(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Manufacturing Labor Productivity Growth is Looking Like an Endangered Species

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Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal Reserve, Jerome Powell, labor productivity, manufacturing, multi-factor productivity, non-farm business, productivity, recovery, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell stated yesterday that the U.S. economy is doing “very well.” Judging by the metrics that the central bank is supposed to focus on as a matter of law – inflation and the headline unemployment rate – that’s an eminently respectable claim. Based on another key measure of economic performance – labor productivity – it looks like whistling in the dark.

As known by RealityChek regulars, strong productivity growth is widely seen by economists as the best guarantor of sustainable future prosperity and rising living standards. And as also known, labor productivity is the narrower of the two such measures of economic activity tracked by the federal government.

But it’s the gauge that’s updated on the most timely basis, and the latest numbers – which came out last week – should be spurring alarm, not complacency.

These final (for now) results for the first quarter of this year both confirmed that output per person hour worked for the non-farm business sector (the broadest definition of the U.S. economy used in these studies) remains stuck in an historically slow-growth phase, and showed that labor productivity in manufacturing may be shifting into contraction.

The labor productivity performance of both these major sectors was revised down in the latest release from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Rather than having grown by 0.70 percent on an annualized basis sequentially in the first quarter, labor productivity for non-farm businesses is now estimated to have advanced by only 0.40 percent. And in manufacturing, a 0.50 percent annualized increase is now judged to have been a 1.20 percent decrease. That’s its third such drop in the last five quarters.

A glass-half-full analysis would point out that the new non-farm business figure was better than that for the fourth quarter of last year (0.30 percent), and that the manufacturing fall-off followed a 4.20 percent fourth quarter jump.

But the new BLS report also presented manufacturing revisions going back to 2008, and they make clear that its labor productivity performance during this period has been far worse than even previously thought. (And it was already really bad.)

Let’s concentrate on how the new statistics have changed the picture for manufacturing labor productivity during the current recovery, and compare those results with those for previous recoveries – since such analyses yield the best, apples-to-apples, results.

Before the new data came out, manufacturing labor productivity during this expansion was reported to have grown by a total of 9.69 percent. That was less than a third of the rate achieved during the recovery of the early 2000s – which was also known as the Bubble Recovery that helped trigger the financial crisis and ensuing recession, and which last only six years versus. The current recovery is approaching its ninth anniversary.

And during the nearly ten-year long expansion that began in the early 1990s, manufacturing labor productivity surged even more strongly – by 45.86 percent.

The new manufacturing labor productivity growth number for the current expansion? Only 8.28 percent! That’s a downgrade of more than 14.50 percent!

Moreover, although the non-farm business labor productivity growth rate for the current recovery wasn’t revised down nearly as much – from 9.70 percent to 9.62 percent. But this figure, too, pales next to those of previous recoveries. During the bubble expansion, non-farm business labor productivity rose by a total of 16.03 percent. During the 1990s expansion, the rate was 23.25 percent.

By the way, don’t put too many hopes in the broader productivity measure – multi-factor productivity – to come to the rescue. Those numbers haven’t been much better.

Some productivity students have been arguing that it’s only a matter of time, and that recent technological advances will soon start super-charging productivity growth after a slow start just as they did in an earlier era of transformative technological change – the 1920s.

These optimists had better be right. Because if not, the only way to return American growth and living standards gains to their historic rates of improvements will be to flood the economy with credit in order to crank up spending. Feel free to scream if the date “2008” means anything to you.

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Industries Claiming Labor Shortages are Productivity as Well as Wage Laggards

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compensation, Labor Department, labor productivity, labor shortages, productivity, restaurants, trucking, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The labor shortage claims from American businesses keep filling the media (even though wages, which are supposed to rise sharply in such circumstances, are improving only sluggishly). So it was more than a little interesting to look over the latest statistics on labor productivity released by the Department of Labor.

After all, companies and industries really facing dire labor shortages, and unwilling or unable to raise wages, are supposed to boost their productivity (generally by introducing labor-saving devices and practices). But the new Labor Department numbers show that they’re doing surprisingly little on this front, either.

Let’s examine two sectors of the economy that say with special vigor that they’re running out of workers: trucking and restaurants.

According to a typical account (from yesterday’s Washington Post), American trucking companies are facing “an extraordinary labor shortage” and their CEOs (including industry veterans) are saying things like “I’ve never seen it like this, ever….It doesn’t matter what the load even pays. There are just not drivers.”

