(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Output Held its Own in October

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automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, civilian aircraft, coronavirus, COVID 19, durable goods, Federal Reserve, industrial production, manufacturing, masks, medical devices, non-durable goods, pharmaceuticals, PPE, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning’s monthly Federal Reserve industrial production report is an object lesson in not counting your real manufacturing output chickens too soon – that is, before the revisions hatch.

So keeping in mind that today’s data will be revised further several times as well, it looks like my concerns last month about manufacturing turning from a CCP Virus-era economic leader into a laggard might have been premature.

Not that today’s release, which brings the story through October, showed gangbuster results. Inflation-adjusted manufacturing output increased by 1.04 percent over September’s levels. Much more encouraging, though, were the continually positive overall revisions and especially those for September. Its initially reported 0.29 percent constant dollar monthly output decline is now reported as a fractional (0.01 percent) increase.

As a result, after having sunk by just over twenty percent from February (the last month before the virus began seriously weakening the economy’s performance) through its April bottom, after-inflation manufacturing production is up by 19.35 percent. Alternatively put, it’s 4.56 percent below the February level, and 3,61 percent lower than last October’s.

Today’s October release also provided more evidence that the automotive sector’s dominant role role in determining overall manufacturing growth has just about faded away. Combined vehicles and parts production remained virtually flat in October, after falling an upwardly revised 3.02 percent sequentially in September.

In addition, October’s figures confirmed that, within manufacturing, the non-durable goods supersector has outperformed its durable goods counterpart – mainly because its first-wave pandemic dropoff was so much less dramatic.

Between February and April, price-adjusted durable goods output (including automotive and the troubled aerospace sector – due to Boeing’s woes and the virus-related travel shutdown) plunged by 27.99 percent, versus a 11.53 percent decline in non-durables (which contains industries like food, healthcare goods, and paper products manufacturing).

Since April real durables output has rebounded by 31.22 percent. But it’s still 5.51 percent lower than in February, and 4.19 percent lower than last October.

Since April, non-durables’ real output is up by 9.06 percent. But since its decline was so much less severe than durables’, in after-inflation terms its production is just 3.51 percent off the February level, and 2.97 percent below last October’s figure.

And what of some of the obvious drivers – for good or ill – of manufacturing output during this CCP Virus era?

Between February and April, aircraft and parts production plunged by 32.85 percent. An astonishing 43.31 percent recovery since has left the sector only 3.77 percent production-wise than in February. But because Boeing’s woes predated the pandemic, this output remains down 17.79 percent year-on-year.

Oddly, constant dollar production of medical equipment and supplies (a category including face masks, protective gowns, and ventilators) dropped by 19.75 percent as the CCP Virus was surging between February and April. And since then, it’s risen only 23.20 percent – including an encouraging 3.54 percent monthly improvement in October. Year-on-year, moreover, these sectors have seen 2.73 percent real output growth, but that improvement suggests how modest – and in retrospect, how inadequate – production was before the pandemic.

Finally, pharmaceutical and medicines production has been steady all year long in inflation-adjusted terms, and advanced by a modest 0.12 percent sequentially in October. Year-on-year, moreover, output has grown by just 0.39 percent – which makes these industries of special interest in the months ahead as mass production of recent promising vaccines ramps up.

For now, though, overall, domestic manufacturing production more than held its own in October. But except for that vaccine production, as the virus second wave strengthens, its near-term future could be just as challenging as that of the rest of the economy and nation

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Through the Pandemic Fog, Signs of Trump Trade Progress Keep Coming

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(What's Left of) Our Economy, aircraft, Boeing, CCP Virus, Census Bureau, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, exports, goods trade, healthcare goods, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, medical devices, non-oil goods trade deficit, pharmaceuticals, services trade, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, trade war, Trump, Wuhan virus

Proof positive that much of the U.S. government grinds on whatever the political tumult surrounding it: Despite the controversies that erupted due to the largely unexpected, still-incomplete, and increasingly contested Presidential election results, the Census Bureau nonetheless still put out the new monthly U.S. trade report yesterday – this one taking the story through September.

And by the bizarro economic standards of the bizarro CCP Virus era, the figures were strangely normal: The various September deficits remained awfully high given an economy whose levels are still markedly subdued despite a powerful growth rebound in the third quarter (which ended in September). Yet although these results have been widely interpreted as a stinging rebuke to effectiveness of President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies (see, e.g., here and here), widely overlooked details reveal major mitigating developments – and resulting reasons for continued encouragement.

