Making News: Breitbart Radio Interview Now On-Line on the Economy & That Yield Curve

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Breitbart News Tonight, economy, Making New, Rebecca Mansour, recession, yield curve

I’m pleased to report that the podcast is now on-line of my interview Thursday night on Breitbart News Tonight on the state of the economy and whether or not America is on the verge of a recession.

Click here and look for the segment with my name on it for a timely and wide-ranging conversation with host Rebecca Mansour on developments that will not only effect Americans’ pocketbooks, but the politics of the country’s upcoming election year.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

 

 

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Making News: Manufacturing Views Quoted in the Washington Post…& More!

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American Greatness, China, Denver Post, Hollywood, Making News, manufacturing, Modern Machine Shop, recession, tariffs, Thaddeus McCotter, Trade, Trump, Washington Post

I’m pleased to announce that three recent news reports – two on the state of American manufacturing, and one on China’s growing influence over the American movie industry – have cited my views and analyses.

On July 25, this Washington Post article included my – cloudy- forecast about industry’s near future due to all the uncertainties created by President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies.  It was also gratifying to see a Mainstream Media piece mention my observations about technical manufacturing recessions – I believe that’s a first.

For more on recent manufacturing recessions, including the one in which industry is still stuck, see this recent post of mine.

This Washington Post piece was also reprinted in several major dailies around the country, like the Denver Post.

The day before, this post on Modern Machine Shop‘s blog quoted from my recent offering on how U.S.-based companies have dealt with Mr. Trump’s tariffs.

Finally, on July 19, former Michigan Republican Congressman Thaddeus McCotter’s essay for the American Greatness website on Hollywood’s latest kowtow to Chinese investors mentioned a tweet of mine on the subject.  Here’s the link.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming and recent media appearances, and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Those New GDP Numbers Keep Showing Healthier Trade-Related Growth Progress Under Trump

Tags

debt, GDP, gross domestic product, inflation-adjusted growth, real GDP, real trade deficit, recession, recovery, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

So much data were released yesterday morning on the U.S. economy’s growth rate – not only the initial read on the second quarter of this year, but revisions going back to 2014 – that it’s impossible to explore all the results and their implications in one post. As a result, I’ll focus today on the main messages being sent by how the tariff-centric Trump trade policies are affecting growth.

In a nutshell, the big takeaway for me was that, despite the sizable increase in the inflation-adjusted trade deficit in the second quarter of this year (to an annualized total of $978.70 billion – the second biggest ever, after the $983 billion mark hit in the fourth quarter of last year), the economy kept indicating that it can grow – and pretty strongly – without racking up big increases in trade gap. In other words, the United States is regaining the ability to expand at acceptable rates without getting deeper into hock. 

Still, there’s a major uncertainty hovering over these results: Signs continue that they’re being distorted by what’s called tariff front-running (accelerating purchases of imports in order to avoid announced or threatened duties), and the consequent effects on building and reducing business inventories. And since tariff threats hang over not only hundreds of billions of dollars of goods imports from China, but rhetorically anyway over automotive imports from all over the world, import and inventory levels could well remain volatile. Moreover, don’t forget the potential effect on exports: If President Trump carries through with tariff threats, foreign economies are likely to impose retaliatory levies on American goods, and curb these sales.

So far, though, so good.

As in recent reports on trade and the gross domestic product (or GDP – what economists define as “the economy”), this post will compare the economy’s growth rate with the growth rate of the trade deficit during two recent similar periods of time – the statistical year (e.g., four straight quarters) during which growth was fastest when former President Barack Obama was in office, and the statistical year during which growth has been fastest so far during President Trump’s administration.

Even with the latest revisions, the fastest statistical Obama growth year was between the second quarter of 2014 and the second quarter of 2015. Adjusted for inflation (the most closely followed GDP measure), the economy grew by 3.35 percent over those four quarters – just a little less than the 3.37 percent previously estimated. And during that period, the real trade deficit rose by 21.34 percent (a little more slowly than the 21.55 percent previously estimated).

Before today’s revisions, the fastest Trump era growth stretch took place between the first quarter of 2017 and the first quarter of 2018. But that 3.18 percent after inflation growth has now been downgraded all the way down to 2.65 percent. But growth between the second quarters of 2017 and 2018 has been revised up – to 3.20 percent. So there’s a new Trump growth champ.

