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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trump’s NAFTA Rewrite Blueprint is an Encouraging Start

18 Tuesday Jul 2017

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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bubbles, Buy American, Canada, dispute resolution, environmental standards, GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, government procurement, labor standards, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, national treatment, non-discrimination, North American Free Trade Agreement, reciprocity, rules of origin, tariffs, TPP, Trade, trade deficit, trade enforcement, trade laws, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trump, value-added taxes, VATs, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Trump administration is out with its detailed statement of renegotiation objectives for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and if you’ve favored turning U.S. trade policy from an engine of debt-creation and offshoring into one of production-fueled growth and domestic job creation, you should be pretty pleased.

As critics have noted, yesterday’s statement does lack numerous important details about how the administration intends to achieve its goals, and some of these omissions (as will be explained) raise legitimate questions about the depth of the president’s commitment to these changes. But the statute requiring the release of such statements doesn’t mandate disclosure of every – or any – specific strategy for reaching these goals. Moreover, the talks haven’t even started, and these tactics naturally tend to change with circumstances. So those accusing the administration of excessive vagueness should start holding their fire.

As indicated in yesterday’s post, the most important change needed in NAFTA is the addition of teeth to the agreement’s existing rules of origin – the requirements that goods sold within the NAFTA free trade zone comprised of the United States, Mexico, and Canada be made overwhelmingly of parts, components, and materials made inside the zone.

After all, manufacturing dominates trade not only inside NAFTA, but between the NAFTA countries and the rest of the world. Without imposing teeth, non-NAFTA countries will have no meaningful incentive to invest in new NAFTA-area facilities to produce the intermediate goods that comprise the content of final products, like automobiles. And the economies, businesses, and workers in the three countries will be denied immense opportunities to boost production and employment. Indeed, this is precisely this opportunity that’s been missed under the current NAFTA.

It’s difficult to imagine these teeth taking a form other than steep tariffs on goods imports from outside NAFTA, and the Trump blueprint never mentions that “t” word. But it does contain a call to “Update and strengthen the rules of origin, as necessary, to ensure that the benefits of NAFTA go to products genuinely made in the United States and North America.” And it specifies that these improved origin rules must “incentivize the sourcing of goods and materials from the United States and North America.” How could anyone supporting more U.S. manufacturing production and employment not be heartened?

Also impressive – as widely reported, the administration has prioritized preserving America’s ability to “enforce rigorously its trade laws, including the antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard laws” chiefly by eliminating the NAFTA provisions that established international tribunals as the last word in resolving trade complaints among the signatories, rather than the U.S. trade law system. The Trump administration is also seeking to reestablish America’s unfettered authority to impose “safeguard” tariffs on imports from Mexico and Canada when they begin to surge into the United States. So if you’re worried that NAFTA and other recent U.S. trade agreements have needlessly undermined American sovereignty, this blueprint is for you.

Similarly, critics have long complained about NAFTA’s overriding of the Buy America provisions of U.S. public procurement regulations aimed at maximizing the American taxpayer dollars used to purchase goods and services for government agencies. The Trump strategy laid out in the blueprint seeks to preserve these and other key domestic preference programs.

It’s true, as is being contended, that in areas ranging from promoting high labor rights and environmental standards, to dealing more effectively with the trade distortions created by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the Trump NAFTA blueprint looks a lot like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal that the president condemned as a candidate and withdrew from on his first day in office.

It’s just as true, however, that formidable obstacles were bound to prevent effective enforcement of those proposed TPP rules. These loom as large as ever – notably, the huge numbers of U.S. government officials that would be needed to monitor the even huge-er Mexican manufacturing sector on anything close to an ongoing basis. But the final TPP text demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that the Obama administration failed to address these concerns adequately. Maybe the Trump administration will come up with viable answers.

Finally, the Trump NAFTA blueprint contains two conceptual objectives that have never been prioritized since the current world trading system was created shortly after World War II, and that trade policy critics should be applauding vigorously. The first is the endorsement of reciprocity as a lodestar of American trade strategy. The second is an emphasis on reducing America’s mammoth trade deficits.

Although reciprocity (i.e., America opens its markets to certain trade partners only to the extent that their markets are open to U.S.-origin goods and services) seems like an uncontroversial trade goal for Washington to seek, and is often presumed to be the goal, nothing until now could be further from the truth. In particular, the foundational principles of the world trade system under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are national treatment and non-discrimination.

National treatment simply insists that countries deal with foreign enterprises the same way they deal with their own domestic enterprises. Non-discrimination simply mandates that countries treat imports from all trade partners’ identically. The big problems? They enable closed economies to maintain way too many trade barriers. For instance, countries that favor certain companies over others for either political reasons (as with China’s state-owned sector) or reasons of national economic strategy (as with Japan’s efforts to limit entrants into certain industries to prevent excessive domestic competition) can continue discriminating in similar ways against foreign competitors. And countries can maintain high trade barriers as long as they apply equally to all imports.

As for trade deficit reduction, it’s a great way to promote healthy, production-led American growth, rather than the kind of debt-led, bubble-ized growth that’s been engineered arguably going back to the 1990s. But here’s where the Trump blueprint can be faulted. Especially if the new NAFTA contains better rules of origin, it’s likeliest to reduce the U.S. trade deficit with non-NAFTA countries, not with the treaty signatories that the blueprint targets. And nothing would be wrong with that result at all.

Two other aspects of the NAFTA objectives deserve comment – and merit genuine concern. First, although it’s good that the administration has included on the list currency manipulation, critics are right to note that specifics are urgently needed. Their development, moreover, is important not mainly because Canada and Mexico have been important culprits (they haven’t been) but because this is a challenge that President Trump needs to meet in connection with countries that clearly have manipulated in the past and could well do so again.

Second, the Trump blueprint makes no mention of value-added taxes (VATS). Mexico’s is 16 percent, Canada’s is five percent at the federal level and eight percent at the provincial level. As with all other VATs, these levies act as barriers to imports and subsidies for exports. Candidate Trump rightly called for American countermeasures in order to level the trade playing field inside NAFTA. President Trump should take heed.   

