Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Could U.S. Protectorates in Asia Finally Become Real Allies?

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Afghanistan, alliances, allies, Asia, Asia-Pacific, AUKUS, Australia, Biden, China, credibility, Donald Trump, extended deterrence, globalism, Indo-Pacific, Japan, nuclear umbrella, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, semiconductors, South Korea, submarines, Taiwan, transactionalism, United Kingdom, vital interests

Lots of stuff going on lately in security affairs in the Asia-Pacific region (which foreign policy congoscenti have been calling the Indo-Pacific region, reflecting India’s new prominence). And I’m not just talking about the new agreement (which goes by the awkward acronym “AUKUS”) by which Australia will acquire nuclear-powered submarines provided by the United States and the United Kingdom (acing out the furious French in the process), and gain access to lots of advanced militarily-relevant American technology, like artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

I’m also talking about long overdue signs that key U.S. allies in the region are starting to take the threat they face from growing Chinese aggressiveness as seriously as the United States has been taking it. The interesting policy questions are (1) why they seem finally to be waking up and (2) what if anything the United States can or should do to convince Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in particular to assume more of the burden of defending themselves, thereby enabling America to take a less risky, less costly role in the region.

For the time being, unfortunately, the United States is going to have to stay deeply involved in the defense of these countries, and to keep accepting a degree of nuclear risk that I’ve long described as unacceptable, and still consider unnerving. I’ve changed my mind, however, because the globalist and free trade-happy U.S. foreign policy establishment and the tech companies that write so many of its members’ paychecks boneheadedly let South Korea and especially Taiwan seize global leadership in the manufacture of the world’s most advanced and powerful semiconductors.

These devices are simply too valuable to the American economy as a whole and to its continuing military superiority to take the chance that the relevant Taiwanese and South Korean facilities and knowhow fall into Chinese hands. As for Japan, it continues to produce many of the materials and equipment on which cutting-edge semiconductor production relies, so it’s got to be kept safe from the likeliest threat it faces from China – which is some form of blackmail. (See this recent Biden administration report, and especially pp. 45 ff.)

As a result, until the United States gets its semiconductor act back together, the American nuclear umbrella needs to remain over Japan and South Korea – which means that America could well be sucked into a nuclear war with China and especially North Korea if hostilities break out. And such “extended deterrence” may need to be extended to Taiwan (which Washington is not yet as tightly committed to defend).

That’s why it’s not good that not only the Australians will be getting nuclear-powered (but not – so far – nuclear-armed) submarines. Because of their superior capabilities, these which will add quantitatively and qualitatively to the forces China would need to think about when contemplating, say, moves to increase its sway over the regional sealanes through which so much of the world’s trade flows.

It’s also good that South Korea has decided to build (so far non-nuclear) ballistic missiles that can be launched from its own submarines (in response to North Korea’s progress toward the same capabilities). Deserving of applause as well are Japanese and Taiwanese plans to boost defense spending – and acquire some impressive weapons along the way. Japanese officials are even talking seriously about what steps Tokyo can and should take to help defense Taiwan if the stuff hits the fan with China – although nothing like a clear decision had been made.

Defense spending levels in all three countries are still measly, especially considering what dangerous neighborhoods they live in. And it’s not as if time is necessarily on their side. But something new seems astir, and I’m not convinced that China’s worsened behavior is entirely responsible. Some credit undoubtedly goes to the Trump administration. Since his initial White House campaign, the campaign, the former President insistently asked why Americans should risk their own security for that of allied freeloaders, and foot so much of the bill. And throughout his presidency, he kept so much pressure on that the Asia allies clearly worried that the Uncle Sucker days were over, and that Trump’s complaints reflected much and possibly most American public opinion. (See, e.g., here.)

President Biden deserves some credit here, too – but I would argue in part in spite of himself. Mr. Biden of course is a card-carrying globalist who for the entirety of his long career in public life has agreed wholeheartedly with the need to maintain strong U.S. alliance relationships. Hence it was no surprise that during the 2020 campaign and immediately after his inauguration, he took great pains to assure U.S. allies that the United States would “be back” after years of Trump-ian neglect. And indeed, earlier this year, Mr. Biden showed every sign of coddling continued Asian defense free-riding.

But ironically, the biggest Biden spur to more Asian defense burden-sharing might be his botched withrawal from Afghanistan. In other words, whereas the Asians (and other allies) were worried mainly that Trump would cut them loose because he was unwilling to protect them if they didn’t change their deadbeat ways, it’s entirely possible that they fear Mr. Biden won’t be able to ride to their rescue – at least not in any effective way.

I know that there’s little evidence of such mistrust in official Asian rhetoric so far. And of course, one of the President’s main stated reasons for leaving Afghanistan in the first place was to free up more American energies and resources to focus on China. But some unofficial Asian voices seem less sure, and it would be surprising to see any governments pushing the panic button in almost any circumstances. And could it be a total coincidence that the aforementioned spate of Asian defense decisions came in the wake of the Afghanistan pullout?

I seriously doubt it.  And as a result, if Mr. Biden wants to turn America’s Asian protectorates into genuine allies, he should continue his own strategy of stepping up exports of advanced weapons to them (and to many of their neighbors, depending on each one’s solidarity), signaling his willingness to go even further (as with this excellent decision) and employ some of the Trump-ian “transactionalism” that’s had so many globalists clutching their pearls for so long. 

But instead of threatening American withdrawals if they don’t pony up more defense-wise, the President should promise them more hardware if they do.  Casually floating the idea of OKing the acqusition of nuclear weapons by various allies wouldn’t hurt, either.

And he should stop pretending that none of this activity is directed against China. Not only does such rhetoric signal credibility-shaking skittishness. It contradicts yet another example of transactionalism that should become part of the Biden strategy: Making clear to China that staying on its current belligerent course will be a great way to guarantee that it’s ringed with ever more neighbors that are armed to the teeth.        

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Will the Foreign Policy Experts – Finally – Start Learning Some Geography?

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Afghanistan, Biden, Blob, Bloomberg.com, CNN.com, Europe, geography, globalism, Jeremy Shapiro, Luke McGee, Mainstream Media, Marc Champion, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Robert D. Kaplan, The Economist

I’m thrilled to report that I may have jumped the gun in my post last Wednesday in scoffing at the possibility of President Biden’s botched Afghanistan withdrawal – and the broader U.S. failure in that Forever War – would resulting in any major changes in America’s needlessly risky and costly globalist approach to foreign policy.

I’m not saying that the two-decade Afghanistan fiasco and its humiliating final chapter will spur a search for real alternatives in the foreseeable future, or even that significant new strategies will ever be put into effect – at least not without a much bigger disaster reflecting the same kinds of mistakes. But it’s nonetheless remarkable not only that any unconventional idea has appeared – especially given the determination of the strongly globalist Mainstream Media to suppress them – but that the one that has surfaced challenges the root assumption of globalism.

