(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Hold Your Applause on Inflation Progress Signs

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consumers, demand, Employment, Federal Reserve, fiscal policy, gas prices, GDP, gross domestic product, household spending, housing, inflation, Jobs, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, manufacturing production, monetary policy, mortgages, personal consumption, personal spending, recession, retail sales, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

At the end of last month, I wrote that if a national government (including its central bank) wants to get inflation down, it’s not a rocket science-type challenge.” Basically all that’s needed is the willingness to take some combination of the kinds of fiscal and monetary measures that are guaranteed to slow economic growth.

Keep that in mind as you read the mushrooming number of claims that America’s recent historic burst of inflation is either peaking (see, e.g., here, here, and here) or should peak soon (e.g., here, here, and here). Because wherever softening prices can be seen, levels of demand have fallen off either because goods and services are becoming unaffordable and sales are down, or because easy money has gotten harder, or some degree of both. So let’s not conclude that inflation progress stems from a sudden outburst of policy-making genius.

Anyone doubting the start of a economic downshifting should check out the many of the latest reports released by the federal government on the economy’s performance. In the first quarter of this year, the gross domestic product (GDP – the standard measure of the economy’s size) fell by 1.58 percent at an annual rate adjusted for inflation, and the pretty reliable forecasters at the Atlanta branch of the Federal Reserve system expect about the same kind of contraction for the second quarter.

If this prediction holds, the United States will have entered a recession by the most widely used yardstick – two straight quarters of what economists call “negative growth.”   

Manufacturing production – which RealityChek regulars know has held up very well during the pandemic period – has now dropped sequentially for two straight months. And a downshifting U.S. economy is importing less, which has reduced the bloated trade deficit for two straight months as well.

The employment picture is better (including in manufacturing) but on an economy-wide basis some signs of deterioration are visible as well. Chiefly, if you look at three-month averages (which help smooth out often misleading short-term fluctuations, you see that from January through March, this measure of private sector job growth totalled 527,000. From April through June, it dropped to just under 362,000, and may sink lower, as the April and May figures have been downwardly revised, signaling that the same may be in store for June’s results.

Some of the best evidence of declining affordability – across the board – come from the official retail sales figures. On an annual basis, their increase is down from the mid-double digit levels of January and February (propped up by the unusually weak numbers from the heavily pandemic-affected figures for the previous – baseline – winter), to 9.26 percent in June.

That may not sound like a lot, but when inflation is considered, these retail sales increases turn into decreases for three of the last four months through June’s preliminary report. In other words, because of rapidly rising prices, consumers weren’t actually buying more in the way of goods and services. They were simply paying more for quantities that had actually shrunk. And the month-on-month sales numbers have been negative for three of the last four months, too.

The affordability issue is especially clear from the recent decrease in gasoline prices. Yes, they’ve tumbled for more than a month. But less driving is the obvious reason. For example, here we are in the middle of peak summer driving season, when the subsiding of the pandemic supposedly has millions of Americans determined to engage in so-called “revenge travel.”

But according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, gasoline consumption “is just above the same time two years ago [when revenge travel was popular, too, as the virus’ first wave receded, but was still taking a much bigger toll than today] but below every other year going back to 2000.”

The American Petroleum Institute added that last month’s 9.1 million barrels per day of demand was “down 2.3% y/y compared with June 2021—a third straight month in which gasoline trailed its year-ago levels.” Moreover, so far, this year’s May-June increase of 0.4 percent in gasoline use has badly “lagged the average 2.9% seasonal increase seen between May and June in 2012-2021.”

Meanwhile, the role of higher interest rates (and consequently tighter credit) is best seen in the housing market. Summarizing the latest findings of the National Association of Realtors, The Wall Street Journal just reported that “sales of previously owned homes fell for a fifth straight month, dropping 5.4% in June to an annualized rate of 5.12 million.”

The main reason? The big run up in mortgage rates has depressed mortage applications for three straight weeks has pushed them down to their lowest levels since 2000. That means they’re below where they were even during the deflation of the mid-2000s housing bubble that helped trigger the global financial crisis and Great Recession.

Most important of all, even those believing that American leaders deserve credit for figuring out a successful anti-inflation fighting strategy, should remember that although interest rates are higher, they’re far from historically high and even fall well short of even recent very low norms; and that even though some prices are down, they’re still historically high. And that’s not even considering that the supply chain troubles also contributing to recent inflation could well intensify as long as the Ukraine war drags on, and the threat of more over-the-top Zero Covid lockdowns in China can’t be dismissed.

So even though this kind of bitter policy medicine is needed to avoid worse inflation down the road, and genuinely harsh austerity measures (especially as long as U.S. leaders seem to lack a clue regarding the inflation-fighting potential of productivity growth improvement), American voters aren’t likely to be grateful this November – or in any elections in the foreseeable future. And who could blame them?

 

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why U.S. Manufacturing’s Record Trade Deficits Aren’t Biting — Yet

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Biden administration, CCP Virus, China, consumers, coronavirus, COVID 19, Covid relief, exports, Federal Reserve, imports, inflation, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, manufacturing production, stimulus, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Perceptive RealityChek readers (no doubt the great majority!) have surely noticed something odd about my treatment of trade-related developments and the American domestic manufacturing base. For most of the CCP Virus period, I’ve been writing both that U.S.-based industry has been performing well according to practically every major measure, and that the manufacturing trade deficit has been setting new record highs.

