Im-Politic: The Public Shows Signs of Getting It on Fighting Pandemics

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CCP Virus, CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, coronavirus, COVID 19, facemasks, Great Barrington Declaration, Im-Politic, lockdowns, mandates, masks, Pew Research Center, public health, social distancing, vaccines

It looks like Americans are having second thoughts about how their government has responded to the CCP Virus pandemic, at least according to this new Pew Research Center survey. And that’s great news for those of us who have insisted that, once it became clear (awfully early on) that the pandemic wasn’t a rerun of the Black Death, the widespread lockdowns, mandates, and other indisciminate measures were cures that, on balance, were needlessly worse than the disease.

To be sure, Americans still feel pretty cautious about the pandemic and its effects. Principally, in May, 41 percent of U.S. adults told Pew that they viewed the virus as a “major threat to public health.” That’s down considerably from the spring of 2020, when the share describing the virus this way was in the mid-60s percent. But it’s still more than four in ten.

The public also still gives robust endorsements to many restrictions on behavior and anti-covid measures that have been strongly encouraged or required nationally or in various states at various times during the pandemic era. For example, 55 percent said that vaccination had been “extremely” or “very” “effective in limiting the spread of the coronavirus,” 49 percent agreed with his characterization of “wearing masks around other people indoors,” and 48 percent thought the same of “limiting activities/interactions with other people.” One exception: Only 34 percent put much stock in “staying at least six feet apart from other people indoors.”

But by an impressive 62 percent to 31 percent, respondents said that “the country’s COVID-19 response has given too little priority” to “meeting the educational needs of K-12 students.”. By 48 percent to 40 percent they felt that short shrift had been given to “supporting overall quality of life for the public.” By 46 percent to 40 percent they said not enough attention was paid to “supporting businesses and economic activity.” And by 46 percent to 30 percent they said that anti-virus strategies failed adequately to “respect individuals’ choices.”

Moreover, the public approval of the authorities most supportive of the virus-centric priorities has taken a major hit. In the spring of 2020, 79 percent agreed that “public health officials such as those at the CDC [U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention]” had done “an excellent or good job responding to the coronavirus outbreak.” By this past May, this support had dropped to 52 percent. And since February, 2021 (shortly after his inauguration) the share of U.S. adults stating that President Biden’s response to the CCP Virus has been excellent or good fell from 54 percent to 43 percent. (Such approval for former President Trump’s virus responses sank as well – from 48 percent in March, 2020 to 36 percent in February, 2021. But no samplings about the Trump strategy have been taken since.)

Predictably, partisan splits appeared, and although no trends over time were presented, it was striking how many self-identified Democrats and ”Democratic leaners” expressed disenchantment with some priorities that have been pursued for most of the pandemic era. In particular, 57 percent of them agreed that “the educational needs of K-12 students have been neglected and 45 percent agreed that too little attention has been paid to “overall quality of life for the public.” At the same time, only 34 percent of Democrats and leaners felt that “businesses and other economic activity” should have received more support, and only 28 percent believe “respecting individuals’ choices” has deserved more emphasis. 

To me, the big takeaway is that Americans may finally be realizing that the tradeoffs between public health and other pressing needs were never adequately acknowledged by the nation’s lockdowns- and restrictions-obsessed public health establishment, or by the political leaders who uncritically followed their advice and failed to understand that balances needed to be struck.

Far from a position that’s “anti-science” or dismissive or the virus’s deadly properties and potential, it’s one that’s entirely consistent with that pressed by the legions of eminent epidemiologists, virologists, and other medical specialists who signed the Great Barrington Declaration. This manifesto urged viewing the public health dangers posed during the pandemic holistically, avoiding the wide-ranging and grave consequences of shutting down entire national economies and societies, and focusing virus-mitigation measures instead on those most vulnerable to serious disease and death.

Will the U.S. public health establishment display as much of the learning curve that the Pew poll indicates the public has demonstrated? Will the politicians whose policies overwhelmingly reflected their conventional wisdom? Those are questions whose answers had better be “Yes” if America is to cope with the next pandemic better than it handled this one.  

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: No Great Reset Yet in the Makeup of U.S. Trade

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aerospace, Boeing, CCP Virus, computers, coronavirus, COVID 19, exports, facemasks, Great Reset, healthcare goods, imports, jewelry, masks, personal protective equipment, phamaceuticals, pharmaceuticals, PPE, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, semiconductor shortage, semiconductors, stay at home economy, Trade, trade deficit, trade surplus, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Throughout the CCP Virus period, I’ve refrained from posting on detailed, industry-by-industry trade figures. My reasoning? Pandemic distortions rendered them all but meaningless in terms of what they revealed about the fundamentals of U.S. trade flows and in particular the competitiveness of domestic manufacturing.

Of course, now it looks reasonable to suggest that the pandemic is ending – or at least that the end might really be in sight this time. So I spent some of my weekend comparing the trade flow details from 2019 (the last full pre-pandemic year) with those of 2021 (the last full data year, and whose figures have just been released). And the results surpised the heck out of me. Because if you look at trade deficits and surpluses and how they’ve changed, the best description seems to be surprisingly little.

To start, let’s check out the twenty sectors of the economy that have racked up the biggest trade surpluses in 2019 and 2021. They’re presented below according to the categories created by the U.S. government’s North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), which has become official Washington’s main system for slicing and dicing the U.S. economy. To the right of the actual dollar figure (in billions), you’ll find its rank for that particular year.

And for data junkies, these groupings are those at NAICS’ sixth level of disaggregation – one I like because in many cases it permits distinguishing between final products and the parts and components that make them up. Since for decades, so much U.S. and global trade today takes place in those inputs (because the manufacturing process has become so fragmented because creating complex worldwide supply chains became a premier business model), this distinction has mattered crucially in understanding trade flows.

                                                      2019                             2021

civil aircraft & parts:               $125.953   1                 $79.510   1

natural gas:                                $21.823   4                 $54.923   2

soybeans:                                   $18.493   6                 $27.110   3

other special class provns:         $24.499   3                 $27.019   4

petroleum refinery products:      $30.583  2                 $26.245   5

waste and scrap:                         $13.065  7                 $21.362   6

plastics meterials and resins:     $18.803   5                 $18.771   7

corn:                                             $7.620  11               $18.674    8

semiconductor machinery:          $1.408  43                $11.971   9

semiconductors/related devices: $5.994  14                $10.326  10

non-anthracite coal/petroleum gas:  $9.312  8              $9.250   11

used/second hand merchandise:  $8.805  10                 $8.604  12

non-poultry meat:                        $7.364  12                 $7.898  13

wheat:                                          $5.898  15                 $6.891  14

motor vehicle bodies:                  $9.201  9                   $6.886  15

cotton:                                         $6.225  13                  $5.789  16

copper, nickel, lead, zinc:           $4.402  18                 $5.471   17

tree nuts:                                     $5.096  16                 $4.712   18

prepared/preserved poultry:        $3.745  20                $4.554   19

misc basic inorganic chemicals: $4.169  19                $4.081   20

Some reshuffling of the order of these biggest trade flow winners has taken place. Most stunningly, semiconductor manufacturing equipment jumped from the industry with the forty third widest trade surplus in 2019 to number nine in 2021. Computer parts was in 17^th place in 2019 and fell all the way to 52d place (and out of the Top Twenty) in 2021. And motor vehicle bodies dropped from number nine to number 15. But otherwise, the two lists look remarkably similar. In fact, the seven biggest trade surplus industries of 2019 were also the seven biggest in 2021, though the order changed sllghtly.