The sector does appear to be raising pay. But not until the last two years have its overall employment costs been rising faster than those for the private sector overall – and the latter’s increases have hardly impressed. These data cover the entire transportation and warehousing sector, but after shooting up from a 2.1 percent annual pre-inflation pace to four percent (between the fourth quarters of 2011 and 2012), total compensation advances slowed to 2.3 percent annually during the next two years, and then to 2.2 percent in 2015 before accelerating.

Moreover, trucking industry productivity growth hasn’t been world-beating, either. The Labor Department reported last week that its overall gain in labor productivity (the narrower of two productivity growth measures tracked by Labor, but the one whose data is more up to date) in 2017 was 0.8 percent. A comparable figure for services industries in general isn’t available, but the Department does track labor productivity for non-farm businesses and for manufacturing.

Since labor productivity productivity for the former increased by 1.3 percent in 2017 and only 0.4 percent in manufacturing, it seems safe to conclude that services sector labor productivity grew by more than 1.3 percent – and therefore much more than trucking’s 0.8 percent. Nor does this picture change much going back to 2013.

Further, a remarkably similar pattern emerges upon examining the restaurant business. Labor shortages are widely claimed and reported, along with examples of the industry starting to improve compensation practices. New technologies are also apparently being tried to improve efficiency in the sector. But according to the data, these responses to the purported shortage of workers have been belated at best.

For example, as with trucking, annual total compensation gains in the accommodation and food services sectors (no restaurant-specific numbers are available) trailed those for the overall private sector for several years until 2016. And their owners and lobbyists have been making labor shortage claims for at least that long.

Data for restaurants (and bars) specifically are available for their labor productivity, and their performance here is only roughly comparable to the dreary results for non-manufacturing non-farm businesses.

Industries like trucking and restaurants may indeed not be able to choose their employees from as many applicants as they would like, or from numbers to which they’ve become accustomed. But if they haven’t been doing anything special, at least until recently either to hike pay, improve productivity, or both, then several explanations are possible. Maybe they’re waiting for another wave of wage-depressing legal and illegal immigrants to save their days without the need to fatten paychecks of invest in new plant and equipment. Maybe they’re don’t know how to improve productivity in particular, in which case, their businesses simply may not be viable, or they’re simply lousy managers.

But unless the Labor Department figures are completely off-base, one explanation we can rule out completely is that, as groups, they’re utterly desperate for workers.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: America’s Productivity Blahs Continue

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bubble decade, Financial Crisis, Great Depression, labor productivity, manufacturing, multi-factor productivity, non-farm business, productivity, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although productivity is widely seen by informed students of the U.S. economy as the biggest key to ensuring the nation’s prosperity over the longest run, the release of the government’s new figures on these measures of efficiency rarely generates many headlines. Last week was no exception, but as always, they’re worth considering in detail.

In this case, last Thursday’s new report on labor productivity – the most current but narrower of the two measures  — were most notable not for the preliminary estimate of the results for the first quarter of this year (which we’ll summarize below), but for revisions going back to 2013. And unfortunately, these resulted in little change to the feeble performance already reported in creating a unit of output per each person hour worked. Indeed, for manufacturing, the revisions amounted to a not-negligible downgrade.

Here are the two sets of figures for annual percentage gains in labor productivity between 2013 and 2017 for the non-farm business sector – the government’s main proxy for the entire American economy.

  Previous results                                                              Revised results

2013 +0.3 percent                                                               +0.3 percent

2014 +1.0 percent                                                               +1.0 percent

2015 +1.3 percent                                                               +1.2 percent

2016  -0.1 percent                                                                          0

2017 +1.2 percent                                                                +1.3 percent

Like I said, no important differences here. In fact, on net, the revisions brighten the picture marginally. Not so for manufacturing:

  Previous results                                                                Revised results

2013 +0.9 percent                                                                 +0.9 percent

2014    0                                                                                        0

2015 +0.2 percent                                                                 +0.3 percent

2016 +0.4 percent                                                                 -0.4 percent

2017 +0.7 percent                                                                +0.4 percent 

Here we see a marked weakening, especially for the last two years. And the extent of manufacturing’s lousy record is even clearer from comparisons among the current economic recovery and its two predecessors.

non-farm business                                                                  manufacturing

90s expansion: (2Q 1991 to 1Q 2001) +23.25 percent          +45.86 percent

bubble expansion (4Q 2001 to 4Q 2007) +16.03 percent      +30.23 percent

current expansion: (2Q 2009 to present)  +9.70 percent          +9.69 percent

Not only has labor productivity growth slowed much more dramatically in manufacturing than in the rest of the economy between the expansion of the 2000s – which of course ended in the worst national and global financial crisis since the Great Depression — and the current expansion. Manufacturing labor productivity actually has been growing more slowly in absolute terms during this recovery than non-farm business labor productivity. And it’s not as if non-farm business labor productivity has been killing it.