It’s not that I’ve ignored a situation that would normally strike me as being utterly paradoxical and even inconceivable over any serious time span. I’ve mainly attributed it to the pandemic’s main economic damage being inflicted on services industries, and to the Trump tariffs on Chinese imports, which have shielded domestic manufacturers from hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of competition that has nothing to do with free trade or free markets.

But the longer manufacturing has excelled as the trade gap has skyrocketed, the more convinced I’ve been that something else was at work, too. What finally illuminated this influence has been the recent controversy these last few weeks over President Biden’s suggestion that he might cut some of those Trump China tariffs in order to curb inflation.

As I’ve written previously (see, e.g., here), there’s no shortage of economic-related reasons to dismiss the claims that levies that began being imposed in mid-2018 bear any responsibilityfor inflation that only became worrisome three years later, and that reducing the tariffs would ease this inflation meaningfully. Even the Biden administration keeps admitting the latter point.

But the increasingly striking contrast between manufacturing’s strong output, job creation, and capital equipment spending on the one hand, and its historically awful trade deficits on the other points to the paramount importance of another explanation I’ve mentioned for doubting that tariffs have fueled inflation. It’s the role played by the economy’s overall level of demand.

I’ve written that trade levies will contribute to higher prices or boost prices all by themselves overwhelmingly when consumers are spending freely – and consequently when businesses understandably believe they have scope to charge more for tariff-ed goods. That is, companies are confident that the higher costs stemming from tariffs can be passed along to customers who simply aren’t very price sensitive.

Strong enough demand, however, has another crucial effect on manufacturing – and on other traded goods: It creates a market growing fast enough to enable domestic companies to prosper even when their foreign competitors are out-performing them and taking share of that market. In other words, even though all entrants aren’t benefitting equally, all can still benefit.

Conversely, when demand for manufactures is expanding sluggishly, or not at all, this kind of win-win situation disappears. Then U.S.-based and foreign industry are competing for a stagnant group of customers, and one’s gain of market share becomes the other’s loss. In this situation, increasing trade deficits mean that American demand is being met by imports to eliminate any incentive for domestic manufacturers to boost production or employment. Indeed, they become hard-pressed even to maintain output and payrolls.

Of course, even if trade deficits keep surging during periods of slow domestic demand, U.S.-based manufacturers can still in principle keep turning out ever more products and hiring ever more workers if they can achieve one goal: super-charging their export sales. But the persistently mammoth scale of the American manufacturing trade shortfall indicates either that foreign demand for U.S.-made goods almost never improves enough to compensate for reduced or stagnant domestic sales, or that foreign economies prevent such growth by keeping many American goods out, or some combination of the two.

Super-strong demand for manufactured goods is precisely what’s characterized the economy since the CCP Virus arrived in force. As a result, the pie has gotten so much bigger that domestic industry as a whole has had no problem finding enough new customers to support healthy production and hiring levels even though imports’ sales have been lapping them.

Specifically, between the first quarter of 2020 and the fourth quarter of last year (the last quarter for which current-dollar (or pre-inflation) U.S. manufacturing production data are available, the U.S. market for manufactures increased by 22.83 percent – or $1.518 trillion. Revealingly, this demand would have been strong enough to enable domestic industry to pass tariff hikes on to customers, and enable these levies to fuel inflation on at least a one-time basis. But tariffs of course have not been raised during this stretch.

Meanwhile, the manufacturing trade deficit soared by 64.31 percent ($566 billion). And the import share of the U.S. market rose from 29.50 percent to 32.47 percent.

But domestic industry was able to boost its production (according to a measure called current-dollar gross output) by 16.55 percent, or just under $954 billion. ,

Contrast these results with the pre-CCP Virus expansion. During those 10.5 years (from the second quarter of 2009 through the fourth quarter of 2019), the U.S. market for manufactured goods increased by just 45.37 percent, or $2.154 trillion. That is, even though it was more than five times longer than the above pandemic period, that market grew by only about twice as much.

The manufacturing trade deficit actually also grew at a slower rate than during the much shorter pandemic period (169.2 percent). But because the pie was expanding more slowly, too, the import share of this domestic manufacturing market climbed from 23.12 percent to 31.10 percent.  These home market share losses combined with inadequate exports were enough to limit the growth of U.S. manufacturing output to 34.64 percent, or $1.512 trillion. Again, though this 2009-2019 growth took place over a time-span more than five times longer than the pandemic period, it was only about twice as great. That is, the pace was much more sluggish.

And not so coincidentally, because pre-CCP Virus demand for manufactures was so sluggish, too, businesses concluded they had little or no scope to raise prices when significant tariffs began to be imposed in 2018. Further, the levies generated no notable inflation over any significant period even on a one-time basis. Companies all along the relevant supply chains (including in China) had to respond with some combination of finding alternative markets, becoming more efficient, or simply eating the higher costs.

The good news is that as long as the U.S. market for manufactures keeps ballooning, domestic industry can keep boosting production and employment even if the manufacturing trade deficit keeps worsening or simply stays astronomical, and even if domestic industry keeps losing market share.

The bad news is that the rocket fuel that ignited this growth spurt is running out. Massive pandemic relief programs that put trillions of dollars into consumers’ pockets aren’t being renewed, and Americans are starting to dig into the savings they were able to pile up in order to finance their expenses (although, as noted here, these savings remain gargantuan). Credit is being made more expensive by the Federal Reserve’s decision both to raise interest rates and to reduce its immense and highly stimulative bond holdings. And some evidence shows that U.S. consumer spending is shifting from goods like manufactures to services (although some other evidence says “Don’t be so sure.”)