Specifically, some establishment voices are, inchoately to be sure, pointing out that for all the worries understandably expressed by Americans about new threats to their security appearing in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, Europe faces much greater threats. The reason, moreover, is that it’s located much closer to Afghanistan than the United States.

In other words, geography counts, and America’s position halfway around the world from this troubled region and its utterly dysfunctional Middle East neighborhood, and separated from them and from its leading adversaries by wide oceans, is a leading contributor to its security that creates options enjoyed by no other major power.

Further, by implication – given that these points are being made in the context of the United States concluding that a Taliban victory in Afghanistan is acceptable after all – one of the most important of these options when many forms of trouble arise in any number of locales abroad is simple non-involvement.

The importance of America’s unique geography and its advantages may seem screamingly obvious. But as I’ve explained in detail (see, e.g., here and here), it has not only been ignored by generations of globalist American leaders and thinkers literally since Pearl Harbor. It’s been actively rejected.

Instead, the prevailing foreign policy conventional wisdom has consistently held that peace and security around the world make up a seamless whole, and that war and aggression and even instability anywhere across the globe are matters of urgent concern to the United States and must be squelched or resisted ASAP lest they mestastasize and directly endanger the American homeland.

Some of these “Geography matters”-type statements have been made by members of America’s most prominent and influential proponents of universal and open-ended foreign policy activism – the so-called Blob. This Washington, D.C.-centered bipartisan agglomeration of globalist former diplomats and Congressional aides, retired military officers, genuine academics, and think tank hacks shapes American diplomacy in two critical ways.

First, it represents the main personnel pool drawn on to staff presidential administrations and House and Senate offices on rotating bases, and also serves as key informal sources of advice for these politicians. In other words, it’s a central portion of what’s often called the “permanent bureaucracy” (and by some, the “Deep State”), whose combination of experience (which of course has unmistakable value), sheer staying power, and skill at projecting an air of authority (which clearly have much less intrinsic value) enables it often to steer policy independent of what elected officials favor – and especially to keep the status quo alive through inertia-reenforcing foot-dragging and even sabotage.

Second, the Blob powerfully influences what so many Americans read, hear, and see about foreign policy by dominating the list of sources used by Mainstream Media journalists (who are predominantly sympatico by virtue of shared elite educations and clubby intertwined social networks) to report and interpret the news. The resulting permeation of reporting and analysis with Blob-y globalist perspectives goes far toward defining for the public which foreign policy ideas are and aren’t legitimate to discuss.

That’s why I was so gobsmacked when Blob mainstay Robert D. Kaplan wrote in the (ardently globalist British magazine) The Economist that

“America is a vast and wealthy continent densely connected by navigable rivers and with an economy of scale, accessible to the main sea lines of communication, yet protected by oceans from the turmoil of the Old World.

“And that geography still matters, despite technology having shrunk the globe….”

As a result, Kaplan added that “geography helps explain why America can miscalculate and fail in successive wars, yet completely recover, unlike smaller and less well-situated countries which have little margin for error.” Moreover, logically speaking (and these are my views, not Kaplan’s), the very geography-grounded security that enables the United States to recover quickly from (at least most) foreign involvements that produce disastrous consequences means that it was never significantly vulnerable to the perceived threats that led to that involvement to begin with.

Similar opinions have been offered by former senior U.S. official Jeremy Shapiro, who argues that post-Afghanistan, the United States “can and will work effectively with allies, but only when its vital interests are at stake. It sees those interests in the competition with China. Increasingly, however, in places such as central Asia, the Sahel, and perhaps even Europe’s eastern neighbourhood, it does not.”

By contrast, he observed, “Europeans have more direct interests at stake in those places.”

Further, some Mainstream Media journalists have followed suit – providing further evidence that such once utterly heretical notions are now being bandied about in some Blob-y circles.

For example, Bloomberg.com‘s Marc Champion has contended that

“The U.S. left Afghanistan on Tuesday humbled and with few of its goals achieved after 20 years of war. For America’s European allies, the humiliation may just be starting.

“Connected to Afghanistan by land, unlike the U.S., for Europe the return of the Taliban presents more concrete threats. Those include not just terrorism but also mass migration and the heroin trade.”

More vividly, a recent CNN.com post was headlined, “Europe left exposed as Biden walks America away from the world stage.” It seems reasonable to infer that if the headline writer – and his editors – regarded America as exposed, too, they’d have mentioned that danger explicitly. Indeed, correspondent Luke McGee went on to report that “Multiple European officials and diplomats told CNN of their shock at Biden’s assertion that the only US interest in Afghanistan was to neutralize the terrorists who attacked the US in 2001 and prevent further attacks on American soil.

“They now fear the humanitarian and political consequences of mass migration from a country run by militants who’ve historically harbored terrorists and that is connected to mainland Europe by land” – unlike, I’d remind again, the United States.

Again, I’m not saying that an intellectual revolution in U.S. foreign policy is on the horizon. But as suggested above, only a few weeks ago, I couldn’t have imagined seeing so many examples of any of the above in so short a timespan.

On balance, I’m still convinced that the Blob will wind up stamping out such dissent, at least within its own ranks – if only because at the end of the day, so few would be employable in a truly post-globalist America. But many Blob-ers are also savvy enough to recognize a potentially sinking ship. So I feel pretty confident in predicting that the longer lousy headlines and optics keep emanating from Afghanistan, the more of these globalists will start appreciating the virtues of America’s geography.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: How Much Change Will the Afghanistan Debacle Really Bring?

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Afghanistan, Al Qaeda, Biden, Central America, Donald Trump, failed states, globalism, Immigration, migration, nation-building, Northern Triangle, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, terrorism, The National Interest, Vietnam War

Since just yesterday, two big articles in the Mainstream Media have told us that President Biden’s latest speech on America’s (going-going-gone?) military involvement in Afghanistan could usher in a new, more circumspect era for U.S. foreign policy. (See here and here.) Me, I’m not so sure, even though I’d like to see nothing better, since I’ve been calling for such changes for no fewer than 35 years.

In fact, it’s not even clear whether Mr. Biden’s decision to pull the plug on this longest of America’s wars will profoundly influence America’s approach to world affairs on the level of day-to-day operations. For example, the President has insisted that “I was not going to extend this forever war. And I was not extending a forever exit”; and that with the Al Qaeda threat to attack the U.S. homeland and American allies squelched; and that the United States has “no vital interest in Afghanistan.” Nonethless, he still declared that “We will maintain the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan and other countries.”