Those preliminary results for the first quarter of this year extend this narrative. On a quarter-to-quarter basis, both non-farm business labor productivity and manufacturing labor productivity increased – by 0.7 percent and 0.5 percent at an annual rate, respectively. But the revisions revealed a major slowdown in manufacturing labor productivity growth on a quarterly basis (from a downwardly revised — and kind of fishy — 4.5 percent on an annual basis) and a slight pickup in non-farm business productivity growth (from no growth at all at the end of last year).

The latest results for the broader measure of productivity growth – multi-factor productivity, which includes a range of inputs broader than just worker hours – showed a small uptick, too. So even though they’re not as current as the labor numbers, maybe we’re seeing the beginnings of lasting improvement in productivity growth generally speaking. But as the recovery-to-recovery data still make clear, the United States still has a long way to go before it genuinely shakes off its productivity blahs.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Puzzling New Glimpses into U.S. Manufacturing

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Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Commerce Department, durable goods, Labor Department, labor productivity, manufacturing, non-durable goods, productivity, real value-added, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Two important sets of economic statistics came out today that shed lots of new light on the health of American manufacturing. Unfortunately, little of it is especially encouraging. In fact, some of it’s pretty mystifying.

The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis issued its annual report on the growth rates of different sectors of the U.S. economy. The main manufacturing finding: Industry’s annual growth rate did pick up last year according to a measure called real value-added (which leads off the report, and which attempts to eliminate the double-counting of output that occurs when broader gauges fail to distinguish between final products on the one hand, and their parts, components, and other inputs on the other). Yet the acceleration from a 0.5 percent yearly expansion in 2016 to 2017’s 1.9 percent trailed that output increase of the economy as a whole – which improved from 1.5 percent to 2.3 percent. As a result, the economy became slightly more manufacturing light in 2017.

In addition, within manufacturing, growth leadership shifted dramatically. Whereas the non-durable goods super-sector outperformed its larger durable goods counterpart in 2016 (with the former’s real value-added improving year-on-year by 1.2 percent while the latter’s slipped by 0.2 percent), durable goods rebounded to a 3.4 percent annual growth rate in 2017 while non-durables’ real value-added inched up by just 0.1 percent.

The American economy’s overall growth leader in 2017 in real value-added terms? The mining sector, which jumped by 8.5 percent after plummeting by 13.3 percent the year before. The next fastest-growing industries were administrative and waste management services (4.9 percent), corporate management (4.6 percent), and information services (four percent even).

Today’s second data set (from the Labor Department’s Bureau of Labor Statistics) shows which sectors within manufacturing last year excelled in terms of labor productivity (the narrower of economists’ two main measures of efficiency), and which lagged and, once more, many of the results were surprising. (We already know that industry in toto had a dreary labor productivity year last year.) For instance, computer and computer peripheral equipment led the way last year, generating eleven percent more output per employees hour worked. But next came apparel knitting mills, at 10.5 percent, followed by agriculture, construction, and mining machinery at 10.4 percent, and cutlery and handtools at 9.4 percent.

The biggest productivity loser in 2017? Miscellaneous transportation equipment, where it nosedived by 11.5 percent. In ascending order, the next worst performers were electric lighting equipment (down 9.2 percent), sugar and confectionary products (down eight percent), and beverages (down 7.8 percent).

Other manufacturing sectors whose labor productivity worsened on year in 2017? Pharmaceuticals and medicine (down seven percent), metal-working machinery (which includes machine tools – and where labor productivity declined by 1.3 percent), communications equipment (down 2.2 percent), semiconductors (down 0.7 percent), motor vehicles (down 4.1 percent), and aerospace products and parts (down 3.1 percent).

And if you’re thinking that this list of productivity losers includes lots of so-called industries of the future, you’re of course right. Kudos also if you’ve noted that aerospace is the economy’s biggest trade surplus industry. It’s enough to instill a little humility in those of us who think we’re getting a handle on this gargantuan, complex American economy, or heighten for those who had some already.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Productivity Growth Remains Far from Great Again

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labor productivity, manufacturing, multi-factor productivity, non-farm business, productivity, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The U.S. government’s latest figures on the broadest measure of the economy’s productivity growth came out this morning, creating the perfect opportunity to report on these key data along with a narrower set of productivity growth numbers released two weeks ago. The latter generally are timelier (though not this time), and the latest edition revises these numbers going all the way back to 1990!