Worse, when the stimulus tide finally recedes, domestic industry will likely find itself in a shakier competitive position than before. For without considerably above-trend demand growth, and with the foreign competition controlling more of the remaining market than before the pandemic, it will find itself more dependent than ever on maintaining production and employment (let alone increasing them) by winning back customers it has already lost. And changing purchasing patterns in place will be much more challenging than selling to customers whose patterns haven’t yet been set.

U.S. based manufacturing is variegated enough – including in terms of specific sectors’ strengths and weaknesses – that the above generalizations don’t and won’t hold for every single industry. But the macro numbers make clear that domestic manufacturing as a whole has experienced unusually fat years lately, and generally has been competitive enough to take some advantage of these favorable conditions. But industry’s continuing and indeed widening trade shortfall and market share losses in its own back yard should also be warning both manufacturers overall and Washington that many of domestic industry’s pre-pandemic troubles could come roaring back once leaner years return.

Making News: Podcast Now On-Line of Ohio Radio Interview on China Policy & the U.S. Economy — & More!

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Akron, Biden, China, Gordon G. Chang, IndustryToday.com, inflation, Making News, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, Ohio, Ray Horner, recession, tariffs, The Hill, WAKR-AM

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast of my latest radio appearance is now on-line. Click here to listen to a wide-ranging conversation last Friday between me and WAKR-AM (Akron, Ohio)’s Ray Horner.  The subjects: President Biden’s suggestion that he might unilaterally lift some of the Trump administration’s tariffs on imports from China in order to fight inflation; China’s recent devaluation of its currency; and the chances that the U.S. economy will tip into recession.

In addition, it was great to be quoted on Mr. Biden’s China trade policy in Gordon G. Chang’s May 11 op-ed for The Hill. Here’s the link.

Finally, IndustryToday.com reprinted (with permission!) two recent posts of mine – on why cutting the China tariffs is such a lousy idea (on May 10) , and on the latest (strong) official U.S. manufacturing jobs figures (on May 9).

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Manufacturing Jobs Strength – & Vindication of Trump Tariffs

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737 Max, aerospace, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Employment, Jobs, machinery, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, non-farm payrolls, pharmaceuticals, PPE, private sector, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning’s official U.S. jobs report, for December, shows that, to paraphrase that unforgettable battery ad slogan, domestic manufacturing just keeps hiring and hiring and….

As a result, the December data also add to the already compelling case that domestic industry’s continued resilience – including an ongoing hiring out-performance – owes significantly to the Trump tariffs that have prevented imports from China from flooding U.S. markets and massively depriving Made in America products of customers as they had before his presidency.

The nation’s manufacturers boosted their payrolls by 38,000 on month in December, even as the private sector shed 95,000 jobs and government at all levels lost 45,000.

Moreover, in line with the strong overall employment revisions for October and November, industry’s previously reported 33,000 hiring improvement for the former (which had already been downgraded from 38,000) is now judged to be 43,000. And November’s figure has been upgraded from 27,000 to 35,000.

Although this performance pales compared with the 333,000 jobs added in manufacturing in June, the sector continues to punch above its employment weight, and in fact has now won back a status it apparently had lost in the fall.

As of December, U.S.-based industry had regained 60.16 percent (820,000) of the 1.363 million jobs it had lost during the worst (so far) of the pandemic-induced downturn in March and April.

That’s slightly ahead of the total private sector, which has recovered 59.91 percent (12.696 million) of its 21.191 million drop last spring.

And its considerably ahead of the overall economy’s record. Non-farm payrolls (the definition of the American employment universe used by the Labor Department, which issues these jobs reports) have risen by 12.321 million since April, a bounceback reprsenting only 55.60 percent of their 22.160 million plunge that month and in March.

The big reason is the slump in government jobs at all levels, and especially in states and localities. Public sector employment sank by 45,000 sequentially in December and by 81,000 the month before. And the outlook for public sector employment remains clouded by the brightening (due to the nearly final 2020 election results) but still uncertain prospects for a federal bailout of state and local governments, whose December monthly job losses totaled 49,000. (The federal government actually added positions.)

Manufacturing’s biggest monthly employment winners in December were plastics and rubber products (up 6,900), the automotive sector (6,700), non-metallic mineral products (6,100), food manufacturing (5,500), and apparel (4,000).

Especially encouraging were the 2,800 jobs created by domestic machinery makers, since the equipment they make is so widely used throughout the rest of manufacturing and elsewhere in the economy. November’s on-month machinery jobs gains were revised up from 1,900 to 2,500, but October’s totals were revised down for a second time, from 3,000 to 2,700.

December’s biggest manufacturing job losers were miscellaneous non-durable goods (down 11,200 sequentially) and primary metals (down 2,100).

Also on the encouraging side: Better progress has been made in job-creation for the CCP Virus-related medical manufacturing categories. These only go through November, but they show that the the broad pharmaceuticals and medicines sector added 1,000 new jobs that month, and its October figure was upgraded all the way from 100 to 1,100.

In addition, the sub-sector containing vaccines increased payrolls in December by 1,100, and its October performance was revised up from 600 to 1,100.

But in the manufacturing category containing PPE goods like face masks, gloves, and medical gowns, along with cotton swabs, the previously reported October employment increase stayed unreivsed at 400, and the November growth was only 500.

