Im-Politic: Liz Cheney’s Weird New Messaging on the January 6th Hearings

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Capitol riot, conservatives, Donald Trump, election 2022, GOP, Im-Politic, January 6 committee, Liz Cheney, MAGA, midterms 2022, neoconservatives, Never Trumper, Republicans, Wyoming

With the first set of January 6^th Committee hearings on the Capitol riot on that day in 2021 coming up tonight in prime time, I just got a clue that these sessions might not be Must-See TV in terms of revealing any wide-ranging conspiracy (including Donald Trump or not) to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election illegally. The source? None other than my buddy, Liz Cheney.

To be sure, I was as surprised as anyone to learn that I’m a Close Personal Friend of the Wyoming GOP Member of Congress. After all, I’ve never come close to endorsing her long record as an enthusiastic neoconservative warmonger and leading Never Trumper. And there’s no reason to view me as the kind of Republican campaign donor who could help finance her efforts to continue representing her state in the House.

But here I am holding in my hand a “Dear Alan” letter from her dated May 21 inviting me to join her “National Campaign Team.”

The funny thing is, though, despite the role she’s actively created for herself as one of Washington’s most outspoken nemeses of the former President – to the point of earning a nod as one of two Republican members on the riot and sedition investigating panel unilaterally created by Democratic House Speaker Nancy Pelosi – her fund-raising pitch never mentioned the January 6^th Committee by name, and contained only the most glancing references to its work.

This letter – obviously sent to reach recipients just before the hearings – did say that “Putting my principles first has made me an enormous target,but I am not – and will not be – deterred. America needs leaders who are not afraid to do what’s right regardless of political fallout. I will never forget the duty that we swore to uphold: to defend the Contitution and he freedoms so many have worked so tirelessly to preserve.”

In addition, Cheney did promise to “uphold that oath at all times…not just when it is politically convenient.”

But that was it for her anti-insurrectionary work. Indeed, Cheney’s letter began with her claim that, “Since I was first elected, I’ve fought to restore America’sstrength and standing in the world, to pursue conservative solutions that stimulate job growth, to cut taxes and onerous regulations, and to expand America’s energy, mining, and agriculture industries.”

Cheney went on to “strongly oppose the massive waste and liberal priorities crammed into seemingly every bill the Democrats have put forward in the first year of the Biden administration” and called the party’s priorities not only “a radical socialist wish list” but an agenda that, by “handing our children and grandchilden something that has never happened…a weaker nation than the one left to us,” must be condemned as being as “unconscionable as it is immoral.”

And the letter was completely dominated by such themes.

Moreover, it’s clear that Cheney wasn’t simply appealing to voters in her very conservative and strongly pro-Trump state. Her letter was addressed to “ALL Republicans who believe in the Constitution and want to see our Party led in a way that actually reflects traditional conservative values and priorities.” So it’s logical to assume – especially since as a Committee member, Cheney already knows exactly what’s been discovered – that she doubts that the results of her January 6^th Committee work will greatly impress even a faction that’s long been clamoring for Trump’s scalp, and a recovery of the supremacy it’s clearly lost in right-of-center circles.

And because these Cheney-type Republicans and conservatives have generally been as virulently anti-Trump as even many Democrats (Google “The Lincoln Project”), it seems just as logical to assume that she also doubts that any hearings revelations will resonate much among the rest of the non-MAGA electorate either.

So if I’m expecting the January 6th Committee hearings to be a nothing-burger, think twice before you dismiss this perspective. After all, it seems like that’s what I’ve just heard from Liz Cheney.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Trump’s Record and the Bolton Effect

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Afghanistan, alliances, America First, Asia-Pacific, Barack Obama, China, Europe, extended deterrence, globalism, Iran, Iran deal, Iraq, Israel, Japan, John Bolton, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Kim Jong Un, Middle East, neoconservatives, North Korea, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Palestinians, Republicans, South Korea, Syria, Trump

With John Bolton now out as President Trump’s national security adviser, it’s a great time to review the Trump foreign policy record so far. My grade? Though disappointing in some important respects, it’s been pretty good. Moreover, Bolton’s departure signals that performance could improve significantly, at least from the kind of America First perspective on which Mr. Trump ran during his 2016 campaign. That’s less because of Bolton’s individual influence than because what his (clearly forced) exist tells us about the President’s relationship with the Republican Party and conservative establishment.

There’s no doubt that the Trump foreign policy record is seriously lacking in major, game-changing accomplishments. But that’s a globalist, and in my view, wholly misleading standard for judging foreign policy effectiveness. As I’ve written previously, the idea that U.S. foreign policy is most effective when it’s winning wars and creating alliances and ending crises and creating new international regimes and the like makes sense only for those completely unaware – or refusing to recognize – that its high degrees of geopolitical security and economic self-reliance greatly undercut the need for most American international activism. Much more appropriate measures of success include more passive goals like avoiding blunders, building further strength and wealth (mainly through domestic measures), and reducing vulnerabilities. (Interestingly, former President Obama, a left-of-center globalist, saltily endorsed the first objective by emphasizing – privately, to be sure – how his top foreign policy priority was “Don’t do stupid s–t.”)     

And on this score, the President can take credit for keeping campaign promises and enhancing national security. He’s resisted pressure from Bolton and other right-of-center globalists to plunge the country much more deeply militarily into the wars that have long convulsed Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, and seems determined to slash the scale of U.S. involvement in the former – after nineteen years.

He’s exposed the folly of Obama’s approach to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Although Tehran has threatening to resume several operations needed to create nuclear explosives material since Mr. Trump pulled the United States out of the previous administration’s multilateral Iran deal, it’s entirely possible that the agreement contained enough loopholes to permit such progress anyway. Moreover, the President’s new sanctions, their devastating impact on Iran’s economy, and the inability of the other signatories of Obama’s multilateral Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to circumvent them have both debunked the former President’s assumption that the United States lacked the unilateral power to punish Iran severely for its nuclear program and ambitions, and deprived Tehran of valuable resources for causing other forms of trouble throughout the Middle East.

Mr. Trump taught most of the rest of the world another valuable lesson about the Middle East when he not only recognized the contested city of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, but actually moved the U.S. Embassy there. For decades, American presidential contenders from both parties had promised to endorse what many of Israel’s supporters called its sovereign right to choose its own capital, but ultimately backed down in the face of warnings that opinion throughout the Arab world would be explosively inflamed, that American influence in the Middle East would be destroyed, and U.S. allies in the region and around the world antagonized and even fatally alienated.

