Im-Politic: The Public Shows Signs of Getting It on Fighting Pandemics

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CCP Virus, CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, coronavirus, COVID 19, facemasks, Great Barrington Declaration, Im-Politic, lockdowns, mandates, masks, Pew Research Center, public health, social distancing, vaccines

It looks like Americans are having second thoughts about how their government has responded to the CCP Virus pandemic, at least according to this new Pew Research Center survey. And that’s great news for those of us who have insisted that, once it became clear (awfully early on) that the pandemic wasn’t a rerun of the Black Death, the widespread lockdowns, mandates, and other indisciminate measures were cures that, on balance, were needlessly worse than the disease.

To be sure, Americans still feel pretty cautious about the pandemic and its effects. Principally, in May, 41 percent of U.S. adults told Pew that they viewed the virus as a “major threat to public health.” That’s down considerably from the spring of 2020, when the share describing the virus this way was in the mid-60s percent. But it’s still more than four in ten.

The public also still gives robust endorsements to many restrictions on behavior and anti-covid measures that have been strongly encouraged or required nationally or in various states at various times during the pandemic era. For example, 55 percent said that vaccination had been “extremely” or “very” “effective in limiting the spread of the coronavirus,” 49 percent agreed with his characterization of “wearing masks around other people indoors,” and 48 percent thought the same of “limiting activities/interactions with other people.” One exception: Only 34 percent put much stock in “staying at least six feet apart from other people indoors.”

But by an impressive 62 percent to 31 percent, respondents said that “the country’s COVID-19 response has given too little priority” to “meeting the educational needs of K-12 students.”. By 48 percent to 40 percent they felt that short shrift had been given to “supporting overall quality of life for the public.” By 46 percent to 40 percent they said not enough attention was paid to “supporting businesses and economic activity.” And by 46 percent to 30 percent they said that anti-virus strategies failed adequately to “respect individuals’ choices.”

Moreover, the public approval of the authorities most supportive of the virus-centric priorities has taken a major hit. In the spring of 2020, 79 percent agreed that “public health officials such as those at the CDC [U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention]” had done “an excellent or good job responding to the coronavirus outbreak.” By this past May, this support had dropped to 52 percent. And since February, 2021 (shortly after his inauguration) the share of U.S. adults stating that President Biden’s response to the CCP Virus has been excellent or good fell from 54 percent to 43 percent. (Such approval for former President Trump’s virus responses sank as well – from 48 percent in March, 2020 to 36 percent in February, 2021. But no samplings about the Trump strategy have been taken since.)

Predictably, partisan splits appeared, and although no trends over time were presented, it was striking how many self-identified Democrats and ”Democratic leaners” expressed disenchantment with some priorities that have been pursued for most of the pandemic era. In particular, 57 percent of them agreed that “the educational needs of K-12 students have been neglected and 45 percent agreed that too little attention has been paid to “overall quality of life for the public.” At the same time, only 34 percent of Democrats and leaners felt that “businesses and other economic activity” should have received more support, and only 28 percent believe “respecting individuals’ choices” has deserved more emphasis. 

To me, the big takeaway is that Americans may finally be realizing that the tradeoffs between public health and other pressing needs were never adequately acknowledged by the nation’s lockdowns- and restrictions-obsessed public health establishment, or by the political leaders who uncritically followed their advice and failed to understand that balances needed to be struck.

Far from a position that’s “anti-science” or dismissive or the virus’s deadly properties and potential, it’s one that’s entirely consistent with that pressed by the legions of eminent epidemiologists, virologists, and other medical specialists who signed the Great Barrington Declaration. This manifesto urged viewing the public health dangers posed during the pandemic holistically, avoiding the wide-ranging and grave consequences of shutting down entire national economies and societies, and focusing virus-mitigation measures instead on those most vulnerable to serious disease and death.

Will the U.S. public health establishment display as much of the learning curve that the Pew poll indicates the public has demonstrated? Will the politicians whose policies overwhelmingly reflected their conventional wisdom? Those are questions whose answers had better be “Yes” if America is to cope with the next pandemic better than it handled this one.  

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Im-Politic: Will the Pandemic’s Real Lessons Ever Be Learned?