These results, however, still mean that the PPE category’s job gains since February have been much stronger (7.85 percent) than those of the vaccines category (a disappointing 2.82 percent) and of the broader pharmaceuticals industry (an even weaker 1.40 percent).

Finally, other than the prospect of a vaccine-related return to normal in the U.S. and global economies (for domestic manufacturing is a big exporters), the biggest reason for further manufacturing employment optimism concerns the aerospace sector. It’s been pummeled by both the pandemic-induced nosedive in air travel around the world, and by Boeing’s safety woes.

The U.S. aerospace giant isn’t out of the woods yet. Its troubled 737 Max model has now been recertified by the federal government as safe to return to flight, but new production-related problems have cropped up, too. Moreover, who can say with any confidence when “normal,” or enough of it to help, Boeing, returns?

Yet assuming some substantial Boeing recovery in the foreseeable future, a major restart of its own manufacturing could give a big boost to domestic industry as a whole, given its many and long domestic supply chains.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The New U.S. Jobs Report Underscores Manufacturing’s Resilience – & Possibly Tariffs’ Value

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automotive, China, Jobs, machinery, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, non-farm jobs, non-farm payrolls, private sector jobs, tariffs, Trade, Trump

The headline figure for today’s September U.S. jobs report might have been lousy, but America’s manufacturers delivered excellent results, continuing a show of resilience that’s lasted throughout the CCP Virus era, and that could be closely connected with President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade policies.

Industry added 66,000 net new jobs from month to month – its best totally since June (now confirmed for the time being at a 333,000 gain. And revisions overall were positive.

August’s previously reported manufacturing jobs increase of 29,000 is now estimated to have been 36,000. And July’s results held at 41,000.

Moreover, although the automotive sector’s payroll improvements once more dominated the manufacturing results, the dominance was, as with the data since June, much less pronounced than during the spring. Combined vehicle and parts payrolls rose by 14,300.

Another encouraging development – the broad machinery sector, which is so closely connected with other segments of manufacturing as well as with much of the non-manufacturing economy (e.g., construction and agriculture) – added 13,800 new jobs on net. That’s a major acceleration from previous months’ results.

The other significant manufacturing monthly jobs winners in September included non-metallic mineral products (+6,200), the continually strong food products sector (+5,000), printing and related activities (+4,700), and fabricated metals products (4,200).

By far the the worst September sequential manufacturing jobs performance came in primary metals (-3,400), followed by the huge chemicals sector (-2,000).

September’s advances mean that manufacturing has now regained 716,000 (52.53 percent) of the 1.363 million jobs it lost in March and April, as the CCP Virus was peaking. (Those earlier job losses represented 10.61 percent of the last pre-virus – February – manufacturing employment level.)

The total decrease in nonfarm payrolls (NFP – the U.S. government’s definition of the nation’s jobs universe) in March and April was 22.16 milion – 14.53 percent of the February total and thus a steeper drop than suffered in manufacturing. Since then, 11.417 million, or 51.52 percent, of those jobs have been recovered.

As for private sector employment (which, unlike non-farm jobs, omits public sector employement, which is affected far more by government decisions rather than economic fundamentals), its levels fell by 21.191 million, or 16.34 percent , during the worst of the pandemic. Since April, 11.39 million, or 53.75 percent, of these jobs have been regained.

Given U.S. manufacturing’s extensive exposure to foreign competition, this relative strength is difficult to imagine absent Mr. Trump’s tariffs, especially the high levies remaining on most imports of goods from China. Without the tariffs, it’s easy to imagine a much greater flood of Chinese manufactures into the U.S. market once the People’s Republic and its factories emerged from their own pandemic shutdown, and depressing demand for domestic U.S. produced manufactures – as well as for the employees that make them.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Solid Manufacturing Jobs and Trade Numbers Despite Boeing’s Woes

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Boeing, China, exports, imports, Jobs, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, manufacturing trade deficit, Phase One, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

You say U.S. manufacturing jobs keep growing too slowly? You say manufacturing’s trade deficit remains too high, and its exports inadequate? According to two big new government reports on the state of the American economy this morning, if you do, you should also be saying (with beaucoup de snark) “Thanks, Boeing!”

For it keeps getting clearer that the aerospace giant’s safety woes and resulting production halt of its (once) popular 737 Max model are sandbagging both measures of manufacturing’s performance – and not trivially. Don’t forget the silver lining, however.  Despite the Boeing effect, domestic industry has been holding up encouragingly well. 

The evidence is clearest from the trade figures. As reported last month in RealityChek, if not for a big deterioration in the civilian aircraft trade balance (until recently the sector of the entire economy with the biggest trade surplus), the full-year 2019 manufacturing trade shortfall would barely have grown over the 2018 level. And since industry itself increased output last year in pre-inflation terms, (at least through the latest – third quarter – data available), that represented a heartening sign that domestic manufacturing was becoming more self-reliant.

In January, the manufacturing shortfall actually fell month-to-month (by 0.38 percent, from $82.24 billion to $81.93 billion, and $850 million in absolute terms). The mix wasn’t exactly ideal: Imports were down 3.11 percent, but the value of exports (which are much smaller) fell by 5.58 percent.

But the civilian aircraft trade surplus plunged 44.43 percent – from $3.06 billion to $1.70 billion. So in January, had the sector simply equaled its December trade performance, the January manufacturing deficit would have been not $81.93 billion but $80.57 billion – the lowest total since last March’s $76.96 billion, and a monthly drop of 2.03 percent, not 0.38 percent. Further, manufacturing exports would have been $87.93 billion rather than $86.25 billion – or down only 3.74 percent, not 5.58 percent.