The big takeaway: Despite some very modest upgrades for the most recent results, the economy remains in the midst of a major productivity slowdown. This matters greatly, because even though many economists doubt how accurately the government statistics measure productivity growth, nearly all economists agree that strong performances in this field are crucial to boosting Americans’ living standards in a sustainable way.

First, the broader measure – known as multi-factor productivity because it measures the nation’s prowess at using a wide range of inputs to generate a unit of output of a certain good or service. For non-farm businesses (the headline figure used by the productivity-tracking Bureau of Labor Statistics to capture the economy as a whole), the BLS calculates that multi-factor productivity improved by 0.9 percent between 2016 and 2017. That’s reasonably good news, since it’s the best such rate of growth since 2013-14’s one percent.

Revisions for 2014-15 and 2015-15, moreover, were only slightly negative in toto.

Yet in historical perspective, this performance remains pretty miserable. Comparing multi-factor productivity growth during the last three economic recoveries (to obtain the best apples-to-apples data), shows the following:

Non-farm business multi-factor productivity grew by 9.75 percent during the 1990s expansion (which lasted roughly nine years). It grew by 7.29 percent during the early 2000s bubble recovery (so called because its dependence on borrowing and spending wound up triggering the national and global financial crises). Since that expansion lasted about six years, it’s annual multi-factor productivity growth was actually a little better.

But the current economic recovery began in the middle of 2009. Yet through the end of 2017, multi-factor productivity for non-farm businesses increased by only 6.84 percent. So the pace of growth has slowed considerably.

The labor productivity figures tell us about economic efficiency stemming from the use of just one input – an hour’s worth of work by a single worker. But they’re usually more up to date since they come out on a quarterly, not annual, basis. And these more frequent reports also contain more detailed breakdowns, which is especially interesting for me because they make possible gauging manufacturing’s performance.

For that non-farm business sector, BLS now tells us that last year’s fourth quarter labor productivity stayed unchanged sequentially on an annual basis – hardly good, to be sure, but better than the 0.1 percent dip previously reported. That upgrade, plus a third quarter growth rate that’s now 2.7 percent rather than the previous 2.6 percent number, helped bring the full-year 2017 advance to 1.1 percent. That’s the best annual performance since 2013-14’s 1.5 percent.

Unfortunately, as indicated above, these results incorporate long-term revisions, and these actually worsen the non-farm labor productivity story. Again, examining the trend over the last three economic recoveries, we find that cumulative labor productivity growth remained the same for the 1990s and bubble-decade expansions – 23.25 percent and 16.03 percent, respectively. But the figure for the longish current recovery was cut from 9.34 percent growth to 9.32 percent.

Manufacturing’s labor productivity growth patterns look quite similar. The fourth quarter sequential advance was revised up from an excellent 5.7 percent annualized to six percent. And the third quarter’s dismal 4.9 percent annualized drop was upgraded to a 4.7 percent decrease.

Longer term, moreover, the slowdown story here remained intact, too. As with non-farm business labor productivity, manufacturing labor productivity’s cumulative growth during the 1990s recovery and the bubble decade recovery were unrevised by the BLS. So they’re still 45.91 percent and 30.08 percent (much higher in absolute terms, you’ll note, than the growth for non-farm businesses overall). But the 10.91 percent manufacturing labor productivity growth increase for the current recovery was revised down to 10.90 percent. And yes, its performance between the last two economic recoveries deteriorated at a much faster rate than that of non-farm business labor productivity.

It’s still true, as indicated above, that lots of uncertainty still surrounds all these productivity data. But it’s also still true that most of the economists who argue about their accuracy agree that the current recovery’s overall growth has been historically feeble. Significantly slowing productivity growth is entirely consistent with this weakness.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Labor Productivity Resumes Falling

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Labor Department, labor productivity, manufacturing, multi-factor productivity, non-farm business, productivity, recovery, total factor productivity, {What's Left of) Our Economy

So much for the overall American labor productivity revival (which wasn’t much of a revival). At least so far.

The newest (preliminary) figures for the fourth quarter of last year are just in, and they show that the headline figure (for non-farm businesses) fell sequentially by 0.11 percent on an annual basis. The dip was the first since the first quarter of 2016. Moreover, the third quarter surge that was originally reported at 2.95 percent annualized (the best sequential result since the 4.34 percent of the third quarter of 2014) was revised down to 2.72 percent.

