(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Worker Pay (Momentarily?) Tops Inflation

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benefits, Biden administration, CCP Virus, Census Bureau, consumption, coronavirus, COVID 19, demand, ECI, Employment Cost Index, Immigration, labor force, labor market, labor shortage, Open Borders, Paul Krugman, production, productivity, recession, salaries, supply, Title 42, Trump administration, wages, workers, workforce, {What's Left of) Our Economy

American workers got some unambiguously good news this past week. Although it’s not all that high on the “good” scale. And it could well be short-lived.

Still, good is good, so it’s important to note that by one official measure, American workers’ earnings have at last caught up to the recent burst of inflation – and a little bit more. In the first quarter of this year, wages and salaries have risen by 0.1 percent over last year’s first quarter. (These are private sector wages and salaries, the ones economy watchers really care about. That’s because unlike public sector earnings, they’re driven predominantly by market forces, not politicians’ decisions.)

No, it’s not much, but it’s a better situation than prevailed as of the end of last year, when such compensation had fallen by 1.2 percent on year. In fact, these new results for the Employment Cost Index marked the first time since the first quarter of 2021 that, in real terms, wage and salary gains combined have moved back into the black.

This encouraging development, however, comes with two important caveats. First, when you add in the value of benefits and get numbers for total compensation for private sector workers, they’re still lagging inflation, and have since, again, the first quarter of 2021.

To be sure, by this gauge, workers are catching up. As of the first quarter of last year, total private sector compensation was down 3.5 percent on an annual basis, the worst such result in a data series going back to 2001. Now it’s trailing by just 0.2 percent. But it’s still trailing.

Second, although progress is being made on the earnings front, labor productivity growth remains weak. The best combination in terms of yielding sustainable prosperity is strong growth for both.

And like I hinted at the start, this progress may be just about over. Not only is the economy slowing – which will surely make employers more reluctant to hire than they have been, and thereby reduce the pressure they feel to keep and add workers by raising pay at whatever rate. A recession will of course leave workers with even less bargaining power.

But the supply of workers available to business, which had shriveled thanks largely to the effects of the CCP Virus, has rebounded past pre-pandemic levels. And much of this recovery stems from a strong rebound in net immigration inflows – which the U.S. Census Bureau believes have returned to pre-virus levels and to their levels before the advent of the Trump administration’s restrictive border policies.

Many immigration devotees, like Nobel Prize-winning economist and New York Times pundit Paul Krugman argue that the immigrant-driven loosening of the national labor market has kept employment up while preventing “runaway inflation” not by suppressing wages but by keeping production up – and thereby closing the CCP Virus-created gap between demand and supply.

But if you look at the economy’s growth over the year when immigration surged, that argument falls apart. It may become validated farther down the road, but in inflation-adjusted terms, but between the first quarter of 2022 and 2023, U.S. output rose a bare 1.56 percent Moreover, as I’ll be showing in a subsequent post, even this weak growth in the gross domestic product, along with the better performance of 2021-22, was led by unusually high levels of consumer spending, not by output.

As a result, the main effect to date of the immigration resurgence clearly has been undercutting wage pressures. And it’s certain to continue with the Open Borders-friendly Biden administration in office through the start of 2025 at least, with the pandemic-era Title 42 restriction program ending May 11, and the President so far deciding to respond with a plan featuring numerous provisions aimed at easing major current obstacles to legal immigration. 

So let’s all hope that American workers are enjoying this mini-near earnings recovery while they still can. For if they blink, they might miss it. 

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Today’s Really Recession-y U.S. Manufacturing Production Report

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aircraft, aircraft parts, Federal Reserve, machinery, manufacturing, medical devices, medical equipment, miscellaneous transportation equipment, nonmetallic mineral products, output, petroleum and coal products, pharmaceuticals, primary metals, printing, production, real output, recession, semiconductors, soft landing, {What's Left of) Our Economy

A U.S. recession is either imminent or already here – that’s the main message being strongly suggested by today’s release by the Federal Reserve on inflation-adjusted manufacturing production (for December).

Not only did industry’s real output sink by 1.30 percent sequentially – the worst such result since February, 2021’s 3.64 percent weather-affected plunge. But November’s initially reported 0.62 percent retreat was revised down to one of 1.10 percent.

Two straight monthly drops of one percent or more each haven’t been recorded by U.S.-based manufacturers since the February through April, 2020 period – when the arrival of the CCP Virus began roiling American life and the national economy, and indeed threw the latter into a deep downturn.

The new figures pushed price-adjusted U.S. manufacturing production into contraction for full-year 2022 – by 0.41 percent. That’s a major deterioration from the 4.19 percent constant dollar gain in 2021 – the strongest such showing since the 6.48 percent achieved in 2010, during the recovery from the Global Financial Crisis and ensuing Great Recession.

Moreover, since just before the pandemic arrived in force in the United States (February, 2020), after-inflation manufactuing has now grown by just 1.21 percent. As of last month’s industrial production release, this figure stood at 3.07 percent.

Of the twenty broadest manufacturing sub-sectors tracked by the Fed, only three boosted monthly inflation-adjusted production in December: aeropace and miscellaneous transportation equipment (0.96 percent), primary metals (0.84 percent), and nononmetallic mineral products (0.65 percent).

The biggest losers among their 17 other counterparts were machinery and printing and related support activities (3.37 percent each), and petroleum and coal products (3.13 percent).

Especially concerning, and continuing a pattern identified last month – for machinery and printing, these results were the worst since April, 2020, at the peak of the CCP Virus’ devastating first wave, when their real output collapsed month-to-month by 18.64 percent and 23.10 percent, respectively. Meanwhile, the monthly decrease in petroleum and coal products was its biggest since weather-affected February, 2021.

And as known by RealityChek regulars, machinery’s tumble last month is a particularly bright red flag. Because its products are used so widely in sectors inside and outside of manufacturing – including by growing companies or firms counting on continued or faster growth – its fortunes are seen as a good predictor of the economy’s future. Therefore, a big machinery production decrease (the second in a row) could well mean that business activity across the national board is at least slowing markedly and won’t be reviving any time soon.

The December numbers were only somewhat better for sectors of special interest since the CCP Virus’ arrival stateside. Sequential increases were registered in pharmaceuticals and medicine (by 1.10 percent) and aircraft and parts (by 1.49 percent). But price-adjusted output fell in automotive (by 1.03 percent), the shortage-plagued semiconductor industry (by 1.20 percent), and the medical equipment and supplies sector that encompasses products heavily used to fight the pandemic (by 2.50 percent).

In addition, the slippage in medical equipment and supplies was one of those that was the greatest since the peak of the CCP Virus’ first wave (when it nosedived by 17.76 percent).

