Im-Politic: A Left-Wing Attack on Trump Tariffs that the Offshoring Lobby Could Love

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"resistance", China, Democrats, globalism, globalization, Im-Politic, liberals, multinational companies, NAFTA, Nomi Prins, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring lobby, progressives, strange bedfellows, tariffs, The Nation, Trade, Trump, Trump Derangement Syndrome, Trump tariffs

Although I view it as being small-minded, short-sighted, and often over-the-top, I can’t completely fault many left-of-center American trade policy critics for failing to support (and even attacking) most of President Trump’s trade policy initiatives. Not so with Nomi Prins’ new indictment in The Nation. She’s taken this dimension of Never Trump-ism and “Resistance” to a wholly new and troublingly counterproductive level,

Mr. Trump has assaulted many of the trade deals that liberals, progressives, and many Democrats themselves long resisted (like NAFTA – the North American Free Trade Agreement – and the the Trans-Pacific Partnership – TPP). And he’s dealing decisively (so far!) with many other foreign trade policy transgressions and global trade institutions they’ve long assailed (like China’s dumping of steel and aluminum and wide array of other predatory trade practices, and the World Trade Organization, or WTO).

But many on the Left (and indeed, all over American politics) are understandably disgusted with some of the President’s rhetoric and record in immigration and gender issues and race relations, and with his family’s continuing domestic and foreign business ties (including with China), which look like conflicts of interest and at the least can look hypocritical (e.g., using immigrant workers both legal and illegal). Moreover, you don’t have to be a Never-Trumper to be upset with the ties between many Trump administration appointees and industries they’re supposed to be regulating.

Moreover, the President is attacking American trade and related globalization policies from an economic nationalist/America First standpoint. Having worked with left-of-center trade critics for nearly 30 years, I can tell you that this has never been their perspective. Though this is an overly broad generalization, they have been loathe to acknowledge that what’s best for America and what’s best for the rest of the world may not be identical – especially in the short and even medium-terms. As a result, their criticisms of many long-standing U.S. trade policies have often demonstrated at least as much concern for their impact on workers in developing countries as on their counterparts in the United States.

In fact, they tend to reject the idea that the main fault-line in the global economy has been the United States (and even the U.S.’ productive economy) versus “the rest”. In the view of these left-of-center critics, the main fault line instead is between the capital holders of the world versus the workers of the world.

The point of this post is not to insist that the nationalists have been right and the progressives et al have been wrong. It is to note that Prins’ new Nation piece disturbingly edges into Trump Derangement Syndrome territory. The main reasons: Her stated problems with the administration’s trade policies aren’t based on any of the above counter-arguments. Instead, her main anti-Trump points are almost indistinguishable from those made by the establishment supporters of the trade and globalist status quo – including not only the foreign policy “Blob” that has always backed seeking geopolitical and diplomatic gains even when they come at the expense of U.S. workers and the domestic economy, but those multinational business groups comprising the “global capitalist” interests that the trade policy progressives have always targeted!

Thus we hear from Prins both that the actual and prospective Trump tariffs have angered America’s “closest allies” in the Group of 7 industrial countries of Europe and the Far East, along with “our regional partners” in NAFTA. She’s repeated the canard that the President’s trade moves scarily resemble the Hawley Smoot tariff that “sparked the global Great Depression, opening the way for the utter devastation of World War II.” She consistently portrays the world’s other major economies as genuine paragons of free trade. (Not even China is chided.)

Even more striking, the main evidence she cites for the claim that the President “is sparking a set of trade wars that could, in the end, cost millions of American jobs” comes from Offshoring Lobby pillars like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, and the Brookings Institution (which, not so incidentally, takes lots of money from most of the leading foreign economies that will be hit by Trump tariffs).

It’s been noted often since the NAFTA’s negotiation in the early 1990s ushered in the offshoring-happy phase of U.S. trade policy that the resulting domestic political divisions have created some “strange bedfellows” alliances – i.e., coalitions that have had little in common other than common views on this front. Will the Prins article help usher in the strangest trade bedfellow coalition yet – between the left-wing anti-Trump resistance and the Fortune 500? Such groups are singing much the same tune on issues like immigration policy, so this prospect isn’t as far-fetched as it might seem. Further, don’t forget that voters who consider themselves Democrats and those leaning in this direction are viewing trade in general much more favorably these days than during any other recent period – at least according to polls. (Republicans and GOP leaners have shifted in the opposite direction.) And the appearance of an article containing these arguments, and evidence drawn from corporate and corporate-funded sources, has appeared in The Nation – long one of the American Left’s flagship publications – is another ominous sign.

One reason for optimism (if you agree that U.S. trade policy needs a big-time overhaul): Many left-of-center trade policy critics have (albeit grudgingly) supported the main thrust of the President’s trade policies. Even though most still retain their “globalist loyalties,” their complaints about the administration’s approach have centered on its instances of backtracking on Mr. Trump’s campaign promises, and (like me) on apparent inconsistencies. So it will be especially interesting to see if they push back strongly, or at all, versus Prins’ views. The answer could help determine the future of the politics of American trade policy – and of the policy itself.

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Rules-Based Global Order – & Other Fairy Tales

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alliances, America First, burden sharing, China, currency, Federal Reserve, Financial Crisis, globalists, Great Recession, hegemony, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, public goods, recovery, Robert Triffin, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, Triffin dilemma, Trump, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Can the foreign and domestic critics of President Trump’s latest trade policy moves finally get real – and start talking and acting like adults? I’m not referring to politicians and analysts who have pointed out problems with individual aspects of the President’s recent announcements of tariffs on various trade competitors. I’ve been one of these myself.

Instead, I’m talking about those who keep whining that Mr. Trump’s tariffs and his overall – inconsistently to be sure – emerging “transactional” approach to alliances and other international arrangements are endangering a rules- and institutions-based global order that has served both America and the rest of the world unmistakably well. No description of the post-World War II world could be less accurate and indeed more childish – not to mention more self-serving for the supposed U.S. allies and multinational business interests (and their Washington, D.C. hired guns) that have pushed this canards so insistently.

