Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Why America’s Stakes in East Asia’s Security are Looking Vital Again

Tags

allies, America First, China, East Asia, East Asia-Pacific, extended deterrence, free-riding, globalism, Intel, Japan, Joe Biden, manufacturing, Michele Flournoy, nuclear weapons, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, protectionism, Samsung, semiconductors, South Korea, Taiwan, Trump, TSMC

News flash! This past week I read a newspaper column by George F. Will that didn’t prompt me to say “What an ignoramus!’ In fact, not only did I learn something. I learned something so important that, in conjunction with some other recent developments, is causing me to rethink some long and deeply held ideas I’ve had about America’s grand security strategy in the East Asia-Pacific region.

Specifically, although Will’s own focus in the September 8 piece was who Joe Biden would pick as Secretary of Defense, the piece itself described some ominous changes in the U.S.-China military balance in Asia that call into question my main concerns about America’s approach to region, and especially what I’ve depicted as an increasingly dangerous reliance on nuclear weapons to deter Chinese aggression. Meanwhile, as I’ll detail in a forthcoming freelance article, two U.S. Asian allies – Taiwan and South Korea – whose value to the United States I’ve long insisted doesn’t remotely justify running such risks, are looking for now like critical assets.

To review, since the Cold War began, the United States has resolved to defend its East Asian allies in large part by using the threat of nuclear weapons use to persuade potential attackers to lay off. Presidents from both parties agreed that the conventional military forces needed to fight off China and North Korea (and early on, the Soviet Union) were far too expensive for America to field. Moreover, the Korean War convinced the nation that fighting land wars in Asia was folly.

Before China and North Korea developed nuclear weapons able to reach the U.S. homeland, or approached the verge (the case, it seems, with the latter), this globalist policy of extended deterrence made sense whatever the importance to America of Asian allies. For the United States could threaten to respond to any aggression by literally destroying the aggressors, and they couldn’t respond in kind.

As I noted, however, once China and North Korea became capable of striking the continental United States with nuclear warheads, or seemed close to that capability, this U.S. policy not only made no sense. It was utterly perverse. For nothing about the independence of South Korea and Taiwan, in particular, made them worth the incineration of a major American city – or two, or three. The security of much larger and wealthier Japan didn’t seem to warrant paying this fearsome price, either.

Greatly fueling my opposition to U.S. policy and my support for a switch to an America First-type policy of military disengagement from the region was the refusal of any of these countries to spend adequately on their own defense (which, in combination with U.S. conventional forces, could deter and indeed defeat adversaries without forcing Washington to invoke the nuclear threat), and their long records of carrying out protectionist trade policies that harmed the American economy.

As Will’s column indicated, though, the threat, much less the use, of nuclear weapons is becoming less central to American strategy. Excerpts he quotes from recent (separate) writings by a leading Republican and a leading Democratic defense authority both emphasize dealing with the Chinese threat to Taiwan in particular with conventional weapons. The nukes aren’t even mentioned. Especially interesting: The Democrat (Michele Flournoy) is his recommended choice to head a Biden Pentagon – and she’s amassed enough experience and is well regarded enough among military and national security types to be a front-runner. I also checked out the journal article of hers referenced by Will, and nuclear weapons don’t come up there, either.

Moreover, neither Flournoy nor her Republican counterpart (a former aide the late Senator John McCain) shies away from the obvious implication – accomplishing their aim will require a major U.S. buildup of conventional forces in East Asia (including the development of higher tech weapons). In fact, they enthusiastically support it.

Any direct conflict involving two major powers has the potential to escalate beyond the expectations of the belligerents. But certainly bigger and more capable American forces in East Asia would reduce the chances that war with China will go nuclear. So in theory, anyway, the nuclear dimensions of my concerns could be reduced.

Moreover, my willingness to run greater risks to safeguard Taiwan and South Korea in particular, and pay the needed economic price – even if they keep free-riding on defense spending – is growing, too. That’s because of the theme of that forthcoming article I mentioned: Intel, the only major U.S.-owned company left that both designs and manufactures the most advanced kinds of semiconductors, has run into major problems producing the last two generations of microchips. In fact, the problems have been so great that the company has lost the technological lead to South Korea’s Samsung and in particular to Taiwan’s TSMC, and their most advanced facilities are in South Korea and Taiwan, right on China’s rim.

Given the importance of cutting edge semiconductors to developing cutting edge tech products in general, and ultimately cutting-edge weapons (including advanced non-weapons electronic gear and cyber warfare capabilities), acquiring the knowhow to produce these microchips by whatever means – outright conquest, or various forms of pressure – would make China an even more formidable, and even unbeatable challenge for the U.S. military, at least over time.

So until Intel, whose most advanced factories remain in the United States, figures out how to regain its manufacturing chops, or some other U.S.-owned entrant rides to the rescue, there will be a strong argument on behalf of protecting South Korea and Taiwan against Chinese designs at very high risk and cost. And as noted above, Americans may even have to tolerate some more military free-riding along with, in the case of South Korea, fence-sitting in the overall U.S.-China competition for influence in East Asia.

At the same time, because of the military (including nuclear) risks still involved, seizing back control of the semiconductor manufacturing heights ultimately is the best way out of this bind for Americans. So shame on generations of U.S. leaders for helping this vulnerability develop by swallowing the kool-aid about even advanced manufacturing’s obsolescence and replacement by services. But this grave mistake can’t be wished away, or overcome instantly, either – though efforts to regain this lost tech superiority need to be stepped up dramatically. So shame on current leaders, their advisers, and wannabe advisers – whatever their favored foreign policy strategy – if they fail to acknowledge that dangerous new circumstances may be upon the nation, and the sharp imperatives they logically create. And that includes yours truly.