Since manufacturing is only about fifteen or sixteen percent of the total U.S. economy (depending on how you count output), a downturn in industry doesn’t necessarily presage an overall recession. But the new industrial production statistics aren’t the only signs of shrinkage. Consumer spending comprises nearly 71 percent of the economy according to the latest (third quarter, 2021) data, and today’s advance official retail sales report (for December) indicates that they’ve now fallen consecutively for two months. Possibly weaker inflation (indicated most recently by today’s wholesale price report, which I’ll post about tomorrow), also signals gloomy times ahead.

Since the new Fed manufacturing production results will be revised several times over the next few months, it’s possible that the real picture in industry could brighten somewhat. But likelier, in my view (as I wrote yesterday), is for a recession-averse Washington to move to stimulate consumer spending without seeking similar results for production – in other words, a time-tested formula for stagflation at best for the foreseeable future.

P.S. As alert readers may have noticed, this post contains many fewer manufacturing production details than its recent predecessors. My aim is to ensure that I can get this info to you on a same-day basis. Do you like this simpler format better? Or should I return to going deeper into the weeds? Please let me know if you get a chance.         

        

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Second Straight Month of Production Shrinkage for U.S. Manufacturing

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aircraft, aircraft parts, apparel, appliances, automotive, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, dollar, electrical components, electrical equipment, exchange rates, Federal Reserve, fiscal policy, inflation, inflation-adjusted growth, machinery, manufacturing, medical devices, medicines, metals, miscellaneous durable goods, monetary policy, personal protective equipment, petroleum and coal products, pharmaceuticals, production, real output, recession, semiconductor shortage, semiconductors, stimulus, supply chains, textiles, Trade Deficits, Wuhan virus, Zero Covid, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Yesterday’s after-inflation U.S. manufacturing production report (for June) marked a second straight decline in real output for domestic industry, adding to the evidence that this so far resilient sector is finally suffering the effects of the entire economy’s recent slowdown.

Another possible implication of the new downbeat results: The record and surging trade deficits being run in manufacturing lately may finally be starting undermine U.S.-based manufacturing’s growth. (See here for how and why.)

Also important to note: This release from the Federal Reserve incorporated the results of both typical monthly revisions but also its annual “benchmark” revision, which reexamined its data going back several years (in this case, to 2020), and updated the figures in light of any new findings.

And the combination has revealed some big surprises – notably that the domestic semiconductor industry, which along with its foreign competition has been struggling to keep up with recently booming worldwide demand, has turned out fully 36 percent less worth of microchips on a price-adjusted basis since the CCP Virus struck than was calculable from the (pre-revisions) May report.

In real terms, U.S.-based manufacturing shrank by 0.54 percent on month in June – the worst such result since last September’s 0.78 percent drop. Moreover, May’s originally reported 0.07 sequential percent dip is now judged to be a decrease of 0.52 percent.

The April results remained good, but were downgraded a second time, from 0.75 percent monthly growth in after inflation to 0.66 percent, while the March numbers told a similar story, with a third consecutive modest downward revision still leaving that month’s inflation-adjusted expansion at 0.76 percent.

Especially discouraging, though – the June report plus the two revisions left constant dollar U.S. manufacturing output just 2.98 percent greater than just before the pandemic struck the economy in full force and began distorting it, in February, 2020. The pre-benchmark revision May release pegged its virus-era real growth at a much higher 4.94 percent, and the first post-benchmark number was 4.12 percent.

May’s biggest manufacturing growth winners among the broadest manufacturing categories tracked by the Fed were:

>the very small apparel and leather goods industry. Its price-adjusted output surged by 2.54 percent month-to-month in June – its best such perfomance since May, 2021’s 2.63 percent. May’s initially reported 0.88 percent gain was revised down to a 0.34 percent loss, though. April’s upgraded 0.30 percent rise is now judged to be a 0.33 percent decrease, and March’s figures were revised down after two upgrades – from 1.54 to a still solid 1.30 percent. But whereas last month’s Fed release showed inflation-adjusted production in this sector up 4.59 percent during the pandemic era, this growth is now pegged at just 0.56 percent; 

>the miscellaneous durable goods sector, which contains the medical products like personal protective equipment looked to as major CCP Virus fighters. It’s June sequential output jump of 2.25 percent was its biggest since March, 2021’s 2.61 percent, and revisions were overall positive. May’s initially reported 0.96 percent monthly price-adjusted production gain was downgraded to 0.49 percent, but the April figure was revised up for a second time – to 0.71 percent – and March’s results were upgraded a third straight time, to 0.51 percent.

These industries are now 14.11 percent bigger in constant dollar terms than in February, 2020, versus the 11.41 percent gain calculable last month; and

>the electrical equipment, appliances, and components cluster, where price-adjusted production climbed 1.34 percent on a monthly basis in June, the strongest such showing since February’s 2.29 percent.. Revisions were positive on net, with May’s originally reported 1.83 percent monthly falloff downgraded to one of 2.35 percent, but April’s initially estimated -0.60 percent decrease upgraded a second time,to a 0.49 percent gain, and March’s three revisions resulting in an originally judged 1.03 percent increase now pegged at 1.23 percent. These results pushed these companies’ real production 5.59 percent higher than in immediately pre-pandemic-y February, 2020, not the 2.19 percent calculable last month;

The list of biggest manufacturing inflation-adjusted output losers for June was considerably longer, starting with

>printing and related support activities, where the monthly inflation-adjusted production loss of 2.16 percent was the worst such showing since February, 2021’s 2.26 percent. Revisions were actually net positive, with May’s initially reported dip of 0.35 percent upgraded to one of 0.15 percent; April’s results downgraded from a one percent advance to one of 0.33 percent after being revised up from an initially reported 0.49 percent; and March’s totals rising cumulatively from an initially reported 1.10 percent decrease to a decline of just 0.05 percent. All the same, the printing cluster is now judged to be 11.37 percent smaller in real terms than in February, 2020, not the 1.89 percent calculable last month;

>petroleum and coal products, whose June sequential production decrease of 1.92 percent was its biggest since January’s 2.96 percent. Revisions here were mixed, too, with May’s figure revised up from a 2.53 percent improvement to one of 2.61 percent; April’s totals downgraded a second time, from a 0.13 rise to one of 0.04 percent to a decrease of 1.91 percent; and March’s results increasing from an initial estimate of 0.72 percent to one of 1.03 percent. But whereas last month’s Fed release showed petroleum and coal products’ after-inflation output 1.21 percent above its last pre-pandemic level, this month’s reports that it’s 0.27 percent below.

