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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Blaming the Restaurant Crisis on…Trump’s Tariffs

03 Sunday Jan 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Europe, food, imports, productivity, restaurants, spirits, tariffs, The Washington Post, Trade, Trump, wine, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s like the Washington Post, and especially the folks who run its op-ed page, will do anything to slam President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies. Example number 4,369,589? A piece not from an Offshoring Lobby mainstay, or one of this pressure group’s hired gun think tank hacks, or an academic economist with his or her head stuck in the clouds – but from two of America’s leading chefs and restaurateurs.

I’ll give Post editors and the authors – Kwame Onwuachi and Alice Waters – style points for creativity at least. The article contends that a great way for apparent President-elect Joe Biden to provide some desperately needed help for a national restaurant sector decimated by the CCP Virus would be to lift a set of tariffs imposed by Mr. Trump on European food products. The tariffs, they contend, are adding 25 percent to the costs of restaurants that use these products exactly at a time when few establishments in this usually low-margin sector can afford such burdens.

Unfortunately, all the piece makes clear is that chefs and restaurateurs should stick to cooking and serving and running their own businesses rather than advising the nation on trade, and that the folks at the Post should try requiring their authors to meet some minimal standards of credible argumentation.

After all, as Onwuachi and Waters themselves point out, these Trump tariffs were imposed last October 19. And the nation’s restaurants seemed to be doing just fine until…the pandemic and the lockdowns came along. So blaming the trade curbs for any significant contribution to the restaurant crisis seems a major stretch.

No doubt dining establishments that rely heavily on sales of products stressed by the authors like “wine from France, Spain and Germany, whiskey from Ireland and Scotland, and Spanish olives and olive oil, along with cheeses from all over the continent, pork, and much more” are now seeing their remaining (post-lockdowns) earnings suffering.

But nowhere in the piece are readers given the bigger picture. For example, what share of the nation’s restaurants even serve any of these foods or beverages? And what share of their total costs do such imports from Europe represent? Further, what percentage of these restaurants have closed for good, meaning that tariff elimination won’t provide them with a speck of relief at all? As RealityChek regulars know, presenting economic data in isolation is the first refuge of an intellectual scoundrel.

The authors – and their editors – also seem unaware that lots of domestic substitutes are available for these European products. For instance, on the eve of the pandemic, U.S.-produced wine accounted for about two-thirds of all the wine sold in the country both by value and by volume. I’m no oenophile, but I keep hearing that many measure up quite well against their foreign counterparts – and often better. In addition, not all the imports, or even the choice imports, come from Europe, as connoisseurs of Australian, South American, and South African wines can attest.

It’s a shame that the Trump tariffs won’t enable the restaurants that do maintain an extensive European wine menu to offer their customers exactly what they want, at exactly the prices to which they’re accustomed. But I strongly suspect that diners today are in a pretty supportive, accomodating mood. And if restaurateurs are indeed desperate – which so many clearly are – they won’t gripe excessively about switching to non-tariffed wines.

Moreover, any restaurateur worth his or her salt should have the marketing chops to encourage customers to expand their palates. Heaven knows they’ve succeeded extraordinarily in persuading Americans to sample all sorts of new, exotic, and often downright weird dishes and drinks containing equally new, exotic, and often downright weird ingredients and combinations thereof.

Since wine and other spirits play an outsized role in restaurant sales and profits, it’s that alcohol trade picture that counts most, and it’s enough to refute in large measure the case for saving or even meaningfully boosting the dining industry by rescinding the tariffs. But as opposed to my indifference to wine, I am a cheese lover, and can personally attest that many outstanding domestic varieties are available, too, for gourmet chefs to place on appetizer or dessert plates.

Finally, both the authors and the Post editors ignore the economics maxim holding that businesses facing cost increases can absorb them without raising prices by boosting their productivity. And although cooking, serving, and dining probably don’t strike many as an activities where efficiency can be greatly raised, the industry itself admits that its productivity growth is unacceptably low and needs to get on the stick.

Just as important, unless Unwuachi, Waters, any other spokes folks for their sector, or Post editors can come up with more convincing evidence that U.S. trade policy has decisively impacted their fortunes, focusing on improving productivity would sure be a better use of their time than whining about Mr. Trump’s tariffs.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Some New Trump-Friendly Data on Manufacturing Productivity

01 Tuesday Sep 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Barack Obama, Labor Department, manufacturing, metals tariffs, multi-factor productivity, productivity, tariffs, total factor productivity, Trade, trade wars, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If I had a list of twenty top wishes, more timely U.S. government publication of the multifactor productivity statistics wouldn’t make the cut. All the same, I’d like to see the posting of this data sped up for several reasons, including:

>Multi-factor productivity (also called total factor productivity) is the broadest of the measures of economic efficiency tracked by Washington, purporting to show how much in the way of all kind of inputs are needed to produce a unit of economic output in a given time period; and

>although even stalwarts of the rarely humble economics profession agree that productivity is challenging to measure precisely, they also mainly tend to agree that the stronger a country’s productivity performance, the likelier that country’s population will be living standards rise on a sustainable, not bubbly, basis.