But even though the Trump growth spurt has been only a little slower than its Obama counterpart, the story with the trade deficit was strikingly different. For during the Trump spurt, the gap widened by only 6.34 percent. That’s less than a third as fast as under Obama.

In other words, constant dollar growth under President Trump has taken place while piling up much less debt than similar growth during the Obama years. And growth that’s less reliant on debt is growth that’s a lot healthier and more sustainable.

Trump-era growth looks all the more sustainable upon realizing that during Mr. Trump’s administration so far, robust growth (at least by recent standards) has been much more self-reliant than during the Obama administration – at least until very recently. The table below shows the annual (calendar year, from fourth quarter to fourth quarter) real growth rates during the Obama and Trump presidencies starting in 2010 (the first full calendar yer of the current economic recovery); the growth rate of the after-inflation trade deficits, and the ratios between these two figures for each year:

Obama yrs          real GDP       real trade deficit      deficit growth to GDP growth

10-11:              1.61 percent       0.85 percent                         0.53:1

11-12:              1.47 percent      -0.92 percent                       -0.63:1

12-13:              2.61 percent     -8.89 percent                       -3.41:1

13-14:              2.88 percent    23.36 percent                        8.11:1

14-15:              1.90 percent    21.83 percent                      13.07:1

15-16:              2.03 percent    10.87 percent                       5:35:1

Trump years

16-17:             2.80 percent      5.90 percent                       2.11:1

17-18:             2.52 percent    11.22 percent                       4.45:1

The table shows that only once (between 2012 and 2013) did the Obama-era economy display any ability to grow faster than the humdrum rate of two percent with the trade deficit’s growth restrained. (In fact, it shrunk significantly.) Once growth accelerated (the following year), the trade shortfall exploded, and its rate of increase, along with those ratios, stayed high even as growth itself cooled notably.

Moreover, without pronounced tariff front-running, the 2017-18 Trump trade deficit figure and the resulting ratio both would likely have been much lower. And economic growth looks even more self-reliant, and therefore healthier, so far this year, as the follo  wing table shows:

                               real GDP      real trade deficit     deficit growth to GDP growth

4Q 18-1Q 19:       3.06 percent    -3.97 percent                       -1.30:1

1Q 19-2Q 19:       2.04 percent     3.68 percent                         1.80:1

The Trump record looks even better when presented on a rolling four quarters basis, starting with that peak Obama growth period between the second quarter of 2014 and the second quarter of 2015, and ending with the last such period – between the second quarter of 2018 and the second quarter of 2019:

                              real GDP      real trade deficit      deficit growth to GDP growth

2Q 14-2Q 15:    3.35 percent      21.34 percent                       6.37:1

3Q 14-3Q 15:    2.44 percent      30.60 percent                     12.54:1

4Q 14-4Q 15:    1.90 percent      21.83 percent                     11.49:1

1Q 15-1Q 16:    1.62 percent      11.72 percent                       7.23:1

2Q 15-2Q 16:    1.34 percent        9.59 percent                       7.16:1

3Q 15-3Q 16:    1.56 percent        2.42 percent                       1.55:1

4Q 15-4Q16:     2.03 percent     10.87 percent                        5.35:1

1Q 16-1Q 17:    2.10 percent       6.92 percent                        3.30:1

Trump

2Q 16-2Q 17:    2.16 percent    11.71 percent                        5.42:1

3Q 16-3Q 17:    2.42 percent      9.50 percent                       3.93:1

4Q 16-4Q 17:    2.80 percent     5.90 percent                        2.11:1

1Q 17-1Q 18:    2.86 percent     6.34 percent                       2.22:1

2Q 17-2Q 18:    3.20 percent     0.06 percent                       0.19:1

3Q 17-3Q 18:    3.13 percent   15.44 percent                      4.93:1

4Q 17-4Q 18:    2.52 percent   11.22 percent                      4.45:1

1Q 18-1Q 19:    2.65 percent     6.76 percent                      2.55:1

2Q 18-2Q 19:    2.29 percent   15.07 percent                      6.58:1

Though the figures fluctuate significantly, the difference under two different presidents at roughly the same phase of the same economic expansion is at least as significant. To start, the only time that annual real growth under Obama topped three percent during this stretch, the inflation-adjusted trade deficit soared 6.37 times faster. Under Trump, the economy has enjoyed two such periods. During the first, the real trade deficit barely budged. During the second, it rose 4.93 times faster than the economy.

