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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Manufacturing Jobs Strength – & Vindication of Trump Tariffs

08 Friday Jan 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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737 Max, aerospace, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Employment, Jobs, machinery, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, non-farm payrolls, pharmaceuticals, PPE, private sector, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning’s official U.S. jobs report, for December, shows that, to paraphrase that unforgettable battery ad slogan, domestic manufacturing just keeps hiring and hiring and….

As a result, the December data also add to the already compelling case that domestic industry’s continued resilience – including an ongoing hiring out-performance – owes significantly to the Trump tariffs that have prevented imports from China from flooding U.S. markets and massively depriving Made in America products of customers as they had before his presidency.

The nation’s manufacturers boosted their payrolls by 38,000 on month in December, even as the private sector shed 95,000 jobs and government at all levels lost 45,000.

Moreover, in line with the strong overall employment revisions for October and November, industry’s previously reported 33,000 hiring improvement for the former (which had already been downgraded from 38,000) is now judged to be 43,000. And November’s figure has been upgraded from 27,000 to 35,000.

Although this performance pales compared with the 333,000 jobs added in manufacturing in June, the sector continues to punch above its employment weight, and in fact has now won back a status it apparently had lost in the fall.

As of December, U.S.-based industry had regained 60.16 percent (820,000) of the 1.363 million jobs it had lost during the worst (so far) of the pandemic-induced downturn in March and April.

That’s slightly ahead of the total private sector, which has recovered 59.91 percent (12.696 million) of its 21.191 million drop last spring.

And its considerably ahead of the overall economy’s record. Non-farm payrolls (the definition of the American employment universe used by the Labor Department, which issues these jobs reports) have risen by 12.321 million since April, a bounceback reprsenting only 55.60 percent of their 22.160 million plunge that month and in March.

The big reason is the slump in government jobs at all levels, and especially in states and localities. Public sector employment sank by 45,000 sequentially in December and by 81,000 the month before. And the outlook for public sector employment remains clouded by the brightening (due to the nearly final 2020 election results) but still uncertain prospects for a federal bailout of state and local governments, whose December monthly job losses totaled 49,000. (The federal government actually added positions.)

Manufacturing’s biggest monthly employment winners in December were plastics and rubber products (up 6,900), the automotive sector (6,700), non-metallic mineral products (6,100), food manufacturing (5,500), and apparel (4,000).

Especially encouraging were the 2,800 jobs created by domestic machinery makers, since the equipment they make is so widely used throughout the rest of manufacturing and elsewhere in the economy. November’s on-month machinery jobs gains were revised up from 1,900 to 2,500, but October’s totals were revised down for a second time, from 3,000 to 2,700.

December’s biggest manufacturing job losers were miscellaneous non-durable goods (down 11,200 sequentially) and primary metals (down 2,100).

Also on the encouraging side: Better progress has been made in job-creation for the CCP Virus-related medical manufacturing categories. These only go through November, but they show that the the broad pharmaceuticals and medicines sector added 1,000 new jobs that month, and its October figure was upgraded all the way from 100 to 1,100.

In addition, the sub-sector containing vaccines increased payrolls in December by 1,100, and its October performance was revised up from 600 to 1,100.

But in the manufacturing category containing PPE goods like face masks, gloves, and medical gowns, along with cotton swabs, the previously reported October employment increase stayed unreivsed at 400, and the November growth was only 500.

These results, however, still mean that the PPE category’s job gains since February have been much stronger (7.85 percent) than those of the vaccines category (a disappointing 2.82 percent) and of the broader pharmaceuticals industry (an even weaker 1.40 percent).

Finally, other than the prospect of a vaccine-related return to normal in the U.S. and global economies (for domestic manufacturing is a big exporters), the biggest reason for further manufacturing employment optimism concerns the aerospace sector. It’s been pummeled by both the pandemic-induced nosedive in air travel around the world, and by Boeing’s safety woes.

The U.S. aerospace giant isn’t out of the woods yet. Its troubled 737 Max model has now been recertified by the federal government as safe to return to flight, but new production-related problems have cropped up, too. Moreover, who can say with any confidence when “normal,” or enough of it to help, Boeing, returns?

Yet assuming some substantial Boeing recovery in the foreseeable future, a major restart of its own manufacturing could give a big boost to domestic industry as a whole, given its many and long domestic supply chains.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The New U.S. Jobs Report Underscores Manufacturing’s Resilience – & Possibly Tariffs’ Value

02 Friday Oct 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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automotive, China, Jobs, machinery, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, non-farm jobs, non-farm payrolls, private sector jobs, tariffs, Trade, Trump

The headline figure for today’s September U.S. jobs report might have been lousy, but America’s manufacturers delivered excellent results, continuing a show of resilience that’s lasted throughout the CCP Virus era, and that could be closely connected with President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade policies.

Industry added 66,000 net new jobs from month to month – its best totally since June (now confirmed for the time being at a 333,000 gain. And revisions overall were positive.

August’s previously reported manufacturing jobs increase of 29,000 is now estimated to have been 36,000. And July’s results held at 41,000.

Moreover, although the automotive sector’s payroll improvements once more dominated the manufacturing results, the dominance was, as with the data since June, much less pronounced than during the spring. Combined vehicle and parts payrolls rose by 14,300.

Another encouraging development – the broad machinery sector, which is so closely connected with other segments of manufacturing as well as with much of the non-manufacturing economy (e.g., construction and agriculture) – added 13,800 new jobs on net. That’s a major acceleration from previous months’ results.

The other significant manufacturing monthly jobs winners in September included non-metallic mineral products (+6,200), the continually strong food products sector (+5,000), printing and related activities (+4,700), and fabricated metals products (4,200).

By far the the worst September sequential manufacturing jobs performance came in primary metals (-3,400), followed by the huge chemicals sector (-2,000).

September’s advances mean that manufacturing has now regained 716,000 (52.53 percent) of the 1.363 million jobs it lost in March and April, as the CCP Virus was peaking. (Those earlier job losses represented 10.61 percent of the last pre-virus – February – manufacturing employment level.)

