Im-Politic: The January 6th Card Isn’t Working for the Democrats

Tags

Biden, Capitol assault, Capitol riots, CNN, Democrats, Donald Trump, election 2022, election 2024, Im-Politic, January 6, January 6 committee, midterm elections, midterms 2022, Pew Research Center, RealClearPolitics.com, Republicans

Some compelling evidence emerged this past week that if the Democratic Party thinks it’s going to prevent major losses in this year’s Congressional elections mainly by beating the Capitol riot and the Donald Trump-as-deadly-danger-to-American-democracy drums, it needs a major reality check. For new polls are showing that the public is increasingly moving on from January 6^th, and is less and less critical of the former President’s role.

The most eye-opening survey results came out on Tuesday from the Pew Research Center. They showed that, since the immediate aftermath of the attack, 52 percent of the country’s adults assigned Trump “a lot of responsibility” for the riot, 23 percent said he deserved “some” responsibility, and 24 percent saw him as blameless. But of those responding to the same question in the middle of last month, only 43 percent agreed with “a lot,” 24 percent agreed with “some,” and 32 percent agreed with “none at all.”

Predictably, a big partisan split emerged. But changes in Trump’s favor were evident even among adults calling themselves Democrats and those avowedly leaning Democratic. Last year, 81 percent told Pew that Trump bore “a lot” of blame for the riot, 14 percent answered “some” blame, and just five percent let him off the hook. This year, the results were 70 percent, 17 percent, and 12 percent, respectively.

A CNN-co-sponsored poll also taken last month and released Thursday found somewhat similar results in response to a somewhat different question. Last January, 75 percent of the adult respondents surveyed called the Capitol attack a “crisis” or “major problem” for American democracy, with 36 percent choosing “crisis.” Last month, the comparable overall figure was 65 percent, with 28 percent calling the riot a “crisis.”

These two surveys also warn Democrats not to expect the House of Representative’s January 6^th committee to be a political game changer. The Pew poll reports that, since last September, the share of U.S. adults who have heard a lot about the committee has more than doubled. But it’s still just 26 percent. And only 29 percent of Democrats say they’ve been tuned in to this extent.

Meanwhile, according to Pew, only 44 percent of American adults overall are “very” or “somewhat” confident that the committee’s investigation of the riot is “fair and reasonable.” Fifty-four percent are “not too” or “not at all” confident.

CNN’s results were more favorable to the committee: Forty-four percent of its respondents viewed it as “a fair attempt to determine what happened” and just 36 percent dismissed it as a “one-sided effort to blame Donald Trump.” (Twenty percent “hadn’t heard enough to say.”) But no earlier figures were presented to enable judging any trend over time.

But maybe the most revealing poll results pointing to a big fading of January 6th’s political effects (totally contrary to what yours truly predicted) come from RealClearPolitics.com. Since August, the site has tracked polls that have asked the public whether they would back Trump or President Biden if they ran against each other in the 2024 presidential election. Of the 12 surveys monitored, Trump has won in ten and one produced a tie.

At least as revealing: In five of these polls (including two of the last three), the “Trump vote” topped his official 46.86 percent share of the 2020 vote.

As I’ve written previously, this could all change if the House committee or the press produce some genuinely blockbuster findings, or if Trump is perceived to be going unprecedentedly far off the rails or if most of the myriad challenges and opportunities sure to face America over the next few months break the Democrats’ way. And I certainly don’t rule out Republicans screwing up in some disastrous way between now and November.   

But so far, it looks very much like their “All January 6th” approach has been a bad bet for Democrats. At the same time, given Mr. Biden’s record and deep unpopularity, maybe it’s still the best bet they’ve got.

Im-Politic: Why Virginia Really Revealed a Winning Trumpism-without-Trump Playbook

Tags

2016 election, 2017 election, 2020 election, 2021 election, 2022 election, 2024 election, battleground states, Donald Trump, Ed Gillespie, Glenn Youngkin, governor, Im-Politic, midterm elections, midterms 2022, Populism, Republicans, Virginia

Since the 2020 election results came in, I’ve been convinced that the biggest question hanging over the future of the Republican party – and one of the biggest hanging over American politics – was whether the GOP could foster what you could call Trump-ism without Trump that produced political winners.

