(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Tariff-Spurred Front-Running Still Clear from New U.S. GDP Figures

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exports, GDP, gross domestic product, growth, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, Made in Washington trade deficit, real exports, real GDP, real imports, real trade deficit, recovery, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning came the government’s second read on U.S. economic growth in the third quarter of this year, and the trade results were virtually identical with those of the first report – including on the short-term noise created by President Trump’s tariff-centric policies and foreign retaliation. (The final set of three – for now – third quarter figures will come out toward the end of next month.)

In other words, the new statistics confirmed that, earlier this year, both American exporters and importers had been rushing shipments of goods to each other’s markets in order to beat the tariffs at home and abroad that have been actually imposed or threatened. The biggest new wrinkle is that the resulting boost to the inflation-adjusted U.S. trade deficit, and the resulting trade bite from real growth taken by the trade shortfall’s quarterly increase, was a bit larger than previously estimated.

According to the new release, the price-adjusted U.S. trade deficit hit $945.8 billion on an annual basis the third quarter – 0.72 percent greater than the $939.0 billion reported in the first read on the quarter’s real gross domestic product (GDP). That means that record level reached by the deficit in the third quarter has climbed higher. The previous all-time annualized high for a quarterly constant dollar trade deficit was $932.5 billion, attained in the third quarter of 2006 – shortly before the financial crisis broke out.

Consequently, a conspicuous sign of trade-related front-running – the increase in the real trade deficit between the second and third quarters – grew as well. Pegged last month at 11.65 percent, this sequential rise now stands at 12.46 percent. Nonetheless, it remains only the second biggest such increase on record (behind the 13.18 percent trade deficit widening during the second quarter of 2010, during the current economic recovery’s early stages).

Another sign of front-running (re)appeared in the goods exports numbers. During the second quarter, these exports jumped sequentially by 3.21 percent sequentially on an annual basis – the biggest such increase since the fourth quarter of 2013’s 3.93 percent annualized surge.

In the initial read on third quarter GDP, after-inflation goods exports were judged to have dropped by 1.79 percent – the worst such performance since the 2.44 percent decrease in the first quarter of 2015. Largely as a result, the real third quarter trade deficit ballooned. This morning, this decrease was upgraded – to 2.09 percent. Hence the even larger constant dollar trade deficit number.

The pattern for merchandise imports was similar, though not identical. During the second quarter, they were essentially unchanged sequentially, but as of the third quarter’s initial read, they increased by 2.48 percent – the biggest such increase since the 3.37 percent of the fourth quarter, 2017.

This morning, that increase was revised up slightly, to 2.49 percent.

Because the third quarter price-adjusted trade deficit was revised slightly higher in this latest third quarter GDP report while the growth rate remained at 3.46 percent annualized, the trade bite from growth was revised higher, too. Estimated last month as a 1.78 percentage point subtraction from the overall real economic growth rate, it’s now judged to be 1.91 percentage points. The last time the trade bite was that size in absolute terms was the third quarter of 1985.

In relative terms, the trade bite from growth increased as well – from 51.44 percent of such growth to 55.20 percent. But that remained only its highest level since the fourth quarter of 2016. Then, a growing real trade deficit subtracted 1.32 percentage points from that period’s much slower 1.75 percent annualized inflation-adjusted growth rate (or 75.43 percent of such growth).

With a higher third quarter constant dollar trade deficit came a bigger trade drag on America’s real growth during the current, still far-from-robust economic recovery. As of the initial third quarter GDP report, the real trade deficit’s increase since the recovery began in mid-2009 subtracted $461.7 billion from cumulative economic growth. That was a 13.05 percent hit. This morning’s results, however, pushed up those figures to $468.5 billion – translating into a 13.24 percent hit. As of the final second quarter data, trade had sliced $363.7 billion from cumulative recovery growth, 10.77 percent of the total at that time.

