(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Let’s Stop Hiding the Main Facts About Multinationals and Trade

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2016 election, automotive, Caroline Freund, Colgate Palmolive, Donald Trump, exports, Ford, Hillary Clinton, imports, Jobs, multinational corporations, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Trade, trade balances, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Since U.S. trade policy is such a hot topic in this year’s presidential election, you’d expect that American leaders and voters and journalists could rely on reasonably good data for judging the claims of office-seekers and other participants. Sadly, when it comes to a crucially important globalization-related subject – the activities of multinational corporations – you’d be wrong. The following media and think tank examples show exactly what I mean.

Last week, Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump last week slammed Ford Motor Company for announcing the move of its U.S. small-car production to Mexico. This week, the firm denied his charges that it was a serial killer of American jobs, and noted that last year, it had moved big truck production from Mexico to American factories.

In the process, it made the plausible point that these sourcing decisions made eminent sense. Low-cost Mexico, Ford noted, was a great place for small-car production because these products are low-margin, Meanwhile, the higher priced United States was a perfectly fine place for building its larger, higher margin vehicles.

Of course, Trump could have countered by asking why truck production had been located in Mexico to begin with, and added that Ford had confirmed one of his previous indictment of such offshoring by stating that most of this new Mexico production would be imported back to the United States – a practice made much easier by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

But this debate – and so many others like it – could be easily resolved with the following information:

>The share of Ford’s total global vehicle and parts production located in the United States the year before NAFTA went into effect (1994), and the share located in Mexico.

>That Ford U.S.-Mexico division of labor today.

>The share of Ford’s Mexico vehicle and parts production sold in the Mexican market, exported to the United States, and sold to third countries pre- and post-NAFTA.

>The same export information for Ford’s U.S. production.

>The Mexican and U.S. shares of Ford’s vehicle content pre- and post-NAFTA.

>A breakdown of all these results by segment.

>A tally of Ford’s domestic exports to and imports from Mexico, and to and from the rest of the world, year-by-year since NAFTA’s signing. A breakdown detailing information for other Ford foreign production sites would be helpful, too.

That seems like pretty basic stuff. It also seems like the kind of information that’s absolutely essential for properly evaluating the impact of NAFTA – and similar trade policy decisions – on the American economy.

But Ford won’t produce it, and Washington doesn’t require such disclosure – agreeing with the company that it’s proprietary information crucial to competitive advantages and ultimate success. But as the press coverage make clear, Ford is free to release any information voluntarily, whether it illustrates the big picture or not, and does so with gusto when it portrays the company in a favorable light. Does that sound like a sound basis for policymaking to you?

The Peterson Institute for International Economics recently provided our second example of this problem. In a September 12 post, Senior Research Fellow Caroline Freund looked at the question, “Multinational Corporations: Friends or Foes of the American Worker?” and more specifically at the charge (leveled in this case by Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton) that “Too many companies lobbied for trade deals so they could sell products abroad but then they instead moved abroad and sold back into the United States.”

She concludes that, although stagnating American wages are indeed a valid concern, “On balance, multinational corporations are very good for the US economy.” And in response to a question she received from a concerned citizens, she used the example of the Colgate-Palmolive Company and its Mexican-made toothpaste.

According to Freund, Colgate merits an American seal of approval because the company makes more of its profits in Latin America than in the United States; because its “future growth prospects are in emerging markets”; because the share of Colgate employees in America is roughly the same as the U.S.’ share of those profits; because low Mexican production costs generate savings for American consumers; and because research ostensibly shows that companies that boost their employment in Mexico tend to increase their American employment, too.

So Freund deserves credit for using company-specific statistics. But many crucial questions remain unanswered. In addition to the production, sourcing, employment, and trade information mentioned above (and for the entire company, not just toothpaste), it would be helpful to know if even those Colgate-specific data provided are typical of multinational companies as a whole. One reason for suspecting they’re not: Colgate makes consumer goods. Many of America’s leading offshoring firms are producers of parts and components and material for finished manufactured products.

Also, I wouldn’t be so sure about the emerging markets as Colgate’s most promising going forward – especially Latin America. The United States’ hemispheric neighbors benefited tremendously over the last decade or so from a boom in the prices of the raw materials on which their economies heavily depend. Unfortunately, few of them used the opportunity to diversify into higher value sectors that are more durable sources of prosperity. Once commodities demand began slowing, so did their growth. And in the case of the region’s giant, Brazil, along with Venezuela, the news looks like a horror story.

In addition, I’d like to know whether Colgate out so much manufacturing in Mexico before or after Latin America began taking off. Finally, as implied above, if the region goes completely into the tank, will the company move those factories to faster-growing places – including the United States, if it qualifies?

The way to fill this globalization-related information vacuum is obvious: Require such disclosures from the multinationals. The response to their concerns about divulging proprietary information is just as obvious: If all companies are required to release such business secrets, no one of them loses on net. And the penalties? Let’s just say, “Enjoy life as a global company without access to the U.S. market.”

Proposing these measures would bring an added bonus, too: Anyone or any company opposing them will stand revealed want to know less, not more, about America’s position in the world economy, and the policies that deserve responsibility.

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Can the U.S. Chamber Put One & One Together on Trade?

