(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Strong Fall Kickoff for U.S. Manufacturing Employment

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aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, aluminum, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Employment, fabricated metals products, health security, Jobs, machinery, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, metals, metals-using industries, NFP, non-farm payrolls, personal protective equipment, pharmaceuticals, PPE, private sector, semiconductor shortage, steel, supply chains, tariffs, Trade, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although the disappointing official September U.S. jobs figures released this morning might have been depressed significantly by “strange [CCP Virus-related] statistical quirks around school reopening,” it’s still noteworthy that manufacturing employment rose nicely during the month – by 26,000 workers. These results are all the more impressive given all the supply chain and semiconductor shortage headwinds faced by domestic industry, especially in the automotive sector.

Moreover, revisions of the strong July and August payroll figures for U.S.-based manufacturers were only slightly negative, with the former’s upgraded 52,000 sequential gain now judged to be 57,000, and August’s initially reported 37,000 improvement downgraded to 31,000.

As a result, in September, domestic industry closed still more of the gap that had opened up in its hiring performance versus that of the total American non-farm sector (the government’s definition of the U.S. employment universe, which includes government jobs), although it lost some additional ground against the private sector.

According to this latest jobs report, manufacturing had regained 74.51 percent of the 1.385 million jobs it lost during the steep pandemic-related recession of March and April, 2020 – up from the 72.71 percent reported in the August jobs release. That’s a faster rate of improvement than for the non-farm sector (whose payroll recovery grew from 76.60 percent of jobs lost during that early spring of 2020 to 77.77 percent) but slower than that of the private sector (which has now seen an 80.71 percent employment recovery from the spring, 2020 lows – up from 78.72 percent).

It’s certainly plausible that the non-farm jobs recovery has been most recently held back by those school reopening problems, and therefore manufacturing’s laggard status will resume once they’re cleared up. At the same time, the relatively slow industry employment rebound is also explained by its superior jobs performance during the CCP Virus recession. Specifically, its payroll levels fell then by 10.82 percent, versus 16.46 percent for private employers and 17.18 percent for the non-farm sector.

And indeed, since February, 2020 (the last full data month before the pandemic and related lockdowns and behavior changes began seriously distorting the economy), manufacturing’s share of non-farm jobs has risen from 8.39 percent to 8.43 percent. In addition, it’s increased as a share of private sector jobs fromThe 9.87 percent to 9.91 percent.

Among the manufacturing sector categories broken out in the official monthly U.S. jobs reports, the biggest September employment winners were fabricated metals products (up 8,200 on month – its best performance since March’s 10,100 jump); machinery (a 6,300 sequential advance); printing and related support activities (4,200 – its best since March’s 5,300); and food products (up 3,500).

Strong machinery hiring is always particularly encouraging, as the sector’s products are used so widely in the rest of manufacturing, as well as in big non-manufacturing industries like construction and agriculture. Almost as important, whereas its August monthly job creation was previously reported as having flatlined, now its estimated to have climbed by 2,600. And fabricated metals products good recent jobs increases are noteworthy given the continuing U.S. tariffs on the steel and aluminum on which they rely so heavily – which supposedly are decimating metals-using industries.

The aforementioned U.S. vehicles and parts-makers were by far the biggest monthly jobs losers recorded in the September release, shedding 6,300 positions on month. That sequential drop was their worst since semiconductor shortage-induced layoffs plunged their employment levels down by 41,600 in April. No other major manufacturing category mentioned in the September jobs report lost more than 800 jobs.

The most detailed employment data for pandemic-related industries is one month behind those in the broader categories, but their job creation performance remained mixed in August.

In surgical appliances and supplies (the sector containing PPE – personal protective equipment – and similar goods), payrolls fell by 2,500 – their worst monthly performance since the previous August’s identical number. July’s 500 sequential jobs gain was upgraded to 900 and June’s 500 improvement remained the same, but jobs in these industries are now just 7.03 percent more numerous than in pre-pandemic February, 2020. As of last month’s jobs report, the figure was 9.22 percent.

The overall pharmaceuticals and medicines industry saw hiring dip by 400 in August – its worst monthly result since May’s 300 decrease. July’s job gains were revised up from 400 to 500, but June’s losses remained at a downgraded 2,300.

These sectors’ payrolls, therefore, have now risen by only 4.62 percent since February, 2020 – not the 4.72 percent published last month.

The pharmaceuticals subsector containing.vaccines fared better. Employment rose by 400 sequentially in August, July’s flatline was upgraded to an increase of 200, and June’s 1,000 jobs improvement remained unrevised. Whereas as of last month, this sector’s payrolls had grown by 10.21 percent since just before the pandemic hit, that figure is now 10.82 percent.

U.S. aircraft producer Boeing continues to suffer from manufacturing and quality problems, but jetliner employment inched up on month in August anyway – by 200. But July’s 1,500 sequential jobs decline was revised down to 1,600, while June’s upwardly revised 4,700 jump remained the same. All told, aircraft employment is now down by 8.04 percent since February, 2020 – a bit better than the 8.08 percent shortfall reported in last month’s jobs report.

The story was similar in aircraft engines and engine parts. These industries added 600 workers seqentially in August, and July’s previously reported payroll increase of 200 is now estimated at 300. June’s downgraded 400 jobs gain was unrevised, and so employment in these sectors is now off by 14.04 percent since February, 2020 – some progress over the 14.80 percent reported last month.

Non-engine aircraft parts and equipment are still stuck even deeper in the doldrums. August’s 500 jobs loss drove its payrolls down to 16.60 percent lower than in February, 2020, versus the 16.17 percent drop reported as of last month.

With manufacturing employment still powering ahead even with its supply chain issues (which reportedly don’t seem likely to end till sometime next year), and with the CCP Virus threat still hanging over the economy, betting against more of the same going forward seems foolish. And interestingly, industry’s jobs prospects look bright despite signs that its mammoth trade deficit is heading back up, at least in absolute terms. (We don’t yet have recent enough figures to know whether it’s rising in relation to manufacturing output, which is the much more important measure.)

As they say in the investment world, past performance is no guarantee of future results.  But domestic manufacturing’s recent employment performance has overcome so many obstacles over the past year-plus that it might be the best basis we have right now for prediction.  

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Another U.S. Trade Deficit Surge on the Way?

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Biden administration, Canada, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Delta variant, exports, goods trade, imports, lockdowns, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, merchandise trade, semiconductors, services trade, South Korea, Taiwan, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

A day after the Biden administration began laying out its “strategic vision” for trade policy toward China (which looks an awful lot like the tariff-heavy Trump administration policies decried by candidate Biden), this morning’s latest official U.S. monthly trade figures reminded that the predatory People’s Republic is hardly the only obstacle to an improved national trade performance.