Importantly, though, the growth lost due to the expansion of the price-adjusted Made in Washington trade deficit continues to be much greater. That’s the trade gap calculable from trade flows minus sectors not greatly affected by American trade policy or related decisions – that is, energy and services – and adjusted for inflation.

As of the second quarter, the widening of the Made in Washington deficit resulted in cumulative recovery-era growth being $502.92 percent less than it otherwise would have been had it not grown at all. That’s 14.89 percent less growth.

The latest third quarter figures? Foregone after-inflation growth worth $587.2 billion, or 16.60 percent less growth. Sobering numbers for an economy that’s pulled out most of the available conventional growth-promoting stops (years of super-easy monetary policy being followed by super-easy fiscal policy) with so-far mediocre and likely bubbly results

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Manufacturing’s Real Wage Recession Keeps Lengthening

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inflation-adjusted wages, manufacturing, private sector, real wages, recovery, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Whether it’s because of unskilled, unproductive newbies or continuing jobs offshoring or (as likely) some combination of these and other trends, today’s real wages figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics can’t be read as good news for American manufacturing workers. For it means that the lengthy technical real wage depression they’ve been suffering on average just got longer.

Because of a 0.37 percent monthly drop in October – the biggest such falloff since August, 2017 (0.64 percent) – inflation-adjusted hourly pay in manufacturing is now down on net since December, 2015 (by 0.19 percent). That’s one month longer than this slump had lasted as of the previous data in this series, and a decline that’s lasted far longer than the definition of a technical recession: a cumulative decline over at least two consecutive quarters.

Another measure of manufacturing’s pay doldrums: After-inflation hourly wages are now back to exactly their level in June, 2009 ($10.72), when the current recovery began. That is, they’ve made absolutely no progress over a more than nine-year period.

Moreover, the October figures indicate that current-dollar manufacturing wages will weaken further before they start strengthening. In particular, the 1.11 percent annual decrease was the biggest such deterioration on a relative basis since October, 2012’s 2.09 percent nosedive. By contrast, between October, 2016 and October, 2017, real manufacturing wages dipped by only 0.28 percent.

The real wage news for all private sector workers was better – but not by much. On month in October they were down 0.09 percent (their first such drop since February). On an annual basis, though, they rose by 0.65 percent. And meager as that is, it was the best yearly performance since January (0.66 percent), as well as a substantial improvement over the previous October’s 0.19 percent.

As a result, though, inflation-adjusted private sector wages still have advanced by only 4.75 percent since the current economic recovery began in mid-2009. And whether justified by inadequate skills levels or not, for an economy that remains strongly dependent on consumption for its growth, that doesn’t sound like a formula for lasting prosperity.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The New U.S. Trade Figures are (Nearly) All About China

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China, exports, GDP, goods trade, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, merchandise trade, recovery, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today was one of those days when the U.S. government treated us with both the jobs numbers (for October) and the trade numbers (for September). But just because I posted on the former first doesn’t mean that the latter were humdrum – far from it. And the big story in so many ways was China – along with an important black mark revealed when trade flows are adjusted for inflation.

Specifically, the combined American goods and services trade deficit hit $54.02 billion – just 1.33 percent higher than August’s upwardly revised $53.31 billion, but the second highest monthly total during the current economic recovery. (The highest was February’s $54.96 billion.)

And the prime culprit was the 4.34 percent sequential increase in the immense, chronic U.S. merchandise trade gap with China – to a record $40.24 billion level that represented the third straight monthly all-time high.

This growth means that as of September, this trade shortfall is running 9.91 percent ahead of last year’s annual total – $375.58 billion, which so far has been the record. Also at all-time highs as of September: American goods imports from the People’s Republic. They topped the $50 billion monthly mark for the first time, and were up by 4.32 percent sequentially – possibly because many American companies were rushing their purchases from China ahead of tariffs.

U.S. merchandise exports to China were of course much lower – $9.79 billion in September. The figure was the year’s second lowest (after August’s $9.29 billion) and might have reflected some Chinese front-running of their own government’s retaliatory levies against the United States – although September’s 5.32 percent monthly increase followed a 9.43 percent sequential drop in August.

