(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Confusing but Overall Downbeat News on U.S. Manufacturing Productivity

Tags

aluminum, CCP Virus, China tariffs, coronavirus, COVID 19, durable goods, lavbor productivity, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, multifactor productivity, productivity, steel, tariffs, trade war, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I wish I could say that the detailed U.S.manufacturing labor productivity statistics for 2019 that came out late last week provided a clear, pre-CCP Virus picture of domestic industry’s health, and especially insights into how well manufacturing was holding up during the ongoing U.S.-China trade war. Unfortunately, the sector-by-sector data add up to a confusing mix of halfway decent and bad news.

First a reminder: Productivity is an important measure of efficiency, and labor productivity is the narrower of the two sets of productivity statistics tracked by the Labor Department. But although it only measures output per hour by individual workers (as opposed to examining the usage and output results for a wide-ranging combination of inputs), the labor productivity figures are released on a timelier basis than the more comprehensive multifactor productivity numbers.

Also important to remember: For all their importance, the productivity data represent the statistics in which economists have the least confidence, although the problem is much more difficult in services than in goods like manufactured products.

Nevertheless, most economists do agree that raising productivity levels is any economy’s best way to boost living standards on a sustainable basis, and so it’s discouraging to report that the overall context for manufacturing last year was pretty dreary. Another productivity series from the Labor Department judged that labor productivity in industry shrank by 0.56 percent. In 2018, it rose by 0.64 percent. Moreover, this general result certainly doesn’t indicate that American manufacturers made much progress compensating for higher costs created by metals and China tariffs by figuring out how to make their workers more efficient.

At the same time, last year, labor productivity fell in 54 of the 86 manufacturing sectors monitored by the Labor Department. As bad as that sounds, this result was actually better than that for 2018, when labor productivity decreased in 67 of those sectors.

Although the so-far-pervasive but widely varying use of Chinese materials, parts, and components makes identifying the China tariffs’ impact on labor productivity, figuring out the effects of the metals tariffs is much easier, and here the news is more encouraging still.

In durable goods – the super-sector that contains the major U.S. industries that use tariff-ed steel and aluminum – labor productivity fell in 31 of the 51 sectors examined. That’s a genuine improvement on 2018, when labor productivity decreased in 41 out of 51.

Even more revealing: Most of the big metals users themselves stepped up their productivity game somewhat in 2019, though in absolute terms (as shown in the table below), their yearly performances weren’t by any means impressive.

                                                                        2018                       2019

fabricated metals products:                    -1.4 percent             -0.1 percent

machinery:                                                  0 percent             -0.2 percent

household appliances:                           +1.6 percent            +2.0 percent

motor vehicles:                                       -7.6 percent            -2.1 percent

motor vehicle parts:                                -1.2 percent            -0.6 percent

aerospace products & parts:                   -8.1 percent            -2.2 percent

As long as the CCP Virus keeps affecting the American and global economies (an especially important point for manufacturing, since in 2019, its exports represented nearly 18 percent of its total gross output), it’ll be tough to get a handle on underlying trends in manufacturing labor productivity and other performance indicators. But on the labor productivity front, last week’s figures sadly make clear that a return to pre-virus levels won’t be terribly difficult to achieve.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is Manufacturing Employment Being Undercut by Boeing Along with Trade Wars?

Tags

737 Max, aerospace, aircraft, aluminum, Boeing, China, Jobs, manufacturing, metals, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, supply chain, tariffs, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

One of the biggest questions raised by the new (lousy) manufacturing results of this morning’s monthly U.S. jobs report concerns whether industry’s dismal recent performance is being impacted more by President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade policies or by Boeing’s aircraft safety woes. The bulk of the evidence released this morning seems to point to the trade wars as the continuing main culprit, but also to some Boeing-related puzzles. 

Overall, the sector lost 12,000 jobs on month in December – its worst such result (excluding October, whose figures were distorted by the General Motors strike) since August, 2016’s 23,000 decrease).  Moreover, the year-end annual manufacturing jobs gain of 46,000 was the lowest such figure since 2016’s 7,000 loss.  (For comparison’s sake, 2018’s annual manufacturing employment increase of 264,000 was the best such result since 1997’s 304,000.  

The trade wars evidence for the recent deterioration comes in the form of comparisons between the major metals-using industries during the early months following the imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum, and afterwards (when many Trump critics argue that the trade curbs’ impact began sinking in). As always, the impact of Mr. Trump’s levies on imports from China remain too diffused throughout the manufacturing sector – and too unevenly so – to be gauged reliably. For good measure, they’ve also been threatened and applied in a confusing, on-and-off manner, and the recent Phase One trade deal and announcement of follow-on negotiations looks unlikely to end much of the measurement uncertainty.

First, here are the data on employment changes in those metals-using sectors from April, 2018 (the first full month during which the tariffs were in effect) through last month. Figures for the U.S. private sector overall, manufacturing overall, and manufacturing’s durable goods super-sector (in which most of the main metals users are classified) are included for comparison’s sake. Keep in mind that the results for household appliances also reflect a separate set of tariffs for large household laundry machines that have been in place since February, 2018.