>textiles and products, where price-adjusted output sank on month by 1.80 percent for its worst month since March’s 2.45 percent shrinkage. Revisions were negative, with May’s initially reported 0.02 percent real production decline downgraded to one of 0.35 percent, April’s upgraded 0.45 percent increase now pegged as a 0.05 percent decrease, and March’s initially reported 1.55 percent falloff now judged to be one of 2.45 percent. As a result, the sector is now 5.35 percent smaller in terms of constant dollar output, rather than down 3.80 percent as calculable last month; and

>primary metals, whose inflation-adjusted production sagged by 1.60 percent on month – its poorest performance since March’s 1.42 retreat. Revisions were overall positive here, with May’s initially reported 0.77 percent real output rise downgraded to one of 0.66 percent, April’s initially downgraded 1.22 percent increase revised up to 1.46 percent, and March’s initially reported 1.69 percent drop now judged to be that aforementioned 1.42 percent. Even so, primary metals price-adjusted production is now estimated as having inched up only 0.50 percent since the pandemic arrived, not the 4.45 percent increase calculable last month.

In addition, an unusually high three other major industry sectors suffered constant dollar output declines of more than one percent on month in June. On top of plastics and rubber products (1.25 percent), the were two that RealityChek has followed especially closely during the pandemic period – machinery and automotive.

As known by RealityChek regulars, the machinery industry is a bellwether for both the rest of manufacturing and the entire economy, since use of its products is so widespread. But in June, its real production was off by 1.14 percent on month, and May’s initially reported 2.14 percent decrease is now estimated at-3.14 percent – its worst figure since the 18.64 collapse recorded in pandemic-y April, 2020. And although this April’s numbers have been revised up twice, to have reached 2.20 percen, March’s initially reported 0.78 percent inflation-adjusted increase is now estimated to have been a 0.89 decrease. Consequently, in price-adjusted terms, the machinery sector is now estimated to be 4.70 percent larger than in February, 2020, not the 6.29 percent calculable last month.

As for motor vehicles and parts makers, dogged for months by that aforementioned semiconductor shortage, their real output was off by 1.49 percent on month in June, and May’s initially reported rise of 0.70 percent is now estimated as a1.86 percent decline. Following a slight downgrade, April’s output is now pegged as growing by 3.85 percent rather than 3.34 percent, and March’s initially reported 7.80 percent advance is now pegged at 9.08 percent – the best such total since last October’s 10.34 percent. Nonetheless, after-inflation automotive output is now reported to be 1.07 percent lower than just before the pandemic arrive in force, not the 1.17 percent higher calculable last month.

Notably, other industries that consistently have made headlines during the pandemic outperformed the rest of manufacturing in June.

Constant dollar output by aircraft- and aircraft parts-makers was up 0.26 percent month-to-month in June, but revisions were mixed. May’s initially reported 0.33 percent rise has now been downgraded to a 0.23 percent decline – snapping a four-month winning streak. April’s results were upgraded a second straight time – from a hugely upgraded 2.90 percent to an excellent 3.13 percent (the best such performance since January, 2021’s 8.60 percent burst). But the March figures have been substantially downgraded from an initially reported 2.31 percent to a gain of just 0.53 percent. After all this volatility, though, real aircaft and parts production is now 25.58 percent greater than in February, 2020, much better than the 19.08 percent calculable last month.

The big pharmaceuticals and medicines industry grew its real putput by another 0.39 percent in June, but revisions were generally negative. May’s initially reported 0.42 percent improvement, however, is now judged to be just an infinitesimal 0.01 percent. April’s upgraded 0.15 percent rise is now pegged as a 0.04 percent loss, and March’s results have been downgraded all the way from an initially reported 1.17 percent increase to one of just 0.49 percent. Price-adjusted output in these sectors, therefore, is now estimated at 12.98 percent higher than in February, 2020, versus the 14.64 percent calculable last month.

Medical equipment and supplies firms boosted their inflation-adjusted output for a sixth straight month in June, and by a stellar 3.12 percent – their best such performance since January’s 3.15 percent. May’s growth was downgraded from 1.44 percent to 1.01 percent, but April’s estimate rose again, from 0.51 percent to 1.01 percent, and March’s initially reported 1.81 percent improvement has been slightly downgraded to 1.67 percent. This progress pushed these companies’ real pandemic era output growth from the 11.51 percent calculable last month to 17.27 percent.

The news was significantly worse, though, in that shortage-plagued semiconductor industry. Real production rose by 0.18 percent sequentially in June, but May’s initially reported 0.52 percent advance is now judged to have been a 2.24 percent drop. Meanwhile, April’s already dreary initially reported 1.85 percent slump has now been downgraded again to one of 2.71 percent (the sector’s worst such performance since the 11.26 percent plunge in December, 2008 – in the middle of the Great Recession that followed the global financial crisis). Even March’s initially reported impressive 1.99 percent monthly price-adjusted production increase has been revised all the way down to 0.52 percent.

The bottom line: The pandemic-era semiconductor real production increase that was estimated at 23.82 percent last month is now judged to have been just 15.22 percent.

It’s not as if the recent official manufacturing data has been all disappointing. Employment, notably, rose respectably on month in June. And the pace of capital spending has actually sped up some (at least through May) – which, like employment is a sign of continued optimism among manufacturers about their future outlook.

But at this point, the headwinds look stronger – including continued credit tightening by the Federal Reserve (not to mention a drawdown in the massive bond purchases that also have significantly propped up the entire economy); the resulting downshifting in domestic economic growth at which the Fed is aiming in order to bring down raging inflation; an even worse slump in economies overseas, which have been important markets for U.S.-based industry; the strongest dollar in about two decades, which puts Made in America products at a price disadvantage the world over; and the ongoing supply chain snags resulting from the Ukraine-Russia War and China’s lockdowns-happy Zero Covid policy.

And don’t forget those stratospheric and still-rising manufacturing trade deficits, which could well mean that, once the unprecedented pandemic fiscal and monetary stimulus/virus relief that have helped create so much business for domestic industry starts fading significantly, U.S.-based manufacturers could might themselves further behind the eight-ball than ever.  

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: How to Really Make Trade Fair

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automotive, BBB, Biden administration, bubbles, Build Back Better, Canada, consumption, Donald Trump, electric vehicles, EVs, fossil fuels, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, North America, production, tax breaks, Trade, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA, {What's Left of) Our Economy

There’s no doubt that the next few weeks will see a spate of (low-profile) news articles on how unhappy Canada and Mexico are about proposed new U.S. tax credits for purchasing electric vehicles (EVs) and how these measures could trigger a major new international trade dispute.

