(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Latest Data Remain Full of Normalization Puzzles

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Biden, CCP Virus, China, construction, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, exports, goods trade, imports, inflation, inflation adjusted wages, labor shortages, leisure and hospitality, lockdowns, manufacturing, metals, non-oil goods trade deficit, non-supervisory workers, private sector, real wages, reopening, retail, services trade, shutdowns, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, transportation, wage inflation, wages, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

While I was away for a few days last week, two major U.S. government reports came out both giving off conflicting signals on on whether the economy has started to return to normal in critical ways as the CCP Virus subsides and reopening, along with consequent changes in consumer behavior, proceed.

The monthly trade figures (for April) showed a sequential decline, following a record surge, in America’s chronically huge gap between exports and much larger amounts of imports. Moreover the monthly drop took place as economic growth sped along at unusual rates after being shut down by government mandates and consumer caution. So maybe they’re an early sign that a return to immediate pre-virus conditions has begun?

Or is their most important message that these deficits, and especially the import levels, are still hovering near all-time highs in (the most widely followed) pre-inflation terms even though the economy as of the latest (first quarter) numbers is still a bit smaller in (the most widely followed) inflation-adjusted terms than during the last full pre-pandemic quarter (the fourth quarter of 2019)?

Indeed, the deficits are gargantuan even though President Biden has left former President Trump’s substantial tariffs on metals and goods from China practically untouched. 

The monthly inflation numbers (for May) are similarly confusing. They revealed that consumer prices (just one inflation measure published by Washington, but an important one) rose by 4.93 percent in seasonally adjusted terms. That was their fastest annual pace since September, 2008’s 4.95 percent. Surely, as widely claimed (including by the Federal Reserve, which wields so much influence over the economy, this upswing stems from a combination of bottlenecks resulting from (1) the sudden, widespread reopening; (2) the unusually low overall inflation numbers generated a year ago, when the economy was near the depths of its viruts- and shutdown-induced slump; and (3) the immense dose of stimulus injected into the economy by both elected politicians and the unelected Fed.

At the same time, the Fed has told us that its stimulus isn’t ending anytime soon, and although the Biden administration and Congressional Democrats are displaying some cold feet about approving more such levels of economic fuel (e.g., in the form of outlays on infrastructure, and a wide variety of income supports and enhanced unemployment benefits), it’s difficult to imagine that most or even much of this spending will actually be withdrawn even once a post-virus recovery is an indisputable reality.

But the biggest surprise of all: Despite the economy-wide inflation pressures, and by-now-routine claims that employers are dealing with nearly crippling labor shortages, wages overall adjusted for inflation keep going down.

Compounding the confusion over whatever conclusions can legitimately be drawn from these two reports: They cover two different months.

But let’s begin with the most important details from the April trade report. The ambiguity embodied in the data begins with the total deficit figure. The record March result was revised up from $74.45 billion to $75.03 billion but April’s $68.90 shortfall for goods and services combined, though the second worst monthly figure ever, was 8.17 percent smaller. That’s the biggest sequential drop since February, 2020 (8.39 percent), when China’s export-heavy economy was still largely closed because of the virus.

The same holds for the goods trade gap. The record March figure was revised up, too, from $91.56 billion to $92.86 billion. But April’s $86.68 billion result represented a 6.65 percent monthly decline, and this falloff was the biggest since the 8.39 percent plunge of January, 2019 – when American businesses were still adjusting both to Trump’s tariffs and anticipated tariffs.

Also still fueling the high U.S. deficits – a worsening of services trade balances. Here, U.S. trade has long been in surplus, but the surpluses keep shrinking because service sectors like travel are still suffering from the pandemic’s arrival and the consequent decimation of travel and othe transportation in particular. In fact, the April figure of $17.78 billion was the lowest since September, 2012’s $18.62 billion.

One key set of trade flows does, however, provide some evidence of Trump tariff effectiveness – U.S. non-oil goods trade, which encompasses those exports and imports whose magnitudes are most heavily influenced by trade policy (because, as known by RealityChek regulars, trade in oil is almost never the subject of any trade policy decisions and services trade liberalization remains at very early stages). In April, the monthly shortfall retreated 4.16 percent from its March record of $90.12 billion to $86.37 billion – which is only the fourth highest such total ever.

The import figures I focused on last month exhibit the same overall patterns: April saw big drops from record levels but the absolute numbers remain distressingly high. March’s initially reported record $274.48 billion in total imports was revised up considerably – to $277.69 billion. April’s total of $273.89 billion represented a 1.37 percent drop, but nonetheless was the second worst such figure on record.

March’s record monthly goods import figure was upgraded, too – from $234.44 billion to $236.52 billion. April’s total of $231.97 billion was a 1.92 percent drop but these purchases also still represented the second highest of alll time.

As for non-oil goods imports, the $215.33 billion April total was 1.98 percent down from an upwardly revised record $219.68 billion, and also the second biggest ever. Biggest drop since last April’s 10.91

Whether normalization is returning in manufacturing is more difficult to tell. Imports in March hit a record $207.59 billion, and did drop by 4.59 percent sequentially to $198.06 billion in April. That decrease, however, was a typical monthly move for manufacturing imports, and the April figure was still the third highest ever.

Incidentally, the April manufacturing deficit of $103.60 billion was 4.64 percent lower than March’s $108.66 billion. The March total was the second highest on record, but April’s figure was only the seventh all-time worst. The record, $110.20 billion, came last October, and it’s notable that the gap has narrowed on net despite the resilience shown during the pandemic period by manufacturing output.

More evidence of the Trump tariffs’ impact comes from the data on goods trade with China – whose products have attracted nearly all of these levies, and that cover hundreds of billions of dollars worth of products. The April figure of $37.59 billion was 6.56 percent lower than its March predecessor – a thoroughly unexceptional sequential decline and monthly level by historical standards. But the monthly dropoff was consideraby greater than the aforementioned 1.98 percent decrease for non-oil goods – the closest global proxy.

As a result of all these inconclusive developments, I’ll be awaiting the May trade report with even more interest than usual.

But despite all the uncertainties I mentioned at the start of this post, those May inflation figures have made me more confident than before in my previous contention that current price surges are anomalies by the extremely low inflation generated by the CCP Virus-battered economy of a year ago, and by the sudden reopening of so much of the economy following the long shutdowns and lockdowns. Even clearer, as I see it: Claims of significant, troubling wage inflation are especially weak.

