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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Greatest Presidential Job Creator Ever?

09 Sunday Jan 2022

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Biden, Bureau of Labor Statistics, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, Employment, Jobs, lockdowns, NFP, non-farm payrolls, reopening, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

However unwittingly, President Biden rendered the nation a major public service on Friday with his remarks on his administration’s achievements in boosting American job creation. Specifically, he provided a good indication of how many ways and how dramatically economic data can be spun.

According to the President, “we have added 6.4 million new jobs since January of last year — in one year. And that’s one of the most — that’s the most jobs in any calendar year by any president in history.”

A look at the data provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) shows that Mr. Biden actually slightly understated calendar 2021 overall net new job creation. Non-farm payrolls (BLS’ definition of the American employment universe) increased by 6.448 million during this period.

Mr. Biden’s focus on the calendar year, however, means that he’s taking credit for January. Not only wasn’t he inaugurated until January 20, but each month’s BLS job increase numbers cover the period between the middles of each month. (See the “Technical Note” section of each month’s report.) So the January job creation he’s claiming as his own stopped days before he entered office.

If it’s assumed that the current administration’s impact on employment (and the rest of the economy) didn’t start until the President took the Oath of Office – on a monthly basis, in February – then the employment increase that’s taken place on his watch so far is 6.215 million. That’s nearly 200,000 less than he claimed.

There’s no question that the employment picture orders of magnitude better than that of the last calendar year of the Trump administration – when non-farm payrolls cratered by 9.416 million.

At the same time, that calendar year includes the depths of the steep economic downturn induced by the CCP Virus’ arrival in the United States. In March and April, American employment levels crashdove by a sickening 22.362 million. And as should be remembered, including by those who view the Trump response to the pandemic itself as disastrously bad, this employment calamity mainly stemmed not from Trump economic policy decisions that presumably were inferior to their Biden administration counterparts. They mainly stemmed from health-related economic and behavioral restrictions that the former President supported only belatedly and reluctantly.

In fact, once the economy began reopening (raggedly, to be sure), job creation skyrocketed. From April, 2020 through January. 2021 – bringing the story up to just about the end of Trump’s presidency – NFP rose 12.575 million. That’s twice as much in absolute terms in nine months as in Mr. Biden’s 11 months in office.

As implied, though, this rapid improvement wasn’t mainly Trump’s doing. Clearly, economic stimulus measures helped. But far more important was a reopening and highly uneven return to economic normality. Moreover, because of the federal government’s limited authority over issues such as whether businesses closed altogether, or operate during limited hours, or how their customers should behave, the reopening decisions were overwhelmingly taken at the state and local level.

But as known by RealityChek regulars, President Biden’s remarks ignore a more fundamental concern: The kinds of absolute increases touted by President Biden are far from the whole story when it comes to judging economic performance, and can profoundly mislead even factoring out the whopping distortions of the economy created by the CCP Virus. At least as important are relative increases (or decreases) – in this case, because the size of the American workforce keeps changing.

And when the Biden job creation record is presented in terms of percentage increase, it doesn’t look so extraordinary at all. The Washington Post‘s Andrew Van Dam put it perfectly yesterday:

“The 6.4 million jobs gained this year, while a record in absolute terms, represents only a 4.5 percent increase in the workforce. That’s smaller than the 5.0 percent growth seen in 1978, when a much smaller labor force added 4.3 million jobs. In fact, relative to the size of the workforce, it’s only the 11th best calendar year since record-keeping began in 1939.”

Biden’s boasts about the economy certainly aren’t the first issuing from the Oval Office. Indeed, they’re no more exaggerated than TrumpWorld’s repeated claims that, pre-virus, he “helped America build its strongest economy in history.” But they’re also a needed reminder that whoever’s in office – a Democrat or Republican, an establishmentarian or a disrupter – their economic pronouncements are bound to deserve some Pinocchios.       

