(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Everything You Wanted to Know About Immigration & the Economy — & Less

Tags

economics, immigrants, Immigration, innovation, labor shortages, Open Borders, productivity, The Washington Post, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Leave it to the zealously pro-Open Borders Washington Post. It chose as the reviewer of a book by two economic historians apparently unaware of the relationship in U.S. history between immigration levels and productivity improvement a business professor seemingly just slightly less clueless about this crucial link either historically and going forward.

Doubt that? Then take a look at this morning’s rave by Harvard business professor Michael Luca about a new study by Ran Abramitzky and Leah Boustan of Stanford and Princeton Universities, respectively, titled Streets of Gold: America’s Untold Story of Immigrant Success.

According to Luca, Streets of Gold “reflects an ongoing renaissance in the field of economic history fueled by technological advances — an increase in digitized records, new techniques to analyze them and the launch of platforms such as Ancestry — that are breathing new life into a range of long-standing questions about immigration. Abramitzky and Boustan are masters of this craft, and they creatively leverage the evolving data landscape to deepen our understanding of the past and present.”

And their overall conclusion (which rightly takes into account the non-economic contributions of immigrants to American life) is that (in Abamitzky’s and Boustan’s words): “Immigration contributes to a flourishing American society” – especially if you take “the long view.”

But there’s no indication in Luca’s review that the authors weigh in on a key (especially in the long view) impact of immigration on the U.S. economy – how it’s affected the progress made by the nation in boosting productivity: its best guarantee for raising living standards on a sustainable basis.

As I’ve written repeatedly, mainstream economic theory holds that one major spur to satisfactory productivity growth is the natural tendency of businesses to replace workers with various types of machinery and new technologies when those workers become too expensive. Most economists would add that although jobs may be lost on net in the short-term, they increase further down the road once these productivity advances create new companies, entire industries, and therefore employment opportunities.

By contrast, when businesses know that wages will stay low – for example, because large immigration inflows will keep pumping up the national labor supply much faster than the demand for workers rises – these companies will feel little need to buy new machinery or otherwise incorporate new technologies simply because they won’t have to.

And more important than what the theory says, abundant evidence indicates that businesses have behaved precisely this way in the past (when scarce and thus increasingly expensive labor prompted acquisitions of labor-saving devices that helped turn the United States into an economic and technology powerhouse), into the present (as industries heavily dependent on penny-wage and often illegal immigrant labor have tended to be major productivity laggards).  

Reviewer Luca demonstrates some awareness that this issue matters in the here and now and going forward, writing that “Compared with the rest of the country, businesses in high-immigration areas have access to more workers and hence less incentive to invest in further automation.”

He also points out that “This has implications for today’s immigration debates.”

But his treatment of the current situation is confused at best and perverse at worst (at least if you buy the economic conventional wisdom and evidence concerning the productivity-immigration relationship).

Principally, he claims that “the United States is expected to face a dramatic labor market shortage as baby boomers retire and lower birthrates over time result in fewer young people to replace them.” Let’s assume that’s true – despite all the evidence that more and more employers are filling all the job openings they’ve been claiming by automating. (See, e.g., here, here, and here.)

Why, though , does Luca simply conclude that “Increased immigration is one approach to avoiding the crunch. Notably, the other way to avert this crisis is through further automation, enabled by rapid advances in artificial intelligence. Immigration policy will help shape the extent to which the economy relies on people vs. machines in the decades to come.”

Is he really implying that a low-productivity — and therefore low-innovation — future would be a perfectly fine one for immigration (and other) policymakers to be seeking?

Just as important, although Luca clearly recognizes that these questions have at least some importance nowadays, he provides no indication of where the book’s authors stand.

So let the reader beware. Luca clearly believes, as Post headline writers claim, that Streets of Gold makes clear “What the research really says about American immigration.”  What his review makes clear is that this claim isn’t even close.

   

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Will the Tech Competitiveness Bill Shaft American Tech Workers?

Tags

China, competitiveness, Congress, Immigration, labor shortages, Lisa Irving, NumbersUSA, semiconductors, STEM, STEM workers, tariffs, tech workers, technology, Trade, visas, {What's Left of) Our Economy

In case you didn’t already think that the U.S. government has become a dysfunctional mess, the immigration realist group NumbersUSA has just highlighted a recent, thoroughly depressing example. It’s the decision of the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives to turn its version of a bill to boost American technological competitiveness (especially versus China) into a device to advance its Open Borders-friendly immigration agenda ever further – and at the expense in particular of native-born tech workers and tech worker hopefuls.

Not that the story of this competitiveness effort wasn’t a prime example of dysfunction already. As I’ve previously pointed out, both the House bill and its Senate counterpart were originally introduced in mid-2020, and these efforts still haven’t become law – even though concerns about China catching up to the United States technologically, and threatening both American national security and prosperity even more sharply, remain as strong and widespread as ever.

