(What’s Left of) Our Economy: May US Manufacturing Output Figures Could Feed Optimism or Pessimism

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automotive, durable goods, Federal Reserve, Great Recession, industrial production, manufacturing, non-durable goods, recovery, {What's Left of) Our Economy

May’s Federal Reserve domestic U.S. manufacturing production figures presented a puzzling glass-half-empty-half-full picture. Overall sequential real output levels were down 0.63 percent – their worst such performance since July, 2013’s 1.06 percent decrease. Clearly playing a big role was a fire at a factory producing parts for especially popular pickup truck models, which helped depress after-inflation automotive production by 6.45 percent – its worst such performance since April, 2011’s 7.91 percent plummet.

Yet stripped of automotive’s woes, inflation-adjusted manufacturing output was still down 0.18 percent on month in May, and the month’s decline represented the third such fall-off in the last five months. Largely as a result, industry’s annual constant dollar production increase improved in May by just 1.85 percent – the slowest such rate since January’s 1.10 percent. The automotive decline helped drag down monthly production in the durable goods super-sector by 1.16 percent in price-adjusted terms – the biggest such decrease since July, 2013’s 1.42 percent. Real output in the smaller non-durable goods super-sector was off only 0.08 percent in May.

After-inflation manufacturing output is still down 3.85 percent since the start of the last recession – more than eleven years ago.

Here are the manufacturing highlights of the Federal Reserve’s release Friday on May industrial production:

>May’s Federal Reserve industrial production figures contained evidence for both optimism and pessimism about the U.S. economy and its domestic manufacturing sector.

>Optimists could reasonably blame much of the 0.63 percent sequential drop in real manufacturing output – the worst monthly decrease since July, 2013’s 1.06 percent decline – on a fire at a factory providing parts for popular U.S. pickup truck models.

>And indeed, the May overall manufacturing production swoon was led by a 6.45 percent on-month plunge in motor vehicle and parts output – the worst such performance since April, 2011’s 7.91 percent.

>But pessimists could note that even counting the automotive effect, the rest of domestic manufacturing posted a 0.18 percent dip in monthly inflation-adjusted output – the third such shrinkage in five months.

>Largely as a result, manufacturing’s annual growth rate in May was down to 1.85 percent – its weakest since January’s 1.10 percent. Between the previous Mays, real manufacturing production expanded by 1.87 percent.

>Automotive’s troubles also showed up in the results for the durable goods super-sector in which it’s found. Durable goods’ after-inflation production sank by 1.16 percent sequentially in May – its worst such performance since July, 2013’s 1.42 percent plummet.

>In addition, its 1.97 percent constant dollar May annual growth rate was durable goods’ slowest since January’s 0.94 percent. Between the previous Mays, price-adjusted durable goods production advanced by 2.18 percent.

>Inflation-adjusted output held up better in the smaller non-durables super-sector in May. Its monthly production slipped by just 0.08 percent.

>On-year in May, non-durables’ real production rose by 1.73 percent. As with durable goods, this growth rate is the slowest since January (1.28 percent), but the deceleration has been smaller. Moreover, this year’s May annual production rate for non-durables was better than that for the previous Mays (1.57 percent).

>Revisions for overall real manufacturing production were slightly negative. April’s previously 0.47 percent monthly increase was upgraded to 0.57 percent. March’s already downgraded 0.02 percent rise was downgraded to a 0.11 percent decline. And February’s downwardly revised 1.40 percent increase was bumped down again to 1.39 percent.

>Largely as a result, in price-adjusted terms, domestic manufacturing’s production is now 3.85 percent lower than at the onset of the Great Recession – more than eleven years ago, at the end of 2007.

>After-inflation durable goods output is now 0.10 percent below the levels it hit in December, 2007, and 0.13 percent less than in January, 2008 (its last actual peak).

>Despite their recent out-performance, the non-durables sector has fared much worse since the last recession hit. Its constant dollar output is down fully 8.35 percent from its previous peak, which came in July, 2007.

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Manufacturing Labor Productivity Growth is Looking Like an Endangered Species

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Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal Reserve, Jerome Powell, labor productivity, manufacturing, multi-factor productivity, non-farm business, productivity, recovery, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell stated yesterday that the U.S. economy is doing “very well.” Judging by the metrics that the central bank is supposed to focus on as a matter of law – inflation and the headline unemployment rate – that’s an eminently respectable claim. Based on another key measure of economic performance – labor productivity – it looks like whistling in the dark.

As known by RealityChek regulars, strong productivity growth is widely seen by economists as the best guarantor of sustainable future prosperity and rising living standards. And as also known, labor productivity is the narrower of the two such measures of economic activity tracked by the federal government.

But it’s the gauge that’s updated on the most timely basis, and the latest numbers – which came out last week – should be spurring alarm, not complacency.

These final (for now) results for the first quarter of this year both confirmed that output per person hour worked for the non-farm business sector (the broadest definition of the U.S. economy used in these studies) remains stuck in an historically slow-growth phase, and showed that labor productivity in manufacturing may be shifting into contraction.

The labor productivity performance of both these major sectors was revised down in the latest release from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Rather than having grown by 0.70 percent on an annualized basis sequentially in the first quarter, labor productivity for non-farm businesses is now estimated to have advanced by only 0.40 percent. And in manufacturing, a 0.50 percent annualized increase is now judged to have been a 1.20 percent decrease. That’s its third such drop in the last five quarters.