As for the awfully high deficits: The combined goods and services trade gap actually decreased on month by 4.73 percent, from a downwardly adjusted $67.04 billion to $63.86 billion. Yet this monthly total (during a troubled economic time) was still firmly in the neighborhood of trade shortfalls during the bubbly mid-2000s, when Washington’s trade policy was about as cluelessly import- and especially China-friendly as possible.

Moreover, back in those days, oil made up a much bigger share of the total goods deficit than today. So obviously, most of the remaining gap owes a good deal to U.S. trade policy decisions – as will be seen below.

Encouragingly, total U.S. exports to a world still largely struggling with virus-related downturns of its own were up 2.55 percent sequentially in September, and registered their best performance ($176.35 billion) since March – just as major pandemic effects were taking hold. Total September imports of $240.22 billion also represented the highest amount ($240.22 billion) since March, but the monthly increase was only 0.51 percent. And where export growth has consistently been strong since May, import growth has begun slowing markedly.

Yet the persistence of high combined goods and services U.S. trade shortfalls stems mainly from problems with services trade that are clearly CCP Virus-related. For example, the longstanding services surplus (which of course includes travel services) is on track for its biggest drop since recessionary 2001. So far, through the first three quarters of 2020, it’s sunk by 20.47 percent on a year-to-date basis.

Indeed, the $43.96 billion reduction in the services surplus has been greater than the $38.54 billion increase in the overall deficit – meaning that if the service surplus had simply remained the same, the total deficit would have declined year-to-date (although still less than expected at least during a normal deep recession).

As indicated above, however, the total trade numbers don’t tell the whole story about the successes or failures of trade policy. That’s because, as known by RealityChek regulars, services are one huge sector where trade agreements and similar decisions have had relatively little impact so far. Ditto for oil

At first glance, examing trade flows that are substantially “Made in Washington” also reveals a nice-sized monthly September reduction in that deficit (4.62 percent), but to a level that’s the third worst on record ($80.74 billion) – just behind the August and July totals, respectively. And on a year-to-date basis, the Made in Washington deficit is up 3.80 percent from last year,to $663.55 billion.

Yet here’s where another detail comes in. This entails the woes of Boeing, which have spread beyond the safety debacle stemming from crashes of its popular 737 Max model to the global virus-induced collapse in air travel.

The safety problems of 2019 cut the longstanding U.S. civilian aircraft trade surplus by nearly 28 percent, or $8.86 billion on a January-September basis. Had the surplus stayed stable, it would have risen only from $600.08 billion during the first three quarters of 2018 to $630.39 billion, rather than $639.25 billion. Given all the import front-running seen throughout 2019 to try to avoid the Trump China tariffs (which artificially inflated the entire non-oil import total), that’s not a bad performance at all.

The aircraft effect has been much more dramatic this year. Year-to-date through September, the Made in Washington deficit is up from that $630.29 billion to $663.55 billion. Yet the nosedive in the aircraft surplus (all the way from $23.16 billion to just under $3 billion) accounts for nearly 83 percent of that increase.

Want another aircraft effect? Check out the manufacturing trade deficit – so rightly the focus of the President’s attention. Month-to-month, it rose by only 1.46 percent. But the new September level of $103.87 billion is the second-worst monthly total of all time – just behind July’s $104.63 billion. Even worse: The aircraft industry’s problems didn’t add to this number, since its trade deficit actually shrunk slightly on month.

But for the entire year so far, the plunge in the aircraft surplus (which, not so coincidentally, has been mirrored by smaller but not trivial reductions in the surpluses of all sorts of aircraft parts, including engines) has made a sizable difference. From January-September, 2019 to this year’s comparable period, the manufacturing trade shortfall has grown by $10.18 billion, from $777.60 billion to $787.78 billion. Take out the $20.16 billion worsening of the aircraft trade surplus, and the $10.18 billion higher year-to-date manufacturing trade deficit becomes a nearly $10 billion lower year-to-date manufacturing trade deficit.

And when it comes to both the manufacturing and overall Made in Washington trade deficits and a virus effect, don’t forget its healthcare goods component. Specifically, the U.S. trade deficit in pharmaceutical preparations jumped by $12.58 billion year-to-date between last year and this year, and in the categories containing (but not restricted to) protective gear like masks and gowns, testing swabs, ventilators, and oxygen tents by another $2.33 billion.

Since China remains so important for Made in Washington and manufacturing trade flows, bilateral exports, imports, and deficits not surprisingly reveal a major pandemic effect, too. The big China difference is how strongly the September data confirm that President Trump’s goals of reducing the bilateral trade gap and decoupling economically from the People’s Republic are being achieved even without taking the CCP Virus into account.