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: It’s “Big Week” on Trade

17 Monday Jul 2017

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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100-day China plan, Canada, China, environmental standards, G20, Gary Cohn, H.R. McMaster, James Mathis, labor standards, Mar-a-Lago summit, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, North Korea, Robert Lighthizer, rules of origin, steel, Steve Mnuchin, tairffs, Trade, Trump, Wilbur Ross, Xi JInPing, {What's Left of) Our Economy

During World War II, the United States and the United Kingdom launched a massive multi-day strategic bombing campaign against Nazi Germany called “Big Week.” The stakes are considerably less apocalyptic, but yesterday began a period for U.S. trade policy that qualifies as a big week, too. Here’s why, and what to look for.

First, yesterday marked the deadline for the 100-day plan announced at the summit between President Trump and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping to start bringing down America’s immense trade deficit with the People’s Republic. Some near-term deals were announced in May, and the Chinese seem to be playing along, to at least some extent. But even the American offshoring lobby, which has greatly soured on China since its full-court-press lobbying campaign convinced Washington to expand U.S.-China trade exponentially, has been complaining that agreements of this scope are way too small to solve their own problems with Beijing in the Chinese market. These deals have even less potential to stop most of the damage still being inflicted on the American domestic economy from wide-ranging predatory Chinese economic practices.

The results are due to be announced this week – and may be delayed to take into account whatever can be accomplished by a new high-level economics dialogue that will hold its first session in Washington this week. Will they produce some big wins for the administration and the domestic economy? As I see it, reasons for pessimism outweigh reasons for optimism.

The former include the president’s continuing statements about the threat posed by China’s imports (in this case, of steel), and the awareness demonstrated by his campaign of how varied and unconventional (meaning they went far beyond tariffs and quotas) China’s trade and trade-related transgressions have been. Among the reasons for pessimism, though, are intra-administration divisions that entail both economic issues (with the administration’s economic populists arrayed against what’s been called the pro-free trade “Goldman Sachs” gang comprised of top economic adviser Gary Cohn and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin) and security issues (pitting the populists against traditional foreign policy thinkers like national security adviser H.R. McMaster and Defense Secretary James Mattis, who would sympathize with notions like the claim that China should be courted to enlist its help in sitting on North Korea). In addition, the kinds of staffing woes still dogging the administration typically make sharp departures from a policy status quo difficult to engineer.

In fairness, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, who has forthrightly described the China economic challenge, acknowledged when announcing the 100-day trade plan’s first results that three months worth of talks couldn’t possibly be a game-changer precisely because China’s mercantilism was so pervasive. But in so doing, he unintentionally made the argument – which I support for U.S. trade policy generally – for dispensing with talks altogether and capitalizing on China’s urgent need to export to the United States by addressing this issue unilaterally.

Certainly, this kind of course change would be much more consistent with the president’s numerous campaign statements emphasizing the destructive effect of Chinese predation on America’s economy and working class. It’s also the kind of strategy you’d expect from a chief executive whose non-trade agenda is almost completely stalled in Congress, who’s under intense political pressure, and who could badly use a big economic win in order to prevent major Congressional losses in the next off-year elections – whose campaign cycle will be here before he knows it.

Another big (self-imposed) administration deadline falls today. It marks the date by which the White House said it would submit its detailed plan to renegotiate NAFTA – the North American Free Trade Agreement. In May, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer sent Congressional leaders a brief letter alluding generally to some objectives, but by tomorrow he needs to fill in critical details. Many might have been contained in a draft letter released March 30, and that plan looked pretty impressive. The big question of course is which ones will wind up surviving – and whether the administration is open to other ideas.

As I’ve written, the most important issue concerns the treatment of “rules of origin” – the provisions of NAFTA aimed at ensuring that any goods sold in the three signatory countries (the United States, Canada, and Mexico) are overwhelmingly made in some combination of those countries. The deal that’s currently in place specifies North American content levels that need to be met to qualify for duty-free treatment inside the free trade zone. But the tariff penalties for goods not meeting these standards aren’t nearly high enough to achieve the goal of increasing the entire region’s competitiveness.

The March 30 letter suggested that the administration would seek origin rules that promote U.S. production and jobs more effectively, but it didn’t say how. If much higher external tariffs aren’t proposed in the plan due today, it’s doubtful that any reforms will result in non-NAFTA countries to make more of their products in any of the countries inside the NAFTA zone. Moreover, it’s of course going to be easier for Washington to persuade Canada and Mexico to go along if it re-emphasizes what President Trump has been saying since his meeting last summer, before the election, with his Mexican counterpart: NAFTA should aim to boost the competitiveness of all three countries.

The brief May 18 Lighthizer letter also suggested obliquely the need to change NAFTA’s dispute-resolution procedures, and the March 30 draft discussed the issue at greater length. But even its recommendations to strengthen America’s authority both to respond to import surges from its NAFTA partners (called “safeguards”) and to apply its own Buy American government procurement rules to intra-NAFTA trade may not go far enough.

As I’ve explained, the fundamental problem is that the current dispute-resolution process treats the three NAFTA countries as legal equals, even though the U.S. market is nearly 90 percent of the total NAFTA market, and clearly remains the most valuable prize for all three signatories. Without closing or somehow changing acceptably, the yawning gap between the NAFTA legal regime and the economic facts on the ground, it’s hard to imagine the system serving U.S. interest on net.

At this point, you might be wondering why I haven’t mentioned NAFTA’s labor and environmental provisions. The reason? Although they’ve been major objectives of Democratic party and other left-of-center NAFTA and broader trade policy critics, as with their counterparts in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) deal, they’re largely unenforceable. As I’ve asked before, how many American bureaucrats will be needed to run around how many factories in a signatory country (in this case, Mexico) to ensure that companies aren’t abusing workers or dumping sewage into nearby streams? With more effective rules of origin, however, producers in Mexico will feel less pressure to remain competitive versus rivals in China and elsewhere in Asia by offering the worst possible working conditions and ignoring environmental considerations completely.

