(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. and Other Foreign Investors Keep Funding the China Threat

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bonds, China, decoupling, delisting, FDI, Financial Times, foreign direct investment, investment, Joe Biden, pension funds, Phase One, portfolio investment, Steven A. Schoenfeld, stock markets, stocks, Trade, trade surplus, Trump, Wall Street, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s one of the most depressing articles I’ve read in a long time, and it deals with a (big) piece of U.S.-China economic relations to which I haven’t paid enough attention so far:  flows of financial investment.

It’s depressing because it shows that, although the Trump administration has (rightly, in my view) begun to decouple America’s economy from China’s, and made impressive progress in trade and foreign direct investment (purchases of “hard assets,” like factories and labs and enterprises and real estate), portfolio investment (purchases of stocks and bonds) into China from around the world is not only continuing – it’s booming. And these capital flows, including resources from Americans, are already much bigger than direct investment flows and are  rapidly approaching even the mammoth scale of trade flows.

According to this Financial Times piece, in total, investors outside China this year have bought about $150 billion worth of Chinese stocks and bonds – including Chinese government bonds. (Not that the debt of Chinese entities practically speaking differs fundamentally from national and local Chinese government debt, since there’s no private sector worthy of the name in China.)

The Financial Times reports that the vast majority of these inflows are bond purchases, meaning that investors outside China are lending to all manner of borrowers inside the People’s Republic. But buys of stocks in the Chinese entities commonly and misleadingly described as “companies” that presumably closely resemble their counterparts in genuine free market systems matter as well, because they, too, make new resources available to the Chinese regime. And after suffering from net outflows earlier this year, when Beijing locked down much of the country’s economy after the CCP Virus broke out, Chinese stocks are enjoying net inflows once again.

Moreover, China is starting to enjoy this foreign capital windfall just as its own ability to generate the savings needed to finance the huge debts that have fueled the latest phase of its ongoing economic expansion has begun weakening. Indeed, the need to replace faltering domestic capital sources with foreign capital is exactly what’s behind Beijing’s recent spate of decisions to reduce the barriers to overseas investing in China’s financial markets.

Foreign purchases of Chinese financial assets are still dwarfed by China’s global trade surplus (i.e., its profits) this year, which stands at just under $500 billion through November. But they’re now twice as great as global direct investment in China (about $115 billion through October, Beijing reports).

Obviously, the Trump administration can’t directly control non-U.S. foreign investment into China. But capital coming from the United States hasn’t exactly been chump change. I haven’t been able to find official data, but Steven A. Schoenfeld of the investment research and advisory firm MV Index Solutions, who has been investigating this issue for several years, has written that, in 2019, “nearly $400 billion of new foreign investment into Chinese equities was driven by changes in allocations within benchmark indexes, with American investors accounting for more than a third of these massive portfolio flows.” In addition, he has estimated that the 30 largest U.S. public workers’ pension plans had invested more than $50 billion in Chinese entities as of the beginning of this year. (Full disclosure: Steven is a long-time close personal friend.)

The Trump administration belatedly has tried to curb American portfolio investment in China, and has both forced a big federal workers’ pension fund to halt a planned great increase its China holdings, and has ordered a ban on all U.S. financial investment in dozens of companies linked to the Chinese military.

But unless more comprehensive curbs are enacted, the decisions by Wall Street research firms to boost China’s presence in the stock indices they construct, and which both government pension and private fund managers generally try to track, will still ensure that these investors’ exposure to China keeps rising. And the lure of expanded opportunities in China’s already huge and potentially huge-er financial services market, and its still healthily growing real economy, will continue fueling American and other foreign investors’ appetite for both Chinese stocks and bonds. Ironically, the President’s Phase One trade deal could help sustain and even increase U.S. investments in China via the commitments China has made to ease barriers to entry for American finance companies.

In fact, Steven Schoenfeld’s research makes clear that overall, despite these Trump administration curbs, total foreign holdings of Chinese stocks and bonds could approach and even exceed the half trillion dollar level in the next two or three years. These sums would equal several percentage points of China’s total economy.