So even though the new detailed multi=factor productivity statistics released by the Labor Department late last week only bring us through 2018, they’re worth contemplating anyway – and even for those focused tightly on politics in this presidential election year. For these latest numbers somewhat further undercut widespread claims that President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade policies have been weakening American domestic manufacturing (which is strongly affected by trade), and indeed add to those overall economic metrics for which the Trump years have seen better performance than the Obama years. (As known by RealityChek regulars, the Obama administration holds an edge here.)

Let’s start with what the new Labor Department release says about how many of the industries it follows achieved multi-factor productivity growth during the last two Obama years and the first two Trump years (the best basis for comparison, since it examines time spans closest together in the same – expansionary – business cycle). Here are the numbers:

2015: 21 of 86

2016: 37 of 86

2017: 32 of 86

2018: 44 of 86

On average, these gains were considerably more widespread under the Trump administration. Also noteworthy: Although the number of multi-factor productivity growers dipped between the final year of the Obama administration and the first year of the Trump administration, that first Trump year featured no tariff increases. These moves didn’t begin until the early spring of 2018 – a year in which the numbers of productivity growers rose significantly.

Such figures by no means clinch the case that the tariffs helped domestic manufacturers – because a single year can’t make or break an argument; because trade policy was far from the only development influencing manufacturing; because none of the developments that do influence productivity work their magic in ways convenient for calendar-watchers; and because the 2018 tariffs only covered aluminum and steel.

Still, it’s hard to look at these productivity numbers and see any harm done to U.S.-based manufacturing by the tariffs – or by the very good reasons at the time for assuming that many more were on the way, with all their implications for business plans.

But what about actual multi-factor productivity throughout the entire manufacturing sector. Here’s what separate Labor Department data reveal:

last two Obama years combined:  -2.15 percent

first two Trump years combined: +0.84 percent

Another Trump edge, and another reason for doubting the “tariff-mageddon” claims concerning manufacturing.

The multi-factor productivity reports also handily present the numbers of manufacturing sectors that enjoyed overall output growth year in and out. These data make the Trump years look superior, too, and cast further doubt on the tariff opponents’ credibility:

2015: 50 of 86

2016: 31 of 86

2017: 44 of 86

2018: 55 of 86

Unfortunately, even if the multi-factor productivity data for 2019 (a slower growth year for domestic industry) were available, robust conclusions about the Trump manufacturing record on this front per se, and especially about the effects of the tariffs would be difficult for the fair-minded to draw. After all, that’s the year when major tariffs on Chinese goods were imposed, and therefore when the inevitable inefficiencies they created began. In other words, U.S.-based manufacturers were just at the start of efforts to make supply chain and other adjustments to the levies, not at the end of this process. And the CCP Virus’ arrival and all the economic distortions it’s produced will complicate analysis going forward.

Moreover, although it should be “needless to say,” I’ll make the point again anyway: Major changes in U.S. trade policy toward China and overall were vital both for economic, national security, and – as has become clear this year – health security reasons.

As a result, here’s the firmest conclusion I can draw: The stronger U.S. manufacturing’s performance in improving multi-factor productivity remains, the easier these needed trade wars will be to win at acceptable prices.

Im-Politic: On the Economy, Obama’s Record Looks Stronger than Trump’s

25 Tuesday Aug 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Im-Politic

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Barack Obama, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, election 2020, Employment to Population Ratio, GDP, gross domestic product, Im-Politic, Jobs, Joe Biden, Labor Force Participation Rate, labor productivity, manufacturing, non-farm jobs, private sector, productivity, real GDP, real private sector, real wages, recession, subsidized private sector, Trump, value added, wages, Wuhan virus

Not surprisingly, as this U.S. presidential cycle gets ever more intense, so has the debate over which boasts a better record in helping steer the nation’s economy: the Obama administration in which Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden served as second-in-command, or the incumbent Trump administration. I’ve just looked over some key data, and the verdict on most counts goes to the Obama administration. The margin of victory here isn’t huge, but it’s anything but razor thin, either. Moreover, any Obama edge is surprising given that the economy is President Trump’s major advantage in nearly all the polls.

All the same, here are the data. They compare performance during the last three full years of the Obama presidency and the first three full years of the Trump presidency. In my view, these time-frames deserve priority because they’re the ones closest to each other in the same expansionary business cycle, making apples to apples results much likelier.

The time-frames of course leave out the CCP Virus period, during which all the Trump numbers sank like stones. But if you regard the virus’ economic effects as purely artificial, having nothing to do with the economy’s fundamentals (as I do), then you want to strip them out.

Other methodological notes: Although the jobs-focused data come out from the federal government on a monthly basis, and therefore permit comparisons between completely identical (and virus-adjusted) three-year periods, the economic growth and productivity data don’t, so I show Trump results both through the first quarter of this year (affected by the shutdowns that began in March) and through the last quarter of 2019. In addition, regarding the monthly figures, because of the January 20 inauguration date, I peg the end of the Obama administration as January, 2017 and the beginning of the Trump administration as February, 2017.

And off we go, starting with overall employment, which consists of the Bureau of Labor Department’s U.S. employment universe – “non-farm jobs.”

Obama: +5.55 percent            Trump: +4.56 percent

But of course, non-farm jobs include all government jobs, and their status has much less to do with the economy’s underlying strengths and weaknesses than with politicians’ decision. So here are the numbers for private sector jobs.

Obama: +6.56 percent            Trump: +5.04 percent

So advantage Obama again. As RealityChek regulars know, however, not all private sector jobs are created equal. In fact, many barely deserve the term at all, because their circumstances depend so heavily on government spending. Healthcare is of course the leading example. Therefore, it’s useful to examine the employment results in what I’ve called the “real private sector”.

