(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Energy Drove the U.S. Trade Deficit Drop in a March Full of Records

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Advanced Technology Products, China, energy, European Union, exports, Germany, goods trade, imports, Made in Washington trade flows, manufacturing, Mexico, Netherlands, non-oil goods trade, oil, petroleum products, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The monthly improvement in the U.S. deficit in March revealed in today’s official U.S. trade report was first and foremost an energy story – not that other noteworthy developments couldn’t be found, specifically records in manufacturing and in American trade with several leading partner countries and regions, and big changes in goods trade with China.

The combined goods and services trade gap narrowed sequentially on month by 9.08 percent, from an upwardly revised $70.64 billion to $64.23 billion. The March total was the lowest since November’s $60.65 billion.

Moreover, the deficit shrank in the best possible way. Total exports rose by 2.12 percent, from a downwardly revised $250.84 billion to $256.15 billion, while total imports dipped (and for the second straight month) by 0.34 percent, from an upgraded $321.48 billion to $320.38 billion. And this trade deficit progress took place when the economy was still growing (albeit at a significantly slowing rate).

And of the $5.31 billion sequential increase in total exports, $4.68 billion (88.14 percent) came in the petroleum products category. In fact, these foreign sales grew at the fastest monthly rate (21.26 percent) since March, 2022 (28.22 percent).

Largely as a result, the goods deficit tumbled in March by 6.92 percent, from $93.03 billion to $86.59 billion – their lowest level since last November, too. ($83.02 billion).

Indeed, petroleum products exports accounted for 89.66 percent of the $5.22 billion expansion of goods exports. On a relative basis, these foreign sales climbed by 3.09 percent, from a downwardly revised $169.09 billion to $174.31 billion.

Goods imports, meanwhile, decreased for the second straight month as well, by 0.47 percent, from a downwardly revised $262.12 billion to $260.90 billion.

The longstanding surplus in services trade slipped in March by 0.11 percent, from a downwardly revised $22.39 billion to $22.37 billion – the lowest level since October’s fractionally higher figure.

Services exports improved by 0.11 percent, from a downwardly revised $81.75 billion to a second straight record of $81.84 billion. The new total topped the old $81.32 billion mark from last December by 0.65 percent.

Services imports, meanwhile, advanced by 0.20 percent, from a downwardly revised $59.36 billion to $59.48 billion – the second highest total ever behind last September’s $59.55 billion.

The huge and longstanding U.S. goods trade deficit with China became a good deal less huge in March, sinking for the second straight month – and by 12.59 percent, fom $19.00 billion to $16.61 billion. Further, that total was the lowest since the $15.76 billion hit in February, 2020 – when China’s economy was still grappling with the devastating first wave of the CCP Virus.

U.S. goods exports to the People’s Republic shot up by 22.06 percent sequentially in March – from $11.62 billion to $14.18 billion. The new total is the highest since last November’s $15.58 billion, and the rate of increase the fastest since last October’s 31.33 percent.

For some perspective, though, this big March increase followed a sizable 11.26 percent decrease in February.

U.S. goods imports from China inched up for the second straight month, but by just 0.55 percent, from $30.62 billion to $30.79 billion. And those two totals are the lowest since early in China’s recovery from that first 2020 virus wave.

Most strikingly, on a year-to-date basis, the U.S. goods deficit with China has cratered by a whopping 39.85 percent, from $101.04 billion to $60.77 billion.

These results, moreover, clash loudly with those of the U.S. worldwide non-oil goods trade – which as known by RealityChek regulars is a close proxy for U.S.-China goods trade.

The U.S. non-oil goods deficit (which can also be considered the “Made in Washington” deficit because it tracks trade flows most strongly influenced by U.S. trade deals and other policy decisions) worsened by 0.19 percent between February and March – from $92.19 billion to $92.36 billion. So China goods trade performed better sequentially on this basis.

U.S. goods exports to China were up in March much faster than the 0.25 percent gain in non-oil goods exports (from $145.80 billion to $146.16 billion).

As for non-oil goods imports, they increased by just 0.23 percent in March (from $237.98 billion to $238.52 billion) – not dramatically different from the China goods performance.

But the year-to-date contrast is enormous. Whereas the U.S. goods deficit with China nosedived by nearly 40 percent, for non-oil goods trade, it fell by less than half that – 17.80 percent, from $336.25 billion to $276.40 billion.

That makes it hard to avoid concluding that the Trump (now Trump-Biden) tariffs keep punishing China (along with Beijing’s own-goals ranging from last year’s wildly over-the-top Zero Covid policies to increasing harassment of U.S.- and other foreign-owned companies) but not simply by diverting imports and trade to other countries and regions. Domestic American producers must be getting some of that old China business as well.

The manufacturing trade deficit, however, worsened by 9.08 percent in March, from $100.05 billion to $109.64 billion. True, this increase followed a 14.36 percent drop in February, but it can’t be good news given the sector’s recent weakness.

Interestingly, this deterioration reflected major changes in both monthly exports and imports. The former soared by 18.91 percent, from $98.06 billion to a new record $116.60 billion (which topped the previous mark of $114.78 billion set last June by 1.58 percent).

Industry’s foreign purchases jumped by 14.20 percent, from $198.10 billion to $226.24 billion.