During these Obama years, the after-inflation trade deficit’s annual growth rate slipped under ten percent three times. Real annual GDP growth never bested 2.10 percent during any of them. During the Trump years, sub-ten percent annual growth for the real trade deficit has occurred five times. Real annual GDP increased during those years at rates between 2.42 percent and 3.20 percent. The worst Obama ratio has been 12.54 percent. The worst Trump ratio has been 6.58 percent (coming during the most recent statistical year, and possibly indicating tariff front-running). 

Has President Trump managed to reduce the U.S. trade deficit as such, or made the U.S. economy, and especially strong growth, completely self-sufficient, and therefore free of debt dependence (in terms of parts of the economy where this is feasible, as opposed to, say, tropical fruit)? Of course not. The nearly $20 trillion American economy is obviously a supertanker that isn’t turned around easily or quickly. But it’s clear that whereas the United States was moving ever further from those goals before Mr. Trump was inaugurated, it’s now moving closer. Just as clear: If the President stays the course on tariffs (much less increase and/or broaden them), progress will likely continue.      

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Just When Did U.S. Manufacturing’s Current Recession Begin?

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Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted growth, manufacturing, recession, {What's Left of) Our Economy

U.S.-based manufacturing went into its latest recession in April, and I missed it. Or did I? Once I realized my apparent oversight, I went back to the figures and realized that, although the definition of a recession that I’ve long used (two consecutive quarters of cumulative output shrinkage) is clear enough, figuring out what start date to use has been anything but throughout the current economic recovery.

For example, between April, 2018 and April, 2019, inflation-adjusted manufacturing output (the measure I’m using here, and the measure used by the Federal Reserve when it puts out its industrial production statistics each month) dropped by 0.14 percent. So even though it wasn’t down much, it was down on net for a full year – or four straight quarters.

That recession came to an end in May of this year, when industry’s after-inflation production grew by 0.25 percent on-month. But manufacturing was still mired in another recession – one that began in July. How could that be? Because between May and July of last year, price-adjusted output climbed by 0.43 percent – enough to push it back to 0.39 percent higher than the May, 2019 level. Since that time period covers more than two consecutive quarters, it qualifies as a new technical recession.

Moreover, even though between May and June of this year, constant-dollar (i.e., inflation-adjusted) manufacturing production advanced by another 0.43 percent, that still wasn’t enough to push it out of technical recession territory. The reason? Between last June and July, such output improved – by 0.43 percent itself. So since last July, it’s still down by 0.36 percent on net.

And if real manufacturing production doesn’t pick up even faster over the next few months, its current recession could continue for several more months, because last year, it continued growing healthily through December.

Interestingly, even though the U.S. economy has been in recovery mode since June, 2009, this current technical manufacturing recession is far from the first. I’ve counted five alone between January, 2012 and November, 2016. Here they are:

Jan., 2012-Oct., 2012 (down 0.22 percent)

Dec., 2012-July, 2013 (down 0.75 percent)

Aug., 2013-Jan., 2014 (down 0.01 percent)

Feb., 2014-Sept., 2016 (down 0.11 percent)

Jan., 2016-Nov., 2016 (down 0.19 percent)

In addition, those last two entries show the type of rolling, overlapping character like that seen since April, 2018. And I’ve spotted at least one more such instance – the downturn that took place between February and August of 2013, when real manufacturing output dipped by 0.04 percent.

And one more – big! – complication: Although the U.S. economy began recovering from the recession that began at the end of 2007, American manufacturing still hasn’t. Sure, it’s grown since it hit bottom (also in June, 2009). But as I’ve been pointing out ever since, it’s never grown enough to better that December, 2007 peak and in fact at present remains 2.09 percent smaller in terms of after-inflation production that at the recession’s onset. That’s more than a decade. And at its current rate of growth, the slump could easily turn eleven at the end of this year.