Moreover, Mr. Biden acknowledged that the “over-the-horizon capabilities” that now enable attacks on “terrorists and targets” without fighting ground wars (through drone strikes and the like) will still require some “American boots on the ground.” That’s because you need some physical presence in order to identify and track the targets (which move around a lot), and because these forces need bases of some kind out of which to operate.

Further, the President claimed that “The terror threat has metastasized across the world, well beyond Afghanistan. We face threats from Al Shabab in Somalia, Al Qaeda affiliates in Syria and the Arabian Peninsula, and ISIS attempting to create a caliphate in Syria and Iraq and establishing affiliates across Africa and Asia.”

Even if he thinks that those over-the-horizon capabilities can suddenly meet this challenge (and obviously, they can’t now, or else we’d have seen a lot more of them and a much faster Afghanistan troop pullout), we’re talking about a non-trivial number of American boots on the ground in a huge number of countries – including more than a few states as failed, or as always-mythical, as Afghanistan.

President Biden was also pretty emphatic about “moving on” from what he suggested was the post-September 11 mindset of nation-building in places like Afghanistan – where democracy and unity and even cohesion has “never” existed.

But take another look at his “Strategy to Address the Root Causes of Migration in Central America.” The idea is to turn El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras into places acceptable enough to live in to convince huge portions of their populations to remain there, rather than seek better lives in the United States. And to achieve this aim, the administration’s blueprint “identifies, prioritizes, and coordinates actions to improve security, governance, human rights, and economic conditions in the region.”

That sounds pretty nation building-y to me, even if you believe that, unlike Afghanistan, these “Northern Triangle” countries have ever deserved to be called “nations” to begin with – rather than simply relatively large groups of very poor people exploited by (rotating) smaller groups of people possessing enough money and guns to climb to and stay on top for a while.

And since all the countries and regions that Mr. Biden has identified as new sources of terrorism suffer many of the same problems, there’s no reason to rule out the administration eventually dreaming up similar plans for them. According to the President’s speech, that would certainly be preferable to putting more American military boots on the ground.

But there’s a more fundamental reason to doubt that the President will engineer a major shift even in nation-building-type policies, much less in American foreign policy’s broader direction: Although the label didn’t emerge until after the September 11 attacks, nation-building has always been a core precept of the globalist approach that American foreign policy has carried out since Pearl Harbor, and Mr. Biden is a long-time card-carrying globalist. That’s the “back” to which he so proudly proclaimed America would return during his presidency.  

I explained what I mean by that most recently in a 2018 article for The National Interest. Globalism’s root assumption, I wrote, “has stemmed from the ostensibly timeless lessons of the nation’s 1930s indifference to aggression in Europe and Asia: that America’s security, freedom and prosperity are inseparable from the security, freedom and prosperity of a critical mass of the rest of the world in which trouble anywhere is sure to spread like wildfire unless checked.” And to prevent such contagions from emerging to begin with, “the entire global environment needed to be managed adequately” – including turning failed states and other breeding grounds for terrorism and all sorts of turmoil and instability into entities that are substantially better, or at least more tranquil.

That same article pointed out, however, that globalism’s grip on American foreign policy is so tight that even an avowed disrupter and America First champion like Donald Trump couldn’t shake it off completely – and even doubled down on some major globalist policies (like deepening America’s – nuclear – commitment to Europe’s security against Russian expansionism). Indeed, his Middle East and anti-terrorism policies were especially conflicted – as he himself admitted.

So the likeliest transformation I can envision for post-Afghanistan U.S. foreign policy is what I’ve called “globalism on the cheap” – retaining every ounce of this strategy’s grandiose objectives, but pretending that they can be pursued exclusively in neat, safe, and aesthetically appealing ways. In fact, this was the course chosen after another foreign policy debacle – the Vietnam War. And revealingly, Mr. Biden touted some of them yesterday: “diplomacy, economic tools, and rallying the rest of the world for support” (along with those over-the-horizon capabilities).

These and other tactics in principle can have their place in U.S. foreign policy, depending on circumstances. But calling them substitutes for major military deployments and operations in carrying out a globalist strategy is first-order misinformation spreading. And it makes me wonder just how damagingly globalism, on the cheap or otherwise, will need to fail before genuinely new foreign policy eras will begin.

 

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Biden’s Just Blundered on Taiwan, Too

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ABC News, Afghanistan, alliances, allies, Article Five, Biden, China, Cold War, Congress, credibility, George Stephanopoulos, Japan, NATO, North Atlantic treaty Organization, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Republic of China, semiconductors, South Korea, Taiwan, treaties, vital interests

Last week I tweeted that I was worried that President Biden would do something stupid and reckless to try to establish or reestablish (depending on our viewpoint) his global chops following the Afghanistan military withdrawal his administration has so disastrously conducted. As known by RealityChek regulars, American Presidents have followed this course before – notably John F. Kennedy.

And sure enough, on Wednesday he at least came uncomfortably close. No, Mr. Biden didn’t invade or threaten another country, or even move U.S. military forces into provocative positions versus, say, China or Russia or Iran or North Korea. But he did say something that should worry all Americans. In his interview with ABC News’ George Stephanopoulos, the President suggested that Taiwan now enjoys the same status in American eyes as Japan, South Korea, and the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). That is, they’re allies in whose defense against external aggression the United States is treaty-bound to fight.

Specifically, when asked by Stephanopoulos if China could credibly tell the Taiwanese – who they claim run a renegade province that Beijing has vowed to bring back into its fold with force if necessary – “See? You can’t count on the Americans,” Mr. Biden’s response included:

“We have made– kept every [defense] commitment. We made a sacred commitment to Article Five that if in fact anyone were to invade or take action against our NATO allies, we would respond. Same with Japan, same with South Korea, same with– Taiwan. It’s not even comparable to talk about that.”

The President is right about NATO. In fact, that Article Five he mentioned is the keystone of the treaty that established the alliance. In 1949, the signatories agreed

“that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs…will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”

The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty of 1951 contains its own Article Five. The key section:

“Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.”

The promise to meet aggression with U.S. military force is a little looser here – and notice that the treaty creates no Japanese obligation to aid the United States with its own military if American territory comes under attack. The reasons are complicated – for example, in 1947, Japan, then under U.S. military cooperation, adopted a constitution containing a proposal from Supreme Allied Commander General Douglas MacArthur that pledged “never” to “maintain” “land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential.” The idea, of course, was to prevent Japan from ever reemerging as the type of threat it became in the 1930s. And at that point, it wasn’t even a fully sovereign nation, much less an armed one.