Im-Politic: A World Trade Organization Pull-Out Proposal that Falls Sadly Short

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America First, CCP Virus, China, conservartives, coronavirus, COVID 19, export bans, GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, health security, Im-Politic, Josh Hawley, Marco Rubio, national treatment, nationalism, non-discrimination, Populism, protectionism, reciprocity, Republicans, rules-based trade, sovereignty, Trade, unilateralism, World Trade Organization, WTO, Wuhan virus

I can barely describe how much I wanted to like Missouri Republican Senator Josh Hawley’s May 6 op-ed piece in The New York Times calling for a U.S. withdrawal from the World Trade Organization (WTO). That’s why I can also barely describe the growing disappointment I felt as I read through it.  At best, it deserves only an “A for effort” grade.

First, let’s give Hawley (considerable) credit where it’s due. As I’ve been arguing since it went into business at the start of 1995, and in fact was predicting during the national debate preceding Congress’ approval of the idea the fall before, the WTO has gravely harmed crucial American economic interests. (This recent post briefy summarizes my views.)

Let’s also give The Times op-ed page credit for running an article that’s even more strongly opposed to the pre-Trump U.S. trade policy status quo than President Trump has been – because although he’s approved policies that have thrown the WTO’s future into doubt, he’s never explicitly called for a pull-out, and in fact his administration has portrayed these measures as vital steps toward WTO reform.

Hawley, moreover, articulates many powerful indictments of the WTO’s failure to defend or advance U.S. interests satisfactorily – notably, the cover it’s given to China and other protectionist economies. 

Unfortunately, Hawley’s anti-WTO case and recommendations for going forward are fundamentally basedsed on two big misunderstandings. The first is that the pre-WTO global trading order set up by the United States was based on reciprocity, and therefore adequately safeguarded the interests of American workers. Absolutely not. In fact, the concept of reciprocity – holding that a country has no obligation to reduce its trade barriers any more than those of its partners – was explicitly rejected by the pre-WTO rules, which were known collectively as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Instead, this global trade regime was based on two principles that actually entitled protectionist countries to maintain higher trade and related economic barriers than those of freer trading countries. The first was called non-discrimination. It simply urged all member countries to treat all other countries the same trade-wise. So if, say, Japan largely closed its markets to one country, all it needed to do to satisfy GATT rules was to treat other countries just as badly.

The second core GATT principle was called national treatment. Under its terms, member countries agreed to treat foreign-owned companies the same as their own companies. So if, say, a country like (again) Japan, which was is still known for fostering cartel-like arrangements that favored some of its own companies over others wanted to discriminate against whatever foreign companies it wished, that was OK according to the WTO.

Some limited exceptions were permitted to both principles. But they explain in a nutshell why Japan’s trade predation (among others’) inflicted so much damage on U.S.-based manufacturing during the WTO period, and why its own economy (among others’) remained so hermetically sealed throughout.

The GATT’s only saving grace – as I just tried to hint by using terms like “urged” and “agreed”  – was that its rules were essentially unenforceable. All told, though, it’s a lousy model for post-WTO U.S. trade policy.

The WTO has featured a strong enforcement mechanism, which is why Hawley (and other critics, like me) have rightly argued that the organization has eroded U.S. national sovereignty. But at the same time, Hawley wants to replace it with “new arrangements and new rules, in concert with other free nations, to restore America’s economic sovereignty and allow this country to practice again the capitalism that made it strong.”

If the rules are for all intents and purposes voluntary, as with the GATT, then fine – although the question then arises of why the rules are needed in the first place. And the question becomes particularly pointed when it comes to the United States, whose longstanding role as the world’s importer of last resort has long given it more than enough unilateral leverage to create all by itself whatever terms of trade it wishes with any trade partner.

At the same time, this business about creating new arrangements with “other free nations” reveals a second major flaw in Hawley’s argument: a belief that there are lots of other countries out there that agree with the United States on defining what is and isn’t acceptable in international trade and commerce. That kind of consensus is a sine qua non of any rules-based system. In fact, it needs to predate the formal creation of that system. The existence of the system itself can’t summon it into existence – unless one or a group of members can force holdouts to accept the consensus, which brings us back to the question of why countries with those capabilities need a system in the first place.

But if anyone really believed in the required preexisting consensus before the CCP Virus struck, their conviction should lay in smoking ruins now. Because as of March 21, no fewer than 54 countries worldwide had been imposing export curbs of some kind on medical supplies, and the same think tank that compiled this data reported that, as of early April, that number had risen to 70. And their ranks included many U.S. allies. So it should be obvious that, when major chips are down, global trade becomes more of a free-for-all than ever.

Hawley has been among those leading U.S. conservatives and Republicans who are trying to develop a nationalist and populist approach to both domestic and international U.S. policy-making that can survive President Trump’s departure from the White House. (Another has been Florida Republican Senator Marco Rubio.) And I’ve been very impressed by much of their work so far.

But if they’re genuinely concerned about transforming U.S. trade policy, they’ll recognize the need not only to pull the United States out of the WTO, but to replace that organization with a unilateral strategy incorporating the street smarts and the flexibility to free up America to handle its trade policy needs on its own. If others want to sign on and accept U.S. rules and unilateral enforcement, so much the better. But that kind of “America First” arrangement is the only kind of international regime that can adequately serve the national interest.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trump-Like China Trade War Advice – from China!

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America First, Asia, China, Clyde V. Prestowitz, free trade, globalism, Japan, Long Tongyu, managed trade, protectionism, South China Morning Post, Trade, trade talks, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

When I first entered the trade and manufacturing world, I worked for a fellow named Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., who was shaking up American attitudes on international economic policy (in a good way) with sharp critiques of the prevailing dogma and often ingenious ideas for reform and even transformation. (The most complete statement of his views – this 1988 book.) 

And one of his most intriguing thoughts held that died-in-the-wool protectionist Asian governments like Japan’s would much rather deal with an openly economic nationalist U.S. President than with a standard preacher of free trade. So imagine my (pleasant) surprise to see this morning that a former senior Chinese economic official who still clearly retains much influence express substantial agreement – and in the process light the way for an American approach toward China’s trade transgressions that moves from what might be called a “Trump Lite” strategy that only partly reflects the President’s sharpest instincts to a much more thoroughly America First-oriented policy.