Finally, there’s the steel tariff issue. The administration has delayed announcing its decision to impose national security-related tariffs on U.S. steel imports, but is expected to reveal its intentions this week. For what it’s worth, the president sounds determined to approve some levies on some countries’ steel. The main question is who the main targets will be. It will also be crucial to see whether and how prominently the announcement emphasizes the need to deal decisively with the underlying problem – the ocean of subsidized steel from China that has flooded and distorted world markets in recent years.

At the same time, there’s a reason for Mr. Trump to punt – or to punt for the most part: At their summit earlier this month in Hamburg, Germany, the leaders of the world’s twenty largest economies (the “G20”) agreed to require an international commission on the subject to deliver a report by November containing “concrete policy solutions that reduce excess steel capacity.” Postponing unilateral action until this mandate is fulfilled could prove a tempting option for a president who doesn’t exactly need to come under fire from new fronts.

Moreover, if the commission’s ideas don’t pass U.S. muster, Mr. Trump would be in a much stronger position to slap the tariffs on everyone, and vow to maintain or even increase them until meaningful, concrete agreements are reached.

President Trump has been sending surprisingly (at least to me) mixed signals on trade since his Inauguration Day two-step – killing the TPP but refraining from labeling China a currency manipulator. Big Week in trade isn’t likely to clarify the picture fully, but we’re bound to know more at its end than we do here at the beginning.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Which Democrats are Serious and Un-Serious About Trade Overhaul?

19 Friday May 2017

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Uncategorized

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AFL-CIO, Bernie Sanders, Canada, Charles Schumer, currency manipulation, Debbie Dingell, Democrats, dispute resolution, Elizabeth Warren, environmental standards, labor standards, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, Politico, Richard Neal, Robert Lighthizer, Rosa deLauro, rules of origin, Thea Lee, Trade, Trump, U.S. Trade Representative, unions, Wilbur Ross, William Pascrell, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Usually, paying attention to instances of politicians and other public figures getting up on their soapboxes is a waste of time. Yesterday served up an exception: a press conference held by House Democrats in reaction to President Trump’s official decision to open talks to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The statements recorded in this Politico account offer some evidence as to which leaders on America’s Left are willing to work with the administration on trade policies that can help the working class voters Democrats still profess to champion, and those who will remain content to sit on the sidelines and take partisan potshots.

Reportedly, all of the House members who spoke at the event “said…they feared Trump would make only modest changes to NAFTA after blasting it as an economic disaster throughout last year’s presidential campaign.” The basis for these worries? The letter sent yesterday by new U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer to Congressional leaders announcing the administration’s intention to open NAFTA talks with the two other signatories, Canada and Mexico. According to these House Democrats and some other trade critics, the document apparently was “short on details,” which many claimed indicated Trump’s intention simply to “tweak” rather than comprehensively overhaul the agreement.

All else equal, wondering about the president’s real intentions is anything but unreasonable. His personality, after all, is mercurial, and one of his major trade initiatives to date – the negotiations begun with Beijing following February’s summit with Chinese leader XiJinping – has legitimately disappointed advocates of the major course change he pledged during the campaign. (The other major trade initiative, scrapping the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, kept a leading campaign promise to the letter.) Moreover, the Lighthizer letter is indeed short on specifics.

But none of the participants in the press conference seems to have noticed that in previous statements –including reportedly to leading Democratic lawmakers, top Trump officials have emphasized the need for dramatic NAFTA changes.

For example, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross has described as high NAFTA-related priorities greatly tightening the pact’s rules of origin in order to incentivize more non-NAFTA manufacturing investment inside the free trade zone, and restructuring a dispute-resolution system that gives each signatory an equal vote even though the United States represents more than 85 percent of North America’s total economic output. Reinforcing this point was the Lighthizer letter’s contention that “establishing effective implementation and aggressive enforcement of the commitments made by our trading partners under our trade agreements is vital to the success of these agreements and should be improved in the context of NAFTA.”

Meanwhile, Lighthizer reportedly has told Senators that the administration is thinking of adding to NAFTA rules that would prohibit currency manipulation – a move that would set a valuable precedent for future trade deals. In addition, his letter mentioned the need to improve NAFTA’s labor and environmental protections. In my view, they’re largely unenforceable. But they’ve been a prime focus of Democratic Party trade policy positions for decades.

So given that background, it seems fair at this point to finger Connecticut’s Rosa deLauro, New Jersey’s Bill Pascrell, and Massachusetts’ Richard Neal as grandstanders. The former stressed the “tweaking” allegation. The latter two charged that “It was clear from the start that the administration was only interested in working with the Congressional Republican leadership in drafting this notice [the Lighthizer letter].”

I’d also include in this group several key Senate Democrats, including Leader Charles Schumer of New York, former presidential candidate Bernie Sanders of New York, and Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts. They voted against Lighthizer’s confirmation despite his decades-long record of fighting predatory foreign trade practices both as Deputy U.S. Trade Representative during the Reagan administration, and as a trade lawyer representing domestic American producers.

More temperate in their judgments were Michigan’s Debbie Dingell, and the AFL-CIO’s Thea Lee. The former stated that she was “investing the time to understand where the consensus is.” The latter said, “We enter every negotiation in a good faith state of mind and we expect a lot from our government. Certainly candidate Trump made a lot of promises about fixing flawed trade agreements and looking out for American workers and good jobs, so we will hold him and his administration to that promise.”

I can’t think of a more reasonable position for politicians and other supporters of a movement that still styles itself as the “party of the common man [and woman].”

