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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Biden Big Wigs Signal a Cave-in on China Tariffs

25 Monday Apr 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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apparel, bicycles, Biden, Biden administration, CAFTA, Central America, Central America Free Trade Agreement, China, consumer goods, consumer price index, CPI, Daleep Singh, Donald Trump, Hunter Biden, Immigration, inflation, Janet Yellen, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, tariffs, Trade, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

In theory, once can always be dismissed as a gaffe (even President Biden isn’t the speaker) or a trial balloon motivated by genuine uncertainty and curiosity. Twice, especially within two days, looks an awful lot like the preview of a policy change. Which is why recent remarks by two senior Biden administration officials last week are so worrisome. If that’s the game they’re playing, then the President is planning what could be major cuts in the Trump tariffs on China – without requiring any meaningful concessions from China in return. Even worse, the rationale being advanced – reducing inflation — is completely bogus.

This potential tariff-cutting spadework began last Thursday, when deputy White House national security advisor Daleep Singh told a conclave of globalist poohbahs that tariffs could advance U.S. [in the words of Reuters reporter Andrea Shalal “strategic priorities such as strengthening critical supply chains and maintaining U.S. preeminence in foundational technologies and to support national security.”

But, he added (in his words) “For product categories that are not implicated by those objectives, there’s not much of a case for those tariffs being in place. Why do we have tariffs on bicycles or apparel or underwear?”

“So that’s the opportunity,” he continued. “It could be that in this moment of elevated inflation and China having its own very serious supply chain concerns … maybe there’s something we can do there.” Singh also suggested that eliminating such U.S. tariffs could prompt China to cut duties on comparable American products, though he didn’t establish such Chinese moves as a condition.

The very next day, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said on Bloomberg Television that “We’re re-examining carefully our trade strategy with respect to China” and that removing the tariffs is “worth considering. We certainly want to do what we can to address inflation, and there would be some desirable effects. It’s something we’re looking at.”

One immediate problem with Yellen’s position is that she herself has belittled it. As recently as last December, she testified to Congress that cuts in so-called non-strategic tariffs would not be an inflation “game-changer.”

In addition, although Yellen might be excused for not recognizing a major strategic benefit that the China tariffs could create, to the second in command in President Biden’s National Security Council – which is supposed to look at the nation’s global opportunities and challenges holistically – they should be obvious. Specifically, these kinds of labor-intensive consumer goods are exactly the kinds of products that could create the kinds of vital economic opportunities in Mexico and Central America that could many of the incentives for mass emigration.

Indeed, as I’ve written, pre-Trump presidents’ short-sighted decision to pursue trade liberalization with virtually all low-income countries guaranteed that the gains that could have flowed to U.S. neighbors via the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) would shift instead to China and the other more competitive economies of East Asia. Just something to keep in mind the next time the Biden administration claims it’s serious about solving the “root causes” of mass migration in this hemisphere.

As for the inflation angle, Singh and Yellen have some big questions to answer. First of all, all sports vehicles (the category in which the U.S. Labor Department includes bicycles when it breaks down the contributions made to rising prices by different types of goods and services) comprise about 0.4 percent of the core Consumer Price Index (CPI) and apparel makes up about 3.2 percent. So it is indeed difficult to understand how stemming price rises of these products could be an inflation game-changer, as Yellen observed. (See here for the official CPI breakdown.)

Second, and at least as important, announced tariffs on some Chinese bicycles and bike products had already been suspended for much of the Trump China trade war period. For the rest of imports from China in this grouping, the 25 percent tariff remained unchaged. Yet annual inflation in the sports vehicles category has ranged from 4.8 percent in February, 2021 (President Biden’s first full month in office) to 10.52 percent this past January. Why such dramatic price fluctuation and big net increase over time? 

As for U.S. apparel imports, products from China represented just about a quarter of the U.S. global total last year – so it would seem that these goods represented just about a quarter of the total apparel contribution to the CPI (or about 0.80 percent).  And the Trump trade war levies cover just a tiny share of these imports, according to this industry source. Even so, however, annual apparel inflation rates have fluctuated even more dramatically than those for the bicycle category during the Biden presidency. They’ve ranged from -3.72 percent in February, 2021 to 6.79 percent last month (the latest available figures). 

The only possible explanation for these trends: As with the rest of the economy, apparel and bicycle prices have been determined ovewhelmingly by forces other than tariffs – principally the status of the CCP Virus pandemic and of the overall economic growth and consumption rates it’s so powerfully influenced; the injection of trillions of dollars worth of stimulus injected into the economy by the administration, the Congress, and the Federal Reserve; the supply chain snags that have caused shortages and therefore boosted prices of practically everything that needs to be transported; and the energy price rises that have generated the same kinds of effects. In other words, it’s the supply and demand, stupid.