But because the President recognized how sadly outdated this conventional wisdom had become (for reasons I first explained here), he defied the Cassandras, and valuably spotlighted how utterly powerless and friendless that Palestinians had become. That they’re no closer to signing a peace agreement with Israel hardly reflects an American diplomatic failure. It simply reveals how delusional they and especially their leaders remain.

Nonetheless, Mr. Trump’s Middle East strategy does deserve criticism on one critical ground: missing an opportunity. That is, even though he’s overcome much Congressional and even judicial opposition and made some progress on strengthening American border security, he’s shown no sign of recognizing the vital America First-type insight holding that the nation’s best hope for preventing terrorist attacks emanating from the Middle East is not “fighting them over there” – that is, ever more engagement with a terminally dysfunctional region bound to spawn new violent extremist groups as fast as they can be crushed militarily. Instead, the best hope continues to be preventing the terrorists from coming “over here” – by redoubling border security.

The Trump record on North Korea is less impressive – but not solely or even partly because even after two summits with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, no progress has been made toward eliminating the North’s nuclear weapons or even dismantling the research program that’s created them, or toward objectives such as signing a formal peace treaty to end the Korean War formally that allegedly would pave the way for a nuclear deal. (Incidentally, I’m willing to grant that the peninsula is quieter today in terms of major – meaning long-range – North Korean weapons tests than when the President took office – and that ain’t beanbag.)

Still, the main – and decisive – Trump failure entails refusing to act on his declared instincts (during his presidential campaign) and bolstering American security against nuclear attack from North Korea by withdrawing from the peninsula the tens of thousands of U.S. troops who served as a “tripwire” force. As I’ve explained previously, this globalist strategy aimed at deterring North Korean aggression in the first place by leaving an American president no choice except nuclear weapons use to save American servicemen and women from annihilation by superior North Korean forces.

But although this approach could confidently be counted on to cow the North before Pyongyang developed nuclear weapons of its own capable of striking the United States, and therefore arguably made strategic sense, now that the North has such capabilities or is frighteningly close, such “extended deterrence” is a recipe for exposing major American cities to nuclear devastation. And if that situation isn’t inexcusable enough, the United States is playing such a dominant role in South Korea’s defense largely because the South has failed to field sufficient forces of its own, even though its wealthier and more technologically advanced than the North by orders of magnitude. (Seoul’s military spending is finally rising rapidly, though – surely due at least in part to Trump pressure.) 

Nonetheless, far from taking an America First approach and letting its entirely capable Asian allies defend themselves and incentivizing them plus the Chinese and Russians to deal as they see fit with North Korean nuclear ambitions that are most threatening to these locals, the President seems to be happy to continue allowing the United States to take the diplomatic lead, bear much heavier defense spending burdens than necessary, and incurring wholly needless nuclear risk. Even worse, his strategy toward Russia and America’s European allies suffers the exact same weakness – at best.

Finally (for now), the President has bolstered national security by taken urgently needed steps to fight the Chinese trade and tech predation that has gutted so much of the American economy’s productive sectors that undergird its military power, and that his predecessors either actively encouraged, coddled, or ignored – thereby helping China greatly increase its own strength.

In this vein, it’s important to underscore that these national security concerns of mine don’t stem from a belief that China must be contained militarily in the Asia-Pacific region, or globally, as many globalists-turned-China economic hawks are maintaining. Of course, as long as the United States remains committed to at least counterbalancing China in this part of the world, it’s nothing less than insane to persist in policies that help Beijing keep building the capabilities that American soldiers, sailors, and airmen may one day need to fight.

I’ll be writing more about this shortly, but my main national security concerns reflect my belief that a world in which China has taken the military and especially technological need may not directly threaten U.S. security. But it will surely be a world in which America will become far less able to defend its interest in keeping the Western Hemisphere free of excessive foreign influence, a la the Monroe Doctrine, and in which American national finances and living standards will erode alarmingly.

The question remains, however, of whether a Bolton-less administration’s foreign policy will tilt significantly further toward America First-ism. President Trump remains mercurial enough to make any such forecasting hazardous. And even if he wasn’t, strategic transitions can be so disruptive, and create such short-term costs and even risks, that they’re bound to take place more unevenly than bloggers and think tankers and other scribblers would like to see.

But I see a case for modest optimism: Just as the end of Trump-Russia scandal-mongering and consequent impeachment threat has greatly reduced the President’s need to court the orthodox Republicans and overall conservative community that remain so influential in and with Congress in particular, and throw them some big bones on domestic policy (e.g., prioritizing cutting taxes and ending Obamacare), it’s greatly reduced his need to cater to the legacy Republicans and conservatives on foreign policy.

Not that Mr. Trump has shown many signs of shifting his domestic priorities yet. But I’m still hoping that he learns the (screamingly obvious) lessons of the Republicans’ 2018 midterms losses (e.g., don’t try to take an entitlement like Obamacare away from Americans until you’re sure you can replace it with something better; don’t endorse racist sexual predators like Alabama Republican Senatorial candidate Roy Moore simply for partisan reasons). It’s still entirely possible that the growing dangers of his remaining globalist policies will start teaching the President similar lessons on the foreign policy front.

Im-Politic: What Trump Can Learn from the Weekly Standard’s Woes

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Daniel McCarthy, Im-Politic, Mainstream Media, neoconservatives, The American Conservative, Trump, Weekly Standard

To many readers, Daniel McCarthy’s excellent new article in the Spectator USA about the likely demise of the Weekly Standard magazine will be most interesting for his thoughts on what this apparently impending event says about how best to keep alive non-mass market political publications. After all, McCarthy edits another such publication: The American Conservative.

To me, his piece is most interesting for another reason: It briefly points to how President Trump can marginalize a Mainstream Media that has worrisomely transformed itself from an essential watchdog for democracy into an unapologetic defender of a failed bipartisan political establishment – and in a much more effective way than by hurling insults on Twitter or at political rallies. And it’s no coincidence that the relevant McCarthy observation supports some suggestions I’ve made along these lines. (See, e.g., here.) 