The total decrease in nonfarm payrolls (NFP – the U.S. government’s definition of the nation’s jobs universe) in March and April was 22.16 milion – 14.53 percent of the February total and thus a steeper drop than suffered in manufacturing. Since then, 11.417 million, or 51.52 percent, of those jobs have been recovered.

As for private sector employment (which, unlike non-farm jobs, omits public sector employement, which is affected far more by government decisions rather than economic fundamentals), its levels fell by 21.191 million, or 16.34 percent , during the worst of the pandemic. Since April, 11.39 million, or 53.75 percent, of these jobs have been regained.

Given U.S. manufacturing’s extensive exposure to foreign competition, this relative strength is difficult to imagine absent Mr. Trump’s tariffs, especially the high levies remaining on most imports of goods from China. Without the tariffs, it’s easy to imagine a much greater flood of Chinese manufactures into the U.S. market once the People’s Republic and its factories emerged from their own pandemic shutdown, and depressing demand for domestic U.S. produced manufactures – as well as for the employees that make them.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Solid Manufacturing Jobs and Trade Numbers Despite Boeing’s Woes

06 Friday Mar 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Boeing, China, exports, imports, Jobs, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, manufacturing trade deficit, Phase One, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

You say U.S. manufacturing jobs keep growing too slowly? You say manufacturing’s trade deficit remains too high, and its exports inadequate? According to two big new government reports on the state of the American economy this morning, if you do, you should also be saying (with beaucoup de snark) “Thanks, Boeing!”

For it keeps getting clearer that the aerospace giant’s safety woes and resulting production halt of its (once) popular 737 Max model are sandbagging both measures of manufacturing’s performance – and not trivially. Don’t forget the silver lining, however.  Despite the Boeing effect, domestic industry has been holding up encouragingly well. 

The evidence is clearest from the trade figures. As reported last month in RealityChek, if not for a big deterioration in the civilian aircraft trade balance (until recently the sector of the entire economy with the biggest trade surplus), the full-year 2019 manufacturing trade shortfall would barely have grown over the 2018 level. And since industry itself increased output last year in pre-inflation terms, (at least through the latest – third quarter – data available), that represented a heartening sign that domestic manufacturing was becoming more self-reliant.

In January, the manufacturing shortfall actually fell month-to-month (by 0.38 percent, from $82.24 billion to $81.93 billion, and $850 million in absolute terms). The mix wasn’t exactly ideal: Imports were down 3.11 percent, but the value of exports (which are much smaller) fell by 5.58 percent.

But the civilian aircraft trade surplus plunged 44.43 percent – from $3.06 billion to $1.70 billion. So in January, had the sector simply equaled its December trade performance, the January manufacturing deficit would have been not $81.93 billion but $80.57 billion – the lowest total since last March’s $76.96 billion, and a monthly drop of 2.03 percent, not 0.38 percent. Further, manufacturing exports would have been $87.93 billion rather than $86.25 billion – or down only 3.74 percent, not 5.58 percent.

The picture is muddier for manufacturing employment because the data for civilian aircraft and their parts is reported one month after most other industry-by-industry jobs statistics. Another complication: The new jobs report overall goes up to February.

More puzzling still: Although latest statistics for the Boeing-related categories are January, they’re little changed from the December totals even though the 737 Max production suspension was announced in the middle of that month.

But it’s still legit to wonder whether they would’ve been better without the Boeing crisis. And how much better? Moreover, the vast aircraft supply chain encompasses dozens of manufacturing sectors beyond the engines and parts themselves. After all, these systems are in turn made of any number of components and materials. Boeing’s difficulties, therefore, could have been holding back manufacturing job growth broadly speaking for months.

Even so, industry as a whole added 15,000 jobs sequentially in February – it’s best such performance (except for a November increase that was aided by the end of the General Motors strike) since January, 2019’s 20,000.

And let’s not forget – industry achieved this employment gain even though the “Phase One” trade deal with China has left stiff U.S. tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of imported goods from China, as well as on much foreign steel and aluminum.

No doubt the coronavirus outbreak could send the manufacturing performance arrows pointing down again, or leveling off, in the next few months. But the new jobs and trade data make clear that despite an external (Boeing) shock that has nothing to do with President Trump’s trade wars, and despite the trade curbs he has enacted, domestic manufacturing has been on the rebound lately, and showed impressive resilience that bodes well for its future – and the entire economy’s.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New U.S. Jobs Data Show a Continued Trade Punch for Manufacturing – & Industry Resilience

06 Friday Dec 2019

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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aircraft, aluminum, automotive, Boeing, Bureau of Labor Statistics, China, General Motors, General Motors strike, GM, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For observers of U.S. domestic manufacturing, this morning’s new jobs report (for November) could not have made clearer how the recent strike at General Motors (GM) have bollixed up the recent monthly totals for reasons having nothing to do with the underlying state of the economy or with President Trump’s trade wars. Nonetheless, even with the strike’s effects filtered out, industry’s job creation this year continues to lag behind last year’s strong pace, and damage from Mr. Trump’s metals tariffs in particular is still apparent – if anything but calamitous.

Moreover, in a continuing mystery, although Boeing’s safety woes are kneecapping domestic manufacturing’s trade performance, their impact on manufacturing employment is still nowhere to be seen.

Because of the GM strike’s impact, the overall manufacturing job figures for November (along with the revised October numbers) are pretty worthless. What does matter are the results with motor vehicles and parts stripped out (although even taking this step fails to account for the strike’s effects on all the industries making up the domestic automotive supply chain).

Ex-automotive, the previously reported October U.S. manufacturing monthly jobs change would have come to a 5,600 net monthly gain, rather than a 36,000 net loss. The revised October manufacturing jobs change reported today was somewhat better – without the GM strike, a net sequential employment loss pegged at a higher 43,000 would have been a net gain of 6,800. (And another revised October figure will come out next month, along with a new November number.)

For its first read on November’s performance, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that domestic industry’s payrolls rose by 54,000 on net. Removing from that total the 41,300 jump in automotive employment stemming from the return to work of GM workers and of employees at parts companies who may have been laid off, and you get a 12,700 monthly increase in manufacturing jobs.

Encouragingly, that’s the best such performance since January’s 17,000 payroll advance. But the year-on-year improvements remain humdrum even taking out the automotive distortions.