For the institutions and rules so touted by President Trump’s globalist critics were simply window-dressing created to obscure a much less aesthetically pleasing reality: The postwar (non-communist) world’s success has been based fundamentally on America’s power and wealth, and the  consequent U.S. ability to provide what political scientists call “public goods” for those aligned with it. Specifically, it almost single-handedly created the conditions on which success decisively depended: the military protection that countries recovering from war-time devastation could not provide for themselves, and the credit and export markets that were similarly beyond the capacities of their crippled economies. Just as important, during the early post-war decades, the United States could play this role for the most part without excessive security risks and economic costs.

Unfortunately, even the biggest, best-run public goods-providing country will find these arrangements unsustainable, especially on the economic front, and especially if its government is substantially accountable to its people. The essential dilemma was first identified by the Yale University economist Robert Triffin back in 1960, when American power was at or near its zenith.

Triffin’s warning was narrowly economic. He argued that the very free lending and especially spending by which such a country (which political scientists call a “hegemon”) fueled growth around the world would eventually massive international deficits and a global glut of its currency – which was serving as the world’s money – and erode global confidence that currency’s value. Either the hegemon could tighten up – and likely throw the entire world economy into a major downturn. Or it could keep over-lending and especially spending. In this case, its currency would lose enough of its perceived value to end its world-money role, and the world economy would degenerate into chaos. Or the rest of the world could keep stockpiling these excess dollars – which as the French in particular noted would result in the inflation caused by the greenback’s declining value being exported around the world.

Yet in America’s case, the ultimate engines of the paradox – at least in post-World War II America’s case – were foreign policy and domestic politics-related. The over-spending, and consequent deficits stemmed from the United States’ determination simultaneously to incur the expenses of maintaining huge military forces at home and abroad (along with dispensing considerable foreign aid), and of satisfying the American public’s growing demand for social services, without increasing taxes enough to finance these programs responsibly. At the same time, the dilemma was greatly intensified by the refusal of the foreign beneficiaries of these U.S.-provided public goods to pay many more of the costs of their own defense, or to open their markets wider to American exports.

The breakdown of these arrangements in 1971 bore out Triffin’s warnings, but although major adjustments were made globally, the rest of the world continued relying heavily on American security guarantees and markets. And in fairness, a bipartisan American foreign policy establishment addicted to intangibles like “global leadership” and genuinely worried that its European and East Asian allies could not manage their own security affairs in particular responsibly, staunchly resisted any fundamental changes to the status quo.

Fast forward to the mid-2000s, and the exact same fundamental problem reemerged. Further, a Triffin-like situation was greatly worsened by two new developments. First, the Federal Reserve decided to enable reckless over-spending by American consumers by keeping interest rates at peacetime lows not seen for many decades.

Second, American trade policy swelled the international deficits by taking a new, offshoring-focused turn starting with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the early 1990s, and culminating with multinational companies’ decisions to focus tightly on supplying more and more American business and consumer demand from China, not from the United States.

Not so coincidentally, this trade policy shift was accompanied by the creation of an international organization – the World Trade Organization (WTO) – that was the first such body ever authorized to create both binding rules for any international policy sphere, and to utilize enforcement mechanisms in which the United States enjoys no special standing (as opposed, for example, to the United Nations Security Council, where the United States and other permanent members possess an individual veto over decisions).

A better recipe could not be created for empowering China (and the rest of the world’s major export-dependent economies) to view the United States as an even more attractive dumping ground for surplus production; for undermining America’s internationally recognized right to respond unilaterally; and for consequently enabling footloose multinational companies to supercharge the trade deficits by sending an astonishing amount of the nation’s production capacity to China and other super-low cost countries that could not or would not import remotely as much as they could or would export.

The end result: Rather than the United States winding up exporting inflation and (along with free-riding allies and trade competitors) bringing down a global monetary order, America exported financial instability, triggering the worst worldwide financial crisis, the deepest international economic downturn since the Great Recession, and the weakest U.S. economic recovery on record. And revealingly, to the cheers of the bipartisan American foreign policy and economic policy establishments, the first post-financial crisis president, Barack Obama, kept America’s grand strategy firmly on course.

Although it’s still unclear whether Mr. Trump is choosing an effective combination of trade and alliance policy tactics, his initiatives so far raise even more important questions. Chiefly, is he simply trying to achieve greater security and economic burden-sharing? And even if his aims at present are restricted to securing better deals, is he prepared to scrap American participation in current alliances and other international institutions altogether if U.S. tariffs and other America First-type threats don’t seem to be working?

Nonetheless, the President has opened the door to elevating America’s thinking about its global environment toward the adult levels that ultimately will be needed to prevent today’s lopsided unsustainable international arrangements from disastrous crackups. If his critics want to increase the odds that the best choices will be made, they’ll need to grow up, too.

Making News: Two New National Podcasts – & More!

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Akron, Breitbart News Daily, China, Kim Jong Un, Making News, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, North Korea, Ray Horner Morning Show, Sirius XM Patriot radio, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, Trump, Trump Kim summit, Voice of America, WAKR-AM

I’m pleased to announce that two podcasts of recent radio interviews are on-line.

Here’s a link to the first – my interview Wednesday night on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show on the latest phase in President Trump’s China trade policy.

And here’s a link to the second – an interview early this morning on Breitbart News Daily on Sirius XM Patriot radio on those possible new Trump auto tariffs and their impact on the effort to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Moreover, the video is now on-line of my Wednesday appearance on a Voice of America Chinese-language TV show, during which I tried to explain the Trump China policies to a Chinese audience. My English-language remarks are almost impossible to hear beneath the translator’s voice, but I thought some of you might get a kick out of this segment anyway. Click here to see it.

In addition, I was interviewed later this morning on the new North Korea nuclear crisis developments – including the on-again Trump-Kim Jong Un summit? – on the Ray Horner Morning Show on Akron, Ohio’s WAKR-AM. Unfortunately, WAKR doesn’t post many podcasts.

Even so, keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Deepening Mystery of Trump’s NAFTA Strategy

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autos, Canada, light trucks, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, Nick Carey, North American Free Trade Agreement, Reuters, ROO, rules of origin, tariffs, Trade, Trump, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Trump administration’s approach to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) keeps getting murkier. And although I agree that keeping the other parties to a negotiation off balance from time to time, and holding cards close to one’s vest, can be excellent tactics, the latest apparent twist in American policy doesn’t appear to be explained by such considerations.

