(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is Growth’s Quality Again Turning for the Worse?

Tags

bubbles, Financial Crisis, GDP, Great Recession, gross domestic product, housing, inflation-adjusted growth, Obama, personal consumption, real GDP, real growth, toxic combination, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

“The consumer will save us,” or some variation thereof, has become a rallying cry for those believing that the U.S. economy will avoid recession, at least for the foreseeable future. For RealityChek regulars, however, it’s a red flag, possibly revealing that too many economy watchers have forgotten, or never learned, the most important lesson of the global financial crisis of the previous decade and the Great Recession it triggered: The quality of American growth matters at least as much as the quantity – and more specifically, economic expansion that’s too heavily reliant on consuming rather than producing is too likely to end in tears.

That’s why last week’s latest official report on America’s economic growth has me somewhat worried. It’s true, as I reported, that it contained some good news on the trade front, showing a continuing Trump administration trend of decent growth rates no longer tightly linked with huge, soaring trade deficits. But the figures (the second look of three looks at the second quarter’s performance – at least for the time being) also confirm major backsliding when it comes to the domestic determinants of healthy and unhealthy growth – a big surge in the role of consumption and housing combined as growth engines. That’s exactly the toxic combination that inflated the last decade’s historic bubble. And it could become a reversal of a positive Trump-period trend.

According to those official data, consumption and housing in the second quarter fueled 150 percent of that period’s 2.02 percent annualized inflation-adjusted growth – the most closely followed measure of change in gross domestic product (GDP – economists’ term for the economy as a whole). A figure greater than 100 percent, by the way, is possible because other components of GDP can subtract from growth – and in the second quarter, obviously did..

That 150 percent figure is the biggest by far since the third and fourth quarters of 2015. The only saving grace for that figure is that back in 2015, much stronger performance in personal consumption and housing was producing only roughly comparable overall growth.

The second quarter numbers are somewhat better on a standstill basis, but point in the wrong direction as well. From March through June this year, the toxic combination represented 72.67 percent of the economy in constant dollar terms. That’s the highest level since the fourth quarter of 2017 (72.87 percent). Moreover, back then, the economy was growing a good deal faster (at a 3.50 versus a 2.02 percent annual rate).

None of this means that the U.S. economy is now firmly on an unhealthy growth track. In fact, the worrisome second quarter “growth contribution” figures followed an especially good first quarter. From January through March, personal consumption and housing together produced only 23.87 percent of that stretch’s solid 3.01 percent annualized real growth – the lowest such figure since the fourth quarter of 2011 (16.38 percent of 4.64 percent annualized growth).

On a standstill basis, the last time that the toxic combination represented a lower share of the total economy in real terms was the fourth quarter of 2015 (72.15 percent). And during that period, there was almost (0.13 percent) real annualized economic growth.

Further, the Trump healthy growth record so far is better than the record during President Obama’s two terms in office. During the latter’s administrations, the toxic combination generated 80.74 percent of its $2.2537 trillion in after-inflation growth. Under President Trump, personal consumption plus housing has been responsible for 72.64 percent of $1.002 trillion of such growth. (Both calculations begin the these two administrations in the second quarter of their first year in office, since Inauguration Day doesn’t take place until January 20.)

Real growth, moreover, has been somewhat faster so far. Over 32 quarters, the U.S. economy grew by 18.44 percent after inflation under Obama. Over nine Trump quarters, the economy has become 5.56 percent larger – which translates into 19.80 percent growth over a 32-quarter stretch. All in all, that’s a pretty good reflection on this President’s performance.

Economically, though, the big question is whether it will continue. And politically, it’s whether it will suffice, in tandem with any other perceived strengths, to bring a second Trump term.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Healthier U.S. Growth is Continuing, at Least Trade-Wise

Tags

exports, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, Obama, real GDP, real growth, real trade deficit, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Since we’re clearly well into the 2020 presidential campaign, comparisons understandably have begun to be made by political and even economic types between President Trump’s economic record and that of his White House predecessor, Barack Obama.

In that vein, today’s new official U.S. figures on economic growth contain some good news for Mr. Trump, his supporters – and in fact for Americans collectively:  Even though they confirm that the nation’s growth this year is indeed slowing, and the trade deficit targeted for reduction by the President is going up, the latest numbers on the gross domestic product (GDP) also show that inflation-adjusted growth (the growth figure most closely followed) during the Trump years is still less closely associated with trade deficit increases than under Obama. In other words, by one important measure, the economy’s expansion is healthier – more of it is being generated by producing goods and services at home, instead of consuming imported goods and services.

The new numbers – which are the first of two sets of revisions for the second quarter of the year that will be released this year – don’t indicate progress at first glance. The real trade deficit, originally reported at $978.7 billion on an annualized basis, is now judged to have been $982.5 billion. That’s just a bit less than the record $983 billion figure that was hit in the fourth quarter of last year.

Moreover, total exports were revised down ($2.5205 trillion annualized to $2.5165 trillion annualized). Total imports were less than first reported as well, but only by a hair – $3.4990 trillion rather than $3.4992 trillion. And worse, quarter-to-quarter after-inflation total exports are now off by 1.48 percent, and after-inflation total imports are up 0.02 percent. Indeed, that real export fall-off was the biggest quarterly decrease since the depths of the last recession – when they cratered by 8.08 percent in the first quarter of 2009.