And speaking of stupid, that adjective doesn’t begin to describe the politics of this seemingly impending Biden move. In an election year, does the President really want to expose himself to charges of being soft on China? Especially since evidence keeps emerging of his son Hunter’s lucrative business dealings with Chinese interests – which have clearly feathered the nests of the entire Biden family, including the President’s?

Even though, as I’ve pointed out, Mr. Biden has been a China coddler for his entire career in Washington, I was convinced that the American public’s mounting fear and loathing of the Beijing dictatorship would keep persuading him to follow the basic Trump approach to China trade. Indeed, his chief trade advisor implicitly endorsed this Trump strategy less than a month ago and indicated it would shape Biden administration polic going forward.

The President can still stop this initiative in its tracks.  But if he doesn’t, he’ll have only himself to blame when his political opponents ramp up their charges that he’s in Beijing’s pocket after all, and that his early China hawkishness meant that the payoff from his election, far from being off the table, was merely being delayed.  

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: How to Really Make Trade Fair

15 Wednesday Dec 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 1 Comment

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automotive, BBB, Biden administration, bubbles, Build Back Better, Canada, consumption, Donald Trump, electric vehicles, EVs, fossil fuels, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, North America, production, tax breaks, Trade, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA, {What's Left of) Our Economy

There’s no doubt that the next few weeks will see a spate of (low-profile) news articles on how unhappy Canada and Mexico are about proposed new U.S. tax credits for purchasing electric vehicles (EVs) and how these measures could trigger a major new international trade dispute.

There’s also no doubt that any such disputes could be quickly resolved, and legitimate U.S. interests safeguarded, if only Washington would finally start basing U.S. trade policy on economic fundamentals and facts on the ground rather than on the abstract and downright childishly rigid notions of fairness that excessively influenced the approach taken by Donald Trump’s presidency.

The Canadian and Mexican complaints concern a provision in the Biden administration’s Build Back Better (BBB) bill that’s been passed by the House of Representatives but is stuck so far in the Senate. In order to encourage more EV sales, and help speed a transition away from fossil fuel use for climate change reasons, the latest version of BBB would award a refundable tax break of up to $12,500 for most purchases of these vehicles.

The idea is controversial because the administration and other BBB supporters see these rebates as a great opportunity to promote EV production and jobs in the United State by reserving his subsidy for vehicles Made in America. (As you’ll see here, the actual proposed rules get more complicated still – and could change some more.) And according to Canada and Mexico, this arrangement also violates the terms of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada-Agreement (USMCA) governing North American trade that replaced the old NAFTA during the Trump years in July, 2020.

Because USMCA largely reflects those prevailing concepts of global economic equity, Canada and Mexico probably have a strong case. But that’s only because this framework continues classifying all countries signing a trade agreement as economic equals. Even worse, there’s no better illustration of this position’s absurdity is the economy of North America.

After all, the United States has always accounted for vast majority of the continent’s total economic output and therefore market for traded goods. According for the latest (2020) World Bank figures, the the United States turned out 87.51 percent of North America’s gross product adjusted for inflation. And when it comes to new car and light truck sales, the U.S. share was 84.24 percent in 2019 (the last full pre-pandemic year, measured by units, and as calculated from here, here, and here).

But in 2019, the United States produced only 68.88 percent of all light vehicles made in North America (also measured by units and calculated from here, here, and here.) Moreover, more than 70 percent of all vehicles manufactured in Mexico were exported to the United States according to the latest U.S. government figures. And for Canada, the most recent data pegs this share at just under 54 percent (based on and calculated from here and here).

What this means is that, without the American market, there probably wouldn’t even be any Canadian and Mexican auto industries at all. They simply wouldn’t have enough customers to reach and maintain the production scale needed to make any economic sense.

So real fairness, stemming from the nature of the North American economy and the North American motor vehicle industry, leads to an obvious solution: Give vehicles from Canada and Mexico shares of the EV tax credits that match their shares of the continent’s light vehicle sales – just under 16 percent.

Therefore, using, say, 2019 as a baseline, from now on, the first just-under-16 percent of their combined light vehicle exports to the United States would be eligible for the credits for each successive year, and the rest would need to be offered at each manufacturer’s full price (a pretty plastic notion in the auto industry, I know, but a decision that would need to be left to whatever the manufacturers choose).

Nothing in this decision would force Canada or Mexico to subject themselves to these requirements; they would remain, as they always have been, completely free to try to sell as many EVs as they could to other markets (including each other’s).