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Cheap Labor Lobby, Donald Trump, free trade agreements, General Electric, Information Technology Agreement, ITA, Jobs, multinational corporations, national security, non-tariff barriers, offshoring, Ooffshoring Lobby, protectionism, tariffs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I’ve long urged trade policy critics (including Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump) to stop questioning the intelligence of globalization cheerleaders. Especially, when we’re talking about offshoring-happy multinational corporations and their hired guns in Washington, I’ve insisted, they’ve known exactly what they’ve been doing – pushing the trade and other international economic policies likeliest to reward the companies with the biggest profits in the shortest time-frame.

True, the longer-term effects have produced losses for many of them – especially since the immense imbalances resulting from these policies helped trigger the financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession, which at least initially hit earnings and stock prices. But charges of stupidity don’t seem valid even in this regard, since most of the American economic system’s incentives discourage long-term thinking.

A new U.S. Chamber of Commerce report, however, could justify a rethink. For it’s a great example of an organization ignoring evidence that’s been staring it in the face for literally decades – and that’s become especially glaring recently. Moreover, it inadvertently validates the claim made by American politicians like Trump that major numbers of manufacturing jobs could be returned to the United States if Washington only mustered the will to do so.

The Chamber, of course, has been one of the most powerful mainstays of the overlapping corporate offshoring and cheap labor lobbies, and this morning released a study bemoaning the worldwide growth of what’s often called “techno-protectionism.” That is, more and more countries have been working harder and harder to promote their own domestic information technology industries through a variety of new regulations that the Chamber rightly notes have cloaked simple beggar-thy-neighbor aims in national security rationales.

In the Chamber’s words, “some national governments, by intentionally or unintentionally defining security concerns in an overly broad manner, are applying intense pressure on the [tech] sector to localize rather than globalize.” And the group has echoed numerous charges that China is a prime culprit.

The Chamber’s long list of these practices underscores points that I and many others have been making since even before trade and offshoring became hot-button issues. The first is that such non-tariff barriers, which are excruciatingly difficult for trade agreements to deal with meaningfully, have become much more important obstacles to international commerce than more easily identifiable and therefore vulnerable tariffs and quotas. The second is that, since foreign governments with secretive bureaucracies can erect and maintain these barriers much more effectively than the more transparent United States, trade agreements with these governments usually shaft America.

Yet groups like the Chamber have typically ignored or dismissed these concerns – largely because they produce so much overseas, and care so little about whether their products are Made in America or not. Indeed, their foreign factories and other facilities actually often benefit from the host countries’ subsidies and various forms of protection.

That’s why the Chamber so enthusiastically greeted the announcement late last year that Washington had negotiated a new global agreement to free up further trade in technology products. This broadening of a 1997 pact – the Information Technology Agreement, or ITA – was hailed by the Chamber as “welcome news for American companies and the workers they employ” because it would “end tariffs on approximately $1 trillion worth of high-tech products….” Consistent with my above analysis, none of the dozens of non-tariff barriers that distorted this tech trade was even mentioned.

Less than a year later, we see the Chamber complaining that these largely hidden trade barriers have not only remained so influential, but are spreading so rapidly that they “are now threatening to slow or even reverse” the “globalization of the [tech] sector.” Translation: Despite supposed landmark achievements like the ITA (and the long string of similar deals that preceded it starting with the North American Free Trade Agreement) protectionism worldwide has both remained in place and become so widespread that it’s now handcuffing self-styled global businesses that had hitherto boasted of their power to ignore borders.

In this respect, the Chamber is echoing a recent lament of General Electric’s CEO, who complained that localization pressures have become so pervasive and intense that his giant firm has no choice but to bow before them.

As I pointed out in covering this corporate confession, the global economy features one immense exception to this spreading protectionism – the United States. And ironically, it’s America that has the world’s greatest store of the kind of leverage needed to pursue this strategy successfully. Trump-ian politicians have been saying nothing more remarkable than that this leverage should be used. Reports like the Chamber’s today can only make it that much more difficult for Trump-ian opponents to dismiss this idea as delusional.

Following Up: Where Trump on Trade Falls Short

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2016 election, advanced manufacturing, apparel, Donald Trump, Follwing Up, Hillary Clinton, inflation-adjusted growth, Made in Washington trade deficit, multinational corporations, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, offshoring lobby, recovery, regulation, Rust Belt, steel, subsidies, taxes, The Race to the Bottom, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade law, World Trade Organization, WTO

Donald Trump has just given a deadly serious, detailed, and common-sensical speech about the need for overhauling American trade policy, and the establishment media has decided to respond largely by dredging up the fatuous observation that the presumptive Republican presidential nominee himself produces his name-brand apparel overseas.

Before dealing with some of the genuine – though anything but fatal – shortcomings of Trump’s trade speech, let me (again) dispose of this ignorance-based cheap shot: The very trade policies that Trump has been attacking have practically destroyed the domestic U.S. apparel industry. When Trump claims that it’s nearly impossible to make garments in this country profitably anymore, he’s absolutely right. Indeed, the Federal Reserve’s industrial production data show that, since the North American Free Trade Agreement went into effect in January, 1994, and launched the current, offshoring-focused stage of U.S. trade policy, domestic garment output is down nearly 83 percent in real terms. That’s a bloodbath.

Yes, that means that some companies still produce clothing in the United States. But it also means that the biggest money in the industry has taken the hint that opening the American market to competition from penny-wage developing countries with no meaningful environmental or worker safety regulation has been an invitation to shut down or join the party and offshore. Any journalist who fails to mention these facts is either clueless or trying to sell you a bill of goods.