                                                  Old thru Nov      New thru Nov       Thru Dec

entire private sector:                +2.82 percent      +2.81 percent    +2.92 percent

overall manufacturing:            +1.83 percent      +1.84 percent    +1.75 percent

durable goods:                         +1.99 percent      +2.02 percent    +1.94 percent

fabricated metals products:     +1.51 percent       +1.45 percent   +0.96 percent

non-electrical machinery:       +1.26 percent       +1.56 percent   +1.37 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:   -0.45 percent        -0.73 percent    -0.81 percent

household appliances*:            not available        -5.84 percent     not available

aerospace products & parts*:  not available        +9.02 percent     not available

*data are one month behind

There’s no mistaking that net new hiring in the metals-using sectors has been slower than in the rest of manufacturing and the private sector. As is clear from the table below, that’s a substantial change from the early post-metals tariffs period (presented here as April, 2018 through December, 2018 and January, 2019), when most metals-users were leaders in boosting payrolls:

                                                                Thru December           Thru January

entire private sector:                                +1.36 percent            +1.60 percent

overall manufacturing:                            +1.39 percent            +1.49 percent

durable goods:                                         +1.72 percent            +1.97 percent

fabricated metals products:                     +1.57 percent            +1.78 percent

non-electrical machinery:                        +2.33 percent           +2.57 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:                   +1.07 percent           +1.15 percent

household appliances:                              -2.05 percent –           2.52 percent

aerospace products & parts:                    +5.47 percent           +5.87 percent

But what about the Boeing effect – which figures to be considerable given the major role played by the aircraft and aerospace giant not only in American industry but the entire economy? As the data below show, the impact of the company’s production slowdown and more recent suspension of the previously best-selling but flawed 737 Max model (not to mention worldwide groundings) is anything but clear-cut. Presented here are the job change figures for aircraft and related parts industries, along with the numbers for other major supplier industries and the usual comparison sectors for the eight months preceding and following the announcement of global 737 Max groundings last March. The latest available data for the aerospace-specific industries only go through November, so that’s the final month used for the entire table.

                                                 July, 2018 thru March           March thru Nov

entire private sector:                     +1.38 percent                    +1.03 percent

overall manufacturing:                 +0.98 percent                    +0.28 percent

durable goods:                              +1.17 percent                    +0.11 percent

fabricated metals products:          +0.89 percent                     -0.31 percent

non-electrical machinery:            +1.38 percent                     -1.16 percent

aerospace products & parts:        +4.34 percent                    +2.27 percent

aircraft:                                        +6.59 percent                    +2.09 percent

aircraft engines & engine parts:  +1.04 percent                    +3.67 percent

non-engine aircraft parts/equip: +3.06 percent                     +1.22 percent

The pattern seems to show employment slowdowns nearly across the board. But the two non-aerospace-specific supplier industries – fabricated metals and non-electrical machinery – saw net hiring increases turn into net hiring decreases. Moreover, in aircraft engines and engine parts, payroll improvements actually accelerated.

At least some of this apparent paradox might result from the November end date used here. Boeing didn’t decide to suspend outright production of the troubled model until December 16, and the decision won’t even go into effect until sometime this month. Indeed, the company initially announced that no layoffs were accompanying the halt, although significant workforce reduction plans were finally made public yesterday. In this vein, reports of actual supply chain employment effects didn’t begin appearing until mid-December. Moreover, it’s possible that employment pain has been felt by the non-aerospace-specific companies in Boeing’s vast domestic supply chain before it spread to the aerospace-related firms.

So the safest bottom line so far seems to be this: Contributors to manufacturing’s recent jobs slump might now include both trade war- and non trade war-related developments. And anyone singling out one or the other deserves considerable skepticism.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: GM and Boeing Effects Still Affecting U.S. Manufacturing Output

Tags

737 Max, aircraft, aluminum, Boeing, China, durable goods, Federal Reserve, General Motors General Motors strike, GM, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, manufacturing production, metals-using industries, steel, supply chain, tariffs, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Like its immediate predecessor, this morning’s Federal Reserve release on inflation-adjusted U.S. manufacturing output made clear how the recent strike at General Motors have grossly distorted the latest results, as well as how Boeing’s mounting 737 Max aircraft safety woes remain difficult to identify from these production statistics.

First, let’s look at the overall numbers. According to the Fed, constant dollar American manufacturing output in November jumped sequentially by 1.15 percent. That was the best such increase since October, 2017’s 1.36 percent, and quite the turnaround from October’s 0.70 percent monthly drop-off (which was revised slightly downward).

These figures still left domestic industry in a recession, but not much of one. Since July, 2018, its price-adjusted output is down by 0.14 percent.

But the big role of the GM strike’s end in November’s turnaround couldn’t be clearer. In October, combined U.S. combined vehicle and parts output sank by 5.98 percent after inflation from September’s total. That decline was considerably less than the 7.65 percent nosedive reported last month, but still the worst such performance since the 7.18 percent decrease in January.

Last month, however, thanks to the return of the striking workers, real automotive production skyrocketed by a whopping 12.45 percent – the best monthly performance since the 29.95 percent surge of July, 2009 – as the last recession (which was especially woeful for auto and parts makers) came to an end.

Another way to look at the automotive effect: Without the GM strike, October’s 0.70 percent overall manufacturing after-inflation production decrease would have been a much better (but by no means great) 0.28 percent decline. And without the GM strike’s end, the 1.15 percent jump in price-adjusted manufacturing output would have been only 0.25 percent.

But the impact of Boeing’s safety troubles is as unclear as those of the GM strike are obvious. In November, American aircraft and parts production rose another 0.40 percent on month in real terms. Moreover, since March (when governments around the world began grounding the 737 Max or banning it from their airspace), such production is only down a total of 0.34 percent. Since April (the first full data month since that March flood of bad news), it’s actually up by 2.32 percent.