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CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, facemasks, Great Barrington Declaration, Im-Politic, lockdowns, Mainstream Media, mandates, natural immunity, The New York Times, vaccines

Give The New York Times some credit here. On the one hand, its big, graphics-rich feature marking the grim news that about a million Americans have been killed by the CCP Virus has pinpointed a highly specific group of culprits for this towering toll, and an equally specific group of measures that could have held it way down (although it’s never indicated by how much).

Among the worst: “elected officials who played down the threat posed by the coronavirus and resisted safety measures” and “lower vaccination and booster rates than other rich countries, partly the result of widespread mistrust and resistance fanned by right-wing media and politicians.”

So clearly, the authors insist, mask-wearing and lockdowns and social distancing should have been imposed much faster and more widely (without stating for how long), and more vaccinations required.

On the other hand, the reader is presented with abundant evidence that the benefits of such measures might have been limited – which is especially striking since not even a hint is provided that such steps might have inflicted considerable damage in their own right – including from other threats to public health that have been neglected.

Most strikingly, consistent with its observation that “The virus did not claim lives evenly, or randomly.” the piece reminds that in fact, the worst damage was remarkably concentrated in a single group. Specifically, “Three quarters of those who have died of Covid have been 65 or older.” Moreover, of that cohort, a third were 85 and over.

And then there was the related nursing homes disaster. According to the Times piece, a fifth of the roughly million CCP Virus-induced deaths in America occurred among residents and staff of these facilities.

Why longer and more sweeping lockdowns and the like would have reduced the virus’ damage to the nation as a whole, considering all the economic, educational, and health harm they produced for the vast majority of Americans who were far less vulnerable, is never explained.

The article’s case for vaccine mandates is similarly muddled. It repeats the widespread claims that most of those who died from the virus after vaccines became widely available were unvaxxed, and that “vaccinated people have had a much lower death rate — unvaccinated people have been at least nine times as likely to die since April 2021 [when the eligibility for the doses became universally available].”

At the same time, readers learn that:

>“at least 50,000 vaccinated people, many of them older or without booster shots, were among the deaths reported since late April 2021….”; and that

>”People 80 and older who had gotten shots were almost twice as likely to die at the height of the Omicron wave as those in their 50s or early 60s who had not, according to C.D.C. [U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] data.”

Further, the article makes clear that, even forgetting about the decisive role played by age, claims about vaccine effectiveness are substantially exaggerated. Despite presenting the common contention that “unvaccinated people have been at least nine times as likely to die since April 2021,” the chart presented to support this point shows that this ratio has held for only part of the period duing which vaccines have become widely available. The chart also that the gap has almost disappeared today.

In addition, the piece reports that “The C.D.C. has received data on deaths by vaccination status from only about half of the states….” As the authors explain, this data shortage makes it “impossible to know exactly how many vaccinated people are among the million who have died.”

Conversely, this data shortage – along with thoroughgoing ignorance about how many Americans have enjoyed natural immunity from the virus and therefore passed up the jabs, and how many who caught Covid asymptomatically and made similar decisions – also prevents figuring out what share of unvaccinated Americans died of the virus.

But because both numbers are doubtless both enormous, this percentage is doubtless much smaller than commonly supposed.  The Times authors (and their editors, who it should always be remembered greenlight every article’s journalistic methodology) might have adjusted their judgements, and recognized that alternative pandemic mitigation approaches — including those that took into account the difficult tradeoffs that needed to be made — have long been recommended, had they bothered to consult any of the impressively credentialed specialists who have been making these points. 

Yet they seemed as determined to ignore or marginalize their views as the official U.S. medical establishment has been.  As long as both America’s healthcare leaders and its Mainstream Media so doggedly oppose full debate on the real lessons taught by the pandemic, it’s hard to imagine that the nation will be prepared for the (inevitable) arrival of the next deadly pathogen. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: At Least Pre-Ukraine, U.S. Manufacturing’s Solid Growth Continued

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aerospace, aircraft, aircraft parts, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Federal Reserve, interest rates, lockdowns, mandates, manufacturing, manufacturing production, medical devices, monetary policy, pharmaceuticals, real output, semiconductor shortage, semiconductors, Ukraine, Ukraine invasion, Ukraine-Russia war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning’s Federal Reserve report on U.S. domestic manufacturing production (for February) was especially interesting for three reasons. First, it showed that the output of America-based factories rose month-on-month in inflation-adjusted terms by 1.20 percent. That was the best such performance since October’s 1.71 percent, and although it covers the period just before whatever Ukraine war-related disruption is going to hit the U.S. economy, it also contrasts with most (sluggish) estimates of overall American growth for the first quarter of this year. Manufacturing production revisions, moreover, were only slightly negative.