A glass-half-full analysis would point out that the new non-farm business figure was better than that for the fourth quarter of last year (0.30 percent), and that the manufacturing fall-off followed a 4.20 percent fourth quarter jump.

But the new BLS report also presented manufacturing revisions going back to 2008, and they make clear that its labor productivity performance during this period has been far worse than even previously thought. (And it was already really bad.)

Let’s concentrate on how the new statistics have changed the picture for manufacturing labor productivity during the current recovery, and compare those results with those for previous recoveries – since such analyses yield the best, apples-to-apples, results.

Before the new data came out, manufacturing labor productivity during this expansion was reported to have grown by a total of 9.69 percent. That was less than a third of the rate achieved during the recovery of the early 2000s – which was also known as the Bubble Recovery that helped trigger the financial crisis and ensuing recession, and which last only six years versus. The current recovery is approaching its ninth anniversary.

And during the nearly ten-year long expansion that began in the early 1990s, manufacturing labor productivity surged even more strongly – by 45.86 percent.

The new manufacturing labor productivity growth number for the current expansion? Only 8.28 percent! That’s a downgrade of more than 14.50 percent!

Moreover, although the non-farm business labor productivity growth rate for the current recovery wasn’t revised down nearly as much – from 9.70 percent to 9.62 percent. But this figure, too, pales next to those of previous recoveries. During the bubble expansion, non-farm business labor productivity rose by a total of 16.03 percent. During the 1990s expansion, the rate was 23.25 percent.

By the way, don’t put too many hopes in the broader productivity measure – multi-factor productivity – to come to the rescue. Those numbers haven’t been much better.

Some productivity students have been arguing that it’s only a matter of time, and that recent technological advances will soon start super-charging productivity growth after a slow start just as they did in an earlier era of transformative technological change – the 1920s.

These optimists had better be right. Because if not, the only way to return American growth and living standards gains to their historic rates of improvements will be to flood the economy with credit in order to crank up spending. Feel free to scream if the date “2008” means anything to you.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: America’s Real Wage Recession Drags On – Especially in Manufacturing

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(What's Left of) Our Economy wages, inflation-adjusted wages, manufacturing, private sector, real wages, recovery

In one sense, President Trump’s summit with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un was well-timed – it’s inevitably distracting attention from the latest set of real wage figures (for May) released this morning by the Labor Department. The big takeaways: On a monthly basis, Americans’ inflation-adjusted hourly pay keeps going nowhere, and in fact, constant dollar wages for both the entire private sector and for manufacturing remained in technical recession. That is, they’re down on net for two straight quarters or more of economic activity.

The new data show that, for the private sector overall, real wages inched up sequentially by 0.09 percent in May after flat-lining in April. For manufacturing workers, they fell for the second straight month, with April’s 0.09 percent dip followed by a 0.19 percent drop in May.

As a result, on an annual basis, after-inflation private sector wages are unchanged, and such pay in manufacturing is off by 1.20 percent. Between the previous Mays, real wages in the private sector rose by 0.66 percent, and in manufacturing by 0.28 percent.

The new May statistics reveal that the private sector has been enduring a real wage recession since last June, as constant dollar hourly pay has declined by a cumulative 0.09 percent since then. As for manufacturing, its real wage recession dragged into its 28^th straight month, with price-adjusted hourly wages down by 0.28 percent since January, 2016.

Just as worrisome, real wages in manufacturing are nearing the point of complete stagnation during the current economic recovery. Since mid-2009, they’ve advanced only by a barely perceptible 0.19 percent. The private sector’s performance during this period is only decent by comparison: It’s after-inflation hourly pay has risen by 4.27 percent during this nearly nine-year expansion.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Rules-Based Global Order – & Other Fairy Tales

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alliances, America First, burden sharing, China, currency, Federal Reserve, Financial Crisis, globalists, Great Recession, hegemony, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, offshoring, public goods, recovery, Robert Triffin, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, Triffin dilemma, Trump, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Can the foreign and domestic critics of President Trump’s latest trade policy moves finally get real – and start talking and acting like adults? I’m not referring to politicians and analysts who have pointed out problems with individual aspects of the President’s recent announcements of tariffs on various trade competitors. I’ve been one of these myself.

Instead, I’m talking about those who keep whining that Mr. Trump’s tariffs and his overall – inconsistently to be sure – emerging “transactional” approach to alliances and other international arrangements are endangering a rules- and institutions-based global order that has served both America and the rest of the world unmistakably well. No description of the post-World War II world could be less accurate and indeed more childish – not to mention more self-serving for the supposed U.S. allies and multinational business interests (and their Washington, D.C. hired guns) that have pushed this canards so insistently.

For the institutions and rules so touted by President Trump’s globalist critics were simply window-dressing created to obscure a much less aesthetically pleasing reality: The postwar (non-communist) world’s success has been based fundamentally on America’s power and wealth, and the  consequent U.S. ability to provide what political scientists call “public goods” for those aligned with it. Specifically, it almost single-handedly created the conditions on which success decisively depended: the military protection that countries recovering from war-time devastation could not provide for themselves, and the credit and export markets that were similarly beyond the capacities of their crippled economies. Just as important, during the early post-war decades, the United States could play this role for the most part without excessive security risks and economic costs.