What would change dramatically, though, is a situation that’s needlessly harmed the productive heart of the U.S. economy for far too long, resulting from trade agreements that lock America into an outsized consuming and importing role, but an undersized production and exporting role. In other words, what would change dramatically is a strategy bearing heavy responsibility for addicting the nation to bubble-ized growth. And forgive me for not being impressed by whatever legalistic arguments Mexico, Canada, any other country, or the global economics and trade policy establishments, are sure to raise in objection.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Biden’s Immigration-Enabling Goals Couldn’t be Worse Timed

03 Thursday Dec 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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asylum seekers, California, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Department of Labor, Eduardo Porter, illegal aliens, illegal immigration, Immigration, Jobs, Joe Biden, NAFTA, North American Free Frade Agreement, Open Borders, path to citizenship, Pew Research Center, recession, refugees, services, The New York Times, The Race to the Bottom, wages, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Apparent President-elect Joe Biden emphatically and repeatedly told the nation that he’s determined to increase the flow of immigrants to America – whether we’re talking about his promises that will greatly strengthen the immigration magnet (like creating a “roadmap to citizenship” for America’s illegal alien population, tightly curbing immigation law enforcement activities, and offering free government-funded healthcare to anyone who can manage to cross the border lawfully or not), or his promises to boost admissions of refugees, speed systems for processing applications for asylum and (legal) green card applications, and generally “to ensure that the U.S. remains open and welcoming to people from every part of the world….”

During normal recent times such pledges – and the fallout of pre-Trump efforts to keep them – had proven troublesome enough for the U.S. economy and for working class Americans in particular. Inevitably, they pumped up the supply of labor available to U.S.-based businesses, and created surpluses that enabled companies to cut wages with the greatest of ease – exactly as the laws of supply and demand predict.

During the CCP Virus pandemic and its likely economic aftermath, however, this quasi-Open Borders strategy looks positively demented, as emerging trends most recently described by New York Times economics writer Eduardo Porter should make painfully obvious.

According to Porter in a December 1 piece, “The [U.S.] labor market has recovered 12 million of the 22 million jobs lost from February to April. But many positions may not return any time soon, even when a vaccine is deployed.

“This is likely to prove especially problematic for millions of low-paid workers in service industries like retailing, hospitality, building maintenance and transportation, which may be permanently impaired or fundamentally transformed. What will janitors do if fewer people work in offices? What will waiters do if the urban restaurant ecosystem never recovers its density?”

What’s the connection with immigration policy? As it happens, the service industries the author rightly identifies as sectors apparently vulnerable to major employment downsizing are industries that historically have employed outsized shares of immigrant workers (including illegals). And along with other personal service industries, they’re kinds of sectors whose modest skill requirements would continue to offer newcomers overall their best bets for employment.

The charts below, from the Pew Research Center, show just how thoroughly dominated by both kinds of immigrants these sectors, and present similar data broken down by occupation. (The U.S. Department of Labor tracks employment according to both kinds of categories.)

Twenty years ago, in my book The Race to the Bottom, I wrote about news reports making clear that

“immigrants were flooding into California in hopes of landing jobs in labor-intensive industries such a apparel and electronics assembly that NAFTA [the North American Free Trade Agreement] had steadily been sending to Mexico — where most of the immigrants come from! In other words, the state was importing people while exporting their likeliest jobs.” 

And not surprisingly, wages throughout the southern California in particular stagnated.  

If a Biden administration proceeds with its stated immigration plans as quickly as it’s promised (with many actions scheduled for the former Vice President’s first hundred days in office), this epic blunder will wind up being repeated — but this time on a national scale.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: How Pre-Trump Trade Policies Devastated U.S. Protective Gear Capacity

17 Friday Apr 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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apparel, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Fed, Federal Reserve, free trade, garments, health security, manufacturing, manufacturing capacity, NAFTA, non-durable goods, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, textiles, Trade, Trump, World Trade Organization, WTO, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Recently I put up a post expressing gratitude that, despite their best efforts, pre-Trump U.S. trade policies didn’t manage to send the entire U.S. textile and apparel industries offshore. After all, companies in these sectors are the companies with the greatest expertise and capabilities in making all the personal protective equipment (PPE) crucial in the anti-CCP Virus fight.

Of course, the nation is therefore reliant for these and other medical products on countries, like China, which have responded to the emergency at various times with export bans. And in the case of pandemic-prone China, much production of all kinds was shut down temporarily because of the original virus outbreak.