Nor does the foreign financial support for China stop there. Although the Trump administration and Congress have been working to tighten the standards Chinese entities must meet to list on U.S. stock exchanges, their presence in the three biggest such financial markets as of October had allowed them to achieve total market capitalization of $2.2 trillion.

Of course, the Trump years seem to be nearing a close, raising the question of whether apparent President-elect Joe Biden will try to tighten the clamps on U.S. capital flows further and even encourage American allies to do the same, or whether he’ll simply let current trends continue, or open the flood gates further.  Something we do know for sure:  Investors in Chinese markets seem awfully confident that Washington will let them continue with their version of selling Beijing the rope with which it can hang the free world.  Why else would Chinese stock prices be way up since his apparent election? 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trump is Winning the Trade and Decoupling Wars

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CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, decoupling, FDI, foreign direct investment, goods trade, merchandise trade, MSCI, non-oil goods trade deficit, pension funds, Rhodium Group, Securities and Exchange Commission, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade war, Trump, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s become increasingly clear in the last few days that President Trump’s trade war with China and his apparent efforts to decouple the U.S. and Chinese economies have achieved real successes. Just why exactly? Because of a recent flurry of claims in the Mainstream Media that the trade war has been an ignominious defeat for the President and his tariffs, and that decoupling can only backfire on America if it’s taken too far (an outcome that’s supposedly imminent). (See here, here, and here in particular.)

As RealityChek regulars know, such media doom- and fear-mongering – spread both by journalists and by the purported experts they keep quoting who have been disastrously wrong literally for decades about trade and broader economic expansion with China – are now well established contrarian indicators. And here’s some of the key data that these proven failures have overlooked.

Let’s start with the least controversial measure of decoupling – two-way trade. Let’s generally use the end of the previous administration as our baseline, since decoupling really is a Trump-specific priority. And let’s generally end with the end of 2019, not only because it’s our last full data year, but because the coronavirus pandemic clearly is distorting the data, and won’t be with us forever (although some of its effects on supply chains and the like might – also because of reinforcement from the trade war). We’ll also stick with goods trade, since detailed service trade figures are always late to come out, and because they’re rarely major subjects of trade policy.

Between 2016 and 2019, combined US goods imports from and goods exports to China actually grew by 2.92 percent. So where’s the decoupling, you might ask? It becomes clear from using economic analysis best practices and putting these figures into context – mainly, the performance of the entire economy.

And in this case and many of those below, it’s crucial to know that the economy grew during this period, too. As a result, in 2016, this two-way goods trade (also called merchandise trade) amounted to 3.08 percent gross domestic product (GDP) – the nation’s total output of goods and services. In 2019, it was down to 2.60 percent. That is, like a supertanker, this trade doen’t turn around right away.

Therefore, it is indeed legitimate to fault Mr. Trump for claiming that trade wars are easy to win. But the supertanker is turning. And the impact on the economy? In 2016, it expanded by 2.78 percent. In 2019? 3.98 percent. So not much damage evident there. (All these figures are pre-inflation figures, because detailed inflation-adjusted trade figures aren’t available.)

Similar trends hold for the U.S.-China goods trade deficit, which the President views as the most important scorecard for his China trade policy success. Between 2016 and 2019 in absolute terms, it barely budged – dipping by just 0.47 percent. That could be a rounding error.

But viewed in the proper context, this trade deficit fell from 1.85 percent of GDP to 1.61 percent. And again, the economy grew much faster in 2019 than in 2016.

It’s still possible to ask what any of the trade decoupling had to do with the President’s ballyhooed tariffs. But the only reasonble answer? “A lot.” That’s because even after the signing of the so-called Phase One U.S.-China trade deal in January, levies of 7.5 percent remain on categories of imports from China that have been totalling about $120 billion annually lately, and tariffs of 25 percent remain on $250 billion more. (That’s most of the $451.65 billion in total goods imported by the United States from China in 2019.)