Some of the distorting effects of the stop-start nature of the CCP Virus-era U.S. and global economies can be seen in the statistics. Principally, the last three data months have seen a month-on-month increase in the overall U.S. deficit in June, a decrease in July, and the rebound reported in today’s August release.

At the same time, through May, the growth of this total goods and services deficit was pretty sluggish. Since June, though, it’s remained above $70 billion for three straight months. (as will be detailed below).

At least as troubling – the rates of change in trade deficit increases and decreases, and in the economy’s rates of growth and shrinkage never match up exactly in the short run, because of lag times between orders and the receipt of supplies of traded goods in particular. But it’s not good news that whereas the U.S. economy grew at after-inflation annual rates topping six percent in each of the first and second quarters (ending in June) while the trade gap’s growth was pretty sluggish, third quarter growth could well be much slower (see, e.g., here), and the trade deficit seems to be settling in at higher levels.

To return to the China data – not that they were good. The S$31.74 billion U.S. merchandise deficit with the People’s Republic was the biggest monthly total since July, 2019’s $32.68 billion, and was up sequentially by 10.79 percent. Goods imports rose 6.51 percent on month to just under $43 billion for their highest level since last November. But merchandise exports sank month-to-month by 3.94 percent, to $11.26 billion – their lowest level since February.

Even so, the August trade report showed again that, longer term, the Trump tariffs are bringing and keeping America’s huge and longstanding China goods trade gap under control. Specifically, this deficit is up 13.65 percent year-to-date – much more slowly than the closest global proxy, America’s non-oil goods deficit (19.11 percent).

As for the headline U.S. combined goods and services trade deficit, it rose in August by 4.19 percent, from a slightly upwardly revised $70.30 billion to a new record $73.25 billion.

The merchandise trade shortfall increased, too – but by just 1.82 percent sequentially. And the $89.41 billion total, while high by historic standards, still trailed the $93 billion-plus top-two levels hit in March and June (the latter’s $93.26 billion remaining the record).

The August services trade surplus of $16.16 billion, however, was the lowest since December, 2011, and fell by 7.74 percent from July.

Several other records were set by the August results in the broadest U.S. trade flow categories. On the negative side, total U.S. imports hit an all-time high of $286.99 billion during the month, as did goods imports ($239.11 billion). But at $149.69 billion, August goods exports hit their second consecutive historical best.

And speaking of records, manufacturing’s $116.88 billion trade shortfall represented another. The August total was 5.76 percent greater than July’s $110.05 billion and exceeded the previous all-time worst (June’s $114.06 billion by 2.47 percent).

Delving more deeply into the manufacturing numbers, industry’s exports did improve by 1.95 percent sequentially, from $95.22 billion to $97.13 billion. But the much greater amount of imports jumped more than twice as fast – by 4.03 percent, from $205.72 billion to $214.01 billion.

On a January-August basis, the manufacturing deficit has ballooned by 23.77 percent, from $686.36 billion to $849.50 billion – making a fourth straight trillion-dollar trade gap for industry all but certain.

Year-to-date, manufacturing exports have grown by 19.28 percent, but imports remain more than twice as great, and they’ve swelled by 21.64 percent.

Some more records and notable results:

>At $3.73 billion, the August goods trade deficit with global semiconductor manufacturing superpower Taiwan set a fifth straight monthy record.

>The merchandise gap with South Korea, another leading semiconductor manufacturer, soared by 51.18 percent to $3.15 billion – its third highest total all-time.

>And the goods shortfall with Canada, America’s third largest goods trade partner (after the European Union and China, respectively) surged 24.48 percent, to a $5.33 billion level that was the loftiest monthly amount since October, 2008 ($5.65 billion).

The bear case for the trade deficit is easy to identify: For example, if it’s been rising even as the CCP Virus’ highly contagious Delta variant and related economic and behavior curbs are depressing growth, it’s sure to rise higher and faster as the Delta wave keeps showing signs of weakening, and growth picks up again. Further, whenever unsnarling begins of the kinds of logistical snags that have disrupted supplies of semiconductors and created long backups at ports on America’s West Coast and elsewhere, U.S. imports in particular will rise even more rapidly.

The bull case seems to depend mainly on the winding down domestically and internationally of the virus – which will help America’s trade partners finally to start catching up with the United States recovery-wise, and therefore to step up net buys of U.S. imports. (See, e.g., here.) There are also the arguments that supply chain normalization will help restore domestic U.S. business’ export potential; and that the Biden administration has just made clear that the vast bulk of the steep and sweeping Trump China tariffs will remain in place for the foreseeable future – which will keep pricing enormous amounts of imports from China out of the U.S. market.

At this point, the fence looks like the safest place to be analytically, as has often been the case for the pandemic economy. So that’s where I’ll sit regarding future prospects for the trade deficit – but leaning a little toward the bearish side for now.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Strange U.S. Monthly Trade Report Even by 2020 Standards

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Agence France-Presse, Boeing, China, goods trade, goods trade deficit, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, merchandise trade, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Because the economy, its strengths and weaknesses, and the policy issues they raise haven’t disappeared despite, yesterday’s outrageous attack on the U.S. Capitol Building, I’m reporting as usual in detail on this morning’s monthly international trade figures (for November).

But a first read of the data, anyway, reveals something pretty unusual (aside from the now-standard CCP Virus- and lockdowns-related distortions) – the 7.97 sequential increase in the combined goods and services deficit, to the second biggest monthly level ever, came from a very large number of sources. And some of the biggest standard culprits (including recent problem sectors like services) played a very minor role.  

At the same time, it’s important to remember that the makeup of that all-time worst overall monthly trade gap ($68.28 billion, in August, 2006), was completely different from the latest $68.14 billion total in that 38.31 percent consisted of oil. The latest trade data show a small oil surplus. That change has major policy implications, since (as known by RealityChek regulars), it means that now the entire trade shortfall in goods (the bulk of the overall deficit) comes in those flows heavily influenced by trade policy. And we’ll get back to that “Made in Washington” portion of the trade gap below.

The November figure brought the year-to-date total trade deficit figure to $604.82 billion – 4.85 percent bigger than last year’s counterpart of $576.85 billion. As a result, the December results are certain to produce a new annual record (currently held by 2018’s $579.94 billion).