That is, could Republicans find a strategies and candidates that (1) embraced the policies pursued by the former President capitalize on their popularity with a broad group of voters that includes conservatives, many independents and moderates, and growing numbers of African Americans and Hispanics, while rejecting the kinds of behavior that clearly turned or outright disgusted so many voters outside Trump loyalist ranks, but (2) conveyed enough of the anti-establishmentarianism and overall combativeness that appealed to the loyalists and inspired them to vote robustly?

Since this year’s Virginia governor’s race unexpectedly turned competitive this fall, it became clear that Republican candidate Glenn Youngkin was pursuing a Trump-ism without Trump strategy – to the point of successfully discouraging the former President from campaigning personally in the state for him. He also seemed likely to pass any personality tests required by gettable voters outside the Trump diehards’ ranks.

But I wasn’t convinced that he could generate the kind of diehard turnout he’d also need to carry an increasingly but still not entirely blue state like Virginia – and that could translate into Republican wins in other battleground states.

After looking at the details of Youngkin’s upset victory last night, I’m now pretty convinced that he accomplished exactly that goal. The evidence? His actual turnout numbers in the southwestern part of the state, whose largely rural and semi-rural counties aren’t especially populous, but whose voters gave Trump overwhelming triumphs both in 2016 and last year.

My methodology: I looked at the Youngkin vote last night, the Trump votes both last year and in 2016, and for losing Virginia Republican gubernatorial candidate Ed Gillespie in 2017, for 22 counties west of the city of Roanoke (and including Roanoke County). My source: Politico.com‘s county-by-county tallies for the four years in question, found here, here, here, and here.

These elections of course aren’t strictly comparable – chiefly because presidential election turnout is usually greater than voting in state-wide and local races. The issues dominating each contest weren’t identical, either – because things change.

But what the numbers make emphatically clear is that this big slice of the Trump loyalist vote in Virginia decreased much less between last year’s presidential election and this year’s gubernatorial race than it did between the 2016 White House contest and the 2017 gubernatorial race. That is, Youngkin kept Trump base voters considerably more energized than Gillespie.

Specifically, between 2020 and 2021, the Republican vote in these counties fell by 11.05 percent. But between 2016 and 2017, it plunged by 40.85 percent. Also important, and potentially a sign of Trump fatigue: The former President won 6.21 percent fewer votes in these counties in 2020 than in 2016 – even though total Virginia turnout in 2020 was 12.60 percent higher than four years before.

Youngkin’s success by no means guarantees Republican victories anywhere in the upcoming mid-term elections, much less in the 2024 campaigns for the White House and Congress. Too much can happen between now and both of those “thens,” and regarding the next presidential race, there’s no telling who the Democratic nominee will be. Moreover, of Trump’s hot button issues, one understandably didn’t come up at all in the Virginia election (trade) and Youngkin pretty much ignored another (immigration). Finally, though the state’s gubernatorial race wasn’t generally expected to be even competitive, Youngkin didn’t exactly win in a landslide.

Not very surprisingly, Trump has rejected the idea that Virginia represents evidence of his expendability. In fact, he appears to be taking credit for the results. But if you look closely at his phrasing, his emphasis on the Make America Great Again movement rather than his own actions could signal a recognition that his lasting impact on American politics might wind up being much more ideological than personal.             

    

Im-Politic: Will Trump Let Trump be Trump on Issues?

Tags

Congress, conservatism, conservatives, Democrats, deregulation, establishment, Im-Politic, infrastructure, John McCain, Marco Rubio, midterm elections, Nancy Pelosi, Obamacare, Populism, regulation, Republicans, tax cuts, Trade, Trump

Ever since Donald Trump made clear his staying power in presidential politics, his more populist supporters have tried to beat back efforts of more establishment-oriented backers to “normalize” him by insisting that they “Let Trump be Trump.” The results of Tuesday’s midterm elections tell me that the populists’ arguments on substance (as opposed to the President’s penchant for inflammatory and/or vulgar rhetoric) are stronger than ever, but that the obstacles that they’ve faced remain formidable.

