(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Trade Figures Still on a (CCP Virus) Roller Coaster

Tags

Biden, CCP Virus, China, consumers, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, exports, Federal Reserve, goods trade, imports, Janet Yellen, manufacturing, non-oil goods deficit, recovery, stimulus, supply chains, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Just as September’s official U.S. trade figures revealed numerous records and multi-month or year highs and lows (mainly of the bad kind), today’s October release reported its share of startling results – but mainly of the good kind. One black spot deserves mention right away, though – the country’s manufacturng trade deficit passed the $1 trillion mark for the fourth straight year. And we still have two data months left in 2021.

Still, the all-time monthly bests and similar extraordinary readings from October were nonetheless impressive. And combined with the September statistics, they make clear that the CCP Virus and government efforts to fight it are far from done distorting the U.S. and world economies. 

The chief records set were:

>Combined goods and services exports of $223.63 billion, which beat May, 2018’s previous record of $216.09 billion by 3.49 percent. Moreover, the 8.14 percent sequential improvement was the biggest since June, 2020’s 8.69 percent – which came during the strong national and global economic recoveries from the first wave of the CCP Virus and the short but sharp depression it caused.

>Total imports of $290.75 billion, which edged outthe previous month’s record of $288.23 billion by 1.06 percent.

>Goods exports, where the $158.73 billion figure exceeded the former record of $149.92 billion set in August by 5.87 percent. And the monthly increase of 11.07 percent was the biggest since March’s 10.18 percent.

>Goods imports of 242.67 billion, also the second straight all-time high, and a level that topped September’s $240.89 billion by 0.74 percent.

Another all-time best and worst came in non-oil goods trade. As known by RealityChek regulars, these trade flows deserve special attention, because they consist of exports and imports whose levels are significantly affected by trade agreements and other U.S. trade policy decisions (unlike trade in oil and services, where liberalization efforts are still at early stages at best).

The best? Non-oil goods exports climbed to an all-time high, with their $138.82 billion total standing 5.87 percent higher than the previous record of $131.12 billion set in August. Moreover, their monthly growth of 9.57 percent was the biggest such advance since the 10.65 percent increase of July, 2020 – also during that recovery from the first CCP Virus-related downturns.

The worst? Non-oil goods imports set their second straight record, coming in at $242.67 billion, or 0.74 percent higher than the September total of $240.89 billion.

And finally, when it comes to new records, imports of advanced technology products (ATP). Their $51.54 billion level also was a second straight, and surpassed September’s $50.50 billion by 2.06 percent.

But multi-month and even multi-year highs and lows abounded in the October trade report:

>The overall deficit plummeted from the record (and upwardly revised) $81.44 billion figure for September to $67.12 billion. The monthly total was the lowest since April’s $66.15 billion, and the sequential drop of 17.58 percent the greatest since April, 2015’s 18.16 percent.

>Similarly, in October, the goods deficit hit its lowest level ($83.95 billion) since November’s $86.23 billion, and the month-to-month decline of 14.33 percent (from September’s record $97.98 billion, was the biggest such drop since the 20.79 percent nosedive of February, 2009 – when the Great Recession following the global financial crisis was in its depths.

>The 11.40 percent monthly decrease in the non-oil goods deficit (the steepest fall-off since April, 2015’s 13.76 percent), brought this trade gap to its lowest level ($82.99 billion) since last November’s $85.73 billion.

October’s trade report contained some eye-popping numbers in U.S.-China goods trade, too.

>Goods exports to the People’s Republic shot up from $10.91 billion to a new record of $16.64 billion. Further, not only did this figure top the previous best (October, 2020’s $14.77 billion). But the 52.46 percent sequential jump was the biggest since the 71.04 percent recorded back in November, 1996 – when much smaller trade numbers made big percentage improvements much easier to generate.

>In addition, the U.S. goods trade deficit with China of $31.40 billion was the lowest since July’s $28.65 billion read, while the 13.99 percent monthly improvement was the biggest since the 25.19 percent figure reported for March, 2020 – when China had still shut down much of its economy due to the pandemic.

The China data also show that U.S. trade with the People’s Republic continue to perform better than U.S. trade in non-oil goods – the best global proxy for U.S. goods trade with China – and as a result, that the Trump (now Trump-Biden?) tariffs continue to work well.

For example, that 13.99 percent sequential narrowing of the U.S. goods trade gap with China in October was faster than the comparable 11.40 improvement in the non-oil goods deficit. That 52.46 percent monthly increase in goods exports to China, moreover, was nearly ten times greater than the 5.87 percent rise in non-oil goods exports.

The 1.30 percent increase in U.S. goods imports from China was nearly twice as fast as the 0.74 percent increase in America’s non-oil goods imports, but both absolute increases are modest.

And on a year-to-date basis, the U.S. goods deficit with China is still up less (13.67 percent) than the non-oil goods shortfall (16.73 percent).

On the down side, the U.S. manufacturing deficit did decline in October – by 3.32 percent, from a record $118.75 billion to $114.81 billion. But it remained astronomical by any reasonable standard.

Manufacturing exports improved on month by a healthy 10.99 percent, from $92.58 billion to $102.75 billion. But although manufacturing imports climbed by a much slower pace (2.95 percent, from $211.33 billion to $217.56 billion), they’re still more than twice as great.

Year-to-date, the 18.78 percent advance in manufacturing exports and the 19.56 percent rise in manufacturing imports has resulted in that trillion-dollar-plus manufacturing deficit ($1.083 trillion, to be precise). As of October, moreover, it’s running 18.26 percent ahead of last year’s pace.

The outlook for America’s trade flows? I’m still pretty sure that the deficits will keep rising in the near term – mainly because overall economic growth, and therefore consuming and importing are expected to stay so strong.  Longer term, though, uncertainties are still noteworthy and arguably could frustrate forecasts even more. 

After all, it’s still not clear how America’s and other governments will respond to the new Omicron variant ofthe virus (or whatever other strains come down the pike).

There’s the seemingly likely ebbing of the fiscal stimulus that’s boosted savings, and therefore purchasing and importing power, for the entire population during the pandemic period. Continued high inflation could start depressing consumer spending on its own – although less government stimulus all else equal should start restraining prices at some point.

Additionally, don’t forget the Federal Reserve, which has been prompted by faster-than-expected price increases to reduce the bond-buying program that’s provided another massive source of economic stimulus.  Is Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen right to be confident that consumer demand will stay strong nonetheless?  Beats me. 