The picture is muddier for manufacturing employment because the data for civilian aircraft and their parts is reported one month after most other industry-by-industry jobs statistics. Another complication: The new jobs report overall goes up to February.

More puzzling still: Although latest statistics for the Boeing-related categories are January, they’re little changed from the December totals even though the 737 Max production suspension was announced in the middle of that month.

But it’s still legit to wonder whether they would’ve been better without the Boeing crisis. And how much better? Moreover, the vast aircraft supply chain encompasses dozens of manufacturing sectors beyond the engines and parts themselves. After all, these systems are in turn made of any number of components and materials. Boeing’s difficulties, therefore, could have been holding back manufacturing job growth broadly speaking for months.

Even so, industry as a whole added 15,000 jobs sequentially in February – it’s best such performance (except for a November increase that was aided by the end of the General Motors strike) since January, 2019’s 20,000.

And let’s not forget – industry achieved this employment gain even though the “Phase One” trade deal with China has left stiff U.S. tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of imported goods from China, as well as on much foreign steel and aluminum.

No doubt the coronavirus outbreak could send the manufacturing performance arrows pointing down again, or leveling off, in the next few months. But the new jobs and trade data make clear that despite an external (Boeing) shock that has nothing to do with President Trump’s trade wars, and despite the trade curbs he has enacted, domestic manufacturing has been on the rebound lately, and showed impressive resilience that bodes well for its future – and the entire economy’s.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New U.S. Jobs Data Show a Continued Trade Punch for Manufacturing – & Industry Resilience

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aircraft, aluminum, automotive, Boeing, Bureau of Labor Statistics, China, General Motors, General Motors strike, GM, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For observers of U.S. domestic manufacturing, this morning’s new jobs report (for November) could not have made clearer how the recent strike at General Motors (GM) have bollixed up the recent monthly totals for reasons having nothing to do with the underlying state of the economy or with President Trump’s trade wars. Nonetheless, even with the strike’s effects filtered out, industry’s job creation this year continues to lag behind last year’s strong pace, and damage from Mr. Trump’s metals tariffs in particular is still apparent – if anything but calamitous.

Moreover, in a continuing mystery, although Boeing’s safety woes are kneecapping domestic manufacturing’s trade performance, their impact on manufacturing employment is still nowhere to be seen.

Because of the GM strike’s impact, the overall manufacturing job figures for November (along with the revised October numbers) are pretty worthless. What does matter are the results with motor vehicles and parts stripped out (although even taking this step fails to account for the strike’s effects on all the industries making up the domestic automotive supply chain).

Ex-automotive, the previously reported October U.S. manufacturing monthly jobs change would have come to a 5,600 net monthly gain, rather than a 36,000 net loss. The revised October manufacturing jobs change reported today was somewhat better – without the GM strike, a net sequential employment loss pegged at a higher 43,000 would have been a net gain of 6,800. (And another revised October figure will come out next month, along with a new November number.)

For its first read on November’s performance, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that domestic industry’s payrolls rose by 54,000 on net. Removing from that total the 41,300 jump in automotive employment stemming from the return to work of GM workers and of employees at parts companies who may have been laid off, and you get a 12,700 monthly increase in manufacturing jobs.

Encouragingly, that’s the best such performance since January’s 17,000 payroll advance. But the year-on-year improvements remain humdrum even taking out the automotive distortions.

For example, without the automotive distortions, October’s stand-still manufacturing jobs total would only have been 56,000 higher than that of October, 2018. Between the previous Octobers, manufacturing employment surged by 275,000. The comparable November numbers? A 32,000 improvement between 2018 and 2019, as opposed to 228.000 between 2017 and 2018.

The November jobs report’s news for so-called trade hawks wasn’t good, either. As usual the impact of the Trump administration’s steel and aluminum tariffs are relatively easy to gauge, and it remains the case that the metals-using sectors’ employment performance has lost notable momentum versus the rest of manufacturing and the rest of the private sector overall.

Below are the latest figures for employment changes at major metals-using industries starting with the April, 2018 – the first full month in which these levies were in effect, and run through October. For comparison’s sake, the results for manufacturing overall are also included, along with those of the durable goods super-sector in which most of the big metals-users are grouped:

                                                       Old thru Oct       New thru          Thru Nov

entire private sector:                    +2.58 percent   +2.62 percent    +2.82 percent

overall manufacturing:                +1.40 percent   +1.40 percent    +1.83 percent

durable goods:                            +1.48 percent    +1.43 percent    +1.99 percent

fabricated metals products:        +1.57 percent    +1.49 percent    +1.51 percent

non-electrical machinery:          +1.74 percent    +1.65 percent    +1.26 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:      -4.89 percent    -4.60 percent      -0.45 percent

household appliances*:               not available    -6.31 percent      not available

aerospace products & parts*:     not available   +8.98 percent       not available

*data are one month behind

The end of the GM effect is clear from the big differences between the October and November overall manufacturing and durable goods jobs changes. But by the same token, November was a lousy employment month for the big machinery and fabricated metals sectors. Look at that aerospace products and parts increase, though – job creation in this Boeing-heavy sector continues to excel.