Unfortunately, even the biggest, best-run public goods-providing country will find these arrangements unsustainable, especially on the economic front, and especially if its government is substantially accountable to its people. The essential dilemma was first identified by the Yale University economist Robert Triffin back in 1960, when American power was at or near its zenith.

Triffin’s warning was narrowly economic. He argued that the very free lending and especially spending by which such a country (which political scientists call a “hegemon”) fueled growth around the world would eventually massive international deficits and a global glut of its currency – which was serving as the world’s money – and erode global confidence that currency’s value. Either the hegemon could tighten up – and likely throw the entire world economy into a major downturn. Or it could keep over-lending and especially spending. In this case, its currency would lose enough of its perceived value to end its world-money role, and the world economy would degenerate into chaos. Or the rest of the world could keep stockpiling these excess dollars – which as the French in particular noted would result in the inflation caused by the greenback’s declining value being exported around the world.

Yet in America’s case, the ultimate engines of the paradox – at least in post-World War II America’s case – were foreign policy and domestic politics-related. The over-spending, and consequent deficits stemmed from the United States’ determination simultaneously to incur the expenses of maintaining huge military forces at home and abroad (along with dispensing considerable foreign aid), and of satisfying the American public’s growing demand for social services, without increasing taxes enough to finance these programs responsibly. At the same time, the dilemma was greatly intensified by the refusal of the foreign beneficiaries of these U.S.-provided public goods to pay many more of the costs of their own defense, or to open their markets wider to American exports.

The breakdown of these arrangements in 1971 bore out Triffin’s warnings, but although major adjustments were made globally, the rest of the world continued relying heavily on American security guarantees and markets. And in fairness, a bipartisan American foreign policy establishment addicted to intangibles like “global leadership” and genuinely worried that its European and East Asian allies could not manage their own security affairs in particular responsibly, staunchly resisted any fundamental changes to the status quo.

Fast forward to the mid-2000s, and the exact same fundamental problem reemerged. Further, a Triffin-like situation was greatly worsened by two new developments. First, the Federal Reserve decided to enable reckless over-spending by American consumers by keeping interest rates at peacetime lows not seen for many decades.

Second, American trade policy swelled the international deficits by taking a new, offshoring-focused turn starting with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the early 1990s, and culminating with multinational companies’ decisions to focus tightly on supplying more and more American business and consumer demand from China, not from the United States.

Not so coincidentally, this trade policy shift was accompanied by the creation of an international organization – the World Trade Organization (WTO) – that was the first such body ever authorized to create both binding rules for any international policy sphere, and to utilize enforcement mechanisms in which the United States enjoys no special standing (as opposed, for example, to the United Nations Security Council, where the United States and other permanent members possess an individual veto over decisions).

A better recipe could not be created for empowering China (and the rest of the world’s major export-dependent economies) to view the United States as an even more attractive dumping ground for surplus production; for undermining America’s internationally recognized right to respond unilaterally; and for consequently enabling footloose multinational companies to supercharge the trade deficits by sending an astonishing amount of the nation’s production capacity to China and other super-low cost countries that could not or would not import remotely as much as they could or would export.

The end result: Rather than the United States winding up exporting inflation and (along with free-riding allies and trade competitors) bringing down a global monetary order, America exported financial instability, triggering the worst worldwide financial crisis, the deepest international economic downturn since the Great Recession, and the weakest U.S. economic recovery on record. And revealingly, to the cheers of the bipartisan American foreign policy and economic policy establishments, the first post-financial crisis president, Barack Obama, kept America’s grand strategy firmly on course.

Although it’s still unclear whether Mr. Trump is choosing an effective combination of trade and alliance policy tactics, his initiatives so far raise even more important questions. Chiefly, is he simply trying to achieve greater security and economic burden-sharing? And even if his aims at present are restricted to securing better deals, is he prepared to scrap American participation in current alliances and other international institutions altogether if U.S. tariffs and other America First-type threats don’t seem to be working?

Nonetheless, the President has opened the door to elevating America’s thinking about its global environment toward the adult levels that ultimately will be needed to prevent today’s lopsided unsustainable international arrangements from disastrous crackups. If his critics want to increase the odds that the best choices will be made, they’ll need to grow up, too.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Manufacturing Job Creation Softened a Bit in May; Wages (Literally) Went Nowhere

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Employment, inflation-adjusted wages, Jobs, manufacturing, non-farm jobs, private sector, recession, recovery, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I was on some travel yesterday and couldn’t put out my usual same-day, post. But here’s my analysis of the latest monthly (May) manufacturing figures contained in that morning’s employment report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics:

>U.S. manufacturing job creation shifted into a somewhat lower gear in May, with its 18,000 sequential gain the smallest such improvement since last September’s 6,000. Revisions left the last February through April monthly totals unchanged on net.

>Worse news, moreover, came on the manufacturing wages front. Pre-inflation hourly pay flat-lined on month in May – its worst such results since last November’s similar performance. In addition, April’s previously reported 0.15 percent monthly manufacturing constant dollar wage gain was revised down to 0.15 percent.

>By contrast, overall current dollar private sector wages saw their best monthly improvement (0.30 percent) since December’s 0.38 percent.

>As a result, May’s year-on-year manufacturing wage improvement before inflation totaled only 1.85 percent. Between the previous Mays, pre-inflation manufacturing wages advanced by 2.12 percent.