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Progress from Progressives on Trade

03 Monday Oct 2016

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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America First, developed countries, developing countries, environmental standards, Financial Crisis, GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, George W. Bush, Global Imbalances, Global Trade Watch, globalization, Hillary Clinton, Jared Bernstein, labor standards, Lori Wallach, multinational companies, NAFTA, national treatment, non-discrimination, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, progressives, Public Citizen, The American Prospect, TPP, Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Ever since the debate over NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) more than twenty years ago turned trade policy into a nationally contentious issue, the American left has provided the overwhelming share of the political money and muscle aimed at creating urgently needed course corrections. So it’s great to see important signs that progressives have finally started touting two ideas that realistically could make a significant difference.

The evidence can be found in an article coming up in The American Prospect by Jared Bernstein, former top economist to Vice President Biden, and Lori Wallach of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch. To be sure, the article does dwell overlong on proposals that left-of-center figures have been making for decades, and that hold little, if any, promise of turning trade agreements and related policy decisions into engines of domestic growth.

For example, there’s the usual call for truly enforceable labor and environmental standards in trade deals – even though adequately inspecting enormous third world national manufacturing complexes is a logistically impossible task. Worse, the offshoring lobby and its minions in Congress and the Executive Branch have already twice used the tactic of making cosmetic changes along these lines in trade agreements to call progressives’ bluff: during the George W. Bush administration in deals with agreements with Panama and Peru; and in President Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

Don’t think Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton doesn’t recognize how successful this ploy has been in persuading fence-sitting Congressional Democrats to fall in line behind new trade deals.

Judging from the Bernstein-Wallach piece, moreover, the American left still believes that no hard choices need be made in trade and broader globalization strategy, and that with their proposed reforms, growing international commerce can become a win-win for first and third world workers alike around the world. As I’ve recently written, positive sum outcomes for developed and developing country workforces are possible – if, for instance, NAFTA was turned into a genuine western hemisphere trade bloc, as its leading founders once suggested they intended.

On a global basis, though, the surplus of developing country workers earning pauper wages (both in absolute terms and in relative terms in sectors like advanced manufacturing and high tech services) ensures that for decades the third world will remain much more important as a low-wage and low-regulation production site than as a source of new consumer demand. And as long as that situation holds, astronomical growth-, job-, and wage-killing trade deficits in the United States will be inevitable. Also inevitable will be the buildup of enormous international economic imbalances like those that set the stage for the last financial crisis.

But the most encouraging aspect of the Bernstein-Wallach article was indeed encouraging: The authors argued that not all prospective U.S. trade partners should be treated equally – because they differ in crucial respects. Ever since the current global trading system began taking shape in the immediate aftermath of World War II, one of its biggest weaknesses – and one posing special problems for a relatively open economy like America’s – has been its insistence (largely at Washington’s behest, to be sure) on the principles of non-discrimination and national treatment.

In other words, regardless of how open or closed they are, or how wealthy or impoverished, the United States needed to deal equally with all countries belonging to the old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and to the newer World Trade Organization (WTO). During the early post-war decades, these requirements legally forced American leaders to open their markets as much, say, to relatively open Britain as to hermetically sealed Japan, and to treat identically in the American market businesses from wildly varying countries.

When the end of the Cold War encouraged third world population giants like China and Mexico to introduce selected free market reforms and join the global economy, the option of mass production offshoring was created for multinational companies. As a result, these GATT and then WTO principles prompted the U.S. leaders influenced by these companies to expand trade whether or not the target countries could become significant net consumers, and thus create reasonably balanced trade flows and their economic benefits.

Bernstein and Wallach don’t favor discrimination on grounds like these. (That’s not surprising, since this practice would undercut their positive-sum first-third world trade optimism.) But they do urge selecting

“trade partners based on their countries’ records of compliance with the terms of past trade agreements, international labor and environmental standards, and human rights and other criteria. [The article makes clear that records of currency manipulation would be among them.] While no country has a perfect track record, there is a well-understood continuum of compliance, and known bad actors should be barred from the negotiating table until they’ve made proven, effective efforts to begin cleaning up their acts.”

That’s a start – and a potential wedge.

It’s also heartening to see Bernstein and Wallach emphasize “rewarding those who play by the rules” by creating and enforcing meaningful rules of origin in trade deals. As they rightly note, without such provisions, countries that have not signed various trade deals can still benefit from them because multinationals and other companies will be free to import into member countries goods largely made outside the new trade zone. That’s great of course for businesses seeking the great possible sourcing flexibility. But these practices inevitably render meaningless most of the rest of the given agreement.

And most encouraging of all – although the authors don’t mention this – an American trade policy (robustly) incorporating these features would be in violation of WTO rules. Free of a straitjacket that mandates policy uniformity in a highly diverse world, Washington would be free to choose another globalization lodestar – one that makes far more sense for a country with incomparable market power, potential for self-sufficiency, and thus unilateral leverage. A lodestar like “America First.”

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: An Empty Obama UN Farewell

21 Wednesday Sep 2016

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Our So-Called Foreign Policy

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assimilation, education, geopolitics, global integration, globalization, international law, international norms, Islam, labor standards, Middle East, Muslims, Obama, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, radical Islam, reeducation, refugees, skills, sovereignty, TPP, Trade, trade enforcement, training, Trans-Pacific Partnership, UN, United Nations

National leaders’ speeches to each year’ UN General Assembly – even those by American presidents – are rarely more than meaningless boilerplate or cynical bloviating. But President Obama’s address to the organization yesterday – as with some of its predecessors – is worth examining in detail both because it was his last, and because Mr. Obama clearly views such occasions as opportunities to push U.S. and international public opinion in fundamentally new directions where they urgently need to head.

In yesterday’s case, the president saw his mission as justifying his belief that Americans in particular need to reject temptations to turn inward from the world’s troubles, and more completely embrace forces that inexorably are tightening international integration economically and even in term of national security.

To be fair to Mr. Obama, he sought to offer “broad strokes those areas where I believe we must do better together” rather than “a detailed policy blueprint.” But even given this caveat, what’s most striking is how many of the big, tough questions he (eloquently) dodges.

Here’s the president’s main premise and conclusion:

“…I believe that at this moment we all face a choice. We can choose to press forward with a better model of cooperation and integration. Or we can retreat into a world sharply divided, and ultimately in conflict, along age-old lines of nation and tribe and race and religion.