McCarthy is surely on target when he contends that the Weekly Standard chose the wrong business model – and especially the wrong business model for losing money (which he rightly notes is a feature of virtually all political magazines). And since a healthy democracy depends on the survival of a critical mass of such publications, his advice – stemming from years of experience in the field – seems well worth heeding.

But the following McCarthy passage matters much more now when it comes to Mr. Trump’s conflict with the Mainstream Media – which of course is largely self-serving, but which nonetheless has the potential, if conducted wisely and shrewdly, to push these news organizations into behaving more constructively:

“The Weekly Standard provided prestige and access to political leaders, especially Republicans.

“The Weekly Standard’s value lay in the fact that it was an insider magazine. It was a top-down product — there was never an independent mass audience clamoring for a second National Review or for a specifically neoconservative publication. (Commentary, as a monthly, already served that market as far as demand could justify.) What was important was that the magazine be read not by a mass market but by Republican officials and their staff and various other influential persons, primarily in Washington, D.C. If officialdom read the Weekly Standard, then it was worth continuing to spend millions on it. In business terms as well as ideologically and literarily, the Weekly Standard had a lot in common with the New Republic, which for decades was dependent upon Marty Peretz’s singular financial support as owner of a magazine that touted itself during the Clinton years as the ‘inflight magazine of Air Force One.’”

Although McCarthy doesn’t make this point explicitly, it captures what’s truly essential about the above analysis: The power and influence of the Standard and the rest of the Mainstream Media – and in the case of smallish political magazines, their ability to attract angel funders – depends on their access to leading political figures, and in particular, on enjoying such close access that their audiences can depend on them to reveal the so-called real inside story of big political and policy decisions.

To accomplish this goal, writers and editors from these organizations need (credibly) to make clear that they’re regularly welcomed into the confidences of bigwigs right on up to the presidency, specifically at chummy off-the-record or on-background lunches and dinners and other such get-togethers that advance the interests of each kind of participant. In addition to turning the favored journalists into must-follows for the political- and policy-minded (and into power-brokers of sorts themselves), these gatherings enable the hosts to make key points or send key messages (often about potentially controversial plans or proposals) to the public at large through sympathetic conduits. In the process, politicians can avoid being held accountable for the content of these messages if they backfire or fall flat.

It’s clear that Mr. Trump hasn’t treated Weekly Standard, or many other – if any – Mainstream Media figures like political intimates. And since it represents a neoconservative school of thought that has never enjoyed any notable popular following, the magazine’s obvious loss of insider status has undoubtedly contributed to its weakening viability under the current administration.

But as I’ve written (see, e.g., the post linked above), the President keeps giving exclusive interviews to other major news organizations – including to the most hostile – which inevitably enhances or sustains their prestige. On the one hand, it’s clear that, as widely observed, Mr. Trump is engaging with the Mainstream Media in the belief that any publicity is good publicity – and likely due to his own (arguably well founded) confidence that he always prevails politically whenever these encounters turn testy. (Think “Jim Acosta“.) On the other, this approach certainly hasn’t made the Mainstream Media pay any significant, much less prohibitive, price for propagating Fake News and too often flagrantly exhibiting bias.

As a result, the establishment press has little incentive to report more responsibly. And ultimately, by continuing to act as if there’s no adequate alternative to the increasingly fallen Washington- and New York-based press corps for his own communications purposes, and for serving larger national purposes, Mr. Trump is squandering a major opportunity for all Americans – even Never Trump-ers – along with a chance to undermine influential enemies and expand his base.

Im-Politic: Enough with the Neocons Already

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American Enterprise Institute, Cato Institute, chattering class, Eric Levitz, Im-Politic, journalism, libertarians, media, neoconservatives, New York magazine, think tanks, Trump

Boy, am I glad I read Eric Levitz’ recent piece in New York magazine all the way through! Not that the author sprung any pleasant surprises on me. Based on the headline, I was expecting just another example of arrogant, intolerant liberalism, and Levitz’ certainly didn’t disappoint in this respect. His main argument: that major liberally oriented opinion publications and op-ed pages should no longer seek left-right ideological and political balance nowadays because the only American conservatism in the age of Donald Trump that has any influence is yahoo-ism in various forms. Instead, these liberal referees of the national political debate generally should keep their forums open almost exclusively to voices from more responsible and rational the left of center.

But within this laughably tendentious claim is a point that’s entirely valid, and that in fact has been bugging me for many years. It concerns the – long-time – practice of either liberal or even nominally neutral opinion forums (i.e., most of the national media) for publishing viewpoints, from whatever perspective, that obviously have no notable constituencies outside the bounds of the interlocking and increasingly hidebound ranks of America’s chattering class elites.

And in my mind, the viewpoint that sticks out more than any other in this respect is neoconservatism. This branch of conservatism began as an interesting hybrid of (a) the kind of Big Government-oriented liberalism that since the New Deal era has dominated the views of Democrats on domestic issues, and (b) the kind of aggressive anti-communism and, more recently, broader global activism that many Democrats have rejected since the Vietnam War began going bad. In addition, much neoconservatism was animated by what its pioneers considered the Democrats’ abandonment of the goal of racial integration in favor of various programs of racial preferences and forms of racial pandering.

As documented in this insightful article by Michael J. Lind of the New America Foundation, the neoconservatives steadily became more conventionally conservative on domestic issues – including a strong enthusiasm for standard free trade policies and mass immigration. But something that still hasn’t changed has been their stunning talent for attracting media attention – a record that genuinely qualifies as stunning because there’s never been a shred of evidence that neoconservatives have any significant following among the general public.

Of course there are many Americans who support the low-tax, small-government positions now taken by neoconservatives these days. There are many fewer who support their brand of foreign policy activism, but at least this position hasn’t completely disappeared from the electorate. Yet have you encountered many friends, neighbors, and relatives who believe in slashing federal spending and shrinking the national tax base on the one hand; sending American troops to the furthest, least important corners of the world to nation-build, spread democracy, fight extremism etc on the other; and opening the national doors wide open to imports from places like China and immigrants the world over? In fact, have you ever met anyone fitting this description?

Just as important (and not unrelated), can you identify many national politicians or office-seekers who embody this set of views? After Republican Senators John McCain and Jeff Flake of Arizona (the former of course afflicted with aggressive brain cancer and the latter deciding to leave office before suffering certain defeat in his state’s Republican primary), and their South Carolina GOP colleague Lindsey Graham?