Obama +6.22 percent             Trump: + 4.63 percent

It’s another Obama out-performance. This string is broken when it comes to manufacturing jobs, however.

Obama: +2.38 percent           Trump: +3.78 percent

But Obama comes out ahead on inflation-adjusted wages for the entire private sector.

Obama +3.69 percent           Trump: +2.99 percent

And the margin is even bigger for real manufacturing wages.

Obama: +3.15 percent          Trump: +0.74 percent

One problem with looking at jobs gains or losses, or even the unemployment rate, is that these numbers don’t tell the whole story about the health of the labor market. To fill in the gaps, economists like to examine two performance measures called the Labor Force Participation Rate, and the Employment to Population Ratio.

The former, according to well regarded left-of-center economics think tank, reveals “the number of people in the labor force—defined as the sum of employed and unemployed persons—as a share of the total working-age population, which is the number of civilian, non-institutionalized people, age 16 and over.”

The latter, the same source explains, shows “the number of people currently employed as a share of the total working-age population, which is the number of civilian, non-institutionalized persons, age 16 and over.”

For what it’s worth, this reliable economics and finance website claims that the Employment to Population Ratio provides the best indication of job shrinkage or growth. So let’s begin there.

Obama: 58.8 percent to 59.9 percent       Trump: 59.9 percent to 61.1 percent

Pretty much a standoff.

As for Labor Force Participation:

Obama: 62.9 percent to 62.6 percent       Trump: 62.8 percent to 63.4 percent

Advantage, Mr. Trump.

As previously mentioned, the economic growth figures are only reported quarterly. Keeping that in mind, here’s how the two administrations stack up. The most commonly followed measure of the economy’s size and how it changes is inflation-adjusted gross domestic product (GDP).

Obama: +8.19 percent           Trump: +5.75 percent

These data, though, include shutdown-y March, 2020. Taking the story only through the end of 2019 brings the Trump years’ performance up to 7.11 percent – but he still trails.

Interestingly, even including the first quarter of this CCP Virus-y year, Mr. Trump’s record is slightly better when another metric for economic growth is used – value-added. Its value lies in trying to eliminate the double- and even more overcounting that results when the of the parts and other inputs of a complicated product are counted both when they’re turned out individually, and when they’re contained in that final product.

Obama: +12.09 percent          Trump: +12.24 percent

The Trump presidency’s margin is even bigger in manufacturing value-added, and even including the first quarter:

Obama: +7.09 percent            Trump: +10.58 percent

Importantly, all the above value-added numbers are pre-inflation. After-inflation value-added data are tracked by the federal government, too, but they’re not even measured on a quarterly basis. Only full-year numbers are available. So since these make precise comparisons less possible, I’m skipping them.

Finally, here are numbers that hardly ever make the news, but might be the most important of all – the productivity data. These various measures of efficiency are widely viewed by economists are crucial to determining how healthy and durable economic growth is and will be, and therefore how strongly and for how long living standards can rise.

Results aren’t up-to-date enough for the broadest measure of economic efficiency – multi-factor productivity. But they are for the narrower measure, labor productivity – which gauges how much a single worker can produce in a single hour on the job – starting with the overall economy

Obama: +3.97 percent           Trump: +3.95 percent

And if you want to remove the first quarter of this year, because of the virus effect in March, overall labor productivity during the Trump period was up 4.02 percent

Labor productivity is monitored for manufacturing, too, and here are those statistics including the first quarter of this year:

Obama: -2.57 percent           Trump: +0.29 percent .

Oddly, if the first quarter is removed, the Trump years’ performance worsens a bit – and even falls to an overall dip of 0.09 percent. But however poor, it still tops the record of the Obama years.

So why are the Trump economy poll numbers so good? One possible answer: The final year of the Obama presidency was feeble by nearly all measures. Real gross domestic product advanced by only 1.70 percent. Total employment grew by a mere 1.64 percent, versuss 2.19 percent in 2014. National manufacturing employment actually dipped by 6,000 from 2015 levels. Real wage growth overall slowed from 1.26 percent in 2014 to 0.56 percent in 2016. And inflation-adjusted manufacturing wages performed scarcely better.

Moreover, as the New York Times article linked above makes clear, the public’s evaluations of the Trump economic record are incredibly partisan – often conflicting with a respondent’s actual situation.

It’s also possible and legitimate, as I’ve noted, to point to some important reasons for this Trump under-performance.  The President’s trade policies clearly disrupted national and global supply chains, and the consequent inefficiencies surely dragged on GDP and employment in the short term.  Boeing aircraft’s safety woes have undercut national economic performance lately, too.  But good luck to you if you think these considerations are going to have any effect on voters.  

I’m hardly naive enough to think that these or other economic facts will be enough to determine November’s outcome. And I have no idea how voters will factor in the deep CCP Virus-induced recession into their thinking. But the facts aren’t a throwaway, either, and although the Obama record didn’t exactly thump Mr. Trump’s, it’ll certainly provide Biden with considerable ammunition.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Confusing but Overall Downbeat News on U.S. Manufacturing Productivity

01 Wednesday Jul 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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aluminum, CCP Virus, China tariffs, coronavirus, COVID 19, durable goods, lavbor productivity, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, multifactor productivity, productivity, steel, tariffs, trade war, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I wish I could say that the detailed U.S.manufacturing labor productivity statistics for 2019 that came out late last week provided a clear, pre-CCP Virus picture of domestic industry’s health, and especially insights into how well manufacturing was holding up during the ongoing U.S.-China trade war. Unfortunately, the sector-by-sector data add up to a confusing mix of halfway decent and bad news.