For example, without the automotive distortions, October’s stand-still manufacturing jobs total would only have been 56,000 higher than that of October, 2018. Between the previous Octobers, manufacturing employment surged by 275,000. The comparable November numbers? A 32,000 improvement between 2018 and 2019, as opposed to 228.000 between 2017 and 2018.

The November jobs report’s news for so-called trade hawks wasn’t good, either. As usual the impact of the Trump administration’s steel and aluminum tariffs are relatively easy to gauge, and it remains the case that the metals-using sectors’ employment performance has lost notable momentum versus the rest of manufacturing and the rest of the private sector overall.

Below are the latest figures for employment changes at major metals-using industries starting with the April, 2018 – the first full month in which these levies were in effect, and run through October. For comparison’s sake, the results for manufacturing overall are also included, along with those of the durable goods super-sector in which most of the big metals-users are grouped:

                                                       Old thru Oct       New thru          Thru Nov

entire private sector:                    +2.58 percent   +2.62 percent    +2.82 percent

overall manufacturing:                +1.40 percent   +1.40 percent    +1.83 percent

durable goods:                            +1.48 percent    +1.43 percent    +1.99 percent

fabricated metals products:        +1.57 percent    +1.49 percent    +1.51 percent

non-electrical machinery:          +1.74 percent    +1.65 percent    +1.26 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:      -4.89 percent    -4.60 percent      -0.45 percent

household appliances*:               not available    -6.31 percent      not available

aerospace products & parts*:     not available   +8.98 percent       not available

*data are one month behind

The end of the GM effect is clear from the big differences between the October and November overall manufacturing and durable goods jobs changes. But by the same token, November was a lousy employment month for the big machinery and fabricated metals sectors. Look at that aerospace products and parts increase, though – job creation in this Boeing-heavy sector continues to excel.

Now it’s possible that much of the damage being done to the company, and manufacturing more generally, is being done in its own vast domestic supply chain. But the employment numbers for narrower sectors like aircraft and their parts show nothing of the kind, and the effects on companies in other supplier sectors (e.g., machinery, metals, and fabricated metals products) simply can’t be teased out.

But even worse for the metals-using industries generally, whereas most were job creation leaders last year, they’ve turned into job creation laggards this year. This deterioration is made clear from comparing the previous table with the following table, which shows their employment performance from the metals tariffs advent through the end of last year and the beginning of this year:

                                                          Thru December               Thru January

entire private sector:                         +1.36 percent                +1.60 percent

overall manufacturing:                     +1.39 percent                +1.49 percent

durable goods:                                  +1.72 percent                +1.97 percent

fabricated metals products:              +1.57 percent                +1.78 percent

non-electrical machinery:                +2.33 percent               +2.57 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:          +1.07 percent               +1.15 percent

household appliances:                     -2.05 percent                -2.52 percent

aerospace products & parts:           +5.47 percent               +5.87 percent

Of course, President Trump’s tariffs on several hundred billion dollars worth of imports heading America’s way from China are affecting domestic manufacturing as well. But because of these products ubiquity throughout domestic industry, the greatly varying levels of their U.S. market share, and the duties’ on-again-off-again nature (prominently on display in recent days), I continue to despair of quantifying the impact usefully.

And speaking of Mr. Trump, there’s no doubt that, contrary to his confidence, trade wars are not “easy to win” – and can be highly disruptive even for countries like the United States with ample leverage to prevail. That’s inevitable when you’re trying to reverse several decades of policy. All the same, U.S. domestic manufacturing’s employment performance, even in leading victim industries, has held up pretty well since the President began responding to foreign predation in earnest. Whether the manufacturing interests he’s counting on to win reelection will agree is another question entirely.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Were the US Washing Machine Tariffs Really Failures?

22 Tuesday Oct 2019

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Uncategorized

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consumers, Federal Reserve, General Electric, imports, jobs multiplier, large residential washers, LRWs, manufacturing jobs, metals tariffs, safeguard tariffs, South Korea, tariff-rate quota, tariffs, U.S. International Trade Commission, University of Chicago, USITC, washing machines, Whirlpool, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s as close to a slam dunk conclusion as can be – at least according to economists, think tank hacks, and Mainstream Media journalists: The early 2018 U.S. tariffs on large household laundry machines have been a dismal failure.

Or have they been?

The levies belong in a category different from those of the main Trump administration trade-limiting measures because they were first mandated by an independent federal agency (the U.S. International Trade Commission, or USITC) via a long-standing legal process.  And they’ve been panned for supercharging costs for consumers, and padding the profits of the domestic industry to extents that dwarfed the new production and jobs they fostered. (Here’s a typical example of the press’ evaluation, drawing on equally typical research from the venerable University of Chicago and the even venerable-er Federal Reserve.)

What has gone oddly unreported has been the verdict rendered by the USITC – which came out in August. Sure, the agency is grading itself. At the same time, it’s privy to the most authoritative data (taken from the domestic and foreign companies involved themselves), and it’s surely worth noting that the Commission paints a significantly different , and brighter, picture.

The tariffs, put in place in February, 2018, affected the nation’s total global imports of these products, but mainly impacted such “large residential washers” (LRWs) from China, Mexico, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam – the biggest foreign suppliers to the U.S. market. The duties’ aim: stemming a sudden surge of LRWs that injure U.S.-based manufacturers. But they don’t shelter the domestic industry forever.

After three years – the amount of time the Commission has determined these domestic manufacturers need to adjust – they’re phased out for both the final products and many of the parts covered in the “safeguard order.” In addition, consistent with their surge focus, they only apply to imports above a certain level of units – a trade curb known as a “tariff-rate quota.” In all, moreover, the ultimate objective is to give victim industries time to adjust and then stand on their own two feet. That’s why detailed adjustment plans are a condition of receiving tariff relief.

To some extent, the USITC’s judgment doesn’t contrast dramatically different from that of the tariffs’ critics. Both noted (in the Commission’s words) “generally increased prices” and “decreased imports.” The Commission, though reported some developments generally missed by the critics (especially “some improvement in the financial performance of continuously operating [domestic] producers,” and market share gains for these companies) and some given decidedly short shrift (“increased production by two new U.S. producers” – both of whose owners come from South Korea, undoubtedly because the option of supplying the American market through exports was sharply limited).