But despite this seeming backsliding, the Trump record has been much more impressive when examined in the context of economic growth. This conclusion emerges by examining how fast the economy has increased in constant dollar terms versus how fast the trade deficit has widened under the two administrations. Here are the calendar year annual rates of change for each, followed by the ratio between the two:

Obama years

                        real GDP       real trade deficit      deficit growth to GDP growth

09-10:          2.56 percent       16.73 percent                        6.54:1

10-11:          1.55 percent         0.39 percent                        0.25:1

11-12:          2.25 percent        -0.09 percent                      -0.04:1

12-13:          1.84 percent        -6.30 percent                      -3.42:1

13-14:         2.53 percent          8.33 percent                        3.29:1

14-15:         2.91 percent        25.02 percent                        8.60:1

15-16:         1.69 percent          8.61 percent                        5:09:1

Trump years

16-17:        2.37 percent          8.43 percent                        3.56:1

17-18:        2.93 percent          8.37 percent                        2.86:1

These tables show that only once during the Obama years (2013-14) did the economy grow at Trump-like rates while keeping real trade deficit growth within modest Trump-like ranges.  And although the that real trade deficit did shrink in absolute terms in two of the Obama years (2011-12 and 2012-13), economic growth during those two years were subpar. 

Moreover, the 2017-18 Trump results were distorted by major tariff front-running – the rush by importers to get their goods into the United States before announced tariffs raised their prices.

In addition, although 2019 isn’t yet finished, the Trump ratios so far look relatively good as well – especially for the first quarter.

                           real GDP     real trade deficit      deficit growth to GDP growth

4Q18-1Q19:    3.06 percent    -3.97 percent                        -1.30:1

1Q19-2Q19:    2.02 percent     4.07 percent                          2.01:1

The Trump record looks better still when presented on a rolling four quarters basis. This time the frame of reference will be a little different. We’ll focus on the high growth Obama period through the end of that administration, and compare it with the high growth Trump period through the present.

Obama years

                          real GDP        real trade deficit      deficit growth to GDP growth

1Q14-1Q15:   3.98 percent       26.68 percent                       6.70:1

2Q14-2Q15:   3.35 percent       21.34 percent                       6.37:1

3Q14-3Q15    2.44 percent       30.60 percent                     12.54:1

4Q14-4Q15:   1.90 percent       21.83 percent                     11.49:1

1Q15-1Q16:   1.62 percent       11.72 percent                       7.23:1

2Q15-2Q16:   1.34 percent         9.59 percent                      7.16:1

3Q15-3Q16:   1.56 percent         2.42 percent                      1.55:1

4Q15-4Q16:   2.03 percent       10.87 percent                      5.35:1

1Q16-1Q17:   2.10 percent         6.92 percent                      3.30:1

Trump years

4Q16-4Q17:   2.80 percent         5.90 percent                      2.11:1

1Q17-1Q18:   2.86 percent         6.34 percent                      2.22:1

2Q17-2Q18:   3.20 percent         0.06 percent                      0.19:1

3Q17-3Q18:   3.13 percent       15.44 percent                      4.93:1

4Q17-4Q18    2.52 percent       11.22 percent                      4.45:1

1Q18-1Q19:   2.65 percent         6.76 percent                     2.55:1

2Q18-2Q19:   2.28 percent       15.52 percent                     6.81:1

Again, under the Trump administration, the economy has managed to expand healthily in real terms while keeping the trade deficit’s increase under control much more often than under the Obama administration. Although the third and fourth quarter figures look like they undermine this case, in fact, they clearly demonstrate the impact of tariff front-running.  The only genuine fly in the Trump ointment so far: that final set of figures, when the price-adjusted trade deficit rose 6.81 times faster than the economy grew in those terms, while the rate of overall growth declined. And unfortunately, when it comes to analyzing these trends going forward, because of Mr. Trump’s new tariff announcements, front-running is likely to continue for the time being.

Even with this tariff front-running – and especially if the front-running doesn’t throw off the figures excessively – an economy growing faster relative to its trade deficit isn’t the sexiest economic achievement to brag about. But is it completely unreasonable to think that a supposed master-brander and pitchman like President Trump can’t rise to the challenge?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Signs of Life in U.S. Manufacturing Output – Including in Tariff-Affected Industries

Tags

aluminum, China, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, real growth, steel, tariffs, Trade, tradewar, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning’s Federal Reserve industrial production report provided further evidence that domestic U.S. manufacturing is moving past a spring rough patch. Rebounding also – output in many of the metals-using industries supposedly being decimated by President Trump’s tariffs on aluminum and steel.

As usual, though, because reliable data is so difficult to come by, the impact of U.S. duties on imports from China is much harder to gauge. But certainly there’s no reason to believe claims that industries using tariff-ed Chinese inputs are experiencing anything close to the damage widely reported.

Not that U.S.-based manufacturing is out of the woods. Its real output in June did improve on a monthly basis by 0.43 percent – its best such performance since December’s 0.64 percent gain. But domestic industry remains in a technical recession, with inflation-adjusted production down 0.36 percent since August – a stretch longer than the two straight quarters of cumulative decline that qualify as a downturn for most economists.

The table below presents the output data for the major metals-using sectors for the period since April, 2018 – the first full month in which the steel and aluminum tariffs were in place. As usual, the numbers for manufacturing overall are used as a control group.

                                             April thru April      April thru May      April thru June

overall manufacturing:          -0.14 percent        +0.11 percent         +0.54 percent

durables manufacturing:       +0.60 percent        +0.68 percent         +0.98 percent

fabricated metals products:   +1.93 percent        +1.14 percent         +1.09 percent

machinery:                             -1.28 percent        +0.91 percent          +0.12 percent

automotive:                            -3.94 percent         -1.75 percent          +1.05 percent

major appliances:                   -8.89 percent         -1.64 percent           -5.99 percent

aircraft and parts:                  +3.25 percent        +1.17 percent           +2.37 percent

These figures make clear that better constant-dollar output has been achieved during the last two months for manufacturing as a whole, for durable goods manufacturing (the super-category that contains most of the main metals-using sectors) and for three of the five leading specific metals-users. Especially interesting are the comeback being staged by major appliances (which face both metals tariffs and separate levies on large household clothes washers and dryers that began in February, 2018), and the deterioration apparent in aerospace (which arguably is being undercut by the safety problems experienced by Boeing).