These views can be found in an interview in Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post describing the views of Long Yongtu. This retired Vice Minister led China’s successful decade-and-a-half effort to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) – a top Beijing priority because membership provided the People’s Republic with valuable insulation from unilateral and other foreign efforts to retaliate against its wide range of predatory practices. And although he’s no longer on active duty, he would never, ever make public statements at odds with the beliefs of current Chinese leaders. In fact, folks in his position often float trial balloons for the regime and serve in other ways as unofficial spokespeople.

According to the Post, Long stated that “We want Trump to be re-elected; we would be glad to see that happen.” And why would Beijing prefer to deal with a President who’s imposed tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of exports on which China depends to achieve adequate growth rates, rather than with Democratic rivals who oppose such measures?

As Long explained, “Trump talks about material interests, not politics.” Further clarifying, he contended that “He makes the US decision-making process efficient and transparent, because he basically says what it is. The pros of [having Trump] outweigh the cons. We don’t need to spend so much time figuring out what Americans want any more, or search for each other’s real thoughts in the dark, like we used to.”

Even more specifically, according to the Post‘s paraphrase, “Despite his fickleness, Trump is a transparent and realistic negotiator who is concerned only with material interests such as forcing China to import more American products, on which Beijing is able to compromise….”

Although Long didn’t use this phrases, it’s clear that he was lauding a Trump trait denounced by the President’s globalist critics – an approach to foreign policy described as “transactional.” In other words, Mr. Trump is more interested in securing relatively immediate, tangible, specific goals when dealing both with allies and adversaries than with more ambitious objectives valued by globalists for their supposed potential to promote U.S. interests most effectively over the long term, whatever the short-term risks or costs – like preserving American alliances and international institutions, and keeping other relationships (i.e., with China) on an even keel. (See this early post-Cold War article of mine for a more complete analysis of such conceptual differences.)

In the process, it’s clear that Long was also endorsing Prestowitz’ belief (which he based on his own personal experiences as a U.S. trade negotiator during the 1980s) that Washington could not hope to succeed with fundamentally different systems like Japan’s (his interlocutor) or, by extension, China, by demanding that these governments agree to American demands for more openness to imports, or broader structural changes that would lead indirectly to better sales for U.S. products and services.

Instead, Washington was much better advised to seek less grandiose but more concrete commitments – specifically, to increase imports by specific amounts.

This shift to “managed trade” or “results-oriented trade” ostensibly horrified the U.S. policy establishment. But the Prestowitz proposal was adopted by former President Ronald Reagan in 1986 in negotiations with Japan over semiconductors, and achieved its objectives of expanding American companies’ share of Japan’s market.

Further, Prestowitz’ main rationale was also echoed in Long’s remarks. He didn’t justify managed trade mainly for the relatively easy verification challenge it presented – although he did emphasize that Washington would be much better able to monitor promises to boost buys of specific products than foreign promises to convert to free trade principles. Nor did Prestowitz stress that such sweeping U.S. demands were unrealistic, and that protectionist countries would respond by simply stonewalling.

Rather, Prestowitz contended that Asian protectionists were genuinely bewildered and frustrated by standard American positions, primarily because the ideas behind them were so alien to their experiences. Similarly, and in line with Long’s views, they didn’t comprehend how negotiations could resolve or bridge differences that ultimately are philosophical or ideological. They much more clearly understood pragmatic haggling over quantities, and Prestowitz argued quite sensibly that superior U.S. leverage could be counted on to persuade these export-dependent economies to treat American imports more generously.

As a result, the implications for Trump trade policy couldn’t be clearer. The United States should drop its demands that China change its policies fundamentally, whether on the intellectual property front or the technology extortion front or the illegal subsidy front or various other non-tariff barrier fronts. (As I’ve previously written, there’s no chance of verifying even genuine Chinese compliance satisfactorily.)

A much better response would be a combination of (1) severely punitive tariffs to make sure that Chinese products benefiting from these practices don’t enter the American market, and harm American-owned producers; and (2) other threatened or imposed tariffs aimed at obliging Beijing to purchase much greater amounts not only of agricultural products, but the full array of advanced manufactured products.  The first set of tariffs would center on those advanced manufactures, the second on more labor-intensive Chinese products – which Beijing relies on heavily to keep employment high enough to keep China’s masses content economically.  

That first set of tariffs would not only prevent U.S.-owned producers from having to deal with heavily subsidized and/or copycat Chinese competition. It would surely prompt China to send these exports elsewhere – and finally pressure the rest of the world to get its own act together in responding to China’s excess capacity building and dumping, rather than relying on the United States to soak up these surpluses.

The second set of tariffs would need to be accompanied by a resolve not to let Beijing off the hook with claims that its own economy simply can’t absorb greater supplies of American goods across the board. Rather than enable China to use free market-oriented excuses after decades of (continuing) state planning and other interventionism, Washington should tell Beijing that, for all the United States cares, it can stick these products into warehouses if genuine customers can’t be found.

This new approach shouldn’t represent the totality of a smarter new U.S.-China economic policy. In particular, the Trump administration should keep sharply restricting Chinese purchases of American hard assets, whether defense-related or not – because why should a basically free market economy welcome state-controlled and bankrolled entities that can only further distort free market forces? And controls on exports or other transfers of advanced technology to Chinese entities will need to be further tightened.

But a shift to managed trade is nothing less than essential. And assuming that Long Tongyu reflects Beijing’s thinking, with enough American consistency and resolve, China would go along before too long.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: How Many Strikes Does Paul Krugman Get on Trade?

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automation, China, China shock, globalization, hyperglobalization, Jobs, manufacturing, manufacturing employment, offshoring, Paul M. Krugman, protectionism, tariffs, The New York Times, Trade, Trade Deficits, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Contrary to what many trade mavens must think, Paul Krugman’s recent confession that he (and nearly all of his economics colleagues) have seriously misjudged the impact of international trade on America’s manufacturing workers isn’t his first. At least twice before (see here and here), this Nobel Prize-winning economist and New York Times columnist has admitted in print that the economics profession’s consensus was wrong to brush off (and often scorn) claims that post-Cold War trade agreements and similar trade policy decisions would foster a combination of wholly new and unbeatable (but economically unsustainable) forms of import competition for domestic industry, and related job and production offshoring. (I’m among those he’s mauled in print.) And he’s granted that trade policy critics who predicted these consequences and kept pointing to evidence of their emergence were right. (See here and here.)