After all, that 4.93 percent year-on-year May price increase followed a previous May-to-May rise that was just 0.22 percent. That was the feeblest such rise since September, 2015’s 0.13 percent. In addition, May’s month-to-month 0.64 price advance was smaller than April’s 0.77 percent. Two months do not a trend make, but these numbers certainly don’t point to raging inflation fires.

Nor do the wage data. Otherwise after-inflation total private sector wages wouldn’t be down more on-month in May (-0.18 percent) than in April (-0.09 percent). And the same couldn’t be said of constant dollar wages for non-supervisory workers (-0.20 percent in May versus flat in April).

Getting more granular, the price-adjusted wage trends are as bad or worse in construction; trade, transportation and utilities overall; retail trade; and education and health services.

The two big exceptions: the leisure and hospitality workforces that have been so decimated by the virus (and especially the non-supervisory group) and the transportation and warehousing sub-sector of the transportation and utilities industry category that contains a trucking sector unusually strained by the rapid reopening. In both cases, however, (and especially the leisure and hospitality industry), inflation-adjusted wages in absolute terms are well below the national private sector average. If anything, therefore, it seems like some wage inflation for these workers is long overdue.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Trump-y New U.S. Trade Report – in a Good Way

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Biden, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, exports, goods trade, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, non-oil goods trade deficit, Phase One, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, trade war, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although it covered a presidential transition month, there wasn’t much transitional about the official U.S. international trade figures for January that came out Friday. Trump-y policy fingerprints were all over them – and mostly in a good way – mainly in the form of continuing declines in the monthly deficits for China and the manufacturing sector, two main targets of the former President’s efforts to reduce the overall shortfall.

At the same time, also visible were the distorting affects of the CCP Virus, and the stop-and-start nature of so much economic activity in the United States and throughout the world, which seem certain to impact all economic data for several more months.

Overall, the combined goods and services trade deficit rose 1.86 percent sequentially in January, and the $68.21 billion total was the second highest on record – after November’s $69.04 billion. The goods deficit also hit its second largest total in history, with its $85.45 billion level representing a 1.58 percent increase over December’s total, and trailing the $86.89 billion all-time high also set last November. The services surplus, meanwhile, inched up on month in January by 0.47 percent, to $17.24 billion. This monthly improvement was the first since June for this virus-battered segment of the U.S. and world economies.

Total exports rose by a mere 0.53 percent, to $191.14 billion, and goods exports grew by 1.56 percent, to $135.66 billion. These were the best monthly performances in both categories since last February. Services exports, however, dipped for the first time since July, with the 0.47 percent monthly January decrease bringing the level to $56.28 billion.

A new record was set on the import side – January goods purchases from abroad reached $221.11 billion, surpassing October, 2018’s 218.91 billion, and exceeding December’s total by 1.57 percent. Total imports grew by 1.19 percent on month, to $260.16 billion, but services imports fell sequentially in January by 0.88 percent, to $39.05 billion – the first monthly decrease since May.

In an apparent setback for Trump’s tariffs and other elements of his trade policy, January also saw the second highest monthly deficit in U.S. non-oil goods trade. RealityChek regulars know these trade shortfalls as the “Made in Washington trade deficit”, since they strip out the results for petroleum and services – sectors that are rarely dealt with in trade deals or similar policies, and in which liberalization efforts remain minor.

But the $85.52 billion January level has been topped only by November’s $86.40 billion.

Nonetheless, the U.S. manufacturing deficit in January sank by 6.32 percent, from $106.52 billion to $99.79 billion. The decrease was the third straight, and the monthly gap was the smallest since last June’s. Manufacturing exports declined by 3.47 percent sequentially, to $81.66 billion, while imports dropped by a greater 5.05 percent, to $181.46 billion.

One big reason for this encouraging manufacturing performance was the January narrowing of the manufacturing-heavy U.S. goods deficit with China. January’s $26.50 billion total was 3.60 percent lower than December’s $27.23 billion, and the best such figure since May’s $26.96 billion.

U.S. goods exports to the People’s Republic plunged sequentially by 12.19 percent, to $12.86 billion, and this fall-off was especially discouraging given Beijing’s commitments under the year-old Phase One trade deal to boost imports. Moreover, the monthly decrease (to the lowest level since October) was the biggest percentage-wise since the January, 2020 crash dive of 18.96 percent, when much of China’s economy was shut down by the virus.

Yet China’s much greater goods exports to the United States fell by 6.60 percent, from $41.86 billion to $39.11 billion. This monthly total was the lowest since July’s $40.66 billion, and the sequential decrease also was the third straight. This slump, coming on top of the 3.59 percent decrease in U.S. goods imports from China in 2020, was no doubt due in part to the Trump tariffs on some $360 billion worth of Chinese goods that were as central to the former President’s China trade policies as the trade deal, and that President Biden has decided to keep so far.

Even more important, it can’t be a complete coincidence that U.S. manufacturing output has held up well during the pandemic period as these levies stayed in place. They must have played a significant role in preventing Chinese products from outcompeting their domestic counterparts for the American demand for manufactures that the virus left over.

As a result, the clearly related China and manufacturing performances could be teaching a valuable lesson to the Biden administration: Although virus-related distortions to U.S. trade flows will end sooner or later for reasons only partly related to official policy decisions, the fate of Trump’s China tariffs is entirely up to the President. That makes his eventual decision whether to continue or lift them the most important trade-related wildcard of all still facing the U.S. economy.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Latest U.S. Trade Data Start Bringing Trump Achievements into Focus

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aerospace, CCP Virus, China, computers, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump. Biden, exports, imports, infotech, lockdowns, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, non-oil goods trade deficit, services trade, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

With the release yesterday morning of the U.S. government’s trade report for December (the same morning, frustratingly for me, that the official January jobs figures came out), the final scorecard on former President Trump’s trade policy record is sort of in.

I say “sort of” because (1) these numbers will be revised several times; (2) the full impact of Trump’s tariff-centric policies on the economy won’t be apparent for many years (especially since President Biden has decided to keep in place for te time being all of the steep and sweeping Trump China levies); and (3) the powerfully distorting effects of the CCP Virus will be with us for at least many more months.

Keeping all these caveats in mind, let’s focus on the annual rather than the monthly figures, since they cover a much longer time frame, and see how even this preliminary 2020 data points to some important conclusions about what was and wasn’t accomplished under Trump.  And the accomplishments were anything but negligible.

As widely reported (see, e.g., here and here), the combined goods and services deficit hit $678.74 billion last year – the highest annual figure since 2008. So given Trump’s emphasis on narrowing the gap, and given the annual increase of 17.42 percent (far from a record) during the worst recessionary year since 1946, the result looks like a major Trump failure.