So getting back to my original question, is it fair to say that I missed manufacturing’s most recent recession during the current economic expansion if its post-2007 downturn never ended? As always, let me know your answers.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Private Sector U.S. Jobs Increasingly Really Deserve the Name

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Barack Obama, Employment, healthcare, Jobs, private sector jobs, recession, recovery, subsidized private sector, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although unemployment in America has hovered near multi-decade lows for most of the last year, concerns about job quality rightly persist – largely because wage gains have only recently showed signs of recovering to historically normal levels for a recovery. But the latest official data from the Labor Department demonstrate that the makeup of the country’s employment picture and how it’s changed make clear continued improvement in one key measure: Growing private sector employment increasingly reflects gains in what I’ve called the real private sector, as opposed to the subsidized private sector.

Also apparent from the employment figures: The resurgence of the real private sector in relative terms as well as in absolute terms has been a Trump era phenomenon.

As known by RealityChek regulars, this trend is encouraging because the subsidized private sector consists of parts of the economy that are often (and even officially) viewed as parts of the private sector, but whose health depends largely on government largesse. That is, its total employment and its employment gains would be much smaller without huge government payouts – i.e., politicians’ decisions. The healthcare services industry is the main example.

By contrast, the real private sector consists of parts of the economy whose health flows largely from free market forces. So without getting involved in the debate over whether the United States supports too many subsidized private sector jobs or not, it should be clear that they have little to do with the state and health of the economy as a whole – unlike real private sector jobs.

According to the Labor Department’s Bureau of Labor Statistics, from 2013 through 2016, the subsidized private sector’s share of total annual employment increases more than doubled: from 11.34 percent to 25.99 percent. And its share of annual total private sector jobs gains (that is, employment increases by the private sector as conventionally defined), soared from 11.02 percent to 28.59 percent.

During 2017 and 2018 (and the data for late 2018 is still preliminary), the subsidized private sector’s share of total annual U.S. jobs gains dropped to 21.04 percent and then to 19.90 percent. And its share of the growth of total private sector jobs fell to 21.91 percent and then to 20.74 percent.

Another way to look at the Obama-era growth of subsidized private sector employment is to examine its growth as a share of the growth of real private sector jobs. In 2013, this figure stood at 12.38 percent. In 2016? Just over 40 percent. In other words, in the last year of Barack Obama’s presidency, some four in ten of the net new jobs created in the private sector came in the subsidized private sector – meaning that they were heavily dependent on government largesse.

In 2017 and 2018, subsidized private sector jobs growth as a share of total private sector jobs growth sank all the way to 28.05 percent, and then to 26.16 percent.

Looking at the economy from a static standpoint – i.e., through snapshots taken at crucial dates – illustrates these trends, too, although less dramatically. After all, even major relative changes can take many years to show up as major absolute changes in a supertanker as big as the U.S. economy.

At the outset of the last recession the subsidized private sector represented 13.67 percent of all U.S. jobs and the real private sector’s share was 70.16 percent. And the subsidized private sector’s share of the total (conventionally defined) private sector was 19.49 percent.

By the time the recovery began, in mid-2009, these figures stood at 14.97 percent and 67.80 percent – showing that during an economic downturn that decimated the overall American jobs market, subsidized private sector employment rose not only in relative terms but in absolute terms (from 18.92 million to 19.61 million. Meanwhile, the subsidized private sector’s share of the total private sector employment had risen to 22.07 percent.

By January, 2017 – the final month of the Obama administration and eight and a half years into the recovery – the subsidized private sector comprised 15.75 percent of all American jobs, and the real private sector was back up to 68.94 percent. Subsidized private sector employment had grown to 22.84 percent of total private sector jobs.

By December, 2018 (results that are still preliminary) the subsidized private sector’s share of all American employment had kept increasing – to 15.91 percent. And the real private sector’s share grew modestly, too – to 69.11 percent, as did the subsidized private sector’s share of the total private sector (to 23.02 percent).

Nevertheless, this examination of the changing dimensions of subsidized private sector employment also reveals that the national jobs market still hasn’t returned to pre-recession normality. In particular, even though the current recovery is nearing it’s tenth anniversary, that real private sector share of total employment (69.11 percent) is still below where it stood at the downturn’s onset (70.16 percent).

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Trump is Making Headway on Trade Deficits

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China, Made in Washington trade deficit, Obama, recession, recovery, Trade, Trade Deficits, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Given that two of President Trump’s main trade policy aims have been to reduce the gargantuan U.S. global trade deficit and the comparably huge trade gap with China, it’s been entirely predictable that the chortlers are out with claims that he’s failing on both grounds. (See, e.g., here and here.)