>These increases also lagged those for the overall private sector, where current dollar wages rose by 2.71 percent on year in May. That was the best such performance since January’s 2.77 percent. And it exceeded the 2.46 percent private sector wage gain between May, 2016 and May, 2017.

>Consequently, the wage gap between manufacturing and the overall private sector widened significantly between last May and this. As of last May, during the current economic recovery, pre-inflation private sector wages had increased 21.24 percent faster than manufacturing wages. This May, the difference was up to 28.13 percent.

>Despite May’s somewhat weaker manufacturing employment growth, the sector’s share of total non-farm employment (the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ U.S. jobs universe) remained at just under 8.53 percent. Last May, manufacturing accounted for just under 8.49 percent of total non-farm employment, meaning that during the last year, manufacturing payrolls have grown slightly faster than American payrolls in general.

>In fact, manufacturing’s May year-on-year job creation (259,000) was a tremendous improvement from the figure between the previous Mays (78,000) and the best annual gain since May, 1998’s 262,000.

>Over the longer-term, however, manufacturing remains a significant job-creation laggard. Since it’s latest employment bottom, in February and March, 2010, it’s regained 1.22 million (53.21 percent) of the 2.293 million jobs lost during the recession and its immediate aftermath.

>The overall private sector lost 8.780 million jobs from the year-end 2007 onset of the recession through February, 2010. Since then, it’s created 19.086 million net new jobs.

>Moreover, since the recession’s onset, the private sector has boosted its employment by 8.88 percent. But manufacturing payrolls are still down 7.81 percent from their December, 2007 levels.

>Manufacturing has been an even worse real wage laggard. The latest inflation-adjusted data go through April, and show that manufacturing couldn’t even match the monthly flat-line in private sector wages. In manufacturing, pay between March and April dipped by 0.09 percent.

>Year-on-year, private sector after-inflation wages inched up only 0.19 percent in April, but even that negligible growth handily beat manufacturing’s 1.10 percent decline. Between the previous April’s inflation-adjusted manufacturing wages improved by 0.55 percent.

>Indeed, both the private sector and manufacturing continue to experience technical real wage recessions (periods of cumulative shrinkage lasting at least two quarters). But in the private sector, such pay is off only 0.09 percent since last May. In manufacturing, real wages are down by this amount since January, 2016.

>And whereas private sector wages are up 4.17 percent in real terms during the current economic recovery (which is nearly nine years old), their manufacturing counterpart gained only 0.37 percent – less than a tenth as much.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Higher Trade Deficit Pulls Down First Quarter U.S. Growth Rate

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exports, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, real GDP, real trade deficii, recovery, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The second read on the inflation-adjusted first quarter gross domestic product (GDP) revealed that the slight growth slowdown (from a 2.30 percent annualized increase to 2.16 percent) was driven by a higher trade deficit figure ($650.9 billion annualized) than initially reported ($645.9 billion annualized). This figure – though still lower than the fourth quarter’s $653.9 billion – remained the second highest price-adjusted quarterly trade shortfall since the $703.2 billion total reported for the third qurter of 2007 – just before the onset of the Great Recession.

The quarterly records for all major import and export figures remained intact in the new data, but all of the latest export totals came in slightly lower, and all of the latest import figures came in slightly higher. At the same time, the sequential slowdowns in the growth of total imports and goods imports (79.17 percent and 86.21 percent, respectively) remained the greatest since the first quarter of 2011 and the first quarter of 2009, respectively. The latter date came at the depths of the Great Recession.

The new GDP figures showed that trade’s drag on cumulative growth during the current recovery remained substantial – and the first quarter total (9.41 percent) was slightly higher than the initially reported 9.23 percent. As a result, though, this trade drag was down somewhat from the 9.82 percent it hit as of the fourth quarter of last year. But the subtraction from cumulative constant dollar economic growth was still an impressive $535.09 billion.

Here are the trade highlights from this morning’s second report on first quarter GDP growth from the Commerce Department:

>The Commerce Department’s second read on gross domestic product (GDP) in the first quarter of this year revealed that a higher quarterly inflation-adjusted trade deficit than initially estimated helped bring about the slightly lower growth figure contained in the new report.

>The increase in the quarterly trade deficit estimate (from $645.9 billion annualized to $650.9 billion annualized) contributed to the real quarterly growth estimate being reduced from 2.30 percent to 2.16 percent.

>The first quarter figure was lower than the fourth quarter’s $653.9 billion. But it still represented the second highest such trade shortfall since the $703.2 billion reported in the third quarter of 2007 – just before the Great Recession struck.

>Because of this quarterly decline in the after-inflation trade deficit, trade still added to constant dollar economic growth in the first quarter. But the contribution fell from a 0.20 percentage point contribution to 2.30 percent annualized growth to a 0.08 percentage point contribution to 2.16 percent annualized growth.

>Levels of all major categories of real American exports and imports remained at record levels in the latest GDP data. But all of the export figures came in slightly lower than initially reported, and all the import figures came in higher.

> Real total exports are now judged to have been $2.2529 trillion in the first quarter on an annualized basis, not $2.2563 trillion. As a result, the sequential increase on an annualized basis was 1.04 [ercent, not 1.19 percent.

>The new real total export total nonetheless remained the category’s fifth straight quarterly record.