At the same time, RealityChek regulars know that economic data presented in isolation rarely prove informative. So in this vein, it’s important to note that the 2020 overall trade deficit as a share of the entire economy (gross domestic product, or GDP) was much lower than in 2008 – 3.24 percent versus 4.84 percent. P.S. 2008 was a recession year, too. And though it wasn’t nearly as deep as last year’s downturn, it still saw a slight increase in the trade shortfall. Finally, let’s remember that the previous Great Recession resulted from failures in the economy’s fundamentals that were permitted to reach crisis proportions.

This latest downturn has stemmed largely from government decisions literally to shut down much of the nation’s economic activity due to a pandemic coming from China, and created deficit-boosting problems having little to do with U.S. trade policy.

For example, $50.41 billion of the $101.56 billion annual increase in the deficit in absolute terms came from a shrinkage in the services trade surplus that was by far a record in absolute terms and the second greatest relatively speaking (17.54 percent) since recessionary 2001 (19.58 percent).

Another $36.01 billion of the increase in the overall 2020 deficit came from a drop in the civilian aviation sector surplus that had nothing to do with Trump tariffs or retaliation and everything to do with Boeing’s safety woes and the pandemic-induced nosedive in domestic and global air travel.

And another $20.92 billion of the deficit increase came from the computer and computer accessories sectors, where imports surged due to the growth of working, schooling, and otherwise Zooming from home prompted by the pandemic.

These shifts had an especially marked effect on that portion of U.S. trade flows deeply influenced by trade policy decisions like the Trump tariffs. As known by RealityChek regulars, I call the huge deficit still run in these sectors collectively the “Made in Washington” trade deficit, because it strips out two parts of the economy (services and energy) that are rarely the focus of trade agreements or related policies.

Between 2019 and 2020, this trade gap expanded by $83.03 billion, to an all-time high of $923.03 billion. But as just made clear, the non-trade policy growth in the civilian aviation and computer-related sectors made up $56.93 billion (or 68.57 percent) of the difference. And even counting these one-off developments, the Made in Washington trade deficit during the Trump years grew much more slowly as a share of GDP (by 22.16 percent) than during the second term of Barack Obama’s presidency (33.21 percent).

Similar trends can be seen in the manufacturing sector. Its deficit worsened in 2020 by $79.63 billion, to a record $1.1128 trillion. But without the bigger deficits in aviation and computers, it would have fallen year-on-year. That hasn’t happened since recession-y 2009. As a share of GDP, the manufacturing trade deficit also rose more slowly during Trump’s term (13.70 percent) than during Obama’s second term (14.14 percent).

Much of this progress, in turn, owed to the substantial reduction in the huge, chronic, U.S. manufacturing-dominated goods trade deficit with China. Even though the $83.03 billion widening of the comparable Made in Washington trade deficit gap in 2020 represented a 9.88 percent rise, the China goods deficit dropped by $34.04 billion, or 9.97 percent. And at $310.80 billion, the goods trade deficit with China was America’s smallest since 2011 ($295.25 billion). Surely Trump’s tariffs on $360 billion worth of Chinese imports (in pre-tariff times), and his Phase One trade deal, which required increased imports from the United States by Beijing, deserve considerable credit.

Further, as a share of U.S. GDP, the goods gap with China sank all the way to 1.48 percent in 2020. During Obama’s last year in office, that figure stood at 1.85 percent – a modest decrease from 1.95 percent in the last year of his first term. But even if you take away the deeply recessed U.S. economy of 2020 and look at only the first three Trump years, you see that the China goods deficit stood at only 1.61 percent of GDP – meaning it had still fallen considerably faster under his presidency.

What happens with U.S. trade flows – and all the sectors of the economy they profoundly affect – though, will remain unclear for the foreseeable future. For not only is the direction of Biden administration policy substantially up in the air. So is the future course of the pandemic, including whether vaccines can be rolled out fast enough to stem its tide, and whether they can keep up with mutations. And all of the CCP Virus-related uncertainties will of course largely determine how fast the economies of America’s trade partners recover, how much they export, and how much they import.

But even though the results of upcoming official trade reports will need to be taken with several boulders of salt, it’s nonethless clear that if the main policy-fostered Trump trends continue under the Biden administration, American workers and producers of all kinds will have reason to be grateful.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Through the Pandemic Fog, Signs of Trump Trade Progress Keep Coming

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(What's Left of) Our Economy, aircraft, Boeing, CCP Virus, Census Bureau, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, exports, goods trade, healthcare goods, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, medical devices, non-oil goods trade deficit, pharmaceuticals, services trade, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, trade war, Trump, Wuhan virus

Proof positive that much of the U.S. government grinds on whatever the political tumult surrounding it: Despite the controversies that erupted due to the largely unexpected, still-incomplete, and increasingly contested Presidential election results, the Census Bureau nonetheless still put out the new monthly U.S. trade report yesterday – this one taking the story through September.

And by the bizarro economic standards of the bizarro CCP Virus era, the figures were strangely normal: The various September deficits remained awfully high given an economy whose levels are still markedly subdued despite a powerful growth rebound in the third quarter (which ended in September). Yet although these results have been widely interpreted as a stinging rebuke to effectiveness of President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies (see, e.g., here and here), widely overlooked details reveal major mitigating developments – and resulting reasons for continued encouragement.

As for the awfully high deficits: The combined goods and services trade gap actually decreased on month by 4.73 percent, from a downwardly adjusted $67.04 billion to $63.86 billion. Yet this monthly total (during a troubled economic time) was still firmly in the neighborhood of trade shortfalls during the bubbly mid-2000s, when Washington’s trade policy was about as cluelessly import- and especially China-friendly as possible.

Moreover, back in those days, oil made up a much bigger share of the total goods deficit than today. So obviously, most of the remaining gap owes a good deal to U.S. trade policy decisions – as will be seen below.

Encouragingly, total U.S. exports to a world still largely struggling with virus-related downturns of its own were up 2.55 percent sequentially in September, and registered their best performance ($176.35 billion) since March – just as major pandemic effects were taking hold. Total September imports of $240.22 billion also represented the highest amount ($240.22 billion) since March, but the monthly increase was only 0.51 percent. And where export growth has consistently been strong since May, import growth has begun slowing markedly.