At the same time, since most of the public isn’t well informed about trade and manufacturing specifics, either. And since a torrent of such slanted coverage – which has been echoed by Trump’s presumptive November rival, Hillary Clinton – can definitely affect voter judgment, Trump needs to make it as difficult as possible for opponents to portray him as a know-nothing or a hypocrite on what he clearly sees as a core issue. This is where his Tuesday speech – which overall, I liked – fell somewhat short. Here are some important examples:

>Trump deserves a lot of credit for pointing out that misguided policies have killed not only employment – especially in trade-sensitive manufacturing – but growth throughout the economy. But he left off the table eye-opening figures on just how great the trade toll has been. As I’ve documented, during this feeble economic recovery alone, the growth of that portion of the trade deficit directly influenced by trade policy (what I call the Made in Washington trade deficit) has so far slowed this already feeble expansion by some 20 percent. That’s more than $400 billion after inflation, and he should have defied anyone to insist that huge numbers of jobs haven’t been destroyed as a result.

>The likely GOP standard bearer also rightly blasted American political and business elites for pushing these damaging policies. But explaining exactly why will not only educate the public – it will further infuriate voters. As I’ve written repeatedly, and most comprehensively in my book, The Race to the Bottom, the offshoring focus that has dominated U.S. trade policy since the early 1990s resulted from American multinational corporations realizing that expanding commerce with low-income countries would enable them to improve their own (though not the nation’s) competitiveness and boost profits by supplying the high-price American economy from super-low cost and largely unregulated production sites.

In other words, for all the talk about gigantic, rapidly growing third world markets, post-NAFTA trade deals weren’t mainly about expanding American exports – and therefore growth, employment, and wages. They were mainly about expanding U.S. imports from the multinationals’ new foreign production sites. That is, big American business wanted Americans to keep playing their roles as consumers of the products they made. They just didn’t want them to keep playing their roles as producers of these products. You don’t think a critical mass of voters would be outraged to hear this?

>Trump’s vow to file suits in the World Trade Organization to open foreign markets to U.S.-origin goods and services and halt predatory foreign trade practices is completely inadequate. As I’ve also written, the WTO is far from a U.S.-like trade court where objective magistrates render impartial justice. It’s an anti-American kangaroo court numerically dominated by foreign trade powers whose overwhelming interest lies in keeping the U.S. market much more open to their goods and services than their markets are to U.S. exports. That’s largely why even when the United States does win WTO cases, the process takes so long that American interests have been dealt decisive setbacks.

In fact, that’s also why the Offshoring Lobby pushed so hard back in the 1990s for U.S. Entry into the WTO. They knew that it would give predatory foreign trade powers substantial legal immunity from American efforts to deal with illegal subsidization, dumping, currency manipulation, and the like – and that the factories they moved and built abroad would benefit from these market-distorting practices at the expense of domestic American producers and their workers.

In other words, Trump shouldn’t be arguing for working through the WTO. He should be promising to seek an American withdrawal.

>Trump’s related promise to file more suits against predatory foreign traders in the U.S. trade law system is sorely inadequate for three main reasons. First, as suggested above, the WTO nullifies most of America’s legal authority to use such unilateral mechanisms. Second, the domestic trade law system is almost as slow-moving as the WTO. And third, this legalistic set of procedures is by definition piecemeal and reactive. If Trump thinks that American trade law can help make the U.S. economy great again in his lifetime, he’s dreaming.

>I recognize that the steel industry has acquired iconic status in American culture and politics. It also remains incredibly important economically. But Trump’s exclusive reliance on steel’s recent woes to illustrate what’s wrong with American trade policy unfortunately reinforces the wrongheaded conventional wisdom that trade policy critics are naively obsessed with reviving so-called Rust Belt industries.

What Trump should have added is that manufacturing sectors running sizable trade deficits also include semiconductors, electro-medical devices, all categories of machine tools, farm machinery, construction equipment, ball bearings, telecommunications equipment (not including smartphones), and pharmaceuticals. Believe me, I could go on. And that’s not your classic Rust Belt stuff. Are all these domestic producers hopelessly uncompetitive, Trump should ask? Or are global trade markets unmistakably rigged even against American-made products falling into any knowledgeable definition of advanced manufacturing?

>Trump clearly felt the need to throw some red meat to traditional Republicans and conservatives by also promising to boost the productive sectors of the American economy by getting rid of “wasteful rules and regulations” and cutting taxes in order to “make America the best place in the world to start a business, hire workers, and open a factory.”

Of course, there’s an important, legitimate debate about the proper scope of regulations and the proper level of taxation for both corporations and individuals. Think though, of the outreach potential to independent and even many Democratic voters had Trump added something along these lines:

“But we also have to remember that many of our regulations also serve the vital purpose of protecting us from dangers like polluted air, water, and land; and unsafe food and workplaces. By freeing America’s domestic companies of the need to compete against rivals free to ignore these goals, we preserve regulations reflecting values we should be proud of, and ensure that we remain a genuine first world country.”

And let’s not forget arguments made in Trump’s tax plan (though in a form that’s surely vastly overstated) but neglected in this speech: All else equal, the faster the economy’s real (as opposed to bubble-ized) growth, the stronger its ability to generate the tax revenues that are both politically acceptable and needed to finance true national needs and popular national desires in a responsible way.

Again, I really do believe that this Trump speech was the best Americans have heard on trade in decades. But that bar has been abysmally low. If Trump wants to make America “Greater Than Ever Before” ensuring that his trade positions fit this description will help a lot.