Contrasting with these China numbers were the September goods trade results with other U.S. trade partners. Specifically, the shortfalls with the European Union, the Eurozone, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, and Canada all narrowed, and by substantial percentages. Moreover, the China-heavy American manufacturing trade deficit declined as well – by 6.13 percent (albeit from a $92.51 billion August total that was a monthly record).

Moving up to the 30,000-foot level, combined U.S. goods and services exports rose by 1.49 percent, to $212.57 billion, from an August figure of $209.46 billion that was revised upward fractionally. That September total was the third highest ever – after the May and June levels of $214.67 billion and $213.20 billion, respectively.

The much greater amount of overall imports was up 1.46 percent on month in September, with the $266.58 billion figure marking a second straight all-time high. (The previous month’s record of $262.75 billion was revised fractionally higher as well.) So some pre-tariff front-running of purchases from abroad looks like it was at work here, too.  

Some other all-time monthly highs achieved in September: services exports ($70.71 billion – a second straight record as well) and services imports ($47.50 billion).

That black mark? The Made in Washington trade deficit. This is the trade shortfall comprised of flow heavily influenced by U.S. Trade agreements and related policy decisions. As such, it leaves out oil and services – since trade in those sectors is in only a very early stage of liberalization. And adjusting it for inflation enables calculating how much trade has been either contributing to or subtracting from after-inflation growth – the measure of the gross domestic product (GDP) that’s most widely followed.

From the start of the current economic recovery, in mid-2009, through the second quarter of this year, the increase in the price-adjusted Made in Washington trade deficit subtracted 14.89 percent from the period’s cumulative real economic growth of $3.3775 trillion. That’s a trade drag of $502.92 billion.

As of the third quarter, the drag increased to 16.60 percent of cumulative recovery inflation-adjusted growth of $3.5374 trillion. That amounts to $587.23 billion worth of lost growth.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: So How Loud was That Trade Noise in the U.S. Growth Figures?

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exports, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, Made in Washington trade deficit, real GDP, real trade deficit, recovery, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

With all the other news of the last few days, it’s been easy to overlook the release last Friday of the first read (of three soundings that will be released in the near term) the nation got on U.S. economic growth in the third quarter. That’s unfortunate because these data on the gross domestic product (GDP) continued to be distorted by sizable fluctuations generated by President Trump’s recent trade policy moves. As a result, the outlook for future growth looks especially cloudy, and that goes double for the odds that its recent acceleration from the crummy rates so far during the current economic recovery can continue. 

The impact of trade-generated short-term noise is clear from the change seen in the U.S. trade deficit between the second and third quarters. In inflation-adjusted terms (the GDP measure that’s most widely followed) during that period, the shortfall dropped by 6.80 percent, from $902.4 billion on an annualized basis to $841.0 billion. That was the biggest sequential decrease since the fourth quarter of 2013 (9.24 percent).

But in the third quarter, the real trade gap rebounded to $939.0 billion – its all-time highest (besting the previous record of $932.5 billion in the third quarter of 2006, during pre-financial crisis days). In addition, the quarterly increase of 11.65 percent was the biggest since the 13.18 percent during the second quarter of 2010 – during the early stages of the current economic recovery.

What’s been going on? As widely reported, both American exporters and importers have been rushing shipments of goods to each other’s markets in order to beat the tariffs at home and abroad that have been actually imposed or threatened. During the second quarter, the biggest rush was made by U.S. exporters – their shipments overseas jumped by 3.21 percent quarter-to-quarter on an annualized basis. That was the biggest surge since the 3.93 percent annualized rise in the fourth quarter of 2013. That’s largely why the trade deficit narrowed.

During the third quarter, at least according to these preliminary figures, goods exports fell back by 1.79 percent – their worst performance since the 2.44 percent decline registered in the first quarter of 2015. Hence, in part, the rebound in the trade deficit. (Again, all these numbers and those in the next paragraph are annualized.)