Nonetheless, as the Cold War developed, and Washington’s priorities in East Asia shifted toward using any actual and potential assets available to resist communist aggression, the United States proceeded to push Japan to rearm and add to the regional forces that could fight the Soviets or the Chinese or the North Koreans. But even though Japan continuously balked, the United States’ determination to defend Japan could never be seriously doubted as long as tens of thousands of American servicemen were stationed on Japanese soil, representing a “tripwire” whose presence and possible vulnerability to the superior conventional militaries of potential regional aggressors would guarantee an armed U.S. response – poentially complete with the use of nuclear weapons – against an attack on Japan. 

A similar U.S. commitment – complete with unequal obligaions and tripwire forces – has been made to South Korea.

There’s now clearly a case for adopting the same policy toward Taiwan. From 1954 to 1979, the U.S. security relations with Taiwan were governed by a assymetrical defense treaty, too, complete wiith an Article Five American commitment. But since the United States decided to recognize the People’s Republic of China (yes, the Communists) as China’s sole legitimate government, its approach toward Taiwan’s defense has been informally called “strategic ambiguity” – which is just as fuzzy and plastic as it sounds.

Yet whereas that posture arguably made sense for most of the post-1979 period, since the People’s Republic has grown so much stronger and more important economically than Taiwan (which still calls itself the Republic of China), the island can now legitimately claim to boast an asset vital to America’s own national security and prosperity – world leadership in the manufacture of the world’s most advanced and powerful semiconductors.

At the same time, extending Article Five-type status even to a technological powerhouse like Taiwan isn’t a decision to be made on the spur of the moment. The impact on China – which has significantly closed the military gap with the United States especially in its own backyard (where Taiwan is located) – needs to be carefully considered. And more important, it’s a move that the United States can’t make by presidential fiat. Congress needs to approve.

On Thursday, a “senior Biden administration official” told reporters that American “policy with regard to Taiwan has not changed.” And the usual supposed experts and talking heads said that Mr. Biden had simply added to his long record as a “gaffe machine.” But who the heck is this senior official, anyway? Why should anyone believe him or her if they’re not willing to speak for attribution? And why should the Chinese take this walk-back seriously, or take comfort in (unofficial) assurances that the President was just Biden-ing again – especially since “strategic ambiguity” has become a lot bolder under both him and President Trump?

Moreover, if they’re not aware of it already, the Chinese should know that Presidents have used all sorts of ways short of formal treaties to tie the nation militarily to foreign countries, and even to use military force (Google “Tonkin Gulf Resolution,” or “Authorization for Use of Military Force”), and that timely, effective Congressional resistance is anything but a sure thing. That could go double for a national political establishment that today is united by a sense of humiliation due to the Afghanistan debacle – and possibly spoiling for an opportunity to regain global confidence.

Again, I’m not against a treaty commitment to Taiwan. But it needs to be made with full consideration of all the pluses and minuses, and according to clear Constitutional procedures. And it certainly shouldn’t result from an out-of-the-blue comment by a Chief Executive under heavy political fire, however richly deserved.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Toward Avoiding New Afghanistans

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Afghanistan, Al Qaeda, America First, Antony J. Blinken, Barack Obama, Biden, China, credibility, globalism, Jack Keane, jihadism, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Taliban, terrorism, Washington Post

The humanitarian calamity seemingly sure to erupt in Afghanistan now that the Taliban have taken over means that this is no time for I-told-you-so-type gloating – even by long-time critics of U.S. military involvement and nation-building since these jihadist extremists were driven from power in late 2001.

So as one of those long-time critics, I offer the following two observations simply as an attempt to help avoid repeats of this disaster going forward. And interestingly, they’re both inspired by a single Washington Post article.

The first concerns a statement from early this month by a spokesman for the Chinese defense ministry. According to one Colonel Wu Qian, Washington “bears an unavoidable responsibility for the current situation in Afghanistan. It cannot leave and shed the burden on regional countries.”

There’s no doubt that the U.S. military withdrawal could have been handled much better – especially for the local U.S. allies who will be left to the mercy of violent, reactionary, misogynistic Islamists. In particular, as retired U.S. Army General Jack Keane asked on Friday, why did President Biden decide to complete the pullout in the middle of Afghanistan’s fighting season – when the weather is warm enough to permit aggressive, large-scale Taliban military campaigns? Why didn’t he wait till the winter – when, as has consistently been the case, the cold has prevented such operations?

But this notion that America “cannot leave and shed the burden on regional countries”? What on earth is Colonel Wu talking about? Not only can the United States do exactly that. It should have done exactly that long years ago, once the main mission was accomplished of ousting the Taliban regime that permitted Al Qaeda to turn the country into a base for launching terrorist strikes like the September 11 attacks.

And the reason is pretty simple: As I recently posted, Afghanistan is in China’s neighborhood. Not to mention Russia’s and Iran’s. And it’s as far away as it can be from America’s neighborhood. As a result, it’s always been the case that once the United States left, it would have been the regional countries’ burden, and therefore, these countries (which aren’t exactly weak mini-states) would have had no choice but to figure out how to deal with a Sunni Muslim jihadist-led country capable of causing big problems for all of them.

How could this be done? Frankly, that’s not America’s problem. Because the only valid reason Americans ever had to have any significant self interest in who runs Afghanistan had to do with its terrorist base potential. And once the Taliban was gone, along with the unique threat it posed of giving sovereign-state shelter to a terrorist organization, that challenge has always best been handled with a genuine America First strategy: genuinely securing the U.S. border (something Washington can reasonably hope to control) rather than (1) chasing jihadists around a Middle East so dysfunctional that it’s bound to keep breeding new extremist groups faster than existing groups can be neutralized by the American military; much less (2) trying to build nations where none have existed before.

At the same time, more than cynicism and opportunism may be responsible for that Chinese statement. For it comes against the backdrop of decades of Washington acting like Afghanistan’s political makeup and regional behavior indeed mattered more to the United States than it mattered to Afghanistan’s neighbors.

Just as important, the statement also comes against the backdrop of decades of pre-Trump, globalist U.S. politicians, like Mr. Biden, prattling on about how America is and must be the world’s leader and “indispensable nation.” It seems perfectly reasonable, therefore, to suppose that even countries like China, which clearly has some global leadership ambitions of its own, have taken the idea seriously, at least on some subliminal level. That is, the indispensable stuff looks like it’s backfired big-time in the case of Afghanistan. So maybe Washington, and especially the globalists, could bring such bloviation, and the cluelessness and hubris behind it, to an end?  

The second statement that I hope can guide wiser post-Afghanistan U.S. foreign policy decisions (sort of) came today none other than Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken. According to the Washington Post‘s account:

“…Blinken rejected criticisms that the withdrawal damages U.S. credibility. He said staying mired in a conflict that is not in the ‘national interest’ would do far more damage.