Finally, it’s encouraging to read various claims that the global supply chain crisis is easing (e.g., here). But even if progress on this front continues and accelerates, new geopolitical threats to global commerce have emerged – especially rising tensions between China on the one hand, and the United States and most of China’s neighbors on the other, over the future of Taiwan and whether it gets decided peacefully.     

Since America’s economic growth is expected to be torrid in the final three months of this year (including, of course, October), I suspect that, despite all these questions and complications, the next few months of trade figures will worsen considerably (as I wrote last month). But the farther down the road I look, the cloudier my crystal ball gets

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why the Fed is Still (Really) Dovish on Economic Stimulus

Tags

CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Employment, Federal Reserve, global financial crisis, Great Recession, interest rates, Jerome Powell, lockdowns, monetary policy, moral hazard, QE, quantitative easing, recovery, stimulus, taper, transitory, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Yesterday, I tweeted that the Federal Reserve’s just-published statement on its policy plans looked pretty dovish – that is, signaling a continued determination to keep pouring massive amounts of stimulus into the U.S. economy. Most every other student of the economy worth heeding read exactly the opposite into the message and some related materials it issued – including Chair Jerome Powell’s statement at his subsequent press conference that the central bank could start easing off the accelerator as early as November. (One notable exception:  CNBC’s Steve Liesman.)  

Here’s why I’m right – at least in the most important senses – and why the dovishness I see isn’t great news for the American economy at all over any serious length of time.

The folks reading hawkishness into the Fed’s stance pointed to three main reasons for their conclusion, and I’d be the last person to ignore them. First, the policy statement did declare that “moderation” in the central banks’ bond-buying program, known as “quantitative easing” (QE) “may soon be warranted” if the economy’s progress “continues broadly as expected.” That’s a big change even from the July statement’s analysis:

“Last December, the [Fed] indicated that it would continue to increase its holdings of Treasury securities by at least $80 billion per month and of agency mortgage-backed securities by at least $40 billion per month until substantial further progress has been made toward its maximum employment and price stability goals. Since then, the economy has made progress toward these goals, and the [Fed] will continue to assess progress in coming meetings.”

Second, at the press conference, Powell not only hinted at a November start for the so-called “taper” of Fed bond buying.  He added that the process could conclude “around the middle of next year.” So although the change is expected to occur gradually, the Fed is indicating it won’t take forever to accomplish. 

Third, in a regularly issued graphic summary of their (anonymous) future expectations (called the “dot plot”), fully half of these policymakers made clear they anticipated that next year would also see the interest rate they control begin rising. As Powell told the press, taking this step would mean that these Fed officials had seen much more economic progress than that required for the taper of bond purchases they appear ready to begin.

I actually agree that this evidence adds up to more Fed “hawkishness.” But “more” clears only a very low bar for an institution that’s been super-dovish for the better part of the last decade and a half (since it decided to fight the Great Recession following the 2007-08 global financial crisis by opening up the stimulus spigots to an unheard of extent).

In other words, a Fed that for many more months will be continuing to spur growth and employment by purchasing tens of billions of dollars of bonds every month (only less than the current $120 billion) still looks pretty devoted to easy money to me.

At least as important, Powell in particular made clear that the Fed’s expectations for ending what are, after all, measures taken to counter the Covid-induced economic emergency are so fragile that he and his colleagues could change their minds as soon as the current recovery – which has been strong by most measures – veers off track.

It’s true that at the press conference, the Chair stated that all it would take for him to decide that employment was still improving enough to support a prompt beginning of tapering would be a “reasonably good” and “decent” official U.S. jobs report come out next month – not a “knockout, great, super strong” result. (Powell already believes that the nation’s inflation record – the Fed’s other main “taper test” has already been good enough to warrant reducing those bond purchases.)

But aside from questions about how Powell defines “reasonably good,” etc., his remarks show that he (along with his policymaking colleagues, over whom he wields considerable influence) still believes that a single poor jobs report, or similar discouraging development, would suffice to keep the economy on its exact same monumental levels of literal life support even though the patient has long exited the emergency room.

And these exacting standards for merely reducing current stimulus gradually (which, as the Chair himself noted, would still leave its asset holdings “elevated” and “accommodative”) tell me at least that, however well the economy performs, the Fed will be remaining on a super easy-money course pretty much indefinitely.

The one development that could change this picture significantly: a big, sustained takeoff of inflation.

But if Powell’s right (which I believe he is), then the current burst of higher prices results from “transitory” developments peculiar to the dramatic stop-start dynamics created by the pandemic and its policy and behavioral fall-out. Prices, therefore, should start normalizing before too long.

So what’s the problem? First, if the Fed is afraid that the U.S. economy can’t prosper adequately without what are essentially massive government subsidies, that’s a pretty damning indictment of that economy’s ability to generate satisfactory levels of growth and employment and living standards improvements more or less on its own.

Even more important, even if this Fed judgment is wrong, clearly it’s going to keep the stimulus flowing at historically unheard of rates, and historically, anyway, super easy-money has undermined financial stability – and disastrously – by creating what economists call “moral hazard.” That’s the condition in which over-abundant, dirt-cheap resources produce any number of reasons for using these resources foolishly (i.e., unproductively). After all, they drive down the economic penalties for making these mistakes to rock bottom levels by all but eliminating interest costs.

And an economy that uses resources so inefficiently is bound to run into big trouble before too long and suffer punishing and lingering after-effects. If you’re skeptical, think back to that devastating financial crisis and Great Recession – which weren’t so long ago – and to the slowest U.S. recovery in decades that followed. If that’s not persuasive enough, ask yourself why even the easy-money pushers at the Fed are talking about tapering in the first place.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Trade Normality Revealed in New GDP Figures – But for How Long?

Tags

CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Delta variant, exports, GDP, goods trade, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, lockdowns, real exports, real GDP, real imports, real trade deficit, recession, recovery, services trade, Trade, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Last month, I reported that the trade highlights of the first official read on U.S. economic growth in the second quarter of this year showed signs that some form of normality was returning to the nation’s international trade flows after months of unprecedented pandemic-era fluctuations. This morning, the second government estimate of the second quarter gross domestic product (GDP) came out (next month we’ll see the final version – for now), and the signs of a new normality look even stronger.

Specifically, the sequential growth of America’s inflation-adjusted trade deficit during this period was even slower than the slowish rate presented in last month’s GDP release – and using the phrase “to a crawl” seems justified in describing the pace.

That initial estiimate revealed that the real trade gap’s quarterly widening had slowed from the sizzling 31.81 percent in the third quarter of last year, when the economy was roaring back from its brief but epic CCP Virus- and lockdown-induced crash dive to just 2.69 percent between this April and June (a strong growth period itself, but nothing compared with the initial recession rebound). Today, however, the after-inflation trade shortfall’s expansion came in at just 1.71 percent for the second quarter – when real growth itself clocked in at 6.40 percent on an annual basis, not the 6.35 percent estimated last month.