On the merchandise import front, U.S. purchases of foreign goods in the second quarter stayed pretty flat sequentially – which also contributed to the trade shortfall’s improvement. But in the third quarter, goods imports advanced by 2.48 percent – the biggest such rise since the fourth quarter of 2017 (3.37 percent).

At the same time, as just indicated, these fluctuations have been multi-year highs, not multi-decade highs. So even though the data were noisy, they weren’t epic-ally noisy, or even close.

More epic was the bite from after-inflation growth taken by the higher trade deficit in the third quarter. It chopped fully 1.78 percent points off the 3.46 percent annualized increase. That’s the highest such toll in absolute terms since the 1.91 percentage points taken from growth in the third quarter of 1985! But the picture looks much less dramatic if you measure this growth loss as a share of the actual growth.

During the third quarter, the trade bite amounted to 51.44 percent of that growth. But that’s only the biggest such figure since the fourth quarter of 2016, when the sequential increase in the trade deficit subtracted 75.43 percent (1.32 percentage points) of that period’s 1.75 percent annualized constant dollar growth.

All the same, for the time being, the trade drag on cumulative after-inflation growth over the course of the entire economic recovery is up again. As of the second quarter, it had cost the economy 10.77 percent of its cumulative growth – or $363.7 billion. The third quarter numbers reveal the trade hit at 13.05 percent of cumulative growth – or $461.7 billion.

Moreover, the growth lost during the recovery because of the increase of the Made in Washington trade deficit remains much greater. This gauge measures inflation-adjusted trade flows minus sectors (services and oil) still generally unaffected by trade agreements and related policy decisions.

The latest data are from the second quarter, but they show a Made in Washington trade drag of 18.01 percent on cumulative real recovery growth – which translates into $608.12 billion worth of foregone expansion The next set of monthly U.S. trade data, slated to come out on Friday, will provide the first look on the third quarter statistics.

Some more perspective can be gleaned from the price-adjusted trade deficit’s share of the price-adjusted gross domestic product on a stand-still basis. It’s definitely on the upswing – reaching 5.03 percent as of the third quarter. That’s the highest level since just before the financial crisis-induced ensuing Great Recession struck – during the third quarter of 2007, when the share hit 5.23 percent.

The only consolations identifiable are that overall economic growth today is faster than it was eleven years ago, and that it’s still possible that the real trade deficit’s share of GDP, and the size of the trade drag, will settle down once the trade noise goes away. Not that hope will be the test of Mr. Trump’s trade policy success.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Private Sector Job Creation is Still Overstated, but its Comeback Continues

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government, health care services, Jobs, private sector, recovery, subsidized private sector, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Since we get a breather till the last week of the month in the flow of major nation-wide U.S. economic data, why not revisit one of my favorite unofficial measures of the American economy’s health? That’s the share of job creation that’s accounted for by what I call the subsidized private sector – those parts of the economy – notably healthcare services – that are officially classified as private sector industries, but that don’t really deserve the label because they depend so heavily (including for employment levels) on massive government subsidies.

This distinction matters, or should matter, because nearly all Americans rightly believe that the private sector, not the government, is the economy’s best hope for productive, sustainable growth. In turn, genuine private sector job creation is a much better gauge of the economy’s health than private sector job creation whose numbers are inflated by including the subsidized industries’ performance.

So I’m glad to report that the results for the first three-quarters of this year (through September) show the continuation of a trend I’d spotted a while ago: The subsidized private sector’s share of new total jobs and new private sector jobs is considerably lower so far during the Trump years than during Barack Obama’s presidency. At the same time, the subsidized private sector is still punching above its weight in terms of job creation, which isn’t such good news.

Let’s start, as usual, with 2013, since it was a year by which time the current economic recovery (which began in mid-2009) was well established. Conveniently, it also permits examining progress over a five-year period.