“I want to suggest to you today that we must go forward, and not backward. I believe that as imperfect as they are, the principles of open markets and accountable governance, of democracy and human rights and international law that we have forged remain the firmest foundation for human progress in this century.”

This passage makes clear that Mr. Obama doesn’t buy my thesis that the United States is geopolitically secure and economically self-sufficient enough in reality and potential to thrive however chaotic the rest of the world. Nor does he believe the converse – that the security and prosperity the nation has enjoyed throughout its history has first and foremost stemmed from its own location, and from its ability to capitalize on its inherent advantages and strengths, not from cooperating or integrating with the rest of the world.

The president’s contention that “the world is too small for us to simply be able to build a wall and prevent it from affecting our own societies” rings true for most countries – even assuming that he doesn’t really think that this stark choice is the only alternative to complete openness to global developments and commerce and populations and authority, however promising or threatening. But he seems oblivious to America’s “exceptionalism” geopolitically and economically.

Even if I’m wrong, however, and even accepting Mr. Obama’s “broad strokes” objectives, this lengthy presidential address gives national leaders and their citizens almost no useful insights on how countries can achieve his goals. Here are just two examples:

The president recognizes the need to make the global economy “work better for all people and not just for those at the top.” But given the trade deals he himself has sought, how can worker rights be strengthened “so they can organize into independent unions and earn a living wage”? The president insisted again that his Pacific Rim trade deal points the way. But as I’ve noted, the immense scale of factory complexes even in smallish third world countries like Vietnam makes the necessary outside monitoring and enforcement impossible.

Similarly, no one can argue with Mr. Obama’s recommendation to invest “in our people — their skills, their education, their capacity to take an idea and turn it into a business.” But as I documented more than a decade ago in my The Race to the Bottom, governments the world over, including in the very low-wage developing world, recognize the importance of improving their populations’ skill and education levels. In addition, multinational corporations can make workers productive even in these very low-income countries – and continue paying them peanuts compared with wages in more developed countries. Why should anyone expect his recommendation to give workers in America a leg up?

It’s easy to sympathize with the president’s call “to open our hearts and do more to help refugees who are desperate for a home.” Who in principle is opposed to aiding “men and women and children who, through no fault of their own, have had to flee everything that they know, everything that they love,…”?

But as Mr. Obama indirectly admitted, many of these refugees come from a part of the world where “religion leads us to persecute those of another faith…[to] jail or beat people who are gay…[and to] prevent girls from going to school….” He also described the Middle East as a place where too often the “public space” is narrowed “to the mosque.”

It was encouraging to see him recognize the legitimacy – though perhaps not the necessity – of insisting “that refugees who come to our countries have to do more to adapt to the customs and conventions of the communities that are now providing them a home.” But is he blithely assuming success? And it was less encouraging to see him ignore the excruciatingly difficult challenge of adequately vetting migrants from war-torn and chaotic countries.

Finally, on the political side of integration, the president seems to lack the courage of his convictions. For despite his high regard for international law, and support for America “giving up some freedom of action” and “binding ourselves to international rules,” he also specified that these were long-term objectives – presumably with little relevance in the here and now. Indeed, Mr. Obama also argued that, even way down the road, the United States wouldn’t be “giving up our ability to protect ourselves or pursue our core interests….”

So it sounds like he’d relegate even future international law-obeying to situations that really don’t matter. Which is fine. But how that gets us to a more secure world is anyone’s guess.

It’s true that Mr. Obama will be leaving office soon, and that his thoughts no longer matter critically. But at the same time, American leaders have been speaking in these lofty globalist terms for decades. If the president is indeed right about global integration and the future, what a shame that he didn’t make more progress in bringing these ideas down to earth.

Making News: New Op-Ed Says U.S. Trade Strategy Flawed from the Get-Go

31 Tuesday May 2016

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Making News

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enforcement, environmental standards, free trade deals, labor standards, Lifezette.com, Making News, non-tariff barriers, tariffs, TPP, Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership, unilateralism

I’m pleased to report that my latest op-ed article has just been posted this morning on Lifezette.com – which analyzes a new U.S. government report on the likely economic impact of President Obama’s Pacific Rim trade deal. The piece explains that this study makes clear not only the dangers posed by this Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to America’s growth and employment performance, but why the nation’s standard goal of negotiating terms of trade with more protectionist economic powers is completely misguided.

I hope that this piece spurs major debate both on the TPP and on the potential – and indeed the superiority – of unilateralism as a new basis for America’s global trade strategy. What do you folks think?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Obama’s TPP Case is Staler than Ever

03 Tuesday May 2016

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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ADB, AIIB, APEC, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, Asian Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, China, environmental standards, export-led growth, exports, Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific, FTAAP, Japan, labor standards, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, Obama, RCEP, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, SOEs, state-owned enterprises, TPP, Trade, Trans-Pacific Parternship, World Bank, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Maybe President Obama believes that repeating even the most laughably off-base contentions endlessly will make them true? Or convincing? It’s hard to look at his new Washington Post op-ed urging passage of his Pacific Rim trade deal and conclude anything else. The article makes clearer than ever that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) makes sense for the United States only if Americans ignore everything known about the agreement itself, about U.S. trade with the eleven other signatories, and about the region’s economics and commerce.

The President’s fraudulent case for TPP starts with his first claim – that “some of our greatest economic opportunities abroad are in the Asia-Pacific region.” Trouble is, as I’ve noted, the only truly fast growers on the list of TPP countries are economies like Vietnam and Malaysia, whose growth depends on not only exporting, but on amassing large trade surpluses. They lack both the capabilities and the intention of becoming significant net buyers of U.S.-origin goods and services. Compared with the United States, most of the other TPP countries are growth laggards.