What’s just as predictable? The chortlers are missing the main story: On both fronts, Mr. Trump’s first full year in office (the time-span for which the latest complete data are available), showed noteworthy progress. The main evidence? For both the world as a whole and for China, U.S. trade shortfalls grew more slowly during his first full year in office, even as the American economy grew faster.

As standard economic theory holds, that’s not supposed to happen. Quite the opposite: As growth speeds up, all else equal, trade deficit increases should be expected, as the growth boosts purchases of imports.

As RealityChek readers know, this pattern has been broken often in recent decades. And Trump Year One is an example, especially when the trade flows most heavily influenced by trade policy decisions are examined.

By that I mean what I call the Made in Washington trade deficit – the gap resulting by measuring imports and exports while stripping out oil and services, because trade liberalization in those sectors is in its infancy.

The contrast between the first full Trump year and the previous comparable period (the baseline for which came during former President Obama’s final year in office) is especially instructive. From the second quarter of 2016 to the second quarter of 2017, the Made in Washington trade deficit grew 1.72 times faster than the gross domestic product (GDP) in pre-inflation terms, and the China merchandise deficit grew 1.65 times faster.

Yet from the second quarter of 2017 through the second quarter of 2018 (using the latest GDP figures available), the Made in Washington shortfall increased only half (0.49 times) as fast as the economy overall, while the China goods deficit increased 1.33 times faster than GDP.

Moreover, the first Trump year compares well with the entirety of the current economic recovery, which of course began in mid-2009, early in the first Obama term. We can toss out the results from the second quarter of 2009 to the second quarter of 2010, since the second quarter of 2009 marked the end of the previous recession. But from second quarter 2010-2011 to second quarter 2016-2017, the Made in Washington trade shortfall grew as slowly compared with the economy as it did during the first Trump period only once – from the second quarter of 2010 to the second quarter of 2011 (0.44 times faster). In fact, between the second quarters of 2013-2014, and 2014-2015, this trade shortfall surged by 4.68 and 4.07 times faster than growth.

The relative growth rate of the U.S. goods trade deficit with China diminished during the first full Trump year as well – from 1.65 times faster than the economy, to 1.33 times faster.

On China trade, the immediate pre-Trump years overall look more impressive in comparison with the first full Trump year, but hardly in a slam dunk way. Between second quarter 2010-2011 and second quarter 2016-2017, the China shortfall grew slower compared with growth than it did during the first Trump year three times (2012-2013, 2013-2014, and 2015-2016) and faster the other four years.

It’s completely legit to criticize Mr. Trump’s focus on the global trade deficit or the China trade deficit or any trade deficit (although I regard such criticism as wrong for various reasons, including the one analyzed here). And it’s completely legit to criticize other elements of the Trump trade policies (as I have numerous times – e.g., here and here). What’s not legitimate, though, is to accuse the President of failing to make headway in his trade deficit reduction goals – unless you have no interest in the most pertinent facts.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: America’s Real Wage Recession Continues, and Manufacturing Pay Hits a Downbeat Milestone

Tags

inflation-adjusted wages, manufacturing, private sector, recession, recovery, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although this morning’s data from the Labor Department showed that the inflation-adjusted wages picture brightened marginally in June, they also revealed that two underlying trends on the American compensation front remained as discouraging as ever – especially in manufacturing. Further, the statistics confirmed that real hourly pay in industry has reached a milestone that factory workers clearly won’t want to celebrate.

The two underlying trends have to do with the technical real wage recessions (two or more consecutive quarters of net decline) that private sector workers overall, and their manufacturing counterparts, continue to suffer.

For the former, constant dollar hourly pay is down on net since last July – by 0.19 percent. For manufacturing, the real wage recession began two-and-one half years ago. Since January, 2016, after -inflation hourly wages are off by 0.09 percent.

The milestone? Real hourly pay in manufacturing has lately been performing so much worse than pay in the overall private sector that the two figures have now converged for the first time since these statistics have been tracked (beginning in 2006).

In May, price-adjusted wages in manufacturing and the overall private sector both stood at $10.75 per hour in 1982-84 dollars. This morning, those preliminary May readings remained intact, and the preliminary June numbers revealed both categories of workers to be earning $10.76 per hour in real terms.

