(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Has the U.S. Seen Peak Manufacturing Output for the Virus Era?

Tags

(What's Left of) Our Economy, appliances, automotive, capex, capital spending, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Federal Reserve, furniture, household appliances, housing, inflation-adjusted growth, Institute for Supply Management, machinery, manufacturing, real growth, recession, recovery, Wuhan virus

Today’s monthly Federal Reserve report on U.S. manufacturing production was full of surprises, but not enough were of the good kind. And with signs of economic slowing on the rise, the new figures – for September – could mean that, for the time being, industry’s relative out-performance during the pandemic era will begin weakening markedly as well.

The surprises start with the overall figure for the September monthly change in inflation-adjusted output for American factories. Despite an abundance of encouraging data from so-called soft surveys like those issued by the private Institute for Supply Management and the Fed system’s regional banks (see, e.g., here) real manufacturing production dropped by 0.29 percent sequentially. The decrease was the first since April, when national economic activity as a whole bottomed due to the spread of the CCP Virus and resulting shutdowns and stay-at-home orders.

The biggest bright spot in the report came from the upward nature of most revisions. August’s initially reported 0.96 percent monthly gain is now judged to have been 1.13 percent. The July result was upgraded from 3.97 percent to 4.30 percent. And June’s previous 7.64 percent improve was reduced to 3.61 percent. Further, these advances built on similar upward revisions that accompanied last month’s Fed report for August.

In fact, the revisions effect was strong enough to leave domestic industry’s cumulative after-inflation production performance during the virus-induced downturn better than the Fed’s estimate from last month. As of that industrial production report (for August), manufacturing constant dollar production had fallen 6.39 percent from its levels in February – the final month before the pandemic began impacting the economy. Today’s new September release now pegs that decline at only 5.81 percent, and even the monthly September decrease left it at 6.08 percent.

Nevertheless, the breadth of the September monthly decrease in overall price-adjusted manufacturing output unmistakably disappointed. Yes, the automotive sector (vehicles and parts combined) saw its on-month production tumble by 4.01 percent. But in contrast to most of the manufacturing data during the CCP Virus period, automotive didn’t move the overall manufacturing needle much, as real output ex-auto rose only fractionally in September.

Also discouraging –and unexpected, considering the good recent capital spending data reported by the Census Bureau (see, e.g., the “nondefense capital goods excluding aircraft” numbers for new orders in Table 5 in this latest release) – was the 0.41 inflation-adjusted production decline in the big machinery sector following five months of growth.

And even though the U.S. housing sector has been booming during the recession, real output of furniture also slumped for the first time in six months (by 0.96 percent), while price-adjusted household appliances production was down 4.99 percent after its own good five-month run.

As indicated by today’s revisions, these glum September manufacturing output figures could be upgraded in the coming months. Yet given the CCP Virus’ return – which will at best greatly complicate the challenge of maintaining recovery momentum for industry and the entire national economy – no one can reasonably rule out the possibility that, for now, Americans have seen peak post-virus manufacturing production.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Fed Figures Show the U.S. Manufacturing Recovery is Proceeding Nicely

Tags

automotive, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Federal Reserve, inflation-adjusted output, lockdowns, manufacturing, manufacturing production, real growth, shutdown, stimulus package, Trump tariffs, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s not apparent from the overall numbers, but the most important takeaway from this morning’s monthly Federal Reserve report on U.S. manufacturing production is that American industry has continued a steady comeback from the ravages of the CCP Virus and the government-induced shutdown of much of the U.S. economy. And the continuing healthy pace of this comeback is all the more impressive given the stop-and-start nature of so many of the economic restrictions imposed by Washington, D.C. and by the states and localities, and given the recent uncertainty about a new virus-relief bill.

The overall Fed numbers, as indicated above, do show a manufacturing bounceback that’s losing noteworthy steam. In August (the latest available data month), inflation-adjusted manufacturing output grew by 0.96 percent sequentially. That’s definitely a weaker pace than July’s growth (now pegged at 3.97 percent on month), much weaker than June’s 7.64 percent monthly burst, and well short of May’s 3.91 monthly percent production rise.

Grounds for encouragement, though, are justified even by these aggregate figures, as revisions for recent months generally were positive, and July’s was really positive – that month’s previously estimated manufacturing real growth was 3.41 percent.

But the best and most important news comes from the numbers on manufacturing production outside the automotive sector. As known by RealityChek regulars, the wild sequential swings in output from vehicle and parts makers have dominated the Fed manufacturing production reports for nearly the entire CCP virus period. (See., e.g., last month’s post on this subject.) So important though automotive is – both because of its size per se and because it affects the rest of its industry due to its big domestic supply chain – the non-auto results arguably provide a more accurate picture of U.S. manufacturing’s fundamentals. And this picture looks remarkably good, and still displays significant momentum.