There’s also no doubt that any such disputes could be quickly resolved, and legitimate U.S. interests safeguarded, if only Washington would finally start basing U.S. trade policy on economic fundamentals and facts on the ground rather than on the abstract and downright childishly rigid notions of fairness that excessively influenced the approach taken by Donald Trump’s presidency.

The Canadian and Mexican complaints concern a provision in the Biden administration’s Build Back Better (BBB) bill that’s been passed by the House of Representatives but is stuck so far in the Senate. In order to encourage more EV sales, and help speed a transition away from fossil fuel use for climate change reasons, the latest version of BBB would award a refundable tax break of up to $12,500 for most purchases of these vehicles.

The idea is controversial because the administration and other BBB supporters see these rebates as a great opportunity to promote EV production and jobs in the United State by reserving his subsidy for vehicles Made in America. (As you’ll see here, the actual proposed rules get more complicated still – and could change some more.) And according to Canada and Mexico, this arrangement also violates the terms of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada-Agreement (USMCA) governing North American trade that replaced the old NAFTA during the Trump years in July, 2020.

Because USMCA largely reflects those prevailing concepts of global economic equity, Canada and Mexico probably have a strong case. But that’s only because this framework continues classifying all countries signing a trade agreement as economic equals. Even worse, there’s no better illustration of this position’s absurdity is the economy of North America.

After all, the United States has always accounted for vast majority of the continent’s total economic output and therefore market for traded goods. According for the latest (2020) World Bank figures, the the United States turned out 87.51 percent of North America’s gross product adjusted for inflation. And when it comes to new car and light truck sales, the U.S. share was 84.24 percent in 2019 (the last full pre-pandemic year, measured by units, and as calculated from here, here, and here).

But in 2019, the United States produced only 68.88 percent of all light vehicles made in North America (also measured by units and calculated from here, here, and here.) Moreover, more than 70 percent of all vehicles manufactured in Mexico were exported to the United States according to the latest U.S. government figures. And for Canada, the most recent data pegs this share at just under 54 percent (based on and calculated from here and here).

What this means is that, without the American market, there probably wouldn’t even be any Canadian and Mexican auto industries at all. They simply wouldn’t have enough customers to reach and maintain the production scale needed to make any economic sense.

So real fairness, stemming from the nature of the North American economy and the North American motor vehicle industry, leads to an obvious solution: Give vehicles from Canada and Mexico shares of the EV tax credits that match their shares of the continent’s light vehicle sales – just under 16 percent.

Therefore, using, say, 2019 as a baseline, from now on, the first just-under-16 percent of their combined light vehicle exports to the United States would be eligible for the credits for each successive year, and the rest would need to be offered at each manufacturer’s full price (a pretty plastic notion in the auto industry, I know, but a decision that would need to be left to whatever the manufacturers choose).

Nothing in this decision would force Canada or Mexico to subject themselves to these requirements; they would remain, as they always have been, completely free to try to sell as many EVs as they could to other markets (including each other’s).

What would change dramatically, though, is a situation that’s needlessly harmed the productive heart of the U.S. economy for far too long, resulting from trade agreements that lock America into an outsized consuming and importing role, but an undersized production and exporting role. In other words, what would change dramatically is a strategy bearing heavy responsibility for addicting the nation to bubble-ized growth. And forgive me for not being impressed by whatever legalistic arguments Mexico, Canada, any other country, or the global economics and trade policy establishments, are sure to raise in objection.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Progress!

Tags

American Affairs, antitrust, Barack Obama, competition, Financial Times, free trade, Jobs, John Maynard Keynes, Martin Wolf, production, Project Syndicate, Robert Skidelsky, stimulus, stimulus package, tariffs, The New York Times, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I hope you’ll all forgive me for an exercise in self back-patting that (I hope) you’ll read through the end. But the two instances described here of leading economics commentators expressing support for highly unconventional trade policy positions I’ve taken for years are simply too striking to pass up. Even more eye-opening: They appeared within a week of each other!

In chronological order, the first came courtesy of Martin Wolf, the Financial Times columnist who’s more-than-the-average pundit because he boasts both considerable policymaking experience and serious academic chops. As those two bios make clear, he’s also been a strong (though not completely uncritical) supporter of the standard free trade and globalization policies that decisively shaped the entire world economy, including America’s positions, for decades until the CCP Virus’ breakout. (Or did the turning point come with the financial crisis of 2007-08? Oh, well – no need to settle that question right now.)

That’s why I was so amazed to see in his column this past Tuesday the observation that the United States “gains many of the benefits of trade through internal specialisation” essentially because it’s “a large country with a sophisticated economy and diverse resources….”

Wolf’s point may not sound like much. But it not only contradicts the long-standing conventional wisdom – and rationale for supporting the freest possible global trade flows – that emphasizes (1) the centrality of international specialization for maximizing the prosperity of all individual countries and indeed the entire world, and (2) the imperative of exposing national economic activity to global competition in order to force domestic industries continually to improve quality and lower costs.

Wolf has also echoed (unwittingly, no doubt) my own argument that, whatever the validity of these ideas for most countries, there’s no reason for Americans to place any special value on them.

The reason? As I explained in an article in the Summer, 2019 issue of the journal American Affairs, the greatest possible degree of international specialization is advantageous and even crucial for the prosperity of most individual countries because they lack the ability to provide for a critical mass of their essential needs at affordable cost, let alone generate progress.

Any number of reasons or combination of reasons could be responsible. They might lack vital raw materials. Even if they’re wealthy and/or technologically advanced, their domestic market alone might be too small for most forms of economic activity aside from subsistence farming to achieve the scale needed for efficient and therefore relatively low-cost production. Alternatively, this domestic market could be inadequate because most of their people are too poor to be satisfactory customers.

In addition, because they’re so small, inadequate domestic markets have been considered incapable of generating enough competitive pressure needed to force their own producers to keep improving quality, innovating, and to maintain reasonable prices.

Conventional trade thinking has held that these problems could be overcome by individual countries (1) focusing on turning out the goods and services they could provide most efficiently (interestingly, whether in world-leading fashion or not), and (2) selling them where they were in greatest demand (because of other countries’ shortcomings) in exchange for what they themselves required.

Even better, such free trade would continually maximize the efficiency, and therefore the wealth, of all countries, as well as create the conditions for sustainable progress by requiring efforts to enter new, more promising industries to meet global competitive standards.

My own article, however, emphasized that the United States isn’t like most other countries. In fact, it’s uniquely blessed with both the size, the variety of resources, and the economic and social dynamism to supply nearly all its needs and wants from within. In the words of that 1980s inspirational song, in economic term, the United States “is the world.’