(As RealityChek regulars know, labor productivity is the narrower of the two measures of economic efficiency tracked by the Labor Department and most other national economies. Multi-factor, or total factor, productivity, looks at output as a function of a much wider range of inputs than simply person hours worked, but the data come out on a much less timely basis.)

These results were partly offset by a startling turnaround in manufacturing’s labor productivity. The preliminary fourth quarter, 2017 annualized increase is pegged at a stunning 5.56 percent. If that figure (or close to it) holds, that would be industry’s best such performance since the 6.82 jump in the second quarter of 2010 (early during the current recovery, when productivity tends to bounce back, along with the rest of the economy). The final third quarter result was a 4.77 percent plunge.

Still, the continuing crisis in American labor productivity is made (loud and) clear by comparing the economy’s performance across recent economic expansions (to get the apples-to-apples figures). During the 1990s recovery, which lasted just under ten years, non-farm business labor productivity increased by 23.25 percent. During the 2000s “bubble decade” expansion, which lasted six years, the rise was 16.03 percent – indicating a slight slowing of the growth rate. But during the current recovery, which was eight and one half years old at the end of 2017, labor productivity has been up only 9.34 percent. That is, its growth rate has been much slower – and barely flat cumulatively.

Manufacturing’s labor productivity growth slowdown has even more dramatic – especially lately. During the 1990s expansion, it shot up by 45.91 percent. The growth rate plummeted to 30.08 percent during the shorter recovery of the 2000s decade, and then all the way down to 10.91 percent through the first eight and one half years of the current recovery. In other words, manufacturing’s labor productivity growth since the expansion began has been minimal, too.

The productivity data are among the figures in which economists have the least confidence, and it remains entirely possible that, according to one major critique, they’re missing most of the progress enabled by new technologies whose impact is excruciatingly difficult to measure. (Here’s a report spotlighting a typical version of this argument.) At the same time, these figures – especially for the current expansion – track with reports showing weak capital spending, generally seen as a prime source of productivity growth. And when it comes to manufacturing, the Labor Department’s methodology still considers jobs offshoring as a development that boosts labor productivity – even though the total number of workers worldwide doesn’t change, and therefore the sector’s total efficiency doesn’t, either.

So the challenge remains for American leaders to grow the economy in the healthy way, by relying on increasingly productive workers and businesses and industries. Or it can continue the easy money route chosen since the financial crisis, and hope that, for some unspecified reason, the results will be different this time.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Stunning Downgrade for U.S. Manufacturing Labor Productivity Growth

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BLS, bubbles, Bureau of Labor Statistics, David P. Goldman, Financial Crisis, Great Recession, labor productivity, manufacturing, multi-factor productivity, non-farm business, offshoring, productivity, recovery, total factor productivity, unit labor costs, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Wow! There were so many important results flowing from last week’s final (for now) government data on third quarter U.S. labor productivity, I hardly know where to begin. (I’m also feeling a little sheepish about waiting so long to report on these data, but it’s just another sign that we’re living in a target-rich commentary environment, as RealityChek‘s motto suggests.) But after finishing this post, I feel confident you’ll agree that the big downward historical revisions to manufacturing labor productivity growth deserve the most attention.

Not that the new figures on overall labor productivity (for the so-called non-farm business sector) were anything to sneeze at. These new numbers cover the narrowest measure of productivity (gauging only output per hour worked by an individual American employee) but as known by RealityChek regulars, they’re issued on a much more timely basis than the multi-factor or total factor data – which measure the output generated by a wide range of inputs.

And this update on third quarter labor productivity confirmed that it grew at its highest sequential annualized rate (2.95 percent) since the third quarter of 2014 (4.34 percent). The revised labor productivity gain was actually a touch smaller than the originally reported 2.97 percent rise, but not nearly enough to change the overall story. If this rate of improvement continues, that would be excellent news, since strong productivity growth is an economy’s best bet for a sustainable increase in economic growth and living standards.

At the same time, analyst David P. Goldman has noted that the new data add to compelling evidence that recent years have seen a reversal in the relationship most economists have long assumed (and that was borne out by by these same statistics) between unit labor costs (a main labor component of the productivity statistics) and the broadest measures of unemployment. As Goldman just observed, normally, they move in opposite directions – i.e., when joblessness is rising, the price of labor generally (and logically) falls, and vice versa. But since 2014, unemployment has kept tumbling, but labor costs have fallen as well. If this trend continues, that would be much worse news, since it would undermine the portrayal of productivity growth as a boon to the nation’s workers. (And a richly deserved hat-tip to a Twitter follower of mine, who goes by “Field Roamer” for calling my attention to this post.)