And not that the Democrats are solely responsible: As I’ve also noted, Senate Republicans have strongly supported provisions in their version of the legislation that would both greatly weaken a president’s authority to impose tariffs (including on China to offset the economic damage to U.S. industry from its predatory trade and broader economic practices), and reduce various existing tradei barriers to many imports (including from China).

But the immigration provisions of the House version could be just as damaging, and deserve at least as much attention. As explained by NumbersUSA analyst Lisa Irving, this legislation “allows for an unlimited number of green cards for citizens of foreign countries seeking permanent U.S. residency who hold a U.S. doctorate degree, or its equivalent from a foreign institution, in STEM [Science, Technology, Engineering,and Math fields].”

Adds Irving, “This provision would result in further limiting the job prospects and resources for highly qualified Americans in tech fields.” 

To add insult to injury, as Irving reminds, the measure is based on phony and thoroughly debunked claims, mainly propagated by the U.S. technology industry, that it’s facing a crippling labor and talent shortage. In fact, the tech sector’s prime objective is curbing wage and other compensation gains by opening the flood gates ever wider to foreign-born technologists willing to accept much lower pay.   

The best outcome for the cause of American competitiveness — and for its potential to benefit the existing American population economically — would be for the Congressional conference committee assigned with devising a final compromise version that President Biden can sign into law to strip the Senate version of its trade sections, and the House version of these immigration sections

But don’t expect any progress any time soon. Reuters reports that the committee will hold its first meeting next week – and will contain more than 100 House and Senate lawmakers. In other words, more than 100 cooks for this broth.

As a result, even though China continues massively subsidizing its own tech sector, and even though other countries have already responded with their own incentives aimed at attracting and maintaining their capabilities in semiconductors and other industries, “Congressional aides said it could still take months before a final agreement is reached.” In the ultimate sad commentary on American political dysfunction, given the glaring flaws of both bills, that could be a good thing. 

Following Up: Podcast Now On-Line of National Radio Interview on Biden Hints of China Tariff Cuts

Tags

Biden administration, CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, China, Federation for American Immigration Reform, Following Up, Gordon G. Chang, Immigration, inflation, John Batchelor, labor shortages, tariffs

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of my interview last night on the nationally syndicated “CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor.” Click here for a great conversation with John and co-host Gordon G. Chang on why the Biden administration’s interest in cutting tariffs on imports from China makes no sense on any score – including inflation-fighting.

In addition, it was great (even I was mis-ID’d) to see my April 7 post on the pro-Open Borders/Cheap Labor Lobby’s phony claims of a national labor shortage quoted Monday in a blog entry put up by the Federation for American Immigration Reform.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Could the “Great Resignation” be Ending?

Tags

CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Employment, Great Resignation, Jobs, JOLTS, labor market, labor shortages, quits, quits rate, transitory, workers, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Labor Department’s monthly “JOLTS” report is one of the official U.S. economic data series that I stopped covering during the CCP Virus era. After all, the results seemed to be so overwhelmingly driven by pandemic-specific disruptions, and therefore so unrelated to the fundamental state of the U.S. economy.

I’m still wary of putting too much stock in JOLTS, which stands for Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey. As the name suggests, it tracks how many positions at American businesses (including in government) are vacant, how many workers are quitting, how many are getting fired or laid off, and how many are getting hired, and it’s one of the key sets of statistics that have revealed both the extent of the labor shortages marking the economy and of what’s been called the “Great Resignation” – a major and indeed record increase in the numbers and percentages of workers voluntarily leaving their employers.

Yet since this development has so clearly (at least to me) stemmed from pandemicky circumstances, I assumed that it would turn out to be largely “transitory” (to use the Federal Reserve’s now “retired” description of elevated inflation).

So why this JOLTS-y post? Because this morning’s latest report, which takes the story through November, does show signs of normalization in those jobs quits. To be sure, the absolute numbers of quits hit yet another record – 4.527 million. In fact, that total represents the seventh straight month in which this quits level topped the pre-CCP Virus high of 3.627 million, set in July, 2019.

As known by RealityChek regulars, though, absolute numbers don’t provide the entire, or even the most important parts of, a picture. In this case, that’s because the numbers of employed Americans have grown substantially since the JOLTS series began at the end of 2000. What matters more is the quits rate – the percentage of the employed leaving their positions.

For non-farm workers (the Labor Department’s U.S. employment universe), this rate, at three percent in November, is still well above the pre-pandemic high of 2.4 percent – which also came in 2019 (in February, July, and August), as well as in April, 2001. But it’s barely risen on net since April’s 2.8 percent.

For private sector workers, the recent quits rates movement is less dramatic, and that’s more important for judging the transitory-ness of the Great Resignation – because the private sector is much bigger than the public, and the trends shaping it are much more reflective of market forces, not politicians’ decisions.

But it still seems worth noting that even though it rose to a record 3.4 percent in November (significantly higher than the pre-pandemic record 2.8 percent, set back in January, 2001, the private sector quits rate has been pretty stable since coming in at 3.3 percent in August.