The “Let Trump” argument contends that the President’s best hope to attract the most voters has always been his willingness to reject positions that for decades have been conservative and Republican hallmarks, but that have become increasingly unpopular outside the realms of most national GOP office-holders, other Washington, D.C.-based professional Republicans and conservatives, and the donors so largely responsible for their power, influence, and affluence. These maverick Trump positions have included not only trade and immigration; but the role of government and the related issues of entitlements, healthcare, and infrastructure spending; and Wall Street reform.

But since his election, as I’ve argued, Mr. Trump’s willingness to embrace the full maverick agenda has been blunted by his vulnerability on the scandals front. Specifically, he’s seemed so worried about impeachment threats from Democrats that he’s been forced to shore up his support with the conventional Republicans that dominate the party’s ranks in Congress. Why else, I’ve written, would his first two years in office have so prominently featured strong support for right-of-center standbys like major tax and federal discretionary spending cuts; curbs on regulation; repeal of Obamacare; and bigger military budgets, rather than, say a massive push to repair and retool America’s aging or simply outdated transportation, communications, energy, and other networks?

It’s true that Trump remained firmly in (bipartisan) populist mode on trade (notably, withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement and slapping tariffs on metals imports and many Chinese-made products), and just as firmly in (conservative) populist mode with various administrative measures and proposals to limit and/or transform the makeup of legal immigration – though many of his most ardent backers accuse him of punting on his campaign promise to build a Border Wall.

Yet this Trump populism strongly reflected the views of the Republican base – a development now not lost on conventional conservatives when it comes to immigration, even though they’ve been slow to recognize the big shift among Republican voters against standard free trade policies. By contrast, the President has apparently feared that Congressional Republicans would draw the line on the rest of their traditional agenda – or at least that he could curry favor with them by pushing it.

The midterm results, however, might have brought these political calculations to a turning point. On the one hand, there’s no doubt that most House and Senate Republicans, along with the donors and most of the party’s D.C.-based establishment, are still all-in on their tax, spending, regulatory, and Obamacare positions.

On the other hand, according to the exit polls and other surveys, the tax cuts didn’t even greatly impress Republican voters (let alone independents). And most Americans aren’t willing to risk losing Obamacare benefits they already enjoy (especially coverage for pre-existing medical conditions) by supporting Republican replacement ideas that may be less generous.

The message being sent by all of the above trends and situations is that President Trump may have even more latitude than he’s recognized to cut deals with Democrats. At the same time, the Democrats’ capture of the House of Representatives on Tuesday and signs that they’ll ramp up the scandal investigations could keep preventing him from “being Trump” on such issues and possibly antagonize most Republican lawmakers.

Of course, my political neck isn’t on the line here. But I’d advise Mr. Trump to follow his more unconventional instincts. The Congressional Republicans still uncomfortable with him ideologically must be aware that his personal popularity with GOP supporters has grown significantly since mid-2017, and that this surge owes almost nothing to their own priorities. So if they don’t help staunchly resist any intensified Democratic probes, their political futures could look pretty dicey, too.

One big sign that ever more establishment Republicans are getting “woke” on the obsolescence of much establishment conservatism: the efforts by long-time mainstream conservative/Republican favorites like Senator Marco Rubio of Florida to develop a Trump-ian agenda that can survive Mr. Trump’s presidency. Further, resistance in Washington to their efforts is likely to continue weakening, since so many of the President’s ideological opponents on the Republican side are leaving the House and Senate. (And of course, their spiritual leader, veteran Arizona Senator and 2008 Republican presidential nominee John McCain recently passed away.)

To be sure, Mr. Trump yesterday (rhetorically, anyway) erected his own obstacle to deal-cutting – his declaration that he won’t be receptive if investigations persist and broaden. House Democratic leader (and still favorite to become Speaker again) Nancy Pelosi has pretty clearly, however, signaled that she herself is not impeachment-obsessed, even if those exit polls say most of the Democratic base is.

As a result, I can’t entirely blame the President for still feeling spooked by the Democrats – at least this week. But what an irony if the most important opponent “letting Trump be Trump-ism” – whose broad popularity could well combine with the advantages of incumbency to outflank the Democrats, win the President a second term, and pave the way for a truly earth-shaking, lasting realignment of American politics – turned out to be President Trump himself.

Making News: National Radio Podcast on the Economy and the Midterms Now On-Line…& More!