What has seen much more major change during this two-year period have been the absolute numbers themselves, and these movements do seem pandemic related, though in different ways. Commodities like natural gas and corn (and to a lesser extent, wheat) appear to have been dramatically affected by inflation.

Trade in semiconductors and the machines that make them clearly reflect the increased importance of the “stay at home economy” – both in terms of leisure and the workplace. (The skyrocketing of the semiconductor machinery surplus, however, is also a reminder of how many of the world’s semiconductors are made outside the United States these days – although the microchip industry has also been decidedly cyclical for many years).

Meanwhile, the nosedive in the aerospace surplus has of course resulted from the woes of Boeing, both because of the CCP Virus-related global slump in air travel, and the company’s own manufacturing and safety problems.

Did this pattern repeat for the twenty sectors that ran the biggest trade deficits in those two years? Here are those lists, with the actual figures again in the billions of dollars:

autos & light duty vehicles:    -$126.272  1                -$96.250   1

goods returned from Canada:    -$91.240  2               -$96.124   2

broadcast & wireless comms equip:  -$72.231  3       -$80.075   3

computers:                                 -$59.443  6                -$79.209   4

crude petroleum:                        -$62.006  5                -$63.495  5

pharmaceutical preparations:     -$62.236  4                -$63.477  6

female cut & sew apparel:         -$42.088  7                -$41.028  7

audio & video equipment:         -$22.184  12               -$34.349   8

male cut & sew apparel:            -$30.889   8                 -$29.851  9

misc motor vehicle parts:           -$23.242  11               -$29.055  10

dolls, toys & games:                  -$17.285   14              -$26.789   11

printed circuit assemblies:         -$16.709   16              -$26.588   12

iron & steel & ferroalloy:          -$16.954   15              -$26.294   13

footwear:                                    -$25.597  10              -$26.037   14

major household appliances:      -$14.128  19              -$20.849   15

misc plastics products:                -$12.886 20              -$20.566   16

jewelry & silverware:                   -$3.476  68             -$17.819   17

motor vehicle electrical equip:   -$14.418  17             -$16.151   18

curtains & linens:                       -$12.134   22             -$15.256   19

aircraft engines & engine parts: -$25.670   9               -$14.070   20

The patterns revealed on this list closely resemble those made clear from the Top Twenty surplus list – some reshuffling but – with just a few exceptions like jewelry and silverware, (Home Shopping Network lines burning up?), and aircraft engines and engine parts – little major change. Indeed, the order of the top three hasn’t changed a bit, and as with the biggest trade surplus sectors, the makeup of the top seven is identical (though the order has been slightly modified).

As with the big surplus winners (though on the consumption side, not the production side), the advent of the “stay at home economy” is evident from the large increases in the absolute trade deficits for computers and audio and video equipment (though not so much for the broadcast and wireless gear category, which contains cell phones).

The damage done by the worldwide semiconductor shortage can be seen in the dramatically lower motor vehicle trade deficit. And aerospace woes come through loud and clear from the even steeper drop in the aircraft engines deficit.

Another take on the trade balance figures is provided by examining the sectors where trade balances have improved the most (either because surpluses have expanded or because deficits have shrunk), and worsened the most (either because surpluses have shrunk or deficits expanded). Below are the biggest trade balance “improvers” by percentage change among the sectors that have either run the fifty biggest trade surpluses or the fifty biggest trade deficits. The sectors with “deficit” to the right of the percentage change are those where trade shortfalls declined.

miscellaneous grains:                                     +1,021.72 percent

semiconductor manufacturing equipment:        +750.18 percent

Jewelry and silverware:                                     +412.65 percent   deficit

sawmill products:                                               +270.45 percent   deficit

storage batteries:                                                +168.67 percent   deficit

natural gas:                                                         +151.67 percent

corn:                                                                   +145.07 percent

surgical appliances & supplies:                          +134.60 percent   deficit

sporting & athletic goods:                                    +86.13 percent   deficit

artificial/synthetic fibers/filaments:                     +74.73 percent   deficit

semiconductors/related devices:                          +72.28 percent

small electrical appliances:                                  +71.87 percent   deficit

waste and scrap:                                                    +65.50 percent

animal fats/oils/byproducts :                                 +63.15 percent

motor vehicle steering &suspension & parts:       +60.49 percent   deficit

misc plastics products:                                          +59.60 percent   deficit

printed circuit assemblies:                                    +59.13 percent   deficit

cooling, heating, & ventilation equipment:          +55.91 percent   deficit

dolls, toys, & games:                                            +54.86 percent   deficit

audio & video equipment:                                    +54.84 percent   deficit

One trend that should jump out right away: Thirteen of the twenty sectors that have improved their trade balances the most are still in deficit – which reflects the nation’s continuing huge trade gap.

Since some of the greatest changes in the order of sectors with the biggest trade deficits and surpluses have come in pandemic-related sectors, it’s not surprising that such industries are prominent on the list of improvers. Hence the appearance of semiconductors and their manufacturing equipment, and commodities like miscellaneous grains, corn, and natural gas.

As for sawmill products, their results owe largely to U.S. lumber tariffs. In sporting and athletic goods, can the deficit’s shrinkage be due to a pandemic-y dropoff in physical activity?

Totally puzzling, though – the improvement in electrical appliances and audio and video equipment, where so much production has migrated overseas in recent decades, and because imports of the latter would seem to have jumped to serve so much of the stay-at-home demand.

But on the encouraging side – the big decrease in the trade deficit in surgical appliances and supplies, which includes all the personal protective equipment (like facemasks, gloves, and medical gowns) that have figured so prominently in the nation’s pandemic response, along with ventilators.

Now the twenty major sectors whose trade balances have worsened the most:

oil & gasfield machinery:                                  +54.65 percent

aircraft engines & engine parts:                         +45.23 percent   deficit

civilian aircraft, engines, & parts:                      +36.87 percent

railroad rolling stock:                                         +35.04 percent

turbines & turbine generator sets:                      +33.09 percent

non-diagnostic biological products:                   +31.84 percent   deficit

in-vitro diagnostic substances:                           +31.10 percent

cyclic crude & other intermediate chemicals:    +31.05 percent

guided missiles & space vehicles:                      +30.07 percent

fibers, yarns, & threads:                                     +29.32 percent

motor vehicle bodies:                                          +25.16 percent

paper bags/coated & treated paper:                    +23.26 percent

autos & light duty vehicles:                               +23.78 percent   deficit

petroleum refinery products:                              +14.19 percent

misc animal foods:                                              +10.35 percent

aircraft:                                                                  +9.98 percent   deficit

paints & coatings:                                                  +9.07 percent

tree nuts:                                                                +7.54 percent

cotton:                                                                    +7.00 percent

male cut & sew apparel:                                        +3.36 percent   deficit

Interestingly, although the nation’s huge and chronic trade deficits means that many more industries run them than surpluses, fifteen of the twenty sectors listed above as leading trade deficit losers are surplus industries. So during the pandemic period so far, their surpluses have shrunk. Moreover, the degree of shrinkage has only been kept relatively low because the surpluses weren’t that big to begin with.