The new number for the second quarter’s price-adjusted trade deficit, $1.2471 billion annualized, remains astronomical by any reasonable standard. Not only is it still the biggest such figure in absolute terms. It’s the biggest such figure in relative terms – as a share of real GDP – where it still stands at 6.44 percent. And this revised trade deficit remains the fourth straight all-time high recorded. For some more perspective, the inflation-adjusted gap is also still 47.13 percent wider than where it stood in the fourth quarter of 2019 ($847.6 billion), just before the pandemic and its effect began weakening and distorting the economy.

More encouragingly, though, the new trade deficit result is a significant improvement over the $1.2590 trillion first reported. Also on the plus side, the after-inflation trade deficit’s sequential rise cut only 0.24 percentage points from the quarter’s 6.40 percent growth at an annual rate. That is, had the second quarter deficit stayed at its first quarter level, second quarter growth would have been 6.64 percent annualized – or 3.75 percent faster.

It all adds up to the trade deficit’s best such effect on real GDP change in absolute terms since the second quarter of 2020, when the deficit’s shrinkage prevented the nearly 36 percent pandemic-produced real GDP plunge from becoming slightly worse. By contrast, in the first quarter of this year, the inflation-adjusted trade shortfall’s increase cut the 6.14 percent annualized real growth figure by 1.56 percentage point. So had there been no sequential increase at all, that quarter’s price-adjusted growth would have been 7.70 percent at annual rates – a difference of fully 25.41 percent.

The manner in which the second quarter’s constant dollar trade gap improved over the initial read was good news as well, as after-inflation exports rose faster and their import counterparts climbed more slowly than reported last month.

Rather than growing by 1.47 percent sequentially during the second quarter, total after-inflation exports were judged to have advanced by 1.60 percent. At $2.2980 trillion annualized, though, they’re still 9.98 percent lower than in the fourth quarter of 2019 – the last full quarter before the CCP Virus’ arrival. As a result, the second quarter’s real export performance was an even greater improvement over the first quarter’s 0.73 percent dip than previously thought.

Combined goods and services imports were reported up by 1.64 percent between the first and second quarters, not 1.90 percent, as originally reported. This new figure also beat the first quarter’s 2.25 percent sequential real import increase.

At the same time, the new inflation-adjusted total import figure of $3.5547 trillion annualized still represents their second straight quarterly record, and such purchases from abroad are still 4.26 percent higher than their fourth quarter, 2019 level.

Turning to goods (the vast majority of U.S. trade flows), the second GDP read for the second quarter left standing their dubious record of a fourth straight all-time high trade deficit. But as with the overall trade deficit, the new figure of $1.4014 trillion annualized was a solid improvement from the previously reported $1.4610 trillion. And as a result, the second quarter number was only marginally (0.40 percent) worse than the first quarter figure, making clear a major slowdown in this indicator’s rise as well (from 20.40 percent during last year’s super-growth third quarter).

Unfortunately, the revised second quarter real service trade figures told a story that was especially gloomy even given this sector’s well known and disproportionate virus- and lockdown-induced woes. The long-running service trade surplus is now pegged at $149.5 billion for the April-through-June period. That’s a figure lower than the $151.2 billion previously reported, and the weakest quarterly result since the $161.7 billion recorded in the third quarter of 2010, when the recovery from the 2007-2008 financial crisis and Great Recession was in its earliest stages.

Also unfortunate – and frustrating: Whatever is shown in the final (for now) second quarter GDP report, the results will be pre-Delta variant. So although today’s data shows trade normalization to be even closer than previously thought, that next set could be of limited use at best in figuring out how long it’s going to last.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: No Delta Effect on U.S. Manufacturing Growth In Sight. Yet.

Tags

aerospace, aircraft, aircraft parts, appliances, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Delta variant, electrical components, electrical equipment, fabricated metal products, Fed, Federal Reserve, inflation-adjusted growth, inflation-adjusted output, machinery, manufacturing, medical supplies, medicines, personal protective equipment, petroleum and coal products, pharmaceuticals, plastics, PPE, real growth, recovery, reopening, rubber, textiles, vaccines, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The after-inflation U.S. manufacturing production data reported today by the Federal Reserve revealed plenty of newsy developments. But my choice for biggest is the finding that, in price-adjusted terms, domestic manufacturers’ output finally nosed back above its last pre-CCP Virus (February, 2020) level.

The new number isn’t an all-time high – that came in December, 2007, just as the financial crisis was about to plunge the entire U.S. economy into its worst non-pandemic-related downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s. As of this July, real manufacturing production is still 5.94 percent below that peak.

Measured in constant dollars, however, such output is now 1.15 percent greater than just before the virus arrived in the United States in force. Not much, and of course any Delta variant-prompted curbs on economic activity or extra caution in consumer behavior could wipe out this progress. But you know what they say about a journey of a thousand miles.

Had this milestone not been reached, I’d have led off this post by noting that although some really unusual seasonal factors in the volatile automotive sector definitely juiced the excellent July sequential output gain, U.S.-based industry outside automotive performed impressively during the month as well.

Specifically, as the Fed’s press release noted, the whopping 11.24 percent jump in the price-adjusted output of vehicles and parts contributed about half of overall manufacturing’s 1.39 percent growth. That automotive figure was the best monthly improvement since the 29.39 percent rocket ride the sector generated in July, 2020 – when the whole economy was staging its rebound from that spring’s deep but brief virus-induced recession. And that overall real on-month production advance was the best for manufacturing in general since the 3.39 percent achieved in March – earlier in the initial post-pandemic recovery.

But in July, the rest of domestic industry still expanded by a strong 0.70 percent after inflation – its best inflation-adjusted growth since the 3.31 percent also recorded in March.

The revisions in this morning’s Fed data for the entire manufacturing sector were mixed. June’s initially reported 0.05 percent decline is now judged to be a 0.10 percent increase, and April’s previously reported 0.39 percent drop now stands as a 0.21 percent decrease. But May’s last reported increase – upgraded slightly to a strong 0.92 percent – is now estimated at just 0.65 percent.

Looking at broad industry categories, the big real output July winners in domestic manufacturing’s ranks aside from automotive were electrical equipment, appliances, and components (up 2.31 percent); plastics and rubber products (up 2.02 percent); machinery (1.91 percent); the broad aerospace and miscellaneous transportation sector (think “Boeing”), which rose by 1.90 percent; textiles (up 1.67 percent); and miscellaneous durable goods, which includes but is hardly confined to many pandemic-related medical supplies (up 1.55 percent).

