Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Biden’s Dangerously Loose Lips on Nuclear Weapons Policy

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alliances, allies, Baltics, Biden, Biden administration, China, deterrence, globalism, no first use, North Korea, nuclear weapons, Obama, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, semiconductors, South Korea, Soviet Union, Taiwan, Trump, Ukraine

As usual, headline news is coming so fast and furiously from so many different direections that lots of major developments get neglected (including by me). One of the most important pretty stunningly shows once again that those American leaders who most loudly proclaim themselves to be champions of the globalist approach to foreign policy, and of the U.S. security alliances they view as one of its greatest achievements (both for the United States and the globe at large) have once more been flirting seriously with ideas certain to destroy those alliances.

Specifically, I’m referring to recent reports (e.g., here) that the President Biden is considering endorsing a “no first use” (NFU) policy for America’s nuclear weapons arsenal.

The shift hasn’t yet been approved. A rethink hasn’t even been officially announced. And some of the anonymous sources who leaked this news to reporters (no doubt from inside the Biden administration, and no doubt as a trial balloon) claim that what’s being contemplated is changing to something similar to NFU but not identical to it.

But of course, trial balloons are floated precisely to evoke reactions to something that someone awfully high up in government (or whatever organization is doing the floating) thinks is a swell idea, and who’s confident that his or her boss thinks or would think so, too. Moreover, the difference between NFU and the variant being considered seems pretty academic at best.

Most important about this possible new Biden approach to national security is that it reveals this administration to be every bit as cynical and therefore unserious about the globalism and alliances it pretends to prioritize – and about its indignant and sanctimonious portrayals of the more skeptical views of critics like former President Trump as proof of their dangerous ignorance – as the Obama administration.

For as I explained five years ago when Obama entertained NFU right after slamming Trump literally as a foreign policy and specifically nuclear weapons know-nothing, even mulling such a new nuclear doctrine could undermine the very alliances that globalists like him exalted.

And the reason is simple: First use of nuclear weapons is the policy that for decades has enabled the United States to deter attacks on the allies credibly in the first place – and that has held these arrangements together. For long ago, Washington dismissed as impractical trying to match adversaries like the old Soviet Union, China, and North Korea in conventional forces. The first two could draw on populations that would always exceed America’s, and even when it came to relatively small antagonists like the latter, fielding such forces was considered too expensive to be sustained financially and politically.

Nuclear weapons, however, were relatively cheap, and American leaders judged that declaring their intent to respond to purely conventional attacks on allies by these countries by launching the nukes if non-nuclear forces proved inadequate would put the fear of God even in a nuclear superpower like the Soviet Union. And first use would even more effectively deter countries with tiny or non-existen nuclear forces of their own, like China and North Korea for decades.

Even when Beijing and Pyongyang built nuclear forces big and capable enough to call this U.S. bluff successfully at least in theory (because they could now wreak impressive nuclear destruction on the American homeland, too), American leaders put their trust in NFU. And if indeed protecting allies was the overriding priority of U.S. foreign policy, this judgement was at least defensible.

A NFU policy, though, or even trial balloons, could bring disastrous consequences. Either would risk emboldening the enemies of the United States and its allies by signaling that Washington would at the least hesitate to play its most formidable military card. Just as important, it’s hard to imagine a worst recent time than the present for indulging in such speculation. After all, not only does the United States no longer enjoy overwhelming nuclear edges over China and North Korea. But China and Russia have displayed ever greater interest in establishing or reestablishing effective control over small neighbors like Ukraine and the Baltic states and of course Taiwan.

In addition, a NFU policy or talk thereof could frighten allies into bailing on the United States and cutting the best deals they could with Moscow or Pyongyang or Beijing while they still had the chance. Alternatively, because sizable American forces remain right at or near the front lines at all three of these flashpoints, the absence of a first use policy could result in them getting caught up in unwinnable battles even if a U.S. President wanted to stay on the sidelines.

Finally, when we’re talking about Taiwan, of course, we’re talking about the place that now makes the world’s most advanced semiconductors – products that are central to both future American prosperity and national security. So as is not the case with Russia’s neighbors or even South Korea (an impressive semiconductor manufacturer in its own right), adopting NFU could result in the loss of a genuinely vital U.S. interest.

I’ve long favored fundamental changes in U.S. alliance and overall foreign policy and national security strategy. But that’s not the point here. If you like alliances, it’s really pretty simple: At a minimum, you either keep first use, or you greatly beef up U.S. conventional forces, or you convince the allies to fill whatever non-nuclear military force gaps you face, or you do all three or some combination of them. If you adopt NFU and fail to take offsetting steps on the conventional force front, be ready to kiss these arrangements goodbye.

From all accounts (see, e.g., here) the allies themselves recognize this. So does China. What’s scary is that even if the supposed adults-in-the-room and master strategists in the Biden administration eventually realize the stakes involved (as their Obama predecessors eventually did), they may have greatly undermined the nation’s safety – along with boosting the risks of conflict the world over.

Following Up: New Podcasts On-Line Covering the U.S.-China Trade War & Beijing’s U.S. Politics Meddling

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decoupling, economy, election 2020, elections, Following Up, Frank Morano, Gordon G. Chang, Obama, The American Conservative, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, trade war, Trump, WABC AM

I’m pleased to announce that the podcasts of two recent radio appearances are now on-line, and both focus on headline-making China-related issues.

The first is a recording of my interview last night on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show.  Click here for an incisive update on the fast-evolving trade and tech conflict between the world’s two largest economies provided by John, co-host Gordon G. Chang, and me.