Nonetheless, applause should be muted. For earlier in the post-metals tariffs periods, these metals users were clear production out-performers.

Statistics related to the China tariffs (whose first full month in effect was last August, 2018) continues to be plagued by great variations concerning the tariff-ed goods’ role as inputs for a wide range of domestic U.S. industries, uncertainties stemming from the differing classification systems used in the U.S. Trade Representative’s official tariff list and by the Federal Reserve in classifying manufacturing industries, and both the shorter duration of the levies and the increase in coverage since the first tranche was announced.

Keeping these enormous caveats in mind, here are results for a handful of sectors reasonably certain to have faced tariff pressure since last August. Each column measuring real output changes since last August.

                                                Aug thru April       Aug thru May      Aug thru May

overall manufacturing:            -1.03 percent         -0.79 percent        -0.36 percent

ball bearings:                           -1.77 percent         -2.62 percent        -2.89 percent

industrial heating equip:          -8.00 percent         -4.13 percent        -9.04 percent

farm machinery & equip:      -10.27 percent         -7.51 percent        -6.44 percent

oil/gas drilling platform pts:  +2.41 percent         +3.93 percent       +2.13 percent

On the one hand, these numbers provide the tariff opponents with some ammunition for claiming harmful effects from the levies, but not much. Two of the four specific sectors have lost momentum compared with the rest of manufacturing (ball bearings and industrial heating equipment), one has gained (farm machinery and equipment), and once has displayed a slight momentum loss – but also major monthly variation.

On the other hand, given that widespread (though highly uneven) use of Chinese inputs, the recent bounce-back in overall manufacturing production indicates that, if the China duties have been holding industry back – because of increased uncertainty or whatever other reasons have been offered – the impact has been both minimal and offset by other sources of strength. If true, that’s hardly a trivial consideration in judging the wisdom of and prospects for the Trump China trade war – since with each new batch of its own data, China is finding it more difficult to make that claim about its own economy.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Fed Manufacturing Figures Nudge Tariffmageddon a Bit Further Away

Tags

aluminum, China, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted growth, manufacturing, metals, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, real growth, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s industrial production figures from the Federal Reserve showed not only that U.S. domestic manufacturing regained some strength in May following a string of poor monthly results. They also provided more evidence that President Trump’s tariffs have had little, if any, effect on the performance of either the metals-using industries impacted by levies on steel and aluminum imports, or of sectors supposedly affected by China-related duties.

Two more points come through pretty loud and clear from the new figures on domestic industry’s inflation-adjusted growth. First, the weakness displayed in April by manufacturing as a whole and by metals-using sectors could well have been confined to that month. Second, the safety problems revealed in the Boeing Company’s aircraft have begun to influence the picture and may distort the readings for several more months.

The overall readings for manufacturing were mildly encouraging, with the 0.22 percent sequential rise in real output representing domestic industry’s best reading since December’s 0.64 percent improvement. Revisions were ever so slightly positive.

Most of the leading metals-using industries – where the role played by tariffs is relatively easy to identify – fared better in May than in April, too, as the following table shows. The columns show the changes in after-inflation output for these sectors starting with April, 2018 (the first full month the metals levies went into effect) and each of the last three data months of this year. And as usual, the numbers for manufacturing overall are used as a control group.

                                             April thru March   April thru April   April thru May

overall manufacturing:          +0.45 percent        -0.07 percent      +0.89 percent

durables manufacturing:       +1.34 percent       +0.68 percent      +0.98 percent

fabricated metals products:   +2.76 percent      +1.88 percent       +1.73 percent

machinery:                            +2.31 percent       -0.12 percent       +0.11 percent

automotive:                            -3.10 percent       -3.86 percent        -1.55 percent

major appliances:                   -5.27 percent       -8.24 percent        -3.27 percent

aircraft and parts:                  +5.75 percent      +3.34 percent       +1.15 percent

durable mfg ex-automotive: +2.10 percent       +1.48 percent       +1.41 percent

In general, it’s clear that the metals-using industries are still losing growth momentum versus the rest of manufacturing. But do the duties deserve all or even much of the blame? If so, then why did so many of these sectors turn in better growth numbers in May than in April – especially automotive and major appliances? The latter’s relative comeback is especially striking, given that it’s been experiencing not only metals tariffs, but separate levies on large household laundry equipment and a weakness in U.S. housing. Ditto for automotive, where output has been highly volatile for many months.

The Boeing effect is apparent, too, from the falling output numbers since March, when safety problems started generating grounding decisions and airspace national airspace bans for its widely used 737 Max models. Further, both automotive and aerospace are major users of machinery and fabricated metals products.

The impact of the tariffs on products from China remains much more of a puzzle, and for the same reasons that have been apparent since their onset, in August, 2018. They have covered thousands of products, most of which so far have been intermediate goods, and their role as these kinds of inputs for manufacturing industries varies dramatically from final product to final product. In addition, Washington uses different manufacturing classification systems for designating the tariff-ed products and for measuring manufacturing production. The levies have been in place for a shorter period of time than the metals duties. And their scope has widened since the first batch went into effect in August, along with many rates having changed.

Nonetheless, here are some figures for the handful of industries for which I’m sure the numbers create a reasonably accurate picture, with each column measuring real output changes since last August.