Thanks to the release of the latest Federal Reserve industrial production data, it’s possible to quantify the damage done to these vital industries in ways other than the output figures I presented in that previous offering. That’s because the Fed’s monthly releases report in detail not only on increases or decreases in after-inflation output for manufacturing (and related) sectors. They also report the monthly changes in industrial capacity – the resources and facilities available to turn out various goods.

The results through last month are below. They use as baselines the month the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA – which has now been turned into the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement) went into effect, and the month that China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO). NAFTA’s January, 1994 onset signaled to many the transformation of U.S. trade policy into U.S. offshoring policy (see my book, The Race to the Bottom, for this argument). The January, 2002 beginning of China’s WTO membership gave the People’s Republic  overall, and its even-then-immense textile and especially apparel sectors, invaluable protection against American responses to its various forms of trade predation. (Limited safeguards versus “market-disrupting” surges in imports from China were written into the WTO agreement.)

For comparison’s sake, the industrial capacity changes for non-durable goods manufacturing (the super-sector into which textiles and apparel are grouped), and total manufacturing are provided as well:

                                                       Since NAFTA onset    Since China WTO entry

Textiles:                                              -37.05 percent              -44.05 percent

Apparel & leather goods:                   -81.97 percent              -77.18 percent

Non-durables manufacturing:           +17.06 percent                -2.23 percent

Total manufacturing:                         +75.54 percent             +10.78 percent

Clearly, the decimation of apparel capacity sticks out prominently. But although the more capital-intensive textiles industry didn’t suffer nearly as much, it fared much worse than either manufacturing in toto or the non-durables sectors overall. That’s largely because as the apparel industry disappeared, so did a prime domestic customer for textiles producers.

It’s also obvious for all these categories that although NAFTA was, to say the least, hardly a bonanza, the big trade-related damage was done by China’s WTO entry. Afterward that event has been when the shrinkage of textiles capacity accelerated, when the vast majority of the post-NAFTA apparel damage was done, when non-durables capacity gains shifted into reverse, and when total manufacturing capacity growth slowed to a crawl.

Calls are now abounding for remedies to the resulting shortages – like greater stockpiling and various tax and subsidy incentives for reshoring at least some of this production. But material in stockpiles can decay if unused too long, and companies would be foolish to spend heavily on new U.S. factories if they still face the likelihood of being subsidized and dumped out of existence by predatory foreign trade policies. As a result, there’s no substitute for stiff tariffs, and a credible national resolve to keep them in place, for ensuring that America’s health security never becomes so degraded again.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Thank Goodness Free Trade Zealots Didn’t Completely Destroy the U.S. Textiles Industry

24 Tuesday Mar 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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apparel, Apple, health security, healthcare products, manufacturing, NAFTA, National Council of Textile Organizations, NCTO, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, textile, The Race to the Bottom, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The news media have been filled lately with encouraging stories like this one from the Financial Times – reporting that “US factories that usually mass produce hoodies and T-shirts are being retooled to make face masks as chief executives in the clothing industry try to alleviate shortages of equipment to combat coronavirus. A group of nine American apparel companies began producing the masks on Monday….”

Moreover, according to their main industry organization, companies like these and their domestic manufacturing plants “make a broad range of inputs and finished products used in an array of personal protective equipment (PPE) and medical nonwoven/textile supplies, including surgical gowns, face masks, antibacterial wipes, lab coats, blood pressure cuffs, cotton swabs and hazmat suits. These items are vital to the government’s effort to ramp up emergency production of these critical supplies.”

These actions are not only commendable and critically important nowadays. They’re also a major reminder that it’s fortunate in the extreme that there are still domestic textile and apparel industries with production in the United States – and that this sector has survived despite every effort made by pre-Trump Presidents and Congresses either to put them out of business and send them offshore.

Washington’s motivation? Nothing personal or political – just blind adherence to the bedrock economic principle of comparative advantage, which simply put holds that if other countries make certain products more efficiently than the United States (with or without subsidies, by the way), U.S. policy should simply permit the those stateside industries to wither and die, in full confidence that Americans will always be able to import whatever they need whenever they need it.

Geopolitics was at work, too.  Garment-making in particular is the kind of “starter” sector needed by developing countries to start down the road toward industrialization and therefore the broader economic progress they understandably covet. As a result, foreign policy makers viewed chunks of the U.S. industry as an ideal offering for winning and keeping allies in the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union.    