Still, Krugman’s latest mea culpa is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it undercuts another tenet of trade economics dogma held almost as strongly believed as the belief that trade expansion in all circumstances is a net contributor to human welfare – the related conviction that imbalances like trade deficits don’t matter (at worst).

In particular, the author acknowledges that the rapid and massive increase in America’s manufacturing-dominated goods trade deficit – especially from super-low cost economies (and offshoring destinations) like Mexico and especially China – occurred at exactly the same time that U.S. industrial employment cratered. And not coincidentally, the destruction began right about when China was admitted into the World Trade Organization (WTO). That mattered greatly because the Beijing subsidies and other predatory trade practices that benefited both foreign- and Chinese-owned producers in the PRC gained invaluable protection from unilateral U.S. responses.

How greatly? According to Krugman, the worsening of the trade deficit “reduced the share of manufacturing in GDP by around 1.5 percentage points, or more than 10%, which means that it explains more than half the roughly 20% decline in manufacturing employment between 1997 and 2005.” In other words, most of the manufacturing job loss during this crucial period – which is a particularly important one because that’s when critical masses of recently offshored factories got up and running and began exporting to the American market – should be blamed not on supposedly impersonal and clearly positive forces of progress like containerization in global shipping, and automation generally, but on actions by American leaders.

Not that Krugman abandons conventional trade economics completely. Specifically, he contends that trade deficits generally speaking are still ultimately unimportant, partly because countries can’t grow indefinitely indebted to the rest of the world and “must pay their way eventually.” The post mid-nineties surge in the manufacturing trade shortfall hammered domestic American manufacturing, he explains, only because it skyrocketed so suddenly.

Readers, however, will ask themselves how the United States can pay its way in the foreseeable future when manufacturing still dominates its lopsided goods trade flows. And they should note that although the damage to manufacturing could still prove temporary, it’s already lasted nearly twenty years, with no imminent end in sight until the past year. (See this post for one of my recent claims that President Trump’s trade policies are starting to bend the curve.)

Second, and following logically from the first point, Krugman continues to insist that protective tariffs should be avoided. Now his opposition focuses on his contention that the trade-related danger to U.S. manufacturing is coming to an end. The China shock in particular, which spearheaded the recent period of “hyperglobalization,” was “a one-time event” that’s already showing signs of ebbing.

But if Krugman was so offbase in evaluating trade’s economic effects, why should such predictions deserve any credibility? Off the top of my head, I can think of several reasons for ongoing concern. For example, China still has massive reserves of super cheap, U.S. wage-depressing labor in its interior and, counter-intuitively, in its national student body. In addition, the progress Beijing has fostered in capital- and technology-intensive industries means that these sectors of American manufacturing will keep facing the same kinds of low-wage (but high productivity) challenges that decimated less advanced, more labor-intensive U.S.-based sectors in previous decades. Moreover, if China does lose competitiveness even in these portions of manufacturing, there’s no shortage of bargain basement third world population giants – like India, Indonesia, and Brazil – that would be more than happy to receive more manufacturing investment from the United States and other high-income countries.

Everyone’s entitled to make mistakes – even know-it-alls like Krugman, who’s known for torching those disagreeing with him as know-nothings and liars. And Krugman deserves praise for owning up to his own mistakes. But it’s also appropriate to ask this question: Since Krugman first established his economic chops as a trade expert, and since he’s clearly been proven wrong about the leading trade-related controversy of our time, how many more strikes does he get?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Krugman’s (Embarrassingly) Phony Tariff History

Tags

1920s, agriculture, Economic History Association, history, Paul M. Krugman, protectionism, tariffs, The New York Times, Trade, Trump, World War I, {What's Left of) Our Economy

To the many reasons I have to envy Paul M. Krugman (his high profile perch as a New York Times pundit, his Nobel Prize in economics, his surely stratospheric income), one more can now be added:  As strongly indicated by his latest column for The Times, he works for folks who allow him to publish any claim he’d like without being fact-checked or even questioned in any way.

In that piece, Krugman sought to debunk President Trump’s recently tweeted claim that “TARIFF is a beautiful word indeed” by showing that “the actual history of U.S. tariffs isn’t pretty.”  One major example he used:  Because America “took a sharply protectionist turn before the infamous 1930 Smoot-Hawley Act,” the country’s farmers “spent the 1920s suffering from low prices for their products and high prices for farm equipment, leading to a surge in foreclosures.”

“Part of the problem was that U.S. tariffs were met with retaliation; even before the Depression struck, the world was engaged in a gradually escalating trade war.”

Sounds pretty convincing, right? In fact, not even close. And not least of which because the only two sources cited by Krugman contain absolutely no mention of low farm prices or foreclosures or unaffordable farm equipment stemming from any trade-related developments. In fact, there’s not even a mention of “high prices for farm equipment” at all.

The sources – articles on the Economic History Association’s website on the 1920s tariffs, and on the U.S. economy in the 1920s (you can read them here and here) – demonstrate that agriculture’s woes during this period (not surprisingly) resulted from many cases. But tariffs don’t make the list. 

Simply put, the main culprits were excessive borrowing by American farmers late in the previous decade based on the assumption that agricultural output in war-torn Europe would remain long depressed, and that this market would for many years be importing ever greater amounts of U.S. farm products; and a subsequent price-depressing glut in American supply when European output recovered faster than expected once World War I ended.

A a result, U.S. farmers were left with lots of new acreage and machinery that suddenly became superfluous even though their new owners still needed to pay off the debts they incurred to buy them.  No wonder so many weren’t able to meet their mortgage payments.