Therefore, as has been the case recently, the aircraft sector as such has kept outgrowing many of the biggest industries making up its domestic supply chain (which extends way beyond finished parts and into the materials they’re made from). Here’s how these big supplier industries’ output has changed since April, with the overall manufacturing sector’s performance and that of the durable goods super-category in which most are found included for comparison’s sake:

overall manufacturing: +0.68 percent

durable goods: +1.25 percent

primary metals: -1.13 percent

fabricated metals products: -0.54 percent

machinery: +0.16 percent

The above results also indicate that at least some of the economy’s biggest metals-using industries still lack the relative production strength they displayed for the first several months after steel and aluminum tariffs were imposed in March, 2018. Here are their latest numbers from April (the first full data month affected by these levies) through November, also with the overall manufacturing and durable goods results included:

                                          Old Ape thru Oct    New Apr thru Oct    April thru Nov

overall manufacturing: –      0.54 percent            -0.81 percent         +0.33 percent

durables manufacturing:    -0.32 percent            -0.40 percent         +1.75 percent

fabricated metals prods:   +1.42 percent           +1.26 percent         +1.48 percent

machinery:                        -0.81 percent            -0.77 percent          -1.02 percent

automotive:                    -12.24 percent           -11.34 percent          -0.30 percent

major appliances:             -9.14 percent            -9.08 percent          -6.31 percent

aircraft and parts:            +3.59 percent           +4.37 percent         +4.79 percent

One interesting bright spot apparent from the above – a nice improvement for production of major appliances, a sector that’s been dealing since February, 2018 with an additional set of product-specific tariffs. But in machinery and fabricated metals products in particular, where output tends to be less volatile than it’s been in automotive and appliances, recent performance clearly has been worse than that from April, 2018 through, say, this past January:

                                                          April, 2018 through January

overall manufacturing:                               +1.07 percent

durables manufacturing:                            +1.74 percent

fabricated metals prods:                            +3.42 percent

machinery:                                                +3.69 percent

automotive:                                               -3.32 percent

major appliances:                                      -1.43 percent

aircraft and parts:                                     +4.19 percent

Will the new “Phase One” trade deal announced with China make it any easier to gauge the impact of tariffs on most of the imports heading to the United States from the PRC? That’s already been difficult enough, because Chinese products have been used so widely, and to such varying extents, as inputs for so many manufacturing industries). And chances are this challenge will become more difficult, given both that it’s far from clear when follow-on talks will begin; and given Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin’s suggestion that the next phase may consist of many different phases.

Surely adding to the complications will be the Boeing effect, which seems certain to start appearing more conspicuously in the data now that the company has announced that 737 Max production will be suspended starting next month, as well as its failure to say how long the halt will last.

So just about all that can be said for sure is that domestic manufacturing had a good month in November – however unclear it remains whether this improvement has legs.

Glad I Didn’t Say That! The Epic Fail of Tariff Fear-Mongering

Tags

aluminum, China, consumer price index, consumers, core inflation, Glad I Didn't Say That!, inflation, manufacturing, metals, metals-using industries, Producer Price Index, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump

“Trump’s trade war may soon hit consumers’ wallets and paychecks.”

–NBC News, July 18, 2018

“Tariffs will surely lead to higher prices for imported goods and, to a lesser extent, prices for non-imported goods that use imported materials.”

–Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania, July 18, 2018

“Tariffs are about to hit consumers, and it won’t be pretty.”

–CNBC, July 25, 2018

“Trade restrictions, by their nature, result in price increases for the goods in question. If the price of steel and aluminum goes up, manufacturers will be forced to pass those costs onto American consumers.”

–The Heritage Foundation, March 2, 2018

U.S. core consumer price* index year on year, November: +0.1 percent

U.S. core producer price index** year on year, November: +0.5 percent

*commodities less food and energy

**final demand goods less food and energy

(Sources: “Trump’s trade war may soon hit consumers’ wallets and paychecks,” by Ben Popken, NBC News, July 18, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/trump-s-trade-war-may-soon-impact-consumers-wallets-paychecks-n890576: “Tariff Troubles: Will Consumers Feel the Pinch?” Public Policy, Knowledge@Wharton, Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania, July 30, 2018, https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/trumps-tariffs-will-impact-average-consumer/; “Tariffs are about to hit consumers, and it won’t be pretty,” by Jeff Cox, CNBC, July 25, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/25/tariffs-are-about-to-hit-consumers-and-it-wont-be-pretty.html; “3 Reasons Why Trump’s Tariffs Would Hurt American Workers,” by Tori K. Smith and Jay Van Andel, Commentary, The Heritage Foundation, March 2, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/trade/commentary/3-reasons-why-trumps-tariffs-would-hurt-american-workers. All compiled in “Christmas Miracle: Rising Wages and Low Inflation Promise a Very Merry Holiday Season,” by John Carney, Breitbart.com, December 11, 2018, https://www.breitbart.com/economy/2019/12/11/low-inflation-christmas/. “Consumer Price Index – November 2019, USDL-19-2144, News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, December 11, 2018, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cpi.pdf; and “Producer Price Indexes – November, 2019, USDL 19-2146, News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, December 12, 2018, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ppi.pdf)

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New U.S. Jobs Data Show a Continued Trade Punch for Manufacturing – & Industry Resilience

Tags

aircraft, aluminum, automotive, Boeing, Bureau of Labor Statistics, China, General Motors, General Motors strike, GM, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For observers of U.S. domestic manufacturing, this morning’s new jobs report (for November) could not have made clearer how the recent strike at General Motors (GM) have bollixed up the recent monthly totals for reasons having nothing to do with the underlying state of the economy or with President Trump’s trade wars. Nonetheless, even with the strike’s effects filtered out, industry’s job creation this year continues to lag behind last year’s strong pace, and damage from Mr. Trump’s metals tariffs in particular is still apparent – if anything but calamitous.

Moreover, in a continuing mystery, although Boeing’s safety woes are kneecapping domestic manufacturing’s trade performance, their impact on manufacturing employment is still nowhere to be seen.

Because of the GM strike’s impact, the overall manufacturing job figures for November (along with the revised October numbers) are pretty worthless. What does matter are the results with motor vehicles and parts stripped out (although even taking this step fails to account for the strike’s effects on all the industries making up the domestic automotive supply chain).