>Real goods exports are now judged to have been $1.5696 trillion in the first quarter on a annualized basis, not $1.5722 trillion. As a result, the annualized sequential increase was 1.32 percent, not 1.49 percent.

>But this too was a fifth straight quarterly record.

>Real services exports are now judged to have been $687.4 billion annualized in the first quarter, not the $688.3 billion previously reported. As a result, the annualized sequential increase was 0.47 percent, not 0.60 percent. The new total, however, was a new record as well.

>The first quarter’s total real import figure has now been revised up from $2.9022 trillion on an annualized basis to $2.9038 trillion. As a result, the sequential increase is now 0.70 percent, not 0.64 percent. The new total is still a second straight quarterly record.

>The goods imports total is now estimated at $2.3993 trillion annualized, up from $2.3985 trillion. annualized represented this category’s second straight all-time quarterly high. As a result, the sequential growth is 0.56 percent, not the 0.52 percent previously reported, but the level is still a second straight quarterly record, too.

>Real services imports for the first quarter are now estimated at $502.9 billion annualized, not the $502.1 billion previously reported. As a result, their sequential growth is now 1.35 percent, not the 1.19 percent previously reported. But this new total is a record, too.

>At the same time, both the total imports and the goods imports growth rates still represent the biggest sequential slowdowns in years.

>Even the slightly higher inflation-adjusted total import growth reported for the first quarter (0.70 percent) was 79.17 percent lower than the fourth quarter’s 3.36 percent. That’s still the biggest such change since the first quarter of 2011 (81.87 percent).

>The slightly higher inflation-adjusted goods import growth reported for the first quarter (0.56 percent) was 86.21 percent lower than the fourth quarter’s 4.06 percent. That’s still the biggest such change since the first quarter of 2009 (87.63 percent) – near the low point of the Great Recession.

>With the modest increase between the initially reported first quarter annualized real trade deficit and today’s figure, trade’s drag on the current economic recovery became even larger.

>As of the latest data, the increase in the after-inflation trade deficit has reduced total real growth since the recovery’s onset in mid-2009 by 9.41 percent, or $284.6 billion. The initial first quarter read produced a figure of 9.23 percent, or $279.6 billion.

>Yet this growth drag is still a bit less than the fourth quarter’s 9.82 percent (or 287.6 billion.

>The growth drag of the increase in the Made in Washington trade deficit – which focuses on the non-oil goods trade flows most heavily influenced by trade agreements and other trade policies – has been much greater during the recovery.

>As of the first quarter, this Made in Washington recovery drag stood at 18.26 percent of cumulative real recovery growth ($535.09 billion). That’s a small improvement over its drag as of the fourth quarter of last year – 18.38 percent of cumulative recovery growth, or $538.81 billion.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Fed Manufacturing Production Figures Produce Mixed Picture

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durable goods, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted growth, manufacturing, non-durable goods, recession, recovery, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Domestic U.S. manufacturing grew on month in April in real terms for the third straight month, according to the Federal Reserve’s new industrial production figures. Moreover, April’s 0.47 percent sequential after-inflation production increase was the best such result since October’s 1.31 percent – which was boosted by a bounce-back effect from last fall’s hurricanes. Monthly constant dollar output gains were recorded for both durable goods (0.42 percent) and non-durable goods (0.52 percent).

Yet moderately negative revisions generated an annual April real growth rate for overall manufacturing (2.01 percent) that was the lowest since January’s 0.99 percent, and slightly more sluggish than the previous April-to-April’s 2.18 percent. Adjusted for inflation, domestic U.S. manufacturing output remains 3.31 percent smaller than at its peak before the last recession began – more than ten years ago.

Here are the manufacturing highlights of the Federal Reserve’s release today on April industrial production:

>The new April Federal Reserve industrial production figures showed mixed results for domestic manufacturing, with inflation-adjusted output expanding sequentially for the third straight months, but annual real growth showing some signs of slowing.

>Industry’s constant dollar output improved on month by 0.47 percent in April – the best such performance since a hurricane bounce-back effect helped spur a 1.31 percent sequential spurt last October.

>April’s real monthly production improvement was broad-based, including both the durable goods (0.42 percent) and non-durable goods (0.52 percent) super-sectors.

>Yet the latest revisions were moderately negative. March’s meager 0.07 percent monthly output rise was downgraded to 0.02 percent, February’s 1.51 percent jump is now judged to have been 1.40 percent, and January’s 0.37 percent sequential drop is now reported as a 0.59 percent decrease.

>Largely as a result, April’s year-on-year real manufacturing production increase was only 2.01 percent – the lowest since January’s 0.99 percent.

>Between the previous Aprils, constant dollar manufacturing output expanded by 2.18 percent.

>In addition, the new Fed figures reveal that, in price-adjusted terms, domestic manufacturing is still 3.31 percent smaller than at its pre-recession peak at the end of 2007 – more than ten years ago.

>More encouragingly, April’s monthly manufacturing production improvement was broad-based.

>For durable goods, the larger of manufacturing’s two super-sectors, real output advanced by 0.42 percent sequentially in April.

>Nonetheless, revisions were negative as well, with March’s previously reported 0.39 percent increase downgraded to 0.17 percent, February’s 1.84 percent increase to 1.59 percent, and January’s 0.25 percent dip to a 0.40 percent decrease.