                                        August thru March   August thru April   August thru May

overall manufacturing:       -0.45 percent           -0.96 percent         -0.75 percent

ball bearings:                     +0.22 percent          +0.11 percent        +0.01 percent

industrial heating equip:     -0.83 percent          -5.41 percent          -4.70 percent

farm machinery & equip: -11.65 percent         -10.27 percent         -7.51 percent

oil/gas drilling platform    +4.08 percent          +2.58 percent         +4.59 percent

   parts

Unfortunately, no consistent trend emerges. Two of the sectors’ improved between March and May (farm machinery and equipment, and oil and gas drilling platform parts), and two worsened (ball bearings and industrial heating equipment).

And although as long as the China tariffs continue , the future will provide results over a more statistically significant time frame, because the footprint of Chinese inputs in most of U.S. Manufacturing sectors will continue to be so broad and deep, their costs are likely to remain just as hard to discern.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The New GDP Report Confirmed the Good News Trump Trade Story

Tags

GDP, gross domestic product, inflation-adjusted growth, real GDP, real growth, real trade deficit, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The U.S. government’s second look at the gross domestic product (GDP) for the first quarter of the year, which came out yesterday, didn’t significantly change the message sent by last month’s initial read on the economic impact of President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies so far – and that’s good news for anyone who’s not afflicted with Trump Derangement Syndrome. (Actually, if extreme Never Trump-ers’ well-being is tied to the American economy’s, it’s good news for them, too, in real life.)

This newest look provides yet more evidence that Mr. Trump’s long overdue overhaul of the nation’s approach to trade – no doubt coupled with other measures like regulatory reform and possibly the tax cuts – is enabling the economy to grow in a healthy, sustainable way. Specifically, the economy’s overall inflation-adjusted growth (the measure that attracts the most attention) has not only been strong. It’s become stronger than the growth of America’s still oversized, debt-producing trade deficits.

The quarter-to-quarter results show this trend emphatically. According to the second GDP read, the economy grew at a price-adjusted annual rate of 3.03 percent in the first quarter of this year. That’s down only slightly from the 3.13 percent real growth previously reported, and considerably faster than the 2.15 percent results for the fourth quarter of last year.

But during that first quarter, the after-inflation overall trade deficit dropped by 5.45 percent. That’s a bit less than the 5.90 percent sequential drop found in the last month’s GDP report (because the trade shortfall was revised slightly higher), but still considerable given the rapid overall expansion. And it’s a major turnaround from the 0.63 constant dollar trade deficit increase between the third and fourth quarters of last year.

All the same, one quarter does not a trend make. That’s why it’s crucial to note that developments over longer time-frames also support optimism about the Trump trade policies’ results. And as previously shown, the most revealing comparison is between the last high growth period recorded by the economy during President Obama’s administration, and the current Trump surge.

Despite the marginal reduction in the first quarter’s real growth figure, it still leaves after-inflation expansion over the last four data quarters at 3.18 percent. That’s the fastest such growth since the 3.37 percent recorded between the second quarter of 2014 and the second quarter of 2015.

But during that Obama-era growth spurt, the real U.S. trade deficit increased by 21.55 percent. During the current Trump high growth period, this trade gap is up only 0.13 percent so far.

Some other trade-related highlights of the new read on first quarter GDP:

>In absolute terms, the inflation-adjusted overall trade deficit for the first quarter was revised up from $899.3 billion to $903.6 billion. That’s the lowest level since the second quarter, 2018’s $841.0 billion.

>Consequently, the real trade deficit as a share of price-adjusted GDP stood at 4.78 percent, not the 4.76 percent reported in the advance GDP release. That’s still the lowest such number since the second quarter of 2018’s 4.54 percent.

>Trade’s contribution to economic growth in the first quarter remained at its best level in years. In the advance read, the sequential shrinkage of the constant-dollar trade deficit fueled 1.03 percentage points of 3.13 percent annualized growth. As of the new GDP report, these figures stood at 0.96 percentage points of 2.03 percent growth.

In other words, the trade deficit’s improvement accounted for 31.64 percent of the first quarter’s real growth. That’s down from the 32.91 percent figure from the initial read on first quarter GDP, but still the highest such figure since 38.56 percent of the fourth quarter of 2013 (when a reduction in the inflation-adjusted trade deficit fueled 1.23 percentage points of its 3.19 percent annualized growth.

>Because total goods and services exports were revised slightly higher (from $2.5765 trillion annualized to $2.5836 trillion), they remained at record levels.

>Real goods exports exports were estimated to be slightly higher, too – $1.8028 trillion annualized instead of $1.7598 trillion. But that’s still only the second best total on record (after the $1.8092 trillion in the second quarter of 2018).

>After-inflation services exports were also upgraded slightly – from $783.2 billion annualized to $783.6 billion. That still represents their fifth straight quarterly record.

>First quarter constant dollar total imports are still estimated to have fallen sequentially in the first quarter, but only to $3.4871 trillion annualized, not to $3.4758 trillion. That upward revision still left them as representing the third highest level on record.

>The same story unfolded for after-inflation goods imports. Their quarterly drop left them at $2.9229 trillion annualized, not $2.9131 trillion – also a third all-time highest level.

>Real services imports, however, came in higher than the $562.2 billion at annual rates previously reported. The new $563.8 billion total represented a new record.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Evidence that U.S. Growth is Healthier Under Trump

Tags

Barack Obama, GDP, Great Recession, gross domestic product, housing, inflation-adjusted growth, personal consumption, real GDP, real growth, recovery, toxic combination, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The current U.S. economic recovery has lasted so long (at more than ten years old, it’s already tied with the 1990s expansion as the longest on record), that anxiety about how long it might last, and when a new recession might begin, is entirely understandable. Yet what most economy watchers keep missing is what RealityChek regulars have understood for years – the quality of America’s growth matters at least as much as the quantity.