Nevertheless, this projected figure as a share of the total U.S. economy (measured as pre-inflation gross domestic product or GDP) would be well below 2006’s record of 5.58 percent, and could trail some levels hit in the 2010s.

Meanwhile, the goods, or merchandise, trade deficit hit its own all-time high in absolute terms (not the relative terms described immediately above), with the $86.36 billion level topping August’s $83.90 billion. And the November surplus of $18.21 billion represented the worst monthly services trade performance since August, 2012’s $17.08 billion.

The rise in the November overall trade deficit stemmed entirely – and then some – from the 2.94 percent increase in total imports from $245.11 billion to $252.32 billion. And worsening goods imports were just about the whole story, growing 3.04 percent sequentially from $207.76 billion to $214.08 billion. Total exports improved by 1.19 percent, from $182.00 billion to $184.17 billion.

As suggested above, the “Made in Washington” trade deficit (which strips out not only oil, but services, since the former is almost never the focus of trade policy, and liberalization in the latter remains embryonic globally) hit a new monthly record, too. The $85.70 billion November figure was 5.54 percent higher than October’s $81.20 billion total, and slightly exceeded August’s previous $84.65 billion all-time high.

Standing at $830.21 billion to date this year, this trade gap, too, will certainly top the annual record of $840 billion set in 2019.

Strangely, though, two of the biggest historical pieces of the trade deficit – the China goods and manufacturing gaps – were little changed on-month in November.

The former increased by 1.90 percent month-to-month, to $30.68 billion, as U.S. exports fell slightly and the much greater amount of imports increased fractionally. Moreover, year-to-date, this deficit is down 11.51 percent year-to-date, making clear that the Trump tariffs have diverted trade to countries that much friendlier politically, and much less predatory economically.

More evidence for this proposition – and for the overall economic success of the Trump levies: As recent news accounts of China’s official trade figures continually emphasize, the People’s Republic’s global goods exports have been booming lately. This Agence France-Presse article reported that China’s November goods exports represented a 21.1 percent jump on a year-to-date basis, and its merchandise trade surplus surged 29.06 percent on-month.

But if the U.S. November data are to be believed, almost none of this Chinese growth – and, most significant, its trade-fueled economic growth – has been achieved at America’s expense.

The even more chronic and much bigger manufacturing trade deficit actually declined slightly on month in November – by 1.74 percent from October’s record $110.20 billion. But at $108.28 billion, this monthly trade shortfall was still the second biggest of all time.

Year-to-date, the manufacturing trade gap stood at $1.00626 trillion – 5.83 percent bigger than last year’s $950.86 billion. As a result, the 2020 annual figure will certainly break last year’s record $1.03314 billion. But it will be important is by how much, since this trade deficit’s annual growth has slowed markedly since 2013 – from 11.78 percent in 2014 to 1.31 percent in 2019. In fact, as previously reported here, if not for Boeing’s safety woes crippling the trade performance of the big surplus-generating aerospace sector, the 2019 manufacturing trade deficit would have barely worsened at all.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Revival Plans Still Need Trump-like Tariffs

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Buy American, carbon tariff, carbon tax, Dan Breznitz, David Adler, health security, infrastructure, Joe Biden, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, research and development, supply chains, tariffs, taxes, technology, The New York Times, Trade, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I was thrilled to see today’s op-ed piece on U.S. manufacturing in The New York Times, and not just because co-author David Adler is a good friend. I was also thrilled to see it because a careful reading reenforces the essential notion that all the worthy proposals made by policy analysts and politicians lately (including apparent President-elect Joe Biden) on reviving industry will either come to naught or greatly underperform without steep, and indeed Trump-like, tariffs to shut a critical mass of imports out of the economy.

Those domestically-focused manufacturing revival measures have included more federal funding for research and developments, greater federal efforts to help smaller manufacturers in particular learn about and access research breakthroughs in academia and existing government labs, measures to help these smaller industrial firms access capital more easily, tax breaks to foster production and innovation in the United States, and more ambitious and better enforced Buy American requirement for federal purchases of manufactured products. In general, I’m strongly supportive, and have even criticized the Trump administration for giving them short shrift (even on the tax front, where the big 2017 cuts should have come with more investing and hiring strings).

From knowing David, I feel sure that he backs these intiatives, too; indeed, the article concentrates tightly on the Buy American slice of this agenda. And the piece gratifingly (but probably unknowingly) endorses an idea that I’ve made for many years, but that has gotten zero traction: requiring “all manufacturing industries to disclose how much of their sourcing and critical production takes place in the United States.” After all, how can Washington make the right manufacturing policy decisions when it relies so heavily for such crucial information from crumbs self-servingly cherry-picked by offshoring-happy companies themselves?

Yet as also suggested by David and co-author Dan Breznitz – who studies innovation policies at the University of Toronto – except for the Buy American proposals, the standard raft of manufacturing revival plans could work to  stimulate more production and supply, but pays inadequate attention to ensuring that all that supply is actually bought – which would eventually make companies think twice about producing more.

The authors place much stock in government’s ability to soak up this output, and so does Biden – who on top of making sure that more of what government currently purchases is American-made, has pledged to spend “$400 billion in his first term in additional federal purchases of products made by American workers, with transparent, targeted investments that unleash new demand for domestic goods and services and create American jobs.”

The former Vice President correctly contends that these measures will “provide a strong, stable source of demand for products made by American workers and supply chains composed of American small businesses.” The history of U.S. industrial policy also shows that early guaranteed government purchases helped new industries demonstrate the usefulness of innovative products that eventually interested the private sector and produced enormous new markets for their products on top of federal contracts. (Think “computers” and all the hardware and software used pervasively now not only in technology sectors but in virtually the entire economy.)

But U.S.-based manufacturers turned out just over $2.35 trillion worth of goods in 2019 (the last full pre-CCP Virus year). And the manufacturing trade deficit that year was $1.03 trillion. So unless it’s supposed that that 2019 level of domestic manufacturing production is remotely adequate (and clearly, the manufacturing policy reform supporters don’t), or unless they believe that government should buy much more of the output than the $400 billion Biden proposes over not one but four years (to sit in warehouses?), generating more private demand for industry’s output will be essential as well.

As indicated above, David and Dan Breznitz argue that more detailed, accurate labeling will help by enabling more consumers and private businesses to act effectively on their naturally strong preferences for Made in the USA goods – not only out of patriotism, but because of reasonable convictions that their quality and safety are superior. I remain all in favor, but the immense popularity of imports among both classes of customers (made clear by the huge and chronic manufacturing trade deficits) despite numerous news accounts over the years of shoddy, outright dangerous foreign-made products (especially from China), demonstrates that much more will need to be done to spur demand for U.S.-produced manufactures.