For the aforementioned reasons, the aerospace cluster is well-represented among the big deficit losers. But it’s strange that, during the pandemic so far, the U.S. trade shortfall in the non-diagnostic biologic products category that contains vaccines has gone way up.

Overall, however, the weaker export performance even among big U.S. net export winners points to the global economic slump that’s been created by the CCP Virus and the curbs on business and personal activity it’s spawned – which have combined to drag down growth abroad, in U.S. export markets, more than at home. But the remarkably stable makeup of U.S. surpluses and deficits strongly suggests that any new post-virus normal in American trade will strongly resemble the old one.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: An Omicron Bump in the US Manufacturing Recovery

Tags

aircraft, aircraft parts, automotive, CCP Virus, chemicals, coronavirus, COVID 19, facemasks, Federal Reserve, machinery, manufacturing, masks, medical devices, miscellaneous durable goods, monetary policy, non-metallic mineral products, Omicron variant, personal protective equipment, petroleum and coal products, pharmaceuticals, plastics and rubber products, PPE, printing, semiconductor shortage, semiconductors, stimulus, ventilators, wood products, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The big takeaway from today’s Federal Reserve after-inflation U.S. manufacturing data (for December) is that it may show domestic starting to suffer from the arrival into America of the super-infectious Omicron strain of the CCP Virus and the renewed economic curbs and behavioral changes it’s spurring, along with the spread of vaccine mandates in the ranks of U.S. businesses (of course, before yesterday’s Supreme Court decision striking down such policies for the private sector).

And especially discouraging: Just as Omicron began taking off, inflation-adjusted domestic output of medical equipment and supplies – including all the protective gear and treatment devices needed to fight the virus – fell sequentially at its fastest rate since the worst of the spring, 2020 pandemic-induced depression. Indeed, monthly real production in this category is now lower than in February, 2020 – the last full data month before the virus’ first variant began distorting the U.S. economy.

December’s 0.28 percent monthly decline in price-adjusted American manufacturing output represented industry’s first sequential retreat since September’s (hurricanes-affected) 0.52 percent drop. But the solid growth of recent months stayed largely unrevised.

The December results (which will remain preliminary for several more months) brought 2021’s yearly improvement in inflation-adjusted manufacturing output to 3.71 percent. That’s the best growth since 2011’s 6.48 percent, but as known by RealityChek regulars, it’s important to look at possible baseline effects nowadays. And this strong performance in part reflected the virus-fostered 1.94 percent fall-off in such growth in 2020.

The December downturn stemmed in part from problems (like the global semiconductor shortage) in the automotive sector, which shrank on month by 1.29 percent – following sequential expansion in November of a downwardly revised 1.69 percent. But even without the drag from vehicles and parts, domestic industry’s constant dollar production would still have been off by 0.22 percent.

Aside from automotive, the most important December real manufacturing growth loser by far was miscellaneous durable goods – a category that includes those pandemic-fighting essential medical devices and equipment industries. Its price-adjusted output slumped by 2.68 percent – the biggest downturn since April, 2020’s18.43 percent, during the worst of the CCP Virus’ first wave. Even so, measured by real production, the sector is 2.49 percent larger than in February, 2020, right before the pandemic’s initial major economic impact.

Other big December losers included:

>printing and related support activities, whose 1.82 percent slide was also the worst since April, 2020 (23.94 percent), and whose real output is now down by 5.14 percent since February, 2020;

>plastics and rubber products, whose 1.78 percent decrease was the worst since April, 2020 as well (19.12 percent), but that also followed seven months of strong gains. As a result, its real production is off just 1.08 percent since February, 2020; and

>petroleum and coal products, whose 1.58 percent fall-off was its worst since February’s seven percent, and whose after-inflation production is 4.49 percent lower than in February, 2020.

The biggest December winners were:

>non-metallic mineral products, which not only generated a 1.49 percent increase, but whose November inflation-adjusted output advance was revised all the way up from 1.25 percent to 3.03 percent. All the same, this sector’s constant-dollar production is still 1.32 percent lower than in February, 2020;

>wood products, whose 1.18 percent real increase in production was its best since March’s 4.05 percent, and which is now 3.03 percent bigger by this measure since February, 2020;

>the big chemicals sector, where real growth hit 0.69 percent following an upwardly revised 0.65 percent in November (from 0.50 percent), and which has grown by 7.93 percent in real terms since just before the pandemic; and – most encouragingly –

>machinery, a manufacturing bellwether because its products are so widely used throughout both industry and big non-manufacturing sectors like construction and agriculture – not to mention many services sectors. Its price-adjusted output increased by 0.68 percent sequentially in December – its best such result since July’s 2.85 percent, and revisions were unchanged on balance. Machinery production is now 5.20 percent higher than in February, 2020.

As for manufacturing industries that have been prominent in the news during the pandemic, they had a lousy December generally.

Aircraft and parts saw its monthly output down by 0.38 percent, and in stunning news, November’s initially reported 1.90 percent increase is now judged to be a 1.04 percent decrease. With October’s after-inflation production rise downgraded, too, aircraft and parts output is now just 10.71 percent higher than in February, 2020. As of last month’s Fed manufacturing data, this figure was a much higher 15.86 percent.

In pharmaceuticals and medicines, December’s 0.13 percent real output dip was the third straight monthly decline, and November and October revisions were fractionally negative on balance. Consequently, in price-adjusted production terms, these sectors were 13.42 percent larger than in February, 2020 – as opposd to the 13.54 percent calculable from last month’s industrial production report.

And as mentioned at the outset, the December results for medical equipment and supplies sector were awful – especially considering that for the next few months at least, Omicron’s metastasis will greatly increase demand for face masks, protective gowns, ventilators, and the like.

Real production of these products tumbled seqentially by 2.75 percent – the worst such performance since April, 2020’s 15.97 percent, during that first CCP Virus wave. Revisions for November and October were mildly positive, but whereas last month’s report revealed that inflation-adjusted production in these sectors was up since just before the first wave struck in force (though by a bare 0.65 percent), it’s now down by 1.50 percent. 

And let’s add another sector to the pandemic industries list – semiconductors and related devices. As implied by the category name, the numbers include more than the microchips that have been in such global short supply in recent months – and whose U.S. production revival has been such a high stated Washington, D.C. policy priority.