Yet the persistence of high combined goods and services U.S. trade shortfalls stems mainly from problems with services trade that are clearly CCP Virus-related. For example, the longstanding services surplus (which of course includes travel services) is on track for its biggest drop since recessionary 2001. So far, through the first three quarters of 2020, it’s sunk by 20.47 percent on a year-to-date basis.

Indeed, the $43.96 billion reduction in the services surplus has been greater than the $38.54 billion increase in the overall deficit – meaning that if the service surplus had simply remained the same, the total deficit would have declined year-to-date (although still less than expected at least during a normal deep recession).

As indicated above, however, the total trade numbers don’t tell the whole story about the successes or failures of trade policy. That’s because, as known by RealityChek regulars, services are one huge sector where trade agreements and similar decisions have had relatively little impact so far. Ditto for oil

At first glance, examing trade flows that are substantially “Made in Washington” also reveals a nice-sized monthly September reduction in that deficit (4.62 percent), but to a level that’s the third worst on record ($80.74 billion) – just behind the August and July totals, respectively. And on a year-to-date basis, the Made in Washington deficit is up 3.80 percent from last year,to $663.55 billion.

Yet here’s where another detail comes in. This entails the woes of Boeing, which have spread beyond the safety debacle stemming from crashes of its popular 737 Max model to the global virus-induced collapse in air travel.

The safety problems of 2019 cut the longstanding U.S. civilian aircraft trade surplus by nearly 28 percent, or $8.86 billion on a January-September basis. Had the surplus stayed stable, it would have risen only from $600.08 billion during the first three quarters of 2018 to $630.39 billion, rather than $639.25 billion. Given all the import front-running seen throughout 2019 to try to avoid the Trump China tariffs (which artificially inflated the entire non-oil import total), that’s not a bad performance at all.

The aircraft effect has been much more dramatic this year. Year-to-date through September, the Made in Washington deficit is up from that $630.29 billion to $663.55 billion. Yet the nosedive in the aircraft surplus (all the way from $23.16 billion to just under $3 billion) accounts for nearly 83 percent of that increase.

Want another aircraft effect? Check out the manufacturing trade deficit – so rightly the focus of the President’s attention. Month-to-month, it rose by only 1.46 percent. But the new September level of $103.87 billion is the second-worst monthly total of all time – just behind July’s $104.63 billion. Even worse: The aircraft industry’s problems didn’t add to this number, since its trade deficit actually shrunk slightly on month.

But for the entire year so far, the plunge in the aircraft surplus (which, not so coincidentally, has been mirrored by smaller but not trivial reductions in the surpluses of all sorts of aircraft parts, including engines) has made a sizable difference. From January-September, 2019 to this year’s comparable period, the manufacturing trade shortfall has grown by $10.18 billion, from $777.60 billion to $787.78 billion. Take out the $20.16 billion worsening of the aircraft trade surplus, and the $10.18 billion higher year-to-date manufacturing trade deficit becomes a nearly $10 billion lower year-to-date manufacturing trade deficit.

And when it comes to both the manufacturing and overall Made in Washington trade deficits and a virus effect, don’t forget its healthcare goods component. Specifically, the U.S. trade deficit in pharmaceutical preparations jumped by $12.58 billion year-to-date between last year and this year, and in the categories containing (but not restricted to) protective gear like masks and gowns, testing swabs, ventilators, and oxygen tents by another $2.33 billion.

Since China remains so important for Made in Washington and manufacturing trade flows, bilateral exports, imports, and deficits not surprisingly reveal a major pandemic effect, too. The big China difference is how strongly the September data confirm that President Trump’s goals of reducing the bilateral trade gap and decoupling economically from the People’s Republic are being achieved even without taking the CCP Virus into account.

On a monthly basis, the goods trade gap with China dipped fractionally in September, to $29.67 billion. This total represented the second straight such drop and the lowest level since Aprils $28.40 billion. These merchandise imports inched up sequentially in September by just under one percent and have been virtually flat since July, but goods exports improved by 4.53 percent.

On a year-to-date basis, America’s China trade looks like it’s in even better shape. U.S. goods imports from China are off by nearly 11 percent ($37.54 billion) over this stretch, and the trade gap has become 15.24 percent ($40.06 billion) smaller.

This progress, moreover, has been achieved even though total U.S. exports of civilian aircraft and parts (including engines) to China have shrunk by $4.09 billion and the trade deficit in the virus-related medical equipment categories has risen by $1.25 billion. (Oddly, the bilateral pharmaceutical preparations trade balance has improved with the surplus improving from $449 million to $836 million.)

When all of these virus-related complications and the inevitably disruptive and therefore initial efficiency-reducing impact of the Trump trade policies are considered, two questions arise that are equally fascinating and important. First, once these temporary shocks pass, will this approach to globalization look more like a win or a loss for the U.S. economy? Second, will American election politics give the nation a chance to find out?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trump is Winning the Trade and Decoupling Wars

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CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, decoupling, FDI, foreign direct investment, goods trade, merchandise trade, MSCI, non-oil goods trade deficit, pension funds, Rhodium Group, Securities and Exchange Commission, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade war, Trump, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s become increasingly clear in the last few days that President Trump’s trade war with China and his apparent efforts to decouple the U.S. and Chinese economies have achieved real successes. Just why exactly? Because of a recent flurry of claims in the Mainstream Media that the trade war has been an ignominious defeat for the President and his tariffs, and that decoupling can only backfire on America if it’s taken too far (an outcome that’s supposedly imminent). (See here, here, and here in particular.)

As RealityChek regulars know, such media doom- and fear-mongering – spread both by journalists and by the purported experts they keep quoting who have been disastrously wrong literally for decades about trade and broader economic expansion with China – are now well established contrarian indicators. And here’s some of the key data that these proven failures have overlooked.

Let’s start with the least controversial measure of decoupling – two-way trade. Let’s generally use the end of the previous administration as our baseline, since decoupling really is a Trump-specific priority. And let’s generally end with the end of 2019, not only because it’s our last full data year, but because the coronavirus pandemic clearly is distorting the data, and won’t be with us forever (although some of its effects on supply chains and the like might – also because of reinforcement from the trade war). We’ll also stick with goods trade, since detailed service trade figures are always late to come out, and because they’re rarely major subjects of trade policy.

Between 2016 and 2019, combined US goods imports from and goods exports to China actually grew by 2.92 percent. So where’s the decoupling, you might ask? It becomes clear from using economic analysis best practices and putting these figures into context – mainly, the performance of the entire economy.