By comparison, when the last recession began, at the end of 2007, constant dollar manufacturing wages topped their overall private sector counterparts by 2.79 percent. When the current recovery began, in mid-2009, the gap had actually grown – to 3.98 percent.

But during the current expansion, real private sector wages have now improved by 4.36 percent, whereas in manufacturing, constant dollar hourly pay is up only 0.37 percent – less than a tenth as fast.

On a sequential basis, real wages in manufacturing and the overall private sector both increased in June by 0.09 percent. On an annual basis, however, real private sector wages are flat, and real manufacturing wages are down 1.10 percent.

Between the previous Junes, constant dollar private sector wages advanced by 0.84 percent, and their manufacturing counterparts climbed by 0.46 percent.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Manufacturing Job Creation Softened a Bit in May; Wages (Literally) Went Nowhere

Tags

Employment, inflation-adjusted wages, Jobs, manufacturing, non-farm jobs, private sector, recession, recovery, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I was on some travel yesterday and couldn’t put out my usual same-day, post. But here’s my analysis of the latest monthly (May) manufacturing figures contained in that morning’s employment report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics:

>U.S. manufacturing job creation shifted into a somewhat lower gear in May, with its 18,000 sequential gain the smallest such improvement since last September’s 6,000. Revisions left the last February through April monthly totals unchanged on net.

>Worse news, moreover, came on the manufacturing wages front. Pre-inflation hourly pay flat-lined on month in May – its worst such results since last November’s similar performance. In addition, April’s previously reported 0.15 percent monthly manufacturing constant dollar wage gain was revised down to 0.15 percent.

>By contrast, overall current dollar private sector wages saw their best monthly improvement (0.30 percent) since December’s 0.38 percent.

>As a result, May’s year-on-year manufacturing wage improvement before inflation totaled only 1.85 percent. Between the previous Mays, pre-inflation manufacturing wages advanced by 2.12 percent.

>These increases also lagged those for the overall private sector, where current dollar wages rose by 2.71 percent on year in May. That was the best such performance since January’s 2.77 percent. And it exceeded the 2.46 percent private sector wage gain between May, 2016 and May, 2017.

>Consequently, the wage gap between manufacturing and the overall private sector widened significantly between last May and this. As of last May, during the current economic recovery, pre-inflation private sector wages had increased 21.24 percent faster than manufacturing wages. This May, the difference was up to 28.13 percent.

>Despite May’s somewhat weaker manufacturing employment growth, the sector’s share of total non-farm employment (the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ U.S. jobs universe) remained at just under 8.53 percent. Last May, manufacturing accounted for just under 8.49 percent of total non-farm employment, meaning that during the last year, manufacturing payrolls have grown slightly faster than American payrolls in general.

>In fact, manufacturing’s May year-on-year job creation (259,000) was a tremendous improvement from the figure between the previous Mays (78,000) and the best annual gain since May, 1998’s 262,000.

>Over the longer-term, however, manufacturing remains a significant job-creation laggard. Since it’s latest employment bottom, in February and March, 2010, it’s regained 1.22 million (53.21 percent) of the 2.293 million jobs lost during the recession and its immediate aftermath.

>The overall private sector lost 8.780 million jobs from the year-end 2007 onset of the recession through February, 2010. Since then, it’s created 19.086 million net new jobs.

>Moreover, since the recession’s onset, the private sector has boosted its employment by 8.88 percent. But manufacturing payrolls are still down 7.81 percent from their December, 2007 levels.

>Manufacturing has been an even worse real wage laggard. The latest inflation-adjusted data go through April, and show that manufacturing couldn’t even match the monthly flat-line in private sector wages. In manufacturing, pay between March and April dipped by 0.09 percent.

>Year-on-year, private sector after-inflation wages inched up only 0.19 percent in April, but even that negligible growth handily beat manufacturing’s 1.10 percent decline. Between the previous April’s inflation-adjusted manufacturing wages improved by 0.55 percent.

>Indeed, both the private sector and manufacturing continue to experience technical real wage recessions (periods of cumulative shrinkage lasting at least two quarters). But in the private sector, such pay is off only 0.09 percent since last May. In manufacturing, real wages are down by this amount since January, 2016.