Tags

Breitbart News Tonight, China, conservatism, economy, health care, IndustryToday.com, infrastructure, Making News, midterm elections, midterms 2018, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, Trump

Last night I got another late-night national radio opportunity, so I couldn’t clue you in beforehand. But thank goodness for podcasts, because now you can listen on-line to my interview with Breitbart News Tonight on the U.S. economy and next week’s midterm elections.  Click on this link and then scroll down a fair ways until you see the episode with my name on it.

Also, it was great to see IndustryToday.com re-post my October 25 offering on a Wall Street Journal pundit who just unwittingly reminded Americans why a Trump-style course change in U.S. China trade policy was urgently needed.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Dreary U.S. Real Wages Results – & Manufacturing’s Long Pay Recession Continues

Tags

inflation-adjusted wages, Labor Department, manufacturing, midterm elections, private sector, real wages, recovery, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s September real wage figures from the Labor Department show that, by this measure, Americans’ take-home pay advances remain surprisingly sluggish even as the official unemployment rate has reached recent historical lows, and that inflation-adjusted wages in manufacturing remain in a technical recession that began in January, 2016.

On a monthly basis, constant dollar hourly pay in the private sector rose by 0.28 percent – the best such performance since March (when the rate was fractionally higher). The initially reported August sequential increase of 0.09 (which is still preliminary) was unrevised. (Like the Labor Department, I don’t try to track real wage trends in the public sector because that compensation is based largely on politicians’ decisions, not economic fundamentals.)

Year-on-year, the private sector’s after-inflation wage change wasn’t anything to write home about, either. Such pay was up by only 0.46 percent. On the one hand, that number represented the strongest annual growth since January’s 0.66 percent. On the other hand, it was lower than the increase between the previous Septembers – 0.56 percent.

As has long been the case, manufacturing’s pay numbers were far weaker. On a monthly basis, its real wages dipped by 0.09 percent. As a result, constant dollar wages in the sector are now 0.28 percent lower than they were in at the beginning of 2016 – a 32-month stretch that more than qualifies as a technical recession – a period of two or more consecutive quarters of cumulative decline. In addition, the real manufacturing wage flat-line between July and August was unrevised.

The dimensions of manufacturing’s wages woes are also clear from the year-on-year results. In September, the sector’s real wages were down 0.92 percent from the previous September’s level. And that wasn’t even manufacturing’s worst such performance in recent months. Between September, 2016 and 2017, real manufacturing wages decreased by only 0.09 percent.

To add insult to injury, since the current economic recovery began – more than nine years ago, in mid-2009 – real private sector wages have risen by a far-from stellar 4.85 percent. Yet even such a meager advance is more than 25 times faster than the after-inflation wages growth for manufacturing – a rounding error-like 0.19 percent.

P.S. Somewhat disturbing for President Trump and Republicans generally – these are the last real wage figures that will be released before next month’s midterm elections.

Im-Politic: The Politics of Kavanaugh

Tags

1968 election, 1972 election, 2018 elections, Democrats, George S. McGovern, Im-Politic, Kavanaugh, midterm elections, protesters, Republicans, Richard M. Nixon, Supreme Court, Trump, Vietnam War

Although Brett Kavanaugh has now won confirmation to the Supreme Court, the fallout will resonate for months – and likely longer (even if he does follow my advice and withdraw between now and his swearing in). So some final (for now) thoughts on this debacle:

Principally, at this point it looks like President Trump’s instincts on the politics of the Kavanaugh nomination were better than mine. I feared that sticking with Kavanaugh would accomplish less in firing up the Trump-Republican base (by now, they’re almost identical) than it would harm the GOP’s chances in numerous upcoming midterm elections by alienating and downright antagonizing moderate Republicans (especially upper middle-class women) and independents (of all genders).

The main evidence that Trump – and Kavanaugh stalwarts – were right politically? Polls showing a closing of the so-called enthusiasm gap for these midterms, between Republicans and Democrats – widely seen as a good predictor of voter turnout –  has narrowed in favor of the Republicans. But there’s a twist here: as stated by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell this afternoon, the gap closing was mainly a gift from the Democrats, and the die-hard Kavanaugh opponents comprising a big part of their base. That their hysteria and extreme tactics have undoubtedly turned off many voters in the center looks clear from the recent shift in public opinion in support of the Kavanaugh bid. In fact, I have no doubt that videos of the anti-Kavanaugh protests will be a gift that keeps on giving to Republican candidates from now through election day, in the form of countless campaign ads that will feature them.