A labor-intensive sector like apparel was consigned to this fate decades ago. But a sector like textiles was treated similarly – even though it’s the kind of capital- and technology-intensive industry in which high-income, advanced economies like America’s are supposed to excel. Moreover, as countless textile executives with whom I’ve spoken over the years have emphasized, even though they (who make the fabrics and similar materials) differ significantly from the clothing makers (who essentially cut and sew the stuff together), their fates have been closely connected. For the apparel companies are prime customers for the textile producers (though far from the only ones, as you’ll realize if you’ve ever owned, e.g., a carpet), and foreign governments could be counted on to give their own textile sectors a leg up in sales by throwing up all manner of obstacles to U.S.-owned firms supplying overseas garment makers.

In fact, pre-Trump administrations continued to dismiss the textile industry long after its potential became clear for creating all sorts of high tech fabrics with breakthrough qualities like temperature and odor control and bio-monitoring capabilities.

It’s true that the companies could always follow what you might call the “Apple model” – after the electronics giant’s strategy of researching, engineering, and designing its products domestically, and sending the manufacturing overseas. But as I documented nearly two decades ago in my globalization book, The Race to the Bottom, once industries offshore production, many of these so-called white collar activities tend to follow – since there’s nothing like physical proximity to generate the kind of intensive, interactive collaboration between labs and shop floors often needed to spark innovation.

Moreover, as Americans are learning today, you can be the world’s innovation leader by leaps and bounds, but if you lack the domestic production facilities when emergencies arise, you may be standing at the end of the line for supplies of vital products.  In fact, as of late last week, no fewer than 38 countries had limited exports of healthcare-related goods.

So it’s pretty appalling to see how successful pre-Trump U.S. leaders were in stripping the nation of these capabilities. Federal Reserve statistics tell us that inflation-adjusted production of textiles in the United States has sunk by just over half since January, 1994 – when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect and officially ushered in a long offshoring-happy phase of U.S. trade policy. And if you think that’s terrible (which it is), it’s a performance that positively shines when compared to apparel (and leather goods) production. That’s down more than 86 percent during this period.

Interestingly, just two years before NAFTA’s advent, a pair of vocalists, Fontella Bass and Bobby McLure, released a song titled “You’ll Miss Me (When I’m Gone).” What a near-tragedy that shortsighted American trade policymakers didn’t realize how thoroughly this message can apply to major industries. What a blessing that the nation’s remaining textile and apparel makers chose to hang on. And thank goodness that the nation has a President today who clearly recognizes the imperative of Making it in America not only in textiles and apparel, but across the manufacturing spectrum. 

P.S. Full disclosure: For nearly two decades, funders of my work at the U.S. Business and Industry Council included a major domestic textile company. At the same time, the firm suddenly and unceremoniously dumped the organization in 2009 (and not for lack of resources). So my warm and fuzzy feelings toward the sector are limited.

 

Making News: National Media Coverage for RealityChek’s Views on the China Trade Deal…& More!

14 Saturday Dec 2019

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Making News

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Boris Johnson, Brexit, China, European Union, IndustryToday.com, Making News, Market Wrap with Moe Ansari, Marketwatch.com, NAFTA, North American Free Frade Agreement, Phase One, Trade, trade deal, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, United Kingdom, USMCA

I’m pleased to announce that my views on the new U.S.-China “Phase One” trade deal have just come out via some national media organizations.

First, yesterday’s post arguing that the agreement doesn’t cut the mustard when it comes to advancing U.S. interests was re-posted on the widely read Marketwatch.com website.  Here’s the link.

Second, I was interviewed yesterday on the subject on the nationally syndicated radio show “Market Wrap with Moe Ansari.”  Click here for the link to the podcast.  My segment starts right about the 27-minute mark.  And special bonus!  We also discussed the new U.S.-Mexico-Canada-Agreement (USMCA) that replaces the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the reelection of Boris Johnson as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom – which surely makes the country’s departure from the European Union (“Brexit”) are certainty.

In addition, my December 11 RealityChek report on the disappointing performance of the inflation-adjusted wages earned by Americans during the Trump years was re-posted on the IndustryToday.com website.  Click here to see it.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: You Call This a China Trade Deal?

13 Friday Dec 2019

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 6 Comments

Tags

agriculture, China, dispute resolution, enforcement, NAFTA, offshoring lobby, Phase One, tariffs, Trade, trade deal, Trump, U.S. Trade Representative, USMCA, USTR, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

OK, let’s assume that something deserving the name “U.S.-China trade deal” has been reached – even one dubbed “Phase One” or “preliminary.” Deep doubts would remain justified about whether it can possibly serve American interests.

For example, where’s even an English-language version? There’s nothing new about such agreements coming out in both English and Chinese, raising thorny questions about ensuring that key terms in both languages are commonly understood – on top of all the towering issues raised by China’s long record of flouting official commitments it’s made. But if something worth announcing officially on both sides has actually been produced, why is the most detailed description so far this statement from the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) office?