As a result, the latest government report shedding light on this growth – the preliminary look at the gross domestic product (GDP) for the first quarter of this year – was important not only for revealing that the economy expanded at a healthy 3.21 percent at an annual rate. It was also important for showing that by several crucial measures, the growth recipe was by far the healthiest since at least the period during which United States enjoyed its last period of robust expansion – back in 2014 and 2015.

The definition of healthy growth used by RealityChek is growth that depends relatively little on increases in personal consumption and housing investment. Those segments of the GDP and their bloat were most responsible for inflating the previous decades’ bubbles that burst so disastrously in 2007 and 2008, nearly blew up the entire global economy, and triggered the worst national economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Fortunately, the GDP data compiled by the Commerce Department make it easy to calculate how their current growth contribution compares with their past record. And, as with the latest trade figures, they show that progress towards improving growth’s health has been dramatic so far during President Trump’s administration.

In particular, during that previous high growth period (under President Obama), the economy’s quarterly expansion ranged from 2.60 percent at an annual rate to 3.81 percent after inflation. But the growth contributions made by personal consumption and housing (which I’ve called a “toxic combination”) generally ranged from 62.86 percent to 79.70 percent (with one outlier quarter – the fourth of 2014 – coming in at nearly 187 percent, meaning that other elements of the GDP worked to shrink the economy).

During the high growth period under President Trump, which began in the first quarter of 2018, inflation-adjusted quarterly GDP has actually risen by a somewhat slower pace: between 2.58 percent annualized and that 3.21 percent rate of the first quarter of this year. But the contributions made by the toxic combination have ranged only from ten percent to 67.27 percent. And the figure for that high-growth first quarter of this year was only 22.19 percent.

Also worth noting are the growth rates during the Obama years when the role of the toxic combination was within that Trump range. They were somewhat lower.

Principally, in the second and third quarters of 2014, the toxic combination’s combined real growth contribution was 65.69 percent and 62.86 percent, respectively. Annualized constant dollar growth during those quarters was 2.60 percent and 3.04 percent. Those are solid results, but not quite as good as those from the second, third, and fourth quarters of 2018. Then, the toxic combination’s growth contribution ranged between 60 percent and 67.27 percent, and growth ranged from 2.87 percent to three percent.

As indicated above, these results can be pretty volatile from quarter to quarter. But smoothing them out by using annual figures tells a story even more favorable to the Trump record. Here are those annual figures starting with 2009-10, the first recovery year.

From left to right, the columns represent the personal consumption contribution to after-inflation growth measured in percentage points (e.g., the very first figures shows 0.99 percentage points of 1.80 percent growth), the housing contribution, the total percent – not percentage points – of growth they fueled, and the growth rate for the year in question.

09-10:          1.20/2.60       -0.08/2.60         1.12/2.60         46.92%         2.56%

10-11:          1.29/1.60        0.00/1.60         1.29/1.60         80.63%         1.55%

11-12:          1.03/2.20        0.31/2.20         1.34/2.20         60.91%         2.25%

12-13:          0.99/1.80        0.34/1.80         1.33/1.80         73.89%         1.84%

13-14:          1.97/2.50        0.12/1.80         2.09/1.80       116.11%         2.45%

14-15:          2.50/2.90        0.33/2.90         2.83/2.90         97.59%        2.88%

15-16:          1.85/1.60        0.23/1.60         2.08/1.60      130.00%         1.57%

16-17:          1.73/2.20        0.13/2.20         1.86/2.20        84.55%         2.22%

17-18           1.80/2.90      -0.01/2.90         1.79/2.90        61.72%          2.86%

From left to right, the columns represent the personal consumption contribution to after-inflation growth measured in percentage points (e.g., the very first figures shows 0.99 percentage points of 1.80 percent growth), the housing contribution, the total percent – not percentage points – of growth they fueled, and the growth rate for the year in question.

As with the quarterly figures, during the Obama years, when the growth contribution of the toxic combination was low, so was growth.  During the two full Trump data years, as growth itself sped up, the toxic combination’s contribution has plummeted to multi-year (at least) lows.

But a big question remains unanswered: When, under the Obama administration, the economy did manage to grow satisfactorily with a relatively small contribution by the toxic combination, this health growth recipe didn’t last. Indeed, by the third quarter of 2015, growth itself began slowing markedly, until it bottomed at 1.30 annualized in the second quarter of 2016. And it never broke two percent again. But the toxic combination’s contributions during that decelerating growth period ranged from 91.05 percent to a stunning 430 percent (in the fourth quarter of 2015).

The Trump years’ much better performance in this respect has lasted only two years. Only if this strengthening proves to have legs will it be legitimate to start considering the economy genuinely Great Again.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Fed Manufacturing Figures Show Industry is Still Nicely Withstanding the Metals Tariffs

Tags

aluminum, China, durable goods, Federal Reserve, growth, industrial production, inflation-adjusted growth, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, real growth, steel, tariffs, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning brought another poor result for U.S. domestic manufacturing – specifically, a 0.52 percent decrease in inflation-adjusted output that was its worst such performance since January’s 0.66 percent sequential decline. As a result, the temptation is to blame the Trump tariffs that have so dominated economic and business news headlines, but as usual, the data simply don’t support this claim.