The Commission didn’t address one of the critics’ most compelling points – that the new U.S. jobs were created at a cost to consumers (via the higher prices they’ve paid) of a whopping $817,000 per job. But the University of Chicago/Federal Reserve study actually conceded that this number might be an exaggeration, since manufacturing jobs (like all jobs) create a “multiplier effect” – that is, they foster additional employment in related industries ranging from suppliers of inputs to transportation, packaging, and warehousing services. What these researchers didn’t mention is that manufacturing’s jobs multiplier is unusually high.

Moreover, like virtually all scholars of trade, tariffs, and employment, the Chicago/Fed team neglected other benefits of manufacturing job creation (and prevention of further manufacturing job loss). These include:

>avoiding the wage losses suffered by displaced manufacturing workers who find work in lower-paid industries (an especially important consideration given today’s very low overall unemployment rates)

>avoiding the revenue losses incurred by these workers’ communities and the economy as a whole due to reductions in their taxable income;

>avoiding the increased pressure on social programs required to serve employees who can’t find new jobs – which encompass not only unemployment compensation but spending that seeks to address the pathologies that often follow working class Americans’ deteriorating personal finances, like divorce, delinquency, alcoholism, and opioid and other drug use, not to mention higher mortality;

>and the costs incurred by local businesses because of worker-customers who can no longer afford as many of their products and services, which of course reduces business’ own taxable income and additionally crimps public finance at all levels. (See, e.g., this highly cited study.)

The USITC report, moreover, shed light on another big reason that the costs-per-manufacturing-job-saved might be exaggerated: Not all of the increased costs of the tariff-ed products are due to the tariffs. In particular, the Commission listed no less than 14 factors other than import competition (and the tariffs placed on these goods) that affect the prices of LRWs. They range from raw materials, transportation, and energy costs to competition levels from substitute and between domestic producers, U.S.-based production capacity, productivity changes, labor contracts, and state and local government incentives, and demand levels at home and abroad (because all the U.S.- and foreign-owned manufacturers sell all over the world). The USITC then proceeded to ask producers, importers, and purchasers (retailers) to rate the importance of these factors on prices since the tariffs’ imposition in February, 2018.

The answers were reported in table III-26, and import competition levels were anything but dominant. Indeed, their importance consistently was rated by all three stakeholder as lower or no greater than that not only of raw materials costs (higher due to entirely separate tariffs on metals that were imposed by the Trump administration) but of energy costs, domestic production capacity (surely limited over time by the previous import flood), the allocation of this production capacity to other products, productivity levels, labor agreements, transportation and delivery costs, and domestic demand levels.

And adding to the case for reducing the costs per job figure: According to the official U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics figures, after jumping by 16.31 percent from the February, 2018 onset of the tariffs through that November, they’ve since fallen by 9.73 percent (through September).

In fact, this development leads to a major point completely missed by the tariffs’ critics. As also indicated by the phaseout schedule and the linkage of the tariffs to the submission of adjustment blueprints, the levies were never intended to produce instant results, or to furnish crutches forever. The USITC describes the implementation of these plans starting on p. IV-5 and, more revealing, presents the evaluations of the retailers – who are bound to be the most demanding judges.

The reviews are mixed, but varying numbers of these companies stated that the two domestic recipients of the tariff relief – Whirlpool and General Electric – introduced new products (the most commonly cited improvement), upgraded product quality, expanded marketing campaigns, bettered their customer service, and taken other positive steps (Table IV-2).

Will these measures prove sufficient? Even after the tariffs come off, definitive answers will prove elusive, because as made clear, the LRW trade policy picture contains so many moving parts. What does look definitive, however, is that so far, the critics have engaged in a flawed rush to judgment.

 

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Jobs Report Again Shows Evidence of Tariffs Damage

08 Saturday Jun 2019

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

China, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

A speaking engagement yesterday prevented me from posting promptly on that morning’s monthly U.S. jobs report (for May), but after crunching the numbers, two conclusions come through loud and clear. First, the overall results added up to a total stinker. And second, like last month’s release, they contained more evidence that President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies are taking a toll on hiring in manufacturing.

As with economy-wide (“non-farm”) hiring in May, manufacturing employment creation in general grew weakly – and for the fourth straight month. Industry’s payrolls rose by a measly 3,000 on month in May. The revisions, meanwhile, left the discouraging situation basically intact, as April’s previously reported 4,000 net sequential job gain was upgraded to 5,000, but March’s former flatline is now judged to have been a 3,000 net monthly job decrease.

As usual, however, when it comes to the trade policy implications, the results that count are those in manufacturing sectors actually significantly affected by trade policy moves like Mr. Trump’s tariffs. First let’s examine industry’s major metals-using sectors – both the necessary data for these industries goes back to April, 2018 (the first full month when these levies were in effect) and because the industries themselves are much easier to identify.

Here are the figures for these sectors’ employment changes between that month and this past April (both the originally reported numbers and today’s revisions), and between April, 2018 and May, 2019. (All these results, incidentally, are still preliminary.) Serving as control groups are the results for the entire private sector in the United States, for all of manufacturing, and for the durable goods super-sector (where all the main metals-using industries have been found).

                                                    Old thru April   New thru April   April Thru May

entire private sector:                  +1.79 percent     +1.93 percent      +2.00 percent

overall manufacturing:              +1.58 percent     +1.60 percent      +1.62 percent

durable goods:                           +1.92 percent     +1.94 percent      +1.99 percent

fabricated metals products:       +1.82 percent     +1.71 percent      +1.65 percent

non-electrical machinery:         +2.68 percent     +2.52 percent      +2.64 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:    +0.42 percent     +0.20 percent     + 0.48 percent

household appliances:               not available       -4.57 percent       not available

aerospace products & parts:      not available      +7.02 percent       not available

The pattern is clear. Even in metals-using sectors that had been outperforming the overall private sector and overall manufacturing in absolute terms, hiring momentum has waned. Moreover, it’s recently been slackening at a faster rate than evident in those larger sectors. That’s clear from the narrowing of the gap that can generally be seen between the employment increases in the metals-using sectors and the broader parts of the economy.