As I keep noting, good machinery growth is especially encouraging, since its goods are used both throughout manufacturing and the economy as a whole, and strong demand signals optimism among manufacturers about their future prospects – which tends to feed on itself and impart continued momentum to industry.

The list of significant losers was much shorter, with real fabricated metal products output 0.42 percent lower than June levels and petroleum and coal products shrinking by 0.60 percent.

Turning to narrower manufacturing categories that remain in the news, despite Boeing’s still serious manufacturing and safety problems, and ongoing CCP Virus-created weakness in air transport, inflation-adjusted production of aircraft and parts continued its strong recent run. June’s initially reported 5.24 percent monthly output surge was revised down to 3.57 percent. But that’s still excellent by any measure. And July saw production climb another 2.78 percent. As a result, real output in this sector is now 9.95 percent higher than it was just before the pandemic’s arrival in the United States in February, 2020.

Real output in the pharmaceuticals and medicines sector (which includes vaccines) grew by 0.77 percent sequentially in July, and its real output is now 11.35 percent greater than just before the pandemic. But those revisions!

June’s initially reported 0.89 percent increase is now judged to be a 0.34 percent decrease, and May’s previously downgraded 0.15 percent rise has now been upgraded all the way to 1.54 percent.

An even better July was registered by the vital medical equipment and supplies sector – which includes virus-fighting items like face masks, face masks, protective gowns, and ventilators. Monthly growth came in at 1.71 percent. But revisions here were puzzling, too.

June’s initially reported 0.99 percent sequential real production improvement is now seen as a major 1.54 percent falloff. And May’s monthly constant dollar growth, already upgraded from 0.19 percent to 1.18 percent, is now pegged at 1.86 percent.

I’m still optimistic about domestic manufacturing’s outlook, and that’s still based on domestic manufacturers’ own continued optimism – which as shown by the two major private sector monthly manufacturing surveys remained strong in July. (See here and here.)

But I also continue to view U.S. public health authorities’ judgment as suspect when it comes to the balance that needs to be struck between fighting the virus and keeping the economy satisfactorily open. So as long as new virus variants pose the threat of higher infection rates (though not at all necessarily of greater damage to Americans’ health), my own optimism has become more tempered.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New U.S. Figures Show Inflation is Looking More Transitory

Tags

CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, deflation, Delta variant, Federal Reserve, inflation, interest rates, lockdowns, monetary policy, QE, quantitative easing, recession, recovery, reopening, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Normally, a 5.28 percent annual U.S. inflation rate for July reported today by the Labor Department wouldn’t be seen as good news. Ditto a comparable 4.24 increase in prices excluding food and energy (the so-called core rate, which strips out these categories supposedly because they’re so unusually volatile and don’t necessarily reflect the forces influencing prices overall).

Since these times aren’t normal, due to the CCP Virus pandemic, and since they may well not return to normal for quite a while, due to alarm over the latest, highly infectious Delta strain, times may not become normal any time soon, “We’ll take it for now” strikes me as the only reasonable reaction.

In terms of how U.S. leaders, including the Federal Reserve, should react, tentativeness is justified, too. But the new figures add to the evidence that the recent surge in U.S. inflation is likely to be a “transitory” phenomenon (as Fed-speak calls it) that doesn’t warrant any significant monetary policy moves to cool off the economy (like raising interest rates or moderating or reducing the central banks’ monthly bond purchases – the so-calle Quantitative Easing, or QE, program).

As I’ve argued previously (see, e.g. here), the year-on-year numbers actually prove little – because the virus and the recession and curbs on economic activity it prompted weakened prices to such a remarkable degree, and because the relatively quick reopening starting in late spring, 2020, and the historically explosive growth it ignited, generated such strong catch up. Think of a coiled spring getting released.

Skeptical? From February through July, 2020, overall prices in America dropped on net, and such deflation marked core prices from February through June.

That’s why I look instead at the month-to-month price increases this year. And they definitely point to a significant recent slowing inflation by both measures. Here are the sequential numbers for the overall rate reported today (known as the “Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers,” or CPI-U for short);

December-January: 0.26 percent

January-February:   0.35 percent

February-March:     0.62 percent

March-April:           0.77 percent

April-May:              0.64 percent

May-June:               0.90 percent

June-July:                0.47 percent

What’s at least as important as recent signs of inflation slowing is the absence of signs of inflation taking off. They matter because expectations of inflation themselves can become major inflation fuel by causing businesses to boost purchases of inputs above normal rates to avoid greater expenses down the road. The resulting spiral effect can be difficult to halt without the Fed literally slamming the brakes on the entire economy and even producing a recession.

Now here are the monthly increases for core inflation:

December-January: 0.03 percent

January-February:   0.10 percent

February-March:     0.34 percent

March-April:           0.92 percent

April-May:              0.74 percent

May-June:               0.88 percent

June-July:               0.33 percent

The pattern isn’t identical to that for overall inflation, but it’s pretty similar.

The other main body of evidence arguing for abnormally high inflation turning out to be temporary has to do with some of the main engines of the recent price increases. As noted in last month’s post, the surge-y June inflation figures were led by products and services like used cars and trucks (up 10.5 percent month-to-month), vehicle rentals (up 5.2 percent), and hotel and motel rates (up 7.9 percent). These results could be traced either to the stop-start nature of the economy during the pandemic period and consequent bottlenecks and shortages, or to the arrival of the vacation season to a nation long afflicted with cabin fever and hoping that the virus was being beaten.

The July monthly price changes for these items? Used vehicle prices inched up a bare 0.2 percent, vehicle rental prices actually sank by 4.6 percent, and hotel and motel room prices cooled to 6.8 percent. Clearly the latter remain high. But airline fares, whose monthly price increases had already fallen from 10.2 percent in April to seven percent in May to 2.7 percent in June became 0.1 percent cheaper in July.

There’s no guarantee of course that the July numbers will continue the inflation-slowdown trend. But the bad news is that the main reason is anything but good. It has to do with the distinct possibility that the rapid Delta-induced increase in CCP Virus cases will keep prompting a return to business restrictions and behavior curbs that will undermine economic growth. In turn, that would greatly complicate business’ efforts to pass on whatever cost increases they’re dealing with.

If this pattern takes hold, the rising price spiral dynamic could shift into reverse, bringing the economy back to the deflationary days of 2020. And even worse – this kind of spiral can be harder to break than inflationary spirals. For in these circumstances, consumers and businesses hold off on many purchases because they believe prices will drop even further – and production and hiring therefore fall off, too.