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Im-Politic: The Lockdown-Light States are Winning the U.S. Population Contest

27 Monday Dec 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Im-Politic

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Tags

CCP Virus, Census Bureau, coronavirus, COVID 19, demographics, Im-Politic, lockdowns, mandates, mask mandate, migration, population, reopening, states, vaccine mandates, Wallethub.com, Wuhan virus

Unless you don’t think that voting with one’s feet speaks volumes about what people like and dislike, (and how could you not, given what a pain most sane people consider moving to be?), you have to agree that data released last week by the U.S. Census Bureau data sent a powerful message about heavy CCP Virus-induced restrictions on various aspects of their lives. In a phrase, they can’t stand them. Or maybe they can’t stand how they’ve been implemented, which is pretty much the same thing.

Of course, people move for all sorts of reasons. But it’s undeniably striking that the Census data on which states gained and lost the most population during roughly the first pandemic year (April 1, 2020-July 1, 2021) show that those with relatively light anti-virus regimes have generally gained new residents, and those with relatively heavy rules and regulations experienced declines.

The most revealing indicator of these trends isn’t the headline set of population increases and decreases by state during the above time period. After all, those figures also include natural births and deaths (mainly because here we’re trying to measure not the states’ individual records in fighting the virus, but how Americans perceive them), as well as changes due to international migration (which say almost nothing about how the perceptions of the U.S. population as of spring, 2020).

Instead, the best indicators of public opinion about pandemic policies are the domestic migration data – that is, Americans’ movements among states over this latest data year.  They’re found in the third spreadsheet listed under “Tables” at this link, and the states’ April, 2020 populations that are used as the baseline are in the second spreadsheet. 

Our methodology? Comparing the new Census findings with Wallethub.com‘s ranking of individual states’ levels of virus restrictions as of this past April. Let’s start with a list of the ten states (out of 51, including the District of Columbia) that have performed best in absolute terms in attracting residents from other states (listed from most to least successful), with their restrictiveness rankings next to them. (The lower the number, the less restrictive a state.)

Florida                                263,958       2

Texas                                  211,289       5

Arizona                              119,650     15

North Carolina                  106,884      28

South Carolina                    78,812        7

Tennessee                           73,472      16

Georgia                              59,979       24

Idaho                                  56,439       11

Utah                                   36,084       18

Nevada                              34,280        30

What this list shows is that eight of these ten states are among the 50 percent of states that have the fewest anti-CCP Virus restrictions, three of the ten are among the five least restrictive, and four of the ten are in the ten least restrictive. That looks like the least restrictive states have been awfully attractive to Americans.

Similar results come from the list of the ten states that have attracted the most domestic movers as a share of their populations in April, 2020:

Idaho                                    3.07         11

Montana                              1.98         10

Arizona                               1.67          15

South Carolina                   1.54            7

Delaware                            1.45          49

Maine                                 1.25          43

Florida                                1.23           2

Nevada                               1.10         30

Utah                                   1.10         18

New Hampshire                 1.07         22

Tennessee                          1.06          16

Again, eight of this group of ten are found among the half of states with the fewest pandemic restrictions. The correlation, though, is slightly weaker. After all, Delaware and Maine are big outliers, attracting relatively large numbers of domestic movers despite having super-strict approaches to fighting and containing the virus. In addition, only one of these states is in the top five least restrictive states, and just three in the top ten least restrictive. Overall, though, this list supports the case that the least restrictive states have been popular moving destinations for Americans.

But does the opposite conclusion hold – that the most restrictive states have performed especially poorly in this demographic popularity contest? The following list of the ten states that have lost the most residents in absolute terms to other states, along with their restrictiveness rankings, says the answer is “It sure does.”

California                 429,383             45

New York                 406,257             46

Illinois                      151,512             34

Massachusetts            54,339             38

New Jersey                 39,954             41

Louisiana                   36,854              27

Maryland                   26,666              26

DC                             23,222              50

Hawaii                       16,174              37

Minnesota                 15,947               40

All of these states are in the group of 50 percent of states with the most virus restrictions, four of the ten are in the group of the ten most restrictive, and California and New York are among the five most restrictive states.