Big monthly changes and a record were also recorded in Advanced Technology Products (ATP) trade in March. The ATP deficit dropped from $16.23 billion to $14.31 billion. The 11.82 percent narrowing brought the gap to its smallest since February, 2022’s $13.42 billion.

ATP exports shot up from $29.12 billion to a new all-time high $38.33 billion. And the 31.65 percent increase was the most dramatic since March, 2002’s 31.94 percent.

Imports surged, too – by 16.09 percent, from $45.35 billion to $52.65 billion. And that upswing was he fastest since the 33.64 percent burst of last March.

On the regional and bilateral fronts, many of the most dramatic developments came in U.S. goods trade with Europe.

America racked up its biggest exports total ever to the European Union ($34.96 billion – 12.04 percent greater than the $31.20 billion level hit last March) and bought its second greatest total of imports ($50.82 billion, a number trailing only last October’s $53.07 billion).

The volatile U.S. surplus with the Netherlands skyrocketed by 116.40 percent on month, from $1.84 billion to $3.98 billion, keyed by record exports of $7.76 billion. That smashed the previous mark of $6.96 billion by 11.50 percent.

U.S. goods exports to Germany achieved an all-time high, too, with the $7.50 billion figure exceeding the old record of $6.62 billion, set last March, by 13.20 percent.

The U.S. goods deficit with Mexico reached its highest ever, too, in March, with the $13.55 billion total coming in 8.25 percent higher than the old record of $12.57 billion from August, 2020. American goods sales to Mexico totaled $29.27 billion – their second best performance ever after last August’s $29.98 billion. But imports reached a new record of $42.82 billion – 5.87 percent greater than last March’s $40.45 billion mark.

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Glad I Didn’t Say That! A New Low Point for Biden Energy Policy

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Amos Hochstein, Biden administration, clean energy, climate change, energy, fossil fuels, Glad I Didn't Say That!, green energy, natural gas, oil, Russia, sanctions, shale, Ukraine, Ukraine War

“The White House’s chief energy adviser has described as ‘un-American’ the refusal of US shale investors to ramp up drilling, even as Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine causes havoc on global oil and gas markets.”                                                      – — — —

Financial Times, December 11, 2022

 

“The longer-term solution, [he said] was not to invest in more natural gas supply but to cut consumption of fossil fuels themselves….”             

Financial Times, December 11, 2022

 

(Source: “Biden adviser calls Wall Street opposition to shale drilling ‘un-American’,” by Derek Brower, Financial Times, December 11, 2022, Biden adviser calls Wall Street opposition to shale drilling ‘un-American’ | Financial Times (ft.com))

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Is Biden Learning the Limits of Multilateralism?

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Afghanistan, alliances, allies, America First, ASML, Biden, Biden administration, Blob, China, Chips Act, Europe, export controls, Japan, multilateralism, NATO, North Atlantic treaty Organization, oil, oil price, OPEC, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Saudi Arabia, semiconductors, South Korea, Taiwan, Ukraine War

Remember the buzz worldwide and among the bipartisan globalist U.S. foreign policy Blob that Donald Trump’s defeat in the 2020 presidential election heralded the start of a new golden age of America’s relations with its longstanding security allies?

Remember how President Biden himself pushed this line with his claim that “America is back” and that Washington would end the supposed Trump practice of denigrating and even rupturing these relationships, and resume its post-World War II strategy of capitalizing on these countries’ strengths and fundamental agreement with vital American interests to advance mutually beneficial goals?

Fast forward to the present, and it’s stunning how thoroughly these American globalist hopes – and the assumptions behind them – have been dashed.

The latest example has been Saudi Arabia’s rejection of Mr. Biden’s request to delay an increase in oil prices announced by Riyadh and other members of the OPEC-Plus petroleum producers cartel. It’s true that few Americans currently view the Saudis as ideal allies. Continuing human rights abuses and especially evidence that its leaders ordered the assassination of a dissident Saudi-American journalist – and coming on top of revelations of Saudi support for the September 11 terrorists and Islamic extremism more broadly – will do that. Indeed, candidate Biden had even promised to make Saudi Arabia as a “pariah.”

But follow-through? Forget it – largely for fear of antagonizing the Saudis precisely because of their huge oil production and reserves, and because the President evidently still viewed them as a key to countering Iran’s hegemonic ambitions in the energy-rich region.

As for Saudi Arabia, it and much closer allies (including in Europe) were far from enthralled with how Mr. Biden pulled U.S. forces out of Afghanistan – which they charge took them by surprise and seemed pretty America First-y.

Under President Biden, the United States appears to have performed better in mustering allied support for helping Ukraine beat back Russia’s invasion. But look beneath the surface, and the European contribution has been unimpressive at best, especially considering that Ukraine is located much closer to the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) than is the United States.

In particular, according to Germany’s Kiel Institute for the World Economy, which has been tracking these developments since the war began, to date,

 “The U.S. is now committing nearly twice as much as all EU countries and institutions combined. This is a meagre showing for the bigger European countries, especially since many of their pledges are arriving in Ukraine with long delays. The low volume of new commitments in the summer now appears to be continuing systematically.”

In fact, European foot-dragging has reached the point at which even Mr. Biden’s Treasury Secretary, Janet Yellen, has just told them (in diplospeak of course) to get on the stick.

Apparently, America’s allies in Asia as well as Europe have hesitated to get behind another key initiative as well: Slowing China’s growing technological progress in order to limit its potential militar power.