The impact of the China tariffs remains a puzzle, though, because they’ve been in place for a briefer period of time, and because the industry classification system used by the Trump administration in developing its tariff lists is different from the system used by the Labor Department to track employment changes. In addition, the level of China content of domestic manufactured goods can vary considerably, meaning that the impact of the tariffs can vary just as considerably.

Nevertheless, some exact and reasonably close matches can be identified, and, at least through April (the latest month for which data are available for the specific sectors below, which are narrower than those in the table for metals-using industries), the same relative hiring weakness can be seen. That is, job creation in the China tariffs-affected sectors has been growing more slowly than job creation in the private sector in toto, or in manufacturing overall. This trend is visible even in sectors that have greatly bested the private sector and manufacturing control groups in absolute levels of job creation.

                                   July-March    Old July-April   New July-April    July-May

private sector:         +1.23 percent   +1.44 percent    +1.39 percent    +1.46 percent

overall                   +0.98 percent  +1.03 percent     +1.02 percent     +1.04 percent  

   manufacturing:

aircraft engines       +1.39 percent    not available    +1.51 percent    not available

   and engine parts:

industrial heating   +2.46 percent     not available    +1.45 percent    not available

    equipment:

oil & gas drilling   +5.83 percent      not available   +5.02 percent    not available

    platform parts:

farm machinery     +1.67 percent      not available   +0.17 percent     not available

    & equipment:

ball bearings:        +1.82 percent       not available   +1.54 percent     not available

These results don’t mean that the Trump tariffs, as some keep predicting, are going to throw the American economy into recession, much less that if they do start biting significantly, that they won’t be a price worth paying for overhauling decades of boneheaded, offshoring-friendly, national security threatening (especially in the case of China) trade policies. In fact, they don’t even add up to evidence that the levies are biting significantly now.

But empirical evidence of some damage is finally emerging, at least on the jobs front, and it should be seen as a warning to tariff supporters – including the President – to stop insisting that the current trade wars will entail no costs or need for sacrifice whatever.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Some Surprising New Data on Manufacturing and Trade

18 Wednesday Apr 2018

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

China, IMF, International Monetary Fund, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, Nicholas Lardy, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade surpluses, World Bank, World Economic Outlook, {What's Left of) Our Economy

That was some chart in this week’s newest International Monetary Fund (IMF) update on the world economy on how different countries (including the United States) have fared when it comes to increasing or maintaining their manufacturing employment and their manufacturing output. (The detail in the below reproduction is tough to see, but for the original, see p. 5 in the third chapter of the Fund’s April World Economic Outlook.) 

Quill Cloud

 

Looking at performance for 20 high-income countries and 20 low-income countries, it makes clear that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, there’s nothing unusual about national economies boosting manufacturing jobs as a share of total jobs, and manufacturing output as a share of total output, at the same time. So it’s a powerful retort to claims from American globalization cheerleaders that all over the world, in rich and poor countries alike, both manufacturing indicators are bound to fall in relative terms as economies inevitably evolve in more services-oriented directions.

And at the very least, it calls into question the notion that trade balances in manufacturing have little or nothing to do job loss in the sector in particular. For example, according to the chart, 22 of the 40 countries examined have boosted manufacturing as a share of their employment and their real value-added (a measure of output) from 1960 through 2015. And 11 of these were high-income countries, where the conventional wisdom says manufacturing’s economic importance is likeliest to shrink over any significant time frame.

Of these 22 countries, 17 ran surpluses in their combined goods and services trade in 2015. And nine were high-income countries.

Not that trade surpluses are automatic indicators of economic success: This group does include economically stagnant Italy as well as economically collapsing Venezuela. Spain, which experienced a terrible stretch during the last recession, is on this list, too – although it’s been a strong grower more recently. And there’s one country whose failure to qualify sure surprised me: Germany. Nonetheless, the countries that have excelled at manufacturing during this period also include major success stories like Chile, the Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland, Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, and of course China (along with Japan, which is currently in the midst of its best growth stretch in nearly three decades).

Of course, the 1960-2015 time frame is still problematic at best, especially for China – since in 1960 it was still being run by leaders enamored with ideas like making steel in peasants’ backyard furnaces. But more recent comparisons between China and the United States look much more instructive – and supportive of the idea that a strong manufacturing trade performance is a great way to maintain robust manufacturing employment and production – and of its converse.

Let’s examine the post-2002 period – with the baseline chosen because that’s the year China actually joined the World Trade Organization, and began receiving WTO-style protection for its predatory, surplus-building trade practices. And for manufacturing output, let’s use pre-inflation value-added, since I wasn’t able to find inflation-adjusted data for China.

According to World Bank figures, manufacturing by this measure dipped from 31.06 percent of China’s economy in 2002 to 29.38 percent – a 5.72 percent decline. For the United States, between 2002 and 2015 manufacturing value-added as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) fell from 13.74 percent to 12.27 percent. That 10.70 drop-off was nearly twice that of China.

As for employment, Sinologist Nicholas Lardy of the Peterson Institute for International Economics (and no hardliner on China) has compiled Chinese statistics dating from 2003, and covering employment in the country’s cities. They show that manufacturing jobs as a share of this China total rose from 15 percent that year to 20 percent in 2014. In the United States during those years, manufacturing employment as a share of total non-farm jobs (the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ American jobs universe), dropped from 11.91 percent to 8.76 percent.

And nowhere have the manufacturing differences between the two economies been greater than in trade flows. For the first year of its WTO membership, China’s goods and services trade surplus (which was mainly in manufacturing) was $30.35 billion. By 2014, it was ballooned to $382 billion. During this period, the American manufacturing trade deficit shot up by just under 74 percent – from $362.64 billion to $629.53 billion.