Let’s start with the excellent insight contained in a Reuters article today about one of the centerpieces of NAFTA reform identified by the administration – the rules of origin (ROO) for autos and other light-duty passenger vehicles. These treaty provisions have been rightly targeted by Team Trump negotiators from the standpoint of U.S. interests because motor vehicles and parts comprise such a large percentage of the goods exchanged throughout North America, and because since NAFTA went into effect, contrary to its supporters’ promises, the American automotive sector has become less, not more globally competitive.

The NAFTA ROO are ostensibly aimed at encouraging automotive manufacturing inside North America and currently require that 62.5 percent of a vehicle’s value come from within the free trade zone in order to be exempted from tariffs. The administration’s response is widely described as a toughening of these rules because it would raise this threshold to 75 percent.

But there’s always been one huge catch that I’ve been tweeting about consistently: Unless the tariff penalty imposed on vehicle and parts-makers outside North America is greatly increased, boosting the duty-free content threshold will have little impact on these companies’ production and employment decisions. The reason? The current NAFTA external tariff on these products is only 2.5 percent. (Just FYI, this point was first made during the original NAFTA debate, in this Economic Strategy Institute study to which I contributed modestly.)

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: As Beijing Talks Begin, Lower March U.S. China Trade Deficit Reported – But the Drop Looks Seasonal

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Canada, Census Bureau, China, EU, European Union, exports, high tech goods trade, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing trade deficit, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, recovery, South Korea, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The onset of top-level U.S.-China trade talks in Beijing roughly coincided with the release of the March monthly U.S. trade figures, which showed that the monthly American merchandise deficit fell to its lowest level ($25.88 billion) since the previous April ($27.63 billion). Nonetheless, this new figure was the second biggest such total for March on record, behind 2015’s $31.24 billion. In addition, the U.S. goods deficit with China is still running 15.52 percent ahead of 2017’s record yearly rate.

Partly as a result of the China improvement, the combined U.S. goods and services trade shortfall in March plunged to its lowest monthly level ($49.86 billion) since last September’s $45.30 billion. And the sequential decline of 15.22 percent was the biggest since the 17.47 percent plunge in March, 2016. March’s totals for combined U.S. exports, goods exports, and high tech goods exports were all monthly records ($208.53 billion, $140.88 billion, and $34.85 billion, respectively). The all-time high in total exports was the third monthly record in the last four months. And the sequential high tech goods gain was a new all-time best (33.95 percent) even for this volatile category.

America’s merchandise trade with Canada racked up its largest monthly surplus on record ($306.1 million), but the U.S. goods deficit with its other NAFTA trade partner, Mexico, jumped to its biggest monthly total ever ($8.05 billion). Amid trans-Atlantic wrangling over American metals tariffs, new monthly records were also set for U.S. goods exports to and imports from the European Union ($29.85 billion and $41.99 billion, respectively), while the March U.S. goods export figure for South Korea was also the best on record ($5.09 billion).

America’s huge and chronic manufacturing trade deficit rose from $73.21 billion in February to $74.53 billion in March, and stayed on course to exceed $1 trillion this year. The March figure also showed that the drag on the current economic recovery from the growth of the Made in Washington trade deficit – that portion of U.S. trade flows most heavily influenced by trade deals and other trade policy decisions – dipped from 18.37 percent in real terms in the fourth quarter of last year (or $538.38 billion in constant dollars) to 17.66 percent ($535.09 billion in constant dollars) in the first quarter of this year.

Here are selected highlights of the latest monthly (March) trade balance figures released this morning by the Census Bureau:

>As a top-level Trump administration delegation arrived in Beijing for possibly contentious trade talks with China, the Census Bureau reported that the massive American goods deficit with the PRC – whose reduction is a leading on the U.S. goal – fell in March by 11.57 percent to its lowest level ($25.87 billion) since the previous April ($27.63 billion).

>At the same time, because U.S.-China goods trade is strongly influenced by seasonal factors, it was also noteworthy that this new March total was the second highest of all time – behind only 2015’s $31.24 billion.

>In addition, even this latest improvement left the bilateral merchandise shortfall running 15.52 percent ahead of last year’s rate, which produced an annual record of $375.23 billion.

>American goods exports to China jumped by 26.27 percent sequentially in March – the biggest such increase since the 32.70 percent advance in October, 2016 – to reach $12.38 billion.

>U.S. goods imports from China fell sequentially in March for the second straight month, to $38.26 billion. That total was the lowest monthly figure since last May’s $41.80 billion.

>The monthly improvement in goods trade with China helped push the combined U.S. goods and services trade deficit down 15.22 percent sequentially, from an upwardly adjusted $57.74 billion in February to $48.96 billion. The February figure was the highest since October, 2008.

>The monthly drop, moreover, was the biggest since March, 2016’s 17.47 percent.

>U.S. total exports hit a new record in March, with the $208.53 billion figure standing 2.04 percent higher than February’s downwardly revised figure of $204.35 billion. In addition, this was the third all-time monthly total export high achieved in the last four months.

>America’s merchandise exports reached an all-time high in March as well, rising 2.37 percent from February’s downwardly revised $137.13 billion to $140.88 billion.

>Another monthly trade best: high tech goods exports. At $34.85 billion, they were 33.95 percent higher than February’s $26.02 billion. High tech goods trade numbers tend to be volatile, but this advance was the greatest on record.

>Largely as a result, the high tech goods trade deficit sank 23.04 percent on month, from $7.93 billion to $6.11 billion – the second straight post-May, 2017 low.

>High tech imports soared on month in March, too – by 20.64 percent, to $40.96 billion. That was the biggest such increase since last March’s 24.58 percent. And the total was the biggest ever for a March.

>The high tech goods deficit is running fully 33.89 percent ahead of last year’s rate – which resulted in the biggest such shortfall on record.

>U.S. merchandise trade with Canada reached its own milestone in March – the biggest monthly American surplus of all time ($306.1 million). In February, the United States ran a deficit of $404.2 million.

>American goods exports to Canada surged by 15.26 percent on month in March, to $27.10 billion. That was the highest monthly total since October, 2014’s $28.39 billion.