Second, since February, 2020 was the final data month before the CCP Virus and related lockdowns and voluntary behavioral changes started roiling and distorting the economy, it’s noteworthy that exactly two data years later, manufacturing output has grown by a real 3.37 percent. (As of last month’s Fed release, this figure was 2.49 percent.)

Third, these results hardly mean that domestic industry is in top shape, at least not historically speaking. For in inflation-adjusted production terms, it’s still 3.88 percent smaller than at its all-time peak – reached in December, 2007, just before the economy plunged into the Great Recession prompted by the global financial crisis.

February’s biggest monthly manufacturing production winners were:

>non-metallic mineral products, whose 3.46 percent monthly real expansion was its best since the 4.34 percent achieved in June, 2020 – during the rapid economy-wide recovery from the first wave of the virus and resulting activity curbs and dropoffs. This latest sequential increase brought output in the sector to 4.36 above its February, 2020 levels;

>the broad aerospace and miscellaneous transportation equipment industry, which increased after-inflation output in February by 3.22 percent. That rise was its best since July, 2021’s 4.21 percent, and the sector is now fully 16.90 percent bigger production-wise than in February. 2020;

>the small apparel and leather goods industries, which improved its constant dollar output on month by 2.96 percent, for its best sequential gain since January, 2021’s 3.31 percent. This industry’s production – which shrank greatly for decades due to low-cost foreign competition – is now up by just 1.85 percent since February. 2020; and

>wood products, where price-adjusted output expanded sequentially by 2.58 percent – the most since March, 2021’s 4.05 percent. In real terms, wood products production is now 6.28 percent greater than in February, 2020.

RealityChek regulars know that the broad machinery sector is a key barometer of national economic health generally speaking, since its products are used by so many manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. So it’s good news that its sequential inflation-adjusted output advanced by a solid 0.78 percent in February, and even better news that January’s results were revised up from 1.08 percent to 1.83 percent – its best such perfomance since July. The machinery industry’s real output is now a strong 7.62 percent greater than in Febuary, 2020.

Of all the biggest manufacturing sub-sectors tracked by the Fed, only two suffered after-inflation monthly downturns in February:

>The automotive industry continued suffering from the global semiconductor shortage, with its constant dollar output sinking by 3.55 percent sequentially in February – its worst monthly performance since September, 2021’s 6.32 percent plunge. Price-adjusted production of vehicles and parts is now fully 10.68 below Febuary, 2020’s levels; and

>miscellaneous non-durable goods. Its real month-on-month output dipped by 0.36 percent in February, but since February, 2020, it’s off by 16.00 percent.

Industries that consistently have made headlines during the pandemic generally enjoyed February’s at least as strong as manufacturing overall.

Likely stemming from the widening flow of long overdue news from industry giant Boeing (see, e.g., here), aircraft- and parts-makers grew their after-inflation output in Febuary by 2.52 percent over Jauuary’s figure – their strongest such showing since August’s 3.44 percent. That January figure was revised down from 1.37 percent sequential growth to a still impressive 1.21 percent, and December’s upgraded 0.38 percent monthly dip is now judged to be a 0.62 percent decline. But after-inflation output for these companies is now up 16.35 percent since February, 2020 – up from the 13.14 percent calculable from last month’s Fed report.

The combination of a solid February and negative revisions also marked the big pharmaceuticals and medicines sector. February’s 1.08 percent price-adjusted monthly output gain was the industry’s best since August’s 2.39 percent. But January’s initially reported 0.27 percent sequential uptick is now pegged as a 0.14 percent decrease, and December’s upwardly revised 0.81 percent rise is now judged to be a 0.10 percent drop. Even so, total real pharmaceutical and medicines production is 14.91 percent higher than in February, 2020 – up from the 13.42 percent calculable last month.

Much better February results were turned in by the medical equipment and supplies sector. Monthly production improved by 1.39 percent – the best such result since the 10.78 percent reported in July, 2020, early during the recovery from the first pandemic wave.