Ex-auto, as the cognoscenti put it, constant dollar manufacturing production increased by 1.40 percent on month in August. So since that’s much faster than overall manufacturing’s performance (up 0.96 percent) that means automotive output fell (by 2.13 percent, specifically).

The August sequential improvement for ex-auto manufacturing, moreover, isn’t dramatically lower than July’s (1.93 percent). And it compares pretty well with June’s (now estimated at 3.82 percent) and May’s (now judged to be 2.12 percent).

Even better, all the pre-July results have been revised up except for May’s.

When all is said and done, the August Fed report underscores just how resilient domestic manufacturing has been despite the formidable CCP Virus challenges (which also include major economic slowdowns in the foreign markets U.S. industry has always relied on for much of its sales). As of August, overall price-adjusted American manufacturing output was just 6.39 percent below its levels in February (the final month before virus effects began impacting the economy). Manufacturing ex-auto’s real production was just 7.04 percent less than in February. And automotive’s after-inflation production was a mere 1.98 percent below that February benchmark.

And another factor to consider: Since China’s has been the world’s first major economy to resume growth since the virus struck, and since its recent growth has been so markedly export-led, think of how much worse U.S. industry’s state would be had the steep Trump tariffs on hundreds of billions of Chinese goods normally sent to the United States not been imposed, or left almost completely in place by the Phase One trade deal.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Kept Ploughing Ahead in July

Tags

automotive, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted growth, manufacturing, real growth, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Whereas the last few U.S. manufacturing production reports from the Federal Reserve have overwhelmingly been one story – automotive –this morning’s findings (covering July) are notable for at least two other stories: unusually large downward May and June revisions for the entire sector when it comes to their inflation-adjusted growth, and despite that discouraging news, the more positive development that stripping out automotive from the overall totals, manufacturing has now been growing pretty steadily for three straight months.

The new Fed figures show that in toto, real manufacturing output grew sequentially by 3.41 percent. That figure, too, is now up for three straight months.

But those revisions! June’s originally estimated 9.06 percent jump is now judged to have been only a 7.52 percent improvement – still excellent, but much lower. And after being revised up to 5.06 percent, May’s increase is now pegged at 3.88 percent.

As implied above, automotive outperformed the rest of manufacturing by a mile. Its July monthly production advance came in at 28.29 percent – much less than the May and June rocket rides, but still extraordinary. And the numbers for the May and June comebacks have held up well. The former, previously reported as a 117.12 percent surge, is now judged to have been 110.97 percent. And the June number was revised up from 115.02 percent to 118.33 percent. In other words, price-adjusted production of vehicles and parts combined still more than doubled in both May and June, reflecting both the reopening of factories from earlier spring shutdowns, but strong demand from consumers.

The data for the rest of manufacturing have been considerably less spectacular. But these industries did collectively boost their constant dollar output in June by 1.63 percent sequentially. And the May and June monthly results are still 2.04 percent and 3.66 percent, respectively. Arguably that’s an impressive performance given not only the worst overall U.S. economic slump since the Great Depression of the 1930s, but the stop-start nature of the CCP Virus’ spread and, therefore, of many individual states’ lockdowns and shutdowns.

All the same, let’s close with some statistics that make clear how mind-blowing automotive’s production performance has been during the pandemic. Since February – the last month before major numbers of virus infections started appearing and as a result major economic disruption began – total inflation-adjusted U.S. manufacturing output is down 7.84 percent. Leaving out automotive, real production is off by 8.65 percent during this period. And automotive itself? It’s practically back to normal, with its July price-adjusted manufacturing output just 0.32 percent lower than February’s levels.

Following Up: Inside April’s U.S. Manufacturing Crash II

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aerospace, appliances, automotive, CCP Virus, chemicals, components, computers, coronavirus, COVID 19, durable goods, electrical equipment, electronics, fabricated metals products, Federal Reserve, Following Up, food products, healthcare goods, inflation-adjusted output, machinery, manufacturing, manufacturing output, manufacturing production, medical devices, metals, non-durable goods, paper, real growth, Wuhan virus

A little earlier today, RealityChek presented some lowlights from this morning’s Federal Reserve U.S. manufacturing production report (for April). As promised, here’s a more granular look at the results, which yield even more insights as to how the CCP Virus blow to the economy is reflecting – and probably influencing dramatically changed spending patterns.