RealityChek regulars will not be the slightest bit surprised that I’m ruling out overseas demand as a promising net new source of customers for American domestic manufacturers. Unfortunately, the persistence of the huge manufacturing trade deficits is also evidence that most of America’s international trade partners are far too devoted to the health of their own industrial bases to permit major U.S. inroads. In fact, if anything, they’re likely to step up their own efforts to strengthen their own domestic industries by further curbing U.S. and other foreign competition. And that’s where the tariffs come in.

Not that David and Dan Bernitz, or Biden, overlook the need for U.S. market protection entirely. The former, for example, call for “Stopping predatory pricing by foreign manufacturers” – which entails slapping tariffs on these usually government-subsidized artificially cheap goods. The latter makes similar points, and has also mentioned a carbon tariff on products from countries that base their competitiveness on ignoring “their climate and environmental obligations.” (At the same time, Biden could use a similar levy to punish domestic companies that don’t measure up in his administration’s eyes climate-wise, leaving the net benefit to U.S.-based manufacturing minimal.)

Moreover, to ensure adequate domestic supplies of the healthcare goods needed to fight the next pandemic, simple stockpiling of products by government will be necessary. And since practically everything wears out over time, or becomes outmoded, lots of re-stockpiling will be necessary. Meanwhile, it should go without saying that many of the government purchases of manufactures will be used for critical national purposes – like repairing and building all kinds of traditional and technology infrastructure systems, and producing whatever new military equipment or refurbishing of old equipment the new Congress and the likely new administration wind up supporting.

But these are of course public purposes, and since the United States is still a strongly private sector-driven economy, that’s what’s inevitably going to determine the success of most manufacturing revival efforts. So unless manufacturing revivalists want government to play a veritably dominant role in production and consumption decisions, their strategy will employ tariffs – but not in a targeted, sector-specific, and reactive way, much less as an afterthought to domestic initiatives. Instead, they’ll be proactive, come in a flat-rate form, and stand high enough to encourage plenty of new market entrants that it makes sense to join established enterprises in vigorous, overwhelmingly domestic competition for America’s immense pool of customers.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Through the Pandemic Fog, Signs of Trump Trade Progress Keep Coming

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(What's Left of) Our Economy, aircraft, Boeing, CCP Virus, Census Bureau, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, exports, goods trade, healthcare goods, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, medical devices, non-oil goods trade deficit, pharmaceuticals, services trade, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, trade war, Trump, Wuhan virus

Proof positive that much of the U.S. government grinds on whatever the political tumult surrounding it: Despite the controversies that erupted due to the largely unexpected, still-incomplete, and increasingly contested Presidential election results, the Census Bureau nonetheless still put out the new monthly U.S. trade report yesterday – this one taking the story through September.

And by the bizarro economic standards of the bizarro CCP Virus era, the figures were strangely normal: The various September deficits remained awfully high given an economy whose levels are still markedly subdued despite a powerful growth rebound in the third quarter (which ended in September). Yet although these results have been widely interpreted as a stinging rebuke to effectiveness of President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies (see, e.g., here and here), widely overlooked details reveal major mitigating developments – and resulting reasons for continued encouragement.

As for the awfully high deficits: The combined goods and services trade gap actually decreased on month by 4.73 percent, from a downwardly adjusted $67.04 billion to $63.86 billion. Yet this monthly total (during a troubled economic time) was still firmly in the neighborhood of trade shortfalls during the bubbly mid-2000s, when Washington’s trade policy was about as cluelessly import- and especially China-friendly as possible.

Moreover, back in those days, oil made up a much bigger share of the total goods deficit than today. So obviously, most of the remaining gap owes a good deal to U.S. trade policy decisions – as will be seen below.

Encouragingly, total U.S. exports to a world still largely struggling with virus-related downturns of its own were up 2.55 percent sequentially in September, and registered their best performance ($176.35 billion) since March – just as major pandemic effects were taking hold. Total September imports of $240.22 billion also represented the highest amount ($240.22 billion) since March, but the monthly increase was only 0.51 percent. And where export growth has consistently been strong since May, import growth has begun slowing markedly.

Yet the persistence of high combined goods and services U.S. trade shortfalls stems mainly from problems with services trade that are clearly CCP Virus-related. For example, the longstanding services surplus (which of course includes travel services) is on track for its biggest drop since recessionary 2001. So far, through the first three quarters of 2020, it’s sunk by 20.47 percent on a year-to-date basis.

Indeed, the $43.96 billion reduction in the services surplus has been greater than the $38.54 billion increase in the overall deficit – meaning that if the service surplus had simply remained the same, the total deficit would have declined year-to-date (although still less than expected at least during a normal deep recession).

As indicated above, however, the total trade numbers don’t tell the whole story about the successes or failures of trade policy. That’s because, as known by RealityChek regulars, services are one huge sector where trade agreements and similar decisions have had relatively little impact so far. Ditto for oil

At first glance, examing trade flows that are substantially “Made in Washington” also reveals a nice-sized monthly September reduction in that deficit (4.62 percent), but to a level that’s the third worst on record ($80.74 billion) – just behind the August and July totals, respectively. And on a year-to-date basis, the Made in Washington deficit is up 3.80 percent from last year,to $663.55 billion.

Yet here’s where another detail comes in. This entails the woes of Boeing, which have spread beyond the safety debacle stemming from crashes of its popular 737 Max model to the global virus-induced collapse in air travel.

The safety problems of 2019 cut the longstanding U.S. civilian aircraft trade surplus by nearly 28 percent, or $8.86 billion on a January-September basis. Had the surplus stayed stable, it would have risen only from $600.08 billion during the first three quarters of 2018 to $630.39 billion, rather than $639.25 billion. Given all the import front-running seen throughout 2019 to try to avoid the Trump China tariffs (which artificially inflated the entire non-oil import total), that’s not a bad performance at all.

The aircraft effect has been much more dramatic this year. Year-to-date through September, the Made in Washington deficit is up from that $630.29 billion to $663.55 billion. Yet the nosedive in the aircraft surplus (all the way from $23.16 billion to just under $3 billion) accounts for nearly 83 percent of that increase.

Want another aircraft effect? Check out the manufacturing trade deficit – so rightly the focus of the President’s attention. Month-to-month, it rose by only 1.46 percent. But the new September level of $103.87 billion is the second-worst monthly total of all time – just behind July’s $104.63 billion. Even worse: The aircraft industry’s problems didn’t add to this number, since its trade deficit actually shrunk slightly on month.