And revisions were positively eye-popping. January’s initially reported 2.50 percent monthly real output rise is now judged to have been 3.26 percent, and December’s first estimate of a 2.75 percent after-inflation fall-off is now estimated at just a 0.37 percent decline. All told, this grouping is now 8.44 percent bigger real growth-wise than in February, 2020 – as opposed to the 4.43 percent increase calculable last month.

Those semiconductors in such short supply were more abundant after February’s price-adjusted sequential production increase of 1.96 percent that was the best such performance since May’s 2.61 percent growth. January’s previously reported fractional decline is now pegged at a 0.37 percent decrease, but December’s 0.52 percent rise is now estimated at 0.88 percent. Consequently, these industries’ real output is now up 21.97 percent since February, 2020, as opposed to the 20.66 percent calculable last month.

The economic fall-out of the Ukraine war won’t start being reflected in the Fed manufacturing production reports until next month, but it looks virtually certain that it will either keep inflation (and therefore manufacturers’ input costs) high or push it higher. A bigger wild card could be the Fed itself. The central bank yesterday did keep its quasi-promise to start increasing the federal funds rate, but the hike was only 0.25 percent. And though more increases supposedly are scheduled, they’re far from certain if overall growth weakens markedly (as the Fed itself has forecast). New, more dangerous CCP Virus variants can always emerge. But national rates of vaccination and natural immunity seem high enough – and the public fed up enough with restrictive mandates – to keep supporting growth all else equal for the foreseeable future.

So unless the fortunes of manufacturing and the broader economy diverge sharply, it looks like domestic industry’s steady-for-the-most-part expansion since the depths of spring, 2020 will remain on course.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Transitory Inflation Story Endures

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CCP Virus, consumer price index, core inflation, coronavirus, COVID 19, CPI, energy prices, Federal Reserve, food prices, inflation, Jay Bhattacharya, Jerome Powell, lockdowns, mandates, shortages, stimulus, supply chains, vaccine mandates, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Rather than presenting a good news/bad news story, today’s official U.S. figures on one key measure of inflation (bringing the story through December) put into pretty clear focus an important old news/new news story. And its main implication is that the current version of lofty inflation looks considerably different from the standard versions that have hit the nation previously. Therefore, it’s looking more “transitory” (at least in terms of stemming mainly from developments specific to the CCP Virus epidemic) than ever.

This distinction of course matters because evaluating the nature of today’s inflation will greatly influence how American policymakers (especially the Federal Reserve) respond, and how they should respond. If today’s price increases stem from standard sources, then a standard response – tighter monetary policy, less government spending – make sense. If current inflation is distinctive, more austere economic policies stil may be needed for any number of reasons, but inflation-fighting won’t be a strong one.

The new news? The U.S. government tracks two main measures of inflation: Overall price increases, and price increases for “core” goods and services. The latter gauge strips out food and energy prices – because ordinarily they’re supposed to be extraordinarily volatile for reasons mainly unrelated to the economy’s underlying inflation prone-ness.

But today’s inflation data (for what’s called the Consumer Price Index, or CPI), demonstrates that during the virus era, the core price increases have been more volatile than their overall counterparts.

Let me make clear two crucial points right at the outset, though: First, as I’ve written previously, “transitory” (a term used for months but “retired” recently by the Federal Reserve) doesn’t necessarily mean “short-lived.” That’s because the virus itself and its effects may well not be short-lived. Indeed, because of the unusually rapid spread of the Omicron variant, pandemic-related and inflation-fueling economic disruptions could well last for months more.

Second, viewing today’s inflation as transitory doesn’t mean that the Biden administration and Congress may not have made a serious mistake in supporting a major round of economic stimulus earlier this year – and therefore greatly boosting Americans’ spending power while the amount of goods and services remained limited for all sorts of (CCP Virus-related and other) reasons.

At the same time, precisely because the last stimulus bill was explicitly linked to the the pandemic’s effects, because the infusion of new money has been running out, and because President Biden’s Build Back Better bill looks pretty dead in Congress, this fiscal policy mistake’s effects are looking transitory, too.

Don’t forget, moreover, the immense monetary policy support for the economy provided by the Fed. It’s virus-related, too, and yesterday, Chair Jerome Powell made clearer than ever his view that the case for such emergency assistance no longer holds, and that the central bank’s decision to start withdrawing it is firmly on track.