On a monthly basis, the goods trade gap with China dipped fractionally in September, to $29.67 billion. This total represented the second straight such drop and the lowest level since Aprils $28.40 billion. These merchandise imports inched up sequentially in September by just under one percent and have been virtually flat since July, but goods exports improved by 4.53 percent.

On a year-to-date basis, America’s China trade looks like it’s in even better shape. U.S. goods imports from China are off by nearly 11 percent ($37.54 billion) over this stretch, and the trade gap has become 15.24 percent ($40.06 billion) smaller.

This progress, moreover, has been achieved even though total U.S. exports of civilian aircraft and parts (including engines) to China have shrunk by $4.09 billion and the trade deficit in the virus-related medical equipment categories has risen by $1.25 billion. (Oddly, the bilateral pharmaceutical preparations trade balance has improved with the surplus improving from $449 million to $836 million.

When all of these virus-related complications and the inevitably disruptive and therefore initial efficiency-reducing impact of the Trump trade policies are considered, two questions arise that are equally fascinating and important. First, once these temporary shocks pass, will this approach to globalization look more like a win or a loss for the U.S. economy? Second, will American election politics give the nation a chance to find out?

Making News: National Media Cites on the Virus Vaccine Drive and the Stimulus Package Wrangle

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Breitbart.com, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Heather Long, industrial policy, John Binder, Making News, pharmaceuticals, Seattle Times, stimulus package, The Washington Post, vaccines, Wuhan virus

I’m pleased to announce that my views on two major economic policy issues have just been featured in two leading national news publications.

In his report yesterday on the U.S. government’s efforts to help pharmaceutical companies develop a CCP Virus vaccine, Breitbart.com‘s John Binder included remarks of mine providing perspective on the latest example of what economists call “industrial policy” – team-ups between the public and private sectors to generate technological progress and ensure future U.S. prosperity.  Click here to read the article.

Moreover, last Thursday’s Washington Post piece on the debate over the next U.S. economic stimulus package contained a quote from me urging the Trump administration and Congress to “go big.”  Here’s the link.  The article, by the Post‘s Heather Long, was also reprinted in the Seattle Times on Saturday.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

 

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Evidence that the Multinationals Really Did Sell the U.S. Out to China

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capital spending, chemicals, China, computers, electronics, health security, healthcare goods, information technology, investment, Lenin, manufacturing, multinational companies, national security, offshoring, offshoring lobby, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, pharmaceuticals, research and development, supply chains, tech, tech transfer, U.S-China Economic and Security Review Commission, USCC, World Trade Organization, WTO

RealityChek readers and anyone who’s familiar with my work over many years know that I’ve often lambasted U.S. multinational companies for powerfully aiding and abetting China’s rise to the status of economic great power status – and of surging threat to U.S. national security and prosperity. In fact, the dangers posed by China’s activities and goals have become so obvious that even the American political and policy establishments that on the whole actively supported the policies – and that permitted money from this corporate Offshoring Lobby to drive their decisions – are paying attention.

If you still doubt how these big U.S. corporations have sold China much of the rope with which it’s determined to hang their own companies and all of America (paraphrasing Lenin’s vivid supposed description of and prediction about the perilously shortsighted greed of capitalists), you should check out the latest report of the U.S-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC). As made clear by this study from an organization set up by Congress to monitor the China threat, not only have the multinationals’ investments in China figured “prominently in China’s national development ambitions.” They also “may indirectly erode the United States’ domestic industrial competitiveness and technological leadership relative to China.”

Worst of all, “as U.S. MNE (“multinational enterprise) activity in China increasingly focuses on the production of high-end technologies, the risk that U.S. firms are unwittingly enabling China to achieve its industrial policy and military development objectives rises.”

And a special bonus – these companies’ offshoring has greatly increased America’s dependence on China for supplies of crucial healthcare goods.

Here’s just a sampling of the evidence presented (and taken directly by the Commission from U.S. government reports):

> U.S. multinationals “employ more people in China than in any other country outside of the United States, primarily in the assembly of computers and electronic products.” Moreover, this employment skyrocketed by 574.6 percent from 2000 to 2017.

> “China is the fourth-largest destination for U.S. MNE research and development (R&D) expenditure and increasingly competes with advanced economies in serving as a key research hub for U.S. MNEs. The growth of U.S. MNE R&D expenditure in China is also comparatively accelerated, averaging 13.6 percent yearon-year since 2003 compared with 7.1 percent for all U.S. MNE foreign affiliates in the same period. This expenditure is highest in manufacturing, particularly in the production of computers and electronic products.”