“‘Most of our strategic competitors around the world would like nothing better than for us to remain in Afghanistan for another year, five years, 10 years, and have those resources dedicated to being in the midst of a civil war,’ Blinken told CNN. ‘It’s simply not in our interest.'”

I said “sort of” because if you look at the transcript of the interview from which this statement came, Blinken didn’t make the global credibility connection explicit. But since Mainstream Media news organizations like the Washington Post play such a big role in creating dominant narratives on issues like this, he might as well have.

And this connection matters, because it essentially echoes my main point from yesterday’s post: America’s global credibility depends most not on trying to stamp out every foreign challenge that arises, and even less on sticking with obviously lost causes. In fact, pretensions of omnipotence that are just as obviously groundless, and an unwillingness to cut losses, are likeliest to be seen, and have been seen, as signs of lousy judgment.

The real source of U.S. global credibility is demonstrating the wisdom to avoid plunging into conflicts or problems in low priority areas in the first place, and correcting such mistaken moves ASAP.

Former President Barack Obama put it cogently: “Don’t do stupid sh– (stuff).” It seems like a low bar for American foreign policy to meet. But especially as long as the country is led by globalists – like Mr. Biden – who for decades characteristically have viewed security and prosperity as internationally seamless wholes that will unravel disastrously if a single thread becomes loose, any sign that his administration may be learning the Obama lesson is unmistakably encouraging.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Afghanistan and the Credibility Crock

Tags

Afghanistan, Bay of Pigs, Biden, Central America, Cold War, communism, credibility, Cuba, Cuban Missile Crisis, Gideon Rachman, Grenada, John F. Kennedy, Laos, Lebanon, Lyndon B. Johnson, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Reagan Doctrine, Richard M. Nixon, Ronald Reagan, Samuel Johnson, Southeast Asia, Soviet Union, Vietnam

Forgive me if this header makes it sound like I’m unusually ticked off. But I sort of am. Because I’ve been dealing for decades with the claim that the United States can’t set meaningful foreign policy priorities because tolerating any international setbacks of any kind would destroy its global credibility forever.

I haven’t heard this argument lately, no doubt because it’s rooted in the Cold War era, and the absence of a superpower adversary determined to engage in a full-fledged contest for global supremacy (and no, the Chinese aren’t there yet, especially when it comes to fighting proxy wars) drained it of lots of its…well…credibility as a rationale for sweeping American global activism.

Now, however, the seeming certainty of a Taliban takeover following the nearly completed U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan has brought it back (see, e.g., here and here), and it’s even less convincing than during its Cold War heyday.

As a review of U.S. Cold War history makes clear, there were actually several varieties of the credibility theory. For example, John F. Kennedy’s effort to halt the spread of Communism in Vietnam clearly was influenced by the acute need he felt to bolster his own credibility after the Bay of Pigs debacle, a performance at a summit with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev that he himself viewed as a dangerous flop, and a widely criticized diplomatic settlement to a conflict in neighboring Laos. In other words, Kennedy perceived an urgent need to salvage a reputation for simple foreign policy competence.

Credibility throughout the early Cold War decades in particular had an ideological dimension, too. As this study handily summarizes, U.S. leaders strongly believed that prevailing against the Soviets and Chinese required that Americans help threatened countries demonstrate to the world at large that non-Communist systems had the vigor to repel subversion and outright revolt by adherents of that creed. So establishing credibility during that period was also an exercise in global morale building. (Interestingly, echoes of this idea permeate the rhetoric of the Biden administration and other globalists on the subject of China.)

But the main version of Cold War credibility theory held any U.S. failure to resist Communist expansionism the world over would convince friend and foe alike that American declarations of resolve were shams and that American security commitments were worthless whenever push came to shove. The resulting shift in the global balance of power and influence, as U.S. allies and neutrals alike scrambled to accommodate ascendant Communist forces as best they could, would leave an internationally isolated America much weaker and poorer.

Such fears were behind Lyndon B. Johnson’s declaration that America would not “cut and run” from Vietnam because “We must meet our commitments in the world….”

They were behind Richard M. Nixon’s Vietnam-induced fear that “If, when the chips are down, the world’s most powerful nation, the United States of America, acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world.”

And they were explicitly behind Ronald Reagan’s case for his doctrine of resisting Moscow’s efforts to expand its influence in Central America, sub-Saharan Africa – and Afghanistan: “The U.S. must rebuild the credibility of its commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on U.S. interests and those of its Allies and friends, and to support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to the United States, or are special targets of Soviet policy.”

Thankfully, today’s credibility-mongers are outside of power in Washington, not inside. But these members of the globalist foreign policy Blob concentrated in the Mainstream Media, the think tank world, and some factions in Congress, are hardly devoid of influence, especially if the optics coming out of Afghanistan are ugly, as can be counted on. So it’s worth reviewing the main reasons that this form of obsessing about U.S. credibility has no claim to be taken seriously both for that reason, and because their fatal flaws remain the same, too.

In the first place, credibility-mongering falls on its face because its main animating fears have simply not materialized over any stretch of time. The fall of Vietnam, most prominently, clearly led to Communist takeovers in Laos and Cambodia, too. But in the immediate aftermath of Vietnam, no U.S. treaty allies defected into the Communist camp, or turned neutral. Even in Southeast Asia, no more dominoes topped – despite the clear lack of any American appetite to help with any resistance.

In fact, as (globalist) Financial Times columnist Gideon Rachman just noted, “within fourteen years of the fall of Saigon, the cold war was over, and the west had won.”

A least as interesting, as I noted way back in 1985, successful American demonstrations of credibility have displayed little long-term value. For example, Reagan’s 1983 invasion of Grenada was a clear-cut win for the United States. But for years afterwards, Soviet- and Cuban-backed leaders and insurgents in nearby Central America continued defying his administration’s will for years afterward. Outside the Western Hemisphere, the Grenada victory did nothing to stop deadly attacks on U.S. Marines stationed in civil war-torn Lebanon. Meanwhile, many American allies viewed Grenada as more evidence that Reagan was a dangerous cowboy. Even staunch Reagan ally and close personal friend Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, was unnerved.

More important, though, as I argued in that 1985 article, given inevitable limits on American power and will, the real measure of U.S. credibility isn’t a stated determination to respond strongly to every single foreign challenge that arises, or even to try doing so. In fact, because its post-Vietnam circumstances and behavior have made those limits obvious globally, such pretensions are likeliest to have the opposite effect – to fuel doubts about American judgment and wisdom.

Rather than depending on “convincing the rest of the world that the United States will respond to all instances of aggression,” I continued, building and preserving American credibility “must depend on convincing the world that the United States will respond to some instances of aggression” based on the identification of specific interests that are regarded as important enough to defend (or to advance, for that matter, when such opportunities appear). And operationally, “this translates into an ability to use finite assets efficiently and rationally – to convey a clear sense of priorities.”

