(What’s Left of) Our Economy: #PutinPriceHike? Not Even Close – Yet

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baseline effect, Biden administration, CCP Virus, coronvirus, COVID 19, energy, fossil fuels, gasoline, inflation, lockdowns, oil, Putin, sanctions, stay-at-home, Ukraine invasion, Ukraine-Russia war, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

According to the Biden administration, it’s the #PutinPriceHike. That is, don’t blame anything Washington has or hasn’t done for the the bulk of the high gasoline prices Americans have been paying lately. Instead, blame Russian dictator Vladimir Putin, his aggression against Ukraine, and the global oil market turmoil it’s triggered.

The trouble is, if you look at these prices in a comprehensive, statistically legitimate way, scapegoating Putin in this case isn’t justified yet. But the same methodology shows that Mr. Biden and his aides are off the hook, too – at least until recently.

Critics (see, e.g., here) have countered the Biden claims by noting that strong U.S. gasoline inflation predates the Ukraine war and even Russian military buildup by many months, and they’re right. As known by RealityChek readers, however, that’s far from the whole story. In particular, they’re ignoring the impact on gasoline and other prices of the ongoing aftermath of the CCP Virus pandemic, the brief but sharp recession created by the disease and related lockdowns and voluntary behavioral changes, and ongoing stop-start U.S. economy that’s still resulting.

In other words, they’re ignoring the “baseline effect” caused by the economic shocks of the 2020 pandemic year in particular. These drove economic activity down to such low levels, and kept it there so long, that any major return to normal (and therefore normal prices) is going to produce unusually lofty inflation stemming from a catch-up effect. Therefore, it won’t be possible to determine the role of other contributors to inflation in gasoline or any other goods and services until this baseline effect fades significantly and finally disappears. And therefore, scapegoating Biden for soaring gasoline prices pre-Ukraine buildup isn’t justified, either.

RealityChek reported yesterday that the latest official U.S. figures show that the baseline effect has ended for headline inflation, and looks on the way out for core inflation (which strips out food and energy price. And roughly the same is true for gasoline prices.

The table below shows their monthly year-on-year percentage changes for last year (2020-21) in the middle column and for pandemic-dominated 2019-2020 (in the righthand colum). The numbers begin in March because March, 2020 was the first month in which the virus began significantly affecting the economy.

Gasoline price annual percentage changes      2020-21             2019-20

March:                                                               22.58                 -10.05

April:                                                                 49.68                 -32.03

May:                                                                  56.51                 -33.67

June:                                                                  45.42                 -23.41

July:                                                                   41.93                -20.12

Aug.:                                                                  42.76                -16.67

Sept.:                                                                  41.93                -15.43

Oct.:                                                                   49.52                -18.15

As is evident, starting in March, 2020, gasoline prices began nosediving from their levels of 2019, and steep annual drops continued (though at a slower pace) through October. It’s easy to understand why. The combination of lockdowns and stay-at-home behavior caused automotive travel to crater, and national demand for gasoline naturally plummeted as well. Further, that’s clearly a big part of the reason why during the following March-October period, gasoline prices prices skyrocketed on the same annual basis. They were returning to normal from an artificially low base. And as a result, it’s wrong to blame the Biden administration exclusively or even mainly for this hot gasoline inflation.

From that point, however, the Blame Biden case gets stronger. The above table stops in October, 2021 because November was when the Putin military buildup began – and according to the Biden argument, gasoline prices really began taking off. What happened to annual gasoline prices increases from then until the end of  2021, and how strong was the baseline effect? Here are the numbers for November and December, with the 2020-21 annual increases in the middle column and the 2019-20 increases in the righthand column:

Gasoline price annual percentage changes      2020-21             2019-20

Nov.:                                                                  57.76                 -19.53

Dec.:                                                                  49.34                 -15.34

The strong 2020-21 yearly price increases continued for these two months. But the baseline effect (from the big 2019-20 price drops) weakened. In fact, the December, 2019-20 annual 15.34 percent annual gasoline price decline was the smallest such figure since March, 2019-20’s 10.05 percent. And the annual increase for the following March (22.58 percent) was less than half December’s 49.34 percent.

What about this January and February? For these months, of course, the comparison years are 2021-22 (whose increases are presented in the middle column) and 2020-21 (in the right hand column).

Gasoline price annual percentage changes      2020-21             2019-20

Jan.:                                                                   40.02                  -8.90

Feb.:                                                                   38.01                   5.42

So the story for the first two months of this year – between the start of Putin’s buildup and the (late February) invasion – is that annual increases slowed, but the baseline effect vanished much faster. Indeed, between February, 2020 and February, 2021, gasoline prices actually rose. So the administration’s #PutinPriceHike claims hold much less water.

Blaming Putin will become more credible going forward, as sales of Russian oil worldwide are curbed by sanctions. Since the global oil market is so thoroughly integrated, U.S. oil supplies will be crimped and upward price pressures will strengthen. But this is also the point at which other major administration policies will rightly attract attention for their role in spurring torrid gasoline inflation. They include in particular measures and rhetoric that throughout the President’s term have convinced oil and other fossil fuel providers that their industries’ growth will keep facing ever greater policy obstacles, and whose cumulative effect has undercut their ability to ramp up output quickly to fill the Russia gap.(See, e.g., here and here.)

All of which means that, as is the almost always the case with major economic trends and developments, recent gasoline price inflation has many causes, not one. And they can change profoundly in their nature and respective importance with the kinds of changing circumstances that have shaken the global oil and U.S. energy policy landscapes since the CCP Virus pandemic began. Let’s all hope, therefore, that American leaders across the political spectrum begin spending more time developing effective responses to oil price inflation, and less on bombarding each other and the rest of us with facile talking points.

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Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Pointless Polls on Ukraine

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Associated Press, Biden, Gallup, National Opinion Research Center, NATO, North Atlantic treaty Organization, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, polls, public opinion, Putin, Russia, Ukraine, YouGovAmerica

Here are two of the weirdest polling releases I’ve seen in a long time.  And both concern the Russian invasion of Ukraine – not exactly a trivial issue.