> “U.S. MNE capital expenditure in China has focused on the creation of production sites for technology products. This development is aided by the Chinese government’s extensive policy support to develop China.”

> The multinationals’ capital spending on semiconductor manufacturing assets “has jumped 166.7 percent from $1.2 billion in 2010 (the earliest year for which complete [U.S government] data is available) to $3.2 billion in 2017, accounting for 90 percent of all U.S. MNE expenditure on computers and electronic products manufacturing assets in China.”

> “China has grown from the 20th-highest source of U.S. MNE affiliate value added in 2000 ($5.5 billion) to the fifth highest in 2017 ($71.5 billion), driven primarily by the manufacture of computers and electronic products as well as chemicals. The surge is especially notable in semiconductors and other electronic components.”

> “[P]harmaceutical manufacturing serves as the largest chemical sector in terms of value-added [a measure of manufacturing output that seeks to eliminate double-counting of output by stripping out the contribution of intermediate goods used in final products]…” And chemicals – the manufacturing category that include pharmaceuticals – has become the second largest U.S-owned industry in China measured by the value of its assets (after computers and electronic products).

Incidentally, the report’s tendency to use 2000 as a baseline year for examining trends is no accident. That’s the year before China was admitted into the World Trade Organization (WTO) – and the numbers strongly reenforce the argument that the multinationals so avidly sought this objective in order to make sure that the value of their huge planned investments in China wouldn’t be kneecapped by any unilateral U.S. tariffs on imports from China (including those from their factories). For the WTO’s combination of consensus decision-making plus the protectionist natures of most of its members’ economies created a towering obstacle to Washington acting on its own to safeguard legitimate American domestic economic interests from Chinese and other foreign predatory trade and broader economic activity.

At the same time, despite the WTO’s key role in preserving the value of the multinationals’ export-focused China investments, the USCC study underestimates how notably such investment remains geared toward exporting, including to the United States. This issue matters greatly because chances are high that this kind of investment (in China or anywhere else abroad) has replaced the multinationals’ factories and workers in the United States. By contrast, multinational investment in China (or anywhere else abroad) that’s supplying the China market almost never harms the U.S. domestic economy and in fact can help it, certainly in early stages, by providing foreign customers that add to the domestic customers of U.S.-based manufacturers.

There’s no doubt that the phenomenal growth of China’s own consumer class in recent decades has, as the China Commission report observes, generated more and more American business decisions to supply those customers from China. In other words, the days when critical masses of Chinese couldn’t possibly afford to buy the goods they made in U.S.- and other foreign-owned factories are long gone.

But the data presented by the USCC does nothing to support this claim, and the key to understanding why is the central role played by computer, electronics, and other information technology-related manufacturing in the U.S. corporate presence in China. For when the Commission (and others) report that large shares of the output of these factories are now sold to Chinese customers, they overlook the fact that many of these other customers are their fellow entities comprising links of China-centric corporate supply chains. These sales, however, don’t mean that the final customers for these products are located in China.

In other words, when a facility in China that, for example, performs final assembly activities on semiconductors sells those chips to another factory in China that sticks them into computers or cell phones or HDTV sets, the sale is regarded as one made to a Chinese customer. But that customer in turn surely sells much of its own production overseas. As the USCC documents, China’s consumer market for these goods has grown tremendously, too. But China’s continually surging share of total global production of these electronics products (also documented in the Commission report) indicates that lots of this output continues to be sold overseas.

Also overlooked by the USCC – two other disturbing apects of the multinationals’ activities in China.

First, it fails to mention that all the computer and electronics-related investment in China – which presumably includes a great deal of software-related investment – has contributed to China’s economic and military ambitions not only by transferring knowhow to Chinese partners, but by teaching huge numbers of Chinese science and technology workers how to generate their technology advances. The companies’ own (often glowing) descriptions of these training activities – which have often taken the form of dedicated training programs and academies – were revealed in this 2013 article of mine.

Second, the Commission’s report doesn’t seem to include U.S. multinationals’ growing investments not simply in high tech facilities in China that they partly or wholly own, but in Chinese-owned entities. As I’ve reported here on RealityChek, these capital flows are helping China develop and produce high tech goods with numerous critical defense-related applications, and the scale has grown so large that some elements of the U.S. national security community had been taking notice as early as 2015. And President Trump seems to be just as oblivious to these investments as globalist former President Barack Obama was.