Adding to American agriculture’s problems during this period were a productivity boom triggered by surging mechanization and other advances that permitted agricultural production to rise much faster than domestic (and foreign) consumption; and an economy-wide depression in 1920 and 1921 that primarily resulted from excessive monetary tightening by the Federal Reserve. Again, nothing about tariffs.

Importantly, the 1920s economic history article in particular is a gold mine of information about many developments of that time that shed considerable light on today’s major economic challenges – as I’ll be describing in some future posts.  In the meantime, I’d strongly recommend that anyone with an interest in the American economic invest the time needed to read it – starting with Paul Krugman.

Im-Politic: Where McCain Fell (Way) Short

Tags

America First, foreign policy, globalism, Im-Politic, Immigration, isolationism, John McCain, Mainstream Media, nativism, protectionism, Trade, Trump

I spent a fair amount of this past weekend thinking of something to write about John McCain that would adequately explain why my long-time (and continuing) irritation with the late Arizona Republican Senator goes considerably deeper than my opposition to his stances on specific issues like trade, immigration, and foreign policy – and in particular why it was never offset much by any admiration for his instances of political independence, his efforts at bipartisanship, or even his military service.

Not that I don’t admire these widely noted traits and that portion of his bio. But here’s what truly rankles – and should bother you – especially amid the torrent of praise about how McCain supposedly kept the tone of American politics elevated while so many around him (notably President Trump) worked so hard (and successfully) to degrade it: When it came to the issues listed above, he rarely, if ever, resisted the temptation to to portray anyone opposed to what today are called globalist positions in the worst possible light – as selfish protectionists, as xenophobes, and as head-in-the-sand isolationists.

If you’re skeptical, check out statements like

>”Americans don’t run from the challenge of a global economy. We are the world’s leaders, and leaders don’t fear change, hide from challenges, pine for the past and dread the future.

“That’s why I reject the false virtues of economic isolationism.”  (Here’s the source.)

>“To abandon the ideals we have advanced around the globe, to refuse the obligations of international leadership for the sake of some half-baked, spurious nationalism cooked up by people who would rather find scapegoats than solve problems is as unpatriotic as an attachment to any other tired dogma of the past that Americans consigned to the ash heap of history.” (Here’s the source.)

>”We have to fight isolationism, protectionism, and nativism. We have to defeat those who would worsen our divisions. We have to remind our sons and daughters that we became the most powerful nation on earth by tearing down walls, not building them.”  (Here’s the source.)

Beliefs and accusations like these have become so commonplace – largely because they are so enthusiastically promoted by the Mainstream Media – that it’s far too easy to overlook their destructive effects. For these issues, which obviously were so important to McCain, and which not so coincidentally were central to the success of his bitter rival, President Trump, present Americans with powerful and complex questions.

Of course, there’s a compelling case that can still be made for what nowadays are called the globalist views championed so vigorously by McCain. But after the kinds of disasters and blunders represented by the Vietnam and second Iraq Wars, by a terrifying worldwide financial crisis and the worst economic downturn in decades, and by enabling the rise of China, clearly there’s also a compelling case to made for pushing back against the grandiose assumptions about U.S. interests and the nation’s place in the world that underlie them.

In fact, had the bipartisan globalist establishment encouraged, or even allowed, thoroughgoing debate over the assumptions when their vulnerabilities started emerging decades ago, some of the most recent debacles might have been avoided. Instead, the powers-that-be focused on preventing or limiting those debates, and in particular on marginalizing dissenters by casting exactly the kind of intellectual and moral aspersions peddled by McCain. And don’t doubt for a minute that this intolerance accounted for much of McCain’s adoration by a Mainstream Media whose zeal for globalism has been equally extreme, and whose determination to depict the nation’s only choices on trade, immigration, and foreign policy, as black or white has been just as strong.

In other words, the late Arizona Senator denied to his opponents on trade, immigration, and foreign policy issues the credit for good intentions – and the very aura of legitimacy itself – that he famously and laudably extended to his 2008 presidential rival, then-Senator Barack Obama, when he firmly rebuked a voter for portraying the Democratic nominee as an anti-American “Arab.”

Was McCain the worst globalist politician on this score? I’m sure I could find examples of peers who took even lower roads. But on these crucial subjects, he wasn’t notably better. For that reason alone, the election of Donald Trump, and the marked America First turn of the Republican party it has revealed, was a defeat that the McCain and globalists in general richly deserved.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Real Messages of that Business Letter Opposing Tariffs on China

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American Chamber of Commerce in China, Business Roundtable, China, currency manipulation, National Association of Manufacturers, offshoring, protectionism, tariffs, Trade, Trump, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, US-China Business Council, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Forty-five American business groups have just sent a letter to top Trump administration officials urging them not to impose “sweeping tariffs” on China in response to its longstanding and widespread theft of U.S. “trade secrets and other intellectual property.” That’s not especially newsy, since large elements of the American business community have long opposed any measures that would rock what they consider to be a highly profitable boat – the business they do with the People’s Republic.

Here’s what’s much more newsworthy: The list of signers is missing some of the leading lights of the U.S. trade association world, including the Business Roundtable, the National Association of Manufacturers, and two leading China-specific groups – the US-China Business Council, and the American Chamber of Commerce in China (which is distinct from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, an organization that did sign).

Since the membership of the U.S. Chamber in particular is so all-inclusive, it’s possible that its name on the letter was thought to suffice for many companies belonging to those other groups that are absent. But these companies have never been shy about practicing double- and even triple-counting. So it’s also possible that the above absences indicate that the American business community – and especially the multinational companies that have so powerfully influenced U.S. Trade policy with China for decades – is seriously divided on the tariff issue.

What’s also noteworthy is the letter’s statement that “Tariffs would not only affect Chinese shippers but also harm U.S. companies that sell component pieces of final products exported from China.” In other words, the letter is implicitly acknowledging that many of its signers have been among those companies that have long spearheaded the offshoring of American jobs and entire supply chains to China.