Now it’s possible that much of the damage being done to the company, and manufacturing more generally, is being done in its own vast domestic supply chain. But the employment numbers for narrower sectors like aircraft and their parts show nothing of the kind, and the effects on companies in other supplier sectors (e.g., machinery, metals, and fabricated metals products) simply can’t be teased out.

But even worse for the metals-using industries generally, whereas most were job creation leaders last year, they’ve turned into job creation laggards this year. This deterioration is made clear from comparing the previous table with the following table, which shows their employment performance from the metals tariffs advent through the end of last year and the beginning of this year:

                                                          Thru December               Thru January

entire private sector:                         +1.36 percent                +1.60 percent

overall manufacturing:                     +1.39 percent                +1.49 percent

durable goods:                                  +1.72 percent                +1.97 percent

fabricated metals products:              +1.57 percent                +1.78 percent

non-electrical machinery:                +2.33 percent               +2.57 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:          +1.07 percent               +1.15 percent

household appliances:                     -2.05 percent                -2.52 percent

aerospace products & parts:           +5.47 percent               +5.87 percent

Of course, President Trump’s tariffs on several hundred billion dollars worth of imports heading America’s way from China are affecting domestic manufacturing as well. But because of these products ubiquity throughout domestic industry, the greatly varying levels of their U.S. market share, and the duties’ on-again-off-again nature (prominently on display in recent days), I continue to despair of quantifying the impact usefully.

And speaking of Mr. Trump, there’s no doubt that, contrary to his confidence, trade wars are not “easy to win” – and can be highly disruptive even for countries like the United States with ample leverage to prevail. That’s inevitable when you’re trying to reverse several decades of policy. All the same, U.S. domestic manufacturing’s employment performance, even in leading victim industries, has held up pretty well since the President began responding to foreign predation in earnest. Whether the manufacturing interests he’s counting on to win reelection will agree is another question entirely.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Were the US Washing Machine Tariffs Really Failures?

Tags

consumers, Federal Reserve, General Electric, imports, jobs multiplier, large residential washers, LRWs, manufacturing jobs, metals tariffs, safeguard tariffs, South Korea, tariff-rate quota, tariffs, U.S. International Trade Commission, University of Chicago, USITC, washing machines, Whirlpool, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s as close to a slam dunk conclusion as can be – at least according to economists, think tank hacks, and Mainstream Media journalists: The early 2018 U.S. tariffs on large household laundry machines have been a dismal failure.

Or have they been?

The levies belong in a category different from those of the main Trump administration trade-limiting measures because they were first mandated by an independent federal agency (the U.S. International Trade Commission, or USITC) via a long-standing legal process.  And they’ve been panned for supercharging costs for consumers, and padding the profits of the domestic industry to extents that dwarfed the new production and jobs they fostered. (Here’s a typical example of the press’ evaluation, drawing on equally typical research from the venerable University of Chicago and the even venerable-er Federal Reserve.)

What has gone oddly unreported has been the verdict rendered by the USITC – which came out in August. Sure, the agency is grading itself. At the same time, it’s privy to the most authoritative data (taken from the domestic and foreign companies involved themselves), and it’s surely worth noting that the Commission paints a significantly different , and brighter, picture.

The tariffs, put in place in February, 2018, affected the nation’s total global imports of these products, but mainly impacted such “large residential washers” (LRWs) from China, Mexico, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam – the biggest foreign suppliers to the U.S. market. The duties’ aim: stemming a sudden surge of LRWs that injure U.S.-based manufacturers. But they don’t shelter the domestic industry forever.

After three years – the amount of time the Commission has determined these domestic manufacturers need to adjust – they’re phased out for both the final products and many of the parts covered in the “safeguard order.” In addition, consistent with their surge focus, they only apply to imports above a certain level of units – a trade curb known as a “tariff-rate quota.” In all, moreover, the ultimate objective is to give victim industries time to adjust and then stand on their own two feet. That’s why detailed adjustment plans are a condition of receiving tariff relief.

To some extent, the USITC’s judgment doesn’t contrast dramatically different from that of the tariffs’ critics. Both noted (in the Commission’s words) “generally increased prices” and “decreased imports.” The Commission, though reported some developments generally missed by the critics (especially “some improvement in the financial performance of continuously operating [domestic] producers,” and market share gains for these companies) and some given decidedly short shrift (“increased production by two new U.S. producers” – both of whose owners come from South Korea, undoubtedly because the option of supplying the American market through exports was sharply limited).

The Commission didn’t address one of the critics’ most compelling points – that the new U.S. jobs were created at a cost to consumers (via the higher prices they’ve paid) of a whopping $817,000 per job. But the University of Chicago/Federal Reserve study actually conceded that this number might be an exaggeration, since manufacturing jobs (like all jobs) create a “multiplier effect” – that is, they foster additional employment in related industries ranging from suppliers of inputs to transportation, packaging, and warehousing services. What these researchers didn’t mention is that manufacturing’s jobs multiplier is unusually high.

Moreover, like virtually all scholars of trade, tariffs, and employment, the Chicago/Fed team neglected other benefits of manufacturing job creation (and prevention of further manufacturing job loss). These include:

>avoiding the wage losses suffered by displaced manufacturing workers who find work in lower-paid industries (an especially important consideration given today’s very low overall unemployment rates)

>avoiding the revenue losses incurred by these workers’ communities and the economy as a whole due to reductions in their taxable income;

>avoiding the increased pressure on social programs required to serve employees who can’t find new jobs – which encompass not only unemployment compensation but spending that seeks to address the pathologies that often follow working class Americans’ deteriorating personal finances, like divorce, delinquency, alcoholism, and opioid and other drug use, not to mention higher mortality;

>and the costs incurred by local businesses because of worker-customers who can no longer afford as many of their products and services, which of course reduces business’ own taxable income and additionally crimps public finance at all levels. (See, e.g., this highly cited study.)