Ex-automotive, the previously reported October U.S. manufacturing monthly jobs change would have come to a 5,600 net monthly gain, rather than a 36,000 net loss. The revised October manufacturing jobs change reported today was somewhat better – without the GM strike, a net sequential employment loss pegged at a higher 43,000 would have been a net gain of 6,800. (And another revised October figure will come out next month, along with a new November number.)

For its first read on November’s performance, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that domestic industry’s payrolls rose by 54,000 on net. Removing from that total the 41,300 jump in automotive employment stemming from the return to work of GM workers and of employees at parts companies who may have been laid off, and you get a 12,700 monthly increase in manufacturing jobs.

Encouragingly, that’s the best such performance since January’s 17,000 payroll advance. But the year-on-year improvements remain humdrum even taking out the automotive distortions.

For example, without the automotive distortions, October’s stand-still manufacturing jobs total would only have been 56,000 higher than that of October, 2018. Between the previous Octobers, manufacturing employment surged by 275,000. The comparable November numbers? A 32,000 improvement between 2018 and 2019, as opposed to 228.000 between 2017 and 2018.

The November jobs report’s news for so-called trade hawks wasn’t good, either. As usual the impact of the Trump administration’s steel and aluminum tariffs are relatively easy to gauge, and it remains the case that the metals-using sectors’ employment performance has lost notable momentum versus the rest of manufacturing and the rest of the private sector overall.

Below are the latest figures for employment changes at major metals-using industries starting with the April, 2018 – the first full month in which these levies were in effect, and run through October. For comparison’s sake, the results for manufacturing overall are also included, along with those of the durable goods super-sector in which most of the big metals-users are grouped:

                                                       Old thru Oct       New thru          Thru Nov

entire private sector:                    +2.58 percent   +2.62 percent    +2.82 percent

overall manufacturing:                +1.40 percent   +1.40 percent    +1.83 percent

durable goods:                            +1.48 percent    +1.43 percent    +1.99 percent

fabricated metals products:        +1.57 percent    +1.49 percent    +1.51 percent

non-electrical machinery:          +1.74 percent    +1.65 percent    +1.26 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:      -4.89 percent    -4.60 percent      -0.45 percent

household appliances*:               not available    -6.31 percent      not available

aerospace products & parts*:     not available   +8.98 percent       not available

*data are one month behind

The end of the GM effect is clear from the big differences between the October and November overall manufacturing and durable goods jobs changes. But by the same token, November was a lousy employment month for the big machinery and fabricated metals sectors. Look at that aerospace products and parts increase, though – job creation in this Boeing-heavy sector continues to excel.

Now it’s possible that much of the damage being done to the company, and manufacturing more generally, is being done in its own vast domestic supply chain. But the employment numbers for narrower sectors like aircraft and their parts show nothing of the kind, and the effects on companies in other supplier sectors (e.g., machinery, metals, and fabricated metals products) simply can’t be teased out.

But even worse for the metals-using industries generally, whereas most were job creation leaders last year, they’ve turned into job creation laggards this year. This deterioration is made clear from comparing the previous table with the following table, which shows their employment performance from the metals tariffs advent through the end of last year and the beginning of this year:

                                                          Thru December               Thru January

entire private sector:                         +1.36 percent                +1.60 percent

overall manufacturing:                     +1.39 percent                +1.49 percent

durable goods:                                  +1.72 percent                +1.97 percent

fabricated metals products:              +1.57 percent                +1.78 percent

non-electrical machinery:                +2.33 percent               +2.57 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:          +1.07 percent               +1.15 percent

household appliances:                     -2.05 percent                -2.52 percent

aerospace products & parts:           +5.47 percent               +5.87 percent

Of course, President Trump’s tariffs on several hundred billion dollars worth of imports heading America’s way from China are affecting domestic manufacturing as well. But because of these products ubiquity throughout domestic industry, the greatly varying levels of their U.S. market share, and the duties’ on-again-off-again nature (prominently on display in recent days), I continue to despair of quantifying the impact usefully.

And speaking of Mr. Trump, there’s no doubt that, contrary to his confidence, trade wars are not “easy to win” – and can be highly disruptive even for countries like the United States with ample leverage to prevail. That’s inevitable when you’re trying to reverse several decades of policy. All the same, U.S. domestic manufacturing’s employment performance, even in leading victim industries, has held up pretty well since the President began responding to foreign predation in earnest. Whether the manufacturing interests he’s counting on to win reelection will agree is another question entirely.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trade Wars’ Impact on U.S. Manufacturing Output Still Clouded by GM and Boeing

Tags

737 Max, aircraft, aluminum tariffs, automotive, Boeing, Fed, Federal Reserve, General Motors, General Motors strike, GM, household appliances, inflation-adjusted growth, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, metals-using industries, safety, steel tariffs, supply chain, tariffs, Trade, trade wars, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you read last month’s Federal Reserve report on after-inflation U.S. manufacturing output (for September), then there wasn’t much reason to read yesterday morning’s report on after-inflation manufacturing production (for October). For it described the same puzzling picture: American industrial performance clearly dragged down by the recently ended strike at General Motors (GM), but apparently completely unaffected by Boeing safety woes that have sharply reduced the aviation giant’s enormous exports.

The top-line figures released by the Fed were definitely gloomy. Last month, real U.S. Manufacturing output dropped by 0.62 percent sequentially – the worst such result since April’s 0.87 percent fall-off. Inflation-adjusted motor vehicle and parts output, however, plunged by 7.65 percent – its worst such performance since the 7.97 percent nosedive of April, 2011. Moreover, September’s previously reported 4.22 percent monthly automotive price-adjusted automotive decrease was revised all the way down to a 5.49 percent slump.

As the Fed observed, without the huge October monthly plunge in inflation-adjusted automotive output, the overall manufacturing production decline would have been just 0.14 percent – which obviously doesn’t show any strength, either.