>Durable goods’ year-on-year results were no better. April’s 1.94 percent annual production increase was the lowest inflation-adjusted figure since January’s 0.74 percent. It was also significantly worse than the 2.77 percent figure recorded between the previous Aprils.

>Durable goods real production is now 0.78 percent above the level it hit at the outset of the last recession, at the end of 2007. It rose slightly the following month, and is now 0.75 percent above that January, 2008 levels.

>Non-durable goods have turned in a somewhat better recent performance.

>In April, their price-adjusted output rose by 0.52 percent on month.

>Moreover, March’s previously reported 0.27 percent sequential real production decrease was revised up to a 0.13 percent decline, and February’s 1.16 percent increase was revised up to 1.20 percent. Only January’s results were downgraded – from a 0.50 percent monthly decrease to a 0.79 percent drop.

>On an annual basis, non-durables after-inflation output rose by 2.10 percent in April – a decided improvement from the 1.54 percent increase between the previous Aprils.

>Further, although the latest year-on-year non-durables’ real output increase is also the lowest since January’s (1.26 percent), the deceleration has been smaller than that in durable goods.

>Nonetheless, constant dollar non-durables output is now fully 8.13 percent below its pre-recession peak – hit in July, 2007.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Wage Inflation is Everywhere Except the Real Wage Figures

Tags

Federal Reserve, inflation, inflation-adjusted wages, Labor Department, manufacturing, private sector, real wages, recovery, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning was a bad one for observers of the U.S. economy who keep insisting that wage inflation is either here or around the corner. That means it was also a bad morning for American workers. For the new Labor Department figures on wages adjusted for inflation showed no change – at best – in the historically sluggish constant dollar paycheck increases that employees have seen for most of the current economic recovery.

These new data figures bring the story up through April, when the Department says after-inflation hourly wages were unchanged on month in the private sector, and slipped 0.09 percent in manufacturing. In fact, both numbers represent deceleration from March – when real private sector wages increased sequentially by a downwardly revised 0.28 percent, and real manufacturing wages rose by a downwardly revised 0.19 percent.

Most analysts take the year-on-year numbers more seriously, because they exhibit less random fluctuation. But if anything, they make the wage inflation meme look even loonier. Since last April, price-adjusted private sector wages are up a grand total of 0.19 percent, and in manufacturing, actually down by fully 1.10 percent.

Between the previous Aprils, moreover, inflation-adjusted wages improved by 0.28 percent in the private sector, and by 0.55 percent in manufacturing. For good measure, the latest April yearly decrease in constant dollar manufacturing wages was the biggest since October, 2012’s 2.09 percent drop.

And throughout the current recovery, which is approaching its ninth anniversary, inflation-adjusted private sector wages have advanced by 4.01 percent, while their manufacturing counterparts have inched up only 0.37 percent.

It’s true of course that broader measures of American worker compensation reveal greater improvement. But that’s not to say “great improvement.” Or even close. It’s also true that the Federal Reserve can cite any number of reasons to raise U.S. interest rates after many years at rock-bottom levels. The new real wage figures, however, make clear that wage inflation isn’t yet one of them.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Manufacturing Jobs Growth Stays Strong, but Where are the Wages?

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Bureau of Labor Statistics, inflation-adjusted wages, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, non-farm payrolls, recession, recovery, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

According to this morning’s Labor Department jobs report, April was another month of impressive employment gains and sluggish wage growth in manufacturing. Industry added 24,000 net new jobs on month and revisions left recent months’ solid employment growth intact. Further, manufacturing payrolls’ yearly rate of expansion quickened in April (to 245,000) and was still the best such performance since May, 1998’s 262,000. In fact, manufacturing jobs continued their recent trend of increasing faster than overall employment, with their share of non-farm jobs growing from 8.49 percent last April to 8.53 percent.

Yet pre-inflation manufacturing wages advanced by only 0.15 percent on month in April and March’s figure was revised down slightly. Worse, on an annual basis, current dollar manufacturing hourly pay growth fell to 1.36 percent – the slowest such rate since June, 2015’s 1.25 percent. And in inflation-adjusted terms, manufacturing wages are still in technical recession, having fallen on net by 0.28 percent since February, 2016.

Here’s my analysis of the latest monthly (April) manufacturing figures contained in this morning’s employment report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics:

>American manufacturing’s robust net job creation extended into April, yet swelling payrolls continued having little impact on the sector’s weak wage growth.

>Domestic manufacturers boosted payrolls by 24,000 in April. March’s 22,000 monthly jobs increase was left unrevised, and February’s previously reported 32,000 sequential improvement was downgraded to 31,000.

>Industry’s employment performance was even better on an annual basis. From April, 2017 to April, 2018, manufacturing added 245,000 net jobs – its best such performance since May, 1998’s 262,000.

>Between the previous Aprils, industry created 54,000 net new jobs.

>Further, manufacturing employment continued its recent trend of growing even faster than overall U.S. employment. Last April, manufacturing jobs accounted for 8.49 percent of all American non-farm employment (the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ U.S. employment universe). This April, their share stood at 8.53 percent.

>Manufacturing has now regained 52.42 percent (1.202 million) of the 2.293 million jobs it lost since the late-2007 onset of the Great Recession through the sector’s employment bottom in February and March, 2010.

>But not even their recent hiring spurt has induced domestic manufacturers to raise pay significantly.