As a result, Americans have no inherent need to keep their home markets open, or open them wider, in order to secure adequate supplies of goods and services. And if they’re unhappy with the levels of competition their companies face, because of the country’s gargantuan scale, their best bet for maximizing such competition is resuming the vigorous enforcement of antitrust laws – which, as I documented, had long been largely neglected.

Wolf didn’t accept the policy implications I drew concerning these insights about America’s economic distinctiveness. But since he evidently accepts the basic proposition, it’s legitimate to ask why not.

The second example of a leading economic authority making one of my central points came yesterday on the Project Syndicate website. That in itself is pretty remarkable because, as I’ve previously suggested, Project Syndicate is best described as a digital op-ed page for globalist elites. Just as remarkable, and gratifying, the author of the post in question is Robert Skidelsky, a veteran British politician and venerable academic who’s best known for a highly acclaimed three-volume biography of John Maynard Keynes, the most influential economist of the 20^th century and a scholar whose work still shapes much global economic thought and policy.

According to Skidelsky, one of two major gaps in President Biden’s economic proposals – and especially his stated desire to rebuild manufacturing in America – is its failure to impose tight curbs on imports. Without a plan that Skidelsky (and its originator) calls “compensated free trade,” the author writes that domestic industry won’t be “built back better.”

That’s already nearly identical to arguments I make all the time. But what I found most intriguing was Skidelsky’s principal rationale: America’s still towering trade deficits are bound to permit too many of the job- and production-creating benefits of Mr. Biden’s stimulus spending to drain overseas.

That’s virtually identical to the case that I and a colleague made early during the recovery from the previous U.S. recession. Unfortunately, then President Barack Obama apparently didn’t see our New York Times article, because he ignored the continuing growth of the deficit, and partly as a result, the rebound he presided over was the weakest in American history.

I’m hardly above wishing to have gotten some credit for these ideas.  But progress on the economics of trade (as opposed to the ongoing U.S. policy departures from free trade absolutism bemoaned by Wolf) has been so slow to develop that I’ll take it in whatever form it comes – and of course be keeping an eye out for more.           

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: How Big a China Virus Hit?

Tags

China virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Economic Policy Institute, Employment, employment multiplier, Jobs, output, output multiplier, production, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The short answer to the headline’s question? “Really big.” Which is kind of obvious. So today I thought I’d present some information on techniques economists use to come up with a somewhat more specific idea.

First let’s look at jobs – because jobs obviously affect people and their ability to provide for themselves. Economists taking a “put people first” approach would start by looking at the official federal government data on how many Americans are employed by those parts of the economy that clearly will be most seriously affected. Those numbers look like this as of last month’s preliminary figures, in millions of employees:

retail trade:                                                            15.659           1.22

educational services:                                               3.838           1.94

  (includes public & private institutions)

leisure & hospitality:                                            16.873

arts, entertainment, & recreation:                           2.494          3.79

  performing arts & spectator sports:                     0.516

  spectator sports*:                                                 0.146

accommodation & food services:                        14.379          1.61

  accommodation:                                                  2.092

  restaurants & other eating places:                     11.103

*January figure

The indented categories are industries of special interest that are sub-sectors of the larger categories below which they appear. And if you add up the major categories, you come up with 54.193 million workers – nearly 42 percent of the total U.S. private sector workforce.

Sharp-eyed readers will notice a number to the right of the worker figures – that number shows what’s called the employment multiplier for the sector in question. Simply put, it means how many jobs in other parts of the economy the maintenance, creation, or loss of a single job in the first sector affects. In other words, every job in American retail companies and stores affects 1.22 jobs elsewhere (e.g., from suppliers that furnish that industry with the inputs it needs to function, and from the purchases its own workers make from other industries).

Employment multipliers aren’t easy to find – these come from a Washington, D.C. think tank called the Economic Policy Institute, and don’t cover all the initially affected sectors. But from these data alone, it’s obvious that the total number of U.S. jobs that could be lost, or see a cutback in hours, is much greater than the employment damage done, for example, by the simple closing of a single restaurant or sports stadium.

Most economists would also look at how much output the most seriously affected industries contribute to the gross domestic product (GDP – the total sum of all the goods and services Americans turn out during a given time period). GDP and output matter, of course, because if businesses aren’t producing goods and services, they won’t need employees. Here how they look, according to a measure called “value-added” – which seeks to eliminate various forms of double-counting that result when trying to gauge production in sectors that make final products, and sectors that make their parts, components, materials, ingredients, and other inputs. Also important – these figures are not adjusted for inflation.

Percent of total U.S. value-added

retail trade:                                                            5.50           0.66

healthcare services & social assistance:               7.60

educational services:                                            1.20           0.72

performance arts, spectator sports, museums &

  related activities:                                               0.70            0.81

accommodation & food services:                       3.10

  accommodation:                                               0.80

  food services:                                                   2.30

Again, the sub-categories are indented. Here the total percent figure is much smaller than the employment figure. But at 21.20 percent, it’s not bupkis, either.

And as with employment, don’t forget those multipliers (also presented to the right)! Here, the readily available data is scantier, and those I use are from 2012. But clearly the indirect output (and growth) impact will be non-trivial. (These output multipliers come from the Manufacturing Institute of the National Association of Manufacturers.)

Even if the China Virus situation wasn’t still evolving – and possibly dramatically, no one should take these numbers to the bank. Especially important is remembering that none of them take into account the danger that all these jobs and output and income and related business revenue losses bring about the kind of financial system seize-up seen during the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Moreover, although business and entire industry shutdowns will be extensive in the above and other sectors, they won’t be total, or (usually) anywhere close. And the damage will not last forever, or anywhere close.

All the same, we’re talking major drops in employment, incomes, and production – which is exactly why the economic response from Washington needs to focus on getting and guaranteeing money and credit where it’s needed pronto.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trade War(s) Update

Tags

Argentina, Bloomberg.com, Brazil, business investment, China, CNBC, consumption, currency manipulation, debt, Democrats, digital services tax, election 2020, EU, European Union, export controls, Financial Crisis, France, Huawei, internet, investors, manufacturing, production, steel, steel tariffs, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade enforcement, trade war, Trump, Wall Street, Wilbur Ross, Xi JInPing, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The most important takeaway from this post about the current status of U.S. trade policy, especially toward China, is that it may have already been overtaken by events since I began putting these thoughts together yesterday.

What follows is a lightly edited version of talking points I put together for staffers at CNBC in preparation for their interview with me yesterday. I thought this exercise would be useful because these appearances are always so brief (even though this one, unusually, featured me solo), and because sometimes they take unexpected detours from the main subject. .