In a September 16 speech, White House national security advisor Jake Sullivan confirmed that the United States had officially doubled down on this objective:

“On export controls, we have to revisit the longstanding premise of maintaining “relative” advantages over competitors in certain key technologies.  We previously maintained a “sliding scale” approach that said we need to stay only a couple of generations ahead. 

“That is not the strategic environment we are in today. 

“Given the foundational nature of certain technologies, such as advanced logic and memory chips, we must maintain as large of a lead as possible.”

And on October 7, the United States followed up by announcing the stiffest controls to date on doing business with Chinese tech entities – controls that will apply not only to U.S.-owned companies, but to other countries’ companies that use U.S.-owned firms technology in high tech products they sell and high tech services they provide to China.

Including these foreign-owned businesses in the U.S. sanctions regime – as well as in parallel efforts to rebuild American domestic capacity and marginalize China’s role in these sectors – is unavoidable for the time being, since the domestic economy long ago lost its monopoly and in some cases even its presence in the numerous products vital to semiconductor manufacturing in particular.

But as the Financial Times reported last month, a year after Washington drew up plans to create a “Chip 4” initiative to work with Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea to achieve these goals, “the four countries have yet to finalise plans even for a preliminary meeting.”

The prime foot-dragger has been South Korea, which fears Chinese retaliation that could jeopardize its massive and lucrative trade with the People’s Republic. But the same article makes clear that Japan harbors similar concerns.

Also unenthusiastic about the U.S. campaign is the Dutch manufacturer of semiconductor production equipment ASM Lithography (ASML). ASML’s cooperation is crucial to America’s anti-China ambitions because it’s the sole global supplier of machines essential for making the world’s most advanced microchips.

So far it’s been playing along. But similar complants about possibly losing business opportunities in China – which may account for nearly half of the world’s output of electronics products along with much of its production of less advanced semiconductors – have already persuaded the Biden administration to give some South Korean and Taiwanese microchip manufacturers a one-year exemption from the new export curbs. Could ASML try to win similar leniency?

In fairness, the Biden administration hasn’t wound up placing all its foreign policy bets on alliances and securing multilateral cooperation. Indeed, its new National Security Strategy re-states the importance of rebuilding American economic strength as a foundation of foreign policy success; the legislation it successfully sponsored to bolster the United States’ semiconductor and other high tech capabilities put considerable money behind that approach; and to its credit, it announced the new China tech curbs even after it couldn’t initially secure adequate allied cooperation – assuming, correctly, that an act of U.S. leadership could bring start bringing them in line.

Hopefully, a combination of these rifts with allies and its recognition of the importance of maintaining and augmenting national power mean that President Biden at least is learning a crucial lesson: that supporting multilateralism and alliances can’t be ends of a sensible U.S. foreign policy in and of themselves. They can only be means to ends. And although they can obviously be valuable in many instances, the best ultimate guarantor of the nation’s security, independence, and prosperity are its own devices.       

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Nothing to See About This Biden-Wall Street-China Connection?

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Biden, Biden administration, BlackRock, China, Donald Trump, globalism, inflation, Obama administration, oil, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, solar panels, State Department, Strategic Petroleum Reserve, tariffs, Thomas E. Donilon, Trade, Wall Street

It’s a good thing that conspiracy theories are never, ever true. Otherwise, several recent developments in U.S.-China relations would rightly alarm anyone hoping that U.S. policy toward the People’s Republic would reflect efforts to further American national interests rather than selfish special interests.

Those dangerously loony conspiracy theorists would probably begin by noting that last month, the State Department announced Secretary Antony J. Blinken’s appointments to a Foreign Affairs Policy Board that since 2011 has “provided independent advice on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy” on issues that today include “strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China.”

The new Board is chaired (as originally reported by The Washington Free Beacon) by Thomas E. Donilon, who the wingnuts would no doubt immediately observe was the White House National Security Advisor during the Obama administration, which compiled a consistent record of coddling China on both the national security and the economic fronts. And as the Free Beacon post makes clear, out office, Donilon had been a leading voice for continuing to coddle China, too. 

They’d surely further point out that he’s sure found lucrative employment in the right place. For Donilon is now Chairman of the BlackRock Investment Institute, an arm of the finance company of the same name that happens to be the world’s largest asset manager. These conspiracy-mongers would likely explain that BlackRock has been one of Wall Street’s most enthusiastic boosters of sending huge amounts of capital from the United States and around the world into China. Indeed, it’s just become “the first foreign-owned company to operate a wholly owned business in China’s mutual fund industry,” in CNBC.com‘s words.

The strategy will of course net immense fees for BlackRock and the other finance giants pursuing it. And we’d probably hear from the loons that BlackRock has touted major benefits for the People’s Republlc other than making available to its dangerous totalitarian government oceans of new resources – specifically by helping China “to address its growing retirement crisis by providing retirement system expertise, products and services.”

Then these paranoiacs would presumably try to bolster their credibility by arguing that even lefty zillionaire George Soros has warned that BlackRock-like operations in China will “damage the national security interests of the U.S. and other democracies.”