In addition, some of the old news (at least for RealityChek readers) about today’s inflation still holds – and further reenforces the case for “transitory-ness.” And this old news concerns the baseline effects phenomenon – by which unusual results recorded at the beginning of a period of time in which comparisons are made exercise powerful, but intrinsically, misleading results at the end of that period. In this instance, the unusually low annual inflation numbers of 2019-2020 have been bound to play a significant role in generating abnormally strong increases for 2020-2021. (BTW, savvy investors take these baseline effects into account when evaluating stock performance, too. Just Google “easy comps.”)

Nevetheless, even this old news now reflects some of the new news. Meaning that for overall inflation, the baseline effect is fading and will continue to fade for the next two data months. For the core, however, the baseline effect will stay strong through March.

The month-by-month and year-by-year figures for both overall and core CPI illustrate all of these points nicely. First, let’s review the monthly changes in overall CPI for this calendar year:

Dec-Jan:                          0.26 percent

Jan-Feb:                          0.35 percent

Feb-March:                     0.62 percent

March-April:                  0.77 percent

April-May:                     0.64 percent

May-June:                      0.90 percent

June-July:                      0.47 percent

July-Aug:                      0.27 percent

Aug-Sept:                      0.41 percent

Sept-Oct:                      0.94 percent

Oct-Nov:                       0.78 percent

Nov-Dec:                      0.47 percent

That new December figure represents both the smallest such increase since July, and a big slowdown from November. So that’s a noteworthy sign of transitory-ness right there.

Yet on a monthly basis, as shown below, core inflation actually quickened a bit in December:

Dec-Jan:                      0.03 percent

Jan-Feb:                       0.10 percent

Feb-March:                  0.34 percent

March-April:                0.92 percent

April-May:                   0.74 percent

May-June:                    0.88 percent

June-July:                     0.33 percent

July-Aug:                     0.10 percent

Aug-Sept:                    0.24 percent

Sept-Oct:                     0.60 percent

Oct-Nov:                     0.53 percent

Nov-Dec:                    0.55 percent

A closer look, however, shows that the core’s ups and downs have been greater than that for overall inflation, and that was especially true early in the pandemic. From January through April, it skyrocketed from 0.03 percent to 0.92 percent, whereas overall price increases went up more slowly (though still impressively), from 0.26 percent to 0.74 percent.

Similar increase patterns are revealed in the annual overall and core inflation increases, but the volatility trends are somewhat different. First, the overall data:

Jan:                             1.37 percent

Feb:                            1.68 percent

March:                       2.64 percent

April:                         4.16 percent

May:                          4.93 percent

June:                          5.32 percent

July:                           5.28 percent

Aug:                           5.20 percent

Sept:                          5.38 percent

Oct:                            6.24 percent

Nov:                           6.88 percent

Dec:                           7.12 percent

Here the nation has experienced not only accelerating annual inflation, but a fourth straight month of acceleration.

Ditto for annual core inflation:

Jan:                            1.40 percent

Feb:                            1.28 percent

March:                       1.65 percent

April:                         2.96 percent

May:                          3.80 percent

June:                          4.45 percent

July:                          4.24 percent

Aug:                          3.98 percent

Sept:                          4.04 percent

Oct:                           4.58 percent

Nov:                          4.96 percent

Dec:                           5.49 percent

But rather than being more volatile early in the pandemic period, these prices sung the most between last June and September, and during December. Still, if the volatility of overall and core inflation have been in the same ballpark lately, that’s an indication that this most recent burst of inflation has broken the mold.

The baseline effects are also signaling the recent outsized volatility of core inflation. Since it was so unusually depressed early in the first pandemic year 2020, these effects, as mentioned above, will stay prominent in January and February, too. But the baseline effect for regular inflation is already fading and will continue on that path. 

As has been the case for nearly two years now, however, the wild card remains the CCP Virus and now its Omicron variant and even more particularly, government reactions to its stunning transmissability. Moreover, it’s not just the Biden administration that may contribute to inflation-boosting supply chain bottlenecks and shortages due to vaccine mandates, other curbs, and their impact on individual fears and behavior. China’s ongoing Zero Covid policy looms as a major threat, too.     