>And whereas private sector wages are up 4.17 percent in real terms during the current economic recovery (which is nearly nine years old), their manufacturing counterpart gained only 0.37 percent – less than a tenth as much.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Fed Manufacturing Production Figures Produce Mixed Picture

Tags

durable goods, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted growth, manufacturing, non-durable goods, recession, recovery, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Domestic U.S. manufacturing grew on month in April in real terms for the third straight month, according to the Federal Reserve’s new industrial production figures. Moreover, April’s 0.47 percent sequential after-inflation production increase was the best such result since October’s 1.31 percent – which was boosted by a bounce-back effect from last fall’s hurricanes. Monthly constant dollar output gains were recorded for both durable goods (0.42 percent) and non-durable goods (0.52 percent).

Yet moderately negative revisions generated an annual April real growth rate for overall manufacturing (2.01 percent) that was the lowest since January’s 0.99 percent, and slightly more sluggish than the previous April-to-April’s 2.18 percent. Adjusted for inflation, domestic U.S. manufacturing output remains 3.31 percent smaller than at its peak before the last recession began – more than ten years ago.

Here are the manufacturing highlights of the Federal Reserve’s release today on April industrial production:

>The new April Federal Reserve industrial production figures showed mixed results for domestic manufacturing, with inflation-adjusted output expanding sequentially for the third straight months, but annual real growth showing some signs of slowing.

>Industry’s constant dollar output improved on month by 0.47 percent in April – the best such performance since a hurricane bounce-back effect helped spur a 1.31 percent sequential spurt last October.

>April’s real monthly production improvement was broad-based, including both the durable goods (0.42 percent) and non-durable goods (0.52 percent) super-sectors.

>Yet the latest revisions were moderately negative. March’s meager 0.07 percent monthly output rise was downgraded to 0.02 percent, February’s 1.51 percent jump is now judged to have been 1.40 percent, and January’s 0.37 percent sequential drop is now reported as a 0.59 percent decrease.

>Largely as a result, April’s year-on-year real manufacturing production increase was only 2.01 percent – the lowest since January’s 0.99 percent.

>Between the previous Aprils, constant dollar manufacturing output expanded by 2.18 percent.

>In addition, the new Fed figures reveal that, in price-adjusted terms, domestic manufacturing is still 3.31 percent smaller than at its pre-recession peak at the end of 2007 – more than ten years ago.

>More encouragingly, April’s monthly manufacturing production improvement was broad-based.

>For durable goods, the larger of manufacturing’s two super-sectors, real output advanced by 0.42 percent sequentially in April.

>Nonetheless, revisions were negative as well, with March’s previously reported 0.39 percent increase downgraded to 0.17 percent, February’s 1.84 percent increase to 1.59 percent, and January’s 0.25 percent dip to a 0.40 percent decrease.

>Durable goods’ year-on-year results were no better. April’s 1.94 percent annual production increase was the lowest inflation-adjusted figure since January’s 0.74 percent. It was also significantly worse than the 2.77 percent figure recorded between the previous Aprils.

>Durable goods real production is now 0.78 percent above the level it hit at the outset of the last recession, at the end of 2007. It rose slightly the following month, and is now 0.75 percent above that January, 2008 levels.

>Non-durable goods have turned in a somewhat better recent performance.

>In April, their price-adjusted output rose by 0.52 percent on month.

>Moreover, March’s previously reported 0.27 percent sequential real production decrease was revised up to a 0.13 percent decline, and February’s 1.16 percent increase was revised up to 1.20 percent. Only January’s results were downgraded – from a 0.50 percent monthly decrease to a 0.79 percent drop.

>On an annual basis, non-durables after-inflation output rose by 2.10 percent in April – a decided improvement from the 1.54 percent increase between the previous Aprils.

>Further, although the latest year-on-year non-durables’ real output increase is also the lowest since January’s (1.26 percent), the deceleration has been smaller than that in durable goods.

>Nonetheless, constant dollar non-durables output is now fully 8.13 percent below its pre-recession peak – hit in July, 2007.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Manufacturing Jobs Growth Stays Strong, but Where are the Wages?