Unquestionably, these new figures from the Federal Reserve point to a problem with American industry. Tariffs, however, look beside the point. Instead, the numbers reveal what looks like an April problem and an automotive problem, and especially where tariffs on metals are concerned – the major Trump-era levies that have been longest lasting, and where the affected manufacturing sectors are easiest to identify.

Here are the numbers for the economy’s chief metals-using industries. They start in April, 2018 (the first full months when the steel and aluminum levies went into effect). They show the growth rates between then and the last three data months. They include the statistics for overall manufacturing as a control group. And I’ve added two new pieces of information: the year-on-year real production changes for these sectors, and the data for durable goods manufacturing stripped of the automotive industry’s performance.

                                           Apr thru Feb   Apr thru March    Apr y/y prev  Apr y/y

overall manufacturing:          +0.48%             +0.52%              0.00%         +2.33%

durables manufacturing:       +1.31%            +1.35%             +0.40%         +2.49%

fabricated metals prods:       +2.87%            +2.72%             +2.14%         +4.44%

machinery:                           +1.49%            +1.92%              -0.69%         +4.05%

automotive:                          -1.71%             -1.93%              -4.43%          +3.07%

major appliances:                 -1.43%            -6.77%            -10.44%          +0.03%

aircraft & parts:                   +4.89%           +6.08%             +4.82%           -1.30%

durable mfg ex-automotive:  +1.82%        +1.91%              +1.21%          +2.41%

Comparing the automotive and the durables ex-automotive lines clearly shows both the automotive and April effects – with the latter suggesting the possibility of a production hiccup. Strengthening that interpretation: except for the major appliance category, nearly all the April, 2018-March, 2019 growth rates exceeded the April, 2018-February, 2019 growth rates. Moreover, the April automotive nosedive (which has taken place both on a month-on-month and year-on-year basis), is especially important because vehicle and parts production use so much in the way of machinery and fabricated metals products.

In addition, the safety issues encountered by Boeing may be responsible for the April aviation growth slowdown that may also have contributed to manufacturing’s broader woes that month.

The major appliances figures above continue to stick out like a sore thumb.  But of course, this sector has faced not only metals tariffs, but separate product-specific levies that went into effect in February, 2018.  In addition, America’s slumping housing sector has surely depressed sales and therefore production for reasons having nothing to do with tariffs.

As known by RealityChek regulars, gauging the impact of the tariffs on products from China is much more difficult for numerous reasons. Their role as inputs for manufacturing industries varies. The manufacturing classification system used by Washington for designating the tariff-ed products differs from that used for the Fed production statistics. The levies have been in place for a shorter period of time. And their scope has changed since the first batch went into effect in August.

Further, let’s not forget that the China tariff regime is due for some big changes starting in June, when President Trump has just decided that levies will rise on $200 billion worth of products from the People’s Republic. So the data below may tell us little about what to expect going forward. Here they are nevertheless for the handful of industries for which I’m sure the numbers create a reasonably accurate picture.

                                                      Aug thru Feb    Aug thu March    Aug thru April

overall manufacturing:                     -0.33%                -0.38%                -0.90%

ball bearings:                                  +0.32%                +0.25%               +0.14%

industrial heating equip:                 -2.60%                 -1.85%                -5.69%

farm machinery & equip:             -16.86%               -11.65%              -10.40%

oil/gas drilling platform pts:         +4.59%                +4.35%                +2.68%

Something of an April slump can be seen here, too (which in theory is hard to connect to the China tariffs), except for the farm machinery sector. 

The classic Wall Street sales pitch warns (eventually) that “Past performance is no guarantee of future results.” So especially considering the higher China tariffs on the way in two weeks, and the possibility that all goods imports from China will be hit by levies at some future date, predicting manufacturing’s growth performance for the rest of this year seems unusually chancy.

Yet the April figures unmistakably show (yet again) that domestic U.S. manufacturing continues to withstand the metals tariffs with ease.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Trade Data Confirm that U.S. Growth Keeps Getting Healthier Under Trump

Tags

GDP, gross domestic product, Made in Washington trade deficit, non-oil goods trade deficit, real GDP, real growth, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning’s monthly U.S. trade figures (for March) enable an update for the economic impact of President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies – and contain very good news both for Mr. Trump and for anyone hoping that the nation’s growth becomes healthier (which should be all Americans).

The major test, as RealityChek regulars know, is a comparison between the economy’s overall growth on the one hand, and the growth of the trade shortfall most heavily influenced by trade policies. The latter can be termed the “Made in Washington trade deficit,” since it strips out oil (which is rarely the object of trade deals or trade policy decisions) and services (where trade liberalization has made only limited progress).

If the economy is growing faster than this non-oil goods deficit (in inflation-adjusted terms – the gauge most closely followed by economy watchers), or if its growth rate is still slower but the gap between these rates is narrowing, that means that its expansion is at least starting to stem more from domestic production, and less from import-led (and therefore debt-financed) consumption. If the trends are showing the opposite results, then overall growth is becoming still more heavily reliant on credit-financed shopping (whether by households, businesses, governments or some combination of these).

And in case you forgot, that’s the kind of growth that led directly to the last global financial crisis and the worst American recession since the Great Depression. And even though the economy began recovering a decade ago, its expansion consistently trailed the growth rate of the Made in Washington trade deficit – and never more than when the inflation-adjusted gross domestic product was increasing most robustly.

That’s why the new U.S. trade figures are so encouraging. They confirm that the American economy recently has been able to grow impressively without supercharged Made in Washington trade deficits. In fact, that’s way understating the case. For calculations based on the March trade results show that, during the first quarter of this year, the after-inflation Made in Washington trade deficit actually shrunk sequentially (by a 6.09 percent annual rate) while real gross domestic product increased by a healthy 3.13 percent annualized.