As with the states with the biggest percentage domestic migration increases, the list of states with the biggest relative domestic migration decreases is consistent with a strong correlation between virus policies and population gains, but one that’s not quite as strong as the relationship between virus policies and population change among states with the biggest absolute population losses.

DC                                3.38             50

New York                      2.01            46

Illinois                           1.18            34

Hawaii                           1.11            37

California                      1.08            45

North Dakota                0.91            17

Alaska                           0.81              6

Louisiana                      0.79            27

Mass.                            0.77            38

New Jersey                   0.43            41

Maryland                     0.43             26

Here, BTW, we’re dealing with eleven states, because New Jersey and Maryland have lost equal percentages of their populations. But this list reveals that two of the eleven are among the half of states with the fewest virus restrictions (versus none among the states with the biggest absolute domestic migration losses). Moreover, Alaska is one of the ten least restrictive states and North Dakota is among the twenty least restrictive.

At the same time, nine of the eleven are in the half of states that are most restrictive, two are among the ten most restrictive (the District and New York), with California right behind them. Moreover, the strength of the relationship between extensive CCP Virus restrictions and big population losses becomes even clearer given the outsized roles played by highly restrictive California and New York. Together, they account for fully 65.49 percent of the 1.276 million Americans who have moved from high-restriction to low-restriction states. (There’s considerable concentration among the states that have gained domestic migrants, but the top two – Florida and Texas – represent only 475,247 out of this total 1.066 million population, or 44.60 percent.

But there’s still the question of whether the population change and virus regime relationship looks the same when the variables are flipped. In other words, have the least restrictive states performed well and the most restrictive performed poorly in terms of population gains and losses? Here’s that list (starting with the least restictive state), including these states’ population changes in absolute and percentage terms:

Iowa                        -1,116               -0.04

Florida               +263,958               +1.23

Wyoming               +1,531               +0.27

South Dakota         +5,566               +0.63

Texas                  +211,289               +0.72

Alaska                     -5,912                -0.81

South Carolina     +78,812               +1.54

Mississippi (tie)      -7,132                -0.24

Oklahoma (tie)    +27,589               +0.70

Montana              +21,483               +1.98

Of the ten least restrictive states, seven have gained population, and three have gained lots both in absolute terms and percentage terms (Florida, South Carolina, and Texas). Moreover, one of the loser states (Iowa) has barely lost anyone by either measure.

And now for the population changes in the most restrictive states (starting with the most restrictive), again with the increases or decreases presented alongside their names in both absolute and percentage terms:

Vermont                +4,470               +0.70

DC                       -23,322                -3.38

Delaware            +14,387               +1.45

Virginia                -11,294               -0.13

Washington (tie)   +9,408               +0.12

New York (tie)   -406,257               +2.01

California           -429,383              +1.08

Maine                  +17,003              +1.25

Connecticut              +226              +0.01

Rhode Island            +291              +0.03

Among these most restrictive states, the correlation at first glance doesn’t look strong at all. Only three – the District, New York, and California – suffered a net migration outflow during the first pandemic year. But look below the surface and some of the relationship reappears. After all, two of the three are highly restrictive California and New York, whose population losses are enormous in absolute terms and significant in percentage terms. The other, the even more restrictive District of Columbia, saw an astonishing 3.38 percent of its people leave for other states – the highest percentage change whether we’re talking population increases of decreases.

Qualifiers for these conclusions should be kept in mind on top of those concerning multiple possibilities for inter-state moves.  First and foremost, I haven’t compared these migration patterns with those of past years.  If they turn out to be broadly similar, then maybe the CCP Virus isn’t a main determinant at all – and in this vein, the popularity of Sun Belt states like Florida, Arizona, and Texas is nothing new.  Nor are departures from northeastern states like New York and New Jersey. 