In addition, if robust growth continues, along with inflation it views as unacceptably high, the Fed could seek to stabilize prices by slamming on those economic brakes.   

For now, though, the July inflation numbers should be seen as encouraging.  They may amount to favors that are small (and transitory themselves), but they’re still worth being grateful for. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Revisions Outshone the New U.S. Manufacturing Jobs Gains

Tags

aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, appliances, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Delta variant, electrical equipment, Employment, fabricated metals products, Jobs, Labor Department, machinery, manufacturing, medicines, metals, miscellaneous durable goods, NFP, non-farm payrolls, personal protective equipment, pharmaceuticals, PPE, recovery, tariffs, Trade, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although U.S. manufacturers grew their payrolls by a solid net 27,000 in July, according to the Labor Department’s new jobs report for the month, the big story for industry lies in the June revisions. As often the case during the CCP Virus era, moreover, these were dominated by the automotive sector.

Specifically, June’s initially reported monthly 15,000 manufacturing jobs increase was boosted all the way up to 39,000. And the automotive numbers for June executed a stunning turnabout – from an estimated loss of 12,300 to a gain of 2,700. By contrast, net hiring in the vehicles and parts sectors for July was a quiet 800.

The May manufacturing employment revisions were less dramatic – from an increase 39,000 to one of 36,000. But that month had already witnessed its own huge revision – from an initially reported 23,000 to that 39,000.

Outside automotive, the June revisions were widespread through manufacturing, led by electrical equipment and appliances, whose employment increase that month was upgraded from 1,700 to 3,600. (Its July net job creation was a mere 200.)

Even with the strong revisions, though, manufacturing’s recent status as a U.S. recovery employment laggard continued. As of July, domestic industry had regained 952,000 (68.74 percent) of the 1.385 million net jobs lost in March and April of 2020. The numbers for the private sector overall are 76.96 percent of the 21.353 million lost jobs that have been recovered, and for the total non-farm economy (the definition of the American employment universe used by the U.S. government, which includes government jobs) 74.50 percent of the 22.362 million jobs lost.

One reason, of course, is that manufacturing employment suffered less than payrolls in the rest of the economy in the early spring of 2020. Its job levels fell by 10.82 percent, compared with 16.46 percent for the private sector and 14.66 for the entire non-farm economy.

At the same time, U.S.-based industry is still benefiting from stiff tariffs on metals and goods from China, and like the entire economy, is being supported by massive government stimulus along with skyrocketing vaccine production. This puzzle may be explained by the bottlenecks and resulting shortages plaguing all industries, and by the introduction of labor-saving equipment and other restructuring to substitute for the workers so many manufacturers claim are so hard to find. But as I wrote in last month’s examination of the June jobs report, I’m not completely convinced yet by either explanation.

The biggest July manufacturing employment winners by far of the major industry categories used by the U.S. government were machinery (6,800), miscellaneous durable goods (5,500), and fabricated metals products (4,500).

The performance of the first two is especially encouraging, since machinery’s products are used so widely throughout the entire economy (and since robust hiring therefore signals widespread overall strength and healthy capital spending); and since miscellaneous durable goods includes the personal protective equipment (PPE) and other medical supplies whose importance has been underscored by the pandemic.

Indeed, as a result of their July jobs gains, machinery employment has risen to within 3.30 percent of its immediate pre-pandemic level (in February, 2020), and the comparable figure for miscellaneous durable goods is 1.09 percent higher. (More on the performance of its PPE-including category will be presented below.) Both figures are better than that for manufacturing overall, whose payrolls are still 3.38 percent lower than just before the CCP Virus began significantly affecting the economy.

The only July manufacturing jobs losers suffered overwhelmingly fractional sequential setbacks, led by transportation equipment overall (the category containing automotive, where employment sank by 1,500) and semiconductors and electronic components, where global shortages undoubtedly had much to do with its job loss of 800.

Returning to the pandemic-related industries, where the data are one month behind, the picture in surgical appliances and supplies (the sector containing PPE) is dominated by a big downgrade in the May numbers – from a gain of 1,700 to a loss of 900. And in June, 500 more positions were shed. As a result, employment in this crucial national health security sector has fallen to 7.60 percent above immediate pre-pandemic levels.

In the overall pharmaceuticals and medicines industry, a slightly upgrade of May’s originally reported 400 job loss (to a drop of 300) was followed by a June rise of 2,700 – the biggest monthly advance since September, 2019’s 3,500 (well before the CCP Virus arrived). Its employment levels have consequently climbed to 4.72 percent above their February, 2020 figure.

The pharmaceuticals subsector containing vaccines showed continued good job growth, with May’s unrevised 1,000 improvement followed by an identical June increase. This industry now employs 10.20 percent more workers than just before the pandemic.

Aircraft employment levels have fluctuated wildly recently, due surely to the constant barrage of news both good and bad about Boeing. May’s 5,500 job plunge – the worst such performance since June, 2020’s 5,800 shrinkage – was followed by a June gain of 4,500. That’s its best hiring month since the same number of workers was added in July, 2012. But aircraft employment is still 7.55 percent less than in February, 2020, when the pandemic’s spread globally decimated air travel worldwide. On a more positive note, however, Boeing seems to believe the worst is over.

Aircraft engines and parts employment has been much more stable than aircraft’s, and these industries added 500 workers in total in June. But their payrolls are 14.91 percent smaller than in February, 2020 – nearly twice as big a proportional drop as in aircraft.

What’s next for domestic manufacturing employment? Last month I saw plenty of sources of uncertainty, ranging from bottlenecks to the infrastructure legislation to China tariff policy. Now there’s the virus’ hyper-contagious (but so far less harmful) Delta variant to contend with, and all the resumed lockdowns and other economic activity restrictions it could portend – along with the related likelihood of continued strong and even greater vaccine demand (though the sector isn’t big enough to move the national manufacturing jobs needle much).

I’m still most impressed by how all the national and regional surveys keep showing that manufacturers themselves see a still-brightening future ahead. (See, e.g., here and here.) After all, they’re the ones with skin in the game. Let’s hope they’re right. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Dangerous New Bubbles or a Virus Mirage?

Tags

bubbles, business investment, CCP Virus, consumer spending, coronavirus, COVID 19, Financial Crisis, GDP, Great Recession, gross domestic product, housing, lockdowns, logistics, nonresidential fixed investment, real GDP, recession, recovery, reopening, Richard F. Moody, semiconductor shortage, toxic combination, transportation, West Coast ports, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s a great example of how badly the U.S. economy might be getting distorted by last year’s steep, sharp, largely government-mandated recession, and by the V-shaped recovery experienced since then.as CCPVirus-related restrictions have been lifted. Therefore, it’s also a great example of how the many of the resulting statistics may still be of limited usefulness at best in figuring out the economy’s underlying health.