First a reminder: Productivity is an important measure of efficiency, and labor productivity is the narrower of the two sets of productivity statistics tracked by the Labor Department. But although it only measures output per hour by individual workers (as opposed to examining the usage and output results for a wide-ranging combination of inputs), the labor productivity figures are released on a timelier basis than the more comprehensive multifactor productivity numbers.

Also important to remember: For all their importance, the productivity data represent the statistics in which economists have the least confidence, although the problem is much more difficult in services than in goods like manufactured products.

Nevertheless, most economists do agree that raising productivity levels is any economy’s best way to boost living standards on a sustainable basis, and so it’s discouraging to report that the overall context for manufacturing last year was pretty dreary. Another productivity series from the Labor Department judged that labor productivity in industry shrank by 0.56 percent. In 2018, it rose by 0.64 percent. Moreover, this general result certainly doesn’t indicate that American manufacturers made much progress compensating for higher costs created by metals and China tariffs by figuring out how to make their workers more efficient.

At the same time, last year, labor productivity fell in 54 of the 86 manufacturing sectors monitored by the Labor Department. As bad as that sounds, this result was actually better than that for 2018, when labor productivity decreased in 67 of those sectors.

Although the so-far-pervasive but widely varying use of Chinese materials, parts, and components makes identifying the China tariffs’ impact on labor productivity, figuring out the effects of the metals tariffs is much easier, and here the news is more encouraging still.

In durable goods – the super-sector that contains the major U.S. industries that use tariff-ed steel and aluminum – labor productivity fell in 31 of the 51 sectors examined. That’s a genuine improvement on 2018, when labor productivity decreased in 41 out of 51.

Even more revealing: Most of the big metals users themselves stepped up their productivity game somewhat in 2019, though in absolute terms (as shown in the table below), their yearly performances weren’t by any means impressive.

                                                                        2018                       2019

fabricated metals products:                    -1.4 percent             -0.1 percent

machinery:                                                  0 percent             -0.2 percent

household appliances:                           +1.6 percent            +2.0 percent

motor vehicles:                                       -7.6 percent            -2.1 percent

motor vehicle parts:                                -1.2 percent            -0.6 percent

aerospace products & parts:                   -8.1 percent            -2.2 percent

As long as the CCP Virus keeps affecting the American and global economies (an especially important point for manufacturing, since in 2019, its exports represented nearly 18 percent of its total gross output), it’ll be tough to get a handle on underlying trends in manufacturing labor productivity and other performance indicators. But on the labor productivity front, last week’s figures sadly make clear that a return to pre-virus levels won’t be terribly difficult to achieve.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Productivity Growth Keeps Lagging Historically, but has Bumped Under Trump

05 Thursday Mar 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Barack Obama, election 2020, labor productivity, manufacturing, multifactor productivity, non-farm business, productivity, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Sure, they’re lagging indicators, and don’t tell us much, if anything, about whatever coronavirus effect the American economy might face. Still, today’s new U.S. government data on labor productivity both say something about where the economy has been until recently before pandemic fears hit, and provide a noteworthy point of comparison between the record of President Trump and his White House predecessor, Barack Obama. And although the news for the economy isn’t good at all (especially for manufacturing), the findings should cheer Mr. Trump and his supporters.

The figures, from the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), cover labor productivity – a gauge of output of a good or service per each hour a worker has been on the job trying to create it. It’s the narrower of the two productivity measures calculated by BLS (the other, multifactor productivity, reports on output as a function of many more inputs, like capital and technology), but it’s released on a timelier basis. And the latest numbers not only bring the story up to the fourth quarter of last year (preliminarily). They also incorporate revisions – some of which go back to 1947!

As a result, it’s now possible to take a new look at the nation’s productivity performance during the last three economic recoveries – the most economically valid, apples-to-apples way of comparing trends over significant time spans.

And here’s where the news isn’t good, as will be made clear from the following two tables. The first shows the cumulative productivity changes during those last three expansions before these latest revisions:

                                                                        Non-farm business    Manufacturing

1990s expansion (2Q 1991-1Q 2001):              +23.74 percent      +45.86 percent

bubble expansion (4Q 2001-4Q 2007):             +16.59 percent      +30.23 percent

current expansion (2Q 09 thru final 3Q 19):     +12.74 percent        +9.42 percent

The second shows the same developments with the revisions.

                                                                         Non-farm business    Manufacturing

1990s expansion (2Q 1991-1Q 2001):              +23.75 percent        +44.68 percent

bubble expansion (4Q 2001-4Q 2007):             +16.58 percent        +30.92 percent

current expansion (2Q 09 thru final 3Q 19):     +12.74 percent          +6.32 percent

current expansion (2Q 09 thru prelim 4Q 19):  +13.44 percent          +6.11 percent

The big takeaway is that although the revisions leave the picture for both non-farm businesses (BLS’ main definition of the American economic universe) and manufacturing unchanged in terms of a long and substantial productivity slowdown, they downgrade manufacturing’s performance during the current recovery substantially. In fact, industry’s labor productivity growth is now reported to be about a third slower than previously thought.