The first is a Gallup survey from yesterday with findings on American views on the Ukraine conflict that (unwittingly, it seems) leaves the subject more mysterious than ever.

Gallup reports that, just before Russia invaded Ukraine, “52% of Americans [saw] the conflict between Russia and Ukraine as a critical threat to U.S. vital interests. That’s a change from 2015, after Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula, when less than half of U.S. adults, 44%, thought it posed that serious a threat.”

Keep in mind that “vital” literally means needed to ensure the physical survival, or at least the independence of the country. And even if respondents didn’t have that particular definition in mind, surely they equated the term with first-order importance. In either case, you’d think logically that at least a sizable portion of those viewing the Ukraine conflict as a “vital threat” would support a U.S. military response.

But in this survey, Gallup never even posed the question. And its additional queries created even more confusion. Chiefly, a big plurality (47 percent) favored keeping the U.S. commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) “where it is now” – even though the challenges facing the alliance obviously have grown dramatically.

Another 18 percent did favor an increase to the commitment. But the same share of respondents wanted it decreased. And 13 percent supported “withdrawing entirely.” “Go figure” seems to be what Gallup is suggesting.

The second bizarro poll was conducted by the Associated Press and the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago. Between February 18 and February 21 (the day Russian leader Vladimir Putin ordered troops to enter eastern Ukraine), these pollsters asked American adults whether they thought the United States should play a “major,” “minor,” or “no role” in the situation between Russia and Ukraine.” What on earth does that mean?

For the record, 26 percent backed a major role, 52 percent a minor role, and twenty percent no role. That sure sounds like strong opposition to a step as dramatic and fraught with peril as joining a conflict with a nuclear-armed superpower. But these results say absolutely nothing about what kind of role should or shouldn’t be played, which matters a lot because the range is so wide among sending troops, expressing rhetorical support, and all the options in between. And why ignore the troops question in the first place?

Not that all pollsters have sidestepped the issue. The YouGovAmerica firm conducted a survey for The Economist of U.S. adult citizens earlier this month – between February 5 and 8. It found that by a 55 percent to 13 percent, respondents considered it a “bad idea” versus a “good idea” to “send soldiers to Ukraine to fight Russian soldiers.” Fully a third weren’t sure.

But even this survey wasn’t devoid of weirdness. Chiefly, YouGov asked about the option of “Sending soldiers to Ukraine to provide help, but not to fight Russian soldiers.” Granted, the actual Ukraine war was still a hypothetical at that point. But what gave the pollsters the idea that this option was remotely realistic? Or prudent, given the tendency of large-scale fighting to become larger scale fighting, and embroil nearby regions and populations. (The public was split almost exactly into thirds among the “good idea,” “bad idea” and “not sure” alternatives.)

Politicians are fond of bragging that they don’t make policy based on polls. At least when it comes to the war and peace decisions presented by the Ukraine conflict, these surveys make clear that’s something to be grateful for.

Making News: Back on National Radio Talking China, Russia, and the Economy

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Biden, Biden administration, China, energy, Germany, Making News, Market Wrap with Moe Ansari, NATO, natural gas, North Atlantic treaty Organization, Putin, Russia, sanctions, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Ukraine

I’m pleased to announce that tomorrow night I’m scheduled to be back on the nationally syndicated “ “Market Wrap with Moe Ansari” radio program to discuss awhole grab bag of economic and foreign policy topics, ranging from U.S.-China relations to what, if anything, Washington should do to keep Russia from pushing deeper militarily in Ukraine.

“Market Wrap” is broadcast nightly between 8 and 9 PM EST, the guest segments typically come in the second half-hour, and you can tune in by visiting Moe’s website and clicking on the “Listen Live” link on the right-hand side.

As usual, moreover, if you can’t tune in, the podcast will be posted as soon as it’s on-line.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Biden’s Foreign Policy Pillar is Looking Hollow at Best

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alliances, allies, Beijing Olympics, Biden, China, Emmanuel Macron, European Union, France, Fumio Kishida, Germany, Japan, multilateralism, NATO, Nordstream 2, North Atlantic treaty Organization, Olympic boycott, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Putin, Russia, sanctions, Southeast Asia, Taiwan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Winter Olympics

What’s worse than “terrible”? It’s an important question because if that’s a term that accurately describes President Biden’s last week or so in office, then something even stronger is clearly needed for the setbacks suffered recently by multilateralism – the foundation of his foreign policy. And most troublingly, the idea that U.S. foreign policy success requires the cooperation of major allies has been failing most conspicuously when it comes to dealing with America’s two biggest global rivals – Russia and China.

Let’s deal with Russia first, but not because I view it as the biggest threat to the United States – or even much of a threat at all. In fact, I’ve long and repeatedly written that the fate of Ukraine has no importance for America’s national security, and that Washington should accept some form of the kind of spheres of influence-type deal in Eastern Europe that Russian leader Vladimir Putin has proposed.

But the Ukraine crisis is making the most headlines right now, the subject dominated his long press conference last Wednesday, and Mr. Biden is nowhere near taking my advice. Indeed, that presser added powerfully to the evidence that the United States and its allies are deeply divided over how to respond to actual and possible Russian moves against Ukraine.

As the President made clear, “[I]t’s very important that we keep everyone in NATO on the same page.  And that’s what I’m spending a lot of time doing.  And there are differences.  There are differences in NATO as to what countries are willing to do depending on what happens — the degree to which they’re able to go.”

Indeed, that very day, France’s President Emmanuel Macron proposed that the European Union seek separate from U.S. efforts a new security agreement with Russia. Macron did state that “It is good that Europeans and the United States coordinate” but added “it is necessary that Europeans conduct their own dialogue, We must put together a joint proposal, a joint vision, a new security and stability order for Europe.”