The table below shows the findings for durable goods industries, the super-category that covers products with expected usage and shelf lives of three years or more. Included are the original March inflation-adjusted output changes, the revised March data, and the April statistics:

Wood products:                                                -4.22%       -3.15%      -9.04%

non-metallic mineral products:                        -6.56%      -6.50%     -16.26%

Primary metals:                                                -2.82%      -3.95%     -20.37%

Fabricated metal products:                               -8.28%      -4.23%     -11.33%

Machinery:                                                       -5.56%      -3.05%     -10.98%

Computer & electronic products:                     -1.89%      -1.24%      -5.02%

Electrical equip, appliances, components:       -2.24%      -2.83%      -5.99%

Motor vehicles and parts:                               -28.04%    -29.96%    -71.69%

Aerospace/miscellaneous transport equip:      -8.12%      -8.90%     -21.65%

Furniture and related products:                       -9.99%      -6.50%     -20.60%

Miscellaneous manufacturing:                        -9.94%      -7.09%       -9.05%

   (contains most of those non-pharmaceutical healthcare goods)

As in the broader category analysis from earlier today, the automotive collapse – over both March and April – stands out here, although it was joined in the double-digit neighborhood (at much lower absolute levels of course) by six of the other eleven sectors. And as predicted in last month’s post on the March Fed report, the sector that’s held up best has been the computer and electronics industry – though following surprisingly close behind is electrical equipment, appliances, and their components.

It’s also easy to see how the rapid deterioration in automotive and the miscellanous transportation category that includes aerospace (especially in April for the latter) spilled over into supplier industries like metals and fabricated metal products, and machinery.

One durable goods puzzle: the relatively fast April decrease in the miscellaneous manufacturing category, which contains non-pharmaceutical medical goods so crucial for the nation’s CCP Virus response.

The second table shows the same information for the non-durables super-category, where the virus impact has been considerably lighter. Among notable results – the sharp worsening of after-inflation output in the food sector. Although it fared relatively well, there can be little doubt that the worker safety problems in meat-packing plants, along with the cratering of big customers – mainly the restaurant and hotel businesses – played big roles.

The non-durables results also make clear that the sector that’s survived best so far has been paper. Also excelling (at least relatively speaking): the enormous chemicals sector. This industry also contains the pharmaceutical industry, although the any positive CCP Virus impact seems unlikely to date because no vaccines or treatments have been developed yet.

Food, beverage, and tobacco products:          -0.76%      -1.56%       -7.10%

Textiles:                                                        -14.05%      -6.98%     -20.72%

Apparel and leather goods:                          -16.54%    -10.31%     -24.10%

Paper:                                                            -2.04%      -0.08%        -2.58%

Printing and related activities:                    -18.18%    -10.75%      -21.16%

Petroleum and coal products:                       -5.93%      -6.56%      -18.55%

Chemicals:                                                   -1.65%      -1.50%         -5.14%

Plastics and rubber products:                      -7.60%       -4.37%       -11.03%

Other mfg (different from misc above):     -5.37%       -4.29%       -10.37% 

The virus crisis contains so many moving parts (e.g., vaccine and therapeutics progress; infection, fatality, and testing data; uneven state reopening and national social distance practicing; consumer attitudes; second wave possibilities) that extrapolating the manufacturing trends to date seems foolhardy. But tracking industry’s winners and losers as the months pass could still provide important clues as to how much further the economic woes it’s caused will continue; and when, how quickly, and how completely recovery arrives.   

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Inside April’s U.S. Manufacturing Crash I

Tags

aircraft, auto parts, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, durable goods, Federal Reserve, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, manufacturing output, manufacturing production, non-durable goods, real growth, vehicles, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

There was never any point in expecting today’s Federal Reserve manufacturing production figures (for April) to change significantly what’s known about the CCP Virus’ body blow to the American economy overall, and to industry in particular. As with the case last month, however, the details reveal a great deal about how the pandemic is changing patterns of U.S. factory output – which in turn to some extent reflect changing patterns of the spending (by both consumers and businesses) that remains the main driver of the nation’s growth (or, nowadays, contraction).

The big takeaways are that:

>The March revisions show that the virus damage to manufacturing that month was a good deal less (with inflation-adjusted output falling by 5.53 percent on month) than the 6.27 percent drop initially reported.

>The April 13.78 percent month-to-month real production was by far the biggest such decrease on record (going back to 1972) – surpassing March’s previous record.

>As with March, the steepest fall-offs in price-adjusted output came in the durable goods sector – which consists of items whose active use or shelf life is expected to be three years or greater. In March, the sequential production decrease was revised from 9.14 percent to 8.23 percent. But in April, the plunge was more than twice as great: 19.27 percent.

>The March monthly shrinkage of non-durable goods production is also now judged to be smaller than first reported – 2.64 percent rather than 3.21 percent. But in April, the rate of sequential deterioration was even faster than for durable goods, speeding up to 8.23 percent.