Their offshoring focus of course explains much of their staunch opposition to vigorous Washington responses to such cut-and-dry protectionist Chinese practices as currency manipulation: Although this trade predation has damaged America’s domestic production base, these businesses’ China-based operations have been major beneficiaries.

Similarly, the strong interest of so many of these companies in continuing to coddle China’s mercantilism at the domestic economy’s expense explains the seeming paradox of their main policy message to President Trump: On the one hand, they “continue to have serious concerns regarding China’s trade policies and practices” and admit that their persistence endangers “U.S. global competitiveness, innovation, productivity, and cybersecurity.”

And on the other, they insist that American countermeasures be limited to steps – like “measured, commercially meaningful actions consistent with international obligations” and working “with like-minded partners to address common concerns with China’s trade and investment policies” – that have been tried for years, and that so far have produced nothing but failure.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why the Trump-ers (So Far) Aren’t Wrong About the Dollar

Tags

bubbles, consumption, currency, debt, dollar, exchange rates, finance, Financial Crisis, growth, inflation, investment, protectionism, Steve Mnuchin, Trade, Treasury Department, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The economics, finance, and business worlds are kind of up in arms over U.S. Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin’s suggestion earlier this week that a weaker U.S. dollar would be good for the American economy.

I say “kind of up in arms” because Mnuchin’s remarks were more nuanced than generally reported; because financial markets in particular seem to be on steroids and have barely reacted; and because he took pains afterwards to profess his confidence that, despite its recent falling value, nothing fundamental had changed to undermine the greenback’s historic appeal to investors. Indeed, just a little while ago, President Trump stated that he “ultimately” wants to see a strong dollar. 

I say “up in arms” to some extent because, the President’s newest words notwithstanding, no American Treasury Secretary has ever said anything remotely like this in public for decades; because Mnuchin’s original words looked suspiciously consistent with what the establishments in these interconnected economic worlds abhor as the Trump administration’s protectionist instincts on trade policy (because all else equal, a weak dollar promotes U.S. exports and curbs U.S. imports); and because dollar strength (and the big U.S. trade deficits it’s encouraged) has long been a cornerstone of the global economy, and a major growth engine for the numerous countries that rely on selling to Americans to promote their own output and employment. (Hence many of them fiddle around with their own currencies’ values to make sure they can sustain these strategies.) Many strong dollar proponents also claim that a weaker American currency could dangerously stoke inflation (especially by boosting import prices) and deter investment inflows into the United States.

But two crucial points are Missing in Action in the tumult sparked by Mnuchin’s remarks. One should be obvious but can’t be repeated often enough, especially in these current overwrought times: You can have too much and too little of a good thing. An overly weak dollar would cause major problems for the U.S. economy. So would an overly strong dollar. Therefore, the key is not to assume either extreme (especially in the absence of any evidence that they’re around the corner) but to figure out a dollar level that achieves the best combination of benefits.

The second has been much less much widely recognized even in calmer periods, but it’s closely related to my longstanding point about the importance of the quality of American growth. As I’ve written frequently, growth based largely on production and the growing incomes it generates place the economy on the soundest foundation. This approach may not always produce the fastest growth, but it fosters the growth that tends to last longest, and that’s least likely to inflate bubbles that then collapse into economic and financial crises).

Such disasters, as we should have learned, stem from growth largely based on borrowing and consuming – i.e., on shopping sprees that eventually can’t be paid for responsibly, and can only continue by racking up enormous debts. And other than legitimate (though clearly overblown nowadays) concerns about inflation, that’s a main reason why folks in finance – and everyone on their payroll in the U.S. government and the rest of Washington – like the strongest possible dollar. Until the merry-go-round stops, they make tons of money by lending to those borrowers.

Here’s where the dollar’s value comes in. A strong-ish greenback tends to result in that borrowing and consuming brand of growth. A weak-ish dollar tends to result in the healthier kind of growth. And as indicated by this chart showing the change in the dollar’s value (also called the exchange rate) against other currencies, only looked at over the shortest possible period could the dollar nowadays be called weak or even weakening. Over a much longer period, it’s obviously still well in “strong territory.” 

And it’s no coincidence, as I’ve also written, that although the U.S. economy seems to be making some slight progress toward creating healthier growth, it still has way too long a way to go – especially given that the current recovery from the crises and the painful recession that followed is now more than eight years old.

The lessons, then, look clear. If you only care about the fastest growth possible regardless of its makeup or the longer-term consequences, and/or if you think finance should be the dominant part of the American economy, you’ll join the chorus of critics scolding Mnuchin for even hinting that some further dollar decline wouldn’t be a disaster for the nation. If you’d like the economy to steer clear of near-meltdowns like the one experienced just about a decade ago, you’ll be applauding what still looks like a subtle call from him for a somewhat weaker dollar.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Establishment’s Case for Free Trade Keeps Weakening

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Center for Global Development, currency manipulation, Dani Rodrik, free trade, Joseph E. Gagnon, Lawrence Summers, non-tariff barriers, Paul Krugman, Peterson Institute for International Economics, protectionism, sovereignty, Trade, trade agreements, trade barriers, transparency, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although they’ve long enjoyed benefits ranging from lavish financial support to nearly uncritical mainstream media adulation, I felt a twinge of pity this morning for establishment backers of current trade and globalization policies.

As made clear from a new report from one of their leading think tanks and a recent speech from one of their leading individual lights, they’re doubling down on the claims that there’s nothing fundamentally wrong with the trade liberalization priorities long held by the U.S. government, and that the trade barriers supported by populists and other critics will only backfire on the American and global economies. And as also made clear by the report and speech, they keep fighting a losing intellectual battle.

The report comes from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, and addresses the question “Do Governments Drive Global Trade Imbalances?” As emphasized by author Joseph E. Gagnon, the stakes of finding the right answer are towering:

“At current levels, these imbalances will push the net debt of deficit countries gradually toward unprecedented and unsustainable levels….Moreover, the domestic political consequences of persistent trade deficits are already evident in both the United States and the United Kingdom, having contributed importantly to the election of Donald Trump and the outcome of the Brexit referendum….”