Since it’s a presidential campaign year, I thought a Trump-Obama comparison would be appropriate, and here’s where the good news for Trump World, at the very least, comes in.

                                                                   Non-farm business          Manufacturing

last 12 Obama quarters                                 +3.31 percent                -2.27 percent

first 12 Trump quarters                                 +4.17 percent                -0.05 percent

The time frames used make sense because they represent identical numbers of quarters for each President that are also the closest to each other in the current (expansionary) business/economic cycle. The productivity performance under Mr. Trump hasn’t been gangbusters historically speaking for either sector of the economy. But it’s clearly been better than that registered during the most comparable Obama period.

Since most serious students of the economy agree that there’s lots of room for improvement in measuring productivity growth (especially for the services sectors), it would be quite the stretch for Mr. Trump to claim credit for these favorable numbers. Yet when have such substantive considerations ever stopped politicians from pretending they wield such power – for economic good or ill? So unless the productivity arrows start moving down markedly, Americans might finally hear something from the President about productivity before too long.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The State of the Union’s Productivity is Still Gloomy

06 Thursday Feb 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Labor Department, labor productivity, manufacturing, productivity, State of the Union, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Hooray! Americans and the world just got a new batch of productivity data. You know – those statistics that everyone knowing anything about economics calls a key to sustainable national prosperity, but that are usually ignored when they’re issued even when impeachments and State of the Union speeches and presidential primaries aren’t dominating the headlines.

But as often been the case recently, the news on the whole discouraging. Non-farm businesses (the national economic universe as defined by the Labor Department, which tracks productivity) registered a better performance according to these preliminary figures for the fourth quarter of last year than for the third quarter. Yet the rate of year-on-year improvement slowed. Manufacturing’s figures, moreover, worsened over both time frames.

No better is the big picture revealed by these results: The U.S. economy remains smack in the middle of a major productivity slowdown, which augurs poorly for its ability to keep growing in a healthy (as opposed to a bubble-ized) way.

This productivity report measures labor productivity – the amount of output any sector of the economy or the entire economy can generate for each hour worked by each of its employees. It’s a narrower gauge of business efficiency than multi-factor productivity – which, as suggested by its name, records production as a function of a wide variety of inputs. But the labor number is reported on a timelier basis, and therefore tends to attract the most attention – when it attracts any attention at all!

According to the new release, labor productivity during the last three months of 2019 advanced by 1.40 percent at an annual rate. The final third quarter figure (which went un-revised)? A 0.20 percent annualized drop.

Moreover, on an annual basis, non-farm business labor productivity rose between 2018 and 2019 by 1.79 percent. That’s considerably faster than the 1.01 percent advance during the previous year.

Unfortunately, that’s where the good news stops. Labor productivity in domestic manufacturing – once the economy’s leader on this score (see the table below) – dropped sequentially for the third straight quarter. And this 1.20 percent annualized decrease was worse than the third quarter’s 0.26 percent annualized decline – which itself was revised down from a 0.10 percent increase.

Even worse is the latest year-on-year comparison. Between 2017 and 2018, manufacturing’s labor productivity rose by 0.60 percent – not terrific, but at least an improvement. Last year, it tumbled by 0.68 percent. That’s its worst such performance since 2014-2015’s 1.45 percent dive.

But if you really want to be bummed, check out the trends over the last three economic recoveries (including the current expansion, whose length, at least, keeps setting records). The ever weaker growth rates are troubling enough. Worse still is the slowdown’s acceleration (even in non-farm businesses if you take into account the length of the ongoing recovery.

                                                                         Non-farm business   Manufacturing

1990s expansion (2Q 91-1Q 01):                       +23.74 percent      +45.86 percent

bubble expansion (4Q 01-4Q 07):                      +16.59 percent     +30.23 percent

current expansion (2Q 09 thru prelim 4Q 19):   +13.19 percent      +5.98 percent

President Trump’s State of the Union address Tuesday night boasted about numerous economic achievement during his administration, and as noted in my analysis of yesterday’s U.S. trade figures, on some scores, he’s entitled to do so. But the speech never mentioned productivity, and given today’s new numbers, it’s easy to understand why.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Productivity Data Further Debunk “Tariffs Hurt” Claims

28 Tuesday Jan 2020

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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aluminum, aluminum tariffs, China, durable goods, fabricated metals products, inputs, Labor Department, labor productivity, manufacturing, metals, metals tariffs, multi-factor productivity, productivity, steel, steel tariffs, tariffs, Trade, trade law, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Trump administration’s announcement last Friday of new tariffs on some metals-using manufactures imports was greeted with the predictable combination of chuckles and gloating from the economists, think tank hacks, and Mainstream Media journalists who keep insisting that all such trade curbs are self-destructive whenever they’re imposed.

If the critics bothered to look at the new official data on multi-factor productivity, however, they’d stop their victory laps in their tracks. For the Labor Department’s latest report on this broadest productivity measure utterly trashes their claims that the tariffs slapped on metals in early 2018 – which unofficially launched the so-called Trump trade wars – have backfired by undercutting most domestic American manufacturing.