>Within durable goods (e.g., steel, autos, computers, industrial machinery, furniture, appliances, aircraft), the automotive sector remained by far the weakest industry. It was bad enough that March’s horrific on-month after-inflation output crash dive was thought to be even greater than first estimated (29.96 percent rather than 28.04 percent). But in April, inflation-adjusted output was down by another 71.69 percent.

>And within the automotive sector, the big story was vehicles, not parts. The former’s constant dollar March production is now judged to have been 37.77 percent, not the originally reported 34.76 percent. But then in April, it careened down by 93.60 percent. That is, it nearly stopped.

>For an idea of how profoundly automotive’s tailspin has affected manufacturing’s performance, if it’s removed from the total, factory output’s April monthly contraction would have been 10.29 percent in real terms, not 13.78 percent. That is, still a terrible (and record) performance, but not quite so terrible.

>As for durable goods, its April sequential production drop would have been 12.65 percent in real terms, not 19.27 percent. Again, an awful performance, but much better than the numbers with automotive.

>Speaking of tailspins, Boeing’s troubles have continued to mount because the virus crisis has decimated U.S. travel and transportation, and they showed up in abundance in the April Fed manufacturing report. March’s monthly after-inflation output decrease for aircraft and parts was revised from 10.36 percent to 12.09 percent. And that rate more than doubled in April, hitting 28.88 percent.

I’ll be following up with more detailed April production data later this afternoon!

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is Growth’s Quality Again Turning for the Worse?

Tags

bubbles, Financial Crisis, GDP, Great Recession, gross domestic product, housing, inflation-adjusted growth, Obama, personal consumption, real GDP, real growth, toxic combination, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

“The consumer will save us,” or some variation thereof, has become a rallying cry for those believing that the U.S. economy will avoid recession, at least for the foreseeable future. For RealityChek regulars, however, it’s a red flag, possibly revealing that too many economy watchers have forgotten, or never learned, the most important lesson of the global financial crisis of the previous decade and the Great Recession it triggered: The quality of American growth matters at least as much as the quantity – and more specifically, economic expansion that’s too heavily reliant on consuming rather than producing is too likely to end in tears.

That’s why last week’s latest official report on America’s economic growth has me somewhat worried. It’s true, as I reported, that it contained some good news on the trade front, showing a continuing Trump administration trend of decent growth rates no longer tightly linked with huge, soaring trade deficits. But the figures (the second look of three looks at the second quarter’s performance – at least for the time being) also confirm major backsliding when it comes to the domestic determinants of healthy and unhealthy growth – a big surge in the role of consumption and housing combined as growth engines. That’s exactly the toxic combination that inflated the last decade’s historic bubble. And it could become a reversal of a positive Trump-period trend.

According to those official data, consumption and housing in the second quarter fueled 150 percent of that period’s 2.02 percent annualized inflation-adjusted growth – the most closely followed measure of change in gross domestic product (GDP – economists’ term for the economy as a whole). A figure greater than 100 percent, by the way, is possible because other components of GDP can subtract from growth – and in the second quarter, obviously did..

That 150 percent figure is the biggest by far since the third and fourth quarters of 2015. The only saving grace for that figure is that back in 2015, much stronger performance in personal consumption and housing was producing only roughly comparable overall growth.

The second quarter numbers are somewhat better on a standstill basis, but point in the wrong direction as well. From March through June this year, the toxic combination represented 72.67 percent of the economy in constant dollar terms. That’s the highest level since the fourth quarter of 2017 (72.87 percent). Moreover, back then, the economy was growing a good deal faster (at a 3.50 versus a 2.02 percent annual rate).

None of this means that the U.S. economy is now firmly on an unhealthy growth track. In fact, the worrisome second quarter “growth contribution” figures followed an especially good first quarter. From January through March, personal consumption and housing together produced only 23.87 percent of that stretch’s solid 3.01 percent annualized real growth – the lowest such figure since the fourth quarter of 2011 (16.38 percent of 4.64 percent annualized growth).

On a standstill basis, the last time that the toxic combination represented a lower share of the total economy in real terms was the fourth quarter of 2015 (72.15 percent). And during that period, there was almost (0.13 percent) real annualized economic growth.

Further, the Trump healthy growth record so far is better than the record during President Obama’s two terms in office. During the latter’s administrations, the toxic combination generated 80.74 percent of its $2.2537 trillion in after-inflation growth. Under President Trump, personal consumption plus housing has been responsible for 72.64 percent of $1.002 trillion of such growth. (Both calculations begin the these two administrations in the second quarter of their first year in office, since Inauguration Day doesn’t take place until January 20.)

Real growth, moreover, has been somewhat faster so far. Over 32 quarters, the U.S. economy grew by 18.44 percent after inflation under Obama. Over nine Trump quarters, the economy has become 5.56 percent larger – which translates into 19.80 percent growth over a 32-quarter stretch. All in all, that’s a pretty good reflection on this President’s performance.