Since Europe is a lot closer to Russia and Ukraine that the United States, and will be much more dramatically affected by events in that region, this French position seems entirely legitimate to me. At the same time, it’s tough to believe that Macron would place such importance on a Europe-only effort if he was completely happy with what he knows of American diplomacy so far.

Germany’s views seem even farther from Washington’s. Its new government has not only refused to join some other European countries (notably, the United Kingdom) in supplying defensive weapons to Ukraine. It’s blocked at least one NATO country – Estonia – from sending its own Made in Germany arms to bolster Kiev’s military.

Moreover, trade-dependent Germany, whose trade with Russia in energy and other goods is substantial, doesn’t even seem very keen on deterring or punishing Moscow for invading Ukraine with the kinds of sanctions that are widely viewed as the strongest – cutting Russia off from the global network used by almost all the world’s financial institutions to send money across borders for all the reasons that money is sent across borders. At least Berlin is sounding more open to halting final approval of the Nordstream 2 natural gas pipeline if Ukraine is invaded.    

Asian countries seem more prepared to resist aggression from China, especially the military kind (as opposed to Beijing’s economic efforts at intimidation). Since this post last September reporting on steps they’ve taken to transition from U.S. protectorates to countries more closely resembling genuine allies, some have made even more encouraging moves.

For example, Indonesia reportedly “is preparing itself militarily” to deal with Chinese moves against islands located in its territorial waters and major straits through which much of its (and the world’s commercial shipping) travels. The Philippines – another Southeast Asian country embroiled in maritimes disputes with China, has just bought cruise missiles from India, and reportedly some of its neighbors are interested in these devices, too.

At the same time, despite a virtual summit between President Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Japan’s policy on using its forces to help any U.S. attempt to defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack remains ambivalent at best. South Korea looks more hesistant still.

Nor is Japan backing the United States to the hilt on sanctioning Russia economically following a Ukraine attack, or even close. After the Biden-Kishida session, an anonymous U.S. official said (in a briefing posted on the White House website) that although the Japanese leader “made it clear his country would be ‘fully behind’” Washington on the issue, his response concerning economic responses Tokyo would support was “We did not get into the specifics about possible steps that would be taken in the event that we see these [potential Russian] actions transpire.”

The refusal of so many U.S. allies and others to join the Biden administration’s diplomatic boycott versus the upcoming Winter Olympics in Beijing also casts major doubts on the President’s emphasis on multilateralism. Can any countries declining even to keep their officials alone out of China for the games (as opposed to their athletes) be counted on to push back more concretely and powerfully against future provocations from China?

Athletes and sports fans know well the expression “Change a losing game.”  For all you others, it means that if a strategy or approach is failing, switch to an alternative.  But for the future of American foreign policy, the most important part of it remains unspoken, and the one that the President needs most urgently to heed:  “Change it before you’ve lost.”   

 

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Biden’s Real Afghanistan Mistake

Tags

Afghanistan, Biden, border security, Democrats, Donald Trump, jihadism, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Putin, Russia, September 11, Tajikistan, Taliban, terrorism

Isn’t President Biden supposed to be a foreign policy whiz? If so, why has he just stuck the United States with the worst of all possible worlds with his announcement Wednesday that all American military forces would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by September 11?

Mr. Biden’s big mistake isn’t promising to pull all the troops out by a date certain. It’s definitely a mistake, for all the (obvious) reasons noted by critics. Specifically, it tells the fanatic Taliban insurgents that if they just wait a few more months, the only obstacle they’d have left to taking over the country (and gaining the capacity to give the world’s jihadists all the kinds of advantages they enjoyed from the support of a sympathetic sovereign state, a la before the first September 11) will be the current, clearly ineffective Afghan government and its military. (America’s allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO – have stated that they’re withdrawing their troops, too.)

But as I’ve written previously (see, e.g., here), the reestablishment of a national terrorist base in Afghanistan need not expose the United States to devastating terrorist attacks once again. The reason? Because “fighting ’em there so we don’t face ’em here” has always been sounder in theory than in reality. After all, “fighting ’em there” means chasing extremist groups around the Middle East for as long as that completely dysfunctional region keeps producing them – i.e., a very long time. 

At the same time, I’ve continued, there’s always been a way to prevent “facing ’em here” – by more effectively securing America’s borders, so that they can’t get “here” to begin with.

And here’s where we come to the President’s biggest mistake: Not only is he pulling the troops out of Afghanistan without improving border security. He’s pulling them out while substantially weakening border security with his raft of Open Borders-friendly immigration policies. So jihadists soon will both be free to resume organizing and training in Afghanistan and face a much easier challenge slipping back into the United States.

What he should be doing instead (and Donald Trump didn’t emphasize this crucial combination, either) is what I’ve been recommending for years: Pursuing the goal of keeping the Taliban off balance by keeping small contingents of U.S. and allied special forces units in Afghanistan to conduct harassment and disruption operations while putting into place the tough measures needed to make America’s borders truly secure. Once the latter have been completed, the American soldiers could safely leave. This strategy is much more promising than any tried to date because not only is controlling the Middle East intrinsically difficult – at best – but controlling America’s own borders is clearly far easier.

Interestingly, Mr. Biden himself clearly recognizes that the U.S. military’s Afghanistan mission hasn’t been accomplished completely enough to justify a complete withdrawal. That’s why he promised to “reorganize our counterterrorism capabilities and the substantial assets in the region to prevent reemergence of terrorists — of the threat to our homeland from over the horizon.” and to “hold the Taliban accountable for its commitment not to allow any terrorists to threaten the United States or its allies from Afghan soil.”

What’s missing so far, though, is any explanation of how he’ll “refine” America’s strategy “to monitor and disrupt significant terrorist threats” that could emanate from that country. The monitoring part arguably could work, given the remote surveillance capabilities of the U.S. military and intelligence community. But the disruption part? Without U.S. troops on the ground? Good luck with that, along with holding the Taliban accountable in any meaningful way. For the nearby bases that would be needed to host the American force that the President presumably believes would be on call to do the disrupting etc – at least in a timely way – simply aren’t available.