More grist for the conspiracy industry’s mills: Yesterday’s report in The Wall Street Journal that the Chinese government “is implementing changes to its rules governing publicly offered securities investment funds” that would “include requiring foreign-owned fund managers such as BlackRock and Fidelity to create Communist Party cells when operating in China.” Along with the failure of Donilon or BlackRock (or Fidelity, where I park most of my family’s financial accounts) to utter a peep of protest. Not to mention the silence of the Biden administration.

And the icing on this cake of delusion? Recent signs of a China policy shift by a Biden administration that had been surprisingly Trump-y on the subject given the President’s long history of supporting pre-Trump globalist policies of indiscriminately expanding trade and investment with China. Like the persistent talk of cutting tariffs on Chinese imports to help fight inflation. Like the suspension of new levies on Chinese solar panel imports that were transshipped through Southeast Asian countries to evade U.S. trade curbs. Like the sale of oil from America’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve to a Chinese entity (Unipec).

But obviously there’s nothing to see here. Because as I said, conspiracy theories are never, ever true.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Demonization and Double Standards on Gas Prices

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Biden, demand, Democrats, Elizabeth Warren, energy, gas prices, inflation, oil, oil prices, sanctions, supply, Ukraine-Russia war, Vladimir Putin, {What's Left of) Our Economy

According to the reasoning of President Biden, Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren, and many other Democrats and progressives, Vladimir Putin, or Big Oil, or American gas station owners, or some combination of those three, have been getting nicer or less greedy and/or more patriotic (when speaking of the domestic actors). What’s the evidence? The average price of a gallon of gasoline in Anerica has fallen during this period.

After all, the President and his fellow Democrats have been saying since at least mid-spring March that prices at the pump had been soaring because the Russian dictator’s invasion of Ukraine (and resulting sanctions) has pushed up world oil prices, because the world’s oil companies have been earning “windfall profits,” and because U.S. gas station owners have been (unpatriotically) price-gouging.

Since mid-June, though, as Mr. Biden has just noted, gas prices are down. So the above culprits must have become less villainous. In fact, since several authoritative sources track these prices, it’s possible, depending on which one is considered most trustworthy, to know exactly how much less villainous.

Specifically, according to the GasBuddy.com website, national average pump prices are down 6.87 percent over the last month. So clearly, Putin, Big Oil, and gas station owners have collectively become 6.87 percent less heinous and/or avaricious and, in the case of U.S.-owned oil companies and the gas station owners, less unpatriotic.

The widely followed Lundberg survey says regular grade gasoline has become 4.14 percent cheaper during this period – so the Democrats’ culprits in its view haven’t become quite so benign.

They look better in Triple A’s eyes, though, since that organization calculates that pump prices are off by 6.74 percent.

Of course, the above analysis is the most childish and even self-serving form of nonsense. Gas prices, like prices of practically everything, depend on numerous interacting factors having nothing to do with foreign strongmen or corporate iniquity. World oil prices are the biggest single determinant, but these in turn are affected by national and global demand, which in turn results from the overall state of the economy, which in turn can be strengthened or weakened by fiscal policy (e.g., stimulus bills) and monetary policy (e.g., interest rates). Don’t, however, forget refining and pipeline availability, and even weather (as in bad hurricane seasons shutting down oil facilities in the Gulf of Mexico in particular).

Complicating matters further, these and other oil price determinants don’t affect retail gas prices all at once, as they understandably take varying amounts of time to work their way through a lengthy production and distribution system. Meanwhile, future supplies depend on private investors examining this multi-faceted and highly fluid landscape to judge whether committing capital to the oil industry is their best bet for maximum returns. And these calculations are inevitably highly uncertain given that any payoffs will inevitably be years off.

So it’s indeed childish to ignore the complicated and constantly interacting dynamics of an enormous industry that at bottom needs to keep wrestling with inevitably fluctuating supply and demand conditions. And it’s self-serving because for years the President and his party have clearly worked hard to reduce the role played by a fossil fuel like oil in the U.S. energy picture.

If you doubt that self-serving claim in particular, or any of the above analysis, ask yourself this: Are these oil industry critics remotely as likely to start praising the producers and the gas station owners (or Putin) for reducing prices as they’ve been to slam them for the price increases?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Terrible March for U.S. Trade – With Worse Likely to Come

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Advanced Technology Products, Canada, China, currency, dollar, European Union, exchange rates, exports, Federal Reserve, goods trade, imports, inflation, Japan, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, Mexico, oil, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

So many records (mainly the wrong kind) were revealed in the latest official monthly U.S. trade figures (for March) that it’s hard to know where to begin. Some important points need to be made before delving into them, though.

First, don’t blame oil. Sure, this trade report broke new ground in containing a full month’s worth of Ukraine war-period data. But despite the disruption in global energy markets triggered by the conflict, on a monthly basis, the U.S. petroleum balance actually improved sequentially, from a $2.94 billion deficit to a $1.58 billion surplus on a pre-inflation basis (the trade flow gauges from these monthly government releases that are most widely followed)

And even on an inflation-adjusted basis, February’s $8.73 billion oil deficit shrank to $5.15 billion in March.

Second, don’t blame inflation much at all. The Census Bureau doesn’t report after-inflation service trade results on a monthly basis, but it does provide this information for goods (which comprise the great majority of U.S. trade flows). And the March figures show that before factoring in inflation, the goods trade deficit worsened by 18.89 percent from $107.78 billon in February to a new record $128.14 billlion, whereas when inflation is counted, this gap widened on month by 18.86 percent, from $115.96 billion in February to $137.83 billion in March. (Major trade wonks will note that these goods and services data are presented according to two different counting methods, but trust me: the difference in results is negligible.)