In other words, if global trade flows continue getting more lopsided, they could set the stage for a repeat of the kind of global financial crisis they helped foster during the previous decade. And failing to calm populist political waters in the west could tempt key trading powers even more strongly to dabble in economically disastrous protectionism.

So Gagnon makes the case for a feel-good story: These major trade powers, especially the United States,

“have the necessary tools to achieve their stated goal of narrowing current account imbalances. President Trump and some members of his administration have proposed using trade barriers to narrow the US current account (trade) deficit. The data show that trade barriers have very little effect on a country’s trade balance. Fiscal policy and net official flows are the policies that matter for trade balances.”

One problem right at the outset: There’s nothing in the study whatever that explicitly measures the impact of (conventional) trade barriers. But even accepting this unusual methodology, it’s surely significant that he does conclude that “foreign exchange intervention” – i.e., currency manipulation – has an “important” affect on trade balances. That sounds like a trade barrier to me, at least in many instances.

And although fiscal (and related spending) policies aren’t normally considered examples of trade policies, they’ve clearly been used by numerous countries, especially Germany and throughout East Asia, to keep savings rates high, and therefore consumption (and imports) low. Why does Gagnon leave these out?

It’s absolutely true that fiscal and budget policies reflect the choices made by national societies, and therefore economies, and that as such, the presumption should be that they’re entirely legitimate. But at the same time, the nature of such choices can reveal whether these priorities can produce reasonably balanced trade with an economy like America’s – whose priorities on these fronts are substantially different but presumably just as legitimate.

As a result, trade policies that emphasize expanding commerce with countries regardless of their domestic priorities ipso facto can’t help but boost the trade deficit of the freer spending and/or more economically open country. And that description fits decades worth of American trade policies to a tee.

Lawrence Summers, President Obama’s former top White House economic adviser (among many other major government jobs), last month advanced an argument that’s somewhat more sophisticated than Gagnon’s, but no more convincing or useful to policymakers. In a speech to the Center for Global Development, Summers made the standard nod to the “compelling and persuasive case for free trade” and to the follow on view that “erecting tariff or quota barriers to trade between countries is usually a bad idea.”

But then, Summers’ line of argument actually became interesting. He sought to draw a distinction between the (unassailable) idea of free trade on the one hand, and the focus of many recent trade agreements – which he claimed “may be good or they may be bad, but they are not self-evidently and clearly good in the way that free trade is clearly good.” These concerns centered around goals like “securing intellectual property protection for global companies in a wider range of countries” and “achieving access for service companies to a wider range of countries” and “harmonizing rules in areas like safety standards or financial reporting standards.”

Supporters of such measures, he contended, have too often been arrogating

“the prestige of free trade…in support of a rather different agenda of better, more harmonized commercial rules” and expressed support for the view that “the participants in the debate about what constitute better, more harmonized commercial rules are mostly the kinds of people who appear in Davos rather than the kinds of people who work in the companies that are run by the people who appear in Davos.”

It’s hardly new for trade advocates to note critically that recent trade deals have dealt largely with non-trade issues, and more disturbingly, issues that the theory’s originators couldn’t imagine. Many left-of-center opponents of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement nixed (at least for the United States) by President Trump made this very point, and Summers peers such as Dani Rodrik of Harvard University and Nobelist Paul Krugman have echoed these views as well.

But Summers’ indictment of this shift in the trade agenda seems unusually strong, so it’s a great opportunity to pose three major questions that these critiques keep avoiding. First, with standard trade barriers like tariffs whittled down to near-insignificance in most cases, and such non-tariff barriers (NTBs) becoming more popular, how can genuinely free trade be sustained without somehow grappling with the latter?

Second, since the United States maintains relatively few NTBs, since these barriers are easy to identify because they’re typically line items in a completely transparent federal budget, or regulations in other, equally transparent federal documents, and since the world’s NTB champs are known for opaque governing systems that generally hide their barriers effectively, how can the United States adequately safeguard its legitimate interests without threatening to put up or actually erecting its own barriers?

So without the possibility or reality of unilaterally closing off its own market in response, how can the United States avoid being disadvantaged by legalistic systems of harmonization that (understandably but unrealistically) depend on producing evidence for winning redress?

Third, and similarly, there’s no global consensus on what kinds of health and safety regulations are genuine and valid measures to protect the commonweal, and what kinds are designed primarily as trade barriers. Therefore, how – unless again through using the threat or reality of unilateral tariffs – can countries that play it straight (like the United States) adequately safeguard their interests versus the clandestine protectionists?

The only plausible answers to these questions are, “It can’t.” And the sooner globalization’s cheerleaders acknowledge these hard truths and the commonsense measures that logically flow from them, the sooner they’ll start winning back the trust of a public that’s rightly ignoring them.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Big New Hit to Free Trade Theory

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Adam Smith, Bruce R. Scott, comparative advantage, David Ricardo, economics, economists, factors of production, free trade, Great Britain, machinery, manufacturing, Portugal, protectionism, Ralph E. Gomory, Steve Keen, technology, textiles, The Wealth of Nations, Trade, William J. Baumol, wine, {What's Left of) Our Economy

OK, time for some good news – at least if you’d like the economics community to come up with more realistic views of trade policy and its impact on the national and global economy. As made clearest by a (sadly overlooked) journal article by Steve Keen of Kingston University in London, some noted academic economists have identified fatal-looking flaws in comparative advantage theory – the 18^th century concept that ever since has anchored mainstream scholarly thinking about the entire discipline, along with justifying the virtues of the freest possible trade flows.

As Keen writes, comparative advantage identified benefits flowing from economic specialization, and was first advanced by British economist Adam Smith in his seminal The Wealth of Nations to explain the superiority of laissez-faire, free market practices within industries. His compatriot David Ricardo extended the concept to relationships between industries and countries. The core idea in its trade theory version is that all countries and their peoples will reap maximum gains if they limit themselves to those tasks that represent their own best efforts – even if they’re laggards by international standards in that particular sector.