(Actually, there’s one intriguing possibility: Tajikistan, which borders the eastern Afghanistan region where jihadists have been strongest. But as the afore-linked Politico article notes, it’s “heavily dependent on Russia economically,” and Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s cooperation would be needed. Since its own ill-fated Afghanistan war decades ago, it’s been obvious that Moscow is also strongly opposed to any increase in Islamic extremists’ presence near its own southern borders. But the President and the rest of his party seem to equate any cooperation with Russia with – alleged – Trump-style collusion, so that option seems to be out unless his party’s Never Putin-ers relent.)

As the Politico piece observes, Mr. Biden is putting all of America’s Afghanistan chips on what national security types call an “offshore counterterror approach” – and has long advocated this strategy since his vice presidential days. What’s supremely ironic is that the best offshore counterterror approach by far has always entailed focusing tightly on the entirely feasible task of securing America’s own borders – and that the President has been bent on achieving exactly the opposite.

Im-Politic: Biden’s Fake History on Fighting Russia’s Political Interference in Europe

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Alliance for Securing Democracy, Biden, Bill Kristol, Eastern Europe, election 2016, election interference, Europe, German Marshall Fund, Im-Politic, John Podesta, NATO, North Atlantic treaty Organization, Obama, Putin, Russia, Trump, vital interests, Western Europe

Maybe Joe Biden’s main problem isn’t simply that he’s “gaffe-prone” – at least not nowadays, as he again seeks the Democratic nomination for President. Maybe the former Vice President’s main problem is that he’s suffering major memory loss – and I mean major memory loss. Either that, or his recollection of how the Obama administration in which he served responded to Russian political subversion in Europe reveals a truth-telling problem comparable to the one widely believed displayed by President Trump.

How else can the following recent Biden statement be explained, in a CNN interview in which he charged that Mr. Trump’s reelection would wind up destroying the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – America’s most important post-World War II security alliance:

“Why did we set up NATO…? So no one nation could abuse the power in the region in Europe, would suck us in the way they did in World War I and World War II. It’s being crushed.

“Look at what’s happened with [Russian President Vladimir] Putin. While he — while Putin is trying to undo our elections, he is undoing elections in — in Europe. Look what’s happened in Hungary. Look what’s happened in Poland. Look what’s happened in — look what’s happening. You think that would have happened on my watch or Barack [Obama]’s watch? You can’t answer that, but I promise you it wouldn’t have, and it didn’t.”

Leave aside for now the massively inconvenient truth that the Obama-Biden watch was exactly when Putin most recently tried to “undo” (bizarro phrasing, I know) a U.S. election. Leave aside also the incoherence of the claim that “You can’t answer that, but I promise you it wouldn’t have, and it didn’t.”

Because even if Biden is only referring to Russian interference with politics in Europe, his statement ignores literally dozens of such instances and campaigns during his White House years. Abundant evidence comes from the Alliance for Securing Democracy – a research organization housed in the German Marshall Fund – a quintessentially globalist, Washington, D.C.-based think tank. For good measure, the Alliance’s “Advisory Council” contains not only the usual crew of bipartisan Washington foreign policy Blob hangers-on from previous globalist administrations, but virulent Trump-haters like long-time neoconservative stalwart Bill Kristol, as well as John Podesta, who chaired Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton’s unsuccessful presidential run in 2016. So clearly, this source has no interest in putting out anything that will make Mr. Trump look good relative to political rivals.

The Alliance maintains a handy-dandy interactive search engine called the “Authoritarian Interference Tracker,” which makes it easy to identify political subversion efforts by a wide range of countries in a wide range of countries. And here’s just a small sample of what comes up when the controls are set for the Obama years:

>2008 – present: “In 2008, the Institute of Democracy and Cooperation, a pro-Russia think tank headed by former Duma deputy Natlaya Norchnitskaya, opened in Paris. According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ‘the organization toes a blatantly pro-Kremlin line.’ The Institute’s Director of Studies…told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that its financing comes from ‘the Foundation for Historical Outlook in Moscow, which in turn is financed by unspecified private Russian companies.’”

>2008-2017: “According to the [British newspaper] The Guardian, between 2008 and 2017, Rossotrudnichnestvo, a Russian government-organized non-governmental organization (GONGO) worked with state-sponsored media outlet TASS and Russian intelligence agencies as part of a nearly decade-long influence effort that sought to distance Macedonia from the EU [European Union] and N NATO and to prevent the success of the Macedonian name change referendum.”

>2009-2011: “According to the Czech Security Information Service’s (BIS) annual reports for 2009 and 2010, Russian intelligence services were actively involved in programs to build closer relations with the Russian expatriate community in the Czech Republic as a way to expand influence in the country. These programs specifically targeted academic and intellectual elites as well as students, according to BIS.”

>2010-2014: “According to Reuters, between 2010 and 2014, the Russian government offered Ukrainian oligarch Dmytro Firtash lucrative business deals in exchange for Firtash’s political support in Ukraine. Firtash and his companies received large loans and lucrative gas contracts from Russian state-owned energy giant Gazprom at significantly discounted prices. Firtash’s companies would then sell gas to the Ukrainian government at a high price and pocket the difference. Firtash used his domestic political influence in Ukraine to support Russian government-backed presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych’s successful 2010 campaign for the presidency. According to Reuters, the Russian government instructed Firtash to ensure Ukraine’s position in Russia’s sphere of influence.”

Here are some abbreviated descriptions of other such incidents:

>2010-2011: “Funds from Russian money-laundering scheme funneled to Latvian political party.”

>2010: “Russian government-connected oligarch Vladimir Yakunin finances pro-Russian Estonian political party.”

>2010-2014: “Emails expose Greek political party Syriza’s ties to Russian-connected actors.”

>2013: “Russian money-laundering ring cycles money through Polish, pro-Russia think tank.”