The USITC report, moreover, shed light on another big reason that the costs-per-manufacturing-job-saved might be exaggerated: Not all of the increased costs of the tariff-ed products are due to the tariffs. In particular, the Commission listed no less than 14 factors other than import competition (and the tariffs placed on these goods) that affect the prices of LRWs. They range from raw materials, transportation, and energy costs to competition levels from substitute and between domestic producers, U.S.-based production capacity, productivity changes, labor contracts, and state and local government incentives, and demand levels at home and abroad (because all the U.S.- and foreign-owned manufacturers sell all over the world). The USITC then proceeded to ask producers, importers, and purchasers (retailers) to rate the importance of these factors on prices since the tariffs’ imposition in February, 2018.

The answers were reported in table III-26, and import competition levels were anything but dominant. Indeed, their importance consistently was rated by all three stakeholder as lower or no greater than that not only of raw materials costs (higher due to entirely separate tariffs on metals that were imposed by the Trump administration) but of energy costs, domestic production capacity (surely limited over time by the previous import flood), the allocation of this production capacity to other products, productivity levels, labor agreements, transportation and delivery costs, and domestic demand levels.

And adding to the case for reducing the costs per job figure: According to the official U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics figures, after jumping by 16.31 percent from the February, 2018 onset of the tariffs through that November, they’ve since fallen by 9.73 percent (through September).

In fact, this development leads to a major point completely missed by the tariffs’ critics. As also indicated by the phaseout schedule and the linkage of the tariffs to the submission of adjustment blueprints, the levies were never intended to produce instant results, or to furnish crutches forever. The USITC describes the implementation of these plans starting on p. IV-5 and, more revealing, presents the evaluations of the retailers – who are bound to be the most demanding judges.

The reviews are mixed, but varying numbers of these companies stated that the two domestic recipients of the tariff relief – Whirlpool and General Electric – introduced new products (the most commonly cited improvement), upgraded product quality, expanded marketing campaigns, bettered their customer service, and taken other positive steps (Table IV-2).

Will these measures prove sufficient? Even after the tariffs come off, definitive answers will prove elusive, because as made clear, the LRW trade policy picture contains so many moving parts. What does look definitive, however, is that so far, the critics have engaged in a flawed rush to judgment.

 

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Jobs Report Again Shows Evidence of Tariffs Damage

Tags

China, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

A speaking engagement yesterday prevented me from posting promptly on that morning’s monthly U.S. jobs report (for May), but after crunching the numbers, two conclusions come through loud and clear. First, the overall results added up to a total stinker. And second, like last month’s release, they contained more evidence that President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies are taking a toll on hiring in manufacturing.

As with economy-wide (“non-farm”) hiring in May, manufacturing employment creation in general grew weakly – and for the fourth straight month. Industry’s payrolls rose by a measly 3,000 on month in May. The revisions, meanwhile, left the discouraging situation basically intact, as April’s previously reported 4,000 net sequential job gain was upgraded to 5,000, but March’s former flatline is now judged to have been a 3,000 net monthly job decrease.

As usual, however, when it comes to the trade policy implications, the results that count are those in manufacturing sectors actually significantly affected by trade policy moves like Mr. Trump’s tariffs. First let’s examine industry’s major metals-using sectors – both the necessary data for these industries goes back to April, 2018 (the first full month when these levies were in effect) and because the industries themselves are much easier to identify.

Here are the figures for these sectors’ employment changes between that month and this past April (both the originally reported numbers and today’s revisions), and between April, 2018 and May, 2019. (All these results, incidentally, are still preliminary.) Serving as control groups are the results for the entire private sector in the United States, for all of manufacturing, and for the durable goods super-sector (where all the main metals-using industries have been found).

                                                    Old thru April   New thru April   April Thru May

entire private sector:                  +1.79 percent     +1.93 percent      +2.00 percent

overall manufacturing:              +1.58 percent     +1.60 percent      +1.62 percent

durable goods:                           +1.92 percent     +1.94 percent      +1.99 percent

fabricated metals products:       +1.82 percent     +1.71 percent      +1.65 percent

non-electrical machinery:         +2.68 percent     +2.52 percent      +2.64 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:    +0.42 percent     +0.20 percent     + 0.48 percent

household appliances:               not available       -4.57 percent       not available

aerospace products & parts:      not available      +7.02 percent       not available

The pattern is clear. Even in metals-using sectors that had been outperforming the overall private sector and overall manufacturing in absolute terms, hiring momentum has waned. Moreover, it’s recently been slackening at a faster rate than evident in those larger sectors. That’s clear from the narrowing of the gap that can generally be seen between the employment increases in the metals-using sectors and the broader parts of the economy.

The impact of the China tariffs remains a puzzle, though, because they’ve been in place for a briefer period of time, and because the industry classification system used by the Trump administration in developing its tariff lists is different from the system used by the Labor Department to track employment changes. In addition, the level of China content of domestic manufactured goods can vary considerably, meaning that the impact of the tariffs can vary just as considerably.