It’s been clear throughout this current U.S. economic recovery that wage growth has been unusually weak, but Goldman’s post paints the paycheck picture in a much grimmer light, and that’s definitely worth exploring further.

But to me, the manufacturing revisions deserve center stage, both because of their magnitude and the long time frame they cover – all the way back to 1987, when manufacturing labor productivity began to be tracked. I’ll let the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which calculates productivity for the U.S. government, summarize its dreary conclusions:

“A large upward revision to the change in the annual manufacturing productivity index from 2008 to 2009 was more than offset by downward revisions in adjacent years, and the average annual rate of growth from 2007 to 2012 was revised down from 2.9 percent to 1.2 percent. The average annual rate of manufacturing productivity growth during the current business cycle from 2007 to 2016 was revised down from 1.6 percent to 0.9 percent, and the long-term rate for the entire series from 1987 to 2016 is now 2.8 percent, compared to the previous estimate of 3.2 percent.”

In other words, over roughly the last thirty years, labor productivity in industry has risen 12.50 percent more slowly than previously reported. And manufacturing’s performance on this crucial front wasn’t great to start with.

Another way to look at the new numbers is to see how they affect what we know of America’s manufacturing labor productivity performance during the most recent economic expansions – a method that gives us the best apples-to-apples data. If your jaw doesn’t drop, it should.

The 1990s expansion still comes across as a period of robust manufacturing labor productivity growth. The cumulative increase was downgraded only from 46.81 percent to 45.94 percent.

But check out the new results for the previous decade’s recovery. Viewed through the lens of the old productivity data, its performance was excellent, and surprisingly so. After all, this expansion was fueled by the inflation of the credit and housing bubbles whose bursting led to the global financial crisis and the Great Recession. Yet the BLS had been saying that its cumulative productivity gain was 41.23 percent – just about as good as the 1990s advance factoring in this recovery’s shorter duration.

The new numbers – only 30.08 percent manufacturing labor productivity growth – are much more consistent with the idea that the previous economic recovery was marked largely by phony, unsustainable growth.

And as for the present recovery? The old data already made clear what a productivity disaster it’s been. Though it’s lasted nearly as long as the 1990s expansion, the previous BLS data pegged its total manufacturing labor productivity growth at only 20.93 percent – just about half the rate generated during the 2000s expansion.

The new rate? Only 9.41 percent, meaning its been cut nearly in half. Moreover, according to the new figures, the current recovery’s manufacturing labor productivity growth rate represents a much greater deterioration from the performance of the bubble recovery than had been reported. At least by this measure, American economic growth was already appearing even less healthy these days than it was leading up to the last meltdown produced by fake prosperity. Now this problem looks much worse. 

In addition, don’t forget:  Even these dreadful numbers probably overstate manufacturing labor productivity’s advances. Why? Because as the BLS acknowledges, its methodology for calculating this indicator include the effects of offshoring: simply substituting foreign workers for American workers. Since the total number of workers doesn’t change, the productivity figures for U.S. factories and related facilities are artificially inflated – and for reasons having nothing to do with greater efficiency. 

And these results raise all sorts of perplexing questions. For example, I’ve been arguing for quite some time that the overall slowdown in American labor productivity growth must surely stem from the trade- and offshoring-related losses of so much domestic industry – which has generally been the economy’s productivity growth leader. But the new BLS statistics indicates that there could be a bigger labor productivity growth problem within manufacturing itself. Alternatively, these losses could have been concentrated in especially high-productivity sectors of manufacturing – or trade and offshoring have had little or nothing to do with the problem to begin with.

More light could be shed on these questions by comparing America’s manufacturing labor productivity performance with that of other countries. Has it been better? Worse? Some short-range data I’ve seen indicate that the slowdown has been widespread across the globe, at least between 2015 and 2016. But I need to dive much deeper into these statistics to draw firmer conclusions.

Further, how significantly will these new labor productivity results affect the broader multi-factor productivity results? BLS hasn’t scheduled its next report on this indicator, so my oft-used advice to “stay tuned” applies to me, too, in this case.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Data Show a New Sharp U.S. Productivity Divide

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labor productivity, manufacturing, multi-factor productivity, productivity, recession, recovery, total factor productivity, {What's Left of) Our Economy

They’re only preliminary, but the manufacturing labor productivity numbers for the third quarter released by the Labor Department this morning were total stunners. They showed that, by this narrowest measure of efficiency, manufacturing’s performance worsened sequentially by 5.13 percent at an annual rate. If it holds, that would be the biggest quarter-to-quarter decline since the first quarter of 2009 (during the depths of the last recession), when it plunged by a dizzying 17.37 percent.