Economically, though, the big question is whether it will continue. And politically, it’s whether it will suffice, in tandem with any other perceived strengths, to bring a second Trump term.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Healthier U.S. Growth is Continuing, at Least Trade-Wise

Tags

exports, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, Obama, real GDP, real growth, real trade deficit, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Since we’re clearly well into the 2020 presidential campaign, comparisons understandably have begun to be made by political and even economic types between President Trump’s economic record and that of his White House predecessor, Barack Obama.

In that vein, today’s new official U.S. figures on economic growth contain some good news for Mr. Trump, his supporters – and in fact for Americans collectively:  Even though they confirm that the nation’s growth this year is indeed slowing, and the trade deficit targeted for reduction by the President is going up, the latest numbers on the gross domestic product (GDP) also show that inflation-adjusted growth (the growth figure most closely followed) during the Trump years is still less closely associated with trade deficit increases than under Obama. In other words, by one important measure, the economy’s expansion is healthier – more of it is being generated by producing goods and services at home, instead of consuming imported goods and services.

The new numbers – which are the first of two sets of revisions for the second quarter of the year that will be released this year – don’t indicate progress at first glance. The real trade deficit, originally reported at $978.7 billion on an annualized basis, is now judged to have been $982.5 billion. That’s just a bit less than the record $983 billion figure that was hit in the fourth quarter of last year.

Moreover, total exports were revised down ($2.5205 trillion annualized to $2.5165 trillion annualized). Total imports were less than first reported as well, but only by a hair – $3.4990 trillion rather than $3.4992 trillion. And worse, quarter-to-quarter after-inflation total exports are now off by 1.48 percent, and after-inflation total imports are up 0.02 percent. Indeed, that real export fall-off was the biggest quarterly decrease since the depths of the last recession – when they cratered by 8.08 percent in the first quarter of 2009.

But despite this seeming backsliding, the Trump record has been much more impressive when examined in the context of economic growth. This conclusion emerges by examining how fast the economy has increased in constant dollar terms versus how fast the trade deficit has widened under the two administrations. Here are the calendar year annual rates of change for each, followed by the ratio between the two:

Obama years

                        real GDP       real trade deficit      deficit growth to GDP growth

09-10:          2.56 percent       16.73 percent                        6.54:1

10-11:          1.55 percent         0.39 percent                        0.25:1

11-12:          2.25 percent        -0.09 percent                      -0.04:1

12-13:          1.84 percent        -6.30 percent                      -3.42:1

13-14:         2.53 percent          8.33 percent                        3.29:1

14-15:         2.91 percent        25.02 percent                        8.60:1

15-16:         1.69 percent          8.61 percent                        5:09:1

Trump years

16-17:        2.37 percent          8.43 percent                        3.56:1

17-18:        2.93 percent          8.37 percent                        2.86:1

These tables show that only once during the Obama years (2013-14) did the economy grow at Trump-like rates while keeping real trade deficit growth within modest Trump-like ranges.  And although the that real trade deficit did shrink in absolute terms in two of the Obama years (2011-12 and 2012-13), economic growth during those two years were subpar. 

Moreover, the 2017-18 Trump results were distorted by major tariff front-running – the rush by importers to get their goods into the United States before announced tariffs raised their prices.

In addition, although 2019 isn’t yet finished, the Trump ratios so far look relatively good as well – especially for the first quarter.

                           real GDP     real trade deficit      deficit growth to GDP growth

4Q18-1Q19:    3.06 percent    -3.97 percent                        -1.30:1

1Q19-2Q19:    2.02 percent     4.07 percent                          2.01:1

The Trump record looks better still when presented on a rolling four quarters basis. This time the frame of reference will be a little different. We’ll focus on the high growth Obama period through the end of that administration, and compare it with the high growth Trump period through the present.