Before presenting them, however, let’s keep in mind this new Bloomberg piece, which came on the heels of remarks yesterday by President Trump signaling that a trade deal with China may need to await next year’s U.S. Presidential election, and plunged the world’s investors into deep gloom. This morning, however, the news agency reported that considerable progress has been made despite “harsh” rhetoric lately from both countries. It seems pretty thinly sourced to me, and the supposed course of the trade talks seems to change almost daily, but stock indices are up considerably all the same.

Moreover, even leaving that proviso aside, what I wrote to the CNBC folks yesterday seems likely to hold up pretty well. And here it is:

1. The President’s latest comments on the China trade deal – which he says might take till after the presidential election to complete – seriously undermines the claim that he considers a deal crucial to his reelection chances because it’s likely to appease Wall Street and thereby prop up the economy. Of course, given Mr. Trump’s mercurial nature, and negotiating style, this latest statement could also simply amount to him playing “bad cop” for the moment.

2. His relative pessimism about a quick “Phase One” deal also seems to reinforce a suggestion implicitly made yesterday by Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross when he listed verification and enforcement concerns as among the obstacles to signing the so-called Phase One deal. I have always argued that such concerns are likely to prevent the conclusion of any kind of trade deal acceptable to US interests. That’s both because of China’s poor record of keeping its commitments, and because the Chinese government is too secretive and too big to monitor effectively even the most promising Chinese pledges to change policies on intellectual property theft, illegal subsidies, discriminatory government procurement, and other so-called structural issues.

3. Recent reports of the United States considering tightening (or expanding) restrictions on tech exports to Chinese entities like Huawei also support my longstanding point that the US and Chinese economies will continue to decouple whatever the fate of the current or other trade talks.

4. In my opinion, the President is absolutely right to play hard-to-get on China trade, because Chinese dictator Xi Jinping is under so much pressure due to his own weakening economy, and because of the still-explosive Hong Kong situation.

5. I’ll be especially interested to learn of the Democratic presidential candidates’ reactions to Mr. Trump’s latest China statement, as well as the announcement of the reimposed steel tariffs on Argentina and Brazil, and the threatened tariffs on French “digital services” [internet] taxes. With the exception of Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren and Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, the candidates’ China policies seem to boil down to “Yes, we need to get tough with China, but tariffs are the worst possible response.” None of them has adequately described an alternative approach. The reactions of Democratic Congress leaders Nancy Pelosi in the House and Charles Schumer will be worth noting, too. The latter has been strongly supportive of the Trump approach in general.

6. The new steel tariffs, as widely noted, are especially interesting because they were justified for currency devaluation reasons, with no mention made of the alleged national security threats originally cited as the rationale. Nonetheless, I don’t believe that they represent a significant change in the Trump approach to metals trade, because the administration has always emphasized the need for the duties to be global in scope – to prevent China from transshipping its overcapacity to the US through third countries, and to prevent third countries to relieve the pressures felt by their steel sectors from Chinese product by ramping up their own exports to the US. Obviously, all else equal, countries with weakening currencies (for whatever reason) will realize big advantages in steel trade, as the prices of their output will fall way below those of competitors’ steel industries.

7. Regarding the tariffs threatened in retaliation for France’s digital services tax, they’re consistent with Trump’s longstanding contention that the US-European Union (EU) trade relationship has been lopsidedly in favor of the Europeans for too long, and that tariff pressure is needed to restore some sustainable balance. In this vein, I don’t take seriously the French claim that the tax isn’t targeting U.S. companies specifically. After all, those firms are the dominant players in the field. Second, senior EU officials have started talking openly about strengthening Europe’s “technological sovereignty” – making sure that the continent eliminates its dependence on non-European entities in the sector (including China’s as well as America’s). The digital tax would certainly further the aim of building up European champions – and if need be, at the expense of US-owned companies.

By the way, this position of mine in no way reflects a view that more taxation and more regulation of these companies isn’t warranted. But it’s my belief that these issues should be handled by the American political system.

Also of note: Trump’s suggestion this morning that the French tax isn’t a big deal, and that negotiations look like a promising way to resolve the disagreement.

Finally, here are two more points I wound up making. First, I expressed agreement that the President’s tariff-centric trade policies have created significant uncertainties in the economy’s trade-heavy manufacturing sector in particular – stalling some of the planned business investment that’s essential for healthy growth. But I also noted that much of this uncertainty surely stems from the on-again-off-again nature of the tariffs’ actual and threatened imposition.

As a result, I argued, uncertainty could be significantly reduced if Mr. Trump made much clearer that, whatever the trade talks’ fate, the days of Washington trying to maximize unfettered bilateral trade and investment are over, and a new era marked by much more caution and many more restrictions (including tighter export controls and investment restrictions, as well as tariffs), is at hand.

Second, at the very end, I contended that President Trump deserves great credit for focusing public attention on the country’s massive trade deficits in general. For notwithstanding the standard economists’ view that they don’t matter, reducing them is essential if Americans want their economy’s growth to become healthy, and more sustainable. For as the last financial crisis should have taught the nation, when consumption exceeds production by too great a margin, debts and consequent economic bubbles get inflated – and tend to burst disastrously.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Amazon.com Could Kill the Entire Economy

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Amazon.com, bubble decade, bubbles, consumption, credit, Financial Crisis, gig economy, Great Depression, Great Recession, Henry George School of Social Science, housing, housing bubble, production, productivity, Robin Gaster, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Yesterday I was in New York City, on one of my monthly trips to attend board meetings of the Henry George School of Social Science, an economic research and educational institute I serve as a Trustee. And beforehand, I was privileged to moderate a school seminar focusing on the possibly revolutionary economic as well as social and cultural implications of Amazon.com’s move into book publishing.

You can watch the eye-opening presentation by economic and technology consultant Robin Gaster here, but I’m posting this item for another reason: It’s an opportunity to spotlight and explore a little further two Big Think questions raised toward the event’s end.

The first concerns what Amazon’s overall success means for the rough balance that any soundly structured economic needs between consumption and production. As known by RealityChek readers, consumption’s over-growth during the previous decade deserves major blame for the terrifying financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession – whose longer term effects have included the weakest (though longest) economic recovery in American history. (See, e.g., here.)