These criticisms aside, though, the USCC has performed a major public service with this survey of the multinationals’ China activities. It should be must reading in particular for anyone who still believes that these companies – whose China operations have so greatly enriched and therefore strengthened the People’s Republic at America’s expense – deserve much influence over the U.S. China policy debate going forward.

Im-Politic: On Biden’s New Plan for Medical & Other Supply Chain Security

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alliances, Biden, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Defense Department, Defense Production Act, DPA, election 2020, health security, healthcare goods, Im-Politic, manufacturing, offshoring, Pentagon, pharmaceuticals, PPE, supply chains, tariffs, taxes, Trade, Wuhan virus

Joe Biden’s plan for rebuilding U.S. supply chains to ensure American access to critical products like healthcare goods came out yesterday, and any fair reading would have to conclude that these proposals are about as serious as the presumptive Democratic Presidential nominee’s proposals in related areas – like China policy. That is to say, they’re not terribly serious at present.

As with China policy, the first concern entails credibility. In 2011, when Biden was Barack Obama’s Vice President, the Commerce Department issued a report detailing all sorts of dangerous vulnerabilities in U.S. supplies of all manner of vital healthcare goods. The “Obama-Biden administration” did absolutely nothing in response – unless you count avidly pursuing offshoring-friendly trade deals, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that were bound to worsen these vulnerabilities. You could also throw in a record of continually coddling the trade and broader economic predation practiced by China, which surely fostered similar results.

As a result, it’s legit to ask whether any of these proposals will survive Day One of a Biden presidency.

In this vein, it’s more than a little disturbing that Biden proposes to use the Defense Department’s policies to minimize supply chain vulnerabilities as his model for addressing such problems for a wide variety of products –not just healthcare-related goods. These include “energy and grid resilience technologies, semiconductors, key electronics and related technologies, telecommunications infrastructure, and key raw materials.”

Unfortunately, the principal lessons taught by the Defense Department’s record on supply chains are how to duck the problem or define it out of existence, and the administration in which Biden served was no exception. Some of the biggest specific problems (as made clear in this Obama administration report):

>The Pentagon’s overall assessments prioritized financial metrics, not specific domestic production capabilities, as measures of the defense manufacturing base’s health.

>Its treatment of globalization’s challenges placed major emphasis on taking “advantage of emerging capabilities, regardless of where they originate,” not maximizing domestic production capabilities.

>Although specific vulnerabilities – and the related need to maintain or rebuild adequate domestic capabilities – were acknowledged, this vulnerabilities were consistently portrayed as isolated holes that could somehow be plugged without taking into account the dependence of these narrowly defined products on their own supply chains. Indeed, Biden’s new plan seems to reveal a similar flaw when it describes itself as “a set of targeted proposals to ensure the United States has the domestic manufacturing capacity necessary for critical supply chains.”

>Moreover, the Department has long supported objectives such as interoperability with allies’ armed forces and maintaining traditional – pre-Trump – global systems of what it defined as free trade, both of which often clashed with the goal of incentivizing domestic production. These goals were explicitly stated in this George W. Bush administration report, and here’s no evidence that the Obama-Biden Pentagon ever disagreed.

Indeed, the new Biden blueprint indicates that the former Vice President’s definition of supply chain security is pretty global, instead of national, as well:

“Instead of insulting our allies and undermining American global leadership, Biden will engage with our closest partners so that together we can build stronger, more resilient supply chains and economies in the face of 21st century risks. Just like the United States itself, no U.S. ally should be dependent on critical supplies from countries like China and Russia. That means developing new approaches on supply chain security — both individually and collectively — and updating trade rules to ensure we have strong understandings with our allies on how to best ensure supply chain security for all of us.”

If America’s allies were proven reliable suppliers of these products themselves, Biden’s perspective would make sense. But the list of countries that have recently hoarded medical goods for themselves as soon as the CCP Virus pandemic’s full dangers became apparent included most of these allies – meaning that the U.S. vulnerability problem far exceeds “China and Russia.”

Nor is it entirely evident how clearly Biden has thought though the tax policy provisions of his plan. Tax policy’s role is clearly viewed as crucial, as the plan emphasizes that

“Pharmaceutical offshoring has been heavily driven by tax code provisions that have encouraged companies to locate pharmaceutical production in low-tax countries even where those countries have labor and other costs comparable to the U.S.”

Consequently, Biden says he will “eliminate Trump Administration tax incentives for offshoring and pursue other tax code changes that will encourage pharmaceutical production in the U.S.”