Obama years

                          real GDP        real trade deficit      deficit growth to GDP growth

1Q14-1Q15:   3.98 percent       26.68 percent                       6.70:1

2Q14-2Q15:   3.35 percent       21.34 percent                       6.37:1

3Q14-3Q15    2.44 percent       30.60 percent                     12.54:1

4Q14-4Q15:   1.90 percent       21.83 percent                     11.49:1

1Q15-1Q16:   1.62 percent       11.72 percent                       7.23:1

2Q15-2Q16:   1.34 percent         9.59 percent                      7.16:1

3Q15-3Q16:   1.56 percent         2.42 percent                      1.55:1

4Q15-4Q16:   2.03 percent       10.87 percent                      5.35:1

1Q16-1Q17:   2.10 percent         6.92 percent                      3.30:1

Trump years

4Q16-4Q17:   2.80 percent         5.90 percent                      2.11:1

1Q17-1Q18:   2.86 percent         6.34 percent                      2.22:1

2Q17-2Q18:   3.20 percent         0.06 percent                      0.19:1

3Q17-3Q18:   3.13 percent       15.44 percent                      4.93:1

4Q17-4Q18    2.52 percent       11.22 percent                      4.45:1

1Q18-1Q19:   2.65 percent         6.76 percent                     2.55:1

2Q18-2Q19:   2.28 percent       15.52 percent                     6.81:1

Again, under the Trump administration, the economy has managed to expand healthily in real terms while keeping the trade deficit’s increase under control much more often than under the Obama administration. Although the third and fourth quarter figures look like they undermine this case, in fact, they clearly demonstrate the impact of tariff front-running.  The only genuine fly in the Trump ointment so far: that final set of figures, when the price-adjusted trade deficit rose 6.81 times faster than the economy grew in those terms, while the rate of overall growth declined. And unfortunately, when it comes to analyzing these trends going forward, because of Mr. Trump’s new tariff announcements, front-running is likely to continue for the time being.

Even with this tariff front-running – and especially if the front-running doesn’t throw off the figures excessively – an economy growing faster relative to its trade deficit isn’t the sexiest economic achievement to brag about. But is it completely unreasonable to think that a supposed master-brander and pitchman like President Trump can’t rise to the challenge?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Signs of Life in U.S. Manufacturing Output – Including in Tariff-Affected Industries

Tags

aluminum, China, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, real growth, steel, tariffs, Trade, tradewar, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning’s Federal Reserve industrial production report provided further evidence that domestic U.S. manufacturing is moving past a spring rough patch. Rebounding also – output in many of the metals-using industries supposedly being decimated by President Trump’s tariffs on aluminum and steel.

As usual, though, because reliable data is so difficult to come by, the impact of U.S. duties on imports from China is much harder to gauge. But certainly there’s no reason to believe claims that industries using tariff-ed Chinese inputs are experiencing anything close to the damage widely reported.

Not that U.S.-based manufacturing is out of the woods. Its real output in June did improve on a monthly basis by 0.43 percent – its best such performance since December’s 0.64 percent gain. But domestic industry remains in a technical recession, with inflation-adjusted production down 0.36 percent since August – a stretch longer than the two straight quarters of cumulative decline that qualify as a downturn for most economists.

The table below presents the output data for the major metals-using sectors for the period since April, 2018 – the first full month in which the steel and aluminum tariffs were in place. As usual, the numbers for manufacturing overall are used as a control group.

                                             April thru April      April thru May      April thru June

overall manufacturing:          -0.14 percent        +0.11 percent         +0.54 percent

durables manufacturing:       +0.60 percent        +0.68 percent         +0.98 percent

fabricated metals products:   +1.93 percent        +1.14 percent         +1.09 percent

machinery:                             -1.28 percent        +0.91 percent          +0.12 percent

automotive:                            -3.94 percent         -1.75 percent          +1.05 percent

major appliances:                   -8.89 percent         -1.64 percent           -5.99 percent

aircraft and parts:                  +3.25 percent        +1.17 percent           +2.37 percent

These figures make clear that better constant-dollar output has been achieved during the last two months for manufacturing as a whole, for durable goods manufacturing (the super-category that contains most of the main metals-using sectors) and for three of the five leading specific metals-users. Especially interesting are the comeback being staged by major appliances (which face both metals tariffs and separate levies on large household clothes washers and dryers that began in February, 2018), and the deterioration apparent in aerospace (which arguably is being undercut by the safety problems experienced by Boeing).

Nonetheless, applause should be muted. For earlier in the post-metals tariffs periods, these metals users were clear production out-performers.

Statistics related to the China tariffs (whose first full month in effect was last August, 2018) continues to be plagued by great variations concerning the tariff-ed goods’ role as inputs for a wide range of domestic U.S. industries, uncertainties stemming from the differing classification systems used in the U.S. Trade Representative’s official tariff list and by the Federal Reserve in classifying manufacturing industries, and both the shorter duration of the levies and the increase in coverage since the first tranche was announced.

Keeping these enormous caveats in mind, here are results for a handful of sectors reasonably certain to have faced tariff pressure since last August. Each column measuring real output changes since last August.

                                                Aug thru April       Aug thru May      Aug thru May

overall manufacturing:            -1.03 percent         -0.79 percent        -0.36 percent

ball bearings:                           -1.77 percent         -2.62 percent        -2.89 percent

industrial heating equip:          -8.00 percent         -4.13 percent        -9.04 percent

farm machinery & equip:      -10.27 percent         -7.51 percent        -6.44 percent

oil/gas drilling platform pts:  +2.41 percent         +3.93 percent       +2.13 percent

On the one hand, these numbers provide the tariff opponents with some ammunition for claiming harmful effects from the levies, but not much. Two of the four specific sectors have lost momentum compared with the rest of manufacturing (ball bearings and industrial heating equipment), one has gained (farm machinery and equipment), and once has displayed a slight momentum loss – but also major monthly variation.