But for the entire year so far, the plunge in the aircraft surplus (which, not so coincidentally, has been mirrored by smaller but not trivial reductions in the surpluses of all sorts of aircraft parts, including engines) has made a sizable difference. From January-September, 2019 to this year’s comparable period, the manufacturing trade shortfall has grown by $10.18 billion, from $777.60 billion to $787.78 billion. Take out the $20.16 billion worsening of the aircraft trade surplus, and the $10.18 billion higher year-to-date manufacturing trade deficit becomes a nearly $10 billion lower year-to-date manufacturing trade deficit.

And when it comes to both the manufacturing and overall Made in Washington trade deficits and a virus effect, don’t forget its healthcare goods component. Specifically, the U.S. trade deficit in pharmaceutical preparations jumped by $12.58 billion year-to-date between last year and this year, and in the categories containing (but not restricted to) protective gear like masks and gowns, testing swabs, ventilators, and oxygen tents by another $2.33 billion.

Since China remains so important for Made in Washington and manufacturing trade flows, bilateral exports, imports, and deficits not surprisingly reveal a major pandemic effect, too. The big China difference is how strongly the September data confirm that President Trump’s goals of reducing the bilateral trade gap and decoupling economically from the People’s Republic are being achieved even without taking the CCP Virus into account.

On a monthly basis, the goods trade gap with China dipped fractionally in September, to $29.67 billion. This total represented the second straight such drop and the lowest level since Aprils $28.40 billion. These merchandise imports inched up sequentially in September by just under one percent and have been virtually flat since July, but goods exports improved by 4.53 percent.

On a year-to-date basis, America’s China trade looks like it’s in even better shape. U.S. goods imports from China are off by nearly 11 percent ($37.54 billion) over this stretch, and the trade gap has become 15.24 percent ($40.06 billion) smaller.

This progress, moreover, has been achieved even though total U.S. exports of civilian aircraft and parts (including engines) to China have shrunk by $4.09 billion and the trade deficit in the virus-related medical equipment categories has risen by $1.25 billion. (Oddly, the bilateral pharmaceutical preparations trade balance has improved with the surplus improving from $449 million to $836 million.)

When all of these virus-related complications and the inevitably disruptive and therefore initial efficiency-reducing impact of the Trump trade policies are considered, two questions arise that are equally fascinating and important. First, once these temporary shocks pass, will this approach to globalization look more like a win or a loss for the U.S. economy? Second, will American election politics give the nation a chance to find out?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Trump’s Solid Trade Record Survives the Lousy New U.S. Trade Report

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automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, cell phones, civilian aircraft, coronavirus, COVID 19, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, non-oil goods deficit, shutdowns, tariffs, trade deficit, trade war, Trump, U.S. International Trade Commission, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This is how bad this morning’s official US. trade figures (for July) looked at first glance for folks like me – who value trade deficit reduction, and believe that trade policies like President Trump’s can make a real difference: When I began examining the data, even though I kept telling myself, “It’s only one month’s worth of statistics,” I scarcely knew what to despair about most.

Yet the “at first glance” point matters a lot. Because when you dig into the weeds, you’ll find plenty of evidence making clear that much of the deterioration had nothing to do with trade policy at all. And the evidence comes in two tables in these monthly trade reports on which I usually pass: Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 8. They cover U.S. exports and imports of goods “by End-Use Category and Commodity” and they provide the report’s most detailed picture of which areas of the economy have performed best and worst trade-wise during the month covered.

They’re not as detailed as those available from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s interactive search engine, but that database isn’t yet updated, so let’s go with what we have to begin seeing exactly where the biggest goods trade deficit increases came in July. (Goods trade, also called merchandise trade, makes up the bulk of U.S. trade flows, and it’s relatively unaffected by the policy decisions made by Washington – including by trade-minded Presidents like Donald Trump – mainly because international negotiations to deal with barriers in these sectors are still in pretty early stages)

Again, from the 30,000-foot level, the July results look terrible. The goods trade shortfall hit $80.91 billion – $9.26 billion, or 12.92 percent, higher than the June figure of $71.65 billion (which mercifully was revised down slightly). That increase proportionately is dwarfed by the record 31.60 jump of March, 1993. But that nearly 18-year old all-time high can be disregarded pretty easily, both because the law of small numbers is at work here (i.e., when you’re dealing with small absolute numbers, relatively small absolute changes can result in outsized percentage changes), and because back in those days, U.S. trade flows were heavily affected by oil trade – another sector of the economy rarely subject to trade policy decisions.

So what mainly accounted for that $9.26 billion merchandise import surge? First of all, we know that more than all of it ($9.94 billion) came in non-oil goods trade. As known by RealityChek regulars, those are the trade flows most heavily influenced by U.S. trade policy. So this increase in the “Made in Washington” deficit seems to reflect badly on decisions made in Washington. Drilling down a little deeper, manufacturing emerges as an even bigger culprit. Its $89.15 billion June trade gap ballooned to $104.63 billion in July – a rise of $15.48 billion. Not so incidentally, that manufacturing trade deficit is the worst ever in U.S. history, eclipsing the $101.65 billion recorded for October, 2018.

Nearly as interesting, though: China trade – where the President has been fighting a war – was not the biggest problem, as the manufacturing-dominated goods gap with the People’s Republic rose by just $3.22 billion. And neither the 11.35 percent on-month increase nor the $31.62 billion total goods gap was anywhere close to a record. 

So we’re back to manufacturing, and figuring out where the big deficit widening took place. Here’s where Exibits 7 and 8 matter.

What they tell us is that the monthly worsening of the merchandise trade deficit was highly concentrated in a handful of industries, and that these latest developments either have little or nothing to do with the Trump tariffs, or actually  demonstrate their effectiveness in widely overlooked ways.

Most relevant of all here is the automotive sector. Between June and July, the deficit in vehicles and parts combined increased by just under $3.20 billion. That represents more than a fifth of the sequential worsening of the manufacturing trade deficit, and nearly a third of the difference in the non-oil goods deficit. But the problem says little about the Trump trade policies, and a great deal about the reopening of U.S. automotive sector in late spring and early summer after the CCP Virus led to its almost complete shutdown in March and April.

From May through July, total American automotive production nearly tripled in real terms, according to the Federal Reserve’s industrial production reports. So it’s no surprise that since production in this industry is so globalized, and thus so many of its parts and materials (and the parts of the parts) are still imported, its trade deficit ballooned, too.

