger still: Unquestionably, among the cost drivers for these materials have been those Trump tariffs, especially on imports from China – which are not only wide-ranging (covering some $360 billion worth of Chinese-made products when they were imposed in phases), and steep (with most standing at 25 percent).

In fact, “stellar” really isn’t the best adjective for the manufacturing surge. Try “record-shattering.” For the Commerce Department’s “GDP by Industry” statistics show that between the second and third quarters of this year, manufacturing value-added (an output measure that tries to eliminate the double-counting that results from including in manufacturing production levels both final products and all the parts, components, and materials that go into those products) shot up by 13.34 percent at an annual rate. That’s not only never happened before. It’s never come close to happening before – at least since 2005, when the relevant data series began.

To be fair, this growth stemmed from the rubberband-like effect of partial virus-related reopenings of economic activity. Specifically, it followed a record 12.47 percent nosedive between the first and second quarters. But who can reasonably doubt that the immense scale of the Trump tariffs suppressed the amount of Chinese goods that could have satisfied this renewed demand, as they had done so typically in the recent past – especially since China’s export machine recovered exceptionally quickly from the People’s Republic’s own virus outbreak and massive shutdowns?

Moreover, who can reasonably doubt that the exclusion of these imports from the U.S. market more than offset whatever price increases the tariffs created? Because however much these levies are reducing companies’ earnings and profits, every sale lost to a China-based rival – whether at home or abroad – means much less in the way of earnings and profits. 

And this strong American manufacturing growth pickup has put an end to that short-lived manufacturing jobs slowdown. From April of last year (when the CCP Virus’ economic impact peaked on a monthly basis ) through December, Labor Department data show that U.S. industry’s payrolls are up by 820,000 – much faster growth than the 37,000 increase during the same period in 2019. Of course, the incredibly abnormal sudden stop-and-start of virus-era economies not just in the United States but the world over (and in largely unsynchronized ways) sharply limits the use of all such comparisons, because they have so relatively little to do with the economic fundamentals.

At the same time, though, it’s entirely reasonable to expect U.S. manufacturing production and employment to keep expanding as post-CCP Virus normality returns. And as long as the Trump tariffs remain largely in place, the prospect of a renewed Chinese import flood will be one major headwind that domestic industry won’t have to fear.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Sorry, but Little Evidence Yet That Trump-onomics Left Blacks Behind

Tags

African Americans, Barack Obama, Biden, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, Economic Policy Institute, Federal Reserve, Labor Department, Labor Force Participation Rate, median household income, median weekly earnings, racial economic justice, racial wealth gap, systemic racism, Tracy Jan, unemployment rate, Washington Post, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

No one should be surprised, much less outraged, if President Biden spends the next year – or four! – blaming the Trump administration for every problem that remains with or emerges in the American economy, or any other dimension of national life. After all, problems do linger from presidency to presidency, and at least as important, it’s the politically expedient road to take — as much history shows.

Less justifiable are journalistic displays of such behavior. But if Tracy Jan’s January 22 Washington Post piece on African Americans and the economy is any indication, not only are four more years of blame-casting in store, but four more years of whoppingly inaccurate and indeed one-sided blame-casting are in store.

Actually, Jan’s article isn’t quite as slanted as the headline, which proclaims “The Trump Economy Left Black Americans Behind.” Readers are told right off the bat, for example, that racial economic gaps have persisted for decades, and that consequently “many black voters” have been “skeptical of the Democratic Party to represent their interests.” The author adds that “unemployment rates for Black people were at a historic low before the coronavirus shutdown, as Trump frequently reminded voters.”

But her dominant themes are that the CCP Virus pandemic has hit black America much harder economically than white, that therefore racial economic disparities have widened during the pandemic, that Trump’s mismanagement of the response was to blame, and that this CCP Virus period failure is enough to warrant labeling his entire term in office a racial economic justice flop.

I’d grade that first claim as largely accurate, as made clear by the impressive evidence Jan cites; the second claim as largely accurate, too; the third claim as more controversial, since it assumes that another President would have fared much better; and the fourth a wild stretch at best.

In fact, even if it is kosher to view 2020 developments as decisive in evaluating the Trump racial economic justice record, and the full range of policies that produced it, it’s important to note that two key indicators showed that the racial economic gap actually narrowed last year – median weekly earnings of full-time workers, and the headline unemployment rate.

Here are the (Labor Department) data for the former, going back to 2009 – the start of the Obama administration, which hasn’t been accused of having a particularly poor racial economic justice record. The numbers are in pre-inflation dollars, and because they come out quarterly, it’s possible to present the figures for the beginnings and ends of the Obama and Trump administrations, and for the CCP Virus period specifically. The ratios between the two are shown as well. 