Third, don’t blame China. The March pre-inflation goods deficit with the People’s Republic was up sequentially from $42.26 billion to $47.37 billion (12.10 percent). But neither that absolute level nor the rate of increase was anything out of the ordinary, much less a record. In fact, the monthly percentage increase was just half the rate of that of the shortfall for total non-oil goods (a close worldwide proxy for China goods trade) – which hit 24.06 percent. One big takeaway here: the Trump China tariffs are still exerting a major effect, along of course with the supply chain knots Beijing has created with its over-the-top Zero Covid policy.

But regardless of where the blame lies, (and it looks like major culprits are continued strong U.S. spending on both consumer goods and capital equipment, combined with an improvement of the supply chain situation outside China), all-time highs and worsts abounded in the March trade report, include worsenings at record paces.

The combined goods and services trade deficit jumped on-month by 22.28 percent, to $109.80 billion. That total was the third straight record for a single month and the increase the fastest since the 43.71 percent explosion in March, 2015 – a month during which much of the country was recovering from severe winter weather.

As mentioned above, the $128.14 billion goods trade gap was the highest ever, too, topping its predecessor (January’s $108.60 billion) by 17.99 percent. As for the 18.89 percent monthly increase, that was also the biggest since March, 2015 (25.18 percent).

Even a seeming trade balance bright spot turns out to be pretty dim. The headline number shows the service trade surplus improving by 1.96 percent – from $17.98 billion to $18.34 billion. Unfortunately, nearly all of this increase stemmed from a big downward revision in the initially reported February surplus, from $18.29 billion.

As known by RealityChek regulars, the aforementioned non-oil goods trade deficit can also be called the Made in Washington trade deficit – because by stripping out figures for oil (which trade diplomacy usually ignores) and services (where liberalization efforts have barely begun), it stems from those U.S. trade flows that have been heavily influenced by trade policy decisions.

And not only was the March Made in Washington deficit’s monthly increase of 24.06 percent the second fastest ever (after March, 2015’s 31.24 percent). The March, 2022 level of $128.70 billion was the biggest ever.

The story of the non-oil goods trade gap’s growth was overwhelmingly a manufacturing story. The sector’s huge and chronic trade shortfall shot back up from $106.49 billion in February (which was a nice retreat from January’s $121.03 billion) to a new record $142.22 billion. And the monthly percentage jump of 33.55 percent was the biggest since the 37.62 percent during weather-affected March, 2015.

Manufactures exports advanced sequentially by a strong 20.53 percent this past March. That topped the previous all-time monthly high of $105.37 billion (set back in October, 2014), by 8.15 percent. But the much greater volume of imports skyrocketed by 27.43 percent. And their $256.18 billion total smashed the old record of $222.79 billion (from last December) by 14.98 percent.

Within manufacturing, U.S. trade in advanced technology products (ATP) took a notable beating in March, too. The $23.31 billion trade gap was an all-time high, and its 73.65 percent monthly growth the worst since the shortfall slightly more than doubled on month in March, 2020 – as the Chinese economy and its huge electronics and infotech hardware manufacturing bases reopened after the People’s Republic’s initial pandemic wave.

Yet as noted above, despite these extaordinary manufacturing and ATP trade numbers, the latest March numbers for manufacturing-heavy U.S. China trade were anything but extraordinary. U.S. goods exports to the People’s Republic increased on-month by 15.36 percent – slower than the rate for manufactures exports globally, but the fastest rate since the 52.47 percent rocket ride they took  last October.

Goods imports from China, however, rose much more slowly from February to March than manufactures imports overall – by just 12.10 percent, from $42.26 billion to $47.37 billion.

When it comes to other major U.S. trade partners, the March American goods deficit with Canada of $8.03 billion was the highest such total since July, 2008 ($9.88 billion). It was led by a 30.81 percent advance in imports reflecting the mid-February reopening of bridges between the two countries that had been closed due to CCP Virus restrictions-related protests.

The goods deficit with Mexico worsened even faster – by 35.11 percent, to $11.92 billion. That total was its highest since August, 2020’s $12.77 billion.

Another major monthly increase (31.59 percent) was registered by the U.S. goods shortfall with the European Union, but its March level ($16.87 billion) was subdued relative to recent results.

Anything but subdued was the Japan goods shortfall, which shot up sequentially in March by 49 percent. The $6.77 billion total also was the biggest since November, 2020’s $6.78 billion, and the monthly jump the greatest since the 84.37 percent burst in July, 2020, during the rapid recovery from the sharp U.S. economic downturn induced by the first wave of the CCP Virus and related economic and behavior curbs.

The Europe and Japan trade figures stem significantly from a development that’s bound to turn into an increasingly formidable headwind for the U.S. trade balance for the foreseeable future – the dollar’s rise versus other leading currencies to levels not seen in 20 years. And unless it’s reversed substantially soon, China’s latest currency devaluation, which began in mid-April, will weaken the effects of both the Trump tariffs and the Zero Covid policy. So even if the Federal Reserve’s (so far modest) inflation-fighting efforts do slow the American economy significantly, it’s likely that, as astronomical as the March trade deficits were, we ain’t seen nothin’ yet.