In fairness, the Trump administration itself gave the trade and globalization cheerleaders lots of evidence for their triumphalism. Specifically, the levies were justified with statistics showing that various categories of goods made primarily of tariff-ed steel and aluminum had seen major surges of imports since the duties began. The obvious conclusion? Foreign-based producers of these products were capitalizing on their cheaper metals available to their factories to undersell their U.S.-based competition.

As a result, Mr. Trump decided to tariff some of these final products, too – to erase the advantage created for imports from less expensive steel and aluminum.

So in one sense, it’s tough to blame tariff critics for feeling vindicated about predictions that the metals levies might boost the metals-producing sectors themselves, but injure the far larger metals-using sectors. Ditto for their warnings that in an economy with so many connected industries, protection for one or a few would inevitably spur calls for such alleged favoritism by others, threatening a consequent loss of efficiency for all of manufacturing and even the entire economy.

Examine the issue in more detail, though, and you see that it’s entirely possible to arrive at radically different conclusions. For example, the new tariffs appear to be imposed on a limited set of products, and none of them (e.g., nails, tacks, wires, cables, even aluminum auto stampings) qualifies as a major industry. In other words, the chief metals-using industries, like motor vehicles and parts overall, aerospace, industrial machinery (many of which have been complaining loudly about the metals tariffs, even though their overall operational costs have been barely affected) were left out.

Finally in this vein, and as the critics imply, the new Trump tariffs also make the case for trade curbs on any final products whose significant inputs receive duties. Why indeed strap otherwise competitive domestic producers with higher prices for materials, parts, and components? This practice has been a major flaw in the U.S. trade law system, which has prioritized legal over economic and industrial considerations, since its founding. And in fact, my old organization, the U.S. Business and Industry Council, has been urging this reform since at least 2008.

Even better – to prevent cronyism from influencing such trade policy decisions, impose a uniform global tariff on all manufactures, or all non-energy goods.

But it’s just as important to point out a gaping hole in the longstanding argument that cheap imported inputs (including subsidized, and therefore artificially cheap imported inputs) are essential for the overall global competitiveness of U.S. domestic manufacturing. And the hole has been opened (or perhaps it’s more accurate to say, reopened, given this previous RealityChek analysis of earlier data) by those new multi-factor productivity statistics.

They only go through 2018 (such time lags explain why multi-factor productivity trends aren’t followed as closely as labor productivity trends). But they’re the broader of the two productivity measures, as they gauge the effect of many inputs other than hours worked. And via the table below, they make clear that even the wide open access domestic manufacturers enjoyed to artificially cheap metals and other imported inputs have played absolutely no evident role in improving industry’s health. In fact, there’s reason to conclude that the more access domestic industry had to such materials, parts, and components, the less productive it became.

                                                               Total mfg   Durable goods   fabr metals

1990s expansion (91-2000):                   +23.40%       +38.76%         +4.79%

bubble decade expansion (02-07):          +11.74%      +16.61%          +7.62%

current expansion (10-present):                -4.84%         -0.84%           -4.51%

pre-China WTO (87-2001):                   +22.18%      +37.72%           -3.32%

post-China WTO (02-present):               +6.72%      +17.17%           -2.05%

As usual, the time periods chosen to illustrate these trends consist (with one exception) of recent economic expansions (because they enable the best apples-to-apples comparisons to be made). And the 1990s expansion is the first one examined because the relevant Labor Department data only go back to 1987. The products chosen consist of all manufactured goods, durable goods industries (the super-category containing most of the big metals users), and fabricated metals products (the most metals-intensive sectors of all).

The table demonstrates that multi-factor productivity growth across-the-board has weakened dramatically from the 1990s expansion through the current – ongoing – expansion. The slowdown between the 1990s expansion and the previous decade’s expansion was moderate (and multi-factor productivity actually grew faster during the second in fabricated metals, though in absolute terms its improvement lagged badly). But during the current recovery, multi-factor productivity growth has been replaced in all three instances by multi-factor productivity decline. And crucially, during none of this time did any of these manufacturing categories face any shortage of imported inputs of any kind – subsidized or not.

Indeed, one event in 2001 greatly increased the supply of subsidized inputs – China’s admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO). For once China joined, the difficulty of using U.S. trade law to keep these Chinese products out of the U.S. economy became much greater.

Yet at the same time, as shown below, productivity growth was considerably weaker after China’s WTO entry than before in manufacturing overall, and in durable goods. And although its performance actually improved in fabricated metals, that industry’s performance was much worse in absolute terms.

Nor does the inclusion of the 2007-2009 Great Recession in the post-2002 China-related data (which violates the “apples-to-apples rule”) seem to have been a game changer – because the worst performances of all in each case, and by a mile, have been registered during the current expansion. Moreover, since the data stop in 2018, those current expansion results are dominated by the period preceding both the Trump metals tariffs and the Trump China tariffs (most of which target industrial inputs, as opposed to final products).

It’s entirely possible that, for various reasons, the multi-factor productivity statistics would have been even worse if not for the widespread availability of cheap imports. Or maybe multi-factor productivity isn’t much of a measure of manufacturing’s health? Both alternative explanations, however, seem pretty far-fetched (especially given the pre- and post-China WTO results).

Much likelier – as I argued in that post linked above – the availability of cheap inputs has helped retard productivity growth by enabling businesses to achieve cost-savings without investing in research and development into new products and especially processes, and without buying more efficient equipment (including software).