But this is where the Boeing puzzle comes in. There’s still no sign of it in these Fed data. Most curiously, constant dollar production for aircraft and parts production rose a solid 0.57 percent on month in October. It’s down since March, when governments the world over began grounding its popular but now troubled 737 Max jet or banning it from their national air spaces.

But although Boeing’s exports have deteriorated sharply, too, the real output shrinkage has only been 1.48 percent since March, and since April (the first full data month since those March woes), after-inflation production of aircraft and parts has actually risen 1.15 percent. That’s considerably better than the output performance of domestic manufacturing as a whole during this period. And it’s much better than the output of key supplier sectors, although surely they’d been affected by the GM strike as well:

overall manufacturing: -0.19 percent

durable goods: -0.81 percent

primary metals: -1.62 percent

fabricated metals products: -0.60 percent

machinery: +0.37 percent 

It’s true that export sales and production don’t move in lock step for aircraft, or for any other industry.  But with foreign markets representing well over half of Boeing’s revenue last year, the former sinking while the latter keep growing isn’t easy to explain.

Something else that needs to be considered: Whatever the Fed data actually show, they’re not able to show much about how aircraft parts and production would have fared without the Boeing troubles. And they’re even less capable of showing such counterfactuals regarding how supplier sectors might have fared.

As for the impact of the trade wars, as usual, the consequences of the President’s tariffs on aluminum and steel are easiest to gauge, since they’ve been on the longest, and the major metals-using industries (the presumed leading victims) are so easy to identify. The table below represents the changes in their real output since April, 2018 (the first full month in which the levies were in effect), with the data for manufacturing overall used as a control group, and durable goods included because it’s the super-category in which most of the main metals-using industries are located:

                                          Old Apr thru Sept    New Apr thru Sept    Apr thru Oct

overall manufacturing:       +0.09 percent            +0.08 percent         -0.54 percent

durables manufacturing:    +1.25 percent            +0.87 percent         -0.32 percent

fabricated metals prods:    +1.85 percent             +1.63 percent        +1.42 percent

machinery:                            0 percent                 -0.96 percent         -0.81 percent

automotive:                        -3.92 percent             -5.53 percent       -12.24 percent

major appliances:               -2.19 percent            -2.03 percent          -9.14 percent

aircraft and parts:              +5.43 percent           +3.00 percent         +3.59 percent

In absolute terms, the results are still all over the place, and a GM strike effect is clearly evident for supplier industries like fabricated metal products and machinery. The interruption of GM production also seems to have aggravated – but not caused – the loss of relative momentum exhibited by the metals-users – meaning, that their production slowdown has gotten faster relative to that of overall manufacturing, even leaving out the cratering of automotive output. Interestingly, that momentum loss is now affecting aircraft and parts, too – whose September production figures were also revised down significantly.

Also noteworthy – the steep monthly production dive in major appliances in October. Yes, they’ve experienced their own product-specific tariffs (on large household laundry equipment) as well as the metals tariffs. Production of these products is pretty volatile, too. But the 7.26 percent real monthly output drop was the biggest since it plummeted 8.29 percent between September and October, 2013. Even stranger – the housing sector, which drives much appliance buying and therefore indirectly production – registered a major uptick in growth in the third quarter after six quarters of substantial decline.

As for the impact of the China tariffs on manufacturing output, since that’s much more difficult to gauge than the effects of the metals tariffs (e.g., because Chinese products have been used so widely, and to such varying extents, as inputs for so many manufacturing industries) it seems to make less sense than ever to examine them, given the possibility of the Boeing effect lasting months more.

And somewhat depressingly, I find myself wondering if that’s going to be true for following any manufacturing-and-trade-relevant data for at least a month or two more. (Though I’m sure I’ll keep soldering on!)

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Thoroughly Muddled Manufacturing Production Figure

Tags

aluminum, Boeing, China tariffs, Federal Reserve, General Motors, General Motors strike, industrial production, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, recession, steel, supply chains, tariffs, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The latest U.S. inflation-adjusted manufacturing output numbers (for September) are now out, and they leave more muddled than ever the matter of how much (if any) damage American industry has suffered from President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade policies.

And it’s not just because of ongoing uncertainties about the effects of President Trump’s current and threatened China tariffs, and all the fluctuations in coverage and rates. It’s not just because of the month-long General Motors strike – which could end soon if the union rank-and-file approve the settlement agreed on by their leaders, and which the Federal Reserve itself (which tracks manufacturing output) fingered as a big culprit behind September’s lousy read. It’s also because of the impact of Boeing aircraft’s continuing safety woes (a subject on which the Fed has been strangely silent).

As I’ve reported, the Boeing effect finally showed up in the latest U.S. trade data – which is especially important given the aerospace giant’s reliance on exports. But it hasn’t appeared anywhere else, including the new manufacturing production figures, even though orders for Boeing jets have been dramatically slashed, and even though the company is a huge consumer of materials, parts, and components from other manufacturing sectors.

With all those cautions out on the table, here’s what the new Fed statistics showed. After-inflation domestic manufacturing output slid by 0.48 percent sequentially in September, the worst such result since April’s 0.87 percent decrease, and more than enough to keep industry overall in recession. Since July, 2018, its real output is down a total of 0.38 percent.

GM’s labor troubles clearly dragged the total number down. Constant dollar vehicles and parts production in September sank by 4.22 percent on month, its worst such performance since January’s 7.18 percent nosedive (when the federal government was still shut down, surely depressing consumer confidence).

The Fed made clear that “Excluding motor vehicles and parts, [its] overall [industrial production] index and the manufacturing index each moved down 0.2 percent.” (More precisely, the real manufacturing decline would have been only 0.15 percent without automotive.) Oddly, though, the Fed didn’t mention that any development that depresses vehicle and parts production is bound to ripple through all the industries making up its extensive supply chain, too.