And in this case and many of those below, it’s crucial to know that the economy grew during this period, too. As a result, in 2016, this two-way goods trade (also called merchandise trade) amounted to 3.08 percent gross domestic product (GDP) – the nation’s total output of goods and services. In 2019, it was down to 2.60 percent. That is, like a supertanker, this trade doen’t turn around right away.

Therefore, it is indeed legitimate to fault Mr. Trump for claiming that trade wars are easy to win. But the supertanker is turning. And the impact on the economy? In 2016, it expanded by 2.78 percent. In 2019? 3.98 percent. So not much damage evident there. (All these figures are pre-inflation figures, because detailed inflation-adjusted trade figures aren’t available.)

Similar trends hold for the U.S.-China goods trade deficit, which the President views as the most important scorecard for his China trade policy success. Between 2016 and 2019 in absolute terms, it barely budged – dipping by just 0.47 percent. That could be a rounding error.

But viewed in the proper context, this trade deficit fell from 1.85 percent of GDP to 1.61 percent. And again, the economy grew much faster in 2019 than in 2016.

It’s still possible to ask what any of the trade decoupling had to do with the President’s ballyhooed tariffs. But the only reasonble answer? “A lot.” That’s because even after the signing of the so-called Phase One U.S.-China trade deal in January, levies of 7.5 percent remain on categories of imports from China that have been totalling about $120 billion annually lately, and tariffs of 25 percent remain on $250 billion more. (That’s most of the $451.65 billion in total goods imported by the United States from China in 2019.)

For comparison’s sake, between 2016 and 2019, the U.S. worldwide non-oil goods trade deficit – that’s the deficit that’s most impacted by trade policy decisions like tariffs, and the portion of the deficit that’s most like US-China trade – rose by 24 percent. That’s more than 50 times faster than the increase in the China goods deficit.

So there can’t be any serious doubt that the Trump China tariffs have worked both directly (by keeping Chinese goods out of the U.S. market) and indirectly (by encouraging companies that had been producing in China for export to the United States to move elsewhere). Moreover, since that “elsewhere” is always to much friendlier countries, that’s a plus for Americans even though the decoupling by most accounts has only returned modest amounts of jobs stateside.

Moreover, there’s a strong case to be made that the Trump tariffs on China have prevented the U.S. economy’s CCP Virus-induced recession from being much worse. That contention is borne out by the fact that, as RealityChek reported earlier this month, the latest available apples-to-apples statistics show that China’s goods trade surplus with the world as a whole had increased by some 25 percent between July, 2019 and July, 2020. But during that period, the China goods surplus with the United State fell by about 18 percent.

As a result, according to the standard way of measuring the economy and how developments in areas like trade affect its growth or shrinkage, China over roughly the last year has been growing at the expense of the world as a whole, but not at America’s. Indeed, quite the opposite. After decades of trade with China slowing U.S. growth, such commerce is now supporting growth.

The decoupling picture, however, wouldn’t be complete without investment flows. Here, on one front, the disengagement has been even more extensive. The consulting firm Rhodium Group does a good job of crunching the numbers on foreign direct investment (FDI) – those transactions that involve so-called hard assets, like real estate and factories and warehouses and entire companies, as opposed to portfolio investment, which involves stocks, bonds, and other financial instruments.

By a happy coincidence, Rhodium has just issued its latest report, which takes us through the first half of 2020. Yes, that covers the virus era, when it’s natural to expect all kind of economic and commercial activity to decline. But the pre-virus era trends will become clear enough, too.

According to Rhodium, two-way FDI flows between the United States and China in the first six months of this year (measured by the value of completed deals) hit their lowest level since the second half of 2011. And the peak came during comparable periods between early 2016 and late 2017 – when these investments were running nearly four times their current levels. Moreover that peak, not so coincidentally, bridged the Obama-Trump transition.

Chinese FDI into the US during that first half of this year actually rose a great deal – from $1.3 to $4.7 billion. But this increase resulted entirely – and then some – from a single purchase by the big Chinese social media company WeChat of a 10 percent stake in the U.S. company Universal Music. Without that transaction, Chinese flows into the US would have dropped, and even the current somewhat artificially high level is only about a fifth as high as its peak – hit in late 2016. So you can see a decided Trump effect here, too.

U.S. FDI flows into China have held up better, if that’s the term you want to use. But they were off 31 percent between the second half of 2019 and the first halfof this year – to $4.1b. And their peak level – hit in 2014 – was $8.5b. So that’s another big Trump-related drop.

One disturbing counter-trend that the Trump administration has been too slow to address: There’s abundant evidence that U.S. financial investment into China – buys of assets like stocks and bonds – keeps surging.

One indication: According to the Financial Times earlier this month, since the Wall Street firm MSCI in June, 2017, first announced plans to include Chinese domestically listed “A-share” companies into one of its widely followed indices, “roughly $875bn in foreign investment has flowed into Chinese equities through stock connect programmes linking Hong Kong with onshore bourses in Shanghai and Shenzhen.”

And although the U.S. share is difficult to quantify, between private investors and state-level government workers’ pension funds, this analysis from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission makes clear that it’s considerable.  (Due to Trump administration pressure, the body overseeing federal pension plans’ investments has delayed a decision to channel funds into the aforementioned MSCI index.)   

So can anyone reasonably claim “Mission accomplished” for the Trump trade and decoupling policies? Not yet. But is a “job well done so far” conclusion merited? Certainly for anyone who’s not Trump-ly Deranged.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Big China Mystery Inside the Latest U.S. Trade Figures

Tags

China, exports, goods trade, imports, merchandise trade, non-oil goods trade deficit, Trade, trade deficit, U.S. International Trade Commission, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The big mystery about yesterday’s monthly U.S. trade report (for May) concerns China. Specifically, why are imports from the People’s Republic streaming into the American economy again, considering the stiff, sweeping tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of Chinese-made goods destined for U.S. markets, and of course the continuing troubles faced by the U.S. economy from the CCP Virus?

I won’t be able to provide a detailed answer till sometime next week – when I expect the U.S. International Trade Commission to post the data on its website. But I can say right now that these imports were great enough account for more than all of the blame for $4.85 billion (9.74 percent) sequential widening of the overall U.S. trade gap in May.

That combined goods and services trade shortfall hit $54.60 billion – its highest level since October, 2008’s $60.88 billion. And back then, more than half that overall trade deficit was oil. In May, the United States ran an oil trade surplus – as it’s done since last fall.

Moreover, the overall May U.S. goods trade deficit (also known as the merchandise deficit) of $76.06 billion was the biggest such total since December, 2018’s $80.21 billion –and represented a $4.24 billion (5.90 percent) increase from April’s levels.