>April saw pre-inflation hourly pay in manufacturing increase by just 0.15 percent. In a break with recent trends, this sequential manufacturing wage gain matched that for the private sector overall.

>But manufacturing’s March monthly wage increase was revised down from 0.19 percent to 0.15 percent, and the April private sector figure represents a slowdown from March’s 0.22 percent – which was also downgraded (from 0.30 percent).

>Manufacturing wages performed even worse on an annual basis. Between this April and last, they rose by just 1.36 percent – the slowest such improvement since June, 2015’s 1.25 percent. From April, 2016 to April, 2017, they increased by 1.93 percent.

>As a result, since the start of the current economic recovery, in mid-2009, pre-inflation private sector wages have grown by 25.62 percent more than their manufacturing counterparts. Last April, the gap was considerably less: 18.72 percent.

>In real terms, manufacturing’s recent growth has been even less impressive.

>The latest inflation-adjusted data go through March, when its constant dollar pay rose by 0.19 percent – a downgrade from the initially reported 0.28 percent. Real monthly wage growth for the private sector in toto was downgraded for March, too – but from 0.37 percent to 0.28 percent.

>Year-on-year, real wages in April for manufacturing are actually down – by 0.65 percent. For the private sector overall, they were up 0.28 percent.

>In fact, manufacturing workers have suffered a technical recession in real wages (two straight quarters or more of cumulative decline) since February, 2016. During that more-than-two-year period, their inflation-adjusted hourly pay is off by 0.28 percent.

>The overall private sector is in real wage recession, too, but only since last May. Since then, its after-inflation hourly pay is down by 0.09 percent.

>Further, since the current recovery’s mid-2009 onset, overall real private sector wages have risen nearly ten times faster (4.17 percent) than real manufacturing wages (0.47 percent).

>Despite healthy recent growth, manufacturing remains a longer-term jobs laggard. As reported above, since the current economic recovery began in mid-2009, manufacturing has regained more than half the jobs it lost during the recession and its aftermath. But since shedding 8.780 million positions on net from December, 2007 through February, 2010, the private sector has created 18.856 million net new positions.

>From another perspective, manufacturing payrolls remain 7.94 percent below their immediate pre-recession (December, 2007) level of 13.746 million jobs. But overall private sector employment has risen 9.50 percent during that period.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: As Beijing Talks Begin, Lower March U.S. China Trade Deficit Reported – But the Drop Looks Seasonal

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Canada, Census Bureau, China, EU, European Union, exports, high tech goods trade, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing trade deficit, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, recovery, South Korea, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The onset of top-level U.S.-China trade talks in Beijing roughly coincided with the release of the March monthly U.S. trade figures, which showed that the monthly American merchandise deficit fell to its lowest level ($25.88 billion) since the previous April ($27.63 billion). Nonetheless, this new figure was the second biggest such total for March on record, behind 2015’s $31.24 billion. In addition, the U.S. goods deficit with China is still running 15.52 percent ahead of 2017’s record yearly rate.

Partly as a result of the China improvement, the combined U.S. goods and services trade shortfall in March plunged to its lowest monthly level ($49.86 billion) since last September’s $45.30 billion. And the sequential decline of 15.22 percent was the biggest since the 17.47 percent plunge in March, 2016. March’s totals for combined U.S. exports, goods exports, and high tech goods exports were all monthly records ($208.53 billion, $140.88 billion, and $34.85 billion, respectively). The all-time high in total exports was the third monthly record in the last four months. And the sequential high tech goods gain was a new all-time best (33.95 percent) even for this volatile category.

America’s merchandise trade with Canada racked up its largest monthly surplus on record ($306.1 million), but the U.S. goods deficit with its other NAFTA trade partner, Mexico, jumped to its biggest monthly total ever ($8.05 billion). Amid trans-Atlantic wrangling over American metals tariffs, new monthly records were also set for U.S. goods exports to and imports from the European Union ($29.85 billion and $41.99 billion, respectively), while the March U.S. goods export figure for South Korea was also the best on record ($5.09 billion).

America’s huge and chronic manufacturing trade deficit rose from $73.21 billion in February to $74.53 billion in March, and stayed on course to exceed $1 trillion this year. The March figure also showed that the drag on the current economic recovery from the growth of the Made in Washington trade deficit – that portion of U.S. trade flows most heavily influenced by trade deals and other trade policy decisions – dipped from 18.37 percent in real terms in the fourth quarter of last year (or $538.38 billion in constant dollars) to 17.66 percent ($535.09 billion in constant dollars) in the first quarter of this year.

Here are selected highlights of the latest monthly (March) trade balance figures released this morning by the Census Bureau:

>As a top-level Trump administration delegation arrived in Beijing for possibly contentious trade talks with China, the Census Bureau reported that the massive American goods deficit with the PRC – whose reduction is a leading on the U.S. goal – fell in March by 11.57 percent to its lowest level ($25.87 billion) since the previous April ($27.63 billion).

>At the same time, because U.S.-China goods trade is strongly influenced by seasonal factors, it was also noteworthy that this new March total was the second highest of all time – behind only 2015’s $31.24 billion.

>In addition, even this latest improvement left the bilateral merchandise shortfall running 15.52 percent ahead of last year’s rate, which produced an annual record of $375.23 billion.

>American goods exports to China jumped by 26.27 percent sequentially in March – the biggest such increase since the 32.70 percent advance in October, 2016 – to reach $12.38 billion.