Im-Politic: New Survey Shows Surprising Areas of National Consensus

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abortion, American Values Survey, blacks, China, Democrats, Donald Trump, equal opportunity, family leave, Hispanics, illegal immigration, Im-Politic, Immigration, independents, inequality, Islam, minimum wage, multinational corporations, Muslims, offshoring, parental leave, police killings, polls, Public religious Research Institute, race relations, regulations, Republicans, same-sex marriage, Trade, whites

Just when you think you’re getting a handle on the American public’s mood in these raucous political and social times, along comes some polling data that rock your world. And I’m pleased to report that, in the case of the new American Values Survey published by the Public Religion Research Institute (PRII), the net results strike me as encouraging as they are surprising. Specifically, they indicate that the U.S. public is much less divided on many hot button social and cultural issues than politicians and the national media coverage have been indicating. In fact, the findings of this November survey suggest the gathering of a common sense consensus on these supposedly bitterly divisive matters.

The unexpected areas of agreement start with a subject close to the leading headline-maker of the day – Republican presidential front-runner Donald Trump’s call for a temporary ban on travel by all non-citizen Muslims into the United States. It’s too early for a poll on this specific proposal. But I found it instructive that, according to the PRII, Americans agree by a 56 percent to 41 percent margin that “the values of Islam are at odds with American values and way of life.” In 2011, only 47 percent agreed and 48 percent disagreed.

Moreover, although breaking the results down by political leanings produces differences, even 43 percent of Democrats share these suspicions of Islam. For Republican and independents, the figures are 76 percent and 57 percent, respectively.

The survey shows an even split on the question of whether immigrants “strengthen the country because of their hard work and talents” (47 percent agreed) or “constitute a burden on the U.S. because they take jobs, housing, and health care” (46 percent). But only last year, the “strengthen” option won out by 57 percent to 35 percent. The partisan gap is indeed wide, with 63 percent of Republicans holding such negative views of immigrants and 66 percent disagreeing. But 32 percent of Democrats were focused on immigrant-created economic burdens as well.

Even more suggestive of consensus on this issue, though, are the results for a slightly different question. Fully 45 percent of Democrats agreed that “illegal immigrants are at least somewhat responsible for America’s current economic woes” (as well as 70 percent of Republicans and 53 percent of independents). And check out the racial split: Majorities of white and black Americans (58 percent and 52 percent, respectively) told held illegal immigrants “at least somewhat responsible” for the nation’s economic troubles – along with 40 percent of Hispanic Americans. For good measure, so do 44 percent of the white and college-educated, who often benefit from low-wage illegal immigrant labor.

The PRII survey will scarcely comfort President Obama, Congress’ Republican leadership, or the multinational corporations who all support America’s current trade policies. Breakdowns were not provided, but 86 percent of Americans hold “corporations moving American jobs overseas…somewhat or very responsible for the present economic troubles facing the U.S.” That’s up from 74 percent in 2012. “China’s unfair trade practices” were cited by 73 percent. Not surprisingly, 72 percent of Americans believe the country is still in a recession, a figure that’s remained pretty steady 2012. Keep in mind that the current recovery began, at least technically, in mid-2009.

Large majorities also believed that “the current economic system is heavily tilted in favor of the wealthy” (79 percent); that lack of equal opportunity in America is a “big problem” (65 percent); and that “hard work is no guarantee of success” (64 percent – including 52 percent of Republicans).

And these majorities extended to numerous economic policies. Just over three-quarters of all Americans favor increasing the minimum wage to $10.10 per hour (including 60 percent of Republicans). Eighty five percent support paid sick leave and 82 percent back paid parental leave. And although no questions were asked about desired regulatory policy changes, 69 percent of respondents blamed “burdensome government regulations” for at least some of the nation’s economic predicament.

Signs of common ground were also evident on domestic social issues that are thought to be highly polarizing. For example, relatively few Democrats (36 percent) or Republicans (43 percent) considered abortion important to them “personally.” And the partisan split on same-sex marriage was smaller, and at lower levels of salience – 28 percent for Democrats and 29 percent for Republicans.

Big divides remained on numerous issues, to be sure – like confidence in the federal government, and a $15 minimum wage (lots of Republicans climb off that boat), and police treatment of minorities. Interestingly, in this vein, minority Americans are significantly more optimistic than whites that “America’s best days are ahead of us.”

But it’s hard to finish this latest American Values Survey feeling deeply pessimistic that the nation can’t overcome its differences and create that better future. In fact, one of my biggest reasons for hopefulness is the following finding: “Nearly two-thirds (66%) of the public agrees that, ‘everyday Americans understand what the government should do better than the so-called ‘experts.’ There is broad agreement across racial, generational, and partisan lines.”

Following Up: How Intel May Wind Up Inside China’s Military

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China, cyber-security, Digitimes, Following Up, hacking, Intel, multinational corporations, national security, Obama, Office of Personnel Management, South China Sea, technology transfer, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal

China keeps challenging American security interests, notably by staging damaging cyber attacks on key U.S. strategic and commercial targets, and by asserting territorial claims in Asian waters that could threaten global shipping and air traffic. And evidence keeps pouring in of U.S. technology companies showering China with valuable capital and defense-related know-how – and of a decided “What, me worry?” attitude taken by the Obama administration.

Last week, a post of mine summarized two recent New York Times articles reporting the beginnings of some concerns in the national security community about these dangerous corporate activities, along with a Wall Street Journal piece that summarized some especially troubling recent tie-ups involving entities part of or clearly controlled by the Chinese government.