Until recently, you could have added Florida Republican Senator Marco Rubio to this short list, but in recent months, he’s definitely been reading the handwriting on the wall. Just look at his new stances on confronting China both militarily and economically, and complaining about important aspects of the latest tax cuts passed by Congress.

All the same, however, the neoconservative presence in the national media remains impressive. Writers from neoconservative publications like The Wall Street Journal, The Weekly Standard, and Commentary appear constantly on the nation’s talk shows, and they’re frequently joined by neoconservative colleagues from less doctrinaire publications and from think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute. Maybe most revealing, when the proudly mainstream liberal New York Times chose the latest columnist to add to its roster of regulars, it picked card-carrying neoconservative Bret Stephens – a Wall Street Journal alum.

Now it’s true that President Trump, who generally is loathed by neoconservatives, has chosen two of their leading lights as major foreign policy aides – John R. Bolton to serve as his White House national security adviser, and former Kansas Republican Congressman Mike Pompeo to serve as his Secretary of States (after a year of running the CIA). And some important Trump foreign policies look awfully neocon-y, most prominently his approach to countering the influence of ISIS-like terrorists and the Iranian government in the Middle East (combined so far with a loudly stated aversion to massive American boots on the ground). But Trump as a neoconservative-in-the-making? Talk about a wildly premature judgment at best.

So why is the mainstream media still so enamored with neoconservatives? Four main reasons. First, many are still strongly anti-Trump, so featuring them on the air, on-line, and in print enables Trump-hating news organizations to pretend that most opposition to the President remains bipartisan. Second, the United States was governed by a largely neoconservative administration as recently as 2008. And since former this-es and that-s are so skilled at finding post-government careers in Washington, neoconservatives make up an abundant supply of voices with governing experience on which journalists can rely for right-of-center analyses. Third, neoconservatives are still so easy to find in Washington (and secondarily in New York City) largely because although this faction has almost no grassroots, it’s generously funded. So think tank perches and related jobs (including a wide variety of non-tenure university appointments) in the two cities tend to be readily available for individual neoconservatives, and their publications tend to be at least adequately funded.

Fourth, precisely because neoconservatives have been so numerous in the nation’s two main media centers for so long, they’ve become thoroughly familiar to the media. In addition to their widespread and easy availability to newsmen and women as sources of information and analysis, neoconservatives can socialize routinely with their journalistic counterparts. Not only is there no shortage of conferences and receptions at which these segments of the chattering class can socialize (many of which are sponsored by neoconservative or neoconservative-leaning organizations). But neoconservatives (along with other think tankers and the like) and journalists tend to live in the same small group of affluent neighborhoods and send their children to the same first-rate public schools and exclusive private academies.

And as is common with people who hang out a lot together, neoconservatives (and other think tankers) and journalists often become very chummy. The more so if they’re college buddies, or went to the same school, and took the same kinds of courses from the same kinds of professors. The latter of course increases the odds of media types finding themselves in broad agreement with the neoconservatives, and thus regarding these figures as doubly appealing.

New York‘s Levitz argues that conservatives generally shouldn’t be shut out of the news media entirely – and decidedly deserve to appear if they have something new and/or especially interesting to say. I believe the same about neoconservatives. But no doubt largely because these thinkers have had such easy access to the mainstream media, and enjoyed all the associated glistening economic and status prizes, they’ve had little incentive to change their fundamental tune, and surmount this hurdle. So given their predictability and lack of influence, maybe news organizations could at least dial down the overexposure?

Incidentally, for the same reasons, I’d favor treating libertarians the same way. Their funding is impressive, indeed lavish. (Doubt me? Check out the Cato Institute‘s Washington, D.C. headquarters sometime, along with its wide-ranging agenda of conference and similar events). But where are their grassroots? In particular, which noteworthy portions of the electorate share their enthusiasm for unilaterally opening America’s markets no matter how protectionist trade rivals remain, erasing U.S. borders and requiring American workers to compete against an immense new influx of very low-wage foreign counterparts even for high-skill jobs, trusting the private sector (including Wall Street) to regulate itself, and eliminating the major entitlement programs? Even individually, these stances command precious little popular support. Taken together, they comprise a modest minority. That’s surely why Americans have elected exactly zero libertarians as President, and why even Republicans have resoundingly rejected them in presidential primaries even well before the Trump phenomenon appeared. Moreover, read libertarian writings on any of the above issues from decades ago, and you won’t see much difference in terms of their analytic framework with libertarian writings today.

Of course, simply ostracizing neoconservatives, or neoconservatives plus libertarians, from major opinion forums, or at least sharply limiting their presence, would leave the national political debate nearly as narrow, and phony, as following a Levitz-type approach. So what the media referees need to do is work much harder to find contributors who represent not only reasonably coherent emerging schools of thought (like populism’s conservative and liberal variants) but who are trying to turn American politics less rigidly formulaic and exploring various combinations of positions that have never, or not recently, been combined before, along with those who are seeking wholly new answers to pressing national questions.  Moreover, it should go without saying, important new factual findings should always be welcome, no matter how they cut politically.

The op-ed editors and talk show hosts will face a formidable challenge in achieving this goal. After all, success would require exercising judgment, rather than flipping through their familiar (electronic rolodexes). But success is urgently needed – for it would mean a national opinion universe that looks much less like the tiny, inbred communities in which they’re embedded, and much more like America.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: An Asia Grand Strategy that Still Looks Like America Last

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Asia, Barack Obama, China, Defense Department, export controls, John McCain, military spending, neoconservatives, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, pivot, technology transfer, The Wall Street Journal, Trump

It looks like the Trump administration is going All Neocon on its Asia grand strategy. Or is it All Obama? Interestingly, both approaches have shared the same main features, and depressingly, both are dangerously incoherent and disturbingly resemble the course that Mr. Trump apparently has chosen to follow. .

The essence of neoconservative strategy in Asia consists of bloviating about the risks to America’s national security from China in particular, pushing for a stronger American military response, and with equal vigor backing economic policies that inevitably boost China’s military strength. And the quintessential example is Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona.

McCain has voted for his entire career in favor of the U.S. trade policy decisions that have enabled China to amass literally trillions of dollars worth of trade surpluses with the United States, and therefore finance an enormous military buildup that he himself has warned directly threatens American interests in Asia. He’s periodically voiced concerns about the lax U.S. export controls that have enabled China to secure some of America’s best defense-related technology. But he’s never sponsored any steps capable of solving this problem.