Nor was the first quarter a fluke – at least not under the Trump administration. In the second quarter of 2018, the real Made in Washington trade shortfall sank sequentially by 5.90 percent annualized, while the overall economy surged by a price-adjusted 4.10 percent.

And an examination of the two during the current economic recovery produces an unmistakable pattern, which is best illustrated by looking at the far-right column (think of it as the multiple) of the table below: During the Trump years so far, good growth has resulted despite relatively modest increases (and, as we’ve just seen, despite some absolute declines) in the Made in Washington trade deficit. During the Obama years, Trump-like growth was only achieved when the Made in Washington trade deficit practically exploded. And when that trade deficit grew weakly, so did the gross domestic product.

Further, even though the multiple rose between the first and second years of the Trump administration, the quarterly 2018 figures show that this problem stemmed from the tariff front-running of the third quarter – when U.S. importers were scrambling to bring in products from abroad before they were hit with levies, principally on goods from China. Once this period of distortion ended, the multiple fell significantly (and probably overshot in the first quarter of this year).

Real Made in Washington trade deficit        Real GDP         Ratio of first to second

1Q 2019:              -6.09 percent                   3.13 percent                 -1.95:1

4Q 2018:               6.41 percent                   2.15 percent                  2.98:1

3Q 2018:             11.66 percent                   3.31 percent                  3.52:1

2Q 2018:             -5.90 percent                    4.10 percent                -1.44:1

1Q 2018:              1.35 percent                    2.20 percent                 0.61:1

2018:                  12.74 percent                    2.86 percent                 4.45:1

2017:                    6.75 percent                    2.22 percent                 3.04:1

2016:                    2.66 percent                    1.57 percent                 1.69:1

2015:                  22.63 percent                    2.88 percent                 7.86:1

2014:                  15.88 percent                    2.45 percent                 6.48:1

2013:                    6.15 percent                    1.84 percent                 3.34:1

2012:                 10.23 percent                     2.25 percent                 4.57:1

2011:                 11.92 percent                     1.55 percent                 7.69:1

2010:                30.71 percent                      2.56 percent              12.00:1

Another way to compare the Obama and Trump years in this respect: As previously noted on RealityChek, the constant dollar 3.21 percent GDP growth registered between the first quarter of 2018 and the first quarter of 2019 was the best such four-quarter growth stretch since the second quarter of 2014 and the second quarter of 2015 (when real growth was 3.37 percent).

Yet during that Obama high growth period, the real Made in Washington trade deficit shot up by 18.83 percent. During the Trump high growth period, this trade shortfall rose by only 4.99 percent.

The higher and broader tariffs on China threatened by the President to press Beijing in the current trade talks would represent the biggest test yet of the Trump policies’ impact on the health of America’s growth. But the March trade figures are the latest evidence that so far, they’ve passed such tests with flying colors.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Latest Sign of Trump Success on Trade

Tags

exports, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, Made in Washington trade deficit, non-oil goods trade deficit, real exports, real GDP, real growth, real imports, real non-oil goods trade deficit, real trade deficit, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s still not possible to say confidently that the impact of tariff-related distortions are over (at least for the foreseeable future), and that President Trump’s trade policies are once again enabling the U.S. economy to grow strongly faster than its debt-producing trade deficits (i.e., more healthily and sustainably). That moment won’t arrive until May 9, when the last of the monthly trade figures for the first quarter of this year will be reported (at least in a preliminary form).

But Friday’s initial first quarter results for the gross domestic product (GDP – the main measure of the economy’s size and its growth), bring the moment a good deal closer.

Just to recap the main issue: I’ve explained on RealityChek (e.g., here) and elsewhere (e.g., here) that the real measure of Mr. Trump’s trade policy success or failure isn’t the level of U.S. trade deficits presented in isolation. It’s whether the economy can grow at adequate rates without pulling in ever more imports – which are both bought by consumers and used by producers as parts, components, and materials for their final products. Either way, though, their increases on net plunge America deeper and deeper into debt.

With anything as big as the American economy, trends don’t reverse themselves quickly. So the best evidence of change would indicate that the relevant arc is starting to bend in the right direction. In this case, that means signs that growth becomes or remains adequate as the growth of the trade deficit slows. That’s exactly the story that could be told convincingly with some of the latest releases of trade-related numbers (see, e.g., here and here), and that the new first quarter GDP results strengthened further.

First, it’s important to note that the new advance data show that, after adjusting for inflation, as of the first quarter, the U.S. economy grew at its fastest pace over a four-quarter period (3.21 percent) since the second quarter, 2014-second quarter, 2015 period (3.37 percent).

But the first sign that the new growth has been healthier growth emerges when the change in the real trade deficit is examined. During that previous, somewhat faster, growth period, the price-adjusted trade gap widened by 21.55 percent. During the last growth period, which was only slightly slower, the trade deficit actually shrank slightly – by 0.34 percent.

As known by RealityChek regulars, though, changes in the overall real trade deficit have only limited utility for judging the usefulness of American trade policy because the total flows include oil and services trade. The first is rarely the subject of trade diplomacy or policy-making, and liberalization of the latter has made only embryonic progress so far.

The portion of the trade shortfall most heavily influenced by trade policy decisions is that in non-oil goods – what I’ve called the Made in Washington trade deficit. Unfortunately, exact comparisons between the 2014-15 and 2018-19 growth periods can’t yet be made because even the preliminary results for the first quarter of this year won’t be published until the March trade data are released on May 9.