So the new IMF chart (and related data) by no means ends the debate over whether trade balances impact national manufacturing employment and output. But if I was a globalization cheerleader, I’d sure hope they didn’t attract too much attention.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Best Stretch of U.S. Manufacturing Jobs Gains in Nearly Two Years Continues but Wages Outlook is Cloudy

05 Friday May 2017

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Bureau of Labor Statistics, inflation-adjusted wages, Jobs, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, private sector, recession, recovery, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

U.S. monthly manufacturing employment grew for the fifth straight month in April for its best such performance since a nearly two-year stretch of sequential gains from 2013 to 2015. As a result, the sector continued to edge out of its latest jobs recession. But the monthly pace of employment increases (6,000 in April) fell for the third consecutive month.

In addition, manufacturing’s share of total non-farm payrolls fell to its latest record low – 8.46 percent. Revisions were negative by 2,000. Year-on-year manufacturing employment growth sped up again in April (to 40,000) – its best annual improvement since February, 2016 (69,000).

Pre-inflation manufacturing wages in April recorded their best monthly improvement (0.68 percent) since last October (0.73 percent). And for the first time in four months, these manufacturing wage advances exceeded that of the overall private sector (0.27 percent.) Year-on-year current dollar manufacturing wage momentum seemed to stall out, registering its slowest such advance (2.71 percent) since last August (2.68 percent). But the strong monthly gain resulted in industry’s annual wages gains resuming their recent pattern of topping those of the private sector (2.55 percent).

Manufacturing remained a recovery-era jobs and wages laggard, but the gap in pay at least narrowed between March and April from a 22.81 percent difference between the recovery-era increase in cumulative private sector and manufacturing wage increases to an 18.61 percent difference. Yet the latest (March) real wage data kept showing manufacturing pay falling further behind.

Here’s my analysis of the latest monthly (April) manufacturing figures contained in this morning’s employment report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics:

>Manufacturing employment grew sequentially for the fifth straight month in April, enabling the sector to keep edging out of its latest jobs recession and record its best stretch of monthly employment improvement since the August, 2013 to July, 2015 period.

>But April’s monthly gain of 6,000 represented the third straight month of slowing advances, and helped drag industry’s share of total nonfarm payrolls (the government’s definition of the U.S. employment universe) to it’s latest all-time now – 8.46 percent.

>So did slightly negative revisions, with March’s originally reported 11,000 monthly jobs gain revised up to 13,000, but February’s already downgraded 26,000 increase reduced again to 22,000.

>On the brighter side, the April figures were good enough to produce a year-on-year manufacturing jobs improvement of 40,000 – the best such advance since February, 2016’s 69,000. The April annual advance also bettered that between the previous Aprils (35,000).

>Manufacturing wages presented a mixed picture, too. In April, industry pay before inflation enjoyed its best monthly increase (0.68 percent) since last October (0.73 percent). The spurt was especially welcome, since the sector’s monthly March wage change was revised down from 0.04 percent to zero.

>Moreover, for the first time since December, such manufacturing wage rises resumed outpacing increases in the private sector overall (0.27 percent).

>The year-on-year April manufacturing pre-inflation wage increase of 2.71 percent, however, was its slowest since last August (2.68 percent). It was lower, too, than that of April, 2015 to April, 2016 (2.99 percent). At the same time, the new April result also bested that of the private sector overall (2.55 percent), continuing a streak of out-performance that began in March, 2016.

>On a pre-inflation basis, manufacturing’s wage increases during the current economic recovery still trail those of the private sector, but the gap narrowed between March and April. The revised figures for the former month show that private sector wages had risen by 17.98 percent since the current expansio began in mid-2009 – 22.81 percent faster than manufacturing wages (14.64 percent).

>As of April, however, private sector wages during the recovery were up by 18.29 percent while manufacturing wages had improved by 15.42 percent – a gap of only 18.61 percent. ,since the expansion began in mid-2009.

>Yet when wages are adjusting for inflation, manufacturing’s performance looks worse than ever. The latest figures only cover March, but show that industry’s 0.37 percent price-adjusted monthly pay improvement fell short of the overall private sector’s 0.47 percent advance.

>Year-on-year, manufacturing wages were up only 0.19 percent – also worse than the (also meager) 0.28 percent rise for the private sector.

>As a result, real manufacturing wages have increased by only 0.93 percent during the current, nearly eight-year old economic recovery. Overall private sector wages are up 3.97 percent.

>In April, manufacturing retained its status as an employment laggard, too. During the recovery, its payrolls are up by only 5.71 percent. The total for employment in the private sector as a whole? 14.09 percent.

>Since the late-2007 onset of the last recession, manufacturing’s performance is equally poor. From that time to the early 2010 troughs, manufacturing lost 2.293 million jobs and private sector payrolls shrank by 8.801 million.

>Since then, manufacturing has regained just 41.43 percent of those lost jobs (a total of 943,000). The private sector as a whole has boosted employment by 16.436 million.

>As a result, total private sector employment is now 6.62 percent higher than at the recession’s late-2007 onset, but manufacturing employment is still 9.82 percent lower.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Tariffs Can Reverse Offshoring’s Damage

27 Tuesday Dec 2016

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 5 Comments

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China, emerging markets, export platforms, foreign investment, free trade agreements, GE, globalization, intermediate goods, Jeffrey Immelt, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, manufacturing output, Mexico, multinational companies, offshoring, product life cycle theory, reshoring, Richard Baldwin, tariffs, The Great Convergence, The Race to the Bottom, Trade, trade law, World Trade Organization, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s definitely weird to be writing a post in response to a recent tweet-storm. But this was no ordinary tweeter. This was someone who’s getting attention from the Washington economic policy establishment as a new oracle on trade and globalization. That’s evidently because his work conveniently sums up many of the leading myths about the world economy and America’s approach to it that have been propagated by this group of interests. So his burst of social media activism provides a valuable opportunity to set the record straight.

The tweeter extraordinaire was Richard Baldwin. He’s not only an international economics professor at the University of Geneva in Switzerland, but the founder of the informative Voxeu.org economics research portal and president of the Centre for Economic Policy Research in London (not to be confused with the Center for Economic Policy and Research in Washington, D.C.). And he’s just come out with a book titled The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization.

According to Baldwin, I have been guilty of a “Classic misthinking of globalisation” by supporting an overhauled U.S. trade policy featuring much more aggressive use of tariffs and other protectionist measures. But from the rest of his tweet-storm, a summary presentation he’s touting, and some other statements, it’s should be obvious that his own description of recent international economic trends and their main causes is way wide of the mark.