Why does this statement contain plenty of specifics about U.S. tariff reductions (except for the actual dates by which American levies on imports from China will be cut) but no specifics about China’s own pledges? In that vein, no useful accounts have been released of what China will actually buy from the United States (though it’s interesting that President Trump has included manufactures on the list – not simply agricultural products and other commodities), and by when the Chinese will buy these goods. Special bonus – shortly after noon, the President said he “thinks” China will hit $50 billion in U.S. agriculture imports. Over what time period? Heaven only knows.

Don’t forget – such import increases will be the most easily described and verifiable aspects of any agreement. So maybe since these terms are still being left so vague, it shouldn’t be surprising that there’s absolutely nothing from the administration so far about “structural reforms and other changes to China’s economic and trade regime in the areas of intellectual property, technology transfer, agriculture, financial services, and currency and foreign exchange.”

Even the Trump administration has viewed these issues – which lie at the heart of the intertwined U.S.-China technology and national security rivalries, as well as of the purely economic rivalry – as so challenging to address diplomatically that rapid progress can’t be made. Why else would Mr. Trump have settled for now for seeking a shorter term, interim agreement?

If genuine breakthroughs have been made that will strengthen and safeguard and enrich Americans, terrific. But if so, what’s the point of couching them in generalities? And if not, what’s the point in claiming major progress?

Also completely, and crucially, omitted are any indications of what’s actually meant by “a strong dispute resolution system that ensures prompt implementation and enforcement.” In particular, if the United States doesn’t insist on the last word in judging Chinese compliance and meting out punishment when agreement terms are broken, then this deal will work no better on behalf of U.S.-based producers (employers and employees alike) than previous arrangements under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the old North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that pleased only the corporate Offshoring Lobby, its hired guns in Washington, D.C., and the Mainstream Media journalists who have long parroted its talking points.

So if the United States is not recognized as sole judge, jury, and court of appeals when dealing with Chinese compliance, history teaches that will be the case that the agreement literally will be worthless.

The politics of this U.S. announcement are puzzling in the extreme as well. China’s economy obviously has taken a much greater trade war hit than America’s – of course mainly because it’s so much more trade-dependent. Beijing’s dictators are struggling to contain unrest in Hong Kong. The new U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which will replace NAFTA, will offset some of the China-related losses suffered by the agriculture-heavy states so critical to Mr. Trump’s reelection hopes. The polls show unmistakably that the President is winning the impeachment battle in the court of public opinion. And even before the Congressional Democrats’ efforts to remove him from office began bogging down, their party’s slate of presidential candidates had started looking so weak to so many in Democratic ranks that a gaggle of newcomers jumped into the primary campaign on stunningly short notice. 

In short, this is no time for Mr. Trump to reach any deal with China – whatever Phase it’s called. In fact, it’s the time for the President to keep the pressure on (because whatever weakens the Chinese economy ipso facto benefits the United States these days). And since a deal that promotes real U.S. interests remains impossible to reach because of verification obstacles, it’s also time for Mr. Trump to start signaling to American business that major tariffs on China are here to stay for the time being, and may even increase down the road. That’s one way to eliminate any uncertainty employers are feeling about doing business with China that will increase the odds of building a new, improved bilateral relationship – not restore its epically failed predecessor.

The only reasons for optimism on the U.S.-China trade front right now? Just two that I can identify, but they’re hardly trivial. First, for all the reasons cited above, the supposed Phase One deal is clearly still so tentative and, frankly, so flimsy, that it’s likely to fall apart sooner rather than later. Second, U.S.-China decoupling will continue – precisely because the closely related technology and national security gulf dividing the two countries can’t be bridged diplomatically, and because even previously gullible U.S.-owned companies in numerous industries will now be thinking twice about exposing themselves, or exposing themselves further, to the whims of China’s utterly lawless and unreliable government. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A New North American Trade Study’s Crucial Footnote

22 Monday Apr 2019

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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automotive, Canada, Center for Automotive Research, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, regional content, rules of origin, tariffs, trade bloc, Trump, U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USITC, USMCA, {What's Left of) Our Economy

That was some footnote Commissioner Jason E. Kearns apparently insisted be inserted into the U.S. International Trade Commission’s (USITC) recent report on the economic impact of the Trump administration’s attempt to rewrite the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In fact, it contains the key to giving this Congressionally mandated study of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) a passing or failing grade. And a special bonus – it indicates why all three countries should have followed my advice and turned North America into a genuine trade bloc.