Those Stubborn Facts: Is the European Union Really Standing with Ukraine?

Tags

energy, European Union, military aid, natural gas, oil, Russia, Those Stiubborn Facts, Ukraine invasion, Ukraine-Russia war

Amount of European Union payments to Russia for

energy supplies since it invaded Ukraine: $38

billion

 

Amount of European Union aid to Ukraine to help

it resist the Russian invasion: $1.09 billion

 

(Source: “The EU is paying 35 times as much for Russian fuel as it’s given Ukraine for defense, chief diplomat says,” by Sinead Baker, Business Insider India, April 6, 2022, https://www.businessinsider.in/politics/world/news/the-eu-is-paying-35-times-as-much-for-russian-fuel-as-its-given-ukraine-for-defense-chief-diplomat-says/articleshow/90686530.cms)

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A February Reprieve from Lousy U.S. Trade News

Tags

CCP Virus, Census Bureau, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Federal Reserve, goods trade, inflation, manufacturing, monetary policy, non-oil goods trade deficit, oil, services trade, trade deficit, Ukraine-Russia war, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It wouldn’t be accurate to start off this post with a statement on the order of “As bad as the full-year 2021 inflation-adjusted trade figures released last week were, the new pre-inflation data for February were good.” But a contrast was unmistakable, with yesterday’s latest monthly report from the Census Bureau containing some decidedly encouraging news – even though the numbers were pre-Ukraine war, and therefore pre- all the disruption to global supply chains – in particular in the food and energy sectors – that the conflict has already brought.

And the story even begins at the beginning. The combined goods and services trade deficit decreased sequentially for the first time since October. The slippage was only 0.05 percent, and the monthly total ($89.19 billion) was still the second highest ever (behind January’s $89.23 billion). But that January figure itself was revised down 0.52 percent.

Goods trade produced somewhat better results. February’s shortfall of $107.47 billion represented its first monthly drop since October, and the decrease was 1.04 percent. The February goods trade gap was the second biggest on record, too, but January’s $108.60 billion mark was downgraded by 0.24 percent.

When it comes to the broadest trade balance results, the only black mark was found in the service sector. In February, its long-time surplus shrank for the second straight month, decreasing by 5.62 percent, from $19.37 billion to $18.29 billion. That total was the smallest since November’s $18.30 billion. At least the January number was revised up by 1.05 percent.

More good news came on the export front. Total American sales abroad climbed 1.84 percent on month to $228.63 billion – a new record that nosed ahead of the previous all-time high (December’s $228.35 billion) by 0.12 percent.

Goods exports were up to on a monthly basis in February – by 1.79 percent, to $158.78 billion. That total was the second highest ever – 0.15 percent below October’s $159.02 billion.

Services exports improved, too in February. At $69.85 billion, they were 1.96 percent higher than January’s $68.51 billion. But reflecting the outsized hit this sector took from the CCP Virus and related lockdowns and behavioral changes, these totals remain below pre-pandemic levels.

Combined goods and services imports set their seventh straight monthly record in February, increasing 1.30 percent from $313.72 billion in January to $317.81 billion. The January total, however, was revised down by 0.12 percent.

Goods imports alone lengthened their string of monthly records, too, in February, with its $266.25 billion total topping January’s $264.59 billion by 0.63 percent. Their January total was downgraded fractionally.

The biggest relative imports increase came in services, where February’s $51.57 billion in purchases from abroad represented a 4.95 percent jump from January’s $49.13 billion. And the February total marked an all-time high – beating November’s $50.49 billion by 2.14 percent.

Oil was responsible for the overall February trade figures not being considerably better. The petroleum deficit soared by $2.67 billion on month, from a miniscule $115 million to $2.78 billion – the highest.monthly total since September’s $3.37 billion. And this surge was led by an 18.57 percent increase in oil imports. The monthly total of $23.11 billion, moreover, was the highest since December, 2014’s $25.01 billion.

Much higher prices per barrel of oil bought obviously deserve the blame for much of this news. But even adjusting for inflation, U.S. oil imports for February increased by 4.31 percent – the biggest relative rise since last May’s 6.47 percent.

In line with the improvement in the overall February trade deficit, the non-oil goods shortfall fell by 3.43 percent on month in February. At $103.56 billion, this deficit – which RealityChek regulars know covers the trade flows most affected by U.S. trade policy – was still the second highest on record, after January’s $107.24 billion. But the decrease was the first since October. And it resulted from the ideal combination of both a rise in exports and a decline in imports.

This ideal combination also encouragingly appeared in the February data for two long-term (and related) problem areas in U.S. trade flows – manufacturing and China.

The chronically huge American manufacturing trade gap shrank in February by 12.01 percent – from a record $121.03 billion to $106.49 billion. The decrease was the third straight and the biggest percentage-wise since the 12.70 percent plunge in November, 2019. In addition, the new level the lowest since April, 2021’s $103.60 billion.

As indicated, moreover, manufacturing exports were up on month in February – by 2.40 percent, from $92.33 billion to $94.55 billion. The increase, however, did follow a 7.80 percent sequential decrease in January that brought these foreign sales to their lowest level since last August.

Manufacturing imports, though, decreased for the third straight month – by 5.78 percent, from $213.36 billion to $201.03 billion. The monthly drop was the biggest in percentage terms since February, 2021’s 6.98 percent (amid the CCP Virus’ powerful second wave), and the new February total was the lowest since last April’s $198.06 billion.