His fundamental mistake lies in neglecting the crucial role played in fostering today’s flows of goods, services, and capital by trade agreements and by the dramatically differing reductions in trade barriers from both a quantitative and, more important, a qualitative, standpoint. In particular, Baldwin ignores how various bilateral trade deals and decisions, and the multilateral pact that created the World Trade Organization gave multinational companies the essential condition they needed to justify the increasingly sophisticated production and job offshoring that has characterized globalization – guaranteed access to developed country, and especially the U.S. – market.

For the record, here’s the full string of tweets. (Some repeat previous tweets in the sequence.)

Classic misthinking of globalisation by @AlanTonelson

Recent globalisation driven by knowledge offshoring not freer trade

Tariffs don’t address the driving force

Could foster reshoring of some production but also more offshoring

The main problem is domestic: Protect workers, not jobs.

Jobs for U.S.-based robots

Trump tariffs raise cost of industrial import only in US (not Germany, Japan, China, Mexico, Canada)

Knowledge offshore drove 21st century globalisation

Tariffs don’t address globalisation’s driving force

US tariffs foster some reshoring and some more offshoring

So what is the right way to deal with angry middle class?

Protect individual workers, not individual jobs.

So what is the right way to deal with angry middle class?

Are you familiar with the concept of factor substitutability ? Changing relative prices changes decisions.

But think of it this way. Offshoring, especially the kind focused on by Baldwin, to developing countries, can serve 3 main purposes. It can help companies better supply overseas markets. It can help them better supply their home country market. Or it can seek both objectives.

The great expansion of U.S. trade, primarily with developing countries, that Baldwin rightly notes began around 1990 (with the end of the Cold War and the great strengthening of free market reforms in gigantic developing countries), was justified with many and varied arguments. The paramount rationale, however, was serving the huge, ballooning populations of the world’s Chinas, Indias, Mexicos, and Brazils.

Yet as documented exhaustively in my 2002 book, The Race to the Bottom (and of course many other studies), incomes in these so-called Big Emerging Markets were simply too low to enable their final consumption to rise much – at least compared with their production and productive capacity. No one was more aware of this situation than the emerging market countries themselves – unless it was the global corporations considering pouring investment into them.

That’s why the smartest of these countries understood that they could not possibly grow and develop adequately by supplying their own populations alone, however rapid their income gains. Their only real hope for satisfactory progress was serving markets “where the money is.” America’s relatively open market and consumption-led national economic structure was their best bet by far.

And that’s why the multinationals as well were so determined for Washington to negotiate free trade agreements with these countries. – not to lower foreign trade barriers and permit American businesses their workers to reach the third world’s billions of new actual and potential consumers, but to lock in lower or eliminated barriers to the U.S. market. See the end notes to this recent study for references to just some of the scholarly evidence.

Accomplishing this aim would ensure that their plan to supply well heeled American customers from super low-cost and virtually unregulated third world supply bases would actually make money. Alternatively put, if Washington were legally able to curb or cut off access to the United States for Corporate America’s third world factories, these new facilities would lose much of their value.

Bringing the United States into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was also instrumental in this scheme. Its new rules and especially its unprecedented enforcement authority have greatly weakened America’s legal scope to use its trade law system to turn back goods (including those from the multinationals’ factories) that have been dumped, illegally subsidized, or benefited from other predatory trade policies – including currency undervaluation. In this vein, securing Chinese membership was vital, too. It secured near-invulnerability to U.S. trade law for the multinationals’ favorite export platform.

So the crucial importance of tariffs should be obvious to all. Yes, the technological advances cited by Baldwin (and so many others) have facilitated offshoring – and made the offshoring of even sophisticated production possible from the standpoint of logistics and administration and quality control and numerous similar considerations. But much and possibly most of it couldn’t pass the bottom-line test without the U.S. market access that can be made or broken by tariffs. That is, technology was a necessary condition of offshoring. But it was hardly sufficient.

Consistent with the product life cycle model, it’s unmistakably true that a growing share of multinational investment in developing countries is serving those markets. But compelling evidence abounds that the export platform strategy remains crucial – both to the countries and to the companies. Among the strongest, as I’ve recently written: the howls of protest from the corporate Offshoring Lobby and from export platform countries sparked by President-elect Trump’s talk of tariffs on the output they plan to sell to the United States. If America wasn’t such an important destination, and if so much of the offshored production was sold locally, why would they be so concerned?

Two other key items of evidence for the importance of tariffs:

a. The recent acknowledgment by GE CEO Jeffrey Immelt that trade barriers and other localization moves were mushrooming around the world, and that his company would have no choice but to say “How high” when ever more protectionist governments say “Jump!” Immelt’s statement makes clear that economies much smaller and weaker than America’s will be able to lure his company’s production and jobs either through relatively simple restrictions of access to their market, or through various performance standards imposed on inbound foreign investment that will be enforced through tariffs.

b. The prevalence of these practices and their success in influencing corporate location decisions. Indeed, the only major power that abjures these measures is the United States. Obviously, if smaller and weaker economies can wield tariffs and other trade restrictions successfully, America’s inaction stems from inadequate will, not inadequate wallet.

Yet as Baldwin’s tweet-storm shows, he is also offering three related objections to tariffs that have nothing intrinsically to do with the advent and growth of what he calls “knowledge offshoring.” He argues that tariffs would disastrously raise the cost to domestic U.S. manufacturers of all the imported inputs they use in their final products. As a result, he adds, these American manufacturers would lose competitiveness to any number of foreign rivals. Finally, he repeats the widespread argument that even if significant production was reshored with tariffs, the job impact would be minimal because of soaring, labor-saving productivity advances in manufacturing.

But Baldwin seems unaware that intermediate goods, including of course capital equipment, make up a huge share of domestic U.S. manufacturing. Because output data is too general (in particular lumping together such intermediates with finished goods in many super-categories), the exact figure is difficult to calculate. But other statistics leave no doubt as to the scale.

As I’ve previously shown, what the Census Bureau calls “industrial supplies” and “capital goods” have comprised fully 62.5 percent of America’s total merchandise exports for the first ten months of this year. And as with the output figures, these statistics leave out products such as auto parts (which are included, but not broken out, under a separate heading).