The second reprises my session this morning with Frank Morano of New York City’s WABC-AM radio spanning a wide range of topics, from comparisons of the Trump and Obama economies to my new American Conservative article on China’s massive and massively under-reported efforts to interfere with U.S. politics and elections.  Here’s the link; my segment comes in at about the 7:40 mark.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other events.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Keeps Gaining Independence

Tags

Commerce Department, decoupling, GDP-by-industry, health security, healthcare goods, manufacturing, manufacturing production, manufacturing trade deficit, Obama, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Like a strike-shortened sports season’s champion, the conclusion in today’s RealityChek post needs an asterisk. The conclusion stems from this morning’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Industry report from the Commerce Department, which shows that U.S. domestic manufacturing continues to become ever more self-reliant. In other words, it’s reducing its dependence for growth on foreign-made industrial goods of all kinds generally speaking.

The asterisk is needed because the new data covers the first quarter of this year, and therefore it includes March – when much of the U.S economy was shut down by government order or recommendation due to the CCP Virus. As a result, a chunk of the results say nothing about how manufacturing or the rest of economy would have performed in normal times.

Still, this morning’s evidence that U.S.-based industry is becoming more autonomous comes from several different findings calculable from the GDP by Industry’s raw data.

For example, again, due partly to the shutdowns’ effects, the report shows that according to a widely followed measure called value-added, domestic manufacturing’s output dipped by 0.99 percent between the first quarter of 2019 and the first quarter of this year. At the same time, the manufacturing trade deficit during this period shrank by 7.31 percent – more than 13 times faster. During the last comparable period (fourth quarter, 2018 to fourth quarter, 2019), manufacturing production grew by 0.70 percent, and its trade gap narrowed by 7.59 percent – a somewhat better performance on both scores.

At this point it’s vital to note that these growth rates are by no means good. In fact, they’re the worst by far since the final year of the Obama administration – when on a calendar year basis, domestic industry shrank by 1.19 percent. Yet during that same year 2016, despite this contraction, the manufacturing trade shortfall expanded by 4.66 percent. So if you value self-sufficiency (as you should in a world in which the United States has found itself painfully short of many healthcare-related goods, and in which dozens of its trade partners were hoarding their own supplies), it’s clear that during 2016, the nation was getting the worst of all possible manufacturing worlds.

Also important: there’s no doubt that the same Trump administration tariffs and trade wars with which domestic manufacturing has been dealing over the past two years have slowed its growth. In other words, industry has been adjusting to policy-created pressures to adjust its global, and in particular China-centric, supply chains. That’s bound to create inefficiencies.

If you don’t care about significant American economic reliance on an increasingly hostile dictatorship, you’ll carp about paying any efficiency price for this decoupling from China (and other unreliable countries). If you do care, you’ll recognize the slower growth as an adjustment cost needed to correct the disastrous choice made by pre-Trump Presidents to undercut America’s economic independence severely.

Moreover, during the last year, domestic manufacturing output was held back by two developments that had nothing to do with President Trump’s trade policy: the strike at General Motors in the fall of 2019, which slashed U.S. production both of vehicles and parts, and of all the components and materials that comprise dedicated auto parts; and the safety problems at Boeing, which resulted in the grounding of its popular 737 Max model worldwide starting in March, 2019, and in a suspension of all that aircraft’s production this past January.

Also encouraging from a self-reliance standpoint. During the first quarter of 2019, the manufacturing trade deficit as a percentage of domestic manufacturing output sank from just under 43 percent in the fourth quarter of 2019 (and 43.36 percent for the entirety of last year) to 37.27 percent. That’s the lowest level since full-year 2013’s 35.82 percent.

These figures should make clear that the manufacturing trade deficit’s share of manufacturing output kept growing during the final Obama years and into the Trump years. Indeed, on an annual basis, this number peaked at 47.01 percent in the third quarter of 2019. To some extent, blame what I’ve previously identified as tariff front-running (the rush by importers throughout the trade war to bring product into the United States before threatened tariffs were actually imposed) along with those supply chain-related adjustment costs.

To complicate matters further, as suggested above, that very low first quarter result stemmed partly from the nosedive taken by manufacturing and other U.S. economic activity in March. Since that level is clearly artificially low, it’s probably going to bob up eventually – but hopefully not recover fully.

In all, though, the first quarter GDP by Industry report points to a future of more secure supplies of manufactured goods for Americans. And unless you believe that domestic manufacturers have completely lost their ability to adjust successfully to a (needed) New Normal in U.S. trade policy, the release points to a return of solid manufacturing output growth rates as well.

Im-Politic: Biden’s Massive China Fakery

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2020 election, Biden, CCP Virus, CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, China, China trade deal, coronavirus, COVID 19, currency, currency manipulation, Hunter Biden, Im-Politic, Joe Biden, Obama, Trade, travel ban, WHO, World Health Organization, World Trade Organization, WTO, Wuhan virus, xenophobia

Imagine the gall that would’ve been required had Republican nominee Mitt Romney campaigned for President in 2012 by blaming incumbent Barack Obama for the financial crisis and Great Recession of 2007-09. Not only did these economic disasters erupt well before Obama took office, but the White House at that time had been held for eight years by the GOP. (The Democrats did win control of the House and Senate in the 2006 midterm elections, but still….) 