Two caveats need to be mentioned, though. First, these November results are preliminary. Second, they predate the arrival in the United States of the CCP Virus’ highly infectious Omicron variant, which threatens to roil labor markets once again for the foreseeable future. One thing’s for sure – it’s time for me to renew monitoring these JOLTS reports!

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Real Wage Decline is Really Widespread

Tags

CCP Virus, child care, coronavirus, COVID 19, elder care, health care, inflation adjusted wages, labor shortages, nursing, real wages, supply chain, trucking, wages, warehousing, workers, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

A Facebook exchange I was involved in last night prompted me to check the U.S. government data to find out how widespread was the trend of falling real wages – and by definition falling living standards. And the answer is: incredibly widespread – including in supply chain-related sectors where crippling labor shortages are often blamed for much of the bottleneck problem that has helped fuel inflation by reducing the supply of goods sought by Americans.

The exchange began when a Facebook friend posted her view that the U.S. economy was doing far better than gloomy press reports indicated. I countered with my “putting people first” argument that falling living standards meant that the economy was failing in its fundamental mission: improving Americans’ material lives. My interlocutor responded by claiming that the unusually large number of unfilled job openings have appeared during the stop-and-start recovery from the brief but steep CCP Virus-induced downturn showed that many Americans falling behind economically could easily improve their lot by taking jobs in higher paying industries.

I could have answered by pointing out how many Americans in low-paying jobs in particular lack the training to move that wage ladder. But I was more struck by the pervasiveness of the recent decline in inflation-adjusted hourly pay – which shows that even those able to make that transition will find themselves on a downward moving escalator for the time being.

Specifically, I looked at price-adjusted wage trends on a November, 2020-November, 2021 basis for the eight broadest categories tracked by the Bureau of Labo Statistics (BLS). They are: mining and logging; construction; manufacturing; trade, transportation and utilities; information services; professional and business services; leisure and hospitality; and miscellaneous services.

How many of these eight sectors saw real wage declines between the two Novembers? Seven. Leisure and hospitality was the lone exception, and it’s the lowest paying of these categories by far. The constant dollar wage out-performance there was indeed encouraging, but with these hourly earnings still only standing at $6.88 in 1982-84 dollars – versus $11.13 for the private sector as a whole – I wouldn’t claim economic success just yet.

(As known by RealityChek regulars, BLS doesn’t monitor wages in the public sector because there, pay is determined mainly by politicians’ decisions, not economic fundamentals.)

The names of these eight sectors, however, make clear that they’re so broad that they could include subsectors where the story’s very different. And that’s true even for a number of what might be called pandemic-specific sectors with lots of job openings – but only sometimes.

For example, the enormous national healthcare sector is part of the business and professional services grouping, where real hourly wages of $13.44 – higher than the private sector average – are off by a little over one percent so far this year. But for healthcare alone, they’re up by just under one percent (to a lower $12.13, though).

Dig deeper, and you find that after-inflation wages for hospitals, nursing care facilities, elder care facilities, and child care services, have risen, too. But except for hospital workers (a broad, relatively high paying category itself), hourly wages in 1982-84 dollars in none of these sectors is anywhere close to even a measly $10. And none has seen year-on-year wage increases of more than 1.95 percent (for hospital workers).

The wage situation is even worse in many of the supply chain-related industries within the trade, transportation, and utilities super-sector. For example, next time you hear about a dire nation-wide shortage of truck drivers, keep in mind that their real wages have decreased by 3.67 percent annually as of November. And workers at those equally strained warehouses? They’re only off by 0.25 percent. But they’re supposed to be desperate to hire! What gives?

The most obvious answer to me is that a supposed labor shortage in a sector where real wages are decreasing is really a tale of inadequate pay. But that’s a subject for another post – or six. For today, though, it seems abundantly clear that the headline real wage decline number isn’t masking lots of workers gaining ground, and that if you view that standard as the main test of an economy’s success, America’s is definitely flunking.

Im-Politic: A Labor Shortage Story Short on the Facts

Tags

Bloomberg.com, Boris Johnson, Brexit, editing, European Union, globalism, Im-Politic, Immigration, Joe Mayes, journalism, labor shortages, media bias, Open Borders, truck drivers, truckers, trucking, United Kingdom

Is Bloomberg.com trying to make yours truly look good? It certainly seems that way. Exactly two days after I wrote that American journalism has long been suffering from an editing crisis (and subjecting readers and viewers to a flood of ineptly reported and reasoned articles, posts, and broadcast segments), this news site ran a piece illustrating perfectly two of this so-called profession’s biggest (and intimately related) flaws: pushing narratives largely by ignoring information that provides crucial context.

The lead paragraph tells you all you need to know where Joe Mayes’ September 22 story was going (and where he and his editors believed it should go): “The red lines of Boris Johnson’s Brexit project are starting to crack as voters face growing shortages of food and fuel, as well as a marked rise in living costs.”