At the same time, Biden favors raising the overall U.S. corporate tax rate from the 21 percent to which it has recently been lowered to 28 percent, along with a 15 percent “minimum tax” on large corporations. So good luck to drug companies – or any other companies making goods deemed critical by Biden – gleaning clear reshoring or domestic production ramping signals from this combination.

Perhaps any confusion will be cleared up by other alleged Biden measures to boost U.S.-based production – like “new targeted financial incentives, including tax credits, investments, matching funds for state and local incentives, R&D support, and other incentives to encourage the production of designated critical materials such as semiconductors in the United States”? At best, business will surely need to see many more details along these lines before committing the needed capital.

Unless maybe as President, Biden will simply mandate that the needed new facilities will be built when all else fails (as well as in tandem with those other policies)? That’s obviously the implication of his promise to use the Defense Production Act (DPA) “to its fullest extent to rebuild domestic manufacturing capacity in critical supply chains, using the lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic and applying them to our national needs.”

Or does Biden actually view the DPA as his primary tool for “generating the domestic mobilization we need”? That seems like a reasonable conclusion, especially given that it’s the first specific measure he mentions. Maybe instead he’s really talking about using the Act simply “to direct U.S. companies to ramp up production of critical products that will be needed over the near-term.”

Regardless of Biden’s real intentions, though, it’s anything but clear how Biden believes the DPA can be used to increase U.S. production in many of the industries he mentions as vital where such output has largely migrated overseas That’s especially true for the “semiconductors, key electronics and related technologies, [and] telecommunications infrastructure” he specifies. It’s sure going to be far more difficult than, say, ordering auto companies, to make ventilators.

It’s just as unclear how these Biden’s ideas can succeed without a much stronger trade policy dimension – and specifically, continued and even expanded tariffs. And it shouldn’t be limited to straightening out the muddled views mentioned above. 

Specifically, maintaining levies on chronically subsidized and dumped products like metals, along with sweeping tariffs on systemically protectionist China (and on other similar countries) would send the all the companies and sectors concerned an invaluable message. Bipartisan endorsement of these protections would demonstrates that they really can have confidence that new investments won’t be decimated by trade and broader economic predation. Just as important, an enduring commitment to tariffs would help convince overseas competitors (domestic and foreign owned) that if they want to sell the products in which they have big edges to Americans, they’ll need to make these products in America.

The good news is that at least some of these mysteries may be cleared up “soon,” when this Biden plan promises the former Vice President will release his “comprehensive strategy to create American jobs through modern American manufacturing.” The bad news is that if he what he’s said and written so far is any indication, he’ll have a lot of rewriting to do.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is the New U.S. Trade Report a Virus Portent or Anomaly?

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China, decoupling, Europe, healthcare goods, high tech goods trade, Ireland, manufacturing, pharmaceutical, pharmaceuticals, PPE, protective gear, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, travel services, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Were this morning’s latest monthly U.S. trade figures (for March) just one of those things? Or a sign of CCP Virus-affected trade patterns to come? Evidence for both propositions can be found in the weeds, though on balance I remain confident that as the nation’s economy remains gravely wounded (and could well face worse), its trade shortfall will continue its recent (and highly beneficial) Trump-era trend of narrowing.

The reasons for dismissing the new trade report as an outlier stem from the tendency (with numerous exceptions) of the gap to narrow when the economy weakens and to expand when it strengthens. So it was a real surprise to find that, from February to March, when all indicators showed that a major downturn was beginning thanks to the pandemic, the trade deficit rose a strong 11.57 percent – from a downwardly adjusted $39.81 billion to $44.42 billion.

Also surprising for a U.S. economy that’s not very export focused but that’s usually voracious importer: The main reason for the deficit’s growth both in absolute and percentage terms was a drop-off in the former. In March, total U.S. overseas sales sank on month by 9.63 percent, from an upwardly adjusted $207.75 billion to $187.75 billion. That was the lowest monthly total since November, 2016’s $185.49 billion. Combined goods and services imports were down, too – but by a smaller 6.22 percent, from an upwardly adjusted $247.56 billion to $232.16 billion. That total was the lowest for a month since December, 2016 ($234.56 billion).

Moreover, in terms of the trade balance, March’s worse U.S. performance can’t be pinned on the virus-produced collapse in travel. Make no mistake about it – international travel both to and from the United States did collapse. In value terms, two-way travel sank from $28.77 billion in February to $13.49 billion. In other words, it was more than cut in half. But the travel services trade surplus actually improved during that period – from $4.53 billion to $4.72 billion. That means not only that, on net, legal visitors to the United States (including students) as usual spent more in America than Americans spent overseas between February and March. It means that foreign spending in the United States exceeded Americans’ spending abroad by an even greater amount.