>2013: Bulgaria’s “Pro-Russian Ataka party reportedly receives funding from the Russian embassy.”

>2013: “Russian government-connected oligarch Vladimir Yakunin launches foundation in Geneva [Switzerland]. The foundation allegedly “is part of a network of organizations promoting an authoritarian and Eurasianist model of thought to counter the current liberal-democratic world order.”

>2014: A “new Russian Orthodox Church in Skopje [Macedonia] raised concerns among Macedonian officials that ‘Russia may be trying to use the Orthodox Church to its Russian interests in Macedonia,’ according to” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

>2014-present: “Emails reveal Russian government-connected oligarch funded network of pro-Russia fringe political groups in Eastern Europe.”

>2014: “French far-right party National Rally, formerly Front National…receives loan from bank ‘with links to the Kremlin.’”

>2015: “Russian government activist founds pro-Russia political party” in Poland.

>2016-17: “Czech intelligence service reports on Russian covert political influence campaign in annual report.”

My point here certainly isn’t to sound the alarm about all this Russian political activity, especially in Eastern Europe – which, as I’ve written repeatedly (see, e.g., here), has long been part of Russia’s sphere of influence, has never been defined as a vital U.S. interest, and where America’s options for responding effectively are limited at best. Nor is my point to vouch for the accuracy of every single one of the above claims, or others like it in the database. And I certainly don’t believe that the above information represents any evidence that Russian interference put Mr. Trump over the top in 2016.

Instead, the point is to show that, despite Biden’s boasts, the kind of Russian activities about which he’s alarmed plainly took place during the Obama years in spades (and have been reported by many Mainstream Media sources, as the database makes clear), they occurred in both Eastern and in (more important to the United States) Western Europe, and that Washington’s responses evidently did little to stop or even curb them.

Indeed, the record shows that, at least when it comes to Biden’s record of fighting the Russian subversion in Europe that he considers a mortal threat to America, by his own standards, he deserves the Trump-ian label of “Sleepy Joe.” As in asleep at the switch.

Im-Politic: A Neglected Russia Disinformation Objective?

Tags

2016 election, Barack Obama, Central Intelligence Agency, China, CIA, CNN, collusion, cybersecurity, Director of National Intelligence, disinformation, fake news, Im-Politic, intelligence community, James R. Clapper, John O. Brennan, Matthew Rosenberg, MSNBC, NBC, North Korea, Putin, Russia, The New York Times, Trump

Well then. Two passages in a New York Times article from this morning’s print edition were sure conversation-stoppers when it comes to the ongoing uproar about charges that President Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign colluded with Russia to boost his election odds and ensure soft treatment from his administration. That is, if you read far enough into the long piece to encounter them. In fact, they’re so important that they should have been the main angle – or at the very least, the main theme of front-page stories from now until we ever find out what’s really happened.

The passages (which make the same critical point):

First, according to Times reporter Matthew Rosenberg, by some point last September (at the latest), American intelligence officials were worried that Russia had developed an “operation to create discord inside the American government.”

Second, and more specifically, the intelligence agencies viewed one key part of this operation as feeding information suggesting that Vladimir Putin’s regime could blackmail the President (and/or the candidate) to “United States intelligence agencies and pit them against Mr. Trump.”

And here, in Rosenberg’s words, is the context:

“American intelligence agencies believe that Russia’s spy services see the deep political divisions in the United States as a fresh opportunity to inflame partisan tensions. Russian hackers are targeting American voting databases ahead of the midterm election this year, they said, and using bot armies to promote partisan causes on social media. The Russians are also particularly eager to cast doubt on the federal and congressional investigations into the Russian meddling, American intelligence officials said.

“Part of that effort, the officials said, appears to be trying to spread information that hews closely to unsubstantiated reports about Mr. Trump’s dealings in Russia, including [a] purported video [depicting him in compromising sexual situations], whose existence Mr. Trump has repeatedly dismissed.”

In plainer English, if Rosenberg has it right, the Russians have not only been trying to put Mr. Trump over a barrel and make sure that he defeated his main rival, Democrat Hillary Clinton. They have not only been trying to shake Americans’ confidence in their democratic institutions by hacking into them and unleashing a flood of fake news onto its media platforms, social and conventional. They have not only been trying to cover their tracks by using such fake news and other tactics to discredit the Congressional investigations into election meddling and related reported outrages.

They have also – separately – been trying to whip up antagonism between the President and the intelligence community. Achieving this goal of course would both tend to hamper America’s own intelligence operations and broader foreign and national security policies, as well as undermine the nation’s political system and its underlying social and cultural unity. And the tumult engulfing the capital and the nation as a whole suggests that the Russians are succeeding with this disinformation campaign, and that the intelligence agencies are playing their hoped for role.

Not that this possibility lets Mr. Trump and his aides totally, or mainly, or partly off the hook when it comes to their Russia ties either before or after his election.  For this objective could well have been sought on top of an effort to turn Mr. Trump into a Manchurian Candidate and President, not instead of it. But it does raise the question of how many of the allegations have stemmed from simple, and completely fictitious, plants.

Something else noteworthy about this article: If it’s accurate, then the potentially disastrous loss of America’s cyber-weapons to Russia and perhaps other adversaries that keyed Rosenberg’s piece was just the latest disclosed possibly catastrophic intelligence failures that occurred during Barack Obama’s presidency, and on the watches of the former intelligence agency chiefs, like his Director of National Intelligence (the complex’s top job) James R. Clapper, and one of his Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John O. Brennan – both of whom have been particularly sharp Trump critics.

Two others? China’s penetration of the CIA’s operations in the People’s Republic, which reportedly resulted in the assassination or capture of “more than a dozen sources” (according to press accounts, the breach began in 2010, under Brennan’s predecessor, former General David Petraeus) and the failure to anticipate the speed of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development (which can be laid directly at Clapper’s feet, and which Brennan apparently missed as well).