What McCain has focused on has been boosting military spending and stationing more of these forces, in large part to counter burgeoning Chinese ambitions. And recent Trump administration moves make clear that the president and his top advisers have been listening. As The Wall Street Journal reported earlier this month:

“The Pentagon has endorsed a plan to invest nearly $8 billion to bulk up the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region over the next five years by upgrading military infrastructure, conducting additional exercises and deploying more forces and ships….The proposal, dubbed the Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative, was first floated by Sen. John McCain (R., Ariz.) and has been embraced by other lawmakers and, in principle, by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and the head of U.S. Pacific Command, Adm. Harry Harris. Proponents haven’t developed details of the $7.5 billion plan.”

The Journal account goes on to remind readers that the Obama administration had pursued its own military “pivot” to Asia, but that it was “disparaged by critics as thin on resources and military muscle.” And of course, the former president refused to respond effectively to China’s predatory trade practices, and only very late in his second term began rethinking flood of advanced defense-related knowhow to the PRC.

President Trump has of course spoken repeatedly of acting forcefully to overhaul America’s China trade policies. But his administration’s actions so far have fallen far short of this mark.

The mind-blowing upshot: In a military conflict with China, the United States forces could find themselves fighting against, and taking casualties from, Chinese units and weapons that have been paid for and researched by their enemy. Is that the kind of first so many Americans voted for?

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Send in the Clowns

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2016 election, alliances, Bernie Sanders, China, Cold War, Donald Trump, economics, foreign policy establishment, free-riding, George W. Bush, Hillary Clinton, Iraq war, ISIS, Middle East, NATO, neoconservatives, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Republicans, Russia, special interests, think tanks, Trade

You don’t need to have any regard for Donald Trump to appreciate the black humor of Washington’s Republican foreign policy establishment (or at least lots of it) launching a campaign to brand him an incompetent and a menace in international affairs.

Last Wednesday, about 100 “GOP national security leaders” released a letter they signed stating their “core objections” to the possibility that the Republican front-runner will win the White House. The first reaction that any reasonable person should have is “If these are the leaders, who are the followers?” I worked professionally in the foreign policy field for decades and still keep up with it actively. And many of the signatories are completely unknown even to me. Apparently even a glorified briefcase carrier for a fourth-level political appointee in George W. Bush’s administration qualifies.

The second reaction is much more obvious: Many come from the Republican party’s neoconservative wing. Based on its record, their credibility has fallen how deeply into the toilet? Nor is this question based solely on the second Iraq war. After all, I personally favored the effort to overthrow Saddam Hussein, and still believe that the invasion was justified – though of course the occupation was a (largely foreseeable disaster). But these ostensible experts and intellectuals have failed on numerous other major grounds as well.

As made clear by their indictment of Trump, their ranks include champions of the laudable but transparently looney idea that the United States can and should spend considerable amounts of time and effort spreading democracy to and engaging in nation-building in regions and countries (like Iraq) that have no tradition of accountable government and no experience with un-coerced cohesion. More recently, they’ve propounded the equally nutty notion that Middle Eastern countries can be turned into an effective anti-ISIS force that will handle most of the ground fighting to boot.

They’ve long supported U.S. trade and international economic policies whose effects have included enriching increasingly belligerent China and showering it with advanced, defense-related technologies. For nearly as long they’ve favored the expansion of the NATO alliance right up to Russia proper’s borders – which can’t have helped improve relations between Washington and Moscow over the last decade. In fact, even decades after the Cold War ended, they have remained tightly wed to U.S. defense commitments to flagrantly free-riding allies – which also often rip off Americans shamelessly on trade and other fronts. In fact, they have never displayed the slightest genuine inkling that domestic economic strength is the key to any successful American foreign policy strategy, however interventionist or restrained.

But there are two more fundamental problems with these figures, along with the non-neocons among them, that have translated directly into weaknesses and blunders that have plagued American diplomacy since the early post-World War II years. And please keep in mind: Many of these conclusions come straight from my first-hand experience working closely with these folks during my four-year stint as Associate Editor of FOREIGN POLICY magazine.

First, unlike the original Cold War U.S. foreign policymakers – who were certainly not beyond legitimate criticism – most of the current crowd lacks any meaningful experience in the private sector. Its members have never built or even run viable businesses, or invented anything worthwhile. As a result, they have never been judged by standards like successes that create tangible, enduring rewards and widespread benefits, or failures that exact painful, lasting costs.

Instead, most have brought themselves to the attention of decision-makers by rising through the ranks of academe or, worse, its ersatz Washington version – the think tank world. And the skills needed to stand out in these realms – turning a neat phrase or fashioning a catchy soundbite, identifying and courting prospective patrons, manipulating an all-too-gullible national media, and perhaps most important, creatively regurgitating stale dogma that promotes special interests – have nothing to do with keeping the nation as a whole secure and prosperous. They’re entirely about personal advancement in what I’ve called a Washington culture that coddles failure.

In other words, these figures are overwhelmingly foreign policy careerists. And since their working experiences as a rule have been so tightly confined to the bubble worlds of the Beltway or college campuses, they have almost never needed to encounter the obstacles continually erected by stubborn reality to the best laid plans of mice and men. Which is why they typically lack the wisdom and judgment best guaranteed to navigate them.

Not surprisingly, then, these 20^th and 21^st century version of renaissance courtiers deserve credit for no meaningful achievements whatever. Indeed, the degree of safety and prosperity that the nation has enjoyed during their tenures has been due almost entirely to the wealth and power it has amassed over the centuries, along with the inherent security created by favorable geography. If today’s foreign policy establishment can be said to have accomplished anything, it’s taking practically any opportunity available to squander the nation’s built-in advantages.

Not that I want to leave readers with the impression that out-of-control careerism is confined to the Republican wing of the foreign policy establishment. Its Democratic wing has been at least as unimpressive. And you can be sure you’ll be hearing from it if Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders starts posing a greater threat to Hillary Clinton’s presidential hopes.