On the other hand, given that widespread (though highly uneven) use of Chinese inputs, the recent bounce-back in overall manufacturing production indicates that, if the China duties have been holding industry back – because of increased uncertainty or whatever other reasons have been offered – the impact has been both minimal and offset by other sources of strength. If true, that’s hardly a trivial consideration in judging the wisdom of and prospects for the Trump China trade war – since with each new batch of its own data, China is finding it more difficult to make that claim about its own economy.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Fed Manufacturing Figures Nudge Tariffmageddon a Bit Further Away

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aluminum, China, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted growth, manufacturing, metals, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, real growth, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s industrial production figures from the Federal Reserve showed not only that U.S. domestic manufacturing regained some strength in May following a string of poor monthly results. They also provided more evidence that President Trump’s tariffs have had little, if any, effect on the performance of either the metals-using industries impacted by levies on steel and aluminum imports, or of sectors supposedly affected by China-related duties.

Two more points come through pretty loud and clear from the new figures on domestic industry’s inflation-adjusted growth. First, the weakness displayed in April by manufacturing as a whole and by metals-using sectors could well have been confined to that month. Second, the safety problems revealed in the Boeing Company’s aircraft have begun to influence the picture and may distort the readings for several more months.

The overall readings for manufacturing were mildly encouraging, with the 0.22 percent sequential rise in real output representing domestic industry’s best reading since December’s 0.64 percent improvement. Revisions were ever so slightly positive.

Most of the leading metals-using industries – where the role played by tariffs is relatively easy to identify – fared better in May than in April, too, as the following table shows. The columns show the changes in after-inflation output for these sectors starting with April, 2018 (the first full month the metals levies went into effect) and each of the last three data months of this year. And as usual, the numbers for manufacturing overall are used as a control group.

                                             April thru March   April thru April   April thru May

overall manufacturing:          +0.45 percent        -0.07 percent      +0.89 percent

durables manufacturing:       +1.34 percent       +0.68 percent      +0.98 percent

fabricated metals products:   +2.76 percent      +1.88 percent       +1.73 percent

machinery:                            +2.31 percent       -0.12 percent       +0.11 percent

automotive:                            -3.10 percent       -3.86 percent        -1.55 percent

major appliances:                   -5.27 percent       -8.24 percent        -3.27 percent

aircraft and parts:                  +5.75 percent      +3.34 percent       +1.15 percent

durable mfg ex-automotive: +2.10 percent       +1.48 percent       +1.41 percent

In general, it’s clear that the metals-using industries are still losing growth momentum versus the rest of manufacturing. But do the duties deserve all or even much of the blame? If so, then why did so many of these sectors turn in better growth numbers in May than in April – especially automotive and major appliances? The latter’s relative comeback is especially striking, given that it’s been experiencing not only metals tariffs, but separate levies on large household laundry equipment and a weakness in U.S. housing. Ditto for automotive, where output has been highly volatile for many months.

The Boeing effect is apparent, too, from the falling output numbers since March, when safety problems started generating grounding decisions and airspace national airspace bans for its widely used 737 Max models. Further, both automotive and aerospace are major users of machinery and fabricated metals products.

The impact of the tariffs on products from China remains much more of a puzzle, and for the same reasons that have been apparent since their onset, in August, 2018. They have covered thousands of products, most of which so far have been intermediate goods, and their role as these kinds of inputs for manufacturing industries varies dramatically from final product to final product. In addition, Washington uses different manufacturing classification systems for designating the tariff-ed products and for measuring manufacturing production. The levies have been in place for a shorter period of time than the metals duties. And their scope has widened since the first batch went into effect in August, along with many rates having changed.

Nonetheless, here are some figures for the handful of industries for which I’m sure the numbers create a reasonably accurate picture, with each column measuring real output changes since last August.

                                        August thru March   August thru April   August thru May

overall manufacturing:       -0.45 percent           -0.96 percent         -0.75 percent

ball bearings:                     +0.22 percent          +0.11 percent        +0.01 percent

industrial heating equip:     -0.83 percent          -5.41 percent          -4.70 percent

farm machinery & equip: -11.65 percent         -10.27 percent         -7.51 percent

oil/gas drilling platform    +4.08 percent          +2.58 percent         +4.59 percent

   parts

Unfortunately, no consistent trend emerges. Two of the sectors’ improved between March and May (farm machinery and equipment, and oil and gas drilling platform parts), and two worsened (ball bearings and industrial heating equipment).