At the same time, Florida and Texas in particular have gotten terrible publicity all year long for their loose virus restrictions.  (Google, e.g., “Death-Santis.”)  And not only was Califonia’s annual population decline its first ever, but domestic out-migration was responsible for 143 percent of it.  (Positive population developments like births made up the difference.)  So something out of the ordinary demographically seems to have gone on in at least some big states during that first pandemic year.   And if it wasn’t the virus, I’d sure like to know what else it could have been. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Case for Transitory U.S. Inflation Just Weakened

10 Wednesday Nov 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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Tags

CCP Virus, consumer price index, core inflation, coronavirus, COVID 19, CPI, inflation, Labor Department, lockdowns, logistics, prices, reopening, stay-at-home, supply chain, transportation, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

At first glance, this morning’s U.S. inflation report almost had me throwing in the towel in the debate between those (like me) believing that recent price hikes will peter out sooner rather than later, and those believing that they’ll be much longer lasting.

My pessimism stemmed from the indisputable facts not only that by all the major month-on-month and year-on-year measures, the numbers for October were terrible in their own right. They also showed inflation gaining momentum. My case for optimism focused on a loss of momentum I’d identified through September.

Today’s statistics definitely shifted the weight of the evidence in favor of the pessimists. But I still see one possible reason for continued optimism – though the accent is on “possible.” Specifically, the year-on-year numbers may again be partly functions of unusually weak inflation last year, when the CCP Virus pandemic was undermining the economy even more than this year.

Let’s review the main monthly and annual numbers for this calendar year first, though, because it’s worth seeing just how bad they are and how much inflation momentum they reveal. First, the monthly results for overall inflation (as measured by the Labor Department’s Consumer Price Index, or CPI). As you can see, whereas sequential price increases between July and September had been coming in considerably lower than their June peak, in October they shot up past the June peak – to the highest level since June, 2008 (1.05 percent).

Dec-Jan:                          0.26 percent

Jan-Feb:                          0.35 percent

Feb-March:                     0.62 percent

March-April:                  0.77 percent

April-May:                     0.64 percent

May-June:                      0.90 percent

June-July:                      0.47 percent

July-Aug:                      0.27 percent

Aug-Sept:                      0.41 percent

Sept.-Oct:                      0.94 percent

The recent acceleration in the monthly changes in so-called core inflation was even stronger. (This gauge strips out food and energy prices, because however vital these commodities are to daily life, their price levels can be influenced by developments like bad weather or the decisions of the OPEC oil-producing countries’ cartel that supposedly say little about how fundamentally inflation-prone the economy is or isn’t.)

As of October, core inflation is still well below its peak in early spring. But it’s much highe than it’s been in the last three months:

Dec-Jan:                      0.03 percent

Jan-Feb:                       0.10 percent

Feb-March:                  0.34 percent

March-April:                0.92 percent

April-May:                   0.74 percent

May-June:                    0.88 percent

June-July:                     0.33 percent

July-Aug:                     0.10 percent

Aug-Sept:                    0.24 percent

Sept-Oct:                     0.60 percent

The case for acceleration is at least as strong for annual overall inflation. As I wrote last month, the rate of change had been more or less plateauing since May, but clearly shifted into a higher gear in October. Indeed, last month’s yearly increase was the biggest since December, 1990’s increase of 6.25 percent.

Jan:                             1.37 percent

Feb:                            1.68 percent

March:                       2.64 percent

April:                         4.15 percent

May:                          4.93 percent

June:                          5.32 percent

July:                           5.28 percent

Aug:                           5.20 percent

Sept:                          5.38 percent

Oct:                            6.24 percent

The same speed-up can be seen in the annual core inflation figures. And they’ve just hit their highest level since September, 1991 (4.60 percent).

Jan:                            1.40 percent

Feb:                            1.28 percent

March:                       1.65 percent

April:                         2.96 percent

May:                          3.80 percent

June:                          4.45 percent

July:                          4.24 percent

Aug:                          3.98 percent

Sept:                          4.04 percent

Oct:                           4.58 percent

But now the data providing (some) cause for optimism. They cover the annual inflation figures for 2019-2020, and the reason for examining them is that if inflation that year was unusually low, then whatever price hikes are recorded the year after will be unusually – and to some extent, artificially – high.