I first encountered a compelling objection to comparative advantage in the early 1990s, in the form of a sharp observation by Harvard Business School professor Bruce R. Scott. As he noted, Portugal, one of two countries in Ricardo’s classic description of comparative advantage’s virtues, basically hewed to the Ricardian prescription, specialized in turning out relatively simple products (in this case, wine) – and remained a poor country for centuries. The second country was Great Britain. It specialized in higher value goods (epitomized, in that era, by textiles), and became the world’s greatest and richest empire.

More fundamentally, Portugal specialized in activity that could generate good levels of growth in the short-term, but whose long-term wealth creation potential was limited by low levels of productivity growth, capital and technology intensiveness, by limited potential for innovation, and by deficiencies in other closely related indicators of dynamism. Great Britain specialized in activity whose positive spinoffs were bound to be far greater.

Other major Ricardo blind spots have been pointed out since then – for example, his skepticism that capital would ever easily move across borders. But his central insights have continued commanding pervasive respect among professional economists. Just as important, they’re still revered by political leaders and opinion molders who find these theories convenient for portraying their often self-interested trade policy preferences as indisputable truths, or who learned in a freshman economics class that they’re gospel.

Keen’s big addition to comparative advantage critiques has to do with unfettered free trade’s likely effect on an economy’s diversity and growth potential. As he notes, Ricardo’s case for liberalizing trade flows hinges on a completely unrealistic assumption about its impact on a national productive base, and hence on national output and incomes. The assumption: that countries will wind up better on net if they abandon those activities that don’t meet the comparative advantage test, and refocus their efforts on activities that can pass it, and that such a transition is feasible in the first place.

In other words, Portugal would scrap all of its textile factories (and presumably all its other industries as well), and become for all intents and purposes a mono-economy devoted to wine. Great Britain would abandon whatever wine-making and other non-textile work it was engaged in, and turn into a big cloth-making facility. What of the other necessities of national and individual life, at least those that are in theory trade-able? They would be imported – and paid for by the earnings from exports of the national champions.

Simply articulating this scenario reveals how completely fanciful it is. For example, what about supplying needs before the envisioned transitions are completed? How long will they last? And even over decades under a free trade regime, could the global economy possibly be expected to turn into the kind of exquisitely complex but perfectly functioning mechanism that could enable a large number of mono-economies from securing the full range of traded goods and services that are either needed or simply wanted?

Keen, however, identifies what he reasonably seems to view as a more fundamental problem: The sectors of the economy in which Ricardians want countries to specialize are relatively strong because they efficiently use various factors of production (chiefly, according to Keen, machinery). The Ricardian transition entails other parts of the economy switching to that strong sector (again, wine-making and textile-making in Portugal and Great Britain, respectively), and essentially becoming just as good as wine-making – largely because all the kinds of machinery used in that economy can easily, and indeed seamlessly be redeployed in the strong sector.

If this assumption was valid, as Keen observes, then it would be reasonable to suppose that each rejiggered national economy could produce even more output, and generate higher incomes for its population, than before. But as the author also observes, this outcome makes no sense because “machinery is specific to each industry, and the crucial machines in one industry cannot simply ‘move’ to another without loss of productivity.” And if you believe, as is the case with mainstream economics, that rising productivity is a key – and over the long run, the biggest key – to rising incomes, then you should recognize this Ricardian transition also as a recipe for worsening national impoverishment.

That is, in the kind of mono-economy Ricardo hoped would eventually comprise the global economy, most of the populace would be struggling with inappropriate capital stock and other assets to earn a living engaged in activity with which it boasted little, if any, experience.

Why did Ricardo overlook something so obvious? In Keen’s words, it’s an example of “a confusion of monetary capital (which Ricardo, as a stockbroker by trade, knew intimately) with the physical machinery in factories (about which he knew very little). Yes, monetary capital moves easily in search of a profit—today, even internationally. But machinery is specific to each industry….”

However, Keen continues, “The archetypal machines for cloth and wine manufacturing in Ricardo’s time included the spinning jenny and the wine press. It is stating the obvious that one cannot be turned into the other, but stating the obvious is necessary, because the easy conversion of one into the other was assumed by Ricardo, and has been assumed ever since by mainstream economic theory.”

Here’s another example of the same delusionality that will be familiar to everyone who’s followed the U.S. trade policy debate for the last few decades: the claim by supporters of current trade policies that trade-related production and job losses are no big deal because America’s real edge in the global economy going forward is, say, services. So the best response is to train all those displaced auto workers to become nurses (and, pace Keen, to use all that surplus auto production machinery to write software).

Just as interesting, Keen points to a small but growing body of research touting the advantages of industrial and other economic diversity – the opposite of Ricardo’s aim. A broad-based manufacturing and technology base has of course long been supported by critics of current trade policies for national security reasons (to ensure the ability to produce an adequate range of defense assets), and to avoid potentially dangerous dependence on foreign supplies of civilian goods as well.

Similarly, it’s been contended that too many linkages exist among manufacturing industries, and between manufacturing and many kinds of services, to assume that entire sectors can be lost without major collateral damage.

Keen’s piece, however, also spotlights evidence that the world’s least successful national economies tend to possess narrow – at best – productive bases and to generate a comparably narrow range of exports, and that the most successful turn out a wide variety of goods for both domestic and foreign markets.

Keen’s theoretical critique of Ricardo is by no means the only one that’s come from the ranks of economists themselves. In 2001, William J. Baumol (a former President of the American Economic Association no less) and Ralph E. Gomory, one of the nation’s leading technology authorities, produced this study purporting to show that explicitly promoting national industries and technologies via various forms of government intervention (including tariffs) can produce better results for individual countries that toeing the free trade line.

But the Baumol-Gomory case has (so far) failed to dent confidence in Ricardian trade theory notably. And certainly the Mainstream Media never displayed much interest. In that vein, of possible import is the appearance this week on Bloomberg.com of this follow-up of sorts to Keen-like analysis. More steps on a  journey of a thousand miles?