As the second paragraph elaborated, “Despite riding to power on a Brexit campaign that pledged to cut immigration from the European Union, the prime minister [Johnson] and his cabinet are now preparing for what would be a significant and politically damaging U-turn: Tapping those same EU workers to plug the labor shortages crippling parts of the U.K. supply chain.” And “the most immediate and pressing concern”? “A major shortage of truck drivers.”

What could be more revealing – and embarrassing for supporters of the United Kingdom’s 2016 decision to leave the European Union (in large part to gain more national control over immigration inflows)? Immigrants from the same EU are now being recognized even by the Leaver-in-Chief as that country’s last hope for staving off starvation, freezing to death this winter, and raging inflation.

No question Brexit was a landmark decision, and no doubt there were plenty of valid reasons to be skeptical (as the close 2016 referendum results indicate). But this Bloomberg piece plainly suggests that the countries that have decided to remain in the EU literally have truckers to spare the British.

Which insinuates that the Brexiteers deserve to have insult added to injury. Except this story line is a crock. As an internet search that took me mere minutes revealed, there’s lots of info out there making clear that truck driver shortages are a global problem – that is, they’re not limited to countries that left the EU. Indeed, this industry website reports that trucking companies in Europe are expecting a 17 percent driver shortfall this year.

Further, the survey it’s based on found that any number of steps could be taken by trucking companies and governments in shortage-afflicted countries to increase driver supply without importing foreigners. Like raising pay. Like lowering the training age to encourage more young people to replace retiring truckers (a big problem in a sector with an aging workforce). Like creating safer parking areas, which would be especially helpful in attacting more women into the business. (They currently make up only two percent of drivers globally, according to the survey.)

In fact, finding such ;material is so easy that it raises the question of whether the main problem (and all the others I’ve spotlighted on RealityChek – e.g., here) doesn’t reflect simply a competence crisis. It also reflects a bias crisis, with the target being any measures or information that clash with longstanding globalist orthodoxies – in this case, Open Borders- friendly policies on the immigration and labor shortage fronts.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Blaming Extra Unemployment Benefits for U.S. Labor Shortages Just Got a Lot Harder

Tags

CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Employment, Jobs, labor markets, labor shortages, recession, unemployment, unemployment benefits, workers, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you’ve been following the economic news for the last few months, you know that one of the most heated policy debates that’s broken out concerns the impact of the supplemental federal unemployment claims that America’s jobless became eligible for due to the CCP Virus- and lockdowns-induced recession and its continuing aftermath.

Specifically, opponents of these payments – which will end for all states on September 6 (unless they don’t?) – charge that they’ve needlessly enabled many workers to avoid or delay returning to businesses, and thereby greatly worsened labor shortages reported by so many employers. Supporters insist that they’ve been a minor contributor, and that the shortages stem from many more important factors, like ongoing health concerns or childcare issues or the apparent decision of many Baby Boomers and near-Boomers that the pandemic created a convenient time to retire.

I’ve believed for months that the biggest truth has been “all of the above,” but have been frustrated by the lack of statistics that could at least start providing reasonably convincing answers. And unfortunately, this post’s appearance doesn’t mean that terrific data has been found. But what I’ve gone over in the last few days seems reasonably informative, and what it tells me is that the extra federal benefits haven’t been a significant deal at all in the U.S. jobs picture.

What I did was compare four indicators of employment for the states that announced that they’d stop paying those extra benefits by the end of June (along with Louisiana, which announced a July 31 cutoff) and for the states that have decided to continue them as long as Washington was sending the funds. The indicators are unemployment rates, numbers of people employed, first-time jobless claims filed, and levels of continuing jobless claims. And recent Labor Department reports make possible comparing the unemployment rates between June and July, and both sets of claims numbers between the week ending June 26 and the week ending July 24. So they should provide some information on whether the announcement of imminent cutoffs led the jobless to secure reemployment faster.

These data can’t provide definitive answers for numerous reasons. For example, as this article makes clear, the $300 extra federal benefits on which I concentrated haven’t been the only extra benefits provided during the pandemic, and even six of the “early cutoff” states have continued to provide some combination of the others. In addition, two of the early cutoff states have been under court orders to continue the benefits (Indiana and Maryland), and lawsuits are pending in three others (Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas.) Moreover, state benefit levels vary tremendously, both in terms of payment amounts and eligibility periods. So depending on where they live, unemployed Americans could have lost various extended benefits and still received benefits from their state governments (for varying timeframes) generous enough to affect their need or desire to return to work.

But what follows is a pretty good start to the search for answers. And analysts do get one break: The states plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia to be examined divide evenly into two groups of 26.

First, the jobless rate comparisons. As widely known, these aren’t perfect measures of the national employment situation because they leave out big categories of distressed workers like those too discouraged to even search for a job, and those employed part-time because they have no other choice. And as suggested above, they shed no light on changes in the numbers of retirees.