>U.S. goods imports from Canada rose robustly, too – by 12.04 percent, to $26.80 billion. That was their highest monthly total since June, 2015’s $27.34 billion.

>The U.S. merchandise deficit with Canada is running 44.72 percent behind last year’s rate.

>The March trade picture for America’s other NAFTA partner, Mexico, was strikingly different. The U.S. goods deficit of $8.05 billion set a new monthly record.

>U.S. merchandise exports to Mexico rose by 8.31 percent on month, to $21.91 billion (the third highest total on record). But merchandise imports climbed by 13.96 percent, to a new record $29.96 billion.

>The merchandise deficit with Mexico is running 9.01 percent ahead of last year’s pace, which at $71.06 billion was the second highest annual total ever (after 2007’s $74.80 billion).

>Amid continued feuding between the United States and the European Union (EU), America’s merchandise trade deficit with the grouping inched up by 0.82 percent on month in March, from $12.05 billion to $12.15 billion.

>Though this total was far from an all-time high, both U.S. goods exports to and imports from the EU set new monthly records in March – $29.85 billion and $41.99 billion, respectively.

>The 19.51 percent percent monthly export increase was the biggest since March, 2011’s 22.51 percent.

>America’s goods deficit with the EU is running 17.71 percent ahead of last year’s rate, which resulted in the second highest annual figure ever ($151.42 billion, with the record being 2015’s $155.66 billion).

>The U.S. merchandise trade deficit with South Korea soared by 58.61 percent on month in March, to $1.08 billion. But this total was at the low end of the recent range. Moreover, in February, the goods shortfall cratered by 65.28 percent.

>The immense and longstanding American manufacturing trade deficit 73.21 to 74.53

>More notably, American goods exports to South Korea climbed to $5.09 billion – a new all-time high. Further, the 18.53 percent sequential advance was the fastest monthly rate of increase since the previous March’s 22.04 percent.

>U.S. merchandise imports from South Korea rose even faster on month in March – by 23.96 percent, to $6.17 billion. That increase, however, followed a 12.05 percent monthly decrease, repeating a roller-coaster pattern that has been typical for the first quarter of the year.

>Nonetheless, the year-on-year shrinkage of the U.S. merchandise trade gap with South Korea has been impressive – 64.30 percent.

>Volatility has also marked the immense and longstanding U.S. manufacturing trade deficit. After sinking dramatically in February from January’s $86.62 billion (the second highest monthly total on record, following last October’s $88.98 billion), the shortfall rebounded by 1.80 percent – from $73.21 billion to $74.53 billion.

>Manufactures exports increased robustly on month, by 18.56 percent, to $10.5.35 billion. But the far greater amount of manufactures imports rose by 10.99 percent, to $179.88 billion.

>This manufacturing trade gap is now running 13.87 percent ahead of last year’s pace – which produced a record total $927.48 billion annual total.

>As a result, if current trends continue, the manufacturing trade shortfall will top $1 trillion this year.

>The March trade figures permit calculation of the drag exerted as of the first quarter of 2018 on the current American economic recovery of the growth of the Made in Washington trade deficit. This consists of the trade flows, adjusted for inflation, that are most heavily influenced by U.S. trade agreements and similar trade policy decisions – i.e., the nation’s non-oil goods trade.

>As of the fourth quarter of last year, this trade drag had reduced cumulative recovery growth by 18.37 percent, or $538.38 billion in constant dollars.

>In the first quarter of this year, the drag was lower – 17.66 percent, or $535.09 billion in constant dollars.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: February’s Big New U.S. Trade Deficit Driven by Lots of Volatile Internals

Tags

Canada, China, exports, Financial Crisis, Great Recession, high tech goods, imports, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, services, South Korea, Trade, Trade Deficits, Trump administration, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The U.S. monthly trade deficit rose for the sixth straight month in February, to its highest level ($57.79 billion) since some of the darkest days of the last financial crisis (October, 2008’s $60.19 billion). Combined U.S. goods and services exports set their third monthly record ($204.45 billion) in the last four months, but total imports (at $262.04 billion) hit their fifth straight monthly all-time high. New monthly records were also set for goods imports ($214.49 billion), services exports (for the tenth straight month, with a total of $67.27 billion) and services imports ($47.85 billion).

With U.S.-China trade tensions rising, the huge and chronic American trade shortfall with the PRC sank by 18.61 percent on month in February, but the drop was from an unusually high January figure ,and the new total ranked as the biggest February number ever ($29.26 billion). Similar volatility was on display with the U.S. deficits with other trade partners in the Trump administration’s crosshairs, including South Korea, Canada, and Mexico, as well as in manufacturing and high tech goods.

Here are selected highlights of the latest monthly (February) trade balance figures released Thursday morning by the Census Bureau:

>In the process of revealing several new all-time records and multi-year highs and lows, this morning’s U.S. trade balance report also made clear how volatile the nation’s monthly trade figures can be – including those describing the nation’s commerce with major foreign economies whose trade policies have evoked first criticism and now tariffs and threatened levees from the Trump administration.

>The combined U.S. goods and services trade deficit rose in February sequentially for the sixth straight month. The $57.59 billion total, a 1.63 percent increase from January’s upwardly adjusted $56.67 billion figure, was the biggest monthly trade shortfall since October, 2008’s $60.19 billion – when the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy pushed the global financial crisis into a dangerous new phase and ultimately helped usher in America’s worst downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

> U.S. total exports in February set their third new record in the last four months. At $204.45 billion, they were 1.74 percent greater than January’s upwardly adjusted $200.95 billion and 0.41 percent higher than the previous best of $203.61 billion, set last December.

>But U.S. total imports in February set their fifth straight monthly record. The $262.04 billion total was 1.72 percent higher than the upwardly adjusted January level of $257.61 billion – the previous record.

>The $77.01 billion February U.S. trade deficit in goods was also the biggest such total since the last recession – specifically, the $77.63 billion figure for July, 2008. Sequentially, it grew 0.39 percent from January’s upwardly adjusted $76.71 billion.