Similarly, Mr. Obama’s description of the proposed TPP zone as representing a whopping 40 percent of the global economy ignores how the American economy represents more than 60 percent of total TPP area output. Moreover, the United States already has negotiated trade deals with many of the largest signatories, notably Australia, Canada, and Mexico. So Americans have long reaped nearly all of whatever benefits the President argues will result from this exercise in trade expansion.

No more credible is Mr. Obama’s insistence that the TPP will benefit America by enabling the United States to influence writing the rules that govern regional commerce rather than permitting Chinese-led arrangements shape this environment.

After all, as critics like Republican presidential front-runner Donald Trump has pointed out, China already stands to gain from the TPP, thanks to loose origin requirements that permit free or freer trade of goods with high levels of content from non-TPP countries. And since China for decades has been a key node in the multinational production chains that bind together so many Asian economies, much of this non-TPP content will obviously be Chinese.

Further, nothing could be clearer than the determination of the TPP countries to avoid making either-or choices when it comes to rule-writing exercises for East Asian commerce. No less than six TPP signatories – including Australia and New Zealand – have signed up to participate in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) that China set up recently in part as a TPP counterweight. And although the largest by far non-U.S. TPP signatory, Japan, has so far declined to bandwagon, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) that it has traditionally co-dominated has started working actively with the AIIB. So has the World Bank.

These last two developments, by the way, mean that the United States has also decided to work with the Chinese initiative rather than continuing to oppose it, since Washington plays a major role in both institutions.

And what about the Chinese-initiated regional trade agreements about which Mr. Obama expressed so much alarm? The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership singled out by the president has already attracted seven TPP signatories – including Japan, along with Australia and New Zealand.

Interestingly, Mr. Obama didn’t mention a second Chinese regional trade scheme – a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP). Maybe that’s because he’s decided to cooperate with Beijing on this front, too, at least to the extent that he approved a study of the proposal under the auspices of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process in which Washington participates.

Finally, the president’s belief that the TPP will greatly boost U.S. exports through enforceable new rules remains a monument to delusion. As I’ve explained, enforcing labor and environmental standards would require an army of American officials to inspect hundreds of thousands of facilities in low-income countries like Vietnam and Malaysia. Who’s going to pay for these personnel? And that’s not even including the vast manufacturing complex that’s been created in Mexico since it joined a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) more than twenty years ago, and in which evidence abounds such provisions remain overwhelmingly ineffective.  (Hence, largely, the president’s insistence that “this time, it will be different” in TPP.)  

As for the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) whose trade-distorting activities TPP will supposedly curb, how will U.S. officials gain access to these notoriously secretive constructs and their financial records? Moreover, since low (at best) labor and environmental standards along with opaque SOEs are keys to competitiveness throughout Asia, why would the region’s TPP signatories give Washington the power to weaken these arrangements through dispute-resolution hearings?

President Obama writes that the alternative to Congress passing the TPP is “building walls to isolate ourselves from the global economy.” That’s the most pernicious trade policy and TPP myth of all. The real alternative is developing trade policies based on global economic realities, not his own fantasies about the power of mere pen strokes.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Thomas Friedman’s Trump Trade Column Must be a Hack Job

17 Thursday Mar 2016

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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China, Donald Trump, environmental standards, labor standards, monitoring and enforcement, state-owned enterprises, The New York Times, Thomas Friedman, TPP, Trade, trade agreements, Trans-Pacific Partnership, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Thomas Friedman’s email account must have been hacked! Assuming the New York Times columnist doesn’t walk his offerings over to the paper’s editorial page office, what else could explain the appearance last night of an essay on trade under his byline so chock full of embarrassing mistakes and stale canards?

True, the column had a characteristically clever, Friedman-like premise: Republican presidential front-runner Donald Trump shouldn’t be criticizing President Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement because it contains exactly the kinds of tough-minded provisions that the champion deal-maker would insist on himself. Unfortunately, whoever really wrote the article revealed such ignorance that identity theft must have been committed.

To start, the impostor assumed that passages in a treaty’s text are remotely likely to change facts on the ground. But anyone as knowledgeable about trade policy as Friedman – who covered the beat for The Times in the 1990s – must realize that monitoring and enforcing rules on the books has never been a remotely strong suit of the U.S. government.

A big part of the reason is logistical.  As I’ve noted repeatedly, manufacturing complexes even in smallish developing countries like TPP signatory Vietnam are so vast that making provisions like new labor rights and environmental protections actually stick is impossible even for a superpower. Indeed, Washington struggles even to enforce such rules in the United States.

Another big reason has to do with the secretive nature of Asian governments like those in Vietnam and other TPP signatories such as Japan and Malaysia. Although the Pacific Rim trade pact does seek to curb the ways that these bureaucracies distort trade flows, anyone as familiar with the region as Friedman surely realizes that these regimes put few of their biggest decisions in writing, and make even fewer of them public. So as has long been the case, American officials will be hard-pressed even to identify violations of the new TPP provisions, let alone combat them effectively.

It’s also hard to imagine that the real Friedman would simply parrot the Obama administration talking point that TPP will greatly benefit Americans by eliminating tariffs in 18,000 product categories. How could he not have seen the documentation provided by Public Citizen (and refuted by exactly no one) that the United States doesn’t even sell overseas more than half of these products, and that its exports in most of the rest are miniscule?

And it’s positively inconceivable that the genuine Thomas Friedman would have claimed that “if we walk away from the TPP all our friends in the Pacific will just sign up for China’s R.C.E.P., or Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which will set trade rules in Asia….” He obviously would have known that six of the ten other TPP countries are clearly hedging their bets by signing on to the Chinese initiative, too. These including the biggest by far (Japan and Australia), along with Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam.

In other words, the real Thomas Friedman would never have written that a negotiator as good as Donald Trump would have okayed an agreement with this many gaping loopholes and other weaknesses. Let’s hope that the hacker(s) are caught before Friedman’s reputation takes on more water!