>U.S. goods imports from China fell sequentially in March for the second straight month, to $38.26 billion. That total was the lowest monthly figure since last May’s $41.80 billion.

>The monthly improvement in goods trade with China helped push the combined U.S. goods and services trade deficit down 15.22 percent sequentially, from an upwardly adjusted $57.74 billion in February to $48.96 billion. The February figure was the highest since October, 2008.

>The monthly drop, moreover, was the biggest since March, 2016’s 17.47 percent.

>U.S. total exports hit a new record in March, with the $208.53 billion figure standing 2.04 percent higher than February’s downwardly revised figure of $204.35 billion. In addition, this was the third all-time monthly total export high achieved in the last four months.

>America’s merchandise exports reached an all-time high in March as well, rising 2.37 percent from February’s downwardly revised $137.13 billion to $140.88 billion.

>Another monthly trade best: high tech goods exports. At $34.85 billion, they were 33.95 percent higher than February’s $26.02 billion. High tech goods trade numbers tend to be volatile, but this advance was the greatest on record.

>Largely as a result, the high tech goods trade deficit sank 23.04 percent on month, from $7.93 billion to $6.11 billion – the second straight post-May, 2017 low.

>High tech imports soared on month in March, too – by 20.64 percent, to $40.96 billion. That was the biggest such increase since last March’s 24.58 percent. And the total was the biggest ever for a March.

>The high tech goods deficit is running fully 33.89 percent ahead of last year’s rate – which resulted in the biggest such shortfall on record.

>U.S. merchandise trade with Canada reached its own milestone in March – the biggest monthly American surplus of all time ($306.1 million). In February, the United States ran a deficit of $404.2 million.

>American goods exports to Canada surged by 15.26 percent on month in March, to $27.10 billion. That was the highest monthly total since October, 2014’s $28.39 billion.

>U.S. goods imports from Canada rose robustly, too – by 12.04 percent, to $26.80 billion. That was their highest monthly total since June, 2015’s $27.34 billion.

>The U.S. merchandise deficit with Canada is running 44.72 percent behind last year’s rate.

>The March trade picture for America’s other NAFTA partner, Mexico, was strikingly different. The U.S. goods deficit of $8.05 billion set a new monthly record.

>U.S. merchandise exports to Mexico rose by 8.31 percent on month, to $21.91 billion (the third highest total on record). But merchandise imports climbed by 13.96 percent, to a new record $29.96 billion.

>The merchandise deficit with Mexico is running 9.01 percent ahead of last year’s pace, which at $71.06 billion was the second highest annual total ever (after 2007’s $74.80 billion).

>Amid continued feuding between the United States and the European Union (EU), America’s merchandise trade deficit with the grouping inched up by 0.82 percent on month in March, from $12.05 billion to $12.15 billion.

>Though this total was far from an all-time high, both U.S. goods exports to and imports from the EU set new monthly records in March – $29.85 billion and $41.99 billion, respectively.

>The 19.51 percent percent monthly export increase was the biggest since March, 2011’s 22.51 percent.

>America’s goods deficit with the EU is running 17.71 percent ahead of last year’s rate, which resulted in the second highest annual figure ever ($151.42 billion, with the record being 2015’s $155.66 billion).

>The U.S. merchandise trade deficit with South Korea soared by 58.61 percent on month in March, to $1.08 billion. But this total was at the low end of the recent range. Moreover, in February, the goods shortfall cratered by 65.28 percent.

>The immense and longstanding American manufacturing trade deficit 73.21 to 74.53

>More notably, American goods exports to South Korea climbed to $5.09 billion – a new all-time high. Further, the 18.53 percent sequential advance was the fastest monthly rate of increase since the previous March’s 22.04 percent.

>U.S. merchandise imports from South Korea rose even faster on month in March – by 23.96 percent, to $6.17 billion. That increase, however, followed a 12.05 percent monthly decrease, repeating a roller-coaster pattern that has been typical for the first quarter of the year.

>Nonetheless, the year-on-year shrinkage of the U.S. merchandise trade gap with South Korea has been impressive – 64.30 percent.

>Volatility has also marked the immense and longstanding U.S. manufacturing trade deficit. After sinking dramatically in February from January’s $86.62 billion (the second highest monthly total on record, following last October’s $88.98 billion), the shortfall rebounded by 1.80 percent – from $73.21 billion to $74.53 billion.

>Manufactures exports increased robustly on month, by 18.56 percent, to $10.5.35 billion. But the far greater amount of manufactures imports rose by 10.99 percent, to $179.88 billion.

>This manufacturing trade gap is now running 13.87 percent ahead of last year’s pace – which produced a record total $927.48 billion annual total.

>As a result, if current trends continue, the manufacturing trade shortfall will top $1 trillion this year.

>The March trade figures permit calculation of the drag exerted as of the first quarter of 2018 on the current American economic recovery of the growth of the Made in Washington trade deficit. This consists of the trade flows, adjusted for inflation, that are most heavily influenced by U.S. trade agreements and similar trade policy decisions – i.e., the nation’s non-oil goods trade.

>As of the fourth quarter of last year, this trade drag had reduced cumulative recovery growth by 18.37 percent, or $538.38 billion in constant dollars.

>In the first quarter of this year, the drag was lower – 17.66 percent, or $535.09 billion in constant dollars.