Then there are cell phones. Between June and July, the trade deficit here rose by just under $1.44 billion – 9.30 percent of the increase in the manufacturing deficit, and 14.48 percent of the problem in non-oil goods.

The cell phone category in the monthly trade releases also includes “other household goods” – one of the reasons I don’t love these numbers like I love those available from the International Trade Commission. But it’s reasonable to suppose that most of these goods are cell phones, and that most of these are coming from China – with which the Trump administration of course has been fighting a trade war.

As observed on RealityChek last month, however, Mr. Trump decided not to tariff them. So although cell phone imports indicate that the trade war is incomplete, they certainly don’t show that tariffs don’t work. If anything, they underscore what can happen when they’re missing.

A third major source of the deterioration shown in the new trade report is the civilian aircraft industry – where a surplus of $575 million in June became a $1.50 billion deficit in July. That’s a trade balance worsening of nearly $2.08 billion. In other words, this development alone accounts for 13.44 percent of the lousy July manufacturing trade results and 20.93 percent of the woes in non-oil goods trade flows.

Aircraft’s problems, however, have nothing to do with U.S. trade policy, and everything to with Boeing’s safety failures, which have led to big production shutdowns.

Add up the trade performances of these categories, and together they account for fully 43.38 percent of the manufacturing trade deficit’s increase between June and July, and a whopping 67.57 percent of the monthly rise in the non-oil deficit.

Combine these findings with a U.S. economic recovery that so far has been faster than the bouncebacks of many of its leading trade partners (except, notably, for export-heavy China) and the discouraging July trade figures don’t look nearly so discouraging.

Mission accomplished, then, for the Trump administration? Hardly? But the July trade report is far from a conclusive sign of failure, either. In fact, it leaves any fair-minded evaluation of the Trump trade record pretty much where it’s been since the CCP Virus arrived – deserving of solid grades before the bug arrived, and an incomplete during the completely abnormal times we’ve experienced since then.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Keeps Gaining Independence

Tags

Commerce Department, decoupling, GDP-by-industry, health security, healthcare goods, manufacturing, manufacturing production, manufacturing trade deficit, Obama, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Like a strike-shortened sports season’s champion, the conclusion in today’s RealityChek post needs an asterisk. The conclusion stems from this morning’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Industry report from the Commerce Department, which shows that U.S. domestic manufacturing continues to become ever more self-reliant. In other words, it’s reducing its dependence for growth on foreign-made industrial goods of all kinds generally speaking.

The asterisk is needed because the new data covers the first quarter of this year, and therefore it includes March – when much of the U.S economy was shut down by government order or recommendation due to the CCP Virus. As a result, a chunk of the results say nothing about how manufacturing or the rest of economy would have performed in normal times.

Still, this morning’s evidence that U.S.-based industry is becoming more autonomous comes from several different findings calculable from the GDP by Industry’s raw data.

For example, again, due partly to the shutdowns’ effects, the report shows that according to a widely followed measure called value-added, domestic manufacturing’s output dipped by 0.99 percent between the first quarter of 2019 and the first quarter of this year. At the same time, the manufacturing trade deficit during this period shrank by 7.31 percent – more than 13 times faster. During the last comparable period (fourth quarter, 2018 to fourth quarter, 2019), manufacturing production grew by 0.70 percent, and its trade gap narrowed by 7.59 percent – a somewhat better performance on both scores.

At this point it’s vital to note that these growth rates are by no means good. In fact, they’re the worst by far since the final year of the Obama administration – when on a calendar year basis, domestic industry shrank by 1.19 percent. Yet during that same year 2016, despite this contraction, the manufacturing trade shortfall expanded by 4.66 percent. So if you value self-sufficiency (as you should in a world in which the United States has found itself painfully short of many healthcare-related goods, and in which dozens of its trade partners were hoarding their own supplies), it’s clear that during 2016, the nation was getting the worst of all possible manufacturing worlds.

Also important: there’s no doubt that the same Trump administration tariffs and trade wars with which domestic manufacturing has been dealing over the past two years have slowed its growth. In other words, industry has been adjusting to policy-created pressures to adjust its global, and in particular China-centric, supply chains. That’s bound to create inefficiencies.

If you don’t care about significant American economic reliance on an increasingly hostile dictatorship, you’ll carp about paying any efficiency price for this decoupling from China (and other unreliable countries). If you do care, you’ll recognize the slower growth as an adjustment cost needed to correct the disastrous choice made by pre-Trump Presidents to undercut America’s economic independence severely.

Moreover, during the last year, domestic manufacturing output was held back by two developments that had nothing to do with President Trump’s trade policy: the strike at General Motors in the fall of 2019, which slashed U.S. production both of vehicles and parts, and of all the components and materials that comprise dedicated auto parts; and the safety problems at Boeing, which resulted in the grounding of its popular 737 Max model worldwide starting in March, 2019, and in a suspension of all that aircraft’s production this past January.

Also encouraging from a self-reliance standpoint. During the first quarter of 2019, the manufacturing trade deficit as a percentage of domestic manufacturing output sank from just under 43 percent in the fourth quarter of 2019 (and 43.36 percent for the entirety of last year) to 37.27 percent. That’s the lowest level since full-year 2013’s 35.82 percent.

These figures should make clear that the manufacturing trade deficit’s share of manufacturing output kept growing during the final Obama years and into the Trump years. Indeed, on an annual basis, this number peaked at 47.01 percent in the third quarter of 2019. To some extent, blame what I’ve previously identified as tariff front-running (the rush by importers throughout the trade war to bring product into the United States before threatened tariffs were actually imposed) along with those supply chain-related adjustment costs.

To complicate matters further, as suggested above, that very low first quarter result stemmed partly from the nosedive taken by manufacturing and other U.S. economic activity in March. Since that level is clearly artificially low, it’s probably going to bob up eventually – but hopefully not recover fully.

In all, though, the first quarter GDP by Industry report points to a future of more secure supplies of manufactured goods for Americans. And unless you believe that domestic manufacturers have completely lost their ability to adjust successfully to a (needed) New Normal in U.S. trade policy, the release points to a return of solid manufacturing output growth rates as well.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Full Virus-Distortion Mode for New U.S. Trade Figures

Tags

aerospace, Boeing, CCP Virus, China, civilian aircraft, coronavirus, COVID 19, decoupling, exports, imports, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, Phase One, Trade, Trump, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s a heck of a way to start a blog post: On the one hand, it’s a relief to.be writing about something other than the shameful George Floyd killing and its too-often-violent aftermath, and focus on an economic issue like the latest U.S. trade figures. On the other hand, because of the CCP Virus and the deep U.S. and global recessions (and possibly worse) it’s triggered, it’s hard to make the case that the new numbers (for April) even say much of anything useful about that month, much less about how trade flows and their impact on the economy might evolve going forward.