America’s trade with China is dominated by manufactures, so it’s not surprising that its also chronically huge goods surplus with the United States plummeted by 15.69 percent sequentially in February, from $36.37 billion to $30.67 billion. This nosedive was the greatest in percentage terms since the 25.19 percent of February, 2020, when the Chinese economy was still seized up by sweeping CCP Virus-induced lockdowns.

Just as important, this monthly cratering was more than 4.5 times bigger than the monthly drop in the U.S. global non-oil goods deficit – the closest worldwide proxy for U.S.-China goods trade. It’s the latest evidence of the Trump tariffs’ effectivness at keeping enormous amounts of Chinese products out of the U.S. market.

As for the new February U.S.-China goods deficit’s level, it was the lowest since last July’s $28.65 billion.

And goods exports to and goods imports from China moved in exactly the right ways from an American standpoint. The former edged up 1.04 percent, from $11.48 billion to $11.59 billion – a performance that snapped a three-month losing streak. But the latter dropped for the second straight month, by 11.68 percent, from $47.85 billion to $42.26 billion. Decreases in imports from China are typical in post-holiday season February, and this latest drop-off was the biggest in percentage terms since last February’s 13 percent.

All the same, as promising as these February trade results are, one month’s worth of data alone reveal nothing about longer term trends and possibilities. And as mentioned at the outset, the Ukraine war impact is yet to be recorded. Further, more major changes may be in store in the U.S. and global economies, especially as the Federal Reserve is sounding more determined than ever to cool torrid inflation dramatically even if it means slowing growth dramatically. (Unless the central bank chickens out, if only because of the unmistakably political impact such tightening would have during an election year?) And as if all this uncertainty wasn’t enough, never forget that the trade figures are just about the most lagging-y set of indicators that the federal government releases.

So as with so many other dimensions of the U.S. economy, meaningful clarity on trade flows looks unlikely to emerge until the impacts of external shocks like the CCP Virus and the Ukraine war wear off.  That day will come at some point, won’t it?   

P.S. Yes, because my own schedule this past week has been disrupted nearly as much as the economy these last few years, this is my latest effort to catch up on reporting on recent economic releases.  More to come! 

 

Im-Politic: Major U.S. Ukraine Policy Puzzles on the Home Front Remain Unsolved

Tags

Biden, Democrats, gasoline, Iran, Iran deal, Iran nuclear deal, JCPOA, oil, oil prices, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, rural areas, Russia, sanctions, taxes, Ukraine, Ukraine invasion, Ukraine-Russia war, Vladimir Putin

Maybe you readers can help me out here, because I am really confused about what President Biden and other Democrats are saying about the biggest political and ethical issues surrounding his Ukraine war-related decision to ban oil imports from Russia and its likely effect on gasoline prices.

On the one hand, Mr. Biden and his party have portayed the higher oil prices as a sacrifice that Americans should be proud to pay in order to support Ukraine’s unexpectedly stout resistance to the Russian invasion, and one that the nation will agree to pay.

On the other hand, these Democrats have taken to blaming the higher pump prices on the Russian aggression itself, to the point of pushing the social media hashtag #PutinPriceHike.

Unquestionably, the Russian dictator’s decisions are ultimately responsible for the recent shake up in the global oil market that’s driven up prices for oil and all its derivatives (like gasoline) the world over. But now that he’s taken these steps, it seems that some fundamental consistency should be displayed in the Democrats’ case for the response they favor. For example, they could tell the public something like, “Yes, our response to the Russian attack will raise the price of oil. But higher pump prices are a sacrifice we should be proud to make for the cause of global security and freedom.” Why haven’t they?

Something else noteworthy about the stance of the President and his party. The effect of higher oil prices is the epitome of a regressive tax. In other words, because Americans at all income levels will face the same percentage increase when they pump gasoline (and when they heat their homes, if they rely on oil). So the bite on household budgets is deepest for the poorest and shallowest for the richest of us.

Higher oil prices will also surely kneecap any Democratic hopes of improving their political performance in rural America. After all, residents of the nation’s small towns and farming areas use much oil for transportation than their urban counterparts. So do the enormous number of voters in the suburbs, who played such a big role in Mr. Biden’s victory in 2020.

And let’s not forget an mammoth irony about higher U.S. and world prices for oil – as well as natural gas, another major Russian export. As has been widely observed, without steps that dramatically reduce the volume of Russian sales  globally, the more importers pay per barrel, the more revenue flows into Vladimir Putin’s treasury – and war machine. The same goes for Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, along with Iran if the President succeeds in his apparent aim of negotiating a deal aimed at preventing Tehran from building a nuclear weapon in part by lifting economic sanctions on its economy.

Whatever you think of President Biden’s approach to the Ukraine war, it should be clear that it can’t succeed for any length of time until firm support on the home front is secured. These unsolved puzzles and outright contradictions make clear how far his administration remains from achieving that essential goal. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: #PutinPriceHike? Not Even Close – Yet

Tags

baseline effect, Biden administration, CCP Virus, coronvirus, COVID 19, energy, fossil fuels, gasoline, inflation, lockdowns, oil, Putin, sanctions, stay-at-home, Ukraine invasion, Ukraine-Russia war, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

According to the Biden administration, it’s the #PutinPriceHike. That is, don’t blame anything Washington has or hasn’t done for the the bulk of the high gasoline prices Americans have been paying lately. Instead, blame Russian dictator Vladimir Putin, his aggression against Ukraine, and the global oil market turmoil it’s triggered.