Between January and September, 2013, the subsidized private sector generated 11.14 percent of the economy’s total net new jobs created, and 10.83 percent of all the such jobs credited to the private sector as conventionally defined. The “real private sector,” meanwhile, produced fully 91.79 percent of the economy’s new hires, and 89.17 percent of the employment improvement placed in the conventional private sector category. (A drop in government employment accounts for the failure of these percentages to add up to 100.)

But what a change by 2016 – the last year of the Obama administration. During the first nine months of that year, the subsidized private sector’s share of total payroll increases had more than doubled – to 23.04 percent. And its share of all the conventional private sector jobs added during this period rose even faster – to 27.92 percent. Largely as a result, the real private sector accounted for only 59.43 percent of all net new U.S. employment. And the real private sector’s share of job gains credited to the conventionally defined private sector dropped to 72.06 percent.

So far this year, the subsidized private sector’s share of all U.S. job creation is down to 19.73 percent. The real private sector share of this total bounced all the way back to 76.27 percent, and its share of conventional private sector job gains was up to 79.44 percent.

But between 2017 and 2018, progress along these lines was much slower than during the previous year. In fact, when examined on a stand-still basis (different from the dynamic basis represented by the above employment change numbers), the subsidized private sector’s share of total U.S. employment actually has edged up over the last year – from 15.85 percent to 15.89 percent, and these industries’ share of conventionally defined private sector employment remained at 18.69 percent. 

With the subsidized private sector’s share of total job-creation this year nearly four percentage points higher (the 19.73 percent referred to in the previous paragraph), it’s clear that these industries keep creating an outsized share of overall new U.S. hiring.   

As always, please remember that I’m not portraying the subsidized private sector as worthless or only marginally important. Of course we need healthcare services in particular, and as the American population continues to age, we’ll continue to need a lot more. All I’m saying is that the nation needs to define its terms properly, and recognize that, without immense government spending (and the consequently greater debts), many of the jobs we’ve come to consider private sector jobs simply wouldn’t exist.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Trump is Making Headway on Trade Deficits

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China, Made in Washington trade deficit, Obama, recession, recovery, Trade, Trade Deficits, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Given that two of President Trump’s main trade policy aims have been to reduce the gargantuan U.S. global trade deficit and the comparably huge trade gap with China, it’s been entirely predictable that the chortlers are out with claims that he’s failing on both grounds. (See, e.g., here and here.)

What’s just as predictable? The chortlers are missing the main story: On both fronts, Mr. Trump’s first full year in office (the time-span for which the latest complete data are available), showed noteworthy progress. The main evidence? For both the world as a whole and for China, U.S. trade shortfalls grew more slowly during his first full year in office, even as the American economy grew faster.

As standard economic theory holds, that’s not supposed to happen. Quite the opposite: As growth speeds up, all else equal, trade deficit increases should be expected, as the growth boosts purchases of imports.

As RealityChek readers know, this pattern has been broken often in recent decades. And Trump Year One is an example, especially when the trade flows most heavily influenced by trade policy decisions are examined.

By that I mean what I call the Made in Washington trade deficit – the gap resulting by measuring imports and exports while stripping out oil and services, because trade liberalization in those sectors is in its infancy.

The contrast between the first full Trump year and the previous comparable period (the baseline for which came during former President Obama’s final year in office) is especially instructive. From the second quarter of 2016 to the second quarter of 2017, the Made in Washington trade deficit grew 1.72 times faster than the gross domestic product (GDP) in pre-inflation terms, and the China merchandise deficit grew 1.65 times faster.

Yet from the second quarter of 2017 through the second quarter of 2018 (using the latest GDP figures available), the Made in Washington shortfall increased only half (0.49 times) as fast as the economy overall, while the China goods deficit increased 1.33 times faster than GDP.