All of which brings up a point made by Stanford University medical school professor Jay Bhattacharya, a leading public health authority. He’s repeatedly written that “The end of the pandemic is primarily a social and political decision” because although “we have no technology to eradicate the virus,”`the knowhow and strategies for reopening safely and sustainably are already available. If, as I believe, he’s right, then ending virus-induced inflation and making it truly transitory is well within reach, too.  

 

Im-Politic: The Lockdown-Light States are Winning the U.S. Population Contest

Tags

CCP Virus, Census Bureau, coronavirus, COVID 19, demographics, Im-Politic, lockdowns, mandates, mask mandate, migration, population, reopening, states, vaccine mandates, Wallethub.com, Wuhan virus

Unless you don’t think that voting with one’s feet speaks volumes about what people like and dislike, (and how could you not, given what a pain most sane people consider moving to be?), you have to agree that data released last week by the U.S. Census Bureau data sent a powerful message about heavy CCP Virus-induced restrictions on various aspects of their lives. In a phrase, they can’t stand them. Or maybe they can’t stand how they’ve been implemented, which is pretty much the same thing.

Of course, people move for all sorts of reasons. But it’s undeniably striking that the Census data on which states gained and lost the most population during roughly the first pandemic year (April 1, 2020-July 1, 2021) show that those with relatively light anti-virus regimes have generally gained new residents, and those with relatively heavy rules and regulations experienced declines.

The most revealing indicator of these trends isn’t the headline set of population increases and decreases by state during the above time period. After all, those figures also include natural births and deaths (mainly because here we’re trying to measure not the states’ individual records in fighting the virus, but how Americans perceive them), as well as changes due to international migration (which say almost nothing about how the perceptions of the U.S. population as of spring, 2020).

Instead, the best indicators of public opinion about pandemic policies are the domestic migration data – that is, Americans’ movements among states over this latest data year.  They’re found in the third spreadsheet listed under “Tables” at this link, and the states’ April, 2020 populations that are used as the baseline are in the second spreadsheet. 

Our methodology? Comparing the new Census findings with Wallethub.com‘s ranking of individual states’ levels of virus restrictions as of this past April. Let’s start with a list of the ten states (out of 51, including the District of Columbia) that have performed best in absolute terms in attracting residents from other states (listed from most to least successful), with their restrictiveness rankings next to them. (The lower the number, the less restrictive a state.)

Florida                                263,958       2

Texas                                  211,289       5

Arizona                              119,650     15

North Carolina                  106,884      28

South Carolina                    78,812        7

Tennessee                           73,472      16

Georgia                              59,979       24

Idaho                                  56,439       11

Utah                                   36,084       18

Nevada                              34,280        30

What this list shows is that eight of these ten states are among the 50 percent of states that have the fewest anti-CCP Virus restrictions, three of the ten are among the five least restrictive, and four of the ten are in the ten least restrictive. That looks like the least restrictive states have been awfully attractive to Americans.

Similar results come from the list of the ten states that have attracted the most domestic movers as a share of their populations in April, 2020:

Idaho                                    3.07         11

Montana                              1.98         10

Arizona                               1.67          15

South Carolina                   1.54            7

Delaware                            1.45          49

Maine                                 1.25          43

Florida                                1.23           2

Nevada                               1.10         30

Utah                                   1.10         18

New Hampshire                 1.07         22

Tennessee                          1.06          16

Again, eight of this group of ten are found among the half of states with the fewest pandemic restrictions. The correlation, though, is slightly weaker. After all, Delaware and Maine are big outliers, attracting relatively large numbers of domestic movers despite having super-strict approaches to fighting and containing the virus. In addition, only one of these states is in the top five least restrictive states, and just three in the top ten least restrictive. Overall, though, this list supports the case that the least restrictive states have been popular moving destinations for Americans.

But does the opposite conclusion hold – that the most restrictive states have performed especially poorly in this demographic popularity contest? The following list of the ten states that have lost the most residents in absolute terms to other states, along with their restrictiveness rankings, says the answer is “It sure does.”

California                 429,383             45

New York                 406,257             46

Illinois                      151,512             34

Massachusetts            54,339             38

New Jersey                 39,954             41

Louisiana                   36,854              27

Maryland                   26,666              26

DC                             23,222              50

Hawaii                       16,174              37

Minnesota                 15,947               40

All of these states are in the group of 50 percent of states with the most virus restrictions, four of the ten are in the group of the ten most restrictive, and California and New York are among the five most restrictive states.