Yet despite the export troubles revealed in the trade figures, the Fed’s statistics show that aircraft and parts production enjoyed a terrific September. Indeed, the 1.82 percent sequential jump was the biggest since March, 2014’s 2.42 percent.

Nor do sectors comprising the aerospace supply chain (which broadly overlaps considerably with automotive’s) seem to be lagging significantly, except for primary metals. For example, below are the inflation-adjusted output figures for some big supplier sectors and control groups since April (the first full data month following actions the world over grounding or banning from various air spaces Boeing’s 737 Max jets):

overall manufacturing: +0.44 percent

durable goods: +0.75 percent

primary metals: -3.38 percent

fabricated metals products: -0.17 percent

machinery: +1.19 percent

As for the impact of the trade wars, as usual, the consequences of the President’s tariffs on aluminum and steel are easiest to gauge, since they’ve been on the longest, and the major metals-using industries (the presumed leading victims) are so easy to identify. The table below represents the changes in their real output since April, 2018 (the first full month in which the levies were in effect), with the data for manufacturing overall used as a control group, and durable goods included because it’s the super-category in which most of the main metals-using industries are located:

                                           Old Apr thru Aug   New Apr thru Aug   April thru Sept

overall manufacturing:        +0.54 percent          +0.57 percent       +0.09 percent

durables manufacturing:     +1.98 percent          +2.00 percent       +1.25 percent

fabricated metals prods:     +1.88 percent          +2.07 percent       +1.85 percent

machinery:                         +0.67 percent          +1.39 percent           0 percent

automotive:                        +0.17 percent          +0.30 percent        -3.92 percent

major appliances:               -2.04 percent           -1.22 percent        -2.19 percent

aircraft and parts:              +4.39 percent          +3.54 percent        +5.43 percent

The results are mixed – and obviously the most recent automotive number has little to do with the metals duties. Otherwise, three of the remaining four metals users have gained momentum versus the rest of manufacturing (durables, appliances, and aircraft), although their output performances remain subdued in absolute terms, and machinery has lost momentum.

Unfortunately, this kind of analysis not only remains much more difficult for the impact of the China tariffs. But every twist and turn in the trade talks saga only increases the challenge. Primarily because of uncertainties stemming from differences between the manufactured goods classification systems used by the U.S. Trade Representative’s office (which publishes the lists of tariff-ed items) and the main system used by other U.S. government agencies (like the Fed), the sectors below are among the handful that are reasonably certain to have faced tariff pressure since the first duties were placed in imports from China in July, 2018. Each column shows the real output changes since their first full month in effect through July, August, and September of this year:

                                                  Aug thru July      Aug thru Aug      Aug thru Sept

overall manufacturing:             -0.89 percent       -0.33 percent       -0.81 percent

ball bearings:                            -2.32 percent       -2.26 percent       -2.30 percent

industrial heating equip:          -4.58 percent       -1.72 percent       -1.01 percent

farm machinery & equip:        -6.91 percent      +9.71 percent       -0.69 percent

oil/gas drilling platform pts:   -0.86 percent       -1.38 percent       -1.38 percent

As is clear, these results are even more mixed than for the metals-using industries – to which all of these products belong. And with the President’s trade policies all too likely to stay ragged as the 2020 elections come closer, “more confusion” looks like the safest prediction possible regarding American manufacturing production 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Trade Wars’ Bite on Manufacturing Jobs Looks Deeper

Tags

2020 elections, aluminum, China, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, private sector, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s U.S. jobs report (for September) contained much better news for President Trump and his supporters in terms of the economy’s overall performance than it did in terms of his trade policies. American employment on net rose by a decent 136,000 sequentially last month, and the revisions (which boosted the July and August numbers by a total of 45,000) were especially encouraging.

But payrolls in domestic manufacturing – a sector heavily exposed to trade – shrank month-to-month by 2,000. That decline was the first such dip since March’s 3,000. And despite the big positive revisions in overall employment, manufacturing’s left its modest recent hiring record virtually unchanged.

Worse for the President, manufacturing’s metals-using industries in September continued their worrisome recent transition from employment out-performers for the first half year or so after the first duties on steel and aluminum were levied to employment laggards.

Moreover, although manufacturing employment does face two obstacles having nothing to do with the Mr. Trump’s trade wars – Boeing’s safety woes and the strike that began last month against General Motors – damage from the former isn’t yet evident in the jobs data, and the latter probably began too recently to be showing up in the numbers yet.

The impact of the much broader China tariffs remained as elusive as ever, largely because of the on-again, off-again nature of the President’s policies, along with changes and threatened changes in tariff rates on so many goods. But even if Mr. Trump was a model of consistency on this score, the China levies’ effects would be fiendishly difficult to gauge because manufacturing inputs from China are used so broadly but so unevenly by domestic manufacturers.

By contrast, the trends for the metals-using industries look clear enough. This time, I’ll present not only their employment changes since April, 2018 (the first full month in which the metals levies were in effect) and September, but the same employment changes for an earlier post-tariff period. First, the latest numbers:

                                                   Old thru Aug     New thru Aug      Thru Sept

entire private sector:                  +2.30 percent    +2.31 percent    +2.40 percent

overall manufacturing:              +1.73 percent    +1.73 percent    +1.71 percent

durable goods:                           +2.10 percent    +2.10 percent    +2.05 percent

fabricated metals products:        +1.58 percent   +1.56 percent    +1.36 percent

non-electrical machinery:          +2.19 percent    +2.20 percent   +1.95 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:        0 percent         -0.23 percent    -0.69 percent

household appliances*:               not available     -6.31 percent    not available

aerospace products & parts*:      not available    +8.38 percent    not available

*data are one month behind

The loss of the metals-using sectors’ employment momentum in relative and absolute terms can be easily seen. But the more important comparison is between the above figures and those below, which present these trends for the first 10 months of the metals tariffs.