Im-Politic: Cruz on Foreign Policy Could be Both a Lot Worse & Lot Better

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China, Cold War, conservatives, Cuba, democracy, Donald Trump, foreign direct investment, Im-Politic, interventionism, isolationism, John Quincy Adams, morality and foreign policy, nation-building, neoconservatives, Republicans, Ronald Reagan, Soviet Union, Ted Cruz

Difficult as it is to remember sometimes, there are still candidates vying for the Republican presidential nomination other than Donald Trump. For example, there’s Senator Ted Cruz, who in fact has established himself as the runner up in most national polls so far and the leader in Iowa, whose caucuses kick off Campaign 2016’s actual voting.

I’m no Cruz-an, but I’m grateful to economic and security commentator Nevin Gussack for calling my attention to an April interview given to The Daily Caller by the freshman legislator. It shows that Cruz has some sensible instincts when it comes to an overall American approach to world affairs, but that he has a lot to learn about China.

In other contexts, Cruz’ claim that he’s neither a  “full neocon” nor a “libertarian isolationist.” in his strategic leanings could legitimately be dismissed as cynical, Clintonian triangulation. Unfortunately, both American foreign policy and the commentary it’s generated have so typically tended to view the nation’s world role in terms of starkly and foolishly dichotomous choices (like “interventionism” versus “isolationism”) that Cruz’ apparent attempt to stake out a middle ground decidedly encouraging.

In fact, though he cited former President Ronald Reagan as a role model, Cruz actually sounded more like John Quincy Adams, who served not only as president himself but as Secretary of State. In 1821, he famously articulated this definition of the U.S. purpose in world affairs:

“Wherever the standard of freedom and Independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will [America’s] heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. She will commend the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy of her example. She well knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication….” [The rest is very much worth reading, too, but this section suffices for this post’s theme.]

It sounds an awful lot like the Caller‘s account of a “Cruz Doctrine”:

“‘I believe America should be a clarion voice for freedom. The bully pulpit of the American president has enormous potency,’ he [said], before praising former President Ronald Reagan for changing the ‘arc of history’ by demanding Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev tear down the Berlin Wall and lambasting President Barack Obama for not sufficiently standing on the side of freedom during Iran’s 2009 Green Revolution.

“But, Cruz noted, speaking out for freedom ‘is qualitatively different from saying U.S. military forces should intervene to force democracy on foreign lands.’”

I’m not sure I’m with Cruz on Reagan rhetoric bringing down that “Evil Empire.” But for all my hesitancy about the place of moral considerations in American diplomacy, I have no problem with a president speaking out on such questions, provided he or she doesn’t create unjustified foreign expectations about American actions, or provoke dangerous responses. It’s also, after all, entirely conceivable that such statements can do some good.

Even better, like Adams, Cruz is skeptical about involving the United States in protracted democracy-promotion campaigns: “It is not the job of the U.S. military to engage in nation building to turn foreign countries into democratic utopias.”

So far so good. But Cruz betrays some deep ignorance on the subject of China, and on the magnitude of the security threat it poses to America versus that of, say, Cuba. Asked why he favors normal relations with human rights abusers like China and Saudi Arabia, but not with Cuba, Cruz (whose father was born on and fled the island) replied:

“The situation with Cuba and China are qualitatively different. For one thing, in China, direct investment is allowed, where American investment can go into the country invest directly and work with the Chinese people, which is bringing economic development and is transforming China in significant ways. In Cuba, all outside investment has to go through the government. Lifting sanctions will inevitably result in billions of dollars flowing into the Castro government into its repressive machinery.

“Secondly, China or Qatar or the different countries you mentioned, none of them are 90 miles from our border.” Cuba is uniquely situated 90 miles away from the state of Florida. Cuba is a leading exporter of terrorism throughout Latin America. Cuba was recently caught smuggling arms to North Korea in the Panama Canal.”

If he wasn’t running for president, or serving as a U.S. Senator, Cruz might deserve some slack for his clearly emotional feelings about Cuba and his family. But whatever his family background, these views are ridiculous. The economic picture painted of China is flat wrong. First, the Chinese government still sets very strict conditions on incoming investment, and second, although China’s economic growth and modernization unquestionably have benefited, so has China’s military strength and technological sophistication. Even many of the world’s most historically craven panda-huggers have decided that reform in the PRC has now shifted into reverse despite all the economic and even political liberalization that they once predicted inevitably would be produced by engagement with democratic, capitalist world.

Moreover, China’s burgeoning military power wouldn’t be such a concern if its leaders had decided to keep conducting a relatively quiet, passive foreign policy. But those days clearly are long gone, as Beijing has demonstrated a strong determination to expand its territory and influence in the East Asia/Pacific region at America’s expense. Moreover, the Chinese government’s burgeoning cyber-hacking activities are only the latest signs of the dangers of allowing current economically “normal” relations – including massive technology transfer – to proceed apace. And we haven’t even gotten to the damage to the U.S. economy and therefore to its defense industrial base and potential done by China’s predatory trade policies.

No matter how close to American shores lilliputian Cuba might be, it would need to turn into a something like a huge ISIS base even to start threatening major U.S. security interests to this extent – and of course such hostile assets would be easy for American forces to flatten, or simply to embargo into helplessness.

A final worrisome note on the (obviously still embryonic) formulation of Cruz’s foreign policy ideas: Although he claims to reject “full neocon-ism,” the advisers he told The Caller he consults with are all firmly in that camp. Since the end of the Cold War, American conservatism has bred an impressive variety of schools of foreign policy thinking (unlike American liberalism). The more such resources he taps, the likelier Cruz will be to develop an international strategy that both wins votes and furthers American interests.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Why Middle East Refugee Admissions Must be Hyper-Cautious

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anti-semitism, elites, ISIS, liberals, libertarians, Marco Rubio, media, Middle East, neoconservatives, Obama, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Paris attacks, progressives, refugees, Syria, terrorism, The New York Times, World War II, xenophobia

If there are good arguments against hyper-cautious U.S. policies towards accepting Middle East refugees, I haven’t heard them yet. Instead, those urging lenient, “generous” approaches have simply supplied the latest burst of evidence that large percentages of America’s political and media elites, as well as other avowed progressives, neo-conservatives, and libertarians, have lost most of their common sense and even their instinct for self-preservation.

It’s also important to note that too many advocates of tighter restrictions for those fleeing the wars in Syria and Iraq and the Middle East’s general turmoil have taken butt-headed positions, too. (The main example – admitting only Christians.) But on balance, the restrictionists have been much more realistic than their opponents – whose ranks of course include President Obama.