Be that as it may, of the 26 cutoff states, between June and July, unemployment rates fell in 19, rose in three, and held steady in four. And of the twenty cutoff states where no litigation was either affecting payment policies or coming down the pike, and excluding tardy Louisiana, jobless rates fell in 16, rose in two, and remained unchanged in two.

How does that compare with the unemployment rates in the non-cutoff states? They fell in 18 of the 26 states between June and July, rose in four, and held steady in four. So I don’t see a big difference there.

Turning to employment levels, of the 26 total cutoff states, from June to July, they rose in 23 and fell in three. Of the twenty facing no litigation issues and, again, also excepting Louisiana, employment levels rose in 19 and fell in one. Those results actually slightly lag the performance of the non-cutoff states, where employment levels rose in 25 of the 26 between June and July.

It’s much the same story for initial jobless claims from the week ending June 26 and the week ending July 24. For the 26 total cutoff states, initial claims between these two weeks rose in six and fell in 20. Of the 20 facing no legal issues, and excepting Louisiana, claims rose in five and fell in 15.

That’s almost identical to the results for the non-cutoff states, where initial claims between those two weeks rose in five states and fell in 21. In fact, a slight edge goes to these states on this score, too.

Finally, for continuing claims, in the 26 total cutoff states, these fell in 21 and rose in five between the weeks in question. And of the 20 with no litigation existing or pending, and excluding tardy Louisiana, continuing claims fell in 15 and rose in five.

In this group of 26, 22 saw continuing claims fall and four saw the rise.

Again, I’m not contending that these numbers are definitive. More detailed analysis accounting for more of the aforementioned differences among states would help a lot. Nor do I doubt that labor shortages have emerged in some parts of the economy. But if there’s proof out there that the extended unemployment benefits had much impact, it hasn’t emerged yet – and let’s hope it emerges before the economy runs aground for an extended period again.  

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Latest Data Remain Full of Normalization Puzzles

Tags

Biden, CCP Virus, China, construction, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, exports, goods trade, imports, inflation, inflation adjusted wages, labor shortages, leisure and hospitality, lockdowns, manufacturing, metals, non-oil goods trade deficit, non-supervisory workers, private sector, real wages, reopening, retail, services trade, shutdowns, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, transportation, wage inflation, wages, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

While I was away for a few days last week, two major U.S. government reports came out both giving off conflicting signals on on whether the economy has started to return to normal in critical ways as the CCP Virus subsides and reopening, along with consequent changes in consumer behavior, proceed.

The monthly trade figures (for April) showed a sequential decline, following a record surge, in America’s chronically huge gap between exports and much larger amounts of imports. Moreover the monthly drop took place as economic growth sped along at unusual rates after being shut down by government mandates and consumer caution. So maybe they’re an early sign that a return to immediate pre-virus conditions has begun?

Or is their most important message that these deficits, and especially the import levels, are still hovering near all-time highs in (the most widely followed) pre-inflation terms even though the economy as of the latest (first quarter) numbers is still a bit smaller in (the most widely followed) inflation-adjusted terms than during the last full pre-pandemic quarter (the fourth quarter of 2019)?

Indeed, the deficits are gargantuan even though President Biden has left former President Trump’s substantial tariffs on metals and goods from China practically untouched. 

The monthly inflation numbers (for May) are similarly confusing. They revealed that consumer prices (just one inflation measure published by Washington, but an important one) rose by 4.93 percent in seasonally adjusted terms. That was their fastest annual pace since September, 2008’s 4.95 percent. Surely, as widely claimed (including by the Federal Reserve, which wields so much influence over the economy, this upswing stems from a combination of bottlenecks resulting from (1) the sudden, widespread reopening; (2) the unusually low overall inflation numbers generated a year ago, when the economy was near the depths of its viruts- and shutdown-induced slump; and (3) the immense dose of stimulus injected into the economy by both elected politicians and the unelected Fed.

At the same time, the Fed has told us that its stimulus isn’t ending anytime soon, and although the Biden administration and Congressional Democrats are displaying some cold feet about approving more such levels of economic fuel (e.g., in the form of outlays on infrastructure, and a wide variety of income supports and enhanced unemployment benefits), it’s difficult to imagine that most or even much of this spending will actually be withdrawn even once a post-virus recovery is an indisputable reality.

But the biggest surprise of all: Despite the economy-wide inflation pressures, and by-now-routine claims that employers are dealing with nearly crippling labor shortages, wages overall adjusted for inflation keep going down.

Compounding the confusion over whatever conclusions can legitimately be drawn from these two reports: They cover two different months.

But let’s begin with the most important details from the April trade report. The ambiguity embodied in the data begins with the total deficit figure. The record March result was revised up from $74.45 billion to $75.03 billion but April’s $68.90 shortfall for goods and services combined, though the second worst monthly figure ever, was 8.17 percent smaller. That’s the biggest sequential drop since February, 2020 (8.39 percent), when China’s export-heavy economy was still largely closed because of the virus.