                                                   Old thru Dec    New thru Dec      Thru Jan

entire private sector:                 +1.37 percent   +1.36 percent   +1.60 percent

overall manufacturing:             +1.45 percent   +1.39 percent   +1.49 percent

durable goods:                          +1.67 percent   +1.72 percent   +1.97 percent

fabricated metals products:      +1.75 percent    +1.57 percent   +1.78 percent

non-electrical machinery:        +2.20 percent    +2.33 percent   +2.57 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:  +0.77 percent     +1.07 percent   +1.15 percent

household appliances*:            not available      -2.21 percent     not available

aerospace products & parts*:   not available     +5.51 percent    not available

*data are one month behind

This table shows that except for the household appliances sector (which has faced a separate, product-specific set of tariffs on large household laundry equipment since February, 2018), and automotive, the metals-using sectors were creating new employment at a considerably faster pace than both the overall private economy and overall manufacturing. And automotive was closing the gap.

Aside from trade, the White House, and everyone seeking the best for the U.S. economy, should also be troubled by the drop in September in the year-on-year manufacturing jobs increase to 117,000. That’s the worst such performance since August, 2017’s 112,000 and less than half the rate of the previous September annual improvement (266,000).

Better news for Trump-ers? Manufacturing job creation during the first 31 months of the Trump presidency is still much better (464,000) than during the last 31 months of former President Barack Obama’s administration (198,000).

Matters look better for the President (and manufacturing workers) on the wages front. Although industry’s pre-inflation hourly pay only inched up on month by 0.07 percent, that result beat the 0.04 percent dip for the overall private sector. (The Labor Department, which tracks the employment and wages figures, doesn’t monitor public sector wages since they’re set largely by politicians’ decisions, not largely by market forces. Therefore, they say almost nothing about the state of the labor market or the economic in general.)

Moreover, this relatively good manufacturing’s wage performance continued a slow relative catch up trend that began this year. Since January, current-dollar private sector pay is up 1.92 percent, versus 2.20 percent for manufacturing workers.

All the same, since the current economic recovery began, in mid-2009, private sector wages have risen by 26.87 percent. Manufacturing’s increase? Only 21.03 percent. And these manufacturing wages rose faster during the last 31 months of the Obama presidency (6.04 percent) than during the first 31 months of the Trump administration (5.53 percent). 

The safest economic conclusion seems to be that manufacturing hiring is hardly in the dumps – as suggested by the latest (also September) soft data from the Institute for Supply Management.  Nor does this looks like a “Tariff-mageddon” is upon us. But manufacturing job creation is also well off 2018’s robust pace, and the more so in major trade-affected industries . And its underlying situation will as more difficult to describe the Boeing and General Motors effects become visible (assuming the auto strike isn’t settled quickly).

But as cautious as that analysis is, the political implications as the 2020 presidential campaign heats up are even murkier. For barring a dramatic change in the manufacturing picture, they’ll depend on voters deciding whether the Trump manufacturing, trade, and overall economic record are good enough.   

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Some Manufacturing Pushback Versus Tariff Gloom-Mongering

Tags

aluminum, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Is U.S. domestic manufacturing emerging from its recent funk? This morning’s Federal Reserve industrial production figures (for August) certainly supply some compelling evidence. And some of the nation’s major metals-using industries – widely portrayed as major victims of Trump administration tariffs that have been in place since early 2018 on steel and aluminum – led the pack last month.

August’s 0.53 sequential real output increase wasn’t enough to pull domestic industry out of its current technical recession. But it did shorten the length of the downturn considerably. As of the previous industrial production report, manufacturing had been in recession since April, 2018 – with its inflation-adjusted output down 0.004 percent.

Today’s data revealed that constant-dollar production has now fallen 0.36 percent since the previous August. In addition, since its latest bottom (this April), after-inflation manufacturing output is up 0.89 percent. And sequentially, this production is up three of the last four months.

Moreover, the strong August performance of the metals-using sectors was noteworthy. These industries have faced wide-ranging tariffs on steel and aluminum since March, 2018, with April being the first full month in which the duties were in effect. (Major appliances have been an exception – they have also been coping with separate levies on large household laundry equipment since February, 2018.) As reported by RealityChek last month, some of these metals-users suffered a miserable July, indicating that the metals tariffs were finally taking a measurable toll, either because of the higher input costs they created, the greater uncertainty they generated, the impact of retaliatory foreign tariffs, or some combination of all three.

But as demonstrated by the following table, they regained much of their momentum relative to the rest of manufacturing last month. These figures represent the changes in their real output since April, 2018, with the data for manufacturing overall used as a control group.

                                              April thru June    April thru July    April thru August

overall manufacturing:         +0.42 percent       -0.01 percent        +0.54 percent

durables manufacturing:      +1.57 percent       +1.37 percent       +1.98 percent

fabricated metals products:  +1.89 percent      +0.95 percent        +1.88 percent

machinery:                           +0.78 percent       -0.88 percent        +0.67 percent

automotive:                          +0.69 percent      +1.20 percent       +0.17 percent

major appliances:                 -4.84 percent       -4.39 percent        -2.04 percent

aircraft and parts:                +2.39 percent      +3.59 percent       +4.39 percent

With the exception of the automotive sector (where a big inventory overhang could finally be slowing output significantly) and aircraft and parts (which keeps chugging along, so far despite Boeing’s safety troubles) these major metals-using sectors enjoyed Augusts that were much stronger in terms of growth than their Julys. And in August, durable goods overall (the manufacturing super-sector in which the main metals-using industries are located), major appliances, and aircraft and parts have recaptured the relative growth lead they’d lost the previous month.