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: So You Think Trade is an Engine of Productivity Growth?

23 Monday Dec 2019

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Tags

economics, economists, European Central Bank, exports, free trade, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, International Monetary Fund, labor productivity, productivity, productivity growth, total factor productivity, Trade, trade openness, World Bank, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The idea that the more international trade a country engages in, the more strongly its productivity will grow, is widely accepted among economists. Indeed, no less than the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank (the eurozone’s version of America’s Federal Reserve) say so.

How then, can these august institutions and other believers explain the following: On the one hand according to the United Kingdom’s Royal Statistical Society, the country’s feeble annual average labor productivity growth of 0.3 percent over the last ten years was its “statistic of the decade”? Worse, it was the poorest decade for British productivity growth since the early 19th century.

Yet on the other hand, during this period, the United Kingdom’s openness to foreign trade – a data point created by adding a country’s imports and exports and then expressing this sum as a percentage of its entire economy, or gross domestic product (GDP) – has for the most part been hovering near post-1960s highs. In other words, the more foreign trade the UK has been engaging in, the lower its productivity growth seems to have become.

Nor is this phenomenon restricted to the UK. The same pattern can be seen in the United States, although the country’s openness to trade is much lower than the United Kingdom’s in absolute terms (not surprising, since we’re comparing an island with a continental sized economy). RealityChek regulars shouldn’t have to be reminded about America’s discouraging collapse in labor productivity growth.

What about trade? In fairness, America’s openness to trade has been falling recently. But no, that’s not President Trump’s “fault.” The decline began in 2011, when trade’s share of GDP hit a post-1960 high of 30.79 percent. As of 2017 (the latest data year available according to this source), it still stood at 27.09 percent – much higher than the period average of 19.29 percent.   

Also in fairness: Simply because openness to trade for these two big national economies has coincided with lousy productivity growth doesn’t mean that openness to trade causes the problem (or vice versa). It doesn’t even mean that openness to trade is the main productivity culprit, for many different characteristics of an economy influence any single characteristic.

But certainly in light of the American and British experiences, even if the conventional wisdom is right and trade openness does encourage productivity growth, it’s clearly a policy choice that’s often overwhelmed by other features of that same economy. P.S. – it ain’t just the Anglo-Americans. The World Bank’s databases also portray global trade at only slightly off its all-time high as a share of the global economy. And guess what? It turns out that global productivity growth has been crappy lately, too, whether we’re talking labor productivity or total factor productivity (a broader gauge that measures output from the use of many different inputs, not just labor).

As a matter of fact, it’s not difficult to think of ways in which more trade can undermine productivity growth – e.g., if import floods decimate the sectors of the economy that have historically been its manufacturing leaders, or if trade policy fosters their offshoring. (Strong cases can be made for both propositions when it comes to American domestic manufacturing.) 

So the case that trade fosters productivity growth is hardly a slam dunk.  And that’s one more reason to believe that the broader case for free trade isn’t, either.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Back into Decline for U.S. Labor Productivity

06 Wednesday Nov 2019

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

durable goods manufacturing, labor productivity, manufacturing, multifactor productivity, nondurable goods, nonfarm business, productivity, total factor productivity, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Well, that didn’t last long. After two straight quarters of encouraging growth, U.S. labor productivity is back in the doldrums, with this morning’s preliminary data from the Labor Department revealing a drop during the third quarter of this year.

At least, however, these latest figures on the narrowest measure of the economy’s efficiency, and ability to grow healthily and generate sustainably rising living standards contained a novel recent twist: U.S.-based manufacturing outperformed the Labor Department’s main definition of the broader economy – the “nonfarm business sector.”

Moreover, the results pointed to a trend I hadn’t recognized till now: Manufacturing’s transformation from a national productivity leader into a laggard, which began during the current economy-wide recovery (and probably began during the Great Recession preceding it) is heavily concentrated in nondurable goods manufacturing. Labor productivity in the larger durable goods super-sector is still growing faster than that of nonfarm businesses, though the gap between the two has shrunk decidedly.

As known by RealityChek regulars, labor productivity measures how much output an American worker turns out for each hour he or she is on the job. It’s not as broad a gauge as “total factor productivity” (AKA “multifactor productivity), which measures output per hour resulting from a wide array of inputs, including not only human beings but capital, energy, materials, and others. But the labor productivity numbers come out on a timelier basis.

The news for the second quarter’s final (for now) data was pretty good. The increase in nonfarm business labor productivity was upgraded from a 2.3 percent annualized rate to 2.5 percent. Manufacturing’s 2.2 percent annualized drop, however, was revised down to a 2.4 percent decrease – its worse such performance since the four percent plunge in the third quarter of 2017.

This morning’s first initial read on third quarter labor productivity reversed this pattern. Nonfarm business labor productivity was down 0.3 percent on an annualized basis – worse than the 0.1 percent dip for manufacturing, and its first shrinkage since the fourth quarter of 2015 (when it fell by 3.5 percent annualized).

But it was the more detailed figures on manufacturing’s third quarter that really caught my eye. Durable goods sectors’ labor productivity performance was in the black, growing at a 1.2 percent annual pace. But the nondurables result was deep in the red – down 1.5 percent.