Moreover, the first Trump year compares well with the entirety of the current economic recovery, which of course began in mid-2009, early in the first Obama term. We can toss out the results from the second quarter of 2009 to the second quarter of 2010, since the second quarter of 2009 marked the end of the previous recession. But from second quarter 2010-2011 to second quarter 2016-2017, the Made in Washington trade shortfall grew as slowly compared with the economy as it did during the first Trump period only once – from the second quarter of 2010 to the second quarter of 2011 (0.44 times faster). In fact, between the second quarters of 2013-2014, and 2014-2015, this trade shortfall surged by 4.68 and 4.07 times faster than growth.

The relative growth rate of the U.S. goods trade deficit with China diminished during the first full Trump year as well – from 1.65 times faster than the economy, to 1.33 times faster.

On China trade, the immediate pre-Trump years overall look more impressive in comparison with the first full Trump year, but hardly in a slam dunk way. Between second quarter 2010-2011 and second quarter 2016-2017, the China shortfall grew slower compared with growth than it did during the first Trump year three times (2012-2013, 2013-2014, and 2015-2016) and faster the other four years.

It’s completely legit to criticize Mr. Trump’s focus on the global trade deficit or the China trade deficit or any trade deficit (although I regard such criticism as wrong for various reasons, including the one analyzed here). And it’s completely legit to criticize other elements of the Trump trade policies (as I have numerous times – e.g., here and here). What’s not legitimate, though, is to accuse the President of failing to make headway in his trade deficit reduction goals – unless you have no interest in the most pertinent facts.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Dreary U.S. Real Wages Results – & Manufacturing’s Long Pay Recession Continues

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inflation-adjusted wages, Labor Department, manufacturing, midterm elections, private sector, real wages, recovery, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s September real wage figures from the Labor Department show that, by this measure, Americans’ take-home pay advances remain surprisingly sluggish even as the official unemployment rate has reached recent historical lows, and that inflation-adjusted wages in manufacturing remain in a technical recession that began in January, 2016.

On a monthly basis, constant dollar hourly pay in the private sector rose by 0.28 percent – the best such performance since March (when the rate was fractionally higher). The initially reported August sequential increase of 0.09 (which is still preliminary) was unrevised. (Like the Labor Department, I don’t try to track real wage trends in the public sector because that compensation is based largely on politicians’ decisions, not economic fundamentals.)

Year-on-year, the private sector’s after-inflation wage change wasn’t anything to write home about, either. Such pay was up by only 0.46 percent. On the one hand, that number represented the strongest annual growth since January’s 0.66 percent. On the other hand, it was lower than the increase between the previous Septembers – 0.56 percent.

As has long been the case, manufacturing’s pay numbers were far weaker. On a monthly basis, its real wages dipped by 0.09 percent. As a result, constant dollar wages in the sector are now 0.28 percent lower than they were in at the beginning of 2016 – a 32-month stretch that more than qualifies as a technical recession – a period of two or more consecutive quarters of cumulative decline. In addition, the real manufacturing wage flat-line between July and August was unrevised.

The dimensions of manufacturing’s wages woes are also clear from the year-on-year results. In September, the sector’s real wages were down 0.92 percent from the previous September’s level. And that wasn’t even manufacturing’s worst such performance in recent months. Between September, 2016 and 2017, real manufacturing wages decreased by only 0.09 percent.

To add insult to injury, since the current economic recovery began – more than nine years ago, in mid-2009 – real private sector wages have risen by a far-from stellar 4.85 percent. Yet even such a meager advance is more than 25 times faster than the after-inflation wages growth for manufacturing – a rounding error-like 0.19 percent.

P.S. Somewhat disturbing for President Trump and Republicans generally – these are the last real wage figures that will be released before next month’s midterm elections.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Economic Growth Report Confirms Recent U.S. Export Jump & Likely Front-Loading

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GDP, gross domestic product, inflation-adjusted growth, Made in Washington trade deficit, real GDP, real trade deficit, recovery, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The government’s final (for now) read on U.S. inflation-adjusted economic growth during the second quarter contained trade highlights confirming again that a jump in goods exports – likely aimed at avoiding current or threatened American tariffs contributed strongly to the robust performance during this period.