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Bureau of Labor Statistics, inflation-adjusted wages, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, non-farm payrolls, recession, recovery, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

According to this morning’s Labor Department jobs report, April was another month of impressive employment gains and sluggish wage growth in manufacturing. Industry added 24,000 net new jobs on month and revisions left recent months’ solid employment growth intact. Further, manufacturing payrolls’ yearly rate of expansion quickened in April (to 245,000) and was still the best such performance since May, 1998’s 262,000. In fact, manufacturing jobs continued their recent trend of increasing faster than overall employment, with their share of non-farm jobs growing from 8.49 percent last April to 8.53 percent.

Yet pre-inflation manufacturing wages advanced by only 0.15 percent on month in April and March’s figure was revised down slightly. Worse, on an annual basis, current dollar manufacturing hourly pay growth fell to 1.36 percent – the slowest such rate since June, 2015’s 1.25 percent. And in inflation-adjusted terms, manufacturing wages are still in technical recession, having fallen on net by 0.28 percent since February, 2016.

Here’s my analysis of the latest monthly (April) manufacturing figures contained in this morning’s employment report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics:

>American manufacturing’s robust net job creation extended into April, yet swelling payrolls continued having little impact on the sector’s weak wage growth.

>Domestic manufacturers boosted payrolls by 24,000 in April. March’s 22,000 monthly jobs increase was left unrevised, and February’s previously reported 32,000 sequential improvement was downgraded to 31,000.

>Industry’s employment performance was even better on an annual basis. From April, 2017 to April, 2018, manufacturing added 245,000 net jobs – its best such performance since May, 1998’s 262,000.

>Between the previous Aprils, industry created 54,000 net new jobs.

>Further, manufacturing employment continued its recent trend of growing even faster than overall U.S. employment. Last April, manufacturing jobs accounted for 8.49 percent of all American non-farm employment (the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ U.S. employment universe). This April, their share stood at 8.53 percent.

>Manufacturing has now regained 52.42 percent (1.202 million) of the 2.293 million jobs it lost since the late-2007 onset of the Great Recession through the sector’s employment bottom in February and March, 2010.

>But not even their recent hiring spurt has induced domestic manufacturers to raise pay significantly.

>April saw pre-inflation hourly pay in manufacturing increase by just 0.15 percent. In a break with recent trends, this sequential manufacturing wage gain matched that for the private sector overall.

>But manufacturing’s March monthly wage increase was revised down from 0.19 percent to 0.15 percent, and the April private sector figure represents a slowdown from March’s 0.22 percent – which was also downgraded (from 0.30 percent).

>Manufacturing wages performed even worse on an annual basis. Between this April and last, they rose by just 1.36 percent – the slowest such improvement since June, 2015’s 1.25 percent. From April, 2016 to April, 2017, they increased by 1.93 percent.

>As a result, since the start of the current economic recovery, in mid-2009, pre-inflation private sector wages have grown by 25.62 percent more than their manufacturing counterparts. Last April, the gap was considerably less: 18.72 percent.

>In real terms, manufacturing’s recent growth has been even less impressive.

>The latest inflation-adjusted data go through March, when its constant dollar pay rose by 0.19 percent – a downgrade from the initially reported 0.28 percent. Real monthly wage growth for the private sector in toto was downgraded for March, too – but from 0.37 percent to 0.28 percent.

>Year-on-year, real wages in April for manufacturing are actually down – by 0.65 percent. For the private sector overall, they were up 0.28 percent.

>In fact, manufacturing workers have suffered a technical recession in real wages (two straight quarters or more of cumulative decline) since February, 2016. During that more-than-two-year period, their inflation-adjusted hourly pay is off by 0.28 percent.

>The overall private sector is in real wage recession, too, but only since last May. Since then, its after-inflation hourly pay is down by 0.09 percent.

>Further, since the current recovery’s mid-2009 onset, overall real private sector wages have risen nearly ten times faster (4.17 percent) than real manufacturing wages (0.47 percent).

>Despite healthy recent growth, manufacturing remains a longer-term jobs laggard. As reported above, since the current economic recovery began in mid-2009, manufacturing has regained more than half the jobs it lost during the recession and its aftermath. But since shedding 8.780 million positions on net from December, 2007 through February, 2010, the private sector has created 18.856 million net new positions.

>From another perspective, manufacturing payrolls remain 7.94 percent below their immediate pre-recession (December, 2007) level of 13.746 million jobs. But overall private sector employment has risen 9.50 percent during that period.