Nor are these results aberrations, as the table below shows. It presents the total labor productivity growth rates during the previous two economic recoveries and the current upturn (to ensure the best, apples-to-apples findings). The main takeaway: Both super-sectors have suffered major labor productivity growth rates declines since the 1990s expansion. But during the current recovery (the longest on record in the United States), labor productivity growth in nondurables plummeted much faster than in durables (which wasn’t killing it on this front, either).

                                                                                  Durable mfg    Nondurable mfg

1990s expansion (2Q 1991-1Q 2001):                   +66.11 percent  +23.81 percent

bubble expansion (4Q 2001-4Q 2007):                 +34.59 percent  +24.01 percent

current expansion (2Q 2009 thru final 2Q 19):     +15.37 percent    +5.83 percent

current expansion (2Q 2009 thru prelim 3Q 19):  +15.71 percent    +5.44 percent

Moreover, as made clear from the table below, and its comparison of labor productivity growth in nonfarm businesses and in manufacturing as a whole during the same periods, however poor the durables’ performance, it’s still better than that of nonfarm businesses in an absolute sense. Nonetheless, its lead is down considerably.

                                                                         Non-farm business    manufacturing

1990s expansion (2Q 1991-1Q 2001):               +23.74 percent       +45.86 percent

bubble expansion (4Q 2001-4Q 2007):             +16.59 percent       +30.23 percent

current expansion (2Q 09 thru final 2Q 19):     +12.85 percent         +9.00 percent

current expansion (2Q 09 thru prelim 3Q 19):  +12.77 percent         +8.97 percent

Today’s productivity read was the first of three to be released for the third quarter (additional revisions will be made down the road), so it’s possible that the overall labor productivity result will wind up being an upturn rather than a downturn.  But for now, any talk of a new U.S. productivity growth revival looks premature. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Amazon.com Could Kill the Entire Economy

26 Saturday Oct 2019

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Amazon.com, bubble decade, bubbles, consumption, credit, Financial Crisis, gig economy, Great Depression, Great Recession, Henry George School of Social Science, housing, housing bubble, production, productivity, Robin Gaster, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Yesterday I was in New York City, on one of my monthly trips to attend board meetings of the Henry George School of Social Science, an economic research and educational institute I serve as a Trustee. And beforehand, I was privileged to moderate a school seminar focusing on the possibly revolutionary economic as well as social and cultural implications of Amazon.com’s move into book publishing.

You can watch the eye-opening presentation by economic and technology consultant Robin Gaster here, but I’m posting this item for another reason: It’s an opportunity to spotlight and explore a little further two Big Think questions raised toward the event’s end.

The first concerns what Amazon’s overall success means for the rough balance that any soundly structured economic needs between consumption and production. As known by RealityChek readers, consumption’s over-growth during the previous decade deserves major blame for the terrifying financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession – whose longer term effects have included the weakest (though longest) economic recovery in American history. (See, e.g., here.)

Simply put, the purchases (in particular of homes) by too many Americans way outpaced their ability to finance this spending responsibly, artificially and unprecedentedly cheap credit eagerly offered by the country’s foreign creditors and the Federal Reserve filled the gap. But once major repayment concerns (inevitably) surfaced, the consumption boom was exposed as a mega-bubble that proceeded to collapse and plunge the entire world economy into the deepest abyss since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

As also known by RealityChek regulars, U.S. consumption nowadays isn’t much below the dangerous and ultimately disastrous levels it reached during the Bubble Decade. And one of the points made by Gaster yesterday (full disclosure: he’s a personal friend as well as a valued professional colleague) is that by using its matchless market power to squeeze its supplier companies in industry after industry to provide their goods (and services, in the case of logistics companies) at the lowest possible prices, Amazon has delivered almost miraculous benefits to consumers (not only record low prices, but amazing convenience). But this very success may be threatening the ability of the economy’s productive dimension to play its vital role in two ways.

First, it may drive producing businesses out of business by denying them the profitability needed to survive over any length of time. Second, Amazon’s success may encourage so many of its suppliers to stay afloat by cutting labor costs so drastically that it prevents the vast majority of consumers who are also workers from financing adequate levels of consumption with their incomes, not via unsustainable borrowing. Indeed, as Gaster noted, it may push many of these suppliers to adopt Amazon’s practice of turning as much of it own enormous workforce into gig employees – i.e., workers paid bare bones wages and denied both benefits and any meaningful job security. And that can only undermine their ability to finance consumption responsibly and sustainably. 

I tried to identify a possible silver lining: The pricing pressures exerted by Amazon could force many of its suppliers to compensate, and preserve and even expand their profits, by boosting productivity. Such efficiency improvements would be an undeniable plus for the entire economy, and historically, anyway, they’ve helped workers, too, by creating entirely new industries and related new opportunities (along, eventually, with higher wages). Gaster was somewhat skeptical, and I can’t say I blame him. History never repeats itself exactly.

But to navigate the future successfully, Americans will need to know what’s emerging in the present. And when it comes to the economic impact of a trail-blazing, disruption-spreading corporate behemoth like Amazon, I can think of only one better place to start than Gaster’s presentation yesterday –  his upcoming book on the subject. I’ll be sure to plug it here on RealityChek as soon as it’s out.

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Current Thoughts on Trade

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Protecting U.S. Workers

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So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

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Chief Economist at Daniel Stewart & Co - Trying to make sense of Global Markets, Macroeconomics & Politics

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Real Estate + Economics + Gold + Silver

Reclaim the American Dream

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

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