Of course, adversaries might as a result view countries or regions left off an American definition of crucial interests as tempting targets. But precisely because these would be low priorities, by definition any adversary wins in these areas would pose few if any risks to the United States.

The 18^th century British literary giant Samuel Johnson famously proclaimed that false, cynical expressions of patriotism are “the last refuge of a scoundrel.” I wouldn’t go so far as to attach that label to the credibility-mongers. But resort to  this ploy too often has been the last refuge of globalists who are completely out of any other reasons to insist on dubious forms of international activism, and the current hysteria over Afghanistan is clearly the latest example.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Follow Lithuania’s Lead on China

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China, diplomacy, European Union, Lithuania, One China policy, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Taiwan

Don’t look now, but the Baltic country of Lithuania (yes, you read that right) has just shown the entire world a terrific way, low-risk and low-cost way to punish China for its worsening bellicosity and human rights atrocities by giving it a great, big black public relations eye. Even better: Though this action need not harm countries taking it one bit, the damage felt by the PRC’s thug leaders will be grievous and therefore capable of generating actual benefits – unlike most such political moves – especially if enough important (and even unimportant) countries participate.

The specific gambit? Permitting Taiwan to set up “a representative office under the name of Taiwan” on national territory. And Lithuania has demonstrated exactly how to do it – in the process demonstrating how this kind of decision can put China into a thoroughly humiliating box.

Lithuania set the process in motion July 20 when it announced its Taiwan decision. Since China’s Communist leaders have always regarded Taiwan as a renegade province whose claims to any form of autonomy amount to a mortal and thus intolerable threat to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, no one should have been surprised by Beijing’s response: withdrawing its own ambassador to Lithuania, demanding the departure of Lithuania’s envoy to China, and threatening to cut off diplomatic relations altogether.

Interestingly, Lithuania could have fudged matters in a way apparently acceptable to China had it clearly called the Taiwan facility a trade-focused office, or required it to use the name “Taipei” (the island’s capital) rather than “Taiwan.” However grudgingly, Beijing has tolerated other countries (and indeed the entire European Union, of which Lithuania is a member) taking this approach.

But even more interesting, Lithuania went “the full Taiwan.” Although insisting that it still regarded Communist China as the only legitimate government of China (thus like the United States and most other countries, maintaining full diplomatic relations solely with Beijing in line with a “One China” policy), it accepted the island’s decision to use its chosen name for the office. (That’s a first for Europe.). The “trade office” nomenclature has been rejected as well. (For the record, Taiwan does official business in the United States though “Economic and Cultural” facilities in Washington, D.C. and many other big cities. But the web page for the Washington location calls it an “embassy.”) And Lithuania has refused to back down in the face of China’s bluster.

So now it’s clearly time for every other country that values democracy, human rights, and its own self-respect to follow Lithuania’s lead either in permitting the establishment of explicitly Taiwanese government offices on their soil, or dropping the policy or pretense that existing offices must be strictly commercial entities.

Yes, unlike Lithuania, many major countries have the kinds of economic ties with China that make Beijing’s threats of retaliation understandably troubling. But if all or most act in concert, and stick to their policy guns, and for the time being stick officially with the One China policy, what realistically could or would China do? Withdraw its envoys from dozens of world capitals? Expel just as many foreign ambassadors from Beijing? Tariff imports from just as many trade partners? Cut off all their investments in China? Intensify harassment of all their companies operating in China?

Much likelier: China’ dictators huff and puff, and wind up sitting there and taking it – meaning that a face-obsessed regime would suffer a major indignity in the eyes of its own (face-obsessed) population, and in the court of global public opinion.

More important, Beijing would have little choice but to end its campaign of pressuring other countries to limit strictly Taiwan’s overseas official presence. Unless it wanted to be exposed repeatedly as a paper tiger in this respect? And maybe some governments would want to push the Taiwan relations envelope further, which would only further undermine China’s global image and fears that it – and especially its high tech totalitarianism – represents the wave of the future, and spur more resistance to its dangerous global ambitions.

At the same time, the opposite scenario might be even more crucial: If most countries aren’t willing to call China’s bluff despite the scanty risk levels, Beijing could become even more aggressive, and wring more security-related and economic concessions those with which it interacts. Decades of reckless national policies have already fed this beast with immense wealth and cutting-edge knowhow. Will the world now start feeding it psychologically as well?    

 

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: A Neglected Lesson of Afghanistan

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Afghanistan, Biden, border security, China, Donald Trump, forever wars, globalism, Immigration, jihadism, Muslims, nation-building, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, special forces, Tajikistan, Taliban, terrorism, Uighurs, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, women's rights, Xinjiang

Let’s get one matter straight right away: When it comes to the (always important) optics, and to humanitarian considerations, there is no good way for the United States to end its military involvement in Afghanistan that would meet any sensible or decent person’s definition of “good.”

Indeed, much of the news that’s come out of that war-torn country (and I use that term advisedly) is sickeningly reminiscent of the final U.S. pullout from Vietnam in April, 1975 – complete with the almost certain abandonment of many locals who had cast their lot with the Americans in various ways, and therefore face many forms of retaliation if the jihadist Taliban do indeed triumph.

Further, the U.S. departure could produce an Afghan aftermath far worse than that suffered in Vietnam, as the social and economic strides made by many Afghan women of all ages under the umbrella of the American presence seem to be doomed if the country is taken over by a movement wed to Islam’s most misogynistic version.

In fact, a couple of years ago, by which time the American mission’s failure looked inevitable, I came up with the idea of offering all Afghan females asylum in the United States – complete with transportation expenses. I never published it, but wouldn’t it have served the women-haters right to leave them as women-free as possible?

That chance looks to be gone – though I’m still hoping that somehow the interpreters and other U.S. employees can be saved. Otherwise, the best that Americans can hope for now is figuring out what went wrong and how to avoid such fiascoes going forward. There’s been no shortage of post-mortems, and especially encouraging has been the bipartisan globalist U.S. foreign policy establishment’s (belated) agreement that nation-building where no true nation exists is folly. (See, e.g., here.)

Another big lesson, however, remains largely unlearned – even by long-time opponents of the Afghan War like former President Trump: As I’ve written repeatedly, since the only self-interested (and therefore sensible) reason for direct American involvement in the first place was preventing the country’s re-emergence as an officially sponsored and protected base for September 11-like terrorism, Washington should have focused on seriously securing U.S. borders rather than on fighting the jihadis “over there.”