>America’s services trade remained healthily in surplus in February. But the $19.42 billion excess of exports over imports was the smallest such total since December, 2012’s $18.63 billion. Month-on-month, the services surplus sank by 3.12 percent in February from January’s upwardly adjusted $20.04 billion – the biggest such drop since last April’s 4.88 percent plunge.

>U.S. goods imports set their third record in the last four months in February. At $214.19 billion, they exceeded the January total (the previous record, which has been upwardly adjusted) of $210.86 billion by 1.58 percent.

>Services exports in February set their tenth straight monthly record, rising sequentially by 0.70 percent from an upwardly adjusted $66.80 billion to $67.27 billion.

>Services imports in February set their fourth straight monthly record, rising sequentially by 2.34 percent from a downwardly adjusted $46.76 billion to $47.85 billion. The monthly increase, moreover, was the biggest since August 2016’s 3.67 percent.

>At the same time, reportedly, the February services imports total was fueled in part by payments made by American broadcasters for the rights to televise the Seoul Winter Olympics.

>With U.S.-China trade tensions escalating, the February figures showed that the massive, chronic goods trade surplus run by China with the United States plunged by 18.61 percent sequentially, from $35.95 billion (the second highest monthly total ever) to $29.26 billion.

>The February figure was the lowest since April, 2017’s $27.63 billion, and the monthly decrease was the biggest since last February’s 26.64 percent. Yet the February figure was an all-time February high.

>U.S. goods exports in February declined by 0.30 percent, from $9.84 billion to $9.81 billion – the lowest such total since last April’s $9.84 billion.

>The much larger amount of U.S. goods imports from China sank sequentially by 14.68 percent in February, from $45.79 billion to $39.07 billion.

>The goods import decline was the biggest since last February’s 20.82 percent, and the monthly total was the lowest since April’s $37.47 billion. Yet as with the goods deficit, the new February goods import total was a new monthly record for February.

>A similar story is told by the new statistics for U.S. merchandise trade with South Korea, whose bilateral trade deal with the United States was recently renegotiated.

>America’s goods trade deficit with South Korea also shrank dramatically on month in February – by 65.28 percent, from $1.97 billion to $0.68 billion.

>The February total was the lowest since the 0.56 billion figure recorded for March, 2012 – as the trade agreement went into effect. The month-on-month plummet, moreover, was the biggest since the 70.50 percent drop in February, 2012.

>Yet the January U.S.-South Korea merchandise trade deficit was the biggest since October’s $2.51 billion.

>Still, the composition of the monthly U.S.-South Korea goods trade deficit change differed dramatically from that of the U.S.-China deficit.

>Not only did U.S. merchandise imports from South Korea fall sequentially by 12.05 percent – to $4.97 billion, the lowest such total since last February’s $4.87 billion, and the greatest monthly percentage drop since that month. U.S. merchandise exports to South Korea also jumped on month by 16.36 percent, to $4.92 billion.

>That increase was the biggest percentage-wise since last March’s 22.04 percent.

>The U.S.’ merchandise shortfall with Canada nosedived in February, too – by 89.59 percent on month, from January’s $3.70 billion to $0.38 billion.

>The total was the lowest since last September’s $0.25 billion, and the sequential drop was the steepest since May, 2016’s 95.84 percent.

>But the January deficit was the biggest since December, 2014’s $4.07 billion.

>Most of the U.S.-Canada merchandise deficit’s February monthly decrease came on the American imports side, as these purchases declined by 8.95 percent to $23.92 billion – the largest such decrease since last July’s 11.49 percent, and the lowest such total since that month’s $22.89 billion.

>But U.S. goods exports to Canada also rose on month in February – by 4.28 percent, to $23.53 billion.

>A different kind of volatility was exhibited by U.S. merchandise trade with its other North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partner, Mexico.

>The American goods trade shortfall with Mexico soared by 46.62 percent sequentially in February, to $6.06 billion. That’s the biggest such increase since the 81.73 percent of March, 2001 – nearly 17 years ago.

>Yet the $4.14 billion January U.S. merchandise deficit with Mexico was the smallest since last January’s $3.95 billion.

>U.S. goods exports to Mexico sank by 7.24 percent on month in February, to a five-month low of $20.22 billion, while goods imports from Mexico climbed by 1.35 percent, to $26.29 billion.

>Volatility in these bilateral deficits was mirrored in February by volatility in the manufacturing trade deficit. This chronic and enormous shortfall plunged sequentially by 15.48 percent, to $73.21 billion. But the January total of $86.62 billion was the second highest of all time.

>Manufacturing exports improved by 2.89 percent sequentially in February, to $88.86 billion, while imports skidded by 6.31 percent, to $162.07 billion.

>High tech goods trade displayed major ups and downs, too. In February, the shortfall cratered 30.96 percent, to $7.93 billion. That was the smallest total since last April’s $6.04 billion.

>But the $11.49 billion January gap was 14.25 percent bigger than the December figure.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: On Eve of Trump Tariffs, a Big Increase for the (January) U.S. Trade Deficit

Tags

Canada, China, European Union, exports, high tech goods trade, imports, manufacturing, merchandise trade, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, oil, South Korea, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The U.S. monthly trade deficit surged in January to its highest level ($56.6o billion) since October, 2008 ($60.19 billion) – when the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy sparked a worldwide financial and economic panic.

New all-time records were set by monthly services exports ($66.66 billion) and imports ($46.78 billion), and December results for both were revised significantly upward (0.77 percent for the former, and 2.07 percent for the latter). The trade deficit in petroleum products jumped by 116.64 percent on month in January – the biggest sequential percentage increase ever – to $7.08 billion. That total was a post-March ($8.28 billion) high.

America’s January merchandise trade deficit in goods ($76.49 billion) was a post-July, 2008 ($77.63 billion) high, while the trade gaps in manufacturing and in goods with China bounced back on month to their second highest all-time totals ($35.95 billion and $86.62 billion, respectively). Moreover, U.S. merchandise exports to China sank by their greatest percentage on month (28.05 percent) since January, 1999 (43.37 percent). Total exports fell on month (by 1.30 percent) for the first time since October, and combined goods and services imports dipped fractionally (to $257.51 billion) from the upwardly revised record set in December.