Still, it’s noteworthy that constant dollar output in this grouping rose a mere 0.12 percent on month in December, But it is up 16.86 percent since the pre-pandemicky February, 2020.

So far, betting against domestic manufacturing during the virus era has been a losing bet, But the headwinds for the near future at least look especially strong, topped of course by the spread of Omicron not only in the United States but in all the countries to which its manufacturers sell exports. Add to the list the apparent death of President Biden’s Build Back Better bill – which whatever its long-term economic wisdom and other effects, will certainly reduce government support for domestic economic activity – what seems like greater odds of more monetary policy tightening by the Federal Reserve sooner rather than later; and inflation that might be getting high enough to dampen U.S. consumer outlays.  

Tailwinds are by no means absent – like the beginning of spending made possible by the infrastructure bill, the still considerable amount of stimulus being provided by the Fed, and the easing of global supply chain knots. But even this last depends heavily on the medical, regulatory, and behavioral effects of Omicron in the United States and, perhaps even more important, in China, where the regime’s Zero Covid policy looks like a formula for ever broader lockdowns that will paralyze its ports and other infrastructure systems. 

Domestic manufacturers keep telling major surveys that they remain optimistic about the future.  (See here and here for the latest soundings.)  If anything’s certain about the circumstances they’re heading into, it’s that they’ll need every bit of this optimism to keep succeeding. 

Im-Politic: Covid Derangement Syndrome

Tags

CCP Virus, CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, coronavirus, COVID 19, health care, hospitals, Im-Politic, mask mandate, masks, Omicron variant, Politico, vaccine mandates, vaccines, Wuhan virus

If there’s emerged an Exhibit A as to how completely incoherent the nation’s public health establishment and medical systems have become on dealing with the CCP Virus (including its super-infectious but generally mild and often asymptomatic Omicron variant), it’s an article yesterday in Politico headlined “Health care workers are panicked as desperate hospitals ask infected staff to return.”

As is so often the case, moreover, this virus-related trend and its fallout has been reported without any allusions to the incoherence. And practically all of the muddle is expressed in the very first paragraph, starting with the very first half of the very first sentence:

“While most health workers are vaccinated, many are still falling sick, exacerbating a staff shortage as more Americans seek hospital care. The reliance on employees who may still be infectious comes despite objections from nurses‘ unions and the American Medical Association, which warned the decision puts patients’ health and safety at risk. And there are no requirements that patients be notified if their caregiver is sick.”

Presumably, when reporter Rachael Levy writes that “most health workers are vaccinated,” she means “fully vaccinated” – including boosters. Yet “many are still falling sick.” Readers never learn how many or, more important, what percentage. But it’s no doubt lots – indeed, enough to create and worsen staff shortages.

That alone should blow a big hole in the various sweeping “vaccines work” claims used, notably, to justify mandates for the jabs, especially since these health care workers by definition must overwhelmingly be individuals young enough and free enough of the special medical conditions to be able to avoid illness serious enough to render them too infeebled to report to work — much less to threaten grave illness or death.

But the headline indicates that the concern of the “panicked” health care workers isn’t simply that the colleagues who believe they should be staying home are crawling in, uncontrollably shedding pathogens and threatening staff and patients alike, and/or are physically incapable of performing their duties adequately.

They’re also concerned that these colleagues are “infected” in the first place.

Yet these worries are loopy for any number of glaringly obvious reasons. For example, if infected health care workers are asymptomatic, they should be fully capable of doing their jobs. In addition, the evidence so far seems to show that most virus victims don’t spread the pathogen (see, e.g., here and here), and when they do, they’re most contagious very early in their infections.

That last point is crucial because it’s behind the latest guidance for health care facilities issued by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). As Levy (thankfully!) reports, this advisory allows such providers “to bring back workers after five days of isolation, instead of 10, without a negative Covid-19 test.” What’s more, “In cases where workforce shortages become extreme, hospitals can bring back staff without any isolation period.”

Stranger still: Presumably the health care workers who so fear their supposedly irresponsible colleagues are, according to their own definitions, behaving very responsibly themselves. In other words, they’re surely individuals who are both fully vaccinated and dedicated mask-wearers.

If they’re vaccinated, of course, it’s now clear that their protection against infection is far from perfect, but that their protection against severe illness and death is very good. That is, if they do get infected, and since they are young-ish and strong-ish, they’ll recover fully and pretty quickly — assuming they experience any symptoms at all.

Further, since they work in hospitals, they’re almost certainly also wearing the kinds of masks that are highly effective in preventing infection, not the cloth masks worn so widely outside hospitals that even the CDC has found provide pretty ineffective protection. So have the worried workers now joined the “vaccines and many masks don’t work at all” camp?

It’s true that the Omicron variant may be a virulent enough spreader to confound both vaccines and boosters and even high quality masks, at least to a significant degree. But if this is the case, to date, the health effects of Omicron spread look much too weak to justify panic or even close for anyone without specific vulnerabilities.

Yes, hospitals are full of people with such vulnerabilities – the patients. But the CDC guidelines contain recommendations for dealing with them.

Not that the CDC has covered itself with glory throughout the pandemic. Or that this specific approach that it’s taken to the health care system will keep everyone involved fully protected.

But as one hospital CEO quoted by Levy reminds, “We don’t have good choices — or the choices that we want.” A new consensus seems to be emerging in the nation that America has to “learn to live” with the CCP Virus. Unless it’s believed that somehow the health care delivery system should be an exception (and should be crippled until somehow something close to Zero Covid is reached without it?) hospital workers need to follow this advice, too.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing’s Now Defying Hurricanes and Delta

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aircraft, aircraft parts, appliances, Boeing, CCP Virus, chemicals, computer and electronics products, coronavirus, COVID 19, Delta variant, electrical equipment, fabricated metal products, facemasks, Federal Reserve, furniture, Hurricane Ida, inflation-adjusted growth, machinery, manufacturing, masks, medical devices, medicines, oil refining, paper, personal protective equipment, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, plastics, PPE, real output, semiconductor shortage, supply chain, travel, ventilators, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Domestic manufacturing’s done it again. Just as with the Labor Department’s August jobs report, the Federal Reserve’s new release on manufacturing output for the month shows that industry kept dodging whatever potholes the CCP Virus and its highly infectious Delta variant keep digging for the rest of the U.S. economy.

America-based manufacturers’ inflation-adjusted production grew by a meager 0.11 percent sequentially in August. But output was held down by facility closures forced by Hurricane Ida in the petrochemicals, plastics resins, and petroleum refining sectors. Overall revisions were mixed, but some upgrades and downgrades in individual major industries were pretty remarkable, as will be seen below.

The biggest winners in the new price-adjusted manufacturing production report were the small, catch-all “other manufacturing” category (2.42 percent); furniture and related products (up 2.07 percent); computer and electronics products (whose 1.21 percent output rise may have been a response to the worldwide shortage of semiconductors); paper (up 1.07 percent); and fabricated metal products (up 0.74 percent).