Nevertheless, some exact and reasonably close matches can be identified, and, at least through April (the latest month for which data are available for the specific sectors below, which are narrower than those in the table for metals-using industries), the same relative hiring weakness can be seen. That is, job creation in the China tariffs-affected sectors has been growing more slowly than job creation in the private sector in toto, or in manufacturing overall. This trend is visible even in sectors that have greatly bested the private sector and manufacturing control groups in absolute levels of job creation.

                                   July-March    Old July-April   New July-April    July-May

private sector:         +1.23 percent   +1.44 percent    +1.39 percent    +1.46 percent

overall                   +0.98 percent  +1.03 percent     +1.02 percent     +1.04 percent  

   manufacturing:

aircraft engines       +1.39 percent    not available    +1.51 percent    not available

   and engine parts:

industrial heating   +2.46 percent     not available    +1.45 percent    not available

    equipment:

oil & gas drilling   +5.83 percent      not available   +5.02 percent    not available

    platform parts:

farm machinery     +1.67 percent      not available   +0.17 percent     not available

    & equipment:

ball bearings:        +1.82 percent       not available   +1.54 percent     not available

These results don’t mean that the Trump tariffs, as some keep predicting, are going to throw the American economy into recession, much less that if they do start biting significantly, that they won’t be a price worth paying for overhauling decades of boneheaded, offshoring-friendly, national security threatening (especially in the case of China) trade policies. In fact, they don’t even add up to evidence that the levies are biting significantly now.

But empirical evidence of some damage is finally emerging, at least on the jobs front, and it should be seen as a warning to tariff supporters – including the President – to stop insisting that the current trade wars will entail no costs or need for sacrifice whatever.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Some Surprising New Data on Manufacturing and Trade

Tags

China, IMF, International Monetary Fund, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, Nicholas Lardy, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade surpluses, World Bank, World Economic Outlook, {What's Left of) Our Economy

That was some chart in this week’s newest International Monetary Fund (IMF) update on the world economy on how different countries (including the United States) have fared when it comes to increasing or maintaining their manufacturing employment and their manufacturing output. (The detail in the below reproduction is tough to see, but for the original, see p. 5 in the third chapter of the Fund’s April World Economic Outlook.) 

 

Looking at performance for 20 high-income countries and 20 low-income countries, it makes clear that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, there’s nothing unusual about national economies boosting manufacturing jobs as a share of total jobs, and manufacturing output as a share of total output, at the same time. So it’s a powerful retort to claims from American globalization cheerleaders that all over the world, in rich and poor countries alike, both manufacturing indicators are bound to fall in relative terms as economies inevitably evolve in more services-oriented directions.

And at the very least, it calls into question the notion that trade balances in manufacturing have little or nothing to do job loss in the sector in particular. For example, according to the chart, 22 of the 40 countries examined have boosted manufacturing as a share of their employment and their real value-added (a measure of output) from 1960 through 2015. And 11 of these were high-income countries, where the conventional wisdom says manufacturing’s economic importance is likeliest to shrink over any significant time frame.

Of these 22 countries, 17 ran surpluses in their combined goods and services trade in 2015. And nine were high-income countries.

Not that trade surpluses are automatic indicators of economic success: This group does include economically stagnant Italy as well as economically collapsing Venezuela. Spain, which experienced a terrible stretch during the last recession, is on this list, too – although it’s been a strong grower more recently. And there’s one country whose failure to qualify sure surprised me: Germany. Nonetheless, the countries that have excelled at manufacturing during this period also include major success stories like Chile, the Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland, Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, and of course China (along with Japan, which is currently in the midst of its best growth stretch in nearly three decades).

Of course, the 1960-2015 time frame is still problematic at best, especially for China – since in 1960 it was still being run by leaders enamored with ideas like making steel in peasants’ backyard furnaces. But more recent comparisons between China and the United States look much more instructive – and supportive of the idea that a strong manufacturing trade performance is a great way to maintain robust manufacturing employment and production – and of its converse.

Let’s examine the post-2002 period – with the baseline chosen because that’s the year China actually joined the World Trade Organization, and began receiving WTO-style protection for its predatory, surplus-building trade practices. And for manufacturing output, let’s use pre-inflation value-added, since I wasn’t able to find inflation-adjusted data for China.

According to World Bank figures, manufacturing by this measure dipped from 31.06 percent of China’s economy in 2002 to 29.38 percent – a 5.72 percent decline. For the United States, between 2002 and 2015 manufacturing value-added as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) fell from 13.74 percent to 12.27 percent. That 10.70 drop-off was nearly twice that of China.

As for employment, Sinologist Nicholas Lardy of the Peterson Institute for International Economics (and no hardliner on China) has compiled Chinese statistics dating from 2003, and covering employment in the country’s cities. They show that manufacturing jobs as a share of this China total rose from 15 percent that year to 20 percent in 2014. In the United States during those years, manufacturing employment as a share of total non-farm jobs (the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ American jobs universe), dropped from 11.91 percent to 8.76 percent.

And nowhere have the manufacturing differences between the two economies been greater than in trade flows. For the first year of its WTO membership, China’s goods and services trade surplus (which was mainly in manufacturing) was $30.35 billion. By 2014, it was ballooned to $382 billion. During this period, the American manufacturing trade deficit shot up by just under 74 percent – from $362.64 billion to $629.53 billion.

So the new IMF chart (and related data) by no means ends the debate over whether trade balances impact national manufacturing employment and output. But if I was a globalization cheerleader, I’d sure hope they didn’t attract too much attention.