The same holds for the goods trade gap. The record March figure was revised up, too, from $91.56 billion to $92.86 billion. But April’s $86.68 billion result represented a 6.65 percent monthly decline, and this falloff was the biggest since the 8.39 percent plunge of January, 2019 – when American businesses were still adjusting both to Trump’s tariffs and anticipated tariffs.

Also still fueling the high U.S. deficits – a worsening of services trade balances. Here, U.S. trade has long been in surplus, but the surpluses keep shrinking because service sectors like travel are still suffering from the pandemic’s arrival and the consequent decimation of travel and othe transportation in particular. In fact, the April figure of $17.78 billion was the lowest since September, 2012’s $18.62 billion.

One key set of trade flows does, however, provide some evidence of Trump tariff effectiveness – U.S. non-oil goods trade, which encompasses those exports and imports whose magnitudes are most heavily influenced by trade policy (because, as known by RealityChek regulars, trade in oil is almost never the subject of any trade policy decisions and services trade liberalization remains at very early stages). In April, the monthly shortfall retreated 4.16 percent from its March record of $90.12 billion to $86.37 billion – which is only the fourth highest such total ever.

The import figures I focused on last month exhibit the same overall patterns: April saw big drops from record levels but the absolute numbers remain distressingly high. March’s initially reported record $274.48 billion in total imports was revised up considerably – to $277.69 billion. April’s total of $273.89 billion represented a 1.37 percent drop, but nonetheless was the second worst such figure on record.

March’s record monthly goods import figure was upgraded, too – from $234.44 billion to $236.52 billion. April’s total of $231.97 billion was a 1.92 percent drop but these purchases also still represented the second highest of alll time.

As for non-oil goods imports, the $215.33 billion April total was 1.98 percent down from an upwardly revised record $219.68 billion, and also the second biggest ever. Biggest drop since last April’s 10.91

Whether normalization is returning in manufacturing is more difficult to tell. Imports in March hit a record $207.59 billion, and did drop by 4.59 percent sequentially to $198.06 billion in April. That decrease, however, was a typical monthly move for manufacturing imports, and the April figure was still the third highest ever.

Incidentally, the April manufacturing deficit of $103.60 billion was 4.64 percent lower than March’s $108.66 billion. The March total was the second highest on record, but April’s figure was only the seventh all-time worst. The record, $110.20 billion, came last October, and it’s notable that the gap has narrowed on net despite the resilience shown during the pandemic period by manufacturing output.

More evidence of the Trump tariffs’ impact comes from the data on goods trade with China – whose products have attracted nearly all of these levies, and that cover hundreds of billions of dollars worth of products. The April figure of $37.59 billion was 6.56 percent lower than its March predecessor – a thoroughly unexceptional sequential decline and monthly level by historical standards. But the monthly dropoff was consideraby greater than the aforementioned 1.98 percent decrease for non-oil goods – the closest global proxy.

As a result of all these inconclusive developments, I’ll be awaiting the May trade report with even more interest than usual.

But despite all the uncertainties I mentioned at the start of this post, those May inflation figures have made me more confident than before in my previous contention that current price surges are anomalies by the extremely low inflation generated by the CCP Virus-battered economy of a year ago, and by the sudden reopening of so much of the economy following the long shutdowns and lockdowns. Even clearer, as I see it: Claims of significant, troubling wage inflation are especially weak.

After all, that 4.93 percent year-on-year May price increase followed a previous May-to-May rise that was just 0.22 percent. That was the feeblest such rise since September, 2015’s 0.13 percent. In addition, May’s month-to-month 0.64 price advance was smaller than April’s 0.77 percent. Two months do not a trend make, but these numbers certainly don’t point to raging inflation fires.

Nor do the wage data. Otherwise after-inflation total private sector wages wouldn’t be down more on-month in May (-0.18 percent) than in April (-0.09 percent). And the same couldn’t be said of constant dollar wages for non-supervisory workers (-0.20 percent in May versus flat in April).

Getting more granular, the price-adjusted wage trends are as bad or worse in construction; trade, transportation and utilities overall; retail trade; and education and health services.

The two big exceptions: the leisure and hospitality workforces that have been so decimated by the virus (and especially the non-supervisory group) and the transportation and warehousing sub-sector of the transportation and utilities industry category that contains a trucking sector unusually strained by the rapid reopening. In both cases, however, (and especially the leisure and hospitality industry), inflation-adjusted wages in absolute terms are well below the national private sector average. If anything, therefore, it seems like some wage inflation for these workers is long overdue.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Wage Inflation? Seriously?

Tags

CCP Virus, construction, coronavirus, COVID 19, housing, inflation, inflation-adjusted wages, labor shortages, leisure and hospitality, private sector, real wages, recession, recovery, wage inflation, wages, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Reports keep abounding that U.S. businesses can’t find enough workers to match their needs amid an ongoing rapid reopening of the economy from its lockdowns-induced slump, and that companies are therefore being forced to attract employees with ever higher – and even alarmingly higher – pay offers.