The specific China goods numbers? The bilateral trade gap widened by $4.49 billion (19.99 percent) sequentially in May – a figure 92.58 percent as big as the entire monthly U.S. trade deficit increase and, as mentioned above, greater than the monthly increase in the merchandise shortfall. In other words, as the goods trade deficit from everywhere else in toto fell during May, it rose from China. (Of course, because the U.S. trades with so many different countries, this doesn’t mean that goods trade shortfalls fell with every one of them other than China. But overall, the non-China goods trade gap narrowed.)

And the role of merchandise imports was as crucial as it is puzzling. U.S. goods imports from China rose on month in May by $5.53 billion (or 17.79 percent). So they alone exceeded the $4.85 billion sequential increase in the overall trade deficit and the $4.24 billion rise in the goods deficit.

Even weirder – goods imports from China were up in May while overall imports and global goods imports were down (by 0.88 percent and by 0.76 percent, respectively).

Despite the widening of the merchandise trade gap with China, U.S. goods exports to the People’s Republic improved on month in May – by $1.04 billion, to $9.64 billion. That’s not terribly surprising, since all indications are that China’s economy began recovering sooner than America’s from its own CCP Virus-induced shutdown. In fact, that monthly merchandise export total is the highest since last November’s $10.10 billion – meaning that those U.S. sales are back in their range for the whole of last year, before the virus broke out in China.

But was the U.S. economy rebounding strongly enough in May to explain easily a resumption of buying from China that also brought goods imports back to their highest level since November, and well inside their range, too, for all of last year? That’s hard to accept, if only because overall U.S. goods imports remain significantly depressed from last year’s levels, and because of those Trump tariffs. Such bewilderment seems justified even given that in recent years, May has been a month during which merchandise imports from China have risen strongly. After all, this wasn’t a normal May.

It’s true that on a year-to-date basis through May, U.S. goods imports from China in 2020 are down 15.90 percent – more than the 12.60 percent drop for goods imports total (but not that much more). The difference is somewhat greater with the 10.35 percent decrease in January-May total U.S. non-oil goods imports – which are a better global comparison with China goods imports, since China doesn’t sell oil to the United States.

It’s also true that the United States’ merchandise deficit with China through May of this year has shrunk much faster (24.58 percent) than its overall global goods deficit (7.78 percent) and much, much faster than its global non-oil goods deficit (2.34 percent). But it’s true as well that a non-trivial amount of this progress has reversed itself this month (as well as in April).

And that’s why I’ll get you the detailed answer to the “what are these China imports” question ASAP.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why 2019 Was a Winner for Trump Trade Policies & America

Tags

Barack Obama, Boeing, China, GDP, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, non-oil goods trade deficit, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

OK, let’s cut to the chase regarding the new U.S. trade deficit data. (We’ll analyze today’s report from the Census Bureau more comprehensively tomorrow.)

The most important result revealed by the figures – which bring the story up to December and therefore give us our first look at full-year 2019 development – isn’t that the overall U.S. trade deficit fell year-on-year last year (which alone indicates that President Trump is starting to keep one of his signature campaign promises). It isn’t that the huge annual China goods deficit cratered (by 17.62 percent, the biggest such drop on record – including Great Recession year 2009 – and indicating another promise being kept). It isn’t that the still-huge manufacturing deficit has virtually stabilized despite the safety woes of Boeing, long the generator of major trade surpluses. And it isn’t even that these trade gaps have narrowed even as the economy has continued growing acceptably (which most economists insist is practically impossible, especially for a consumer-heavy country like the United States).

Instead, the most important result is that this economic growth continued in 2019 even as that portion of the trade deficit most influenced by trade policy increased at a particularly slow rate. The obvious conclusions? Trade policy can influence the size and rate of change in the trade deficit, and that the Trump trade policies are working.

To remind, this portion of the trade deficit (which I call the Made in Washington trade deficit) sheds light on the above points because it’s the non-oil goods deficit. It’s highly trade policy sensitive because it strips out of the total trade balance numbers the services balance (because so little progress has been made in worldwide services trade liberalization) as well as the oil balance (because oil is rarely the subject of trade deals or other trade policy decisions).

The table below presents the numbers for the last three years of the Obama administration and the first three of the Trump administration – a comparison that’s apt because these time periods are right next to each other in the current (expansionary) business cycle.

Made in Washington trade deficit % change     GDP % change          ratio

2013-14:        +19.35                                                 +4.42                4.38:1

2014-15:        +21.23                                                 +3.98                5.33:1

2015-16:          +2.41                                                 +2.69                0.97:1

2016-17:          +8.05                                                 +4.30                1.87:1

2017-18:        +12.66                                                 +5.43                2.33:1

2018-19:          +1.75                                                +4.12                 0.42:1

As is obvious from the above, the Made in Washington deficit’s growth rates during the Obama years (measured in pre-inflation terms) have been considerably slower than those of the Trump years. And yet the GDP (gross domestic product) growth rates of the first three Trump years have been notably faster than those of the last three Obama years.

In other words, as made clearest by the right-hand column, which shows the ratio between the two, the link between economic growth and trade deficit growth has been weakening significantly during the Trump years. And the President’s tariff-heavy trade policies have plainly played a major role. All else equal, moreover, that means growth that’s more nationally self-sufficient (no small achievement in a still dangerous world), healthier, and therefore more sustainable.

President Trump makes way too many false or exaggerated boasts about the economy (among other subjects). But the 2019 trade data show that when it comes to trade policy, he’s entitled to considerable bragging rights.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Boeing’s Safety Woes are Hammering U.S. Manufacturing & Overall Trade Flows Under Trump

Tags

Airbus, Boeing, civilian aircraft, exports, imports, manufacturing, non-oil goods trade deficit, safety, services trade, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, World Trade Organization, {What's Left of) Our Economy

When last month’s U.S. trade figures (for August) came out, I wrote about how the economic narratives about the woes of domestic manufacturing and America’s trade accounts during the Trump Tariffs Era have been turning into a story about the safety related troubles of Boeing. This morning, the September data were issued, and the Boeing drag on the trade performances of industry and the entire economy look bigger than ever. Especially interesting, the Boeing effect worsened during a data month when total U.S. trade, manufacturing trade, and civilian aircraft trade all took modest turns for the better.

Specifically, the overall U.S. trade deficit in September dropped by 4.70 percent, from an upwardly revised $55.04 billion to $52.45 billion. The total was the lowest since April’s $51.98 billion, and the sequential decrease the biggest since January’s 12.61 percent nosedive.