Come to think of it, I suspect that the Kavanaugh protests have backfired in the way that comparably angry protests unwittingly sabotaged the anti-Vietnam War movement decades ago. This journal article does an excellent job of showing that the polling data from the late-1960s and early 1970s – when U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia expanded dramatically, and dissent became more strident and sometimes violent – can support several different interpretations, no doubt because public opinion was understandably confused by this then-unprecedented type of conflict.

But one legitimate interpretation of the findings is that public opinion would have turned against the war much faster had so many Americans, rightly or wrongly, not found the protests and the protesters themselves to be so offensive in so many ways. Surely that’s why the winner of the 1968 presidential election was not a dove, but Richard M. Nixon. His emphasis of his unhappiness with the Johnson Administration’s supposedly muddled approach to the war and strong suggestion that he would break the emerging stalemate in various (often not mutually consistent) ways closely approximated the views of a critical mass of the public.

And just as surely that’s why (along with dramatically declining casualty rates) Nixon was reelected in a landslide over Democrat George S. McGovern, who Republicans portrayed as the champion of “acid, amnesty [for draft-dodgers], and abortion.”

A “Blue Wave” could still wash over Congress this November, but at this point, it’s also entirely possible that on “the morning after,” the big questions dominating American politics will concern whether the Democrats will recognize their Kavanaugh overreach, and whether they can (or want to) start presenting a more appealing face to the electorate over the next two years.

At the same time, the big qualifier remains fully in tact – whether, between now and then, President Trump will finally cross a line that will convince voters that he and his Republican Congressional and gubernatorial supporters truly are unfit for office, and must be thrown out at the next possible opportunity. But if the President’s many disruptive words and even deeds haven’t produced these results so far, this hope looks like an increasingly slim reed on which to hang political success.

Im-Politic: New Evidence that Trump-Russia is a Voter Nothing-Burger

Tags

2016 elections, 2020 elections, collusion, foreign policy, Gallup, Im-Politic, midterm elections, polls, public opinion, Russia, Trump, Trump-Russia

I know that it’s only one poll, and that poll results can be pretty dodgy. (See “2016 U.S. Presidential Election.”) But the results of a new Gallup survey on Americans’ views towards U.S.-Russia relations seem well worth spotlighting anyway, especially given the continuing unrelenting headlines being generated by the alleged Trump-Russia scandals, by all the evidence of Russian meddling in American politics, and various investigations of the above.

Gallup asked respondents whether it’s “more important to improve relations with Russia” or “more important to take strong diplomatic and economic steps against Russia.” And by a healthy 58 percent to 36 percent margin, the “improve relations” option won out. Just as striking is that a hard line against Moscow is strongly opposed even though 75 percent of the public believes that Russia interfered in the last presidential election, and 39 percent believes that such activities “changed the outcome.”

As predictable these days, these views are sharply divided along partisan lines. But what’s less predictable is that the Democrats come across as the most intense partisans by far. To be sure, their support for a “hard” vs a “soft” line toward Russia wasn’t overwhelming – 51 percent for the former, 45 percent for the latter. But it contrasted sharply not only with the opinion of Republicans (who favored a softer line by a lopsided 74 percent to 22 percent margin). Democrats’ views also differed significantly from those of independents (who favored a softer line by 55 percent to 37 percent).

And this Gallup survey makes it tough to blame supposed public apathy or ignorance for these findings. Specifically, two-thirds of respondents told Gallup they were following news about Russia and the 2016 election “closely” and 33 percent reported following such developments “very closely.” Gallup contends that this level of attention is “slightly above” the norm for their news attentiveness results going back to 1991.

Moreover, Gallup reports that the more closely its sample members followed the story, the likelier they were to believe that Russia interfered and that its interference mattered. Indeed, ninety percent of the true newshounds accepted the meddling claims. But only 51 percent of this highly attentive group believed that the alleged Russian operations changed the outcome. And those respondents who were following such news only somewhat closely split nearly evenly on the matter (with 42 percent agreeing that the meddling affected the outcome and 40 percent disagreeing)

The same pattern was evident when it came to views on Russia relations options. Of those Americans following these stories very closely, a majority favored the harder line. But the margin was only 53 percent to 42 percent. The results for Americans following the Russia coverage only somewhat closely was the reverse – and then some. Only thirty-seven percent backed the hard line while fully 59 percent opposed it.