Multiply that gall many times over and you get this year’s presumptive Democratic candidate for President, Joe Biden, charging that Donald Trump is largely responsible for the devastating hit the nation is taking from the CCP Virus because Mr. Trump has been too soft on China. The Biden claims are much more contemptible because whereas Romney played no role in bringing on the Wall Street meltdown and subsequent near-depression, Biden has long supported many of the China policies that have both greatly enriched and militarily strengthened the People’s Republic, and sent key links in America’s supply chains for producing vital healthcare-related goods offshore – including to a China that has threatened the United States with healthcare supplies blackmail.

The Biden campaign’s most comprehensive indictment of President Trump’s China and CCP Virus policies was made in this release, titled “Trump Rolled Over for China.” Its core claim:

“We’d say Trump is weak on China, but that’s an understatement. Trump rolled over in a way that has been catastrophic for our country. He did nothing for months because he put himself and his political fortunes first. He refused to push China on its coronavirus response and delayed taking action to mitigate the crisis in an effort not to upset Beijing and secure a limited trade deal that has largely gone unfulfilled.”

More specifically, the Biden organization claims that even long before the pandemic broke out, Mr. Trump has “never followed through” on his 2016 campaign’s “big promises about being tough on China” and simply conducted “reckless trade policies that pushed farmers and manufacturers to the brink” before he was “forced to make concessions to China without making any progress toward a level playing field for American industry.”

I’d say “the mind reels” but that phrase doesn’t begin to capture the mendacity at work here. Not to mention the sheer incompetence. After all, the trade deal was signed on January 15. It was only two weeks before that China told the World Health Organization (WHO) that an unknown illness had appeared in Wuhan. On January 3, China officially notified the U.S. government. It was only the day before the trade deal signing that WHO broadcast to the world China’s claim (later exposed as disastrously erroneous – at best) that no evidence of person-to-person transmission had been found. It wasn’t until the very day of the deal signing that the individual who became the first known American virus case left Wuhan and arrived in the United States. It wasn’t until January 21 that the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) confirmed him as the first American victim.  (See this timeline for specifics.)

So evidently the Biden folks don’t know how to read a calendar.

Meanwhile, in early January, The New York Times has reported, CDC offered to send a team of its specialists to China to observe conditions and offer assistance. China never replied. On January 7, four days after Washington received its first CCP Virus notification, but two weeks before it identified the first U.S. virus case, the CDC began planning for tests. We now know that it bungled this challenge badly.

But did Trump coddle China in order to keep Beijing from terminating the agreement? Surely Biden’s team isn’t calling that failure an effort to appease China. It’s also true that on February 7, the Trump administration announced its readiness to provide Beijing with $100 million worth of anti-virus aid to China (and other countries), and had just sent nearly 18 tons of medical supplies (including protective gear) to help the People’s Republic combat the pandemic. But is the Biden campaign condemning these actions? From its indictment, it’s clear that its focus instead is on the numerous Trump statements praising China’s anti-virus performance and transparency, and reassuring the American public that the situation was under control.

Where, however, is the evidence that these remarks amounted to the President treating China with kid gloves, and stemmed from desperation to save the trade deal? Just as important, here we come to a fundamental incoherence in Biden’s treatment of the agreement – descriptions that are so flatly contradictory that they reek of flailing. After all, on the one hand, the Phase One agreement is dismissed as a fake that fails to safeguard American trade and broader economic interests adequately. On the other, it assumes that China has been eager from the start to call the whole thing off. Yet if Phase One had accomplished so little from the U.S. standpoint, wouldn’t Beijing actually have been focused on sustaining this charade?

But even if the Biden read on trade deal politics is correct, how to explain the January 31 Trump announcement of major restrictions on inbound travel from China that went into effect February 2? Clearly China didn’t like it. Or were these reactions part of a secret plot between the American and Chinese Presidents to snow their respective publics and indeed the entire world?

How, moreover, to explain such Trump administration policies as the continuing crackdown on Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei, and its effort to kick out of the U.S. market  Chinese services provider China Telecom? Or the ongoing intensification of the Justice Department’s campaign against Chinese espionage efforts centered on U.S. college and university campuses? Or yesterday’s administration announcement that although some payments of U.S. tariffs on imports would be deferred in order to help hard-pressed American retailers survive the CCP Virus-induced national economic shutdown, the steep tariffs on literally hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of prospective imports from China would remain firmly in place?

In addition, all these measures of course put the lie to another central Biden claim – that Mr. Trump is not only soft on China today, but has been soft since his inauguration. A bigger goof – or whopper – can scarcely be imagined.

Unless it’s the companion Biden insistence that the Trump trade wars have devastated American agriculture and manufacturing? When, as documented painstakingly here, U.S. farm prices began diving into the dumps well before the Trump 2016 victory (when Biden himself was second-in-command in America)? When manufacturing, as documented equally painstakingly, went through the mildest recession conceivable, when its output was clearly hobbled by Boeing’s completely un-tradewar-related safety woes), and when every indication during the pre-virus weeks pointed to rebound? When the raging inflation widely predicted to stem from the tariffs has been absolutely nowhere in sight?

Which leaves the biggest lies of all: The claim that Biden is being tough on China now – the promise that he’ll “hold China accountable,” and the implication that he’s always been far-sighted and hard-headed in dealing with Beijing

According to the campaign’s Trump indictment, the former Vice President “publicly warned Trump in February not to take China’s word” on its anti-virus efforts. But this Biden warning didn’t come until February 26. As to making China pay, the campaign offers zero specifics – and given Biden’s staunch opposition to Mr. Trump’s tariffs (and silence on the other, major elements of the Trump approach to China) it’s legitimate to ask what on earth he’s talking about. In addition, Biden insinuated that the Trump curbs on travel from China were “xenophobia” the very day they were announced – before pushback prompted him to endorse them.