I’d quote from his remarks on the subject earlier this week in Turkey but they were so narrow and shallow (focusing solely on that religious discrimination issue) that they’re easily dismissed. No better was the New York Times’ main editorial on refugees. Its writers – rightly seen as leading voices of what passes for American liberalism these days – endorsed Mr. Obama’s claim that the restrictionists were “betraying” American values. But they also accused the restrictionists (without naming them) of “confusing refugees with terrorists” and of “absurdly” portraying Muslims as “inherently dangerous,” thereby running the risk of validating terrorist propaganda about the Western world’s implacable hostility.

Most revealingly, it handled the crucial issue of vetting refugees streaming in large numbers from lands completely convulsed by chaos simply by scoffing at Republican presidential candidate Marco Rubio’s concern that “you can have 1,000 people come in and 999 of them are just poor people fleeing oppression and violence, but one of them is an ISIS fighter.” Surely, The Times contended, “America can offer a smarter and more generous response.” But it seems that presenting specific recommendations would have meant exceeding space limits, since none were mentioned.

My perusal of the Mainstream and social media has turned up several prominent arguments for leniency that at least make a nod toward history and logic – but only in the most superficial and tendentious ways.

For example, one supposed “Aha!” point made by the lenience backers consists of citing polls from the 1930s indicating strong U.S. public opposition to admitting (often Jewish) refugees fleeing the Nazi-fication of Germany and outbreaks of similar persecution elsewhere in central and eastern Europe. Those past restrictionists unmistakably were motivated by anti-semitism and broader xenophobia. Therefore, imply the modern refugees’ avowed champions, so are today’s restrictionists.

But was the world of the 1930s threatened by anti-American Jewish- or other European-dominated terrorist groups? That’s news to me. One Facebook friend noted that (at least two) German spies had made it to the United Kingdom in December, 1940 disguised as refugees, suggesting that this kind of danger did exist.

But at that time, the U.K. had been at war and fully mobilized for more than a year. Normal peacetime transport between the continent and the British Isles was non-existent, the government was closely guarding the coast against spies and saboteurs, and whatever refugees who managed to leave (perhaps more heavily guarded) Germany, its allies, or occupied Europe, were few in number and easily identified. Indeed, the aforementioned spies came in a rowboat that was escorted to British shores by British forces. Such episodes are supposed to hold lessons for Americans today?

Others advocating for today’s refugees have noted that terrorists can also enter the United States as travelers using valid foreign or forged passports, and that threats can also come from domestic “lone wolves” and cells. All true. But are those observations supposed to demonstrate that there’s no point in vetting Middle East refugees today with the greatest care? That no vetting at all should take place? That today’s procedures should be loosened? If so, that’s tantamount to saying that since many crimes will never be prevented or solved, all law enforcement is pointless.

In fact, this kind of reasoning most plausibly buttresses the restrictionist argument. That is, it’s possible that some refugees or others in the Middle East and elsewhere who are politically inactive may be so enraged by restrictive U.S. and other Western policies that they wind up signing up with ISIS or similar groups. But the strength of these organizations makes clear that many other individuals in many countries have responded to many other terrorist recruiting pitches over many years. So why not use the greatest possible vetting prudence to at least boost the odds that dangerous extremists won’t cross American borders?

Of course, many supporters of lenience do agree that vetting is essential. Logically, this implies a confidence that the current system is satisfactory. But it’s difficult to see why this confidence is justified. It’s true that the current screening process is rigorous and protracted. It’s equally true, however, that significant numbers of Middle East refugees haven’t been admitted into the United States in the Age of ISIS. And although the United States has indeed safely admitted many such individuals previously, not until the latest round of Middle East conflicts had refugee numbers themselves reached flood-tide proportions.

Moreover, precisely because of these conflicts, today’s refugees present unusually difficult vetting challenges. As made clear even by Obama administration officials, the data needed to corroborate identity, criminal records, and other crucial details simply don’t exist or aren’t available.

Ironically, on the one hand, the detailed scrutiny refugees already receive makes clear that, under current U.S. procedures, there’s no chance of the country being flooded with large numbers any time soon. So unless these procedures are considerably eased, and/or American leaders decide to expand greatly the refugee numbers the nation has promised to take (currently “at least 10,000”), neither the threats feared by the restrictionists, nor the humanitarian relief desired by their opponents, will significantly increase any time soon.

But the ability of fewer than ten terrorists to turn Paris into a war zone for hours last week demonstrates that even overwhelming screening success may not prevent unacceptable danger. And the administration’s stated determination to bring all 10,000 Syrian refugees next year troublingly indicates a desire to expedite vetting, not reenforce it.

So anyone listening with intelligence and genuinely wanting maximum possible protection for the American people should recognize that most restrictionists are saying, “Better safe than sorry,” not urging completely closed doors. It’s also obvious that their critics don’t have a message remotely this responsible, or even coherent.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Krugman’s Ignorant Screed on War and Conquest

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"Pottery Barn Rule", aggression, conquest, Iraq, neoconservatives, oil, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Paul Krugman, Putin, Russia, sanctions, Ukraine, war

Congratulations to Paul Krugman! The latest offering from the Nobel Prize-winning economist and New York Times columnist is both ethically disgusting and historically ignorant.

The ethically disgusting elements of Krugman’s December 21 column, “Conquest is for Losers”? The charge that American neoconservatives who supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 were (and remain) a group of would-be conquerors who are typically “eager to fight” and who have viewed Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s recent aggression “with admiration and envy.” According to Krugman, “What really bothered [neoconservatives]was that Mr. Putin was living the life they’d always imagined for themselves.”

I’m a long-time critic of the neoconservatives.  Even though I supported the second Iraq war and still believe it was necessary to launch. I have repeatedly upbraided the neocons for defining America’s overseas interests far too broadly, for being excessively optimistic about exporting American values to regions to which they are completely alien, and for viewing international activism as the real measure of this nation’s worth. And because of their bloated view of what’s needed to ensure American security and prosperity, the neocons do indeed tend to overestimate the utility of military force in achieving foreign policy goals.