The possible example?  New official figures showing that, as of the second quarter of this year, the U.S. economy is even more dangerously bubble-ized than it was just before the financial crisis of 2007-08.

As RealityChek regulars might recall, for several years I wrote regularly on what I called the quality of America’s growth. (Here‘s my most recent post.) I viewed the subject as important because there’s broad agreement that a big reason the financial crisis erupted was the over-reliance earlier in that decade n the wrong kind of growth. Specifically, personal spending and housing had become predominant engines of expansion – and therefore prosperity. Their bloated roles inflated intertwined bubbles whose bursting nearly collapsed the U.S. and entire global economies, and produced the worst American economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

As a result, there was equally broad agreement that the nation needed to transform what you might call its business model from one depending largely on borrowing, spending, and paying for them by counting on home prices to rise forever, to one based on saving, investing, and producing. As former President Obama cogently put it, America needed “an economy built to last.”

Therefore, I decided to track how well the nation was succeeding at this version of “build back better” by monitoring the official quarterly reports on economic growth to examine the importance of housing and consumption (which I called the “toxic combination”) in the nation’s economic profile and whether and how they were changing.

For some perspective, in the third quarter of 2005, as the spending and housing bubbles were at their worst, these two segments of the economy accounted for 73.90 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP – the standard measure of the economy’s size) adjusted for inflation (the most widely followed of the GDP data. By the end of the Great Recession caused by the bursting of these bubbles, in the second quarter of 2009, this figure was down to 71.55 percent – mainly because housing had crashed.

At the end of the Obama administration (the fourth quarter of 2016), the toxic combination has rebounded to represent 72.31 percent of after-inflation GDP. So in quality-of-growth terms, the economy was heading in the wrong direction. And under President Trump, this discouraging trend continued. As of the fourth quarter of 2019 (the last quarter before the pandemic began significantly affecting the economy), this figure rose further, to 73.19 percent.

Yesterday, the government reported on GDP for the second quarter of this year, and it revealed that the toxic combination share of the economy in constant dollar terms to 74.24 percent. In other words, the toxic combination had become a bigger part of the economy than during the most heated housing and spending bubble days.

But does that mean that the economy really is even more, and more worrisomely lopsided than it was back then? That’s far from clear. Pessimists could argue that recent growth has relied heavily on the unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus provided by Washington since spring, 2020. Optimists could point out that far from overspending, consumers have been saving massively. Something else of note: Business investment’s share of real GDP in the second quarter of this year came to 14.80 percent – awfully lofty by recent standards.  During the 2005 peak of the last bubble, that spending (officially called “nonresidential fixed investment”) was 11.62 percent. 

My own take is that this situation mainly reflects the unexpected strength of the reopening-driven recovery and the transportation and logistics bottlenecks it’s created. An succinct summary of the situation was provided by Richard F. Moody, chief economist of Regions Bank. He wrote yesterday that the new GDP data “embody the predicament facing the U.S. economy, which is that the supply side of the economy has simply been unable to keep pace with demand.” The result is not only the strong recent inflation figures, but a ballooning of personal spending’s share of the economy.

Moody expects that both problems will end “later rather than sooner,” and for all I know, he (and other inflation pessimists) are right. But unless you believe that West Coast ports will remain clogged forever, that semiconductors will remain in short supply forever, that truck drivers will remain scarce forever, that businesses will never adjust adequately to any of this, and/or that new CCP Virus variants will keep the whole economy on lockdown-related pins and needles forever, the important point is that these problems will end. Once they do, or when the end is in sight, we’ll be able to figure out just how bubbly the economy has or hasn’t grown – but not, I’m afraid, one moment sooner.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Glimmers of Trade Normality’s Return?

Tags

CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, exports, GDP, goods trade, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, real GDP, real trade deficit, recovery, services trade, tariffs, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Has the new post-CCP Virus trade normal finally started coming into view for the United States? One important reason for believing so came in today’s Commerce Department report on economic growth in the second quarter, and the main evidence can be summed up in these numbers: 31.81, 10.92, 8.24, and 2.69.

They represent the sequential rates of increase in the overall inflation-adjusted trade deficit starting with the third quarter of last year and ending with this year’s second quarter. And they show that even though real economic growth remained strong (albeit well below expectations) in the second quarter, the after-inflation trade gap’s size is stabilizing.

There’s no doubt that bottlenecks clogging transport systems all over the world due to the rapid recovery from CCP Virus-induced recessions deserve much of the credit. But given domestic manufacturing’s continued healthy growth despite the aforementioned supply chain and shortage issues, it’s hard to imagine that the Trump tariffs – especially on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of goods from China – haven’t played a big role, too.

But before diving into the gross domestic product (GDP) report’s trade highlights, it’s important to note that they reveal that the economy’s size in price-adjusted terms in the second quarter finally exceeded the scale reached in the fourth quarter of 2019 – the last fully pandemic-effect-free quarter. The nation’s total output of goods and services is only 0.81 percent greater, but it’s a start.

Also worth observing right away – the combined goods and services trade deficit of $1.2590 trillion at an annual rate was the fourth straight all-time record. That’s nearly 50 percent (48.54 percent, to be precise) higher than the fourth quarter, 2019 level of $847.6 billion, so obviously there’s a long way to go to pre-virus days by that standard. According to the more useful measure of the trade deficit’s size as a share of the GDP, the story’s only a little better. At the end of 2019, it stood at 4.41 percent, and in the second quarter of this year, it stood at 6.50 percent. So it’s up by 47.39 percent since the pandemic began significantly affecting the economy.

More progress toward normalization shows up in in the data on the impact of changes in the after-inflation trade shortfall on quarterly growth. For the second quarter of this year, the sequential growth in the real constant dollar trade deficit subtracted 0.44 percentage points from the 6.35 percent annualized expansion of the economy. In other words, had the real trade deficit not increased at all, real growth would have been 6.79 percent at annual rates, or 6.93 percent higher.

In the first quarter, the after-inflation trade deficit’s increase subtracted 1.56 percentage points from 6.14 percent real annualized growth. So that quarter’s after-inflation price-adjusted GDP rise would have been 7.70 percent at annual rates, or 25.41 percent greater. The final pre-pandemic numbers showed that a fourth quarter, 2019 inflation-adjusted trade deficit sequential decrease added 1.43 percentage points to 1.86 percent annualized growth.