For comparison’s sake, between 2016 and 2019, the U.S. worldwide non-oil goods trade deficit – that’s the deficit that’s most impacted by trade policy decisions like tariffs, and the portion of the deficit that’s most like US-China trade – rose by 24 percent. That’s more than 50 times faster than the increase in the China goods deficit.

So there can’t be any serious doubt that the Trump China tariffs have worked both directly (by keeping Chinese goods out of the U.S. market) and indirectly (by encouraging companies that had been producing in China for export to the United States to move elsewhere). Moreover, since that “elsewhere” is always to much friendlier countries, that’s a plus for Americans even though the decoupling by most accounts has only returned modest amounts of jobs stateside.

Moreover, there’s a strong case to be made that the Trump tariffs on China have prevented the U.S. economy’s CCP Virus-induced recession from being much worse. That contention is borne out by the fact that, as RealityChek reported earlier this month, the latest available apples-to-apples statistics show that China’s goods trade surplus with the world as a whole had increased by some 25 percent between July, 2019 and July, 2020. But during that period, the China goods surplus with the United State fell by about 18 percent.

As a result, according to the standard way of measuring the economy and how developments in areas like trade affect its growth or shrinkage, China over roughly the last year has been growing at the expense of the world as a whole, but not at America’s. Indeed, quite the opposite. After decades of trade with China slowing U.S. growth, such commerce is now supporting growth.

The decoupling picture, however, wouldn’t be complete without investment flows. Here, on one front, the disengagement has been even more extensive. The consulting firm Rhodium Group does a good job of crunching the numbers on foreign direct investment (FDI) – those transactions that involve so-called hard assets, like real estate and factories and warehouses and entire companies, as opposed to portfolio investment, which involves stocks, bonds, and other financial instruments.

By a happy coincidence, Rhodium has just issued its latest report, which takes us through the first half of 2020. Yes, that covers the virus era, when it’s natural to expect all kind of economic and commercial activity to decline. But the pre-virus era trends will become clear enough, too.

According to Rhodium, two-way FDI flows between the United States and China in the first six months of this year (measured by the value of completed deals) hit their lowest level since the second half of 2011. And the peak came during comparable periods between early 2016 and late 2017 – when these investments were running nearly four times their current levels. Moreover that peak, not so coincidentally, bridged the Obama-Trump transition.

Chinese FDI into the US during that first half of this year actually rose a great deal – from $1.3 to $4.7 billion. But this increase resulted entirely – and then some – from a single purchase by the big Chinese social media company WeChat of a 10 percent stake in the U.S. company Universal Music. Without that transaction, Chinese flows into the US would have dropped, and even the current somewhat artificially high level is only about a fifth as high as its peak – hit in late 2016. So you can see a decided Trump effect here, too.

U.S. FDI flows into China have held up better, if that’s the term you want to use. But they were off 31 percent between the second half of 2019 and the first halfof this year – to $4.1b. And their peak level – hit in 2014 – was $8.5b. So that’s another big Trump-related drop.

One disturbing counter-trend that the Trump administration has been too slow to address: There’s abundant evidence that U.S. financial investment into China – buys of assets like stocks and bonds – keeps surging.

One indication: According to the Financial Times earlier this month, since the Wall Street firm MSCI in June, 2017, first announced plans to include Chinese domestically listed “A-share” companies into one of its widely followed indices, “roughly $875bn in foreign investment has flowed into Chinese equities through stock connect programmes linking Hong Kong with onshore bourses in Shanghai and Shenzhen.”

And although the U.S. share is difficult to quantify, between private investors and state-level government workers’ pension funds, this analysis from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission makes clear that it’s considerable.  (Due to Trump administration pressure, the body overseeing federal pension plans’ investments has delayed a decision to channel funds into the aforementioned MSCI index.)   

So can anyone reasonably claim “Mission accomplished” for the Trump trade and decoupling policies? Not yet. But is a “job well done so far” conclusion merited? Certainly for anyone who’s not Trump-ly Deranged.