Simply put, the purchases (in particular of homes) by too many Americans way outpaced their ability to finance this spending responsibly, artificially and unprecedentedly cheap credit eagerly offered by the country’s foreign creditors and the Federal Reserve filled the gap. But once major repayment concerns (inevitably) surfaced, the consumption boom was exposed as a mega-bubble that proceeded to collapse and plunge the entire world economy into the deepest abyss since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

As also known by RealityChek regulars, U.S. consumption nowadays isn’t much below the dangerous and ultimately disastrous levels it reached during the Bubble Decade. And one of the points made by Gaster yesterday (full disclosure: he’s a personal friend as well as a valued professional colleague) is that by using its matchless market power to squeeze its supplier companies in industry after industry to provide their goods (and services, in the case of logistics companies) at the lowest possible prices, Amazon has delivered almost miraculous benefits to consumers (not only record low prices, but amazing convenience). But this very success may be threatening the ability of the economy’s productive dimension to play its vital role in two ways.

First, it may drive producing businesses out of business by denying them the profitability needed to survive over any length of time. Second, Amazon’s success may encourage so many of its suppliers to stay afloat by cutting labor costs so drastically that it prevents the vast majority of consumers who are also workers from financing adequate levels of consumption with their incomes, not via unsustainable borrowing. Indeed, as Gaster noted, it may push many of these suppliers to adopt Amazon’s practice of turning as much of it own enormous workforce into gig employees – i.e., workers paid bare bones wages and denied both benefits and any meaningful job security. And that can only undermine their ability to finance consumption responsibly and sustainably. 

I tried to identify a possible silver lining: The pricing pressures exerted by Amazon could force many of its suppliers to compensate, and preserve and even expand their profits, by boosting productivity. Such efficiency improvements would be an undeniable plus for the entire economy, and historically, anyway, they’ve helped workers, too, by creating entirely new industries and related new opportunities (along, eventually, with higher wages). Gaster was somewhat skeptical, and I can’t say I blame him. History never repeats itself exactly.

But to navigate the future successfully, Americans will need to know what’s emerging in the present. And when it comes to the economic impact of a trail-blazing, disruption-spreading corporate behemoth like Amazon, I can think of only one better place to start than Gaster’s presentation yesterday –  his upcoming book on the subject. I’ll be sure to plug it here on RealityChek as soon as it’s out.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Evidence that Trump’s Trade Wars are Winning for America

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capital spending, Dallas Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve, Jobs, manufacturers, manufacturing, output, production, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s how weird today’s (covering June) Dallas Federal Reserve Bank manufacturing report is. It’s prompted me to write my first ever RealityChek post on an individual regional Fed manufacturing report. And I’m writing this subject instead of my original plan to blog on the Iran/Persian Gulf crisis – which is of course generating lots of headlines.

The main reason? The Dallas findings include considerable evidence that domestic U.S. manufacturing is withstanding President Trump’s trade wars quite well thank you – at worst – and that his tariffs are bringing back a good deal more production to the United States than widely supposed. 

For readers not familiar with such reports, every month, several of the regional branches in the national Federal Reserve system issue results of surveys they conduct on the state of manufacturing in the geographic districts they monitor and whose financial sectors they help regulate. The Dallas Fed’s “jurisdiction” is Texas, northern Louisiana, and southern New Mexico. And because Texas is such an important manufacturing state, the Dallas reports are considered especially important in judging the health of American manufacturing as a whole.

Today’s Dallas Fed report began unusually enough, with a series of seemingly contradictory findings stemming from its usual indicators. For example, the so-called headline figure – which purports to measure district manufacturers’ perceptions of overall industry conditions for a particular month – not only worsened for the second straight month. It sank even deeper into numerical territory that supposedly signals manufacturing contraction.

At the same time, these companies’ reports on their output (like all the regional Fed manufacturing surveys, the Dallas Fed’s gauges “sentiment,” or companies’ descriptions of their activities, rather than measuring the activity itself), rose slightly higher into the numerical territory signaling manufacturing expansion. So did the “new orders” indicator – though it was slightly weaker in absolute terms. (That is, it wasn’t signaling expansion as strongly as the output indicator.)

Dallas Fed district manufacturers also stated that they were continuing to hire, and work their employees more hours per weak – though the growth here slowed from that they reported the previous month. The only indicator which registered a major monthly drop was capital spending. It dropped by double-digits percentage points to a two-year low, but still remained in expansion territory.

Interestingly, the Dallas results roughly mirrored the June report from another closely watched Fed district – Philadelphia’s.

But what was really weird about today’s Dallas Fed report were the answers regional manufacturers gave to a series of “Special Questions” about the impact of President Trump’s tariffs. The responses from 115 companies made clear that they believed that the levies effects were more damaging than last September, when they previously answered these questions (and when Texas and national manufacturing was going great guns).

But the difference was anything but dramatic. By many key measures, strong majorities reported that the tariffs had “no impact” on their fortunes. The companies expected the tariff damage to fade considerably within two years. And many of them were responding to tariff pressures they faced by replacing foreign suppliers with domestic suppliers. In other words, they were replacing imports with domestic orders and production.

For example, between last September and this month, the share of Texas manufacturers stating that the U.S. and foreign retaliatory tariffs had had “no impact” on their production levels fell only from 65.9 percent to 60.9 percent. The share reporting “no impact” on employment dipped from 82.1 percent to a still lofty 78.3 percent, and on capital spending from 69.4 percent to 64.9 percent. I.e., these results don’t exactly scream “Tariffmageddon!”

For those companies that did report tariff-related changes, the gap for each of these indicators between those reporting damage and those reporting benefits definitely widened in favor of damage. But again, the differences – over a nine-month period during which lots of tariffs were actually imposed or increased – were on the limited side. The biggest deterioration, for example, took place in capital spending. In September, 20 percent of the manufacturers responding reported that the tariffs were leading them to cut such investments. This month, that share rose to 27.2 percent. Slightly behind capital spending in this respect was output, with the “decrease” share increasing from 20 percent to 26.1 percent.

The share of companies reporting benefits from the tariffs declined, too – but much more modestly. And in June, they still averaged close to ten percent.

By contrast, the companies’ views on their ability to cope successfully over time with the U.S. and foreign retaliatory tariffs brightened through 2021. The share expecting net tariffs damage dropped from 41 percent to 32 percent, and the share expecting net benefits doubled – to 18 percent.

And potentially most interesting of all – many more companies that reported net negative impacts from tariffs were responding by replacing imports with domestic production, not with non-tariff-ed foreign products. The sample size here is small (46 firms), but 17.4 percent said they were “mitigating” the tariff damage by finding new domestic suppliers and another 17.4 percent were bringing “production or processes” back in-house. Only 10.9 percent answered “finding new foreign suppliers.”

When it comes to China, I’ve long maintained that any reduction in Chinese industrial capacity benefits the United States, even if imports from China are replaced by imports from elsewhere. But the Dallas results show that the number of companies responding by bringing production back home in one way or another – as President Trump has promised – could be much higher than many skeptics have claimed and predicted.