As with the states with the biggest percentage domestic migration increases, the list of states with the biggest relative domestic migration decreases is consistent with a strong correlation between virus policies and population gains, but one that’s not quite as strong as the relationship between virus policies and population change among states with the biggest absolute population losses.

DC                                3.38             50

New York                      2.01            46

Illinois                           1.18            34

Hawaii                           1.11            37

California                      1.08            45

North Dakota                0.91            17

Alaska                           0.81              6

Louisiana                      0.79            27

Mass.                            0.77            38

New Jersey                   0.43            41

Maryland                     0.43             26

Here, BTW, we’re dealing with eleven states, because New Jersey and Maryland have lost equal percentages of their populations. But this list reveals that two of the eleven are among the half of states with the fewest virus restrictions (versus none among the states with the biggest absolute domestic migration losses). Moreover, Alaska is one of the ten least restrictive states and North Dakota is among the twenty least restrictive.

At the same time, nine of the eleven are in the half of states that are most restrictive, two are among the ten most restrictive (the District and New York), with California right behind them. Moreover, the strength of the relationship between extensive CCP Virus restrictions and big population losses becomes even clearer given the outsized roles played by highly restrictive California and New York. Together, they account for fully 65.49 percent of the 1.276 million Americans who have moved from high-restriction to low-restriction states. (There’s considerable concentration among the states that have gained domestic migrants, but the top two – Florida and Texas – represent only 475,247 out of this total 1.066 million population, or 44.60 percent.

But there’s still the question of whether the population change and virus regime relationship looks the same when the variables are flipped. In other words, have the least restrictive states performed well and the most restrictive performed poorly in terms of population gains and losses? Here’s that list (starting with the least restictive state), including these states’ population changes in absolute and percentage terms:

Iowa                        -1,116               -0.04

Florida               +263,958               +1.23

Wyoming               +1,531               +0.27

South Dakota         +5,566               +0.63

Texas                  +211,289               +0.72

Alaska                     -5,912                -0.81

South Carolina     +78,812               +1.54

Mississippi (tie)      -7,132                -0.24

Oklahoma (tie)    +27,589               +0.70

Montana              +21,483               +1.98

Of the ten least restrictive states, seven have gained population, and three have gained lots both in absolute terms and percentage terms (Florida, South Carolina, and Texas). Moreover, one of the loser states (Iowa) has barely lost anyone by either measure.

And now for the population changes in the most restrictive states (starting with the most restrictive), again with the increases or decreases presented alongside their names in both absolute and percentage terms:

Vermont                +4,470               +0.70

DC                       -23,322                -3.38

Delaware            +14,387               +1.45

Virginia                -11,294               -0.13

Washington (tie)   +9,408               +0.12

New York (tie)   -406,257               +2.01

California           -429,383              +1.08

Maine                  +17,003              +1.25

Connecticut              +226              +0.01

Rhode Island            +291              +0.03

Among these most restrictive states, the correlation at first glance doesn’t look strong at all. Only three – the District, New York, and California – suffered a net migration outflow during the first pandemic year. But look below the surface and some of the relationship reappears. After all, two of the three are highly restrictive California and New York, whose population losses are enormous in absolute terms and significant in percentage terms. The other, the even more restrictive District of Columbia, saw an astonishing 3.38 percent of its people leave for other states – the highest percentage change whether we’re talking population increases of decreases.

Qualifiers for these conclusions should be kept in mind on top of those concerning multiple possibilities for inter-state moves.  First and foremost, I haven’t compared these migration patterns with those of past years.  If they turn out to be broadly similar, then maybe the CCP Virus isn’t a main determinant at all – and in this vein, the popularity of Sun Belt states like Florida, Arizona, and Texas is nothing new.  Nor are departures from northeastern states like New York and New Jersey. 

At the same time, Florida and Texas in particular have gotten terrible publicity all year long for their loose virus restrictions.  (Google, e.g., “Death-Santis.”)  And not only was Califonia’s annual population decline its first ever, but domestic out-migration was responsible for 143 percent of it.  (Positive population developments like births made up the difference.)  So something out of the ordinary demographically seems to have gone on in at least some big states during that first pandemic year.   And if it wasn’t the virus, I’d sure like to know what else it could have been.