The biggest losers were electrical equipment, appliances, and components (down 1.16 percent); textiles products (down 0.81 percent on month); machinery (down 0.80 percent); and the big chemicals sector (down 0.49 percent).

Normally, the machinery results would be discouraging, since its products are used so widely both in the rest of manufacturing and also in big non-manufacturing industries like agriculture and construction. But its August dip followed a July jump of 3.31 percent – its best production improvement since January’s 4.63 percent – which was dramatically upgraded from the previously reported 1.91 percent.

The electrical equipment category followed a similar pattern. Its July real production results were revised all the way up from 2.31 percent to 3.95 percent – its best such performance since January, 2010, when the economy was still in its early bounce-back from the Great Recession that followed the global financial crisis.

Also enjoying a solid August were two narrower manufacturing categories that remain in the news due to the ongoing effects of the CCP Virus. Air travel has of course suffered throughout the pandemic-era, and aerospace manufacturing giant Boeing has been hit with numerous related manufacturing and safety problems (including some pre-dating the pandemic, like the grounding of the popular 737 Max jetliner).

Yet aircraft and parts production in constant dollars advanced by 0.34 percent in August, and in another major revision, July’s previously reported 2.78 percent increase is now pegged at 4.10 percent – its best such result since January’s 6.79 percent burst. And June’s downgraded 3.57 percent rise was bumped back up to 3.84 percent. As a result, aircraft and parts production is now 12.63 percent higher in after-inflation terms than in February, 2020 – the last full data month before the virus began significantly affecting the U.S. economy.

The pharmaceuticals and medicines sector (which includes vaccines) saw a real month-to-month production increase of 0.89 percent in August, and revisions were modest and mixed. These results left inflation-adjusted output 12.33 percent higher than its immediate pre-pandemic levels.

But August real production sank sequentially by 1.73 percent in the vital medical equipment and supplies sector – which includes virus-fighting items like face masks, protective gowns, and ventilators.

On the brighter side, July’s initially reported 1.71 percent constant dollar production rise was revised up to 2.42 percent. June’s dramatically downgraded 1.54 percent decrease was upgraded to a 0.13 percent drop, and May’s upwardly revised 1.86 percent real growth was downgraded only slightly – to 1.78 percent. Even so, on a price-adjusted basis, this crucial industry is just 2.66 percent larger than before the CCP Virus arrived in force.

Domestic industry still faces important headwinds of course – and not just from the possibility that Delta keeps worsening America’s public health and economy, and that approaching winter weather triggers a new wave of infections, hospitalizations, deaths, and restrictions. Those global supply chain snags are still with us, too.

But throughout the pandemic era, U.S.-based manufacturers have overcome obstacles just like this, and their consistent vigor indicates that it’s the pessimists about their future prospectswho now face the biggest burden of proof.

Glad I Didn’t Say That! A Claim that Masks Are and Aren’t Good for Kids.

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CCP Virus, children, coronavirus, COVID 19, education, facemasks, Glad I Didn't Say That!, masks, mental health, psychology, schools, Wuhan virus

“[T]here is plenty of reason to believe that [mask wearing] won’t 

cause any harm” to children.

– Research psychologist Judith Danovitch, August 18, 2021

 

“This is not to say that masks are preferable to no masks, all things

being equal.”

– Research psychologist Judith Danovitch, August 18, 2021

(Source: “Actually, Wearing a Mask Can Help Your Child Learn,” by Judith Danovitch, The New York Times, August 18, 2021, Opinion | Actually, Wearing a Mask Can Help Your Child Learn – The New York Times (nytimes.com))

 

 

Im-Politic: Delta Fear is Leading The Science, Not Following It

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Anthony S. Fauci, Biden, CCP Virus, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, coronavirus, COVID 19, Delta variant, hospitalizations, Im-Politic, infections, lockdowns, masks, public health, vaccine passports, Wuhan virus

Sorry, but I’m not that comforted by the fact that Anthony S. Fauci is now saying  that “I don’t think we’re going to see lockdowns” because of the rapid spread of the Delta variant of the CCP Virus.

That’s because (1) President Biden’s top medical advisor has been such a single-minded backer of broad curbs on economic activity despite their devastating costs to both workers and businesses, not to mention the educational and non-virus public health crises they’ve worsened (like deaths from opioid overdoses); and (2) because he and the rest of the lockdown crowd keep harping on fatally flawed measures of virus dangers that have triggered previous lockdowns, and that are especially prominent and misleading because of Delta’s unusual transmissability. The two most important are case numbers and hospitalization increases.

Normally, the number of victims of a given disease and how that number’s been changing would be crucial gauges of the threat it poses to a population at large and of the effectiveness of mitigation steps already taken.

As has been known since the early phases of the pandemic, however, the CCP Virus can be present asymptomatically. That is, many individuals might not know they’re hosting it, either because they’re still feeling perfectly healthy, or because the effects are so mild that they’re judged not worth dealing with – or reporting to the health providers on which governments at all levels in the United States rely heavily for the virus data, and that form the basis for their policy responses.

As a result, literally no one knows how many Americans have been affected by the CCP Virus and, even more important, how that number has been changing. The same goes for the Delta variant. And therefore, literally no one knows the actual national health consequences of its virulence, and especially what percentage of those who have caught Delta are now or will become seriously ill, or have died or will succumb. Those are the Delta statistic — not simple numbers recorded instances of serious illness or mortality, however distressing they are on humanitarian grounds — that matter in assessing the peril posed by this strain, and in formulating responses whose net effects economically, socially, and health-wise aren’t worse than the disease/

To understand this distinction further, think about what’s known about Delta-related hospitalizations. The most accurate answer is “Very little so far in the way of hard data.” Indeed, as pointed out last week by the American Society for Microbiology, “Research is ongoing to determine if Delta infection is associated with increased hospitalization and death.” But that hasn’t prevented a pandemic of claims that it’s been a  primary driver of admissions lately. (See, e.g., here and here — among a gazillion other articles.)

Let’s assume, however, that the narrative is true. If so, since June 27 through the end of last week, when according to the Washington Post‘s very convenient virus tracker, the number of virus-hospitalized Americans hit its lowest level since the spring of 2020, the number of such patients has increased from 16,403 to 49,498 (through July 31), or 33,095. That sounds like a lot of hospitalizations, and the percentage gain (the numbers have nearly tripled), seems even worse. So Delta looks pretty dangerous, right? But again, what’s the context – that is, what’s the share of Americans infected with Delta who get seriously ill enough to get hospitalized?

As of two weeks ago, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the new strain was responsible for just over 83 percent of all new American CCP Virus cases. That was up from just over 30 percent on June 19 – just about the time virus-related hospitalizations hit their latest bottom. From that time through the end of July, just under 1.352 million total new virus cases have been recorded. So assuming that over the entirety of this period, Delta variant cases made up about 75 percent of these, their total at comes to 1.014 million.