Partly as a result, the year-to-date trade deficit is up by 5.47 percent – a rate of increase less than half that of the previous year’s 12.68 percent.

Combined goods and services exports rose by 0.88 percent from $207.83 billion to $205.99 billion – their worst monthly performance since April’s $205.76 billion. Total imports, however, sank by nearly twice as much proportionately – 1.68 percent. And September’s $258.44 billion figure was also the lowest since April ($257.74 billion).

Services trade, however, provided an oddly glum counterpoint. It’s long been a trade surplus generator, and remained so in September. But the new monthly surplus of $19.27 billion was the lowest since December, 2012’s $18.55 billion. The main culprit? The fourth straight high for monthly services imports ($49.89 billion).

At the same time, the huge and chronic manufacturing trade deficit fell sequentially in September for the second straight month, from $92.08 billion by 4.53 percent, to $87.91 billion. That total was the best since June’s $83.63 billion. And this progress was mirrored in civilian aircraft. Their exports jumped month-to-month in September by 25 percent. Imports rose even faster – by 41.58 percent. But their amount is much smaller ($1.35 billion vs $3.29 billion). Therefore, the civilian aircraft trade surplus improved from $1.69 billion to $1.95 billion.

What, then, is the problem? It becomes glaringly visible upon examining trade in civilian aircraft during the entire stretch of Boeing’s current woes (which essentially began this past March with many national aviation authorities grounding the plane in their own countries’ airlines, and/or barring it from their national air spaces), and comparing it with the aircraft trade figures for the same periods of previous years, and with the performance of overall manufacturing exports and imports.

Last month, I described how civilian aircraft’s trade performance between this past April (the first full month in which the Boeing effect could be expected to begin showing up) and August had deteriorated markedly from the same period last year. Today’s trade data show that the deterioration has grown far worse.

As made clear in last month’s post, despite its reputation as a major American trade winner, the civilian aircraft sector has experienced ever poorer results since 2017, and the new trade figures confirm this trend.

Between April and September of 2017 and April and September of 2018, civilian aircraft exports fell by 10.32 percent, even though overall U.S. manufacturing exports increased by 6.84 percent. The industry’s record on the import side was better – they dropped during this time by 13.98 percent, while manufacturing imports in total climbed by 11.64 percent.

But the comparison between the following April-to-September periods looks considerably drearier for aircraft. Between April and September of last year and the same period this year, although manufacturing exports were down by 3.82 percent, civilian aircraft foreign sales sank by 26.80 percent. And although manufacturing imports edged up only 0.27 percent between these periods, American purchases of civilian aircraft surged by just over 26 percent.

Further, the impact of aircraft’s slump on manufacturing and overall U.S. trade has been substantial and growing. As of last month’s trade report, the fall in these products’ exports between the April-August 2018 and April-August 2019 periods accounted for 30.72 percent of the decrease in total manufacturing exports during that time, and 16.81 percent of the increase in total manufacturing imports.

As of today’s figures, the civilian aircraft share of manufacturing’s total export decline is up to 31.35 percent of the total, while their share of industry’s total import increase has shot up to more than half manufacturing’s total.

Expanding the focus to all U.S. goods trade except for energy products (which to date haven’t received significant attention in free trade negotiations or any other aspects of American trade diplomacy) also reveals a sizable Boeing effect. Between the April-September 2018 and 2019 periods, civilian aircraft’s export decline accounted for fully 42.39 percent of the total U.S. non-oil goods export decrease recorded then, and 20.61 percent of the non-oil goods import increase.

In addition, to repeat a crucial point, this major Boeing effect on manufacturing and overall trade has absolutely nothing to do with the Trump trade wars, since civilian aircraft so far have not been subjected to foreign tariffs on American exports imposed in retaliation for Mr. Trump’s levies. This situation will change due to recent and upcoming rulings in the long-running World Trade Organization case between Boeing and the European Union’s Airbus. But as of now, any evaluation of the Trump effect on U.S. trade flows ignoring the powerful drag created by Boeing’s troubles deserves a grade of “incomplete” – at best.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Trade Data Confirm that U.S. Growth Keeps Getting Healthier Under Trump

Tags

GDP, gross domestic product, Made in Washington trade deficit, non-oil goods trade deficit, real GDP, real growth, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning’s monthly U.S. trade figures (for March) enable an update for the economic impact of President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies – and contain very good news both for Mr. Trump and for anyone hoping that the nation’s growth becomes healthier (which should be all Americans).

The major test, as RealityChek regulars know, is a comparison between the economy’s overall growth on the one hand, and the growth of the trade shortfall most heavily influenced by trade policies. The latter can be termed the “Made in Washington trade deficit,” since it strips out oil (which is rarely the object of trade deals or trade policy decisions) and services (where trade liberalization has made only limited progress).

If the economy is growing faster than this non-oil goods deficit (in inflation-adjusted terms – the gauge most closely followed by economy watchers), or if its growth rate is still slower but the gap between these rates is narrowing, that means that its expansion is at least starting to stem more from domestic production, and less from import-led (and therefore debt-financed) consumption. If the trends are showing the opposite results, then overall growth is becoming still more heavily reliant on credit-financed shopping (whether by households, businesses, governments or some combination of these).

And in case you forgot, that’s the kind of growth that led directly to the last global financial crisis and the worst American recession since the Great Depression. And even though the economy began recovering a decade ago, its expansion consistently trailed the growth rate of the Made in Washington trade deficit – and never more than when the inflation-adjusted gross domestic product was increasing most robustly.

That’s why the new U.S. trade figures are so encouraging. They confirm that the American economy recently has been able to grow impressively without supercharged Made in Washington trade deficits. In fact, that’s way understating the case. For calculations based on the March trade results show that, during the first quarter of this year, the after-inflation Made in Washington trade deficit actually shrunk sequentially (by a 6.09 percent annual rate) while real gross domestic product increased by a healthy 3.13 percent annualized.

Nor was the first quarter a fluke – at least not under the Trump administration. In the second quarter of 2018, the real Made in Washington trade shortfall sank sequentially by 5.90 percent annualized, while the overall economy surged by a price-adjusted 4.10 percent.

And an examination of the two during the current economic recovery produces an unmistakable pattern, which is best illustrated by looking at the far-right column (think of it as the multiple) of the table below: During the Trump years so far, good growth has resulted despite relatively modest increases (and, as we’ve just seen, despite some absolute declines) in the Made in Washington trade deficit. During the Obama years, Trump-like growth was only achieved when the Made in Washington trade deficit practically exploded. And when that trade deficit grew weakly, so did the gross domestic product.