Therefore, much ground needs to be made up here, too. At the same time, this particular set of data has been bouncing around a lot since former President Trump began his “trade wars” (in 2018), which led companies throughout the nation and world to adjust their production and especially import patterns dramatically in reactio not only to actual tariffs but to anticipated levies.

The new GDP release estimated that total after-inflation U.S. exports climbed by 1.47 percent sequentially during the second quarter – a reversal of the 0.73 percent quarterly decline during the previous three-month stretch. But at $2.2956 trillion annualized, they’re still 10.09 percent less than the fourth quarter, 2019 result.

Combined inflation-adjusted goods and services imports increased at a slower rate during the second quarter – 1.90 percent sequentially, versus 2.25 percent during the first quarter. But these U.S. purchases from abroad are 4.52 percent higher than just before the pandemic’s arrival. And the immediate pre-pandemic level had already been hit in the fourth quarter of last year.

Moreover, at $3.5547 trillion annualized, total real imports reached their second straight all-time quarterly high.

The constant dollar goods trade deficit level hit a new quarterly record, too – $1.4610 trillion at annual rates. Further, the all-time high was the fourth straight, and this trade gap is now 36.36 percent above the fourth quarter, 2019 pre-pandemic level.

At least this trade shortfall’s sequential growth rate has also been plummeting – from 20.40 percent in last year’s third quarter, when the economy was bursting out of the deep but short virus-and lockdown-induced recession, to 4.66 percent between the first and second quarters of this year.

The service sector continues to be a source of discouraging trade news according to the new GDP read. Its long-time after-inflation real surplus shrank by 6.20 percent between the first and second quarters, and in fact has fallen every quarter snce the second quarter of 2020. As a result, it’s currently 30.55 percent lower than it was in that final pre-CCP Virus fourth quarter of 2019.

Of course, as with the economy and life in general, U.S. trade’s return to normality still depends heavily on huge wildcards like the future of the CCP Virus Delta variant, and whether it will keep spreading fast and long enough to lead governments to reimpose shutdowns and lockdowns.  But the largely pre-Delta GDP numbers released today suggest that if this mutation stays under control, and nothing worse appears, America’s trade performance will keep approaching its pre-virus state.      

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Automotive’s Still in the U.S. Manufacturing Growth Driver’s Seat

Tags

aircraft, aluminum, appliances, automotive, CCP Virus, China, coal, coronavirus wuhan virus, COVID 19, Delta variant, electrical equipment, facemasks, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted growth, inflation-adjusted output, infrastructure, lockdowns, machinery, manufacturing, masks, medical devices, metals, petroleum refining, pharmaceuticals, PPE, real growth, recovery, reopening, steel, stimulus, tariffs, Trump, vaccines, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Talk about annoying! There I was last Thursday morning, all set to dig into the new detailed Federal Reserve U.S. manufacturing production numbers (for June) in order to write up my usual same-day report, and guess what? None of the new tables was on-line! Fast forward to this morning: They’re finally up. (And here‘s the summary release.) So here we go with our deep dive into the results, which measure changes in inflation-adjusted manufacturing output.

The big takeaway is that, as with last month’s report for May, the semiconductor shortage-plagued automotive sector was the predominant influence. But there was a big difference. In May, domestic vehicles and parts makers managed to turn out enough product to boost the overall manufacturing production increase greatly. In June, a big automotive nosedive helped turn an increase for U.S.-based industry into a decrease.

The specifics: In May, the sequential automotive output burst (which has been revised up from 6.69 percent in real terms to 7.34 percent) helped push total manufacturing production for the month to 0.92 percent after inflation (a figure that’s also been upgraded – from last month’s initially reported already strong 0.89 percent). Without automotive, manufacturing’s constant dollar growth would have been just 0.47 percent.

In June, vehicle and parts production sank by an inflation-adjusted 6.62 percent , and dragged industry’s total performance into the negative (though by just 0.05 percent). Without the automotive crash, real manufacturing output would have risen by 0.40 percent.

Counting slightly negative revisions, through June, constant dollar U.S. manufacturing production in toto was 0.60 percent less than in February, 2020 – the economy’s last full pre-pandemic month.

Domestic industry’s big production winners in June were primary metals (a category that includes heavily tariffed steel and aluminum), which soared by 4.02 percent after inflation; the broad aerospace and miscellaneous transportation sector, which of course contains troubled Boeing aircraft, (more on which later), and which turned in 3.75 percent growth, its best such performance since January’s 5.62 percent pop; petroleum and coal products (up 1.36 percent); and miscellaneous durable goods, which includes but is far from limited to CCP Virus-related medical supplies (up 1.21 percent).

The biggest losers other than automotive? Inflation-adjusted production of electrical equipment, appliances, and components, which dropped sequentially by 1.73 percent in real terms; the tiny, remaining apparel and leather goods industry (1.44 percent); and the non-metallic minerals sector (1.07 percent).

Especially disappointing was the 0.55 percent monthly dip in machinery production, since this sector’s products are used so widely throughout the rest of manufacturing and in major parts of the economy outside manufacturing like construction and agriculture.

But in one of the biggest surprises of the June Fed data (though entirely consistent with the aforementioned broad aerospace sector), real output of aircraft and parts shot up by 5.24 percent – its best such performance since January’s 6.79 percent. It’s true that the May production decrease was revised from 1.47 percent to 2.61 percent. But with Boeing’s related and manufacturing and safety-related woes continuing to multiply, who would have expected that outcome?

And partly as a result of this two-month net gain, after-inflation aircraft and parts output as of June is 7.83 percent higher in real terms than in pre-pandemicky February, 2020 – a much faster growth rate than for manufacturing as a whole.

The big pharmaceuticals and medicines sector (which includes vaccines) registered a similar pattern of results, although with much smaller swings. May’s originally reported 0.22 percent constant dollar output improvement was revised down to 0.15 percent. But June saw a 0.89 percent rise, which brought price-adjusted production in this group of industries to 9.33 percent greater than just before the pandemic.

Some good news was also generated by the vital medical equipment and supplies sector – which includes virus-fighting items like face masks, face masks, protective gowns, and ventilators. Its monthly May growth was upgraded all the way up from the initially reported 0.19 percent to 1.18 percent. And that little spurt was followed by 0.99 percent growth in June.

Yet despite this acceleration, this sector is still a mere 2.27 percent bigger in real terms than in February, 2020, meaning that Americans had better hope that new pandemic isn’t right around the corner, that the Delta variant of the CCP Virus doesn’t result in a near-equivalent, or that foreign suppliers of such gear will be a lot more generous than in 2020.