Let’s further assume, in sync with the evidence-free narrative, that all of the new hospitalizations can be blamed on Delta. This would mean that 3.26 percent of the total new Delta cases (that 33,095 figure) were serious enough to require hospital care. Does that number justify even thinking about new lockdowns, much less calling them (only sort of) unlikely?

But don’t forget the asymptomatic cases! According to a new CDC estimate, as of mid-2020, 83 percent of total virus cases in America were asymptomatic – i.e., not recorded. Since so much has changed then – mainly, mass vaccination – that 83 percent figure probably doesn’t hold any more. A reasonable guess might be that 33 percent is now more like it (since about half of the total population is now fully vaccinated and many more Americans have either natural or acquired immunity).

If that’s right, the number of new Delta strain infections is more like 1.5 million, not one million. And the hospitalization rate is more like 2.21 percent. So the notion that “the war [against the virus] has changed” because of this recent mutation, as contended by an internal federal health document obtained by the Washington Post, looks recklessly alarmist.

Further, such views look even wilder and crazier given the likelihood that Washington’s methods for defining cases and virus-related hospitalizations have produced seriously exaggerated counts.

After all, detecting the virus’ presence in an individual is only one of several sets of criteria that the CDC uses to conclude there’s a CCP Virus case to be counted. For example, for individuals that have been in contact with even a probable case of the virus, or who are members of designated vulnerable groups, a positive virus diagnosis can be justified if they display a headache and a sore throat at the same time. Or a sore throat and a runny nose. Or fatigue and a fever. Or if he or she is simply has a cough.

Even the CDC lab test standards for declaring a virus case via testing are dodgy, primarily because the main determinant seems to be the simple presence of the SARS-COV-2 pathogen that causes the disease. Unfortunately, these standards don’t seem to take into account how microorganisms like viruses can enter hosts and form “colonies” that result in no tissue infection and indeed don’t interact with the host at all. And as no less than the World Health Organization has pointed out, “Detection of viral RNA does not necessarily mean that a person is infectious and able to transmit the virus to another person.” Indeed, for all intents and purposes, it means that someone can be hosting the virus but shouldn’t be considered a case at all. One recent study suggests that this pattern is found in more than a tenth of positive cases.

Finally, the hospitalization numbers may be the least reliable of all. In the first place, the reporting system used by the CDC covers only about ten percent of the American population. Moreover, all you need to qualify for the CDC’s definition of a CCP Virus-related hospitalization is to be admitted into such a facility for any reason within 14 days of a positive test. As a result, if you need to be hospitalized for, say, cancer, and you’ve tested positive for the virus during the previous two weeks, you’re considered hospitalized for the CCP Virus.

It’s the same issue that the country has been dealing concerning whether various deaths are “from” or “with” Covid. And genuinely complicated judgment calls are involved. But for that very reason, public health officials should be awfully careful when they talk about devastating consequences of infections in and of themselves.

So the bottom lines are that the sharp recent increase in CCP Virus cases – including of course Delta variant cases – look overwhelmingly to be asymptomatic or mild; that even these numbers define positivity way too broadly, thus representing a major exaggeration and therefore affecting the nation’s health only marginally at best; and that, similarly, there’s probably even less even to true hospitalization rates that are already meager enough than meets the eye.

If Fauci, or anyone else in the Biden administration or in the ranks of restrictions fans had been pointing out any of these absolutely vital nuances since the virus’ Delta phase began, I’d have more faith in assurances about avoiding new lockdowns or any significant new business or behavior curbs. That they haven’t tells me that if such deeply mistaken and needlessly damaging (as known since the virus’ early period) measures aren’t yet on the lockdowners’ table, they’re not too far off — and so far, that would represent leading the science, not following it.  

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Automotive’s Still in the U.S. Manufacturing Growth Driver’s Seat

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aircraft, aluminum, appliances, automotive, CCP Virus, China, coal, coronavirus wuhan virus, COVID 19, Delta variant, electrical equipment, facemasks, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted growth, inflation-adjusted output, infrastructure, lockdowns, machinery, manufacturing, masks, medical devices, metals, petroleum refining, pharmaceuticals, PPE, real growth, recovery, reopening, steel, stimulus, tariffs, Trump, vaccines, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Talk about annoying! There I was last Thursday morning, all set to dig into the new detailed Federal Reserve U.S. manufacturing production numbers (for June) in order to write up my usual same-day report, and guess what? None of the new tables was on-line! Fast forward to this morning: They’re finally up. (And here‘s the summary release.) So here we go with our deep dive into the results, which measure changes in inflation-adjusted manufacturing output.

The big takeaway is that, as with last month’s report for May, the semiconductor shortage-plagued automotive sector was the predominant influence. But there was a big difference. In May, domestic vehicles and parts makers managed to turn out enough product to boost the overall manufacturing production increase greatly. In June, a big automotive nosedive helped turn an increase for U.S.-based industry into a decrease.

The specifics: In May, the sequential automotive output burst (which has been revised up from 6.69 percent in real terms to 7.34 percent) helped push total manufacturing production for the month to 0.92 percent after inflation (a figure that’s also been upgraded – from last month’s initially reported already strong 0.89 percent). Without automotive, manufacturing’s constant dollar growth would have been just 0.47 percent.

In June, vehicle and parts production sank by an inflation-adjusted 6.62 percent , and dragged industry’s total performance into the negative (though by just 0.05 percent). Without the automotive crash, real manufacturing output would have risen by 0.40 percent.

Counting slightly negative revisions, through June, constant dollar U.S. manufacturing production in toto was 0.60 percent less than in February, 2020 – the economy’s last full pre-pandemic month.

Domestic industry’s big production winners in June were primary metals (a category that includes heavily tariffed steel and aluminum), which soared by 4.02 percent after inflation; the broad aerospace and miscellaneous transportation sector, which of course contains troubled Boeing aircraft, (more on which later), and which turned in 3.75 percent growth, its best such performance since January’s 5.62 percent pop; petroleum and coal products (up 1.36 percent); and miscellaneous durable goods, which includes but is far from limited to CCP Virus-related medical supplies (up 1.21 percent).

The biggest losers other than automotive? Inflation-adjusted production of electrical equipment, appliances, and components, which dropped sequentially by 1.73 percent in real terms; the tiny, remaining apparel and leather goods industry (1.44 percent); and the non-metallic minerals sector (1.07 percent).

Especially disappointing was the 0.55 percent monthly dip in machinery production, since this sector’s products are used so widely throughout the rest of manufacturing and in major parts of the economy outside manufacturing like construction and agriculture.

But in one of the biggest surprises of the June Fed data (though entirely consistent with the aforementioned broad aerospace sector), real output of aircraft and parts shot up by 5.24 percent – its best such performance since January’s 6.79 percent. It’s true that the May production decrease was revised from 1.47 percent to 2.61 percent. But with Boeing’s related and manufacturing and safety-related woes continuing to multiply, who would have expected that outcome?

And partly as a result of this two-month net gain, after-inflation aircraft and parts output as of June is 7.83 percent higher in real terms than in pre-pandemicky February, 2020 – a much faster growth rate than for manufacturing as a whole.