Here are selected highlights of the latest monthly (January) trade balance figures released this morning by the Census Bureau:

>The combined U.S. goods and services trade deficit rose on month in January to its biggest total ($53.91 billion) since October, 2008 ($60.19 billion) – when the world economy teetered on the brink of meltdown due to the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.

>The figure represented a 4.99 percent increase from a December figure of $53.91 billion that was revised up by an unusually large 1.49 percent.

>January saw all-time records for monthly services exports and imports. The former improved sequentially from by 0.41 percent, from $66.39 billion to $66.66 billion, while the latter grew by 0.38 percent, from $46.60 billion to $46.78 billion.

>At the same time, both services trade figures also saw major revisions in the December – both upward. The exports number was raised by 0.77 percent, and imports upgraded by an enormous 2.07 percent.

>January’s trade deficit increase was led in relative terms by the nation’s oil trade deficit – which more than doubled sequentially, from $3.27 billion to $7.08 billion. That was the highest such total since last March’s $8.28 billion.

>Partly as a result, the U.S. merchandise trade deficit widened sequentially in January by 3.79 percent, to $76.49 billion – its highest such level since July, 2008’s $77.63 billion.

>But manufacturing contributed significantly to the rise in the overall trade deficit and the merchandise shortfall as well. Its chronic trade shortfall ballooned by 14.54 percent on month to hit $86.62 billion – just shy of October’s record of $88.98 billion.

>Manufacturing exports slid by 8.99 percent sequentially in January, from $94.89 billion to $86.36 billion, while imports were off by only 0.08 percent, from $173.13 billion to $172.99 billion.

>In turn, helping to fuel this deterioration in the manufacturing trade balance was the 16.70 percent worsening of the U.S. merchandise deficit with China. The January figure of $35.93 billion was the second highest of all time, too – trailing only September, 2015’s $36.29 billion. The increase, moreover, was the biggest since May, 2016’s 19.43 percent. 

>Mainly responsible for the China trade deficit’s increase was a 28.05 percent nosedive in U.S. goods exports to the strongly growing People’s Republic. Although the decrease followed a record December export total of $13.67 billion, it was still the biggest such percentage drop since January, 1999 (43.37 percent). 

>The $9.84 billion in U.S. goods sales to China in January, moreover, was the lowest such figure since June’s $9.71 billion. 

>U.S. merchandise imports from China rose – by 2.95 percent, to $45.79 billion.

>Total goods exports were down in January by 1.30 percent (to $200.91 billion) from December’s upwardly revised $203.61 billion. The drop was the first since October.

>Total imports in January dipped only fractionally – to $257.510 billion – from December’s upwardly revised record of $257.514 billion.

>The high tech goods trade deficit rose by 14.25 percent on month in January, from $10.06 billion to $11.49 billion.

>High tech exports plunged on month by 18.11 percent to $27.46 billion – a post February, 2017 ($25.39 billion) low, and the biggest falloff since January, 2017’s 19.01 percent.

>High tech goods imports sank, too – by 10.64 percent, to $38.95 billion. That was the biggest drop since last February’s 13.31 percent.

>As the Trump administration’s efforts to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) face an uncertain future, America’s merchandise trade deficit with Canada shot up by 65.04 percent on month in January, to $3.64 billion. That’s its highest level since December, 2014 ($4.07 billion).

>Yet the U.S. goods trade shortfall with Mexico decreased by 23.03 percent – to $4.14 billion. That’s the lowest such total since last January ($3.95 billion).

>Trade tensions with the European Union (EU) seem to growing as well, due mainly to the Trump administration’s announcement of steel and aluminum tariffs. In January, however, the merchandise trade gap with the EU fell by 13.88 percent, to $13.62 billion.

>President Trump is also hoping to revamp the bilateral U.S.-South Korea trade agreement (KORUS). In January, America’s goods trade deficit with South Korea hit $1.97 billion – a 57.57 percent monthly rise. At the same time, December’s $1.25 billion goods trade gap was the smallest since December, 2016’s $1.17 billion.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Some Rare Big Media Realism on Globalization

Tags

globalization, Immigration, Jobs, Labor Department, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, Pankaj Mishra, Sarah Chaney, strikes, The New York Times Magazine, The Race to the Bottom, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, unions, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Every now and then, the Mainstream Media and the establishment conventional wisdom it parrots show some signs of approaching an understanding of how trade liberalization and globalization really work. Happily, this past week was one of those weeks.

The first of these two signs came in The New York Times Magazine, in the form of an article by Pankaj Mishra, who weirdly isn’t identified in the on-line version of the piece, but who appears to be a prominent Indian writer. Its theme: The world’s leading economies – including the United States in the first two-thirds of its history and now China – have nearly all experienced their greatest rises to prosperity and power based on policies that rejected orthodox free trade principles.

To anyone who has seriously followed the trade and globalization debate over the last quarter century, the case for this claim is anything but new. It’s been made by numerous leading scholars and other analysts. What is new is for this argument to be showcased in such a high profile media outlet. On the one hand, if this kind of information was presented to readers remotely as often as the trade and globalization conventional wisdom, American policies today might be vastly different – and the economy much sounder.

On the other, because of Donald Trump’s political success, the chances of moving U.S. trade policy onto a more realistic foundation seem higher than at any time since the 1930s. So if Mishra and The Times Magazine wind up speeding up that process to any extent, and aiding the adoption by Washington, D.C. of policies that factor in this reality, more power to them.

The second sign came in a Wall Street Journal story on findings I’d spotlighted on Friday – a Labor Department study on the virtual disappearance of major labor actions like strikes from the national economic scene. In her own report on the Labor study, Journal correspondent Sarah Chaney quoted a scholar of labor relations as noting that (in her words) “one major impediment to work stoppages…is globalization.”

To which my immediate reaction was “bingo!” – along with a sense of vindication. Way back in the late-1990s, when I was researching my book The Race to the Bottom, it became clear as can be to me that most efforts to measure globalization’s impact on the U.S. economy were missing a key point: A job doesn’t have to be either eliminated by foreign competition (whether predatory or not) or offshored for American trade policies to have affected employment or wage levels. The mere prospect of offshoring in particular, and its increased likelihood as a result of trade agreements aimed at encouraging it, would also matter, and often decisively.