Clapper, incidentally, is now a “national security analyst” for CNN. Brennan has just joined NBC and MSNBC in the same capacity. Good luck to you if you think there’s any chance these networks’ weekend talk shows tomorrow will raise any of this, including the Rosenberg article, with them?

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Sense and Nonsense on Russia’s Hacking

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2016 election, Amy Klochubar, China, cyber-security, cyber-war, defense spending, Democrats, hacking, Hillary Clinton, intelligence, John McCain, Middle East, NATO, Obama, Office of Personnel Management, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Putin, Republicans, Russia, sanctions, terrorism, Trump

What could be more predictable? The growing uproar over charges that Russia’s government waged a cyber-focused disinformation campaign to influence the last U.S. presidential election has let loose a flood of positively inane statements and arguments on both sides that show politics at its absolute worst.

Even worse, unless both Democrats and Republicans – and the various conflicting camps within the two major parties – get their act together quickly, the odds of further attacks and all the damage they can cause to American governance will only keep shooting up.

Let’s start with those who have expressed skepticism about these allegations, including regarding the substance of yesterday’s intelligence community report concluding that “President Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election. Russia’s goals were to undermine confidence in the democratic process, denigrate [former] Secretary [of State Hillary] Clinton [the Democratic nominee], and harm her electability and potential presidency.”

Can they really be serious in contending that the intelligence agencies’ publicly expressed judgments don’t pass the credibility test because no smoking gun or any other compelling evidence has been published? Do they really want the CIA etc to reveal whatever human and technical sources and methods they rely on? Do they really believe that any effective counter-hacking strategy can be developed or continued after disclosing that information?

The insistence on definitive proof, moreover, amounts to terrible advice for making foreign and national security policy generally. It seeks to apply to the jungle realm of international affairs the standards of the American legal system. President Obama’s years in office should have taught Americans how dangerously childish it is to believe that relations among sovereign countries are governed by commonly agreed on rules and norms, that the world is on the verge of this beatific state of affairs, or even that significant progress is being made. And Americans should hold shadowy world of spying and counter-spying to a simon-pure standard?

A more defensible rationale for doubting the intelligence community’s work emphasizes its past major blunders. And from what’s been made public, they have indeed been all too common and all too troubling.  (Please keep in mind, though, that successes often cannot be made public.)

Nevertheless, if a president or president-elect has no faith in a high confidence judgment of this importance from his intelligence agencies, then it’s clearly time to clean house. If the next administration does indeed decisively reject the community’s work on this matter, it will have no legitimate choice but to replace it leaders.

Back to the genuinely ditzy positions: statements that the Russian hacking failed to influence the course of the election. I personally believe this, and shame on those partisans who keep insisting that this interference prevented former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton from winning the White House or that it delegitimizes to any extent Donald Trump’s victory.

But should the United States count on Moscow – or any other actor – continuing to fail? Should it wait to respond forcefully until a U.S. adversary succeeds? Shouldn’t Washington capitalize on its adversaries’ current evident shortcomings in this regard and focus on punishment and deterrence? Simply posing these questions should make clear how obvious the answers are.

A final major objection to hammering the Russians represents another more reasonable judgment call, but it’s still fatally flawed. It’s the argument that Washington needs to softpedal the hack attack because the United States has a vital interest in improving relations with Moscow.

As I’ve written, opportunities for better ties with Russia abound, and they should be pursued. But that’s no reason to let Moscow off lightly for its cyber-aggression. In the first place, in any mutually beneficial relationship, boundaries need to be drawn. This is especially true given how much stronger and wealthier than Russia the United States is. If an effort to subvert America’s democratic processes doesn’t qualify, count on further, even worse provocations by Moscow.

Just as important, this approach overlooks a crucial reality: Clear indications that Russia has an incentive to cooperate with the United States in fighting Islamic extremism and terrorism haven’t appeared because Moscow is in a charitable, or even helpful, mood. They’ve appeared because these are vital interests as well for Russia, which both borders the dysfunctional Middle East and rules over its own Muslim populations.

In other words, Moscow has plenty of incentive to play ball with Washington on the Middle East whether the United States retaliates sharply for the hacking or not. And if the Russians don’t understand that, then there’s little hope of any form of meaningful cooperation.

Yet the actual and potential inconsistencies and hypocrisies of those urging tough retaliatory measures are equally troubling. Some are exclusive to Democrats. For example, the sanctions imposed on Moscow by the Obama administration for the hacking seem pretty modest for actions that it claims “demonstrated a significant escalation” of Russia’s “longstanding” efforts “to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order.”

And at the same time, the outrage voiced at Moscow contrasts conspicuously with reactions to China’s successful attack on the federal Office of Personnel Management, in which the records of some 22 million U.S. government employees – including classified and confidential information – were compromised. Indeed, President Obama never publicly blamed China’s government nor announced any responses.

Most important, however, is the question of whether Russia hardliners in both major parties old and new will act on the logical implications of their views of Russian actions and intentions – including on Moscow’s efforts to expand its influence along its own European borders. If for instance the hacking, as per Arizona Republican Senator John McCain, is truly an “act of war,” then will the call go out to cut off economic and diplomatic relations with Moscow?

If Russia’s moves against Crimea or Ukraine or the Baltics mean, in the words of Minnesota liberal Democratic Senator Amy Klochubar, that “Our commitment to NATO is more important than ever,” will today’s hawks – especially the noveau liberal variety – call for more U.S. defense spending and bigger American military deployments in endangered countries? And will they demand that American treaty allies in Europe finally get serious collectively about contributing to the common defense – which is first and foremost their own defense?