                               non-hispanic white     non-hispanic black ratio     white-black

2Q 2009:                          757                                 592                             1.28:1

1Q 2017:                          894                                 679                             1.32:1

2Q 2017:                          886                                 689                             1.29:1

1Q 2020:                          980                                 775                             1.26:1

4Q 2020:                       1,007                                 792                             1.27:1

As made clear by the ratio numbers, even counting the pandemic period, weekly pay for the typical black full-time worker rose at a faster rate during the one Trump term than during the two Obama terms. Indeed, during the Obama presidency, the typical black full-time worker fell further behind his or her white counterpart. And between the final pre-virus period last year (the first quarter of 2020) and the final quarter of the year, the gap widened minimally.

The headline unemployment rates that come out monthly (also from the Labor Department) permit an even more precise comparison of the Obama and Trump records, and of the Trump record during the CCP Virus period. And as made clear below, the story they tell (including the ratios presented in the right hand column) isn’t terribly different from that of the weekly pay figures.

                               non-hispanic white     non-hispanic black     white-black

Feb. 09:                              7.6                            13.7                       0.55:1

Jan. 17:                               4.2                             7.4                        0.57:1

Feb. 17:                              4.0                             8.0                        0.50:1

Feb. 20:                              3.5                             6.0                        0.58:1

Dec. 20:                             6.0                             9.9                        0.60:1

The white headline unemployment rate started the Obama years – as the last, post-financial crisis Great Recession was still worsening – at only 55 percent of the rate for blacks. By the final month of his tenure, the white rate had risen to 57 percent of the black rate, meaning that the gap had narrowed slightly. It narrowed significantly faster during the pre-pandemic Trump years, sinces during the former President’s first full month in office, the white rate stood at half the black rate, and hit 58 percent last February, the final full pre-virus month). During the pandemic in 2020, the white-black ratio narrowed even further.

Jan’s narrative is much stronger for data called the Labor Force Participation Rate (LFPR), which gives a more accurate picture of the national employment scene because it reveals and takes into account how many adult Americans have become so discouraged in their search for work that they’ve just given up. The higher the LFPR (also tracked by the Labor Department), the fewer the number of these discouraged workers and vice versa.

                              non-hispanic white     non-hispanic black    white-black

Feb. 09:                            66.2                            62.9                     1.05:1

Jan. 17:                             62.8                            62.2                     1.01:1

Feb. 17:                            62.8                            62.2                     1.01:1

Feb. 20:                            63.2                            63.1                     1.00:1

Dec. 20:                           61.6                            59.8                      1.03:1

These statistics are released monthly (as part of the overall jobs reports) and, as you can see, tend to change only very slowly. But as shown by the dramatic (by these standards) LFPR drop for blacks, the pandemic period has been a stunning exception to the detriment of African Americans. Until then, though, the Obama and Trump results weren’t notably different, especially considering that the former was President twice as long as the latter.

Lots of other relevant statistics only go through 2019, and they don’t exactly scream “Trump failure,” either. Check out one dataset that’s attracted special, and deserved attention – the racial wealth gap. As noted by two other Post writers last year, “More wealth makes for more a comfortable, safer living. And, more importantly, it is passed on to the next generation. Their parents’ wealth gives many white children a boost at birth, an advantage many of their black peers lack.” And my post on the subject at that time expressed full agreement.

The official wealth gap figures come from the Federal Reserve, and are issued only every three years. But since last June (when I first reported on them), we’ve gotten the results (for median households in inflation-adjusted dollars) for 2019. As shown below, they report that although the Obama years saw considerable backsliding, the Trump years showed even greater progress in narrowing disparities:

                               non-hispanic white     non-hispanic black     white-black 

2010:                               144.3                              17.6                    8.20:1

2013:                               146.4                              13.6                  10.76:1

2016:                               181.9                              18.2                    9.99:1

2019:                               188.2                              24.1                    7.81:1

By contrast, the after-inflation dollar median household income numbers (which measure what’s earned each year versus what’s owned in toto) show pre-virus backsliding under Trump. (Here I’m using Labor Department figures as presented by the Economic Policy Institute — definitely a part of “MAGA World” — because they take into account some recent methodological changes made by the Labor Department.)  

                              non-hispanic white     non-hispanic black     white-to-black

2009:                             67,352                         40,231                      1.67:1

2016:                             69,292                         42,684                      1.62:1

2019:                             76,057                         46,073                      1.65:1

Biden has four years to show his racial economic justice stuff, and all Americans should hope that he makes further progress. But where Jan (and so many others) seem to be expecting a major improvement over his predecessors’ record, it seems just as legitimate to wonder if he’ll wind up matching it – even after the results for CCP Virus-ridden 2020 are in.