Another puzzling result that doesn’t have obvious staying power – at least not to me: The biggest single contibutor to the March trade deficit increase was a more than doubling of the monthly goods trade shortfall with Europe – from $11.37 billion to $22.97 billion. That’s the biggest monthly total ever and the biggest absolute increase ever (the figures go back to 1997), and the third biggest percentage increase of all time (after July, 1997’s 418.80 percent and March, 1998’s 205.89 percent – both totals coming when trade volumes were much smaller, and big percentage increases therefore much easier to generate).

The big Europe merchandise trade deficit surge, moreover, came on the the import side. These soared to $56.04 billion in March (another record), and the 26.42 percent sequential rise was the biggest since March, 2011’s 29.35 percent.

U.S. goods exports to Europe didn’t do badly – they hit $33.07 billion in March, the third best total ever. But the monthly increase was a bare 0.26 percent.

Some of the Europe trade results were due to a much bigger goods deficit and much greater goods imports from Ireland – which is a major foreign supplier of pharmaceuticals to the United States. Despite the overall sequential decrease in American merchandise exports and imports in March, trade in pharmaceutical preparations rose both coming and going. The trade shortfall increased by 13.25 percent, with imports rising by 14.92 percent. And the goods trade gap with Ireland (not all due to pharmaceuticals, to be sure) soared by 45.81 percent with imports up 41.91 percent.

It’s true that both the deficit with Ireland and imports from the Emerald Isle fell sharply on month in February. But both totals were all-time highs.

At the same time, India is another big pharmaceutical supplier to the United States, and although its March merchandise trade deficit with America shot up by 47.87 percent month-to-month, imports actually dipped (by 0.37 percent).

And what about March U.S. trade with China – which gave the world the virus, and remains a major supplier of the chemical building blocks of pharmaceutical products as well as protective medical gear?

In an unmistakably good development for those who recognize both the health security and broader economic dangers of doing extensive business with a predatory trader that’s increasingly hostile geopolitically, the U.S. merchandise trade deficit with the People’s Republic plummeted dramatically again – by just over 26 percent month-to-month, to $11.83 billion. You’d have to go back to March, 2004 to find a lower monthly figure ($10.44 billion).

U.S. goods exports to China actually improved sequentially in March – by 16.98 percent, to $7.97 billion. That’s far from the biggest absolute or percentage monthly increase on record. But with China’s economic growth at multi-decade lows due largely to the virus and the Trump tariffs, it’s encouraging that America’s goods exports to China have held up since the Phase One trade deal was signed in January.

U.S. goods imports from China, meanwhile, fell by 13.18 percent on month in March, to $19.81 billion. That total is the lowest since February, 2009 ($18.85 billion), during the depths of the Great Recession.

On a year-to-date basis, the American merchandise merchandise deficit with the People’s Republic is now down an astonishing 32.61 percent. That’s nearly three times more than the comparable drop in the global U.S. goods deficit, and a clear sign that trade diversion and decoupling from China are taking place even as the overall American trade gap narrows – and are likely to continue taking place.

Two other oddities worth noting in the March trade report. First, the manufacturing deficit rebounded from February’s $63.01 billion (the lowest total since February, 2017’s $60.47 billion) to $75.80 billion. That’s a very big 20.30 percent higher. Even though overseas markets for America’s domestic manufacturers are tumbling into recession and maybe worse along with the U.S. economy, manufacturing exports still managed a monthly gain of 3.55 percent in March – to $93.26 billion. But despite signs of weakness in domestic U.S. manufacturing and the overall economy, manufacturing imports shot up by 10.45 percent, to $169.06 billion. It’s difficult to see how either trend lasts until the CCP Virus is brought under control.

Incidentally, the March totals bring the manufacturing trade gap to $220.75 billion so far this year – down 7.01 percent from last year’s comparable $237.38 billion. Manufacturing exports year-to-date as of March are down four percent, and imports have declined 5.38 percent.

Similarly, the longstanding U.S. trade shortfall in high tech goods more than doubled sequentially in March, from $5.13 billion to $10.30 billion. Sure, this increase followed a 55.62 percent plunge in February, but the turnaround is still stunning. And although high tech exports rose in March on month by a healthy 8.55 percent, the big change, as in February, was on the import side – where U.S. purchases from abroad jumped by 22.24 percent.