This week, the Taiwanese publication Digitimes shed major new light on the American tech sector’s role in beefing up China’s capabilities in a piece focusing on Intel’s operations. According to Digitimes, by the end of this year, the world’s biggest semiconductor company will have committed nearly $1.80 billion to helping Chinese companies develop advanced new products and services. Just as alarming as the scale of this investment are some of the specific recipients.

Digitimes correspondents Monica Chen and Joseph Tsai report that the company now owns part of a Hong Kong company that makes unmanned aerial vehicles, and parts of firms in China proper involved in smart devices, robotics, cloud computing services, artificial intelligence, machine vision, three-dimensional modeling, virtual reality technologies, and advanced optics.

Every single one of these investments could easily find its way into Chinese weapons – which could easily wind up using them against the American military. But although tensions in the South China Sea may be rising, and the files of tens of millions of federal employees may have been hacked earlier this year, don’t tell any of Intel’s top executives or anyone making China policy for President Obama. For them, it’s clearly business as usual with Beijing.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: RIP, Manufacturing Renaissance – & Reshoring – Claims

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Asia, China, competitiveness, Deloitte, investment, local content, Manufacturers Alliance for Productivity and Innovation, manufacturing, manufacturing renaissance, MAPI, Mexico, multinational corporations, North America, Obama, offshoring, reshoring, TPP, Trade, Trans-Pacific Parternship, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Because manufacturers (and others) don’t always do what they say, surveys of their intentions on hiring and investment and the like should always be taken with a big boulder of salt – the more so since the questions are often asked and the answers given in a political and policy context. So when one of these surveys clashes with manufacturing reshoring and renaissance claims that America’s most powerful manufacturers – the offshoring multinationals – have been energetically pushing, they deserve special attention. That’s why it’s worth looking closely at a new sounding on where new factories are likely to be built from a major consulting firm and a leading manufacturers association.

As the nation has heard endlessly from the biggest names in American industry and their witting and unwitting political dupes, U.S. domestic manufacturing is either enjoying an historic comeback, or is on the verge of one. These boasts and predictions have become a little less common lately, as manufacturing data keeps disappointing, but they haven’t been recanted or simply dropped because they serve two powerful purposes.

First, at a time of continued U.S. economic weakness, contentions that American-owned manufacturing firms are boosting their U.S. production and employment counter fears and accusations that they have abandoned their home country wholesale. Second, a crucial feature of these renaissance claims – that China’s competitiveness has faltered so dramatically that American industry is actually abandoning the PRC and returning stateside – helps the multinationals defend the offshoring-friendly trade deals they worked so hard to pass by indicating that they did little, if any, long-term harm to the U.S. economy despite critics’ accusations.

It’s hard, however, to read the Footprint 2020 study just released by Deloitte and the Manufacturers Alliance for Productivity and Innovation (MAPI), and take any of the above seriously for one minute longer.

Take the reshoring narrative so central to the renaissance story. According to the Deloitte-MAPI report, “reshoring is a real phenomenon.” But get a load of this kicker: “[A] common misconception is it represents a return of previously offshored operations to US soil. In practicality, reshoring may include returning operations to Mexico. This offers greater access to the US market, but allows companies to maintain advantageous operating cost structures. Sixty-six percent of survey respondents offshored their operations in the past 20 years, and a third are now considering bringing them back to North America. These moves focus on primary production and assembly operations currently located in China, India, and/or Brazil. Mexico is the first choice destination to re-shore operations, followed by the US.”

To be fair, there is a respectable argument made that even reshoring (and other) investment in Mexico helps domestic U.S. industry, too. The supposed reason: Manufactured goods made in Mexican factories, especially if they’re owned or related to American firms, use much more in the way of Made in the USA parts and components than similar products made in Asia and elsewhere.

But this argument overlooks the reality that the U.S. content of America’s imports from Mexico has been falling, and that this trend will accelerate if Congress approves the Pacific Rim trade deal just concluded by the Obama administration. That Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) will make it easier for countries like Japan to send more goods, like automobiles from Mexican assembly plants into the United States that contain more parts and components from outside Mexico and “North America.”

The idea that investing in Chinese manufacturing doesn’t make much sense nowadays also takes a body blow from Footprint 2020. The study found that 98 percent of the companies surveyed plan to expand operations in countries where they’re already in business, either through adding on to existing facilities, or by opening new factories or labs or warehousing and distribution centers. The country that will get the biggest share of this new capital? China. (The United States is second.) Moreover, between the 2002-2007 period (before the financial crisis struck) and the 2010-2015 period (when the American manufacturing renaissance was supposed to have taken off), “North America’s” appeal to American-owned companies increased only slightly, while “Asia’s” (meaning largely China) nearly doubled.

Of course, for literally years, manufacturing renaissance claims have been steadily punctured by the most authoritative data available on production, trade balances, productivity, and wages. With hitherto cheerleading multinational manufacturers themselves now throwing cold water on this idea, too, it’s legitimate to wonder whether domestic industry is closer to suspended animation than to rebirth.

Im-Politic: Why Trump’s Debate Victory over CNBC Really Matters

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2016 elections, Ben Carson, CNBC, diplomacy, Donald Trump, fast track, Im-Politic, multinational corporations, offshoring, presidential debates, Rand Paul, Republicans, Ted Cruz, Trade

No, this isn’t an endorsement, but the way Donald Trump handled the dispute over its planned presidential debate format between CNBC on the one hand, and several Republican candidates including him on the other, shows precisely why he could well transform U.S. trade policy – and possibly American foreign policy – dramatically for the better if elected.