The trouble is, if you look at these prices in a comprehensive, statistically legitimate way, scapegoating Putin in this case isn’t justified yet. But the same methodology shows that Mr. Biden and his aides are off the hook, too – at least until recently.

Critics (see, e.g., here) have countered the Biden claims by noting that strong U.S. gasoline inflation predates the Ukraine war and even Russian military buildup by many months, and they’re right. As known by RealityChek readers, however, that’s far from the whole story. In particular, they’re ignoring the impact on gasoline and other prices of the ongoing aftermath of the CCP Virus pandemic, the brief but sharp recession created by the disease and related lockdowns and voluntary behavioral changes, and ongoing stop-start U.S. economy that’s still resulting.

In other words, they’re ignoring the “baseline effect” caused by the economic shocks of the 2020 pandemic year in particular. These drove economic activity down to such low levels, and kept it there so long, that any major return to normal (and therefore normal prices) is going to produce unusually lofty inflation stemming from a catch-up effect. Therefore, it won’t be possible to determine the role of other contributors to inflation in gasoline or any other goods and services until this baseline effect fades significantly and finally disappears. And therefore, scapegoating Biden for soaring gasoline prices pre-Ukraine buildup isn’t justified, either.

RealityChek reported yesterday that the latest official U.S. figures show that the baseline effect has ended for headline inflation, and looks on the way out for core inflation (which strips out food and energy price. And roughly the same is true for gasoline prices.

The table below shows their monthly year-on-year percentage changes for last year (2020-21) in the middle column and for pandemic-dominated 2019-2020 (in the righthand colum). The numbers begin in March because March, 2020 was the first month in which the virus began significantly affecting the economy.

Gasoline price annual percentage changes      2020-21             2019-20

March:                                                               22.58                 -10.05

April:                                                                 49.68                 -32.03

May:                                                                  56.51                 -33.67

June:                                                                  45.42                 -23.41

July:                                                                   41.93                -20.12

Aug.:                                                                  42.76                -16.67

Sept.:                                                                  41.93                -15.43

Oct.:                                                                   49.52                -18.15

As is evident, starting in March, 2020, gasoline prices began nosediving from their levels of 2019, and steep annual drops continued (though at a slower pace) through October. It’s easy to understand why. The combination of lockdowns and stay-at-home behavior caused automotive travel to crater, and national demand for gasoline naturally plummeted as well. Further, that’s clearly a big part of the reason why during the following March-October period, gasoline prices prices skyrocketed on the same annual basis. They were returning to normal from an artificially low base. And as a result, it’s wrong to blame the Biden administration exclusively or even mainly for this hot gasoline inflation.

From that point, however, the Blame Biden case gets stronger. The above table stops in October, 2021 because November was when the Putin military buildup began – and according to the Biden argument, gasoline prices really began taking off. What happened to annual gasoline prices increases from then until the end of  2021, and how strong was the baseline effect? Here are the numbers for November and December, with the 2020-21 annual increases in the middle column and the 2019-20 increases in the righthand column:

Gasoline price annual percentage changes      2020-21             2019-20

Nov.:                                                                  57.76                 -19.53

Dec.:                                                                  49.34                 -15.34

The strong 2020-21 yearly price increases continued for these two months. But the baseline effect (from the big 2019-20 price drops) weakened. In fact, the December, 2019-20 annual 15.34 percent annual gasoline price decline was the smallest such figure since March, 2019-20’s 10.05 percent. And the annual increase for the following March (22.58 percent) was less than half December’s 49.34 percent.

What about this January and February? For these months, of course, the comparison years are 2021-22 (whose increases are presented in the middle column) and 2020-21 (in the right hand column).

Gasoline price annual percentage changes      2020-21             2019-20

Jan.:                                                                   40.02                  -8.90

Feb.:                                                                   38.01                   5.42

So the story for the first two months of this year – between the start of Putin’s buildup and the (late February) invasion – is that annual increases slowed, but the baseline effect vanished much faster. Indeed, between February, 2020 and February, 2021, gasoline prices actually rose. So the administration’s #PutinPriceHike claims hold much less water.

Blaming Putin will become more credible going forward, as sales of Russian oil worldwide are curbed by sanctions. Since the global oil market is so thoroughly integrated, U.S. oil supplies will be crimped and upward price pressures will strengthen. But this is also the point at which other major administration policies will rightly attract attention for their role in spurring torrid gasoline inflation. They include in particular measures and rhetoric that throughout the President’s term have convinced oil and other fossil fuel providers that their industries’ growth will keep facing ever greater policy obstacles, and whose cumulative effect has undercut their ability to ramp up output quickly to fill the Russia gap.(See, e.g., here and here.)

All of which means that, as is the almost always the case with major economic trends and developments, recent gasoline price inflation has many causes, not one. And they can change profoundly in their nature and respective importance with the kinds of changing circumstances that have shaken the global oil and U.S. energy policy landscapes since the CCP Virus pandemic began. Let’s all hope, therefore, that American leaders across the political spectrum begin spending more time developing effective responses to oil price inflation, and less on bombarding each other and the rest of us with facile talking points.