Finally, the Biden China record has been dreadful by any real-world standards. In the words of this analysis from the Cato Institute, “he voted consistently to maintain normal trade relations with China, including permanent NTR in 2000” – meaning that he favored the disastrous decision to admit China into the World Trade Organization (WTO), which gave Beijing invaluable protection against unilateral U.S. efforts to combat its pervasive trade predation. He did apparently vote once for sanctions to punish China for its currency manipulation (which has artificially under-priced goods made in China and thereby given them government-created advantages against any competition), but many such Senate trade votes were purely for show. (I apologize for not being able to find the specific reference, and will nail down the matter in an addendum and post as soon as possible.)  

Revealingly, once he was in the Obama administration, he failed to lift a finger to continue the battle against this Chinese exchange-rate protectionism, and served as the President’s “leading pitchman” for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, whose provisions would have handed China many of the benefits of membership without imposing any of the obligations. More generally, there’s no evidence of any Biden words or actions opposing an Obama strategy that greatly enriched the People’s Republic, and therefore supercharged its military potential and actual power. 

For good measure, despite constant bragging that his personal contact with numerous foreign leaders during his Senate and Vice Presidential years, he completely misjudged Xi Jinping, writing in a 2011 article that the Chinese dictator (then heir apparent to the top job in Beijing) “agrees” that “we have a stake in each other’s success” and that “On issues from global security to global economic growth, we share common challenges and responsibilities — and we have incentives to work together.”

There clearly are many valid reasons to support Biden’s Presidential bid.  But if China’s rise and its implications worry you (as they should), then the former Vice President’s record of dealing with Beijing just as clearly shouldn’t be one of them. 

Im-Politic: Why Trump’s Ukraine China Ask Was So (Needlessly) Stupid

Tags

China, collusion, conflict of interest, Democrats, election 2020, Hunter Biden, Im-Politic, impeachment, Ivanka Trump, Joe Biden, Obama, Pelosi, Swamp, Trump, Trump-Russia, Ukraine

It’s lucky for President Trump that being stupid per se isn’t (yet?) grounds for impeachment, because if it was, his recent call for Beijing’s aid to investigate the Biden family’s possibly corrupt activities in China would surely qualify. In fact, it’s hard to think of a presidential action in recent memory that fails on so many substantive and political grounds. And no, I don’t agree with Florida Republican Senator Marco Rubio that the President was simply trying to troll the press.

Even so, it’s still possible that this episode could have a silver lining for Trump-World.

First, let me repeat my previous position that there’s absolutely nothing wrong with Mr. Trump probing Hunter Biden’s business dealings in China, Ukraine, or anywhere else, and whether they’ve improperly or illegally influenced U.S. policy toward those countries while his father was Barack Obama’s Vice President. In fact, since the current challenges and opportunities facing Americans nowadays from both countries have been strongly affected by policy decisions made during the Obama years, every American caring about the nation’s interests should want to know more about the Bidens’ goings on.

Nor should Joe Biden’s presidential bid this year shield him from scrutiny. In fact, as the President has pointed out in remarks on the Bidens and China, the former Vice President’s White House bid makes full disclosure absolutely essential. After all, as Mr. Trump has asked, “How would you like to have, as an example, Joe Biden negotiating the China deal if he took it over from me after the election? He would give them everything. He would give them everything. How would you like to have that?”

Can Americans be certain that a President Biden would sell his country down the river in China trade talks or on other fronts? Of course not. Can they be certain that Biden let China off the hook on various important interests, or urged doing so, since Hunter (successfully) began soliciting Chinese business in 2010? No on that score, too. But the uncertainties created and the undoubted, ongoing possibility of various payoffs are precisely why conflict of interest laws are on the books to begin with.

Moreover, conflicts of interest are especially important to investigate when it comes to countries like China and Ukraine. For there, governments and/or the oligarchs to which they’re closely connected call all the major economic and business shots.

Of course, claims abound that Mr. Trump is vulnerable to comparable (or even worse) charges. But regarding the Russia allegations, they’ve been big news since his 2016 Republican primary campaign began gathering real steam. In addition, after his inauguration, they were thoroughly examined by a Special Counsel probe that lasted nearly two years. And so far he’s still innocent until proven guilty in a legal sense. In addition, and revealingly, the current impeachment probe isn’t attempting to revive any of these charges.

Policy-wise, the Trump Russia record has been mixed, including support for measures (like strengthening the U.S. military presence in Eastern Europe right up against Russia’s borders, and strongly backing the American fossil fuels production revolution), that plainly aren’t pleasing Moscow.

It’s true that Trump daughter Ivanka operated a business that made shoes and apparel in China and imported these wares into the United States. I’d joined the ranks of those who believed those ties should have been severed at least once Mr. Trump became the Republican nominee. But Ivanka Trump has now shut down her China business. And can anyone seriously believe that in return for whatever copyrights she received from Beijing while her father was in office, that the President has taken it easy with China? After tariffs on literally hundreds of billions of dollars worth of Chinese products that have deeply wounded China’s economy? And a Taiwan policy that has poked Beijing in the eye on an issue of deep importance to China’s leaders and many of its people?

By contrast, it’s entirely legitimate – and important – to point out that the Obama-Biden record on both China trade and security issues was an eight-year exercise in coddling Beijing.