But between the second quarter of 2014 and the second quarter of 2015, the Made in Washington trade deficit jumped by 18.83 percent. Between the first two months of 2018 and the first two months of 2019, it increased by only 3.17 percent. And because of the fading of the tariff front-running effect (described in this post), it’s highly unlikely that the March and full first quarter numbers will change this arc significantly.

The improving trade deficit and its contribution to healthier economic performance also can be seen by examining the contribution made by that better balance to quarterly growth. In the first quarter of 2019, the 5.90 percent sequential shrinkage of the trade gap was responsible for 1.03 percentage points of the 3.13 percent annualized sequential growth. That’s 32.91 percent of the total – and the highest such figure since the fourth quarter of 2013, when the trade deficit’s decrease fueled 1.23 percent points of the 3.19 percent annualized sequential growth (38.56 percent).

Some other trade-related highlights of the new GDP report:

>Combined goods and services exports in the first quarter hit a new record of $2.5765 trillion at an annual rate.

>Real goods exports were up, too, quarter-to-quarter. But their $1.7598 trillion annualized first quarter total was only the second all-time highest (after the $1.8092 trillion in the second quarter of 2018).

>After-inflation services exports represented a fifth straight quarterly record ($783.2 billion annualized).

>Constant dollar total imports in the first quarter fell on-quarter but they still represented the third highest total on record – $3.4758 trillion at an annual rate.

>After-inflation goods imports also fell sequentially to their third highest all-time level – $2.9131 trillion.

>Real services imports dropped quarter-to-quarter to their second highest all-time level – $563.3 billion.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Tariffs are Off the Hook for Manufacturing’s Slowdown

Tags

aluminum, China, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted growth, metals, metals-using industries, real growth, steel, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s all you need to know to recognize that domestic U.S. manufacturing is experiencing some kind of slowdown: Today’s real output numbers from the Federal Reserve showed that production flat-lined on month in March. And that was a significant improvement from the comparable February figure – a 0.37 percent drop!

So do these dreary results mean that tariff fear-mongers are finally right to claim that President Trump’s levies on imports of steel and aluminum, and on a wide range of goods from China are backfiring on American industry? Not according to the internals.

As has been the case for months, the most convincing evidence comes from the metals-using industries. After all, the tariffs affecting their products have been in place longer. (April was the first full month in which they were in effect.) The most relevant industries are easy to identify. And because (with despite numerous exemptions) the tariffs have been virtually worldwide in scope, there’s no need to wonder whether how extensively the steel and aluminum in question are being supplied by an individual country or even group of countries.

The table below presents the inflation-adjusted output changes in major metals-using industries from April through each of the Fed’s last three data months. This format differs from that used in my previous industrial production-related posts because late last month the Fed released a set of revisions going back to 2015. So rather the old and new figures for the previous data month aren’t comparable anymore, and I simply decided to use the new figures going back three months.

                                            April thru Jan.      April thru Feb.     April thru March

overall manufacturing:      +1.20 percent        +0.83 percent         +0.82 percent

durables manufacturing:   +2.05 percent        +2.05 percent          +1.96 percent

fabricated metals prods:   +3.53 percent        +3.08 percent          +2.85 percent

machinery:                       +4.33 percent         +2.24 percent         +2.71 percent

automotive:                      – 2.84 percent         -0.58 percent          -3.06 percent

major appliances:             -1.83 percent          -1.30 percent         -5.62 percent

aircraft and parts:            +5.45 percent         +6.15 percent         +7.43 percent

An overall manufacturing slowdown is apparent from the February and March columns in the top line. And the second line shows that it’s impacted durable goods to a slightly greater extent – a possible signal of a tariff effect since that’s the super-category in which the main metals-using sectors are located.

But tariff-mageddon claims, as has been the case so far, falter upon looking at the details. First, they’re not very consistent with the volatility much of this data display. (E.g., automotive and appliances.) Second, over the past month, the big machinery sector (which provides equipment serving many different markets) has gained momentum. And aircraft and parts-making just keeps growing faster and faster. (Of course, its performance will likely become a drag on manufacturing output going forward because of Boeing’s 737 Max problems and the damage that will harm not only aircraft production, and possibly the industry’s entire supply chain.)

If tariffs are becoming a challenge for these industries, it’s clear that their impact is being swamped by other influences on their performance – especially the distinctive characteristics and status of their individual markets.

Unfortunately, all of the reasons for considering these metals tariffs-related conclusions compelling cut the opposite way when it comes to evaluating the China levies’ impact. The first full month when the earliest were in place was only August. And identifying industries most plausibly affected is difficult both because the tariff list and the industrial production data use different manufacturing classification schemes, and because of the challenge of figuring out where tariff-ed Chinese products play crucial roles in American industry (in the form of parts, components, materials, and other intermediate goods).

As a result, the bottom line remains that only a handful of manufacturing industries look like strong candidates for producing any kind of a China tariff effect, and most of these suffer from one of the above complications. Sharp-eyed RealityChek regulars will notice that I’ve added oil and gas drilling platform parts to the list:

                                            Aug. thru Jan.       Aug. thru Feb.      Aug. thru March

overall manufacturing:      +0.29 percent         -0.08 percent          -0.09 percent

ball bearings:                     +0.27 percent        +0.19 percent         +0.11 percent

industrial heating equip:     -3.61 percent         -3.39 percent         -5.27 percent

farm machinery & equip:  +2.22 percent       -17.14 percent        -11.65 percent

oil/gas drilling platfm pts: +4.74 percent        +4.59 percent         +4.36 percent

The overall manufacturing slowdown is apparent from these statistics, too. But so is a bewildering range of results, along with a small sample size. Whatever problems American industry might now be facing, the case that tariffs bear much, if any, blame has yet to be supported by these or any other data.