All of that makes perfect sense except for one critical detail: The official U.S. wage figures show precious few signs of soaring wages whatever. In fact, when you adjust for the inflation that has been recorded in Washington’s statistics, you see that workers’ hourly pay generally keeps falling behind, not racing ahead, of rising prices in the economy.

First let’s look at the pre-inflation figures for the entire economy (except for government, where pay levels mainly reflect politicians’ choices, not economic fundamentals).

When it comes to the entire private sector, hourly earnings in April (the latest figures available, which are still preliminary) grew by 0.33 percent year-on-year. That result, though, is somewhat misleading, since the previous April’s level was artificially high. That month, remember, was the depth of the CCP Virus-induced recession, and companies were largely laying off their least experienced (and cheapest) staffers. So the wage number for retained workers rose (and strongly) simply because their pay levels remained relatively lofty, and they accounted for a much bigger percentage of employment. Therefore, perhaps that misleadingly high April, 2020 figure was the main reason that the 2020-2021 improvement is misleadingly low?

Unfortunately, the data shoot down that hypothesis, too. For example, between “normal” April, 2018 and 2019, economy-wide pre-inflation wages jumped by 3.30 percent. That’s ten times the 2020-2021 increase. And in fact, the April, 2019 to 2020 pay hike was by far the smallest since 2006 (when this particular data series began).

But maybe the biggest wage inflation only began this calendar year – when overall inflationary pressures have arguably become visible?  Between January and April, current dollar hourly wages for the entire U.S. private sector did climb by 0.84 percent, and that advance was more than twice as fast as the April year-on-year change. Moreover, this 2021 wage growth was faster than that for “normal” January-April, 2019 (0.76 percent). Indeed, it was the fastest since 2008, another recessionary year when layoffs heavily concentrated among the least experienced, lowest-paid employees rendered the 0.90 percent result artificially high.

But aside from 2008, the January-April increase wasn’t that much higher than that seen in many recent years. For example, the January-April result for “normal” 2019 was 0.76 percent. For 2018, it was 0.71 percent. Just as important – does anyone think that those years, or any time lately, has been a golden age of wage increases?

There’s another possibility to consider: that strong wage inflation has taken place only among the production and other non-management workers, who both tend to be the lowest-paid and who in principle therefore are likeliest to be kept out of the job market by unusually generous unemployment benefits.

Average hourly earnings before inflation for this group have actually risen much more strongly year-on-year in April than for the overall workforce – by 1.15 percent versus 0.33 percent. And this 2020-2021 result, as with wages for the entire workforce, does seem to have been artificially depressed by the equally artificially high (7.84 percent!) figure for 2019-2020.

But historically, the 2020-21 wage increase not only looks anything but exceptional. It’s positively pitiful – by far the weakest April-April rise on record. Just to compare, from April to April in “normal” 2019 and 2018, current dollar wages for these “blue collar” workers were up 3.46 percent and 2.83 percent, respectively. .

Are the trends much different for January-April periods – which in principle should reveal whether wage inflation has waited till this calendar year to take off? For 2020 so far, pre-inflation blue collar hourly pay has improved by 1.23 percent – more than the 0.84 percent increase for all private sector workers.

That’s much slower than the comparable 5.36 percent jump last year, but we agree that last year was weird. The 2021 results are faster than those of normal 2019 (0.91 percent), but the gap doesn’t seem gargantuan to me. At the same time, current dollar January-April pay increases of one percent or greater for blue collar workers have been experienced five times since 1998, and before then, you need to go back to the late-1980s for a period when they were routine.

So describing the January-April, 2021 results as wage inflation-y could be justified. But that’s a far cry from reasonably concluding that this inflation will have much in the way of legs, since the economy, as widely noted, has never seen this kind of sudden stop-start transition in peacetime.

There’s another set of numbers, though, that needs to be examined to put the wage inflation issue in full perspective – recent wage changes after taking into account inflation across the entire economy. And in these real terms, hourly pay has actually been going down lately.

That’s true for all private sector workers between last April and this past April (down 3.66 percent).

It’s true for these workers between January and April of this year (down 0.88 percent).

It’s true for private sector blue collar workers between last April and this past April (down 3.37 percent).

And it’s true for these workers between January and April of this year (-0.71 percent).

Moreover, the “2020 effect” caused by that year’s artificially high baseline doesn’t seem to account fully for this wage deterioration. It’s definitely been apparent for all private workers (for whom average real wages soared by 7.81 percent between 2019 and 2020), and for private sector blue collar workers (whose inflation-adjusted average hourly pay surged by 7.68 percent).

In addition, since 2006, (when real wages for the whole private sector workforce began to be tracked), these wages have fallen on an April-April basis five other times. But they’ve never fallen by remotely as much as in 2021. And this year, employers are supposed to be desperate for workers. Much the same holds for private sector blue collar workers during this period.

Looking at the January-April periods, the 2021 decrease of 0.88 percent for all private sector workers is the second biggest since 2006 (trailing only 2011’s 0.97 percent). Further, this four-month stretch has only seen one other instance of constant dollar wage decrease (2019’s 0.37 percent). And the 2021 result is all the more strange given the strangely strong and sudden nature of the recovery.