Along with Ben Carson, Ted Cruz, and Rand Paul, Trump protested CNBC’s original plans for two hours of actual debating time, plus up to 16 minutes of commercials, with no opening or closing statements by the contenders. The four protesting candidates wanted the event’s total time capped at two hours, and insisted that opening and closing statements be included in that total.

As these disagreements indicate, the gulf between CNBC and the four Republican hopefuls wasn’t terribly wide. But what’s important about this story is how and why these candidates – and especially Trump – prevailed even though the rest of the much more numerous Republican field apparently was fine with CNBC’s intentions.

Essentially, the four dissenters recognized that they had decisive leverage. (Their absence – especially Trump’s – could cost the cable network valuable ratings.) They threw around their weight. And they won. And when it comes to trade policy (and many other international challenges and opportunities facing the United States) that’s exactly what U.S. leaders from both parties have consistently failed to do for decades, even though the United States typically holds all the main cards.

This is especially true in trade policy, because the United States has long served as the market-of-last resort for a world full of major and minor trade powers alike that desperately depend on ever higher exports for adequate growth. But Washington’s failure to wield its relative power and leverage effectively arguably has undercut important American objectives in the national security sphere, too – for example, in persuading free-riding allies to bear a greater share of the West’s common defense burden.

I single Trump out because none of his three comrades in arms in this tussle has made trade policy a centerpiece of their campaigns. In fact, Texas Senator Ted Cruz and his Kentucky counterpart Rand Paul have been strong supporters of the substance of America’s current trade strategy, though both opposed (for procedural and political reasons) the recent (successful) attempt in Congress to award fast track negotiating authority to President Obama. Moreover, unlike Trump, neither Carson nor Cruz nor Paul has touted deal-making and bargaining as among their strongest suits. 

At the same time, Trump’s victory over CNBC underscores how incomplete his attacks on American trade diplomacy have been. For Washington has signed deficit-fueling and deals and reached similarly counterproductive trade policy decisions (like long coddling China’s currency manipulation) not mainly because U.S. officials can’t size up a situation accurately – a charge consistent with Trump’s claim that they’re incompetent and lack elementary street smarts.

Instead, they repeatedly fail at trade bargaining tables to advance and defend the interests of the American economy as a whole primarily because they haven’t considered that their job. They view themselves as agents of offshoring-happy multinational corporations, whose campaign contributions have ensured that their trade priorities prevail even when success comes at the expense of America’s productive sectors.

That’s why, as I keep arguing, Trump’s trade policy rhetoric should mainly demonize these U.S. corporate special interests, not foreign governments. (And why it’s encouraging that he’s shown signs of making this pivot.) At the same time, since the United States no longer dominates the world stage as in the early post-World War II decades, accurately assessing power balances and recognizing when compromises are needed has also become an important ingredient for diplomatic, and presidential, success.

So Trump should promise that he’s independent enough to be working for Main Street (because he doesn’t need that special interest money), that he’s tough enough to press clear advantages hard, and that he’s smart enough to “know when to fold ’em.” What other candidates can credibly make this combination of claims?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Blame-the-Victim Theory of Trade Policy

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consumers, free trade, free trade agreements, lobbying, Mancur Olson, manufacturing, multinational corporations, productivity, retailers, Robert Samuelson, special interests, trade policy, Wall Street

Nationally syndicated economics columnist Robert Samuelson deserves a nice hand for identifying a possible cause for America’s pronounced productivity slowdown that’s been generally overlooked: the relentlessly growing power in national politics and policy of special interest groups. In a column earlier this week, he drew on the ground-breaking analysis of the late Mancur Olson to argue that the numerous successes achieved by smallish but narrowly focused and highly motivated lobbies in securing specialized favors for themselves from government have encouraged countless other interests to pursue the same strategies. The net effect is to diminish the total resources expended by the economy on production, and to increase the resources used for winning and keeping economically unproductive privileges.

I have several big problems with Samuelson’s discussion, though – and in fact with some of the leading examples used by Olson – and they all involve trade policy.

As Samuelson explains it, companies and workers pressing for protection from imports show exactly how the system now functions – and malfunctions. A winning campaign “saves jobs and raises prices and profits. But consumers — who pay the higher prices — don’t create a counter-lobby, because it’s too much trouble and the higher prices are diluted among many individual consumers. Gains are concentrated, losses dispersed.”

The problem is that, however compelling this sounds in theory, at least when it comes to trade policy, it produces a picture that is simply unrecognizable to anyone with any real familiarity with the subject. Perhaps the most important flaw is the implicit assumption that the freest possible trade always results in the best possible outcomes for the greatest number of Americans – and indeed for the economy as a whole – while calls for interfering with such trade flows always result from special interest pleading.

That’s a tough argument to make when you consider that the relentlessly rising trade deficits generated by the standard free trade approach have slowed the growth of this already sluggish recovery considerably. It’s even tough to make given that the income losses that can be blamed on this trade strategy – which were extremely broad-based – spurred Washington to fill the gap with easy money and the mammoth debt it brought, helping to trigger the financial crisis.