Trump tried in his own characteristically ragged way to beef up border protection, and achieved some impressive progress. But as made clear here, he never seemed to make the connection fully. And now President Biden appears determined to create the worst of all possible worlds from the U.S. standpoint – an Afghanistan policy unlikely to enable the Tailban’s containment through special forces guerilla-type operations until the U.S. border was strengthened adequately, and an immigration policy that actually opens the border still wider.

Meanwhile, a third big lesson hasn’t evidently even made it onto official or unofficial U.S. policy screens (including mine), but it was suggested in this Bloomberg news item on Monday: A Taliban-run Afghanistan could well have been kept off balance – and frustrated in its efforts undertake the major initiatives needed to foster September 11-scale terrorism – by the nearby countries its extremism would surely have alarmed and antagonized. And these regional concerns seem compelling enough to keep the lid on in Afghanistan by hook or by crook from this point on in the American military’s absence.

As the piece makes clear, in the near term, smallish Afghanistan neighbors like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are anxious to prevent chaos on their borders – including no doubt massive refugee flows. And both countries have long been cooperating with Washington for many years to bolster “overall regional security” – which won’t be helped by a jihadist regime in their midst. (See here and here.)

And don’t forget Russia – whose help those two central Asian countries are seeking. Its own disastrous 1979 invasion and decade-long occupation of much of the country was triggered largely by fears that the rise of Islamic extremism in Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East would infect the Muslim populations of adjacent Soviet “republics” (like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). Moscow can’t be anxious to repeat that mistake, but the fear of jihadis persists, and like it or not, Russia’s deep reinvolvement in Afghanistan consequently seems inevitable – and bound to cause big problems for the Taliban.

China’s bound to be pulled in, too. All indications are that Beijing hopes to keep post-U.S.-withdrawal Afghanistan stable in a softer way – with big economic development projects that ironically look a lot like nation-building (though apparently lacking its political dimension). More power to Chinese dictator Xi Jinping if he succeeds. But mainly because it’s had its own huge problems (many surely self-created) with its own Muslim population in Xinjiang province (which also shares a short border with Afghanistan) China’s bottom line clearly is maintaining stability and making sure that Afghanistan doesn’t become “a haven or transit corridor” for the Uyghur militants who have aroused its ire. (See the above-linked Economist piece for the quote.)

As a result, it’s more than a little interesting that a Chinese academic recently felt free to tell a Financial Times reporter that “Even though China has for a long time been extremely cautious about sending military forces overseas, if it is supported by a United Nations resolution, China might join an international peacekeeping team to enter Afghanistan.”

Alternatively, the Chinese bet that they can cultivate the Taliban’s pragmatic instincts by financing massive road-building and mining operations could pay off – in which case, the terror-base scenario feared in the United State may not materialize.

But the crucial strategic insight for Americans is that China and all of Afghanistan’s neighbors have compelling stakes in curbing Taliban jihadism and related terrorism, and that these stakes exist precisely because Afghanistan’s in their own neighborhood – and always has been. In other words, however important Afghanistan’s stability, moderation, etc has been for Americans thousands of miles away, it’s always been and remains far more important for the folks right next door. Even better, because some big powers are involved, a strong case can be made not only for their persistence in addressing the problem but their success.

If they fail, however, or get bogged down in their own forever war, that’s OK from the U.S. perspective as well – because they’ll keep the Taliban too busy to concentrate on attacking America. That’s not to say that the United States can therefore forget about sealing the border. After all, Afghanistan is hardly the world’s only concentration of jihadis.

But it does mean that the strategic case for the United States carrying the burden of intervening in Afghanistan specifically is weakening; that the case may have been weak all along – or at least once the Taliban was ousted from power and significantly weakened right after September 11 – and that as long as the neighbors can be relied on to act in their own self-interest (surely a long time), and especially if Washington tends to its border knitting, this case won’t emerge again.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Biden’s Biggest Putin Summit Failure

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Biden, China, Cold War, Democrats, election 2016, election interference, globalism, Henry Kissinger, impeachment, Nordstream 2, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, Trump-Russia, Ukraine, Vladimir Putin

Even though he’s just turned 98, I’m still surprised that none of the voluminous coverage and commentary on the just-concluded summit between President Biden and Russian leader Vladimir Putin featured any analysis from Henry Kissinger. Not that I agree with every policy decision or even strategy that the former Secretary of State and White House national security adviser favored – far from it.

But as I’ve written before, he’s one of the few first-rate analysts of U.S. foreign policy that I’ve encountered over my own decades in the field (and would have been even if in fact this bar was not so low). He’s still speaking out on these issues. And most important of all, Mr. Biden seems to have paid little attention either in the run-up to the Putin meeting and at the actual session (though of course, the details will long remain highly classified) to an historic insight that Kissinger helped contributed to American diplomacy whose core is as relevant as ever: the imperative of not needlessly antagonizing Russia and China at the same time. 

At this point, three big caveats need to be mentioned. First, it’s an imperative if U.S. foreign policy is to take a globalist course. That’s not my favored course, and under my kind of America First framework, the approach toward each of this powers would be substantially different. But the President is a died-in-the-wool globalist, so what counts most isn’t how his decisions compare with my preferences, but how well and coherently he’s pursuing his own strategy.

Second, there’s no question that Kissinger – and the rest of the bipartisan globalist U.S. foreign policy establishment – took the engage-with-China strategy way too, and indeed disastrously, too far. But at the time, and given the prevailing Cold War priorities both he and then President Nixon held, opening ties with China largely (but not exclusively) to complicate global matters for a Soviet Union feeling its oats, not only made good sense, but was long overdue.

And third, as suggested by my Cold War reference and my claim that U.S. China policy went way overboard, both national and international circumstances have changed dramatically.

Nonetheless, although China today is the rising behemoth facing the United States and post-Soviet Russia’s power is greatly diminished, the latter is still more than strong enough militarily and technologically to cause major problems for America. These range from aggressive designs on vulnerable new U.S. allies like the Baltic countries and Moscow’s former Warsaw Pact satellites, to damaging and disruptive hacks to America’s infrastructure. (I put election interference in a different box, since only extreme partisans believe that Russian operations made the difference in 2016.)

Since the China threat is far greater – and much more multidimensional – than the Russia threat, Mr. Biden has to date sensibly continued his predecessor’s policies of pushing back both militarily (in areas like the South China Sea) and economically (by keeping the Trump China tariffs and tech sanctions in place).

But he’s also spent his first months in office until this week seemingly determined to do his utmost to villify Russia and Putin verbally, apparently heedless of how his posture threatened to push Moscow and Beijing even closer together.