These industries are also gigantic employers. My own tally of Bureau of Labor Statistics data reveals that their workers number 5.764 million. That’s slightly over 47 percent of all manufacturing employees. Moreover, just over 28 percent of the workers in these sectors are white-collar workers – meaning in turn that many of them are in research, engineering, and other STEM fields. These numbers, moreover, indicate that even if I’m whoppingly wrong, we’re still talking about lots of valuable production and workers. 

So tariffs would create enormous new opportunities for this immense sector of manufacturing – and comparable new demand for the kinds of folks nearly everyone wants to become bigger and bigger percentages of the American labor market.

In addition, Baldwin’s case against tariffs seems to assume that they’ll be geographically circumscribed – hence his claim about the competitiveness-harming impact of barriers against these intermediate goods. But this assumption is puzzling, to say the least. Of course tariffs limited to, say, China or Mexico would open new opportunities in the U.S. market or third country markets for other manufacturing powers. Yet this is precisely why the trade proposals being floated by the administration-in-waiting increasingly include world-wide restrictions.

Finally, although labor-saving productivity gains are surely responsible for much manufacturing job loss in recent decades, the benefits of reshoring manufacturing output shouldn’t be underestimated. Industry’s very productivity performance is clearly one big reason – how can a national economy not profit from regaining many of its most productive sectors?

The importance of existing industry for fostering new industries and related economic benefits and opportunities is another big reason. This new paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research presents findings indicating just how much technological advance is generated by incumbent companies (and presumably industries) rather than through the “creative destruction” emphasized by much of the economics profession. So a focus on manufacturing output means a focus on much of the economy’s capacity to continue creating genuine wealth – and sustainable prosperity.

Further, for all of its competitiveness issues, manufacturing still dominates American export flows. If free-trade-oriented analysts are right, and main purpose of exporting is earning the income to buy imports, how can sufficient income keep getting created if domestic manufacturing production keeps stagnating or shrinking – which has clearly been the case in real terms since the last recession began?

As indicated by some of the preceding paragraphs, however, much uncertainty – in my view, way too much – is still left by the official data analysts are forced to use to study the vital Who, What, Where, When, Why, and How Much issues raised by globalization. Nor does the information reported sporadically in the business press or reported (often partially and self-servingly) by the companies themselves add more than fragments to the existing picture.

Many of these uncertainties could be cleared up if offshoring companies were required by Washington to disclose much more information than at present about how their domestic and foreign operations compare, and how these comparisons have changed over time. After all, knowing the crucial details is critical to their success. And if the disclosure mandate was universal, no individual firm would gain competitive advantage from this new flood of proprietary facts and figures.

So I hope Baldwin – and others sharing his views – will join me in demanding such disclosure. We have nothing to lose but our (relative) ignorance.

Im-Politic: Meet the Real Trade and Jobs Know-Nothings

06 Wednesday Apr 2016

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Im-Politic

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

2016 election, Bernie Sanders, Clyde V. Prestowitz, Donald Trump, Im-Politic, Jr., manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, Morris Chang, Ronald Reagan, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, The Race to the Bottom, Trade, transplants

Nothing during this wildly unconventional presidential campaign has anchored the economic conventional wisdom more strongly than the claim that only know-nothings like presidential candidates Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders could possibly think that better U.S. trade policies can bring back lots of high-paying manufacturing jobs from countries like China to the United States. And nothing during this same campaign has revealed more Establishment ignorance than this attack on these White House hopefuls.

An excellent recent op-ed in USA Today by former U.S. trade negotiator Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr. explains why. As Prestowitz (with whom I worked in the early 1990s at the Economic Strategy Institute think tank he founded) writes, anyone thinking that free market forces have turned China, for example, into a major producer of advanced manufactured goods needs to get a clue. China’s natural manufacturing advantage lies in labor-intensive products like apparel and toys, because its workforce is so gargantuan and its technological development still has a long way to go.

But Beijing wasn’t content to keep making such low-value products an instant longer than necessary. So it’s used a raft of active policy carrots and sticks to lure even information technology manufacturing to its shores. My book on globalization, The Race to the Bottom, has exhaustively documented how these policies have long been standard operating procedure for governments all over the world – except America’s. And the supposedly all-powerful multinational companies they’ve mainly targeted? Instead of standing on their high horses, and refusing to jump, they’ve simply asked “How high?”

If you still doubt any of this, forget about what Prestowitz and I have reported. Listen to Morris Chang. He started up and still chairs the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which is the world’s largest contract manufacturer of computer chips, and in fact, pioneered the “foundry” model for the industry.

Chang’s company just announced that it’s building a $3 billion semiconductor fab in China, where it will produce advanced (if not leading-edge) semiconductors. How come? There’s no question that part of the reason is that so many of TSMC’s customers – in the information technology products industry – now manufacture so many of their goods in China. But as Chang also admitted, “We say that with some degree of assurance from the authorities, some degree of assurance that building a plant there will indeed enhance our access to the Chinese market. And reversely, not building a plant there will not enhance.”

That is, China’s policy is “Pay to play” – because it wants to develop its own semiconductor sector, regardless of what economic theory says it should be doing. And Chang doesn’t think he can afford to Just Say No.

Revealingly, no one is more aware than the Chinese that the United States is capable of playing this game effectively, too. As a Chinese company told Bloomberg last year, it chose Alabama as the site of a new factory both “to bring it closer to clients in the South and avoid anti-dumping tariffs on copper products.”

Also revealingly, American leaders haven’t always been brain-dead on this score. In 1981, for example, President Ronald Reagan successfully pressed Japan’s auto makers to curb their exports to the United States “voluntarily.” The following year, Honda began assembling cars in Ohio. By 1990, all the major Japanese auto makers had gone the transplant route.

Can using America’s market power bring back all production and jobs lost to trade? Of course not. Can it bring back or create lots? Of course it can, especially in high-value sectors where a technologically advanced country with well developed capital markets like the United States should be fully competitive. The actual trade know-nothings are those unfamiliar with the historic record and current global realities. Assuming of course that any of them really want to know.

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