Wages would be the principal victim, since workers aware that their jobs could easily be sent overseas, to lower cost locations like Mexico (via NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement) or China (through numerous trade liberalization decisions taken since the early 1990s) would hardly be aggressive in pressing for better pay either by striking or taking any similar actions.

And in the book, I cited some evidence for this proposition: A 1992 survey by The Wall Street Journal finding that “one-fourth of almost 500 American corporate executives polled admitted they were ‘very likely’ or ‘somewhat likely’ to use NAFTA as a bargaining chip to hold down wages”; and a 1996 report commissioned by NAFTA’s own Labor Secretariat finding that “more than half the firms…surveyed used threats to shut down U.S. operations as weapons to fight union-organizing drives.”

Moreover, it should be just as obvious that mass immigration creates the same kind of wage-depressing force.

The next step for the establishment and its media messengers to take is to recognize that the very national economic openness for which they have pushed means that terms like “the American labor market,” at least used conventionally, have become largely meaningless. In addition, supposed mysteries like continued wage stagnation during a long economic recovery featuring near-historic lows in the headline jobless rate aren’t so mysterious at all.

In fact, that supposed national labor market has for decades consisted both of American workers inside the country’s borders and all the other workers around the world that have been made available to employers by trade and immigration policies. So if you want a labor market truly capable to pushing wage growth back up to historical norms, no measures are more important than turning that labor market more genuinely national once again.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Banner Month and Year for Trade (Deficits)

Tags

Canada, China, exports, gross domestic product, high tech goods, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, non-oil goods trade deficit, North American Free Trade Agreement, recession, recovery, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning’s U.S. trade figures revealed numerous records and multi-year highs set for the month of December and full-year 2017, but few represented good news. The monthly overall U.S. trade deficit hit its highest level ($53.12 billion) since October, 2008 ($70.14 billion) – just as the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy plunged financial markets and the entire economy into a tailspin. On an annual basis, the combined goods and services trade shortfall was the highest ($566.03 billion) since 2008’s $708.73 billion. And its yearly increase (12.13 percent) was the greatest since 2010’s 28.89 percent. New annual records were also set for total monthly imports ($256.47 billion) and annual imports ($2.895 trillion), as well as for monthly exports ($203.35 billion). But annual exports ($2.329 trillion) fell short of 2014’s record $2.376 trillion.

America’s manufacturing trade deficit fell for the second straight month in December, to $78.24 billion. But that performance was enough to send the annual total into record territory ($927.48 billion). The U.S. goods deficit with China in December took its biggest monthly tumble (13.05 percent) since February’s 26.64 percent. The December total ($30.81 billion) also was the lowest since May’s $31.61 billion, and resulted largely from an all-time high for U.S. goods exports ($13.67 billion). Nonetheless, the $375.22 billion annual merchandise shortfall with China set a new record as both goods exports to and imports from China hit new records of $505.60 billion and $130.37 billion, respectively.

In addition, as President Trump continued to try renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the American goods deficit with Mexico increased in 2017 to $71.06 billion – its highest level since 2007’s $74.80 billion.

Another all-time high was set by the U.S. deficit in high tech goods. At $110.38 billion, it featured both record exports ($353.87 billion) but also record imports ($464.26 billion). Monthly high tech exports also entered record monthly territory in December ($33.53 billion).

The new trade figures also showed that monthly trade deficit surge helped boost the growth drag of the “Made in Washington” trade deficit to 18.47 percent during the current economic recovery. This is the shortfall in trade flows heavily influenced by U.S. trade policy, and its increase since the last recession ended has sliced $538.89 billion after inflation from the cumulative expansion of real gross domestic product.

Here are selected highlights of the latest monthly (December) and full-year 2017 trade balance figures released this morning by the Census Bureau:

>The combined U.S. goods and services trade deficit rose on month in December by 5.32 percent to hit $53.12 billion – its highest level since October, 2008 ($70.14 billion), when the bankruptcy of Wall Street investment giant Lehman Brothers sparked a dizzying tailspin in financial markets and the real economy.

>December’s shortfall helped push the annual U.S. trade deficit for 2017 to its highest yearly total ($566.03 billion) since 2008 ($708.73 billion). Moreover, the overall trade deficit’s annual increase of 12.13 percent represented its fastest growth since 2010 (28.89 percent).

>The new trade figures showed that monthly imports in December reached an all-time high of $256.47 billion – their second monthly record in a row and a 2.49 percent increase from November’s $250.24 billion.

>Last year’s total imports set a new annual record as well. At $2.895 trillion, they were 6.73 percent higher than 2016’s total and 1.02 percent greater than the previous record of $2.866 trillion set in 2014.

>December monthly overall exports were a new record, too – rising 1.77 percent sequentially to $203.35 billion.

>But 2017’s annual combined goods and services exports of $2.329 trillion, though 5.49 percent higher than the 2016 figure, were lower than the annual record of $2.376 trillion, set in 2014.

>The huge, chronic American trade deficit in manufacturing fell sequentially in December for the second straight month, with its $78.24 billion level representing a 9.23 percent improvement.

>Manufacturing exports advanced on month by 2.16 percent, from $92.88 billion to $94.89 billion, while imports sank by 3.32 percent, from $179.08 billion to $173.13 billion.

>On an annual basis, however, the manufacturing deficit set its latest record high by climbing 7.46 percent percent to $927.48 billion.

>Between 2016 and 2016, manufacturing exports advanced by 4.34 percent, but imports swelled by 5.75 percent.

>The behavior of the manufacturing-heavy American merchandise trade deficit with China mirrored that of the overall manufacturing shortfall.

>December’s $30.81 billion U.S. goods trade deficit with China was 13.05 percent lower than November’s total, a sequential decrease that was the fastest since February’s 26.64 percent. The December figure was also the lowest since May’s $31.61 billion.

>Moreover, December’s U.S. goods exports of $13.67 billion were a record – eclipsing the previous peak of $13.15 billion, set in October, 2013, by 4.20 percent.

>Nonetheless, the full-year 2017 U.S. merchandise trade shortfall with China widened by 8.13 percent on year to a new record of $375.23 billion. That figure topped the old (2015) all-time high of $367.26 billion by 2.17 percent.