The answers to these questions will speak volumes to the American people as to whether their government is truly determined to defend interests declared to be major against foreign threats. And you can be sure they’ll convey the same vital information to America’s foreign friends and foes, too.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The Russia – and Broader – Reset That’s Urgently Needed

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China, Cold War, Europe, interest-based thinking, national interests, NATO, NATO expansion, nuclear war, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Putin, Russia, Soviet Union, spheres of influence, third world, threat-based thinking, Vietnam

Even though American policy could take a significantly different turn after Donald Trump becomes president, it’s all too likely that U.S.-Russia relations will continue heating up to worrisome temperatures for the foreseeable future. And although much American rhetoric on the subject has veered into hysteria, there’s no shortage of real-world obstacles to any new White House hopes for a cool-off – mainly Moscow’s undeniable determination to expand its influence along in Europe, where it now directly borders the U.S.-led NATO alliance. There’s also abundant (though not yet conclusive) evidence that Russia’s government tried to interfere with the 2016 American presidential election.

Russian president Vladimir Putin is by no means solely to blame for rising bilateral tensions. As I’ve written previously, much and possibly most of the problem stems from the American decision – supported by presidents and Congresses of both parties – to expand NATO right up to Russia’s doorstep after the end of the Cold War. And facing up to this wholly unnecessary, gratuitous effort to capitalize on Russia’s post-1990 weakness looks to me like the key to a genuinely successful reset of bilateral ties.

But ultimately, just as important for the United States as dealing with this urgent short-term problem is learning a lesson about how to think about its national interests that sadly was missed after the decades-long superpower struggle ended. The lesson: The key to foreign policy success is basing actions on identifying overseas interests of intrinsic, material importance, rather than on assumptions about actual or potential adversaries.

During the Cold War, American foreign policymakers across the board used both sets of criteria as lodestars – and created big, unnecessary trouble for the nation as a result. Washington reasonably treated the security of, for example, Western Europe and Japan as vital interests of the United States – because these regions were reasonably judged to be centers of critical economic and therefore military capability and potential. Losing them to Soviet influence could indeed have tilted the balance of global power against the United States in genuinely damaging ways. Moreover, an equally reasonable determination was made that Western Europe and Japan could be defended at acceptable cost and risk to America.

Tragically, however, this form of “interest-based” thinking was not applied to much of the developing world. In these regions of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, major defense commitments were taken on even though the countries in question were typically of little or no intrinsic interest to the United States – in terms of their actual or (realistically potential) wealth or military power, their raw materials, or even their location.

Instead, Washington based policy on the type of threat it concluded was posed by these countries, by ascendant forces within them, or by Soviet or Chinese designs on them or activity within their borders. Therefore, as I’ve written, Americans consumed themselves with debates over subjects like:

>whether rival superpowers’ activity in these areas was fundamentally offensive in nature or defensive;

>whether the relationships between these rival superpowers and local forces were simply alliances of convenience that meant little in the long run and could be easily broken up with appropriate U.S. overtures, or whether they were strongly ideological ties with real staying power; and similarly

>whether the local forces themselves should be seen simply as Soviet of Chinese pawns (and therefore needed to be fought on some level), or whether they were fundamentally nationalistic and on “the right side of history” (and therefore needed to be accepted and cooperated with).

These are all fascinating questions, and the resulting debate made fascinating reading – at least from an academicky or purely rhetorical standpoint. But they were dangerously off-base as fundamental determinants of American policy. The main reason: They all presented supposed answers to questions that are virtually unknowable – unless we imagine that certain foreign policy-makers and analysts are mind-readers or have highly reliable crystal balls. Disaster in Vietnam – a war never consistently, or even often, justified for intrinsically important reasons – reveals the price America can pay for indulging in these fantasies.

Defining specific, concrete U.S. interests is no science, either. But answers here are relatively knowable. Sure, subjectivity can’t be avoided. But Americans depend on our government to make judgments like this all the time. If the nation has decided otherwise, then it’s hard to make the case for any government at all.

How should this argument affect how Americans think about the new Russia challenges in Europe? Principally, they should stop focusing on whether Putin is a new version of the Soviet leaders who many thought aimed at worldwide dominion, or simply a nationalist feeling besieged by the West and seeking greater security along Russia’s frontiers. And they should start focusing on the intrinsic importance of the countries that Putin seems to be threatening.

In other words, how has Washington viewed Ukraine or Georgia or Moldova? What about new NATO members such as Poland or Hungary or the Baltic countries? Have they ever been placed in the category of vital interests, either from a national security or economic standpoint? Have U.S. leaders ever been willing to risk war on their behalf, even when the United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly or overwhelming superiority? If the answers here are “No” (Spoiler alert: It is.), then has anything about these countries and their concrete and even perceived value changed since the end of the Cold War? In fact, has anything about them economically or strategically changed other than new NATO membership in some cases?

In my view, history makes obvious that the answer to those latter questions is “No” as well. Further, nothing has happened either in these parts of Europe, or in the American or Russian militaries, that has made them more easily defended by the West with conventional weapons alone than during the Cold War.

So it’s easy to see how more threat-based thinking can too easily lead Washington into a corner in which its only choice to defend all of its new treaty allies from some new form of Russian hegemony is to threaten nuclear war more loudly; and how interest-based thinking can lead to the alternative of offering to recognize how geography inevitably (however sadly) relegates these countries to a Russian sphere of influence, and seeking the best possible arrangement for them. And it’s even easier to see which alternative, however imperfect, is vastly superior.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Why Robert Gates is a Flawed National Security Guru

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2016 election, Bill Clinton, border security, China, Crimea, debt, Donald Trump, export controls, George W. Bush, Hillary Clinton, Iran-Contra, Middle East, NATO, NATO expansion, Obama, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Putin, Robert M. Gates, Ronald Reagan, Russia, terrorism, The Wall Street Journal, TPP, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Ukraine

The Wall Street Journal op-ed staff’s decision to publish Robert M. Gates’ article last Friday on how he sizes up the two major presidential candidates’ qualifications for the Oval Office makes sense only by the degraded and often mindless standards of the American political, policy, and media establishments.