The big pharmaceuticals and medicines sector (which includes vaccines) registered a similar pattern of results, although with much smaller swings. May’s originally reported 0.22 percent constant dollar output improvement was revised down to 0.15 percent. But June saw a 0.89 percent rise, which brought price-adjusted production in this group of industries to 9.33 percent greater than just before the pandemic.

Some good news was also generated by the vital medical equipment and supplies sector – which includes virus-fighting items like face masks, face masks, protective gowns, and ventilators. Its monthly May growth was upgraded all the way up from the initially reported 0.19 percent to 1.18 percent. And that little spurt was followed by 0.99 percent growth in June.

Yet despite this acceleration, this sector is still a mere 2.27 percent bigger in real terms than in February, 2020, meaning that Americans had better hope that new pandemic isn’t right around the corner, that the Delta variant of the CCP Virus doesn’t result in a near-equivalent, or that foreign suppliers of such gear will be a lot more generous than in 2020.

As for manufacturing as a whole, the outlook seems as cloudy as ever to me. Vast amounts of stimulus are still being pumped into the U.S. economy, which continues to reopen and overwhelmingly stay open. That should translate into strong growth and robust demand for manufactured goods. The Trump tariffs are still pricing huge numbers of Chinese goods out of the U.S. market. And the shortage of automotive semiconductors may actually be easing.

But the spread of the Delta variant has spurred fears of a new wave of local and even wider American lockdowns. This CCP Virus mutation is already spurring sweeping economic curbs in many key U.S. export markets. Progress in Washington on an infrastructure bill seems stalled. And for what they’re worth (often hard to know), estimates of U.S. growth rates keep coming down, and were falling even before Delta emerged as a major potential problem. (See, e.g., here.)

I’m still most impressed, though, by the still lofty levels of optimism (see, e.g., here)  expressed by U.S. manufacturers themselves when they respond to surveys such as those sent out by the regional Federal Reserve banks (which give us the most recent looks). Since they’re playing with their own, rather than “other people’s money,” keep counting me as a domestic manufacturing bull.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A “Gentleman’s C” for the New Manufacturing Jobs Numbers

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aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, electronics, Employment, fabricated metals products, facemasks, food products, furniture, housing, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, masks, metals, pharmaceuticals, ports, PPE, printing, productivity, protective gear, recession, recovery, reopening, semiconductor shortage, tariffs, vaccines, {What's Left of) Our Economy

June’s gains weren’t nearly enough to overcome the latest trend in U.S. manufacturing employment: From a job growth leader earlier during the CCP Virus pandemic, domestic industry has turned into a laggard. It’s not lagging by a big margin, but given significant net headwinds it should still be enjoying, recent results are clearly disappointing.

This morning, the Labor Department reported that U.S.-based manufacturers created 15,000 net new jobs in June – a modest number given the 662,000 increase in total private sector employment on month. At least revisions were positive. May’s initially reported 23,000 monthly improvement is now judged to be 39,000, but April’s already downwardly revised 32,000 sequential job loss is now pegged at 35,000.

In many of the nation’s supposedly prestige colleges, the grade earned by this kind of result would be called a “Gentleman’s C.”

As a result, domestic manufacturing has now regained 904,000 (66.32 percent) of the 1.363 million jobs lost during the pandemic. The numbers for the private sector overall are 72.98 percent of the 21.353 million lost jobs that have been recovered, and for the total non-farm economy (the definition of the American employment universe used by the U.S. government, which includes government jobs) 69.75 percent of the 22.362 million jobs lost.

A manufacturing optimist (and I’ve been one of them) can note that industry took less of an employment hit during the pandemic-loss months of March and April, 2020. Manufacturing employment sank by 10.65 percent, versus 16.46 percent for the private sector and 14.66 percent for the whole non-farm economy.

But nowadays, domestic manufacturers are still benefiting from major tariffs plus massive government stimulus on both the fiscal and monetary fronts, and from the huge ramp up in vaccine production. Reopening-related bottlenecks clearly are causing problems, but according to the major national surveys that measure how manufacturers themselves believe they’re faring, production and new orders for their products keep growing strongly. (For the newest ones, see here and here.) Even given equally widespread reports that new workers are hard to find, I expected hiring to remain much more robust than it has.

One explanation may be higher productivity, which enables businesses to turn out more goods with fewer workers. But given the longstanding difficulties of gauging this measure of efficiency, and undoubted pandemic-era distortions, I’m reluctant to put too much stock in this argument.

The shortages issues have been once again illustrated by the dominance of the automotive sector in the June manufacturing jobs picture. Payrolls of vehicles and parts companies fell by 12,300 – the biggest individual sector decreases by far – and surely stem from the continuing global shortage of the computer chips that have become ever more important parts of cars and trucks of all kinds.

One small bright spot in the June figures – the 300 jobs increase in the machinery sector. It’s an important indicator of the overall state of industrial hiring, since its products are used throughout industry (as well as in non-manufacturing sectors like agriculture and construction). At the same time, these new positions represented machinery’s weakest sequential performance since January’s 3,200 employment decrease.

Other big June manufacturing net hiring winners were furniture and related products (up 8,500, no doubt reflecting still strong home sales and remodeling activity), fabricated metals products (up 5,700, which is noteworthy given still widespread whining about the ongoing U.S. tariffs on metals), and miscellaneous durable goods manufacturing (up 3,300 – encouraging since this category includes many pandemic-related medical supplies).

The biggest losers other than automotive were food products (down 4,100 and continuing an employment slump that began in January), electronic instruments (down 2,100 and possibly related to the semiconductor shortage), and printing and related activities (down 1,400).

Pandemic-related industries turned in a mixed hiring performance, according to the latest jobs report. Job creation accelerated significantly in the surgical appliances and supply sector, which contains protective gear like face masks, gloves and surgical goans. Its payrolls grew by 1,700 on month in May (its data are one month behind, as is the case with the other sectors examined below), up from April’s 1,200 and its best monthly total since last July’s 3,000. This surgical category’s workforce is now 11.50 percent bigger than in February, 2020 – the last pre-pandemic month.

But the May figures revealed a job creation setback in the overall pharmaceuticals and medicines industry. April’s hiring was revised down slightly, from 2,700 to 2,500, but the number was still solid. In May, however, its payrolls shrank by 400, its worst such performance since pandemicky April, 2020. And its workforce is only 3.82 percent greater than in February, 2020.

Better news came out of the pharmaceuticals subsector containing vaccines, but not that much better. This industry added one thousand workers on net in May, but April’s initially reported 1,300 jobs increase was revised down to 1,100. Still, this vaccines-heavy sector now employs 9.20 percent more workers than just before the pandemic.

And in aircraft, Boeing’s continuing manufacturing and safety issues surely helped produce this industry’s worst jobs month – consisting of a 5,500 payroll decrease – since June, 2020’s 5,800. This sector has now lost 9.39 percent of its jobs since the final pre-pandemic month.