>U.S. goods exports to the strongly growing Chinese economy grew by 12.75 percent in 2017 to $130.37 billion – another record, and 5.43 percent better than 2014’s former all-time best of $123.66 billion.

>U.S. goods imports from China, however, hit a new record, too. At $505.60 billion, they were up 9.29 percent on year, and topped the previous (2015) record by 4.64 percent.

>The new trade figures could reenforce President Trump’s determination to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

>As with China, the U.S. merchandise trade deficit with Mexico fell on month in December to $5.37 billion. That level was the lowest since July’s $4.92 billion, and a sequential drop of 10.14 percent from November’s levels.

>But year-on-year, this goods shortfall increased by 10.41 percent, to $71.06 billion – the highest level since 2007’s $74.80 billion.

>The goods trade deficit with Canada more than doubled on month, to $2.20 billion, and the annual total rebounded by 60.46 percent, to $17.58 billion after plunging by 28.73 percent on year in 2016, to $10.96 billion.

>The 2016 Canada goods deficit is the highest since 2014, but it’s less than half the level of that year’s $36.47 billion.

>America’s trade in high tech goods roughly duplicated this pattern, too. The monthly deficit plummeted by 36.65 percent from the record $15.63 billion in November to $10.06 billion. That monthly drop was the biggest since February’s 46.39 percent nosedive.

>This improvement stemmed from a 10.84 percent increase in exports to $33.53 billion – a new monthly record – and a five percent drop in imports from November’s record $45.88 billion to $43.59 billion.

>On an annual basis, though, the high tech goods deficit surged to a new all-time high of $110.38 billion in 2017 – up 31.93 percent on year and 11.82 percent higher than the previous record of $98.72 billion, set in 2011. The 2017 annual jump in the deficit was also the biggest since 2010’s 44.07 percent, when the current U.S. recovery was in its early stages.

>U.S. advanced technology exports rose on year in 2017 by 2.42 percent, to a record $353.87 billion, while imports increased by 8.17 percent to their own record – $464.26 billion.

>According to the new trade figures, which make fourth quarter, 2017 calculations possible, the growth drag on the U.S. economic recovery of the “Made in Washington” trade deficit worsened significantly from its third quarter levels.

>This shortfall is comprised of trade flows influenced heavily by American trade agreements and similar policies – i.e., trade in non-oil goods, where these measures have had much greater effects on imports and exports than they have in services trade and energy trade.

>As of the third quarter of 2017, the increase in this deficit since the current recovery began in mid-2009 had cut cumulative American inflation-adjusted growth by 16.36 percent, or $459.9 billion.

>The new trade figures peg this lost growth at 18.47 percent of the recovery total, or $538.89 billion.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Offshoring Lobby Snake-Oil on NAFTA

Tags

China, Cummins Inc., free trade agreements, manufacturing, Morning Trade, NAFTA, North American Free Frade Agreement, offshoring, offshoring lobby, Politico, steel, tariffs, Tom Linebarger, Trade, Trump, Vietnam, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If Tom Linebarger conducts business the way he talks about trade policy, I’d watch out for my wallet if I dealt with his company. Because recent remarks made by the Cummins Inc. Chairman and CEO about President Trump’s efforts to rewrite the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) represent an unusually brazen example of snake-oil peddling.

In an interview with Politico‘s “Morning Trade,” Linebarger, whose firm is a leading manufacturer of diesel and natural gas engines and engine components, contended (in the reporter’s words) that “Although Trump believes differently, the United States is a much less attractive place for companies to invest if NAFTA no longer exists.”

In Linebarger’s view (and his own words), even if they’re only bargaining tactics, Mr. Trump’s threats to terminate the deal are “a terrible idea” because “Investors make decisions based on what they project is going to happen and one of the challenges in posturing with something of this nature is that people will begin to change their plans.”

Continued Linebarger:

“Not only would terminating NAFTA worsen the position of the U.S., but it causes multinational companies like mine to figure what’s the best way to position yourself for a world without NAFTA, which might mean changing manufacturing locations. Mexico has 44 free trade agreements. The U.S. has free trade agreements with 20 countries. So the very best way to sell to everybody else is to be in Mexico.”

But here’s what Linebarger didn’t tell Politico. First of all, according to Cummins’ latest annual report, more than half (54 percent) of all of the company’s net sales last year went to customers in the United States. The year before, it was 56 percent. Second, one of Cummins’ senior executives for Latin America stated publicly last month that all of Cummins’ Mexico engine production is exported, and that 80 percent goes to the United States. (The rest goes to the United Kingdom.)

So if Trump terminated NAFTA, and (as he has pledged) raised tariffs on Mexico-produced goods and services high enough to make the country unprofitable as an export platform, Cummins could lose nearly all of the customers for its four Mexico factories if it failed to return that production to the United States. It would also lose a big chunk of its total worldwide customers. 

Of course, Linebarger, Cummins, and other footloose multinationals could always try to skirt those tariffs by producing for the American market in other countries.  But that strategy could only succeed if the Trump administration simply sat back and did nothing about U.S. trade with any of these countries.  And just this week, Washington served notice that it would respond to such production-shifting ploys by announcing stiff new tariffs on Chinese-made steel entering the American market from Vietnam.        

In addition, the Latin America executive made clear that, despite Linebarger’s touting of Mexico’s non-U.S. trade deals, the company has made scarcely any use of them. And continuing U.S. domination of Cummins’ Mexico exports is all the more striking given that Mexico has been able to benefit from a free trade deal with the European Union (which the United Kingdom of course will be leaving) since late 2000, and from such an agreement with Japan since mid-2005. (Incidentally, counting all the EU countries separately is the only way the number of Mexico’s free trade agreements gets anywhere close to Linebarger’s 44.)

The only conclusions that can be drawn from the numbers: Either Linebarger is a complete incompetent and has failed to use Mexico as a supply base for dozens of promising non-U.S. markets, or he recognizes that Europe, Japan, and much of the rest of the world have little interest in importing advanced manufactured goods like those made by Cummins — or at least little interest in importing them from Mexico.

But let’s not ignore an equally important conclusion made clear by this piece: If journalists don’t stop simply taking at face value the claims of Offshoring Lobby mainstays like Linebarger, Americans will never have the kind of informed debate they need on trade and their place in the global economy.