Im-Politic: Trump’s On-Target – & Detailed – China Trade Plan

10 Tuesday Nov 2015

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Im-Politic

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2016 election, China, currency manipulation, Democrats, Donald Trump, environmental standards, exports, forced technology transfer, Hillary Clinton, Im-Politic, imports, intellectual property theft, labor standards, Mainstream Media, Obama, offshoring, political classes, Republicans, special interests, subsidies, think tanks, TPP, Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership, World Trade Organization, WTO, yuan

Boy, it’s hard to keep Donald Trump and his campaign for the GOP presidential nomination from dominating my posting. That’s because he remains the only presidential candidate recognizing the need to overhaul both the U.S. trade and immigration policies that have long been gutting the truly productive sectors of the American economy, and kneecapping wages and living standards for the nation’s working and middle classes.

Trump’s on-target priorities have once again been displayed in the new position paper he’s released on handling China – which is key to getting overall American trade policy right as well as getting much of U.S. national security policy right. Also evident from this paper – despite endless claims by the establishment-coddling Mainstream Media that Trump’s campaign is all sizzle and no steak, he’s once again outlined a series of impressively detailed policy positions.

And Trump’s China policies boast strong potential to put Hillary Clinton and other progressives who claim to champion American workers squarely on the spot. The Democratic presidential front-runner has said or posted nothing comparably specific on trade issues other than (for now?) opposing President Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Unless she ups this part of her game, independent voters are sure to take note.

Trump’s China plan starts off by correctly identifying the crux of America’s China problems right away. In the process, he’s sharpened his rhetoric and message. Rather than blame U.S. policy failures on simple “stupidity” on the part of American leaders, he points out that the nation’s economic approach to China has served the interests of “Wall Street insiders that want to move U.S. manufacturing and investment offshore,” not American workers. I’d have broadened that indictment to include most of the nation’s multinational manufacturing companies, but Trump valuably reminds voters that the biggest immediate obstacles to improving their economic prospects are Americans, not “foreigners.”

Trump also understands that many of China’s most harmful trade practices have nothing to do with the kinds of tariffs and quotas that for centuries dominated country’s efforts to keep domestic closed. Moreover, he focuses on the vast array of non-tariff barriers used by Beijing “to keep American companies out of China and to tilt the playing field in [its] favor.” These range from currency manipulation to rampant intellectual property theft to exports subsidies that clash with global trade law to forced technology transfer to “lax labor and environmental standards” that enable China’s “sweatshops [and] pollution havens [to steal] jobs from American workers.”

In addition, the Republican presidential hopeful gets the vital point that the damage done to the American economy by these Chinese practices can’t be ended without forcing China to face some consequences – namely, lost access to a U.S. market that China desperately needs in order to sustain growth and employment rates that can help keep its rulers in power. Trump does express some hope that such threats can lead China to “join the 21st century.” But he also indicates that, until and unless this goal is achieved, it makes no sense to permit China “to trade with America.”

Trump’s China plan will be slammed by the offshoring-happy, China-coddling Mainstream Media – and surely by nearly all of the policy hacks staffing America’s offshorer-funded think tanks. And let’s not forget many of his fellow Republican candidates, whose campaigns are largely financed by these special interests.

But it will be especially interesting to see the reactions of Trump’s Democratic opponents and the rest of the nation’s liberal and progressive establishment. For most of Trump’s positions mirror those of the party’s mainstream – and can be found in numerous bills their legislators have introduced into Congress and voted for. Will they continue dismissing Trump a charlatan – and worse?

In fact, if Trump’s positions deserve criticism on any score, it’s that they’re too mainstream – and accordingly timid. For example, since, as Trump sees, the United States does enjoy such decisive leverage over China by dint of serving as “the world’s most important economy and consumer of goods,” there’s relatively little need for Washington to negotiate more effectively with Beijing. His positions are better presented as take-it-or-leave-it propositions, with market access turned off, or at least curbed, until strong evidence of China’s compliance is available.

Similarly, Trump is far too deferential to the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose creation spearheaded by the mercantile U.S. trade competitors and American offshoring interests precisely in order to prevent the defense of  U.S. economic interests in a timely, effective – i.e., unilateral – manner. At one point, his China paper (rightly) suggests that U.S. policy need not rely so heavily on the deliberations of “an international body.”

But he also (wrongly) suggests that Washington should continue to rely heavily on using the WTO to resolve its trade problems with China – an approach that is not only pitifully piecemeal, but that keeps an anti-American international kangaroo court in charge of most American international economic interests. If he’s serious about defending these interests – and restoring full American sovereignty – Trump needs to support establishing the United States as judge, jury, and court of appeals over all trade disputes, as well as over whatever enforcement issues arise from existing or future trade agreements.

Further, Trump appears to place excessive emphasis on China’s current currency manipulation. To be sure, there’s still strong evidence that the yuan remains substantially undervalued. It’s also not legitimately deniable that anti-currency manipulation tariffs would be an especially effective response to China’s trade predation. After all, China’s exchange-rate protectionism artificially cheapens the cost of everything produced in and traded by China. Therefore, these Chinese products (and services) receive price advantages over foreign competitors that have nothing to do with free trade or free markets. 

But it’s also undeniable that China’s currency policies have gotten much more complicated in recent months, as Beijing has needed to move to support the yuan in order to stem unprecedented capital flight. So for both political and substantive reasons, Trump would have been much better advised to treat currency manipulation as threat that is all too likely to reemerge if China’s economy keeps slowing, not as today’s leading danger. (The same of course holds for the Asian countries who have just negotiated President Obama’s Pacific Rim trade agreement.)

Yet despite these flaws, Trump’s instincts on trade policy remain much sharper than those of the rest of the nation’s media/political establishment – not least of which entails his understanding that it won’t be possible to “make America great again” unless its trade policy becomes great again, too. And his new China trade blueprint shows that he grasps enough major policy details to make that goal reality.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Text Showcases TPP’s Real Flaws

05 Thursday Nov 2015

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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China, currency manipulation, dispute resolution, enforcement, environmental standards, exports, imports, labor standards, Obama, protectionism, rules of origin, state-owned enterprises, TPP, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade surpluses, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Treasury Department, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The release this morning of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal (TPP) text means that the Obama administration has kept at least one of its promises in connection with the Pacific Rim agreement: The public has gained the ability to review every single provision in detail within a month of the deal’s signing in Atlanta, Georgia.