The effects of President Trump’s China tariffs have been much more difficult to ascertain for many reasons: Even the earliest have been in effect only since last summer. Their nature has been so on-again-off-again nature. The original tariff levels on some have been increased. Their use is so widely (but often so thinly and non-uniformly) spread throughout American industry. And the official lists of tariff-ed products don’t match up precisely with the classification system used by the Fed (and the rest of the U.S. government) to track trends in manufacturing and the rest of the economy.

All the same, here are results for a handful of sectors reasonably certain to have faced tariff pressure since last August. Each column measures real output changes since that month.

                                                   Aug thru June    Aug thru July    Aug thru Aug

overall manufacturing:              -0.48 percent     -0.89 percent      -0.36 percent

ball bearings:                             -2.48 percent     -2.30 percent      -2.23 percent

industrial heating equip:           -4.96 percent     -4.16 percent      -2.52 percent

farm machinery & equip:         -6.44 percent     -6.91 percent     +9.71 percent

oil/gas drilling platform pts:   +2.18 percent     -0.84 percent       -1.04 percent

The sample size is obviously very small, and the results are almost as obviously a wash.

Looking ahead, domestic manufacturing – and especially the metals-using industries – faces at least two visible possible hurdles: Boeing’s ongoing woes, and a new strike at General Motors. And literally no one outside the Oval Office (assuming President Trump does) knows what the future will bring in terms of tariffs on imports from China, retaliation from Beijing. And don’t forget the Congressional vote on the U.S.-Mexico-Canada [trade] Agreement that may be coming.

But the August manufacturing production data were unquestionably solid. They continued a decent recent streak for the nation’s industries, and indicated considerable resilience – including possibly a growing ability to adapt to a radically different and volatile trade policy environment.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Good U.S. Manufacturing Jobs Report – for Trump Trade War Critics

Tags

aluminum, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning’s August jobs report from the U.S. Labor Department was mediocre news for the American economy as a whole, but it finally brought some good news for opponents of President Trump’s trade policies. For the new monthly numbers, plus the latest set of benchmark revisions, finally revealed some notable damage to hiring in U.S. manufacturing in industries exposed the longest and most consistently to the tariffs he’s imposed.

Although it’s now gotten just about futile to measure the effect of Mr. Trump’s China policies – because of the on-again-off-again nature of his tariff and tariff threats, and because their future is still so cloudy – the President’s levies on steel and aluminum date from March, 2018 and most have stayed in place. Therefore, we have a solid idea over a respectable length of time over how these measures have affected manufacturing overall – as Trump critics have noted, not simply for the industries that have received trade protection, but for those (collectively much larger) sectors that use the two metals to make their final products.

As RealityChek regulars know, for many months following the metals tariffs’ imposition, these sectors had actually been outperforming not only the rest of manufacturing but the rest of the private sector economy on several fronts. (See, e.g., here and here.)

But the August jobs report makes clear that those days are over, at least for now. Below, as usual, are the figures for these main metals-using sectors since April, 2018 (the first full month in which the metals tariffs were in effect), along with the hiring statistics for two control groups: manufacturing overall, and the private sector overall.

                                                        Old thru July      New thru July      Thru August

entire private sector:                      +2.13 percent     +2.22 percent      +2.30 percent

overall manufacturing:                  +1.69 percent     +1.71 percent      +1.73 percent

durable goods:                               +2.10 percent     +2.10 percent      +2.10 percent

fabricated metals products:            +1.71 percent    +1.69 percent      +1.58 percent

non-electrical machinery:              +2.73 percent    +2.34 percent      +2.19 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:         +0.33 percent    -0.01 percent           0 percent

household appliances*:                   not available    -7.57 percent         not available

aerospace products & parts*:          not available   +8.36 percent         not available

*data are one month behind

As these figures demonstrate, except for aerospace (and oddly, because of Boeing’s safety troubles and their impact on this giant manufacturer’s sales and orders), all of the metals-using sectors are now under-performing the rest of industry and the private sector when it comes to net new job creation. And all except aerospace have displayed weaker relative momentum. (Don’t forget that the appliances totals have been affected not only by the metals tariffs, but by a separate set of product-specific tariffs levied on large household laundry equipment the month before.) 

The policy questions raised are whether these results mean either that Trump should rethink his decision to confront China’s economic and technological predation, or whether he should change tactics. My own answer is “No” in each case, since the stakes of countering China are so great, the losses are still small, and since the economy, manufacturing generally, and the metals-using industries could easily be revived – and strongly – with a big domestic infrastructure building and repair program. But the August jobs report does further undercut the President’s claim that “Trade wars are good, and easy to win.”

Meanwhile, the actual August manufacturing numbers and the revisions are worth examining. August’s 3,000 net monthly gain in manufacturing payrolls was the worst such improvement since May’s 2,000. And the revisions for July were nothing less than stunning: An initially reported 16,000 jobs sequential increase has been downgraded to 4,000 (a result that’s still preliminary). June’s downgrade was smaller – from a 12,000 advance to 10,000. But the initial estimate was 17,000, so the trend looks comparably bad.

Moreover, if the new (preliminary) August figure holds, it would produce the worst year-on-year manufacturing jobs performance (up 138,000) since September, 2017 (123,000). Last August’s year-on-year manufacturing employment advance, moreover, was nearly twice as strong – 256,000.

That July revision was so big that it could justify some hope that subsequent reevaluations will generate significantly upside surprises. President Trump, moreover, can still brag that manufacturing job creation during his first thirty months in office (up 467,00, or 3.77 percent since February, 2017) has considerably exceeded that of former President Obama’s final thirty months (up 179,000, or 1.47 percent). But hopes are just that. And many more months like the last few, and the Trump manufacturing jobs record will start looking awfully similar to that of his predecessor – both economically and politically.