When it comes to their blue collar counterparts, 2021’s 0.71 percent drop in after-inflation wages between January and April is also the second biggest since 2006 (trailing only the 1.24 percent fall-off suffered, again, in 2011). Pay declines during this period for these workers has been more frequent than for the private sector overall. (They’ve occurred five times all told before 2021.) Again, however, 2021’s has been puzzlingly steep given the economy’s unusually fast recovery this year and all the labor shortage claims that have resulted.

More convincing signs of out-of-the-ordinary wage inflation can be seen in sectors like construction and leisure and hospitality, especially during the first four months of this year. In the former, which has enjoyed strength in residential housing throughout the pandemic period, pre-inflation wages have increased by 1.24 percent. That’s the most since 2006 (again, the earliest data available) – though not outlandishly so. But after accounting for inflation, real construction wages have dropped by 0.49 percent between January and April of this year.

For blue collar construction workers, pre-inflation wages have improved by 1.75 percent during the first four months of 2021 – another post-2006 high. But even though their real wages have dipped during this period by only 0.17 percent, that’s still a dip.

The leisure and hospitality industries are of course coming out of a disastrous pandemic period, and with Americans now flocking to restaurants and bars and resuming travel, it’s not surprising that January-April current dollar hourly pay has risen by 3.71 percent – far and away a post-2006 record. The post-inflation number is up nicely, too (1.98 percent), and also a performance that’s smashed previous records. So this sector so far is telling a stronger wage inflation story.

Non-supervisory blue collar leisure and hospitality workers have fared even better, with pre-inflation wages zooming up by 5.87 percent between January and April of this year, and real hourly pay better by 3.98 percent.

Will these healthy pay hikes continue? That’s a big question for these parts of the economy. But even though wage figures don’t capture the entire compensation picture (in particular, they leave out non-wage benefits and all the signing bonuses employers are reportedly offering to lure workers off the sidelines), with wage and salary income representing more than 80 percent of total employee compensation throughout the economy (including in the public sector), they capture lots of the picture. And the overall message is that, like a famous economist once said about computers being everywhere but in the productivity statistics, wage inflation worth worrying about, and related worker shortage claims, to date are everywhere but in the wage statistics.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Labor Shortage-Spurred Tech Revolution in Construction

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3D manufacturing, 3D printing, Biden, CNBC.com, construction, Diana Olick, Donald Trump, housing, illegal aliens, Immigration, labor shortages, Open Borders, productivity, technology, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As known by RealityChek regulars, there’s abundant evidence that behind most claims of lasting labor shortages by U.S. industries, and the resulting insistence tht more immigration is urgently needed, there’s an industry that’s done almost nothing to improve its productivity. (See, e.g., here.)

In other words, precisely because they’ve been able to rely for so long on an ever expanding supply of cheap labor, these industries have had precious little need to keep costs under control by improving productivity – either by developing labor-saving technologies, or adopting more efficient management practices, or some combination of the two. And the result hurts the entire U.S. economy by retarding progress and knee-capping its best chances of fostering lasting prosperity.

That’s why it was so exciting to read a CNBC.com post yesterday describing the beginnings of a possible productivity-improving technological response to labor shortages (and therefore rising labor costs), by one of the nation’s biggest slacker industries – construction.

Correspondent Diana Olick’s report faithfully presented the residential construction sector’s claim that housing has performed well during the CCP Virus period, but that its potential to keep supporting bady needed growth was endangered by constantly rising costs. And she added that, in addition to building materials becoming ever more expensive, so were workers.

What Olick failed to mention was that housing was a quintessential industry that has long enjoyed the option of compensating by becoming more innovative, but gone down the cheap labor road instead. Indeed, an outsized share of its workforce consists of not only immigrant workers, but illegal aliens. And its labor productivity levels are actually down since 1968 – which is no coincidence.

But the Trump administration’s restrictive immigration policies may finally be forcing home-builders and other construction companies to start using their collective noggins to control costs. As Olick reports, the industry is starting to use 3-D printing technology “in a big way.” According to executives whose companies are using the new technology, it can cut costs by between 10 percent to 40 percent. And one big reason, in Olick’s words, is that “3D-printed homes require very few workers, as the printer does the bulk of the construction.”

Her post also mentions that 3-D-built homes promise to be sturdier and more energy-efficient than their conventional counterparts, and generate less construction waste, too. And business has been so good that one executive told her “The biggest challenge…is we are supply constrained. We have more people asking for us to build houses than we know what to do with now. Every construction system we have is booked up for the next 24 months.”

In fact, from an economy-wide perspective, the biggest, darkest cloud on the horizon is that President Biden’s Open Borders-friendly immigration policies will flood the labor market with low-skill workers again and take the pressure off the construction industry – and other productivity laggards. That result would richly deserve to be called “Build Back Worse.”