That’s not to say that a rapprochement between China and Russia didn’t take place during the Trump years. It did. (See, e.g., here.) And undoubtedly one big reason was that the Trump actions were much tougher than the Trump words. That’s true whether we’re talking about energy policy (where the former President’s encouragement of American independence gravely weakened the economies of Russia and other big foreign oil and gas producers), or Europe policy (where despite Trump’s scorn for America’s militarily free-riding allies, he beefed up the U.S. air and ground force and naval presence in and around Eastern Europe, right at Russia’s doorstep).

But unlike Mr. Biden to date, Trump also just as undoubtedly sought to contain disputes and even keep open the door to lowering tensions. And one key reason for this hostile posture can only be the flagrantly false claims from so many Democratic party politicians that Trump was excusing and even enabling Putin’s hostile actions out of gratitude for that election year assistance. President Biden eagerly joined the chorus, which tragically turned any outreach toward Russia toxic politically, and now he’s paying the piper – coming under fire from vengeful Republicans and other conservatives for even so modest and reasonable a decision as meeting Putin in person.

As a result, despite this recent report that “Biden fears what ‘best friends’ [Chinese leader] Xi and Putin could do together” and that “U.S. wariness over the Russia-China relationship has grown to the point where high-level American strategists are weighing how to factor it in as they try to reorient U.S. foreign policy to focus more on a rising China,” there’s not only no evidence that the subject came up in any serious way. It’s difficult at best to imagine that Mr. Biden could actually take any noteworthy steps in this direction without sparking (understandable) charges that he’s a Trump-like Putin lapdog, too. Just think of the reactions even in his own party to his recent decision to waive U.S. sanctions on finishing the Nordstream 2 natural gas pipeline, which as I’ve written, can only enrich Russia at the expense of Ukraine (whose security against Russian expansionism was declared vital to the United States itself by so many Democrats during the first Trump impeachment procedings).

An anti-American genuine Russia-China alliance is still no foregone conclusion. After all, countries bordering each other often have long histories of intense and often violent rivalries (like Russia and China). Dictators and would-be dictators like Putin and Xi Jinping rarely trust each other. As a result, countries headed by such authoritarians that are also next-door neighbors are especially unlikely partners.

But there’s also historically a great deal to the adage that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” And for the time being – and at an especially crucial juncture – Mr. Biden will struggle mightily to heed it. 

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Biden’s Latest Nod to Trump-ism – Israel-Palestinians Policy?

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Abraham Accords, Antony J. Blinken, Biden, Binyamin Netanyahu, Blob, China, diplomacy, Donald Trump, Gaza, globalism, Hamas, Israel, Jared Kushner, Middle East, North Korea, occupied territories, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Palestinians, tariffs, Trade, two-state solution, West Bank

As known by RealityChek regulars, one of the leading – and most surprising – features of the Biden administration is a tendency to continue certain Trump administration policies that the current President, and much of the globalist bipartisan policy Blob decried as dangerously naive, xenophobic, short-sighted, isolationist, protectionist [feel free at this point to insert your own scornful epithet].

Now on top of tariffs, China trade and economic strategy, and North Korea policy, there’s a sign that the Biden approach to the Israel-Palestinian conflict can be added to the list. My evidence? Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken’s remarks this morning on the latest eruption after a meeting in Jerusalem with the Jewish state’s prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu.

The most specific policy statements Blinken made focused tightly on the need for reconstruction aid for Gaza – where Israeli military strikes aimed at stopping Hamas rocket attacks inflicted serious damage – as well as the need “to work to expand opportunity for Palestinians in Gaza and in the West Bank, including by strengthening the private sector, expanding trade and investment, and other means. Assistance and investment like these will help foster a more stable environment that benefits Palestinians and also benefits Israelis.”

By contrast, there were only the most glancing references to resuming diplomatic efforts to bring lasting peace to the region – principally, Blinken’s report that he and Netanyahu discssed “other steps that need to be taken by leaders on both sides to set a better course for their shared future. As President Biden has said, we believe that Palestinians and Israelis equally deserve to live safely and securely; to enjoy equal measures of freedom, opportunity, and democracy; to be treated with dignity.”

And beyond that – nothing. Not even a mention of a negotiated two-state solution that President Biden continues to support as the end goal of U.S. diplomacy.

That looks awfully Trump-y because a focus on economic development in Israel’s occupied territories to ameliorate their populations’ pressing day-to-day needs and create credible hopes for decent living standards and further progress, and an unmistakable deemphasis on returning Israeli and Palestinian leaders to some kind of bargaining table, was a definite hallmark of the former President’s approach to dealing with the conflict. The idea was that the promise and growing reality of prosperity on the West Bank and in Gaza was the best hope for reducing the appeal of violence and creating the conditions in which realistic compromises could – some day – be accepted.

Indeed, Trump’s peace plan conspicuously began with a purely economic proposal – a fund raised from private investors in the Persian Gulf states and other countries that would spend $50 billion over ten years on infrastructure and development projects in the occupied territories. As the plan’s main author, Trump son-in-law and White House advisor Jared Kushner explicitly stated upon its unveiling, “Today is not about political solutions — we will get to them later.”

And although Mr. Biden just issued a re-endorsement of two-state, it’s more than a little interesting that during his Senate confirmation hearings, Blinken acknowledged that “Realistically it’s hard to see near-term prospects for moving forward on that.” That’s hardly a sign of perceived urgency. Perhaps more revealing: The numerous recent articles (all pre-dating the latest Middle East fighting) reporting Mr. Biden’s determination to deemphasize the Middle East as a U.S. foreign priority to begin with – and evidence the administration was following through in official policy declarations and staffing decisions.

Not that this relative indifference marked a significant change in candidate Biden’s campaign positions. In fact, he praised the Trump “Abraham Accords” that normalized relations between Israel and several Arab countries. And although Mr. Biden did charge that Trump’s strong pro-Israel tilt had made a negotiated Israel-Palestinian settlement “even more difficult,” his campaign’s main foreign policy statement didn’t even mention the issue. (Perhaps that’s because he reserved his more detailed – and somewhat more critical – verdict for his campaign’s articulation of a policy toward “the Jewish community.”)

But the foreign policy Blob’s judgement were much harsher – largely because Trump was seen to be recklessly ignoring the Palestinians’ legitimate aspirations and the supposedly obvious reality that not only was peace between Israel and the Palestinians was impossible without taking the latter’s interests seriously, but that meaningful progress toward pacifying and even stabilizing the entire Middle East was as well. (See, e.g., here and here).

It’s an exaggeration to say that the President has now repudiated this pre-Trump conventional wisdom on the Israel-Palestinian conflict. But he’s clearly in no rush to embrace it. And given his other adoptions of Trump-ian stances, it strikes me as evidence that not only is Mr. Biden moving away from pre-Trump globalism, but that the days of this strategy dominating American foreign policymaking writ large are numbered themselves.