The big-small actor aspect of Olson’s theory doesn’t hold up, either in the trade policy sphere. For decades, the biggest winners by far in the nation’s leading trade policy fights have been big, offshoring-oriented multinational corporations and the often bigger Big Box retailers and Wall Street banks with which they’ve worked fist in glove. The ranks of smaller manufacturers were split, but those opposed to free trade agreements and related decisions were most often defeated. And the smaller companies that did indeed seek to throw sand in the fears of trade liberalization in fact were actually the ones trying to promote broader economic and national interests.

And the smaller retailers and other small service companies not directly affected by trade liberalization generally sided with the corporate giants – in order to win a few easy brownie and lobbying log-rolling points with them (as in “You scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours.”) So they were acting first and foremost on their own narrow interests as well.

As for consumers, who supposedly benefited from those lower prices, they have indeed been pretty disengaged from trade policy disputes. But their apathy powerfully enabled decisions that wound up backfiring on tens of millions of them disastrously, as the crisis increasingly cost them their jobs and their homes. So the Olson theory holds up in the sense that the gains from winning trade positions were highly concentrated – they overwhelmingly benefited the limited constituencies that worked so energetically and effectively to prevail. And the losses were indeed dispersed – among workers and especially among apathetic consumers. The results, however, so damaged the entire economy that its ability to recover fully remains in doubt.

There’s an especially crucial productivity angle that needs to be recognized as well: Surely one of the most effective ways to undermine an economy’s productivity growth is to send much of its most historically productive sector – manufacturing – overseas. So in that sense, the political and lobbying dynamics highlighted by Olson have backfired against the broad national interest as well.

In addition, these trends fed on themselves in a widely unrecognized way: The smaller domestic manufacturing’s physical footprint became, in terms of its share of the workforce and of economic activity, the fewer Americans directly experienced the damage caused by its shrinkage – and the clearer the path to victory for the offshoring/trade liberalization lobby. The latter also benefited from the increased concentration of manufacturing in smaller cities and towns and semi-rural areas. So factories and their workers literally became harder for the rest of the population literally to see and interact with.

Since I’m much less familiar with the lobbying and politics of numerous other economic issues, I don’t feel comfortable commenting on how well the Olson theory describes their workings. But if its tenets are as off-base in these areas as they are in trade policy, it’s easy to see how these ideas would be prized by business, political, and media elites with such a strong stake in blaming the victims for their own grievous policy blunders.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Media Flattery for America’s Corporate China Lobby

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China, cyber-security, Financial Times, hacking, lobbying, multinational corporations, offshoring, protectionism, technology, technology transfer, The Wall Street Journal, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Even before checking out The Wall Street Journal this morning, I was going to post an item on some truly weird material quasi-buried in a Financial Times piece from last week. The Journal article, however, showed  that it’s become nothing less than vital to spotlight this latest instance of how the media spreads the most whoppingly one-sided information on many U.S.-China-related subjects in the most offhanded ways.

According to FT writers Geoff Dyer and Richard Waters in a September 11 piece on “High-tech diplomacy” between the United States and China, “The American business community once saw itself as almost a go-between in the US-China relationship, an embodiment of the two countries’ intertwined economic fates and a diplomatic actor that was sometimes able to take the edge off political arguments” and a “conduit between governments.”

More recently, they observe, the companies have “started to lean more heavily on Washington for support against Chinese policies that seemed designed either to shut them out of large sections of the Chinese market or pressure them to hand over key technologies.” And of course, the article dutifully quotes an “expert” from an American think tank (which happens to be heavily funded by such businesses) sympathetically describing the companies as “being pulled in many directions by both governments in what has become a much more complicated relationship….Most of them do not like being caught in the middle.” Who could help but feel their pain?

These offshoring companies have indeed been hoisted by Beijing on the petard of their longtime claims that expanding trade with China would greatly benefit the U.S. economy, too; that China was moving steadily towards Western business and even legal, and political norms; and that therefore Washington should mainly turn the other cheek in response to any continued economic predation by the Chinese. The firms also undoubtedly told the two FT reporters that they previously saw themselves as valuable diplomatic intermediaries – as is their right. And perhaps some executives actually believed that.  It’s true, moreover, that the FT didn’t present these descriptions as fact.

At the same time, because an alternative perspective was completely ignored, what else could a reader not steeped in these subjects conclude? And omissions like this matter, because what Dyer and Waters didn’t mention is all the evidence that American companies operating in China have actually served, and every effectively, as de facto lobbyists for a Chinese government. Their common interest? Preventing American officials from rocking the boat of bilateral economic relations in order to preserve profits both were reaping at the expense of domestic U.S. producers and their employees – aka the productive core of the American economy. For as the media has ignored ever since China trade issues have been stirring controversy, U.S.-owned firms whose products are made in China for export to the United States benefit every bit as much from Chinese subsidies and protectionism as Chinese-owned companies.

Where the Journal piece comes in is in providing crucial perspective about the growing number and volume of corporate complaints about China’s increasingly brazen protectionism. On top of refusing to support measures that arguably could counter China’s latest moves, the American firms – especially the tech companies – have massively caved to the pressure. As reported by the Journal’s Eva Dou and Don Clark (and as described by RealityChek for months), these companies are doubling down on their longstanding policies of transferring capital and, most important, cutting-edge technology, to Chinese enterprises. The FT referenced these moves, but only briefly, and deep into the second half of the article.

And by the way, if you look at the types of knowhow being provided to China (as I’ve been doing for years), it’s no mystery why it’s become so adept at hacking key U.S. government and private sector computer systems. In other words, reasons abound for viewing the corporations so indulgently portrayed in the FT not only as whiners, but as dangerously two-faced whiners.