Sure, as the tag line ostentatiously noted, “Mr. Gates served eight presidents over 50 years, most recently as secretary of defense under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama.” As a result, I’m certainly interested to know his views – and especially that, although Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton has a deeply flawed record, Republican Donald Trump is “beyond repair.” You should be, too. But should anyone regard Gates as the last word? I’m not convinced – nor should you be.

For starters, one of the presidents Gates served was Ronald Reagan – as a big player in that administration’s reckless and downright looney scheme (the so-called Iran-Contra affair) to evade Congress’ ban on supplying anti-communist Nicaraguan rebels with profits made secretly by selling arms to Iran’s terrorism-sponsoring, hostage-taking ayatollahs. Gates also seems to regard George W. Bush’s disastrous foreign policy presidency as standing within the bounds of acceptability. Hello?

At least as unimpressive, though, is Gates’ judgment regarding current foreign policy issues. Here are three examples. First, the former Bush and Obama Secretary of Defense warned that:

“Every aspect of our relationship with China is becoming more challenging. In addition to Chinese cyberspying and theft of intellectual property, many American businesses in China are encountering an increasingly hostile environment. China’s nationalist determination unilaterally to assert sovereignty over disputed waters and islands in the East and South China Seas is steadily increasing the risk of military confrontation.

“Most worrying, given their historic bad blood, escalation of a confrontation between China and Japan could be very dangerous. As a treaty partner of Japan, we would be obligated to help Tokyo. China intends to challenge the U.S. for regional dominance in East Asia over the long term, but the new president could quickly face a Chinese military challenge over disputed islands and freedom of navigation.”

True indeed. But then he upbraids both Trump and Clinton for opposing President Obama’s Pacific rim trade agreement, a position that he argues (despite presenting no evidence) “would hand China an easy political and economic win.” Indeed, Gates dredges up the know-nothing specter of China responding to Trump-ian tariffs with a trade war against America that it could well win because of all the U.S. debt it holds and because it’s “the largest market for many U.S. companies.”

Apparently he’s unaware that China’s debt holdings are a small fraction of the outstanding U.S. total, that the PRC remains much more important to American multinational firms as an offshore production platform than a final customer (which explains why the United States runs a huge trade deficit with Beijing), and that without adequate access to the American market, China’s export-focused economy and political stability would face mortal danger.

Worse, as chief of Mr. Obama’s Pentagon, Gates pioneered a relaxation of American export controls that greatly expanded China’s access to America’s best commercially produced defense-related knowhow. Talk about feeding the beast!

Gates’ critique of the Clinton, and especially Trump, Russia stances should inspire no more confidence. According to this supposed national security guru, “neither Mrs. Clinton nor Mr. Trump has expressed any views on how they would deal with Mr. Putin (although Mr. Trump’s expressions of admiration for the man and his authoritarian regime are naive and irresponsible).”

As Gates notes, under Putin, “Russia [is] now routinely challenging the U.S. and its allies. How to count the ways. There was the armed seizure of Ukraine’s Crimea; Moscow’s military support of the separatist movement in eastern Ukraine; overt and covert intimidation of the Baltic states; the dispatch of fighter and bomber aircraft to avert the defeat of Syria’s Assad; sales of sophisticated weaponry to Iran.

“There is Russia’s luring the U.S. secretary of state into believing that a cease-fire in Syria is just around the corner—if only the U.S. would do more, or less, depending on the issue; the cyberattacks on the U.S., including possible attempts to influence the U.S. presidential election; and covert efforts to aggravate division and weakness with the European Union and inside European countries. And there is the dangerously close buzzing of U.S. Navy ships in the Baltic Sea and close encounters with U.S. military aircraft in international airspace.”

But actually it’s Gates who’s leaving the biggest questions unanswered. Does he now view the targets of Putin’s aggression as vital U.S. interests that merit a defense guarantee that could expose the United States itself to nuclear attack? When exactly did Crimea and Ukraine, which are so close to Russia that they cannot possibly be defended by Western conventional forces, attain this status? Why were American presidents going back to 1945 wrong to take exactly this position (including all of those he served)?

Indeed, what’s changed since Gates himself recognized this reality, and warned former President George W. Bush that the NATO expansion pushed by him and his predecessor, Bill Clinton, would needlessly provoke the kind of Russian push-back now underway? And if Gates hasn’t reversed himself on Russia, why is he so scornful of Trump’s evident interest in cutting a deal with Putin?

Gates is non-partisan, but no better, when it comes to the Middle East. He accuses the two candidates or failing to define “what the broader U.S. strategy should be toward a Middle East in flames….” But his critique of Trump is especially off base. According to Gates, the Republican candidate has “suggested we should walk away from the region and hope for the best. This is a dangerous approach oblivious to the reality that what happens in the Middle East doesn’t stay in the Middle East.”

But he misses the essence of Trump’s position, which is defending America from threats emanating from the region at America’s borders – which are relatively controllable – versus in that terminally dysfunctional, faraway region – which is completely uncontrollable. Gates can legitimately disagree with this approach (which I have repeatedly endorsed), but he can’t legitimately claim that it doesn’t exist.

Gates’ critique extends to several other current flashpoints, but what’s especially revealing to me is how this supposed diplomatic sage completely mis-identifies the biggest foreign policy question facing America’s leaders and the public. It’s not, per his formulation “how [the next president] thinks about the military, the use of military force, the criteria they would apply before sending that force into battle, or broader questions of peace and war.”

As I’ve been writing since the mid-1980s, that kind of thinking puts the cart before the horse. (Here’s a good summary of my first lengthy article on the subject, which unfortunately is not available in full on-line.) America’s main foreign policy challenge is figuring out its principal overseas interests, and basing its decisions on using force on the importance of those goals. Otherwise, debates on going to war and other uses of military power will be conducted in a strategic vacuum – which already too often has been the case.

Given Gates’ wealth of experience, it’s fine for The Wall Street Journal – or any other news organization – to grant him a prominent forum from time to time. How much better it would be, however, for editors and reporters and pundits to ask him, and themselves, if he’s ever displayed any learning curve.