(Labor productivity examines manufacturing’s efficiency according to how much output is produced by each hour that a worker is on the job. Economists also measure productivity by looking at a greater number of inputs – like capital, energy, and materials – in addition to labor. But the government data on this total factor productivity, or multi-factor productivity, comes out on a less timely basis.)

The only good news for industry in the new report from the Labor Department is that the second quarter’s annualized labor productivity growth was revised up from 2.82 percent to 3.39 percent.

As a result of these new statistics, labor productivity in manufacturing is up by 20.93 percent during the current economic expansion – which began in the second quarter of 2009. That may sound pretty good, but during the previous expansion, which was much shorter, it rose by 41.23 percent. And during the expansion before that (which was a bit longer), it advanced by 46.81 percent. So we’re still seeing a major slowdown.

The non-farm business sector (the Labor Department’s main measure of the entire economy) fared much better on the labor productivity front, with third quarter annualized growth of 2.97 percent. That’s the best such result since the third quarter of 2014 (4.34 percent). The second quarter annual growth rate of 1.53 percent was unchanged.

Still, even this performance leaves non-farm business labor productivity in the doldrums historically speaking. It’s increased by just 9.45 percent during the current recovery – much slower than manufacturing’s rise, and much slower than its own 16.03 percent and 23.25 percent improvements during the two previous recoveries.

But let’s end this particular post on a (somewhat) positive note. The final second quarter productivity growth figures were revised up twice for manufacturing and once for the non-farm business sector. So maybe the next Labor Department report will show better productivity performance as well. Since strong productivity growth is a key to boosting living standards on a lasting basis, that would be about the best economic news any American could imagine. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Productivity Growth Improves – A Bit

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Labor Department, labor productivity, manufacturing, multifactor productivity, non-farm business, productivity, recovery, total factor productivity, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Some more hard U.S. economic data came in this morning, and it looked pretty good. Even better, the news concerned productivity growth, which is widely viewed as the key to ensuring that the nation’s living standards can rise acceptably on a sustainable – as opposed to a bubble-ized – basis.

According to the Labor Department, America’s labor productivity in the second quarter of this year rose somewhat faster than was initially reported. Unfortunately, though, the economy still has a long way to go before it returns to the productivity growth rates it’s generated historically.

As RealityChek regulars know, labor productivity is the narrowest of the two gauges used by the U.S. government to measure this key indicator; it tells us how much output each American worker generates per hour on the job. Multifactor productivity (also called total factor productivity) shows output as a product of many more inputs (such as capital and energy and materials), but these numbers are more difficult to calculate, and come out with a greater time lag.

And although most intellectually honest economists admit that measuring productivity is one of their most challenging tasks, even these statistics are probably more reliable than “soft data” – the various private sector surveys that purport to measure business and consumer sentiment.

Today’s report judges that labor productivity for the non-farm business sector (the Labor Department’s main proxy for the entire economy) grew sequentially in the second quarter at an annualized rate of 1.53 percent. That’s better than the 0.99 percent first estimated and the strongest result since the 2.46 percent achieved in the third quarter of last year.

Second quarter labor productivity growth for manufacturing was upgraded, too – from 2.44 percent annualized quarter-to-quarter to 2.82 percent. And those are the best quarterly manufacturing results since the 3.20 percent spurt in the first quarter of 2012.

The Labor Department left unrevised the first quarter’s miserable 0.13 percent annualized non-farm business sequential productivity growth, and slightly downgraded manufacturing’s comparably poor first quarter improvement to 0.19 percent annualized. But the second quarter numbers are genuinely encouraging.

Still, do they signal the strong productivity revival the U.S. economy urgently needs? My crystal ball is no clearer than anyone else’s. All I can do is point out what a heavy lift this would be. Here are the non-farm business productivity growth performances for the last three economic recoveries (including the current expansion). As always, the best apples-to-apples data comes from measuring economic performance during similar phases of the business and economic cycle:

2Q 1991 to 1Q 2001: +23.25 percent

4Q 2001 to 4Q 2007: +16.03 percent

2Q 2009 to present: +8.65 percent

And here are the same figures for manufacturing:

2Q 1991 to 1Q 2001: +46.81 percent

4Q 2001 to 4Q 2007: +41.23 percent

2Q 2009 to present: +22.33 percent

So even with the latest improvements, labor productivity is advancing during this recovery at only roughly half the rate of its most recent predecessors. And the current expansion has been considerably longer than the previous recovery, and nearly as long as the 1990s recovery.