Even less serious is the notion that they shed light on the past, present, or likely future effectivness of President Trump’s Phase One trade deal with China – which incidentally only went into effect in mid-February.

All the same, speaking of China, the month-on-month change was discouraging at least on the surface. The goods deficit nearly doubled between March and April – from $11.83 billion to $22.27 billion. The last change of that magnitude came back in April, 1989, when trade flows were orders of magnitude smaller, and therefore huge fluctuations much easier to generate. Moreover, this trade gap bounceback followed two straight months of dramatic decline that brought the shortfall to its lowest level since March, 2004.

Worth noting in this regard for additional context. On a year-to-date basis, the U.S. goods shortfall with China is down by 28.55 percent. That’s more than three times greater than the 8.17 percent decrease in the global U.S. merchandise deficit, and more than six times faster than the 4.52 shrinkage of America’s worldwide non-oil goods gap, which is a better global proxy for U.S.-China trade.

In other words, here’s clear evidence of major progress toward President Trump’s unstated but apparent goal of decoupling the U.S. and Chinese economies.

U.S. merchandise exports to the economy of the People’s Republic, which by most accounts has started recovering steadily from its own pandemic setback – did rise by 7.94 percent. But the much greater value of imports shot up by 56.88 percent. That’s the biggest percentage increase ever. In second place? The 49.92 jump back in January, 1986, when trade flows were miniscule.

Year-to-date, U.S. goods exports to China are down by 9.03 percent – a little less than overall U.S. goods exports (9.46 percent) and than overall U.S. non-oil goods exports (10.86 percent).

The comparable imports figures: America’s merchandise purchases from China are off by 23.88 percent. That’s more than twice decrease of its total goods imports (9.03 percent) and of its non-oil goods imports (8.45 percent).

In other words, here’s clear evidence that the decoupling and contraction of the bilateral deficit is taking place exactly where it should from an American standpoint – on the import side.

Some other notable takeaways from the April trade report:

>The combined goods and services trade deficit soared sequentially in April by 16.66 percent, to $49.41 billion. That’s the highest monthly total since last August’s $50.78 billion, and the biggest such rise since…March’s revised 22.11 percent.

But that revision is a story in and of itself. The originally reported $44.42 billion figure for the month is now estimated at just $42.34 billion – 4.68 percent lower. That’s an unusually big change, and indicates some major, CCP Virus-related data-gathering and analysis problems.

Year-to-date, the total trade deficit has fallen by 13.36 percent.

>Total U.S. exports took by far the biggest hit in April. plunging by 20.46 percent, from an upwardly revised $190.18 billion to $151.28 billion. That’s the lowest monthly total since the $150.01 billion recorded in April, 2010, when the last economic recovery was still young.

Moreover, the monthly nosedive was both nearly twice as bad as the old record holder of 10.19 percent set in CCP Virus- and shutdown-impacted March, and nearly doubled the previous all-time high (going back to 1992) of 5.50 percent set in September, 2001 – the month of the September 11 terror attacks.

Goods exports fell even faster – by 33.71 percent, from a downardly revised $127.72 billion to $95.52 billion. This contraction has just obliterated the previous record of 10.03 percent, from Great Recession-y December, 2008. (For comparison’s sake, goods exports declined by 5.80 percent in September, 2001).

>Combined goods and services imports were down dramatically, too, on month in April. But although an all-time high, the 13.36 percent decline — from an upwardly revised $232.52 billion to $200.69 billion – was much smaller than that for exports. In addition, it only slightly exceeded the previous monthly record of 11.58 percent, from the Great Recession month of November, 2008. Further, as with exports, the new April monthly total was also the lowest since April, 2010.

April’s monthly goods import decrease was only a bit greater – 13.62 percent, from an upwardly revised $193.74 billion to $167.35 billion. The monthly level was the lowest since November, 2010 and the rate of decrease just a hair above that of the aforementioned November, 2008.

>The longstanding and huge U.S. manufacturing trade deficit also grew sequentially in April – by 9.63 percent, from $75.08 billion to $82.31 billion..That was the biggest monthly total since October, 2019’s $92.70 billion.

Manufacturing exports sank by 30.51 percent on month in April, while the much larger value of imports was 12.78 percent lower.

Interestingly, the sequential worsening of the manufacturing trade shortfall was dominated by the country’s civilian aerospace industry – once far and away America’s trade surplus and surplus growth leader. But between March and April, this surplus tumbled by 73.21 percent, from $4.05 billion to $1.09 billion. The $2.97 billion decrease accounted for fully 41 percent of the widening of the manufacturing trade gap, and stems from the combined impact of aerospace giant Boeing’s continuing safety woes and production cutbacks, the virus-induced global recession, and its especially great impact on the travel industry.

Year-to-date, moreover, the manufacturing trade gap has narrowed by 6.62 percent, from $324.59 billion to $303.59 billion.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Good – & Promising – News on Manufacturing Reshoring

Tags

Canada, China, Commerce Department, East Asia, Forbes.com, GDP-by-industry, Kearney, Kenneth Rapoza, manufacturing, manufacturing production, manufacturing trade deficit, Mexico, North America, Trade, Trade Deficits, {What's Left of) Our Economy

When two separate sources of information agree on a conclusion, the conclusion obviously becomes a lot more important than if it’s got only a single supporter. That’s why I’m excited to report that a major economic consulting firm has just released data showing that American domestic manufacturing has been coping just fine with all the challenges it faces from Trump tariffs aimed at achieving the crucial goal of decoupling U.S. industry and the the broader economy from China.

I’m excited because these results track with my own analysis of U.S. trade and manufacturing output data – which I’ve been able to update because of a new Commerce Department release measuring manufacturing production through the end of last year. And you should be excited, too – because the more self-reliant U.S.-based industry becomes, the better able it will be to add to the nation’s growth without boosting its indebtedness. In addition, the more secure the country will be both in terms of traditional national security and America’s ability to provide all the military equipment it needs, and in terms of health security and its ability to provide all the drugs and medical equipment it needs to fight CCP Virus-like pandemics.

The consulting firm data comes from Kearney, and I need to tip my hat to Forbes.com contributor Kenneth Rapoza for initially spotlighting it. According to the company, its seventh annual Reshoring Index reveals that last year, imports from low-cost Asian countries like China (well, none are really “like China,” but you get it) as a percentage of U.S. industry’s output hit its lowest annual level since 2014. The decrease was the first since 2011, and the yearly drop was by far the biggest in percentage terms since 2008.