When combined with other Gallup findings that, through June, the constellation of Trump-Russia issues wasn’t even moving the needle in terms of Americans’ rankings of their top concerns, this new survey indicates that, unless a genuine smoking gun is uncovered, Democrats would be best advised to stress other anti-Trump messages in their campaigns this year to regain control of Congress. For if voters were strongly responsive, wouldn’t they be demanding that their leaders make Russia pay dearly for an attack on their democracy? At the same time, since voter turnout in mid-term elections is typically very low, hammering away at Russia and impeachment etc could possibly bring to the polls more “resistance” true believers and swing some close races.

The implications for the next presidential race – again, barring a smoking fun – seem clearer: In such a generally higher turnout race, voters are likely to be paying much more attention to the standard array of pocketbook and cultural issues (along with foreign policy, if crises break out) than to whatever’s left of the Trump-Russia controversy.

Im-Politic: Globalization and Election 2014

Tags

2014 elections, Democrats, exit polls, fast track, Im-Politic, Immigration, immigration reform, manufacturing, midterm elections, Republicans, TPP, Trade

In at least one respect, the political conventional wisdom looks right as rain: Exit polls are highly imperfect gauges of the electorate after a just-concluded election (and probably an even less reliable indicator of future elections (like the presidential race coming up in two years).

Of course, I was disappointed that only one globalization-related issue made it into the polling questions: immigration, naturally. But especially important was the terrible framing. The single query focused on specific policies showed that 57 percent of respondents agreed that “Most illegal immigrants working in the United States” should be “offered a chance to apply for legal status” while 37 percent supported deportation. No other options were offered, and opinions about specific proposals like the Dream Act, and enabling illegals to legally obtain driver’s licenses and government benefits weren’t sought.

These omissions are especially important since the actual election results turned out well for critics of further loosening immigration controls.

For the record, adherents of the two parties split pretty sharply on the question. Sixty four percent of Democrats but only 34 percent of Republicans backed the legalization option. Twenty three percent of Democrats and 74 percent of Republicans supported deportation.  

The other immigration-related question asked respondents to name “the most important” issue “facing the country.”  Only 14 percent chose “illegal immigration,” but that’s not exceptionally revealing since only one answer was permitted, and other options included “the economy” (which garnered 45 percent).  

A sharp bipartisan divide was clear on this front as well.  Of those focused tightly on immigration, 25 percent were Democrats but 73 percent were Republicans.  By contast, the split on “the economy” was nearly even.

Nonetheless, the poll does send one message to globalization activists that urgently needs to be recognized and acted on. No mention was made of trade or manufacturing-related issues. It’s true that there are few signs that these subjects played any significant role in the latest midterm elections. But at a time when good U.S. jobs are still pretty scarce, manufacturing looks anything but renaissance-y, and the trade deficits in manufacturing and with industrial powerhouse China keep hitting new records, that’s a major indictment of the trade policy critics’ movement and its leaders. They’re simply not getting the job done.

And they could be running out of time to get their acts together. Although, as I posted yesterday, the window for pushing new trade deals through Congress once they’re completed is pretty small, it’s not nonexistent. Every powerful economic interest in this country except the unions supports them in principle. The notion is already widespread among the chattering classes that the President and Congress’ new Republican leaders will be tempted to prove their capacity for bipartisanship by mounting a push for these agreements along with the fast track negotiating authority crucial to their success. And the offshoring lobby is already out with renewed calls for action.

Indeed, so far, the main cause for optimism re stopping these trade deals has been the recalcitrance of Japan in the Trans-Pacific Partnership talks. Until the gap is bridged between Washington and Tokyo on opening Japan’s market wider to American farm products in particular, the stalemate is likely to continue. But it makes me wonder when the Japanese will finally wise up, sign anything in full confidence that, as usual, neither President Obama nor the most powerful Congressional Republicans care a wit about enforcing the terms, and get the powerful fast track and TPP balls rolling.