I’m not saying that no one should be optimistic about the United States significantly closing this gap going forward. But it’s still big enough that, so far, this expectation does seem to be a leap of faith.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Still Desperately Seeking Decent Productivity Growth

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Labor Department, labor productivity, manufacturing, multi-factor productivity, non-farm business, productivity, recovery, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The good news about America’s productivity growth that came out this morning is that new Labor Department figures showed it’s gotten a little bit better lately. The bad news is that it needs to get a lot better if the nation is going to achieve the economic goals everyone says they want: economic growth that’s healthy, and wages rising satisfactorily.

Today’s data, which report the results on a relatively narrow but timely measure of productivity growth, also furnish a handy opportunity to review recently released productivity measures that are broader but not quite so up to date.

According to the Labor Department’s preliminary read, U.S. labor productivity for non-farm businesses (the standard definition of the American economic universe) rose in the second quarter of this year at a 0.99 percent annual rate. The first quarter’s advance (feel free to make the “air quotes” gesture) was revised up from literally nothing to next-to-nothing. As RealityChek regulars know, labor productivity measures how much output is generated by each hour worked by each worker.

And that’s where the good news stops. The new Labor Department release also revised these labor productivity figures going back to 2014. These updates left the dismal recent productivity picture little changed, with one noteworthy exception: On an annual basis, labor productivity last year is now judged to have fallen (by 0.1 percent) for the first time since 1982.

Just how gloomy the labor productivity picture has gotten becomes clear when comparing its performance during the last few U.S. economic expansions (a methodology that gives us the best apples-to-apples growth). Note: Because of the new revisions, these figures supersede those contained in RealityChek’s past posts on labor productivity.

2Q 1991 to 1Q 2001: +23.25 percent

4Q 2001 to 4Q 2007: +16.03 percent

2Q 2009 to present: +8.49 percent

Manufacturing’s labor productivity performance shows this kind of deterioration, too. It’s second quarter rise was judged preliminarily to have been 2.44 percent annualized – much better (as has usually been the case) than the increase for the rest of the economy. But the first quarter figure was revised down to 0.29 percent.

And here are the figures for the current economic recovery and its two predecessors:

2Q 1991 to 1Q 2001: +46.81 percent

4Q 2001 to 4Q 2007: +41.23 percent

2Q 2009 to present: +22.25 percent

So manufacturing has seen a big labor productivity slowdown during this expansion, but it’s still leading the economy in this form of productivity growth by far.

But there’s one fly in the ointment here. As previously reported, the way the Labor Department measures labor productivity throughout the economy results in the offshoring of work generating better productivity. And of course nothing’s been offshored in recent decades like manufacturing work. Since offshoring-produced productivity gains aren’t the kind any thinking person would want, this means that the improvements seen in industry lately aren’t quite so impressive as they look. In fact, according to the Department between 1997 and 2006, offshoring accounted for 23 percent of the sector’s labor productivity gains.

At the same time, labor productivity isn’t the only kind of productivity. Multi-factor productivity is a broader, and more reliable measure; it tells us how much output is generated from the use of a wide variety of inputs, like technology, materials, capital, and energy as well as labor. The problem is that the multi-factor productivity data don’t come out nearly as often, and the latest take us only through 2015.

Still, that’s what we have, and what’s striking is that they reveal that, at least for “now,” manufacturing has lost its productivity growth lead. Here are the annual changes reported by the Labor Department for manufacturing in a July 12 release, combined with the latest such figures for the non-farm business sector as a whole:

non-farm business +0.61 percent

manufacturing -2.80 percent

Nor are the longer-term results any better for industry during the last three expansions:

                                        1991-2001          2001-2007           2009-2015

non-farm business       +11.51 percent     +9.91 percent      +5.52 percent

manufacturing             +13.98 percent   +14.66 percent       -2.17 percent

Although honest economists will admit that productivity is one of the most mysterious subjects they study, they’ll also insist that the official statistics provide a reasonably accurate picture about how the nation is using this crucial “secret sauce” for sustainable prosperity. These new Labor Department reports once again remind that the U.S. economy urgently needs to get its productivity culinary skills back up to snuff.