More detailed March trade data — particularly shedding more light on U.S. trade in healthcare-related goods — should be out from the federal government shortly, and I’ll be sure to keep you up to date on those developments.   

Making News: Jim Bohannon Interview on America’s Compromised Health Security Now On-Line; Returning Tonight to Batchelor Show on China & Supply Chains

Tags

CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Gordon G. Chang, health security, healthcare goods, Making News, manufacturing, medicines, pharmaceuticals, supply chains, The Jim Bohannon Show, The John Batchelor Show, Wuhan virus

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is on-line of my interview last night on Jim Bohannon’s nationally syndicated radio show.  Click here for a great discussion of America’s troubling dependence on foreign sources of supply for vital medicines and other healthcare products.

Also, I’m slated to return on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show tonight. John, I, and co-host Gordon G. Chang will be looking at how the CCP Virus crisis is likely to change global supply chains and trade products not only for healthcare products, but for all domestic industry, especially when it comes to China.

Tonight’s segment is a little different from usual, because virus-related disruption has led John to tape his programs for now, and I haven’t yet been told exactly when this particular segment will air.

I’ll certainly post that information on Twitter (a compelling reason to follow me there at @AlanTonelson!), but in the meantime, here‘s where you can listen on-line to this evening’s show.  I’ll be posting a link to that podcast as soon as one’s available. And of course, keep checking with RealityChek for news of other upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Making News: On National Radio Tonight on America’s Healthcare Goods Foreign Dependency

Tags

CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, drugs, health security, Making News, medical devices, pharmaceuticals, PPE, protective gear, The Jim Bohannon Show, Westwood One, Wuhan virus

I’m pleased to announce that I’m slated to appear tonight on “The Jim Bohannon Show” on the nation-wide Westwood One network.  The segment, scheduled to begin at 10 PM EST, will deal with America’s dangerous reliance on imports for vital medicines, medical devices, and protective gear for healthcare workers.

You can listen live on-line at this link to this timely discussion of the nation’s at-risk health security.  And as usual, I’ll post a link to the podcast when it’s available.

Also, keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Making News: American Conservative Article Details Scary U.S. Health Security Vulnerability

Tags

CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, facemasks, health security, imports, Making News, medical devices, pandemics, pharmaceuticals, The American Conservative, Trade, Wuhan virus

I’m pleased to announce the publication of my latest freelance article.  Posted this morning at TheAmericanConservative.com, it presents never-before-seen statistics (gleaned from official U.S. government data) showing alarming U.S. vulnerability to cutoffs of vital medical goods from abroad. P.S.  It makes clear that the problem far transcends China.

And keep checking in at RealityChek for news of media appearances and other developments.

Those Stubborn Facts: Why Health Security Should “Trump” Free Trade for Americans

Tags

active pharmaceutical ingredients, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, European Union, exports, free trade, globalization, health security, India, medical devices, pandemic, pharmaceuticals, surgical equipment, Those Stubborn Facts, Trade

“[White House Office of Manufacturing and Trade Policy Director Peter] Navarro raised a lot of eyebrows when he warned that [international trade] fights over [healthcare-related goods] loomed and told Fox Business Network on Feb. 23: ‘People need to understand in crises like this, we have no allies.’ But what then seemed potentially alarmist now looks like foresight.”

– Bloomberg News, March 16, 2020

Number of countries that have curbed exports of healthcare-related goods*: 38**

 

*Includes pharmaceuticals, active pharmaceutical ingredients, medical devices, surgical appliances and supplies

**India, China, India, Taiwan, Indonesia, Belarus, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, Russia, United Kingdom, and the 27 members of the European Union

 

(Sources: “Export Wars Erupt as Officials Curb Supplies to Battle Virus,” by Shawn Donnan, Bloomberg News, March 16, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-16/trade-war-latest-welcome-to-the-coronavirus-export-wars-of-2020-k7uf1k01; “The Global Mask Shortage May Get Much Worse,” by K Oanh Ha, Ibid., March 10, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-10/the-global-mask-shortage-may-be-about-to-get-much-worse; “Export Trade News,” Foreign Trade Online [latest daily edition], https://www.foreign-trade.com/export_trade.htm; “The World Needs Masks. China Makes Them – But Has Been Hoarding Them,” by Keith Bradsher and Liz Alderman, The New York Times, March 16, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/business/masks-china-coronavirus.html; and “UK bans parallel export of two COVID-19 treatment candidates to protect national supply,” by Janet Beal, “Life Sciences,” IHS Markit, February 26, 2020, https://ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/uk-bans-parallel-export-of-two-covid19-treatment-candidates.html)