And both leaders’ records get to much of the reason why the President’s ask to Beijing was so boneheaded. Whether the Bidens are playing dirty or not, how can it help but legitimately expose Mr. Trump to the same kinds of conflict-of-interest charges he’s leveling against Biden? Indeed, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi is now making them. Moreover, it’s not as if China has anything like an impartial, rule-of-law-dominated criminal justice system. And let’s not forget the so-called political optics of his gambit at precisely the time when Beijing is violently repressing democratic protests in Hong Kong. “Appalling” isn’t too strong an adjective.

Just as bad, the President’s ask undercuts one of his most effective campaign themes – that for decades, his predecessors and their cronies had conspired with foreign governments like China’s to shaft everyday Americans on trade issues in particular. Just think back to his Inaugural Address. So now the same Chinese regime that’s conspired with Swamp-ers from both parties is supposed to help a President damage someone he’s labeled (with good reason) as a prime member of that corrupt complex?

The only justification I can think of for the China ask – at least politically – is the following (and don’t think I’ve got a lot of faith in this speculation): Now that Beijing has brushed off the President, he could turn around and contend that the Chinese are helping the Bidens cover up. Substantively – and whether this objective is being sought intentionally or not – the China ask could result in Mr. Trump taking a harder line on the trade talks.

More credibly, and encouraging in my eyes given my doubt that any verifiable China trade deal is possible: Even had Beijing complied, the President could come under enough Pelosi-like pressure to make impossible the kind of cosmetic deal that in principle could have solved some big potential China-related political problems heading into the election (i.e., with farmers angered at losing a big export market, or consumers outraged at tariff-induced higher prices).

The problem is that constructing these kinds of tortuous scenarios should be completely unnecessary, because, as I’ve stated,

>the Bidens’ conduct has been so questionable;

>the China-related case against them looks so compelling:

>Mr. Trump surely can get enough damning foreign government information about their doings from less substantively and politically controversial sources like Australia and, yes, Ukraine (to which the Democrats seem strongly devoted); and

>consumer and farmer complaints aside, the Democrats will have a devil of a time this coming election year making political hay by accusing the President of being too tough on China.

So the China ask looks an awful lot like another damaging and completely unforced Trump error. Nonetheless, the next time such a blunder seals his political fate will be the first. And even though my above scenario is pretty far-fetched, who can still confidently say that the President’s string of good luck has finally run out?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Economic and Political Productivity Puzzles

Tags

labor productivity, manufacturing, non-farm business, Obama, productivity, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s U.S. labor productivity data time – in other words, the point at which all Americans interested in their economy and its future should be examining the latest news about a major measure of economic efficiency that speaks volumes about the nation’s chances of boosting living standards on a healthy, sustainable, rather than bubble-ized and therefore dangerous, basis.

And the Labor Department figures released last week continue to show a split personality performance: decent results for non-farm businesses (the Department’s main category for the economy as a whole), and woeful, worsening results for manufacturing.

According to these revised numbers for the second quarter of the year, output per each hour on the job by each worker (the narrower but most timely of two productivity measures tracked by Labor), increased over the first quarter’s level by the same 2.3 percent annual rate initially reported. In manufacturing, however, the originally published 1.6 percent annualized sequential decline is now judged to be a 2.2 percent drop – the worst such performance since the four percent nosedive in the third quarter of 2017.

As shown in the table below, the new data leave the current economic expansion (which began in mid-2009) as a major labor productivity laggard. After all, the cumulative growth rate for non-farm businesses is little better than half that of the 1990s expansion, even though they lasted for approximately the same period of time. And it’s even slower than the labor productivity growth rate of the bubble decade’s expansion – which was about 40 percent shorter. As for manufacturing, the table makes clear that the deterioration has been much greater.

                                                                          Non-farm business    Manufacturing

1990s expansion (2Q 1991-1Q 2001):                 +23.74 percent      +45.86 percent

bubble expansion (4Q 2001-4Q 2007):                +16.59 percent     +30.23 percent

current expansion (2Q 2009 thru prelim 2Q 19):  +12.80 percent      +9.19 percent

current expansion (2Q 09 thru revised 2Q 19):     +12.80 percent      +9.02 percent

Nonetheless, the new figures do contain some good news for President Trump. So far during his administration, overall labor productivity has grown faster than during the last comparable period under former President Obama. Manufacturing labor productivity has grown more slowly, but the difference is only fractional:

                                                                         Non-Farm business   Manufacturing

last 8 Obama quarters:                                         +1.33 percent        +0.38 percent

first 8 Trump quarters:                                         +3.46 percent        +0.25 percent

Even better, although the second quarter’s non-farm business annualized 2.3 percent labor productivity growth was lower than the first quarter’s 3.5 percent, the trend under Mr. Trump has generally been up. During those last two Obama years, the growth rate slowed significantly. In manufacturing, however, the momentum picture has been the reverse – modest but overall strengthening under Obama, major weakening under Mr. Trump.

One reason for this recent manufacturing deterioration could actually be good news politically for the President and his supporters: During his months in office so far, manufacturing workers’ compensation cumulatively has risen at more than twice the rate (8.52 percent) than during the final eight quarters of the Obama administration (4.06 percent). And workers, of course, are often voters.

Yet this development brings up a real puzzle: When it comes to non-farm businesses, the Trump productivity performance has been considerably better than the Obama even though compensation under the current administration has also risen much faster (11.30 percent cumulatively) than during the comparable period under the previous administration (6.96 percent).