No one should want the FT or any other news organization to take sides in this debate. But the media needs to do a much better job remembering that these giant companies already have their own flacks.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Reasons to Worry About Obama’s Iran Deal

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allies, China, European Union, Iran, Iran deal, Iran talks, lobbying, Middle East, multinational corporations, nuclear weapons, Obama, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, sanctions, United Nations

In order to evaluate the new deal to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons for the medium run, it’s necessary to examine it both down in the weeds, and at the 30,000-foot level. After reading the text that’s been made available so far, I have major concerns from both perspectives.

Regarding the details, the monitoring and verification provisions are of course paramount, given the nature of domestic politics and international relations generally, and the Iran regime’s record of violating agreements specifically. And major problems can be identified with both the Dispute Resolution Mechanism (DSM) the agreement sets up, and with its procedures for inspecting the full range of Iranian sites that might be engaged in now-banned nuclear activity.

The DSM (paragraphs 36 and 37 of Section I) lays out a process that could take as long as 80 days to complete. Disagreements over whether the agreement’s terms are being violated could in principle go through a Joint Commission established by the pact, a panel consisting of the foreign ministries of all members, an Advisory Board comprised of representatives of the two main parties to the dispute and “a third independent member,” then back to the Joint Commission, and finally to the United Nations Security Council.

Deadlines for all these phases look automatic, and if Iran is determined to be the guilty party, any sanctions that have been lifted would be reimposed if the matter is not resolved to everyone’s satisfaction within 30 days. That sounds good in principle.

But if you fly up to the 30,000-foot level, it becomes clear what is all too likely to happen in practice: Iran would have nearly three months to engage in banned activities. Moreover, influential companies in the United States and all the European countries party to the agreement would start lobbying furiously to paper over the problem and avoid both disrupting business they had already begun, and killing projects that were in works.

And even without such corporate campaigns, the European governments themselves, starved for growth, would feel major pressure to continue capitalizing on new investment, export, and thus job-creating opportunities in Iran. Indeed, economist Jeffrey Dorfman of the University of Georgia has written a terrific column making clear how powerful these appeasing commercial forces has already been in the post-Cold War era.

Moreover, all of the governments that had concluded this deal with Iran would have major vested interests in preserving it even in the face of compelling but less than overwhelming evidence of Iranian violations. It should go without saying that the leaders in power today would be highly reluctant to admit failure. But so would any successors from their political parties. And in Europe in particular, leaders across the spectrum would surely be tempted to cite one of the most prominent defenses offered for the new agreement: However flawed it may be, it’s better than nothing.

Drawn-out procedures appear to be an even bigger substantive problem when it comes to the agreement’s provisions for those sites not yet officially determined by previous diplomacy with Tehran to be part of Iran’s nuclear complex. Worse, this section of the deal (Annex 1, Section Q) arguably contains at least one major loophole.

Specifically, even before inspections of these facilities are even on the table, the international agency charged with this responsibility (the International Atomic Energy Agency) needs to “provide Iran the basis for [its] concerns and request clarification.” In other words, the IAEA needs to tell Iran exactly what it would be looking for. Iran has to respond, but only if its explanations are deemed unsatisfactory can the IAEA request access – while also being required to let the Iranians know what incriminating information it has at its disposal. And Iran can hem and haw enough to extend this process for a total of two weeks.

But access to the facilities could be denied by Iran for another week, as a series of “consultations” is undertaken. And if these fail, five of the eight members of the Joint Commission – made up of Russia and China, the European Union, and the Western countries that would feel the above “30,000-foot pressures” – would need to determine that intrusive measures were indeed required. And after that vote, Iran would have three more days to grant access. It’s not rocket science to figure out that these procedures would give the Tehran ample opportunity to hide whatever its interlocutors want to find.

And then there’s the possible loophole: The agreement requires that inspections “not be aimed at interfering with Iranian military or other national security activities.” This could simply mean that inspectors ultimately must be allowed anywhere they wish to go, but promise to tiptoe their way around. But the wording is so ambiguous that it’s easy to imagine Iran interpreting it as placing all military site completely off limits – because any foreign presence would interfere with their operations. Indeed, the very vagueness of the wording makes that scenario not a possibility but a likelihood – along with agreement by China and Russia, plus squishier western politicians and business interests.

We’re still left with that “better than nothing” argument. At this point, I worry that it’s at least nearly offset by the varying sunset provisions of the agreement. They mean that, by the Obama administration’s own reckoning, even if every syllable is implemented perfectly, largely because of the nuclear programs it will be permitted to keep, in 15 years Iran might be able to “break out” of the accord and build a functioning weapon in one year. (This break-out time today is thought by many – but not all – analysts to be two to three months.) The agreement can also be legitimately faulted for a sanctions relief schedule that could within months start greatly enriching a regime that Mr. Obama himself believes is threatening major American interests in the Middle East.

As a result, I’d vote it down if I was in the Senate and needed to decide right now. But there remain some important details that have not yet been made public, and the big strategic issues just mentioned (as well as others) are still eminently debatable. In addition, I can claim no expertise on the nuclear technology that the agreement is trying to control; those provisions might fall short of acceptability as well. So I’m glad I have some wiggle room of my own before coming to a definitive conclusion, and all Americans should be grateful that their legislators don’t need to rush to judgment, either.