And although as long as the China tariffs continue , the future will provide results over a more statistically significant time frame, because the footprint of Chinese inputs in most of U.S. Manufacturing sectors will continue to be so broad and deep, their costs are likely to remain just as hard to discern.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The New GDP Report Confirmed the Good News Trump Trade Story

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GDP, gross domestic product, inflation-adjusted growth, real GDP, real growth, real trade deficit, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The U.S. government’s second look at the gross domestic product (GDP) for the first quarter of the year, which came out yesterday, didn’t significantly change the message sent by last month’s initial read on the economic impact of President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies so far – and that’s good news for anyone who’s not afflicted with Trump Derangement Syndrome. (Actually, if extreme Never Trump-ers’ well-being is tied to the American economy’s, it’s good news for them, too, in real life.)

This newest look provides yet more evidence that Mr. Trump’s long overdue overhaul of the nation’s approach to trade – no doubt coupled with other measures like regulatory reform and possibly the tax cuts – is enabling the economy to grow in a healthy, sustainable way. Specifically, the economy’s overall inflation-adjusted growth (the measure that attracts the most attention) has not only been strong. It’s become stronger than the growth of America’s still oversized, debt-producing trade deficits.

The quarter-to-quarter results show this trend emphatically. According to the second GDP read, the economy grew at a price-adjusted annual rate of 3.03 percent in the first quarter of this year. That’s down only slightly from the 3.13 percent real growth previously reported, and considerably faster than the 2.15 percent results for the fourth quarter of last year.

But during that first quarter, the after-inflation overall trade deficit dropped by 5.45 percent. That’s a bit less than the 5.90 percent sequential drop found in the last month’s GDP report (because the trade shortfall was revised slightly higher), but still considerable given the rapid overall expansion. And it’s a major turnaround from the 0.63 constant dollar trade deficit increase between the third and fourth quarters of last year.

All the same, one quarter does not a trend make. That’s why it’s crucial to note that developments over longer time-frames also support optimism about the Trump trade policies’ results. And as previously shown, the most revealing comparison is between the last high growth period recorded by the economy during President Obama’s administration, and the current Trump surge.

Despite the marginal reduction in the first quarter’s real growth figure, it still leaves after-inflation expansion over the last four data quarters at 3.18 percent. That’s the fastest such growth since the 3.37 percent recorded between the second quarter of 2014 and the second quarter of 2015.

But during that Obama-era growth spurt, the real U.S. trade deficit increased by 21.55 percent. During the current Trump high growth period, this trade gap is up only 0.13 percent so far.

Some other trade-related highlights of the new read on first quarter GDP:

>In absolute terms, the inflation-adjusted overall trade deficit for the first quarter was revised up from $899.3 billion to $903.6 billion. That’s the lowest level since the second quarter, 2018’s $841.0 billion.

>Consequently, the real trade deficit as a share of price-adjusted GDP stood at 4.78 percent, not the 4.76 percent reported in the advance GDP release. That’s still the lowest such number since the second quarter of 2018’s 4.54 percent.

>Trade’s contribution to economic growth in the first quarter remained at its best level in years. In the advance read, the sequential shrinkage of the constant-dollar trade deficit fueled 1.03 percentage points of 3.13 percent annualized growth. As of the new GDP report, these figures stood at 0.96 percentage points of 2.03 percent growth.

In other words, the trade deficit’s improvement accounted for 31.64 percent of the first quarter’s real growth. That’s down from the 32.91 percent figure from the initial read on first quarter GDP, but still the highest such figure since 38.56 percent of the fourth quarter of 2013 (when a reduction in the inflation-adjusted trade deficit fueled 1.23 percentage points of its 3.19 percent annualized growth.

>Because total goods and services exports were revised slightly higher (from $2.5765 trillion annualized to $2.5836 trillion), they remained at record levels.

>Real goods exports exports were estimated to be slightly higher, too – $1.8028 trillion annualized instead of $1.7598 trillion. But that’s still only the second best total on record (after the $1.8092 trillion in the second quarter of 2018).

>After-inflation services exports were also upgraded slightly – from $783.2 billion annualized to $783.6 billion. That still represents their fifth straight quarterly record.

>First quarter constant dollar total imports are still estimated to have fallen sequentially in the first quarter, but only to $3.4871 trillion annualized, not to $3.4758 trillion. That upward revision still left them as representing the third highest level on record.

>The same story unfolded for after-inflation goods imports. Their quarterly drop left them at $2.9229 trillion annualized, not $2.9131 trillion – also a third all-time highest level.

>Real services imports, however, came in higher than the $562.2 billion at annual rates previously reported. The new $563.8 billion total represented a new record.