Nonetheless, when it comes to evaluating the TPP, the devil is not in the details, and never has been – for all the sweat expended by government officials and industry lobbyists from the 12 signatory countries on even the most arcane aspects of rules of origin, tariff rates and elimination schedules, copyright protections, labor and environmental standards, and the like. All the while, there have been only been two remotely possible exceptions – the agreement’s provisions for dispute resolution, and for determining which goods will actually be eligible for the agreement’s trade breaks.

Re dispute resolution, which is obviously crucial to any agreement’s effectiveness but which has been generally ignored in the TPP debate, the text’s release simply confirms what has always been utterly predictable: This system mirrors the kangaroo court arrangements of the World Trade Organization (WTO) – whose creation has done virtually nothing to prevent the U.S. economy’s victimization from predatory foreign trade practices. As a result, the claim of President Obama and other supporters that the agreement will create a huge, increasingly integrated market governed by U.S.-friendly, free-market-oriented rules should be recognized as the most naive imaginable fantasy.

Re rules of origin, the text confirms numerous press reports that the TPP’s benefits will extend to many products whose content comes from outside the new trade zone – which makes a mockery of the notions that currently excluded countries like China need to join in order to enjoy TPP’s benefits, and that the agreement’s conclusion therefore creates powerful incentives for such non-signatories to adopt the TPP’s high standards,

The TPP dispute-resolution process unveiled in the text demonstrates that the vast majority of member states, whose prosperity depends heavily on maximizing net exports and thus racking up trade surpluses, will gain major new guarantees of unfettered access to America’s much more open market. As with the WTO, a crucial effect of the TPP – and raison d’etre – is to narrow greatly the United States’ internationally accepted legal authority to respond unilaterally to the types of mercantilism in which most TPP countries, notably gigantic Japan, specialize.

Moreover, as with the WTO, despite the paramount importance of the U.S. market, the TPP’s dispute-resolution and rule-making systems grant no special role for America. Even though its economy represents nearly two-thirds of the new total TPP market, its influence under the agreement is simply equal to that of much smaller, and indeed tiny, economies.

Worse, just as with the WTO, the TPP’s one-country/one-vote arrangement will enable the majority of the signatories to game the system and work cooperatively to further their joint goal of ensuring that the U.S. market remains much wider open to their goods and services than the reverse. In other words, like the WTO, and all other international organizations, the TPP will be fundamentally a political organization, not a legal-juridical arrangement, and America’s negotiating strategy has in effect defined its inevitable politics out of existence.

Consequently, whatever market-opening and playing-field language the TPP text contains, turning these words into significantly new, more equitable trade realities is a chimera. For the vast majority of TPP members will be determined – and empowered through their ability to interpret rules and influence verdicts – to ensure the opposite. These countries will be working overtime, and successfully, to prevent TPP dispute-resolution panels from handing down decisions against one that could serve as precedents against all of the others, and the larger organization from writing rules, that could be used to undermine their mercantile national economic structures and strategies.

Understanding the TPP’s protectionist-friendly structure in particular debunks U.S. claims that it will foster meaningful progress toward ending or even disciplining currency manipulation. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, an agreement on this practice among the twelve signatories – which, revealingly, isn’t even in the actual TPP text – “sets a new high standard on exchange rate policies and unfair currency practices for trade agreements.”

But believing this proposition amounts to believing that countries with long protectionist histories, like Japan and Malaysia, are OK with launching efforts that eventually will forever prevent them from using a device for creating decisive price advantages for all the goods they trade in markets around the world. What is it that is known about such economies that convinces anyone that such changes of heart have taken place?

In addition, the rules of origin laid out in the final text make clear that nothing could be easier for non-signatories, like China, to enjoy many crucial advantages of TPP membership. After all, thousands of manufactured goods will be eligible for duty-free or duty-lighter treatment in TPP markets even if most of their content comes from non-TPP members. Given the pervasive global reality of industrial supply chains passing through many countries both in the TPP and outside, this is a Pacific-sized loophole.

The text’s release also should remind Congress, the public, and the media that even if the TPP’s deck wasn’t organizationally stacked against the United States, its measures to prevent abuses of workers and the environment, and the operations of state-owned enterprises, from being used for competitive advantage, are utterly unenforceable from a simple logistical and administrative standpoint.

As I have repeatedly pointed out, the factory complexes of even relatively small TPP economies dwarf the capacity of the U.S. government to monitor their labor and environmental practices systematically. And in many TPP economies, the lines between public and private sector are blurry enough, and bureaucracies opaque and skilled enough at concealing information, to render wishful thinking any confidence that these systems can be transformed.

It’s equally fanciful to suppose that even the TPP’s minimalist origin rules can be effectively enforced, either. How many million American bureaucrats would be required to open how many containers of goods coming into U.S. ports to ensure compliance? And how many more would be needed to find out whether boxes of Chinese-produced goods marked “Made in Malaysia” or “Made in Japan” really are?

All along, the effort to negotiate the TPP, and the debate generated by the deal, have reflected the American delusion that signatures on a piece of paper prove that economies that have been largely closed and centrally commanded for decades have genuinely decided to mend their ways. It’s been a delusion shared by both agreement supporters (who contend that they’ve accomplished this aim) and opponents (who insist that this goal can be achieved with better language).

As a result, even the TPP’s defeat in Congress may not guarantee that American trade policy will get off its failed, export- and negotiations-obsessed track, and focus on what the United States has much more control over – access to its own one-of-a-kind market and the leverage it creates to establish more equitable and sustainable terms of trade unilaterally. But the right kind of TPP debate could still provide an invaluable learning opportunity – and start the process of turning America’s approach to trade into an engine of domestic growth and job creation, rather than of offshoring, higher trade deficits, and (even) slower recovery.      

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