As for manufacturing as a whole, the outlook seems as cloudy as ever to me. Vast amounts of stimulus are still being pumped into the U.S. economy, which continues to reopen and overwhelmingly stay open. That should translate into strong growth and robust demand for manufactured goods. The Trump tariffs are still pricing huge numbers of Chinese goods out of the U.S. market. And the shortage of automotive semiconductors may actually be easing.

But the spread of the Delta variant has spurred fears of a new wave of local and even wider American lockdowns. This CCP Virus mutation is already spurring sweeping economic curbs in many key U.S. export markets. Progress in Washington on an infrastructure bill seems stalled. And for what they’re worth (often hard to know), estimates of U.S. growth rates keep coming down, and were falling even before Delta emerged as a major potential problem. (See, e.g., here.)

I’m still most impressed, though, by the still lofty levels of optimism (see, e.g., here)  expressed by U.S. manufacturers themselves when they respond to surveys such as those sent out by the regional Federal Reserve banks (which give us the most recent looks). Since they’re playing with their own, rather than “other people’s money,” keep counting me as a domestic manufacturing bull.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A “Gentleman’s C” for the New Manufacturing Jobs Numbers

Tags

aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, electronics, Employment, fabricated metals products, facemasks, food products, furniture, housing, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, masks, metals, pharmaceuticals, ports, PPE, printing, productivity, protective gear, recession, recovery, reopening, semiconductor shortage, tariffs, vaccines, {What's Left of) Our Economy

June’s gains weren’t nearly enough to overcome the latest trend in U.S. manufacturing employment: From a job growth leader earlier during the CCP Virus pandemic, domestic industry has turned into a laggard. It’s not lagging by a big margin, but given significant net headwinds it should still be enjoying, recent results are clearly disappointing.

This morning, the Labor Department reported that U.S.-based manufacturers created 15,000 net new jobs in June – a modest number given the 662,000 increase in total private sector employment on month. At least revisions were positive. May’s initially reported 23,000 monthly improvement is now judged to be 39,000, but April’s already downwardly revised 32,000 sequential job loss is now pegged at 35,000.

In many of the nation’s supposedly prestige colleges, the grade earned by this kind of result would be called a “Gentleman’s C.”

As a result, domestic manufacturing has now regained 904,000 (66.32 percent) of the 1.363 million jobs lost during the pandemic. The numbers for the private sector overall are 72.98 percent of the 21.353 million lost jobs that have been recovered, and for the total non-farm economy (the definition of the American employment universe used by the U.S. government, which includes government jobs) 69.75 percent of the 22.362 million jobs lost.

A manufacturing optimist (and I’ve been one of them) can note that industry took less of an employment hit during the pandemic-loss months of March and April, 2020. Manufacturing employment sank by 10.65 percent, versus 16.46 percent for the private sector and 14.66 percent for the whole non-farm economy.

But nowadays, domestic manufacturers are still benefiting from major tariffs plus massive government stimulus on both the fiscal and monetary fronts, and from the huge ramp up in vaccine production. Reopening-related bottlenecks clearly are causing problems, but according to the major national surveys that measure how manufacturers themselves believe they’re faring, production and new orders for their products keep growing strongly. (For the newest ones, see here and here.) Even given equally widespread reports that new workers are hard to find, I expected hiring to remain much more robust than it has.

One explanation may be higher productivity, which enables businesses to turn out more goods with fewer workers. But given the longstanding difficulties of gauging this measure of efficiency, and undoubted pandemic-era distortions, I’m reluctant to put too much stock in this argument.

The shortages issues have been once again illustrated by the dominance of the automotive sector in the June manufacturing jobs picture. Payrolls of vehicles and parts companies fell by 12,300 – the biggest individual sector decreases by far – and surely stem from the continuing global shortage of the computer chips that have become ever more important parts of cars and trucks of all kinds.

One small bright spot in the June figures – the 300 jobs increase in the machinery sector. It’s an important indicator of the overall state of industrial hiring, since its products are used throughout industry (as well as in non-manufacturing sectors like agriculture and construction). At the same time, these new positions represented machinery’s weakest sequential performance since January’s 3,200 employment decrease.

Other big June manufacturing net hiring winners were furniture and related products (up 8,500, no doubt reflecting still strong home sales and remodeling activity), fabricated metals products (up 5,700, which is noteworthy given still widespread whining about the ongoing U.S. tariffs on metals), and miscellaneous durable goods manufacturing (up 3,300 – encouraging since this category includes many pandemic-related medical supplies).

The biggest losers other than automotive were food products (down 4,100 and continuing an employment slump that began in January), electronic instruments (down 2,100 and possibly related to the semiconductor shortage), and printing and related activities (down 1,400).

Pandemic-related industries turned in a mixed hiring performance, according to the latest jobs report. Job creation accelerated significantly in the surgical appliances and supply sector, which contains protective gear like face masks, gloves and surgical goans. Its payrolls grew by 1,700 on month in May (its data are one month behind, as is the case with the other sectors examined below), up from April’s 1,200 and its best monthly total since last July’s 3,000. This surgical category’s workforce is now 11.50 percent bigger than in February, 2020 – the last pre-pandemic month.

But the May figures revealed a job creation setback in the overall pharmaceuticals and medicines industry. April’s hiring was revised down slightly, from 2,700 to 2,500, but the number was still solid. In May, however, its payrolls shrank by 400, its worst such performance since pandemicky April, 2020. And its workforce is only 3.82 percent greater than in February, 2020.

Better news came out of the pharmaceuticals subsector containing vaccines, but not that much better. This industry added one thousand workers on net in May, but April’s initially reported 1,300 jobs increase was revised down to 1,100. Still, this vaccines-heavy sector now employs 9.20 percent more workers than just before the pandemic.

And in aircraft, Boeing’s continuing manufacturing and safety issues surely helped produce this industry’s worst jobs month – consisting of a 5,500 payroll decrease – since June, 2020’s 5,800. This sector has now lost 9.39 percent of its jobs since the final pre-pandemic month.

Interestingly, the aircraft engines and parts, and non-engine parts categories weren’t nearly as hard-hit job-wise in May. (The former even maintained employment levels.) But payrolls in each are down since February, 2020, by roughly twice as much proportionately as in aircraft.

Major uncertainties still hang over the domestic manufacturing jobs scene, and in one important respect – big new backups in Chinese ports – they’ve become murkier. Nor do Boeing’s problems seem ready to end any time soon. I’m still bullish on U.S.-based manufacturing’s employment outlook, at least in the short and medium terms mainly because American policy remains so overwhelmingly stimulative and its effects are still coursing through the economy. But I’m getting a little impatient for the numbers to start backing me up once again.