On the one hand, puzzling productivity results aren’t all that puzzling, since most economists admit that it’s the performance measure that’s the most difficult to track. On the other, these Obama-Trump puzzles look pretty mysterious even by productivity’s standards.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The New Jobs Report’s Wage Details are Mixed, Too – Economically and Politically

Tags

inflation-adjusted wages, Jobs, manufacturing, Obama, private sector, real wages, Trump, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The latest U.S. government report on the nation’s employment picture (for August) produced unusually mixed jobs results. (See, e.g., this report.) Maybe that’s why analysts seem to have missed one of its more encouraging takeaways: Hourly wages in the manufacturing sector, which have remained weak throughout the current economic expansion and into the Trump era, have picked up notably so far this year.

Yet the new data also make clear that, when it comes to the gap between U.S. blue-collar workers’ in the private sector overall and those of their better paid white-collar counterparts, the former have lost some ground under the Trump administration, even though their hourly wages are up in absolute terms.

So for a President who’s going to run for reelection largely as a populist champion of forgotten Americans, the August results were unusually mixed as well. 

That manufacturing-specific pickup has taken place in pre-inflation wages, and we won’t get the latest constant dollar figures until this coming Thursday. But the progress before adjusting for price changes (and don’t forget – inflation has been awfully low lately) has been so notable that, for now, manufacturing wages’ performance is no longer worsening in comparison with the trends in the overall private sector. Indeed, the gap has narrowed a smidge.

Chiefly, from this January through August, current dollar manufacturing wages are up 2.09 percent. That’s the best such increase since 2008 (2.44 percent) – when the economy was still mired in recession, and employers’ tendency to jettison less experienced and thus more poorly paid workers produced a statistical wage increase for the remaining manufacturing workforce.

Moreover, this improvement was slightly faster than the two percent rise achieved by the private sector overall – also the best such performance since 2008 (2.36 percent). (This Labor Department wage series only goes back to 2006.)

The story is similar for blue-collar workers in both manufacturing and the private sector overall. (Data for these wages in the overall private sector goes back all the way to 1964 and for manufacturing to 1939.) For blue-collar manufacturing workers (called “production and nonsupervisory employees” by the Labor Department), January-through-August pre-inflation hourly pay is up 1.74 percent. That’s of course less than for the manufacturing workforce as a whole, but it’s the best such number since 2016 (1.98 percent) and, perhaps more important, the second best since 2006.

For the overall private sector, current-dollar blue-collar wages have advanced by 2.08 percent between January and August of this year. That’s their best such performance since 2008’s 2.48 percent.

As a result, from the beginning of the current economic recovery (mid-2009) this August, overall pre-inflation private sector wages had risen 1.2906 times faster than comparable hourly pay in manufacturing. That’s ever-so-slightly slower (but still slower) than the ratio through last August (1.294 times faster).

Manufacturing’s relative improvement was greater for blue-collar workers. From the mid-2009 beginning of the current economic recovery through this August, private sector nonsupervisory etc current dollar hourly wages have risen 1.2131 times faster than blue-collar manufacturing wages. That’s a smaller gap than the 1.228:1 ratio from the recovery onset through last August.

Nonetheless, the data show that, after narrowing slightly under former President Obama, the pre-inflation hourly wage difference between blue-collar and white-collar workers overall has been growing slightly again under President Trump.

When the recovery began, in mid-2009, private sector production and non-supervisory workers’ hourly wages were 83.83 percent of the wages earned private sector workers overall. By January, 2017 – the last Obama month in office, this figure had grown to 83.99 percent. As of this August, however, it’s back down to 83.92 percent.

Interestingly, the Trump record looks better when only the manufacturing trends are examined. In mid-2009, blue-collar manufacturing wages stood at 78.93 percent of manufacturing wages overall before inflation. By January, 2017, the share had dipped to 78.25 percent. The latest statistics show that it’s grown to 79.88 percent.

None of these changes is anywhere close to dramatic – a timely reminder, as a presidential campaign year rapidly approaches, that the U.S. economy really is akin to a supertanker, and barring sudden catastrophes or windfalls, typically takes a frustratingly long time to turn significantly.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is Growth’s Quality Again Turning for the Worse?

Tags

bubbles, Financial Crisis, GDP, Great Recession, gross domestic product, housing, inflation-adjusted growth, Obama, personal consumption, real GDP, real growth, toxic combination, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

“The consumer will save us,” or some variation thereof, has become a rallying cry for those believing that the U.S. economy will avoid recession, at least for the foreseeable future. For RealityChek regulars, however, it’s a red flag, possibly revealing that too many economy watchers have forgotten, or never learned, the most important lesson of the global financial crisis of the previous decade and the Great Recession it triggered: The quality of American growth matters at least as much as the quantity – and more specifically, economic expansion that’s too heavily reliant on consuming rather than producing is too likely to end in tears.

That’s why last week’s latest official report on America’s economic growth has me somewhat worried. It’s true, as I reported, that it contained some good news on the trade front, showing a continuing Trump administration trend of decent growth rates no longer tightly linked with huge, soaring trade deficits. But the figures (the second look of three looks at the second quarter’s performance – at least for the time being) also confirm major backsliding when it comes to the domestic determinants of healthy and unhealthy growth – a big surge in the role of consumption and housing combined as growth engines. That’s exactly the toxic combination that inflated the last decade’s historic bubble. And it could become a reversal of a positive Trump-period trend.

According to those official data, consumption and housing in the second quarter fueled 150 percent of that period’s 2.02 percent annualized inflation-adjusted growth – the most closely followed measure of change in gross domestic product (GDP – economists’ term for the economy as a whole). A figure greater than 100 percent, by the way, is possible because other components of GDP can subtract from growth – and in the second quarter, obviously did..