Largely as a result, trade’s drag on real growth during the current economic expansion shrunk more during the quarter than previously estimated.

The latest figures on the gross domestic product (GDP) show that apparent export front-loading helped produce a 12.82 percent annualized sequential second quarter increase in price-adjusted goods exports – a slightly greater rise than the 12.64 percent previously reported. Such merchandise exports had not increased this fast since the 15.71 percent advance in the fourth quarter of 2013.

These higher goods export totals helped these sales hit a new quarterly after-inflation record of $1.8092 trillion on an annual basis, slightly more than the $1.8078 trillion previously reported. They also led the quarter’s real trade deficit lower – from $843.5 billion to $841.0 billion annualized. During the first quarter, the inflation-adjusted trade gap had hit $902.4 billion – the highest such level since the $932.5 billion in the third quarter of 2006.

This annualized trade deficit’s quarter-to-quarter tumble, moreover, is now estimated at 27.22 percent, rather than the 26.01 percent previously reported. That still represents the biggest such slide since the 36.96 percent dive in the fourth quarter of 2013.

With the better second quarter trade numbers came a decline in the drag on economic growth that’s been exerted by the expansion of the trade deficit since the current economic recovery began in mid-2009.

As of the final GDP results for the first quarter of 2018, the after-inflation trade shortfall’s increase had reduced cumulative price-adjusted growth during the expansion by $457.20 billion, or 14.33 percent. The three readings on second quarter GDP have now reduced these figures to $404.7 billion, or twelve percent, in the first reading; $398.3 billion, or 11.79 percent in the second; and now to 11.72 percent, or $395.8 billion.

Far greater – but still on the way down – has been the Made in Washington trade deficit – which is comprised of real trade flows heavily affected by trade policy and trade agreements, and which therefore leaves out trade in oil and services.

As of the final first quarter GDP figures, this trade drag stood at 17.23 percent of cumulative real growth during the expansion – a $523.88 billion loss. According to this morning’s revised second quarter estimate, and separate Census Bureau figures, trade’s bite from real growth had fallen to 14.90 percent ($503.19 billion). These figures actually were a bit higher than the 14.88 percent and $502.90 billion that could be calculated as of the previous GDP release. 

Trade’s contribution to after-inflation second quarter growth remained solid in the final second quarter figures, at 1.22 percentage points out of 4.10 percent annualized growth. That was a somewhat greater role than judged in the second read – 1.03 percent out of 4.16 percent annualized growth. In the first quarter, trade subtracted 0.02 percentage points to 2.20 percent annualized growth.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: China, Manufacturing, the EU, & Canada (sort of) Led the New Trade Deficit Surge

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Canada, China, EU, European Union, exports, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Frade Agreement, oil, real trade deficii, recovery, services, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

With President Trump still threatening to slap $200 billion worth of tariffs on Chinese imports this week, this morning’s trade figures from the Census Bureau show that the U.S. goods deficit with China hit a new monthly record of $36.83 billion. The U.S. manufacturing trade shortfall reached an all-time high as well – $92.29 billion. And as talks to revamp NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) continue, America’s goods gap with Canada jumped by nearly 58 percent on month, but the merchandise shortfall with Mexico sank by more than 25 percent.

The goods gap with the European Union, meanwhile, reached record monthly heights as well ($17.59 billion). The sequential increase of 50.03 percent was the greatest since October, 2013 (58.87 percent) and was driven by the biggest monthly plunge in U.S. merchandise exports (15.72 percent) to the region since July, 2006 (16.62 percent).

America’s combined goods and services trade deficit rose at its fastest pace (9.50 percent) since March, 2015 (35.63 percent), to $50.08 billion from a downwardly revised $45.74 billion. Total monthly imports of $261.16 billion were a new record as well, and total monthly exports fell for the first time since January – to $211.08 billion. Other all-time monthly highs were recorded for services exports ($70.29 billion), services imports ($47.22 billion), goods imports ($213.94 billion), and current dollar oil exports ($15.77 billion). Pre-inflation oil imports of $20.32 billion were the highest since December, 2014 ($23.58 billion). Though not a new monthly record in July, the goods trade deficit did increase that month at its fastest pace (6.11 percent) since November, 2016 (6.76 percent).