The particular Kearns-related footnote I’m talking about (number 66, on p. 57) dealt with the USITC’s analysis of one of the most controversial (and in my view, most promising) provisions of the new framework for North American trade – which has been signed by the continent’s three governments but not yet ratified by any of their legislatures. It’s the agreement’s attempts to restructure automotive industry trade among the signatories. These proposed new arrangements matter greatly because trade in vehicles and parts represents such a big share of overall North American trade (more than 20 percent of America’s total goods trade with Canada and Mexico, according to this study).

In brief, at the Trump administration’s instigation, USMCA increases the share of a vehicle’s content that needs to be made somewhere inside the free trade zone in order to qualify for tariff-free treatment, and includes other measures aimed at curbing and even reversing the movement of U.S.-owned auto production and the related jobs from the United States to much lower wage and overall lower cost Mexico, along with the resulting flows of Mexican-assembled vehicles and parts into the American market.

The USITC concluded that although the new NAFTA would produce slight benefits for the American economy overall, including for domestic U.S. manufacturing, the new content measures (called “rules of origin,” or “ROO” for short) themselves would drag on overall economic performance. In fact, they would even slightly depress U.S. vehicle production, not increase it.

As always the case with such projections, these conclusions are based on numerous assumptions, and as almost always the case, at least some of these assumptions can be pretty dodgy. Two that I have special problems with: First, when it comes to auto parts, the USTIC only examines only trade and investment in engines and transmissions; and second, the Commission doesn’t take into the jobs multiplier of vehicle and parts manufacturing.

These assumptions surely skew the conclusions to the downside because, as important as engines and transmissions are, the report itself acknowledges that other parts nowadays represent about 37 percent of total domestic parts output; and because the auto industry’s multiplier effect is really high. Indeed, according to a 2015 report by the Center for Automotive Research, for each American job created in domestic auto or light truck manufacturing, seven other jobs are created in the rest of the economy. That finding is significant because the Center has claimed that the new origin rules would exact exorbitant costs, and because it gets significant funding from an auto industry that has expressed major reservations about them.

But much more fundamental issues are raised by that footnote 66, especially considering these questionable assumptions. Here it is in full:

“Commissioner Kearns notes that, as described above, the model appears to suggest that the trade restrictiveness of a ROO is inversely related to its positive impact on the U.S. economy. Carried to its logical conclusion, this would appear to suggest that the best ROO is a very weak or nonexistent ROO. In turn, this would result in other countries, which do not incur any obligations to import U.S. products, obtaining unilateral, duty-free access to the U.S. market. If, on the other hand, we were to compute an ROO that optimizes regional content while recognizing that there may be slack in the economy, we may estimate a gain to the overall economy from the automotive ROO.”

Kearns first observation not only makes perfect sense. It’s the only sensible macro-conclusion that can be drawn about rules of origin. Because their complete absence (the counter-factual the Commission seems to have ignored) would indeed permit non-North American producers to reap all the gains generated by the USMCA (mainly, unfettered access to the immense continental market) without incurring any of the obligations. That’s supposed to result in a net plus for the American economy, the predominant market prize in North America?

The second observation is even more interesting. It notes that much more stringent rules (those that would “optimize regional content”) could be expected to leave the overall economy better off than the current rules. And as I’ve observed, the low tariff penalties (2.5 percent) imposed on non-North American auto producers for ignoring the origin rules are guaranteed to minimize the gains they produce. Therefore, much higher tariff penalties – which would approximate those commonly associated with trade blocs aimed at minimizing imports – would come closest to maximizing that what the USITC calls “the gain to the economy from the automotive ROO.”

President Trump claims that an “America First” approach to trade policy distinguishes him sharply from his predecessors. Footnote 66 in the USTIC report makes as possible that a genuine “North America First” strategy would have best advanced that goal – and that in this case, anyway, there was no reward for timidity.

Making News: Last Night’s National Radio China Interview Podcast Now On-Line & a Major Seminar on North America’s Future

13 Thursday Dec 2018

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Making News

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Tags

caravans AMLO, Gordon G. Chang, Henry George School of Social Science, Huawei, Immigration, Jorge Castaneda, Lopez Obrador, Making News, NAFTA, North America, North American Free Trade Agreement, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, trade war, Trump

I’m pleased to report that the podcast is now on-line of my interview last night on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show. Click here for a lively update on the rapidly evolving  U.S.-China trade conflict and the China tech executive’s arrest provided by John, co-host Gordon G. Chang, and me.