That 150 percent figure is the biggest by far since the third and fourth quarters of 2015. The only saving grace for that figure is that back in 2015, much stronger performance in personal consumption and housing was producing only roughly comparable overall growth.

The second quarter numbers are somewhat better on a standstill basis, but point in the wrong direction as well. From March through June this year, the toxic combination represented 72.67 percent of the economy in constant dollar terms. That’s the highest level since the fourth quarter of 2017 (72.87 percent). Moreover, back then, the economy was growing a good deal faster (at a 3.50 versus a 2.02 percent annual rate).

None of this means that the U.S. economy is now firmly on an unhealthy growth track. In fact, the worrisome second quarter “growth contribution” figures followed an especially good first quarter. From January through March, personal consumption and housing together produced only 23.87 percent of that stretch’s solid 3.01 percent annualized real growth – the lowest such figure since the fourth quarter of 2011 (16.38 percent of 4.64 percent annualized growth).

On a standstill basis, the last time that the toxic combination represented a lower share of the total economy in real terms was the fourth quarter of 2015 (72.15 percent). And during that period, there was almost (0.13 percent) real annualized economic growth.

Further, the Trump healthy growth record so far is better than the record during President Obama’s two terms in office. During the latter’s administrations, the toxic combination generated 80.74 percent of its $2.2537 trillion in after-inflation growth. Under President Trump, personal consumption plus housing has been responsible for 72.64 percent of $1.002 trillion of such growth. (Both calculations begin the these two administrations in the second quarter of their first year in office, since Inauguration Day doesn’t take place until January 20.)

Real growth, moreover, has been somewhat faster so far. Over 32 quarters, the U.S. economy grew by 18.44 percent after inflation under Obama. Over nine Trump quarters, the economy has become 5.56 percent larger – which translates into 19.80 percent growth over a 32-quarter stretch. All in all, that’s a pretty good reflection on this President’s performance.

Economically, though, the big question is whether it will continue. And politically, it’s whether it will suffice, in tandem with any other perceived strengths, to bring a second Trump term.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Healthier U.S. Growth is Continuing, at Least Trade-Wise

Tags

exports, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, Obama, real GDP, real growth, real trade deficit, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Since we’re clearly well into the 2020 presidential campaign, comparisons understandably have begun to be made by political and even economic types between President Trump’s economic record and that of his White House predecessor, Barack Obama.

In that vein, today’s new official U.S. figures on economic growth contain some good news for Mr. Trump, his supporters – and in fact for Americans collectively:  Even though they confirm that the nation’s growth this year is indeed slowing, and the trade deficit targeted for reduction by the President is going up, the latest numbers on the gross domestic product (GDP) also show that inflation-adjusted growth (the growth figure most closely followed) during the Trump years is still less closely associated with trade deficit increases than under Obama. In other words, by one important measure, the economy’s expansion is healthier – more of it is being generated by producing goods and services at home, instead of consuming imported goods and services.

The new numbers – which are the first of two sets of revisions for the second quarter of the year that will be released this year – don’t indicate progress at first glance. The real trade deficit, originally reported at $978.7 billion on an annualized basis, is now judged to have been $982.5 billion. That’s just a bit less than the record $983 billion figure that was hit in the fourth quarter of last year.

Moreover, total exports were revised down ($2.5205 trillion annualized to $2.5165 trillion annualized). Total imports were less than first reported as well, but only by a hair – $3.4990 trillion rather than $3.4992 trillion. And worse, quarter-to-quarter after-inflation total exports are now off by 1.48 percent, and after-inflation total imports are up 0.02 percent. Indeed, that real export fall-off was the biggest quarterly decrease since the depths of the last recession – when they cratered by 8.08 percent in the first quarter of 2009.

But despite this seeming backsliding, the Trump record has been much more impressive when examined in the context of economic growth. This conclusion emerges by examining how fast the economy has increased in constant dollar terms versus how fast the trade deficit has widened under the two administrations. Here are the calendar year annual rates of change for each, followed by the ratio between the two:

Obama years

                        real GDP       real trade deficit      deficit growth to GDP growth

09-10:          2.56 percent       16.73 percent                        6.54:1

10-11:          1.55 percent         0.39 percent                        0.25:1

11-12:          2.25 percent        -0.09 percent                      -0.04:1

12-13:          1.84 percent        -6.30 percent                      -3.42:1

13-14:         2.53 percent          8.33 percent                        3.29:1

14-15:         2.91 percent        25.02 percent                        8.60:1

15-16:         1.69 percent          8.61 percent                        5:09:1

Trump years

16-17:        2.37 percent          8.43 percent                        3.56:1

17-18:        2.93 percent          8.37 percent                        2.86:1

These tables show that only once during the Obama years (2013-14) did the economy grow at Trump-like rates while keeping real trade deficit growth within modest Trump-like ranges.  And although the that real trade deficit did shrink in absolute terms in two of the Obama years (2011-12 and 2012-13), economic growth during those two years were subpar. 

Moreover, the 2017-18 Trump results were distorted by major tariff front-running – the rush by importers to get their goods into the United States before announced tariffs raised their prices.

In addition, although 2019 isn’t yet finished, the Trump ratios so far look relatively good as well – especially for the first quarter.