Although these July trade figures come too early in the third quarter to calculate trade’s drag on the current economic recovery through that period, if the monthly deficits remain in this neighborhood, trade’s subtraction from cumulative growth since the expansion began would rebound after falling during the second quarter. As of the revised second quarter figures, the increase in the real total trade deficit since mid-2009 had reduced inflation-adjusted growth during this period by 11.79 percent, or $398.50 billion. That was down from the $457.20 billion drag (14.33 percent) as of the final first quarter results.

The trade drag numbers are much greater for the Made in Washington trade deficit – that portion of U.S. trade flows most heavily influenced by trade agreements and similar trade policy decisions. As a result, it omits trade in services (where liberalization efforts remain at an early stage) and in energy (which is rarely discussed in trade diplomacy as such). The final first quarter figures pegged this growth drag at 17.37 percent, or $523.88 billion worth of lost constant dollar growth. As of the revised second quarter numbers, this growth bite had shrunk to 14.88 percent, or $502.90 billion worth of lost real growth.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New GDP Figures Confirm Trade as a U.S. Growth Booster – for Now

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exports, GDP, goods trade, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, real GDP, real trade deficit, recovery, tariffs, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The revised second quarter U.S. government figures for change in the gross domestic product (GDP) came out this morning, and their trade highlights broadly confirm the picture painted in last month’s advance results: A significant sequential reduction in the inflation-adjusted U.S. trade deficit keyed by a jump in goods exports aimed at avoiding impending or threatened tariffs made an impressive contribution to a strong quarterly real growth rate.

As a result, the new data also left in place one of the biggest questions hanging over the second quarter’s performance:  Will this trade boost to growth peter out?

The new results show that this export front-loading was fractionally smaller than first reported, with merchandise exports rising sequentially in the second quarter by 12.50 percent on an annualized basis, not the 12.64 percent initially estimated. Yet this increase was still the biggest since the 15.71 percent jump in the fourth quarter of 2013. The second quarter’s goods exports also still amounted to a new record: $1.8078 trillion annualized.

In addition, the quarterly drop in the combined goods and services trade deficit was steeper than originally reported. The gap, which stood at $902.4 billion annualized in the first quarter (the biggest such total since the $932.5 billion recorded in the third quarter of 2006), decreased to $843.5 billion in this year’s second quarter, not the $849.9 billion reported last month.

This sequential slide, moreover (26.01 percent annualized), was still the biggest since the 36.96 percent plunge in the fourth quarter of 2013.

Trade’s contribution to after-inflation second quarter growth remained solid in the revised figures, at 1.03 percentage points of 4.16 percent annualized growth. That was only marginally lower than the 1.04 percentage point contribution to the 4.00 annualized rate originally estimated.

Even better, the new second quarter results reduced the drag on economic growth that’s been exerted by the expansion of the trade deficit since the current economic recovery began in mid-2009.

As of the final GDP results for the first quarter of 2018, the trade shortfall’s increase had reduced cumulative price-adjusted growth during the expansion by $457.20 billion, or 14.33 percent. The first read on second quarter GDP reduced these figures to $404.70 billion, or twelve percent. This morning’s revision shrunk them further – to $398.50 billion, or 11.79 percent.

The same has held for the growth drag of the Made in Washington trade deficit – comprised of trade flows heavily affected by trade policy and trade agreements, and which therefore leaves out trade in oil and services.

The final first quarter GDP figures pegged this trade drag at 17.37 percent of cumulative real growth during the expansion – a $523.88 billion loss. According to this morning’s revised second quarter estimate, the Made in Washington deficit’s bite from real growth declined to 14.88 percent, or $502.90 billion.