Also, late last month, I had the privilege of moderating a seminar held at New York City’s Henry George School of Social Science (where I serve as a Trustee) featuring Jorge Castaneda, a former Mexican foreign minister who also ranks as a leading authority on U.S.-Mexico relations, Mexico’s politics and economy, and Western Hemisphere affairs more generally.

As the title of the seminar noted, North America’s economy is at a crossroads – due to the recent revamp of NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement), the inauguration of a new Mexican President, and the presence of an avowed disrupter in the White House. Let’s not forget, moreover, a new, caravans-fueled stage of the ongoing immigration crisis!

The video is now on-line, and because no one is more qualified than Jorge to explain how all these events do – and don’t – fit together, viewers will be rewarded with a treasure trove of information and incisive analysis.  Here’s the link.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Following Up: Lousy U.S. Auto-Making Productivity and Those GM Layoffs

27 Tuesday Nov 2018

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Following Up

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automotive, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Detroit automakers, General Motors, GM, Jobs, layoffs, motor vehicles, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, productivity, total factor productivity, Trade, Trump, yoFollowing Up

Yesterday, I posted some data – with a special focus on major victim state Ohio and major victim region Youngstown – providing some badly needed perspective on General Motors newly announced manufacturing jobs layoffs in the United States (along with Canada and other unspecified locations). Today I’d like to follow up with some statistics that shed more light on GM’s decision – and the strengths and weaknesses of the American domestic automobile industry.

There’s no doubt that, as widely noted, many trends and developments are responsible for the new job cuts – which are highly unlikely to be restricted to GM alone. Some of the biggest include changing product mixes (away from smaller vehicles and toward larger vehicles), new technologies (for electric vehicles and self-driving vehicles), and the inevitable waning of the latest “automotive cycle” – that is, a slowdown in auto sales that has been entirely predictable following the sector’s strong recovery from a terrifying downturn during the last recession.

But one industry trend that’s been sorely neglected – and that surely bears heavily on the “Detroit 3” auto companies’ failure to continue producing smaller vehicles profitably at their domestic factories (the plants targeted for closure) – concerns its productivity performance. In a word, it’s been lousy – which supports last week’s post presenting evidence that U.S. metals-using industries like automotive have been using crutches like (foreign government-subsidized and therefore artificially) cheap raw materials, along with massive job and production offshoring, to juice their profits rather than efficiency-enhancing improvements resulting from creating new technologies, investing in new machinery, devising better management techniques, or some combination of these measures.

That post last week featured data showing that the American transportation equipment sector (which of course includes auto manufacturing) has performed relatively well during the current U.S. economic recovery and the previous expansion – though the rate of growth decelerated over that time span. These periods were examined because they were marked by a tremendous increase in American imports of steel over-produced and dumped into the United States by foreign producers, which pushed steel prices way down for reasons having nothing to do with free trade or free markets.

But more detailed statistics make clear that the automotive sector per se lately has fared worse when it comes to total factor productivity – the broadest of two measures of productivity tracked by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the productivity measure I examined last week.

During the 2001-2007 American expansion, total factor productivity in the motor vehicles sector actually grew faster than that for transportation equipment overall – 22.70 percent versus 13.38 percent. But from the 2009 start of the current recovery through 2016 (the latest available data), vehicle makers’ total factor productivity advanced by only 2.53 percent – that is, much more slowly than the 9.67 percent improvement registered by transportation equipment overall.

In fact, since achieving a huge (15 percent) snapback in total factor productivity during the recovery’s first year following a deep (12.29 percent) nosedive during the recession, vehicle-makers’ total factor productivity fell by 10.94 percent through 2016. As a result, its total factor productivity hasn’t improved on net since 1989.

Also interesting: Since the U.S. ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 created a bright green light for automotive production and job offshoring, total factor productivity in American motor vehicle-making is up by only 9.20 percent. That’s a considerably slower rate of progress than for manufacturing overall (20.13 percent), even though automotive trade has figured so heavily in U.S. trade flows with fellow NAFTA signatories Mexico and Canada so far.

I don’t mean to minimize the challenges all automotive manufacturers face given the multi-dimensional crossroads that seems to be arriving rapidly for the sector. What should be glaringly obvious, though, is that they’re unlikely to be met adequately – including producing smaller vehicles profitably, especially if and when oil prices start rising again – with a productivity performance that barely qualifies as second-rate.    

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Current Thoughts on Trade

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Protecting U.S. Workers

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So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Alastair Winter

Chief Economist at Daniel Stewart & Co - Trying to make sense of Global Markets, Macroeconomics & Politics

Smaulgld

Real Estate + Economics + Gold + Silver

Reclaim the American Dream

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

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Kausfiles

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Sober Look

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So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

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RSS

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

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