Sentiment surveys like the regional Fed reports are no substitute for the actual data (largely for the “survivorship bias” problems I’ve explained in this post). But if more of these institutions could keep track of their manufacturers’ stated experiences with and responses to the Trump trade wars – and on an ongoing, not sporadic, basis – they could help the nation better understand the real consequences.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trade and Supply Chain Disruption Myths are Getting Disrupted by Apple

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Apple Inc., Breitbart.com, China, deadweight loss, design, engineering, global value chains, John Carney, manufacturing, marketing, Nikkei Asian Review, production, research and development, sourcing, supply chains, tariffs, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Yesterday’s report from Japan’s Nikkei Asian Review (NAR), on how the U.S.-China trade war is affecting Apple Inc.’s sourcing plans, was stunning not only for claiming that the company is studying moving up to 30 percent of the China production capacity it uses out of the People’s Republic. It also greatly undermined three of the most pervasive myths surrounding the decision by such companies to concentrate so much manufacturing in China, and the resulting impact on the American economy.

Since Apple’s production in China and elsewhere is handled almost entirely by independent contract manufacturers like Taiwan’s Foxconn, its reported decision to ask them to start estimating the costs of partly leaving China speaks volumes about why multinational companies place various links in their supply chains in the countries decided on.

The first myth? That production and sourcing decisions are based overwhelmingly on the kinds of free market forces and developments that supposedly dominate the current world trade system, and that explain its root assumption that any government interference will reduce – to every country’s detriment – trade’s ability to maximize global efficiency.

According to the NAR piece, however, a team of 30 Apple employees has begun “discussing production plans with suppliers and negotiating with governments over financial incentives they might be willing to offer to attract Apple manufacturing, as well as regulations and the local business environment.” In other words, Apple’s decisions won’t solely, or even mainly reflect the principle of comparative advantage – which holds that economic activity naturally flows and should flow to locations where it’s most efficiently conducted.

The NAR article also hints at a point that’s become crucial in today’s trade war-spurred debate – about whether trade barriers like the Trump administration’s recent tariffs create major “deadweight losses” for the world economy by forcing companies to spend precious time and resources coping with government interference, rather than on continuing to improve their products and processes. For as the NAR piece states, among the advantages China has offered manufacturers for so long have been “lighter labor rules.” That’s a euphemism for a government policy of ruthlessly repressing worker’s rights to organize freely.

NAR could have also added practices such as government-encouraged technology extortion (which forces foreign businesses to hand over their knowhow to Chinese partners in return for the ability to operate in China), value-added taxes (which fosters producing inside China by penalizing importing and rewarding exporting), an artificially depressed currency (which has effects similar to those value-added taxes), explicit requirements that goods made in China contain certain levels of Chinese content, and all manner of tariffs and subsidies that are illegal under World Trade Organization rules.

Moreover, as detailed in my 2002 book on globalization, The Race to the Bottom, foreign government distortion of trade is hardly confined to China. It’s long represented the way much manufacturing-related business has been done around the world.

In other words, the deadweight loss issue, and government interference in trade flows, is nothing new, and raised few hackles among economists until the United States under President Trump started imposing serious trade barriers of its own. (See this article by Breitbart.com‘s John Carney for an excellent discussion of the issue and the hypocrisy of Trump tariff opponents.)

The second Apple- (and broader offshoring-related-) myth debunked by the article is that the reshuffling of global supply chains already being prompted by the Trump tariffs will devastatingly disrupt worldwide manufacturing and economic fortunes. But here’s what one Apple supplier representative told NAR: “It’s really a long-term effort and might see some results two or three years from now. It’s painful and difficult, but that’s something we have to deal with.” In other words, rather than whining and/or throwing in the towel, such companies are apparently rolling up their sleeves and getting to work.

P.S. – So, reportedly, is Apple. Not that the company hasn’t whined about the Trump tariffs. But according to the NAR article, its examination of diversifying away from China – where currently more than 90 percent of its worldwide manufacturing is located – began “at the end of last year” to “expand [the aforementioned] capital expense studies team.”

Moreover, the trade war evidently wasn’t the only issue on Apple’s mind. Said “one executive with knowledge of the situation,” a “lower birthrate, higher labor costs and the risk of overly centralizing its production in one country. These adverse [China] factors are not going anywhere. With or without the final round of the $300 billion tariff, Apple is following the big trend [to diversify production].” The biggest implication – which should have always been obvious – is that because countries and their economies, societies, and demographics are constantly changing independent of government policies, no smart business would ever view its supply chains as being set in stone.

The final myth – that performing nearly all Apple manufacturing in China has enormously strengthened the U.S. economy, and that this proposition holds for much China production by U.S.-owned multinational companies.

Because Apple products sell for so much more than the cost of their materials, it’s clear that most of the value they create comes from the company’s mainly U.S.-based research and development, engineering, design, software development, and marketing operations. So its slogan “Designed by Apple in California, Assembled in China” is not only accurate but extremely important economically.

Nonetheless, the company itself has maintained that a significant number of its goods suppliers have been U.S.-owned (though not necessarily American-located). Yet the NAR article found that this number has been shrinking steadily since 2012 – and that the number of China- and Hong Kong-owned suppliers has been rising so strongly that last year they exceeded the number of their American counterparts for the first time.

In fact, as I’ve reported, the China content of most goods produced in China been increasing so significantly for so long that the notion of the People’s Republic as a simple assembler of products that add little value to the Chinese economy is becoming rapidly outmoded. Further, this development has always been a prime objective of the Chinese government, as is especially obvious from its technology extortion and local content requirements.

It’s true that these developments per se don’t affect the aforementioned “white collar” manufacturing activities vital to creating Apple products. But it’s legitimate to ask whether, without the Trump trade war, this extremely high value work would long remain mainly in the United States. After all, even in a world of instant global communications, manufacturers have found it highly advantageous to locate functions like research and development etc close to their factories – because the two broad aspects of manufacturing tend to interact with each other so continuously, and because big differences in time zones means that there’s still nothing as easy and convenient as contacting a colleague by driving a few blocks away or phoning or texting or emailing from there, much less by walking down the hall.

To listen to economists and pundits and even many beat reporters even nowadays (or especially nowadays?), the emergence of the kinds of global value chains epitomized by Apple’s operations has been as much a force of nature, or technology, as economic globalization itself has been portrayed. They’ve ignored how the Trump trade policy revolution reminds invaluably that these trends have also stemmed from human decisions that are anything but givens. The reaction of Apple, and all the other companies that have either left China or are contemplating leaving because of the President’s actual and threatened tariffs, is a welcome sign that the folks who deal with these problems in real life, and not simply in the abstract, have finally been getting this message.