But that’s a far cry from qualifying as warmongers. As for the claim that the neocons support (or even “admire and envy”) Putin-like efforts to take over or politically dominate foreign countries contrary to the expressed wishes of their populations – that’s nothing less than the worst kind of smear. Unless Krugman really believes that the neocons ever wanted to turn Iraq into a U.S. satellite? Or wanted to keep large numbers of U.S. boots on the ground one moment longer than necessary? Maybe he’s forgotten that the Bush administration approach to post-Saddam Hussein Iraq was widely (and accurately) lambasted for the lack of a serious follow-on plan. Remember the so-called “Pottery Barn Rule”?

Krugman’s broader point that, nowadays, for great powers, “War makes you poorer and weaker, even if you win,” is even more obvious know-nothingism. Not to mention having the most destructive implications for U.S. foreign policy. Take his example of Putin and Ukraine. It’s eminently defensible to argue (as I have) that no major American response to this instance of Russian revanchism is needed because Ukraine’s independence has never (for good reason) been seen as a significant American security or economic interest.

But if you disagree (and it’s not clear whether Krugman does), then it matters decisively that the trouble Putin and Russia have now encountered have resulted not from Russia’s aggressive actions as such but from a combination of the Western sanctions response and an oil price drop that was predicted by almost no one. For those believing in the importance of Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity (and the security of Russia’s other threatened neighbors), simply counting on the costs of Putin’s aggression either to produce rollback or adequate containment is the height of recklessness. Unless Krugman thinks that oil prices will remain this low forever?

Krugman is also utterly mistaken in suggesting that Putin’s moves reflect a desire for “tribute” (the author’s words) or any other type of economic gain. Instead, Moscow is clearly motivated mainly by security considerations – specifically, a determination to keep western influence, and NATO forces, out of Ukraine and certain other neighbors. So far, he’s succeeded. In theory, Putin could at some point determine that whatever costs he’s paying to control Ukraine (and it’s not entirely clear what they are) have become high enough to require reversing course. But even that turn of events is likelier to stem ultimately from setbacks on fundamentally separate fronts that reflect Russia’s built-in economic weaknesses.

Like everyone, Krugman has every right to speak out on issues outside his core competence of economics. But his latest column once again makes me wish that he paid more attention to one of the central theories of that field – comparative advantage – and left the foreign policy commentary to people who actually know what they’re talking about.  In the process, he could do his bit to keep our national debate on these matters out of the gutter.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: One of the Neocons’ Biggest Cons

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big government, neoconservatives, Obama, Our So-Called Foreign Policy

As long as Americans remember the Iraq blunders they fostered, neoconservatives and the foreign policy positions they champion aren’t likely to regain decisive influence any time soon. But they continue to mesmerize the nation’s mainstream media, which keep awarding them plum pundit-izing platforms and outsized amounts of space.

That’s why we all owe such a debt to former Wall Street Journal columnist George Melloan’s recent essay attacking President Obama’s foreign record these days. Melloan makes all the by-now-standard charges that the President’s hesitancy, and his supposed determination to pull America largely out of world affairs, have egged on aggressors throughout the Middle East and in Moscow. But he also unwittingly performs a major public by reminding the nation just how internally contradictory and historically whacko neoconservatism can be.

The biggest internal contradiction revealed in Melloan’s column in the (often neoconservative) Journal is of most immediate interest to conservatives. But it also valuably reminds all Americans of a crucial tradeoff between foreign policy and domestic policy that’s too often ignored. According to Melloan, a great lesson taught by the 20th century is that the greatest U.S. foreign policy and military successes owed overwhelmingly to the private sector, and that these vital capabilities are being destroyed “by the progressives who took control of the U.S. government in 2009.”

Not that Melloan or other neocons would ever slight the skill and power of the American military. But the idea that the U.S. economy somehow spontaneously turned its productive might into a gargantuan war machine is either shockingly ignorant or disgracefully deceptive. During World War II, it took a triumph of effective government – including not only crackerjack administrative and logistical expertise but strong support for the numerous technological innovations that were keys to victory.

Yes, many of these war-time government officials came from the private sector, where they developed their skills. But does anyone honestly think that they could have created the vaunted Arsenal of Democracy sitting in their offices on Wall Street or in corporate boardrooms? And P.S.: Stalin’s Russia possessed none of this private sector knowhow or tradition and built a pretty fair military itself.

Government’s role in maintaining the gargantuan peacetime defense establishment for which Melloan and other neocons clearly pine was so pervasive that no less than Dwight D. Eisenhower left office warning his countrymen about the power of a “military-industrial complex.” One key passage is worth spotlighting:

“This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence — economic, political, even spiritual — is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.”

Yet even this description of government’s involvement in the military, and of its impact on the broader post-war economy, is a considerable under-statement. Just one example: Pentagon-funded research and deelopment not only created high tech weaponry. It also made possible, at least on a commercial scale, every American information technology industry you can think of – including the internet.

There’s also a strong argument that, once the New Deal emergency faded and the World War was won, America’s unprecedentedly enormous peacetime military indirectly helped fuel the rise of the permanent welfare state. It’s easy to see how it forced American politicians in both major parties to keep finding ways to persuade taxpayers that they were getting something for their money other than soldiers and weapons. It’s also easy to see why for so long these same politicians refused to choose between guns and butter when they faced budget crunches, and chose both – thereby setting the national debt on a high-growth path.

And this effect hasn’t just been seen since World War II. It’s long been recognized by American historians that the Civil War both established once and for all Washington’s supremacy over the states, and greatly expanded that federal government’s powers.

Such history should be so well known to a veteran commentator like the Journal’s Melloan that it’s hard to believe that he’s not trying to mislead – and that the fictional narrative he offers stems from the anti-government, free market zealotry propagated for so long by him, by the Journal editorial board, and by much of the American conservative movement. (Libertarians have been a major exception: Fear of its pattern of feeding government underlies much of their critique of foreign policy activism.) In other words, he seems to fear that if government gets its due for 20th century foreign policy successes, the rest of the anti-government case could collapse.

The crucial point here is not to defend either government spending as such or Obama’s alleged foreign policy restraint. Instead, it’s to remind not only neocons but others on the right of center in particular that they can’t have it both ways. If they want a more forceful foreign policy, they’re going to have to accept a much bigger government that reaches far more deeply into the civilian economy on an ongoing basis. If they want a much smaller government, they’ll never get it without scaling back their foreign policy ambitions. If, however, they want the nation stuck with the worst and most dangerous of all possible worlds, a highly active, globally engaged foreign policy and a shriveled public sector, they’ll try to rewrite history and wish the problem away– like George Melloan.