Further, even though the multiple rose between the first and second years of the Trump administration, the quarterly 2018 figures show that this problem stemmed from the tariff front-running of the third quarter – when U.S. importers were scrambling to bring in products from abroad before they were hit with levies, principally on goods from China. Once this period of distortion ended, the multiple fell significantly (and probably overshot in the first quarter of this year).

Real Made in Washington trade deficit        Real GDP         Ratio of first to second

1Q 2019:              -6.09 percent                   3.13 percent                 -1.95:1

4Q 2018:               6.41 percent                   2.15 percent                  2.98:1

3Q 2018:             11.66 percent                   3.31 percent                  3.52:1

2Q 2018:             -5.90 percent                    4.10 percent                -1.44:1

1Q 2018:              1.35 percent                    2.20 percent                 0.61:1

2018:                  12.74 percent                    2.86 percent                 4.45:1

2017:                    6.75 percent                    2.22 percent                 3.04:1

2016:                    2.66 percent                    1.57 percent                 1.69:1

2015:                  22.63 percent                    2.88 percent                 7.86:1

2014:                  15.88 percent                    2.45 percent                 6.48:1

2013:                    6.15 percent                    1.84 percent                 3.34:1

2012:                 10.23 percent                     2.25 percent                 4.57:1

2011:                 11.92 percent                     1.55 percent                 7.69:1

2010:                30.71 percent                      2.56 percent              12.00:1

Another way to compare the Obama and Trump years in this respect: As previously noted on RealityChek, the constant dollar 3.21 percent GDP growth registered between the first quarter of 2018 and the first quarter of 2019 was the best such four-quarter growth stretch since the second quarter of 2014 and the second quarter of 2015 (when real growth was 3.37 percent).

Yet during that Obama high growth period, the real Made in Washington trade deficit shot up by 18.83 percent. During the Trump high growth period, this trade shortfall rose by only 4.99 percent.

The higher and broader tariffs on China threatened by the President to press Beijing in the current trade talks would represent the biggest test yet of the Trump policies’ impact on the health of America’s growth. But the March trade figures are the latest evidence that so far, they’ve passed such tests with flying colors.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Latest Sign of Trump Success on Trade

Tags

exports, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, Made in Washington trade deficit, non-oil goods trade deficit, real exports, real GDP, real growth, real imports, real non-oil goods trade deficit, real trade deficit, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s still not possible to say confidently that the impact of tariff-related distortions are over (at least for the foreseeable future), and that President Trump’s trade policies are once again enabling the U.S. economy to grow strongly faster than its debt-producing trade deficits (i.e., more healthily and sustainably). That moment won’t arrive until May 9, when the last of the monthly trade figures for the first quarter of this year will be reported (at least in a preliminary form).

But Friday’s initial first quarter results for the gross domestic product (GDP – the main measure of the economy’s size and its growth), bring the moment a good deal closer.

Just to recap the main issue: I’ve explained on RealityChek (e.g., here) and elsewhere (e.g., here) that the real measure of Mr. Trump’s trade policy success or failure isn’t the level of U.S. trade deficits presented in isolation. It’s whether the economy can grow at adequate rates without pulling in ever more imports – which are both bought by consumers and used by producers as parts, components, and materials for their final products. Either way, though, their increases on net plunge America deeper and deeper into debt.

With anything as big as the American economy, trends don’t reverse themselves quickly. So the best evidence of change would indicate that the relevant arc is starting to bend in the right direction. In this case, that means signs that growth becomes or remains adequate as the growth of the trade deficit slows. That’s exactly the story that could be told convincingly with some of the latest releases of trade-related numbers (see, e.g., here and here), and that the new first quarter GDP results strengthened further.

First, it’s important to note that the new advance data show that, after adjusting for inflation, as of the first quarter, the U.S. economy grew at its fastest pace over a four-quarter period (3.21 percent) since the second quarter, 2014-second quarter, 2015 period (3.37 percent).

But the first sign that the new growth has been healthier growth emerges when the change in the real trade deficit is examined. During that previous, somewhat faster, growth period, the price-adjusted trade gap widened by 21.55 percent. During the last growth period, which was only slightly slower, the trade deficit actually shrank slightly – by 0.34 percent.

As known by RealityChek regulars, though, changes in the overall real trade deficit have only limited utility for judging the usefulness of American trade policy because the total flows include oil and services trade. The first is rarely the subject of trade diplomacy or policy-making, and liberalization of the latter has made only embryonic progress so far.

The portion of the trade shortfall most heavily influenced by trade policy decisions is that in non-oil goods – what I’ve called the Made in Washington trade deficit. Unfortunately, exact comparisons between the 2014-15 and 2018-19 growth periods can’t yet be made because even the preliminary results for the first quarter of this year won’t be published until the March trade data are released on May 9.

But between the second quarter of 2014 and the second quarter of 2015, the Made in Washington trade deficit jumped by 18.83 percent. Between the first two months of 2018 and the first two months of 2019, it increased by only 3.17 percent. And because of the fading of the tariff front-running effect (described in this post), it’s highly unlikely that the March and full first quarter numbers will change this arc significantly.

The improving trade deficit and its contribution to healthier economic performance also can be seen by examining the contribution made by that better balance to quarterly growth. In the first quarter of 2019, the 5.90 percent sequential shrinkage of the trade gap was responsible for 1.03 percentage points of the 3.13 percent annualized sequential growth. That’s 32.91 percent of the total – and the highest such figure since the fourth quarter of 2013, when the trade deficit’s decrease fueled 1.23 percent points of the 3.19 percent annualized sequential growth (38.56 percent).

Some other trade-related highlights of the new GDP report:

>Combined goods and services exports in the first quarter hit a new record of $2.5765 trillion at an annual rate.

>Real goods exports were up, too, quarter-to-quarter. But their $1.7598 trillion annualized first quarter total was only the second all-time highest (after the $1.8092 trillion in the second quarter of 2018).

>After-inflation services exports represented a fifth straight quarterly record ($783.2 billion annualized).

>Constant dollar total imports in the first quarter fell on-quarter but they still represented the third highest total on record – $3.4758 trillion at an annual rate.

>After-inflation goods imports also fell sequentially to their third highest all-time level – $2.9131 trillion.

>Real services imports dropped quarter-to-quarter to their second highest all-time level – $563.3 billion.