Interestingly, the aircraft engines and parts, and non-engine parts categories weren’t nearly as hard-hit job-wise in May. (The former even maintained employment levels.) But payrolls in each are down since February, 2020, by roughly twice as much proportionately as in aircraft.

Major uncertainties still hang over the domestic manufacturing jobs scene, and in one important respect – big new backups in Chinese ports – they’ve become murkier. Nor do Boeing’s problems seem ready to end any time soon. I’m still bullish on U.S.-based manufacturing’s employment outlook, at least in the short and medium terms mainly because American policy remains so overwhelmingly stimulative and its effects are still coursing through the economy. But I’m getting a little impatient for the numbers to start backing me up once again.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Springtime Blahs for U.S. Manufacturing Jobs

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aerospace, aircraft, appliances, automation, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Employment, fabricated metal products, Jobs, Labor Departent, machinery, manufacturing, masks, metals tariffs, non-farm business, non-farm payrolls, pharmaceuticals, PPE, productivity, protective gear, regulatory policy, tariffs, tax policy, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

In contrast to the mixed set of signals I saw being given off by last month’s official monthly U.S. jobs report (for April), today’s May figures are pretty clearly indicating that manufacturing hiring is in a weak patch. In fact, the patch has been weak enough to turn the sector from a national employment creation leader to a laggard. Just as important, the short-term outlook at least seems somewhat dimmer than it had been.

The main reason for confusion over the previous data had to do with the disconnect between the automotive-heavy losses of April (which accounted for more than all of that month’s initially reported 18,000 net job decrease) and the positive revisions for the preceding months. Another very encouraging sign – the second straight month of strong jobs gains for the machinery sector, whose products are used widely not only in the rest of manufacturing, but in other major parts of the economy like agriculture and construction.

May’s results were almost a mirror image – and not in a good way.

For example, whereas in April, the 27,000 sequential automotive job losses exceeded total manufacturing job loss of 18,000 (leaving the rest of industry’s hiring performance pretty subdued, to be sure), in May, automotive payrolls rose by 24,800. But overall manufacturing job gains totaled only 23,000 – so the rest of the sector shed workers on net.

In addition, revisions are now negative. April’s manufacturing employment is now judged to have fallen by 32,000 month-to-month, not 18,000. That’s largely because that month’s automotive layoffs were much bigger than first reported – 37,700 rather than 27,000. Even March’s very good upwardly revised monthly hiring surge of 54,000 has now been revised down again to 51,000.

As for machinery, that crucial industry lost 4,700 jobs on net in May – its worst results by far since April, 2020 – at the depths of the CCP Virus-induced downturn and the first negative number since January. Moreover, this April’s 3,700 monthly jobs increase has now been revised down to 1,900, and March’s last upgraded 5,400 figure is now pegged at only 3,500.

In all, manufacturing has now regained 876,000 (64.27 percent) of the 1.363 million jobs it lost at the pandemic’s height in the spring of 2020. That’s now well behind the 69.74 percent employment recovery of the private sector and even the 65.88 percent rebound of the total economy (defined as the non-farm sector by the U.S. Labor Department, which compiles and categorizes the data).

The manufacturing sectors with the biggest sequential May jobs gains were the overall transportation equipment sector (where a 9,000 hiring improvement was propped up by the automotive increases), miscellaneous non-durbable good makers (up 4,100), fabricated metals products (up 3,500) miscellaneous durable goods manufacturing (a catch-all category including everything from surgical equipment – like facemasks and other personal protection equipment to gaskets to jewelry – where payrolls were up 3,400), and computer and electronics products and electrical equipment and appliances (up 2,800 each).

The hiring in fabricated metals and appliances was noteworthy given that companies in both industries have been complaining loudly about the pain they’ve been suffering from higher metals prices stemming in part from ongoing U.S. tariffs on these materials. (See, e.g., here and here.)

May’s big manufacturing jobs losers aside from machinery were non-metallic mineral products (down 2,200), paper and paper products (down 2,100), and the big chemicals sector, which is another big supplier of a wide variety of products to the entire economy (down 1,100).

More encouragingly, when it comes to industries closely related to the fight against the pandemic, job creation seems picking up, although the relevant data are one month behind the rest of the jobs figures. Specifically, in the surgical appliances and supplies sector that includes the protective gear, March’s employment increase was unrevised at 900, and hiring accelerated to 1,200 in April – the best monthly performance since September’s 1,600. This sector’s payrolls are now 10,400 (9.89 percnt) higher than in February, 2020 – the last pre-pandemic month.

For pharmaceuticals and medicines overall, March’s 1,500 sequential jobs increase was revised up to 1,600, and April hiring surged to 2,700 – its best performance by far of the CCP Virus period. Its payrolls are up by 12,500 (4.01 percent) since pre-pandemicky February, 2020.

For the pharmaceuticals subsector containing vaccines, March’s initially reported employment increas of 500 is now judged to be 800, and net hiring grew by 1,300 in April – a solid improvement by this industry’s recent standards. As a result, its workforce has now increased by 9,200 (9.30 percent) since February, 2020.

The same unfortunately can’t be said for the aerospace industry, and continuing and even mounting troubles for Boeing presage ongoing woes for the foreseeable future. March’s initially reported 1,800 monthly job loss for aircraft has now been revised for the worse to 1,900, and the sectors workforce fell by another 200 in April. Meanwhile, following sequential March losses in aircraft engines and parts, and in non-engine aircraft parts, employment flatlined in these two sectors combined in April.

Continued strength in the overall recovery of the U.S. economy should provide strong tailwinds for domestic manufacturers and for industry’s jobs figures, and continuing tariffs should help by keep much foreign competition (especially from China) out of the market.

Vaccine production will likely keep expanding – and requiring more workers – as well, mainly to supply immense foreign demand. But the sector is so small that its employment performance can’t move the manufacturing jobs needle much.

Boeing’s problems, however, can be expected to cast a big shadow not only over the big aerospace industry, but over its big domestic supply chain as well. And although the global semiconductor shortage that has hit the automotive sector especially hard may be starting to ease, the damage appears likely to take considerably longer to overcome. Manufacturers face big questions about the future of U.S. tax and regulatory policy, too.

Recently, moreover, some data’s come out pointing to a development that might wind up strengthening domestic industry in toto, but weakening its employment potential, at least in the short run. Labor Department figures show that, from the depths of the pandemic through the first quarter of this year, U.S.-based manufacturing has boosted its labor productivity much faster than the non-farm economy generally — and much faster than it has since its recovery from the last recession.  In other words, manufacturers lately been improving their ability to turn out product more than they’ve increased hiring. 

Whether this is a secular change or whether industry will revert to its recent mean is anyone’s guess. Also highly uncertain is whether better productivity growth (including of course more use of labor-saving technologies) will wind up destroying jobs on net, or increasing them by supercharging production. So far history seems to teach that such advances are net employment creators, but is that inevitable going forward? And is it inevitable for manufacturing specifically? All I can say is “Stay tuned” and “Be patient.”