What’s especially interesting is that the Kearney figures show that manufacturing imports from Asia made inroads even during much of the Great Recession. Last year, their prominence dwindled notably even though the American economy as a whole was growing solidly. And although domestic manufacturing output slowed annually last year – due partly to the inevitable short-term disruptions and uncertainties created by major policy shifts, and partly due to the safety problems of aerospace giant Boeing – the Kearney report noted, it “held its ground.”

Kearney reported even better news on the “trade shifting” front, and its findings also track with mine. One major criticism of the Trump China tariffs in particular entails the claim that they won’t aid American domestic manufacturing because they’ll simply result in the U.S. customers of tariff-ed Chinese products buying the same goods from elsewhere – especially from Asian sources.

The Kearney study refutes that claim, reporting that not only did the role of Asian imports decrease in 2019, but that due to the tariffs, this decrease was led by a China fall-off, that production reshoring rose “substantially,”and that a major import shifting beneficiary was Mexico – which is good news for Americans since it means that the globalization of industry is now doing more to help a next-door neighbor whose problems do indeed tend to spill across the border. (I’ve also found important trade shifting away from East Asia as a whole and toward North America – meaning both Canada and Mexico.) 

As for my own research, the release Monday of the Commerce Department’s latest Gross Domestic Product by Industry report, combined with the monthly trade statistics, these data also shed light on the relationship between U.S.-based manufacturing’s growth, and the economy’s purchases of manufactured goods from abroad.

The big takeaway, as shown by the table below: The relationship has continued its pattern of weakening – suggesting less import dependence – during the Trump years, although production growth did indeed slow because of that aforementioned tariff-related disruption and the Boeing mess.

The figure in the left-hand column represents U.S.-based manufacturing’s growth during the year in question (according to a gauge called “value added), the middle column represents the growth that year of the manufacturing trade deficit, and the right-hand column shows the ratio between the two growth rates (with the trade gap’s growth coming first). The higher the ratio, more closely linked manufacturing output growth is to the expansion of the manufacturing trade deficit. All figures are in pre-inflation dollars.

2011:             +3.93 percent              +8.21 percent                2.09:1

2012:             +3.19 percent              +6.27 percent               1.97:1

2013:             +3.36 percent              +0.77 percent               0.23:1

2014:             +2.93 percent            +12.39 percent               4.23:1

2015:             +3.72 percent            +13.22 percent               3.55:1

2016:              -1.19 percent              +3.07 percent                 n/a

2017:             +3.99 percent              +7.22 percent              1.81:1

2018              +6.23 percent            +10.68 percent              1.71:1

2019              +1.67 percent              +1.09 percent              0.65:1

Domestic manufacturers obviously haven’t completed their adjustments to the new Trump era trade environment, and the CCP Virus crisis clearly won’t make this task any easier. But Kearney expects that the pandemic will wind up moving more U.S.-owned or -related manufacturing out of China, and so do I. And although the Kearney authors don’t say so explicitly, it’s easy to read their report and conclude that the crisis and the resulting national health security needs will help ensure that the domestic U.S. economy will keep getting a healthy share.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Solid Manufacturing Jobs and Trade Numbers Despite Boeing’s Woes

Tags

Boeing, China, exports, imports, Jobs, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, manufacturing trade deficit, Phase One, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

You say U.S. manufacturing jobs keep growing too slowly? You say manufacturing’s trade deficit remains too high, and its exports inadequate? According to two big new government reports on the state of the American economy this morning, if you do, you should also be saying (with beaucoup de snark) “Thanks, Boeing!”

For it keeps getting clearer that the aerospace giant’s safety woes and resulting production halt of its (once) popular 737 Max model are sandbagging both measures of manufacturing’s performance – and not trivially. Don’t forget the silver lining, however.  Despite the Boeing effect, domestic industry has been holding up encouragingly well. 

The evidence is clearest from the trade figures. As reported last month in RealityChek, if not for a big deterioration in the civilian aircraft trade balance (until recently the sector of the entire economy with the biggest trade surplus), the full-year 2019 manufacturing trade shortfall would barely have grown over the 2018 level. And since industry itself increased output last year in pre-inflation terms, (at least through the latest – third quarter – data available), that represented a heartening sign that domestic manufacturing was becoming more self-reliant.

In January, the manufacturing shortfall actually fell month-to-month (by 0.38 percent, from $82.24 billion to $81.93 billion, and $850 million in absolute terms). The mix wasn’t exactly ideal: Imports were down 3.11 percent, but the value of exports (which are much smaller) fell by 5.58 percent.

But the civilian aircraft trade surplus plunged 44.43 percent – from $3.06 billion to $1.70 billion. So in January, had the sector simply equaled its December trade performance, the January manufacturing deficit would have been not $81.93 billion but $80.57 billion – the lowest total since last March’s $76.96 billion, and a monthly drop of 2.03 percent, not 0.38 percent. Further, manufacturing exports would have been $87.93 billion rather than $86.25 billion – or down only 3.74 percent, not 5.58 percent.

The picture is muddier for manufacturing employment because the data for civilian aircraft and their parts is reported one month after most other industry-by-industry jobs statistics. Another complication: The new jobs report overall goes up to February.

More puzzling still: Although latest statistics for the Boeing-related categories are January, they’re little changed from the December totals even though the 737 Max production suspension was announced in the middle of that month.

But it’s still legit to wonder whether they would’ve been better without the Boeing crisis. And how much better? Moreover, the vast aircraft supply chain encompasses dozens of manufacturing sectors beyond the engines and parts themselves. After all, these systems are in turn made of any number of components and materials. Boeing’s difficulties, therefore, could have been holding back manufacturing job growth broadly speaking for months.

Even so, industry as a whole added 15,000 jobs sequentially in February – it’s best such performance (except for a November increase that was aided by the end of the General Motors strike) since January, 2019’s 20,000.

And let’s not forget – industry achieved this employment gain even though the “Phase One” trade deal with China has left stiff U.S. tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of imported goods from China, as well as on much foreign steel and aluminum.

No doubt the coronavirus outbreak could send the manufacturing performance arrows pointing down again, or leveling off, in the next few months. But the new jobs and trade data make clear that despite an external (Boeing) shock that has nothing to do with President Trump’s trade wars, and despite the trade curbs he has enacted, domestic manufacturing has been on the rebound lately, and showed impressive resilience that bodes well for its future – and the entire economy’s.