                           real GDP     real trade deficit      deficit growth to GDP growth

4Q18-1Q19:    3.06 percent    -3.97 percent                        -1.30:1

1Q19-2Q19:    2.02 percent     4.07 percent                          2.01:1

The Trump record looks better still when presented on a rolling four quarters basis. This time the frame of reference will be a little different. We’ll focus on the high growth Obama period through the end of that administration, and compare it with the high growth Trump period through the present.

Obama years

                          real GDP        real trade deficit      deficit growth to GDP growth

1Q14-1Q15:   3.98 percent       26.68 percent                       6.70:1

2Q14-2Q15:   3.35 percent       21.34 percent                       6.37:1

3Q14-3Q15    2.44 percent       30.60 percent                     12.54:1

4Q14-4Q15:   1.90 percent       21.83 percent                     11.49:1

1Q15-1Q16:   1.62 percent       11.72 percent                       7.23:1

2Q15-2Q16:   1.34 percent         9.59 percent                      7.16:1

3Q15-3Q16:   1.56 percent         2.42 percent                      1.55:1

4Q15-4Q16:   2.03 percent       10.87 percent                      5.35:1

1Q16-1Q17:   2.10 percent         6.92 percent                      3.30:1

Trump years

4Q16-4Q17:   2.80 percent         5.90 percent                      2.11:1

1Q17-1Q18:   2.86 percent         6.34 percent                      2.22:1

2Q17-2Q18:   3.20 percent         0.06 percent                      0.19:1

3Q17-3Q18:   3.13 percent       15.44 percent                      4.93:1

4Q17-4Q18    2.52 percent       11.22 percent                      4.45:1

1Q18-1Q19:   2.65 percent         6.76 percent                     2.55:1

2Q18-2Q19:   2.28 percent       15.52 percent                     6.81:1

Again, under the Trump administration, the economy has managed to expand healthily in real terms while keeping the trade deficit’s increase under control much more often than under the Obama administration. Although the third and fourth quarter figures look like they undermine this case, in fact, they clearly demonstrate the impact of tariff front-running.  The only genuine fly in the Trump ointment so far: that final set of figures, when the price-adjusted trade deficit rose 6.81 times faster than the economy grew in those terms, while the rate of overall growth declined. And unfortunately, when it comes to analyzing these trends going forward, because of Mr. Trump’s new tariff announcements, front-running is likely to continue for the time being.

Even with this tariff front-running – and especially if the front-running doesn’t throw off the figures excessively – an economy growing faster relative to its trade deficit isn’t the sexiest economic achievement to brag about. But is it completely unreasonable to think that a supposed master-brander and pitchman like President Trump can’t rise to the challenge?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Trump Effect on U.S. Manufacturing Workers

Tags

blue-collar workers, election 2020, inflation-adjusted wages, Jobs, manufacturing, Obama, real wages, Trump, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

There’s no question that President Trump has compiled a solid record when it comes to boosting American manufacturing employment, and the numbers look especially good compared with that of his predecessor, Barack Obama.

Wages, though? They remain another story entirely, and keep raising the question of how convincingly during his reelection campaign the President will be able to portray himself as a godsend to U.S. industry’s workers.

According to the most valid comparison that can be made to date, during the 29 months since Mr. Trump settled into the Oval Office (February, 2017), overall manufacturing employment and blue-collar manufacturing employment are both up considerably faster than during the last 29 months of the Obama administration. Here are the specific percentage gains for the manufacturing sector overall, and for industry’s non-supervisory and production workers – often informally dubbed “blue-collar workers”:

                                                Last 29 Obama months        First 29 Trump months

Manufacturing:                            +1.31 percent                        +3.86 percent

Blue-collar manufacturing:         +0.92 percent                         +3.40 percent

But the average hourly wage figures adjusted for inflation actually flip these results on their head:

                                              Last 29 Obama months          First 29 Trump months

Manufacturing:                           +3.05 percent                           -0.09 percent

Blue-collar manufacturing:         +3.22 percent                          +2.31 percent

It’s true that manufacturing’s blue-collar workers during the Trump era so far have been faring far better than their supervisors (who remain better paid in absolute terms). But the price-adjusted paychecks are growing significantly more slowly than they were during the final Obama years.

Of course, this politics-centric post on manufacturing wouldn’t be complete without discussing how President Trump’s tariffs have affected the picture. And here the script is arguably flipped once again to some extent, at least during the Trump years alone. The table below shows the average monthly jobs gains recorded for manufacturing and blue-collar manufacturing before the first metals tariffs were imposed (March, 2018) and after. Since the time frames differ somewhat, I thought the monthly averages would illustrate the trends more clearly.

                                                   Pre-tariffs                                  Post-tariffs

Manufacturing:                            17.38K                                       15.07K

Blue-collar manufacturing:         11.54K                                           8.6K

After the tariffs, the pace of manufacturing employment increases slowed somewhat, but it slowed much faster for blue-collar manufacturing workers.

Now for the wages results, presented as the average monthly changes in absolute (dollars and cents) terms:

                                               Pre-tariffs                                     Post-tariffs

Manufacturing                        -3 cents                                         +2 cents

Blue-collar manufacturing    +8 cents                                          +5 cents

In sum, after-inflation hourly pay rose slightly after the trade curbs came on after having fallen beforehand. Real wages for blue-collar manufacturing workers rose during both periods, but more slowly after the tariffs.

These results indicate that the President can make a decent case that his administration, and even his tariffs, have helped manufacturing workers on balance. But on the pay front in particular, the story gets complicated – and the kind of rhetorical precision Mr. Trump will need to display to date in order to tout these achievements credibly doesn’t seem to be one of his strong suits.