As clear from the below numbers, those 2019-2020 inflation rates became rock bottom as the CCP Virus began spreading, the economy began locking down, and consumers turned super cautious. From June through September, they rose again as the reopening after that first virus wave proceeded. But numbers like those, with one handles, hadn’t been seen recently since the summer of 2017, and even these were all well above 1.50 percent.

But October saw a sizable dropoff – from 1.41 percent to 1.19 percent.

Jan:                            2.47 percent

Feb:                            2.31 percent

March:                       1.51 percent

April:                         0.34 percent

May:                          0.22 percent

June:                          0.73 percent

July:                          1.05 percent

Aug:                          1.32 percent

Sept:                         1.41 percent

Oct:                          1.19 percent

And possibly as interesting: The November, 2019-2020 overall inflation rate (below) was even lower. December’s was higher, but not by much. So I’d argue that caution is warranted in reading too much into the latest big annual CPI increase.

Nov:                          1.14 percent

Dec:                           1.30 percent

The story told by the core inflation data is similar. Annual price hikes below two percent didn’t reappear until March, 2018 and stayed above that level until the depths of last year’s short but steep pandemic-induced recession. Following that first wave and its dramatic impact, annual 2019-2020 core inflation rates came back, but never approached two percent. And in October, fell back to 1.63 percent.

Jan:                           2.26 percent

Feb:                          2.36 percent

March:                      2.10 percent

April:                        1.44 percent

May:                         1.24 percent

June:                         1.20 percent

July:                         1.56 percent

Aug:                         1.70 percent

Sept:                        1.72 percent

Oct:                          1.63 percent

How did they perform through the end of 2020? Cumulatively, they drifted down further.

Nov: 1.65 percent

Dec: 1.61 percent

In this vein, it will be especially interesting to see how the annual 2021-2022 statistics look when they begin coming in early next year. My bet right now is that they’ll decline simply because this particular CCP Virus effect will be wearing off. And hopefully, progress toward untangling knotted global supply chains will help moderate the monthly numbers. (Until then, though, the holiday shopping season could well keep propping them up.) But if those logistics and transport troubles remain serious, all bets come off. Ditto for energy prices if they stay up.

None of this is to minimize the pain that recent and current inflation have inflicted on Americans, and especially lower income Americans. And the October results suggest that even if these price hikes prove to be a transitory development due largely to one-off CCP Virus-related disruptions, there’s no doubt that the definition of “transitory” keeps expanding chronologically – and possibly making this debate look pretty moot.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: No Delta Effect on U.S. Manufacturing Growth In Sight. Yet.

17 Tuesday Aug 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Uncategorized

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Tags

aerospace, aircraft, aircraft parts, appliances, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Delta variant, electrical components, electrical equipment, fabricated metal products, Fed, Federal Reserve, inflation-adjusted growth, inflation-adjusted output, machinery, manufacturing, medical supplies, medicines, personal protective equipment, petroleum and coal products, pharmaceuticals, plastics, PPE, real growth, recovery, reopening, rubber, textiles, vaccines, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The after-inflation U.S. manufacturing production data reported today by the Federal Reserve revealed plenty of newsy developments. But my choice for biggest is the finding that, in price-adjusted terms, domestic manufacturers’ output finally nosed back above its last pre-CCP Virus (February, 2020) level.

The new number isn’t an all-time high – that came in December, 2007, just as the financial crisis was about to plunge the entire U.S. economy into its worst non-pandemic-related downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s. As of this July, real manufacturing production is still 5.94 percent below that peak.

Measured in constant dollars, however, such output is now 1.15 percent greater than just before the virus arrived in the United States in force. Not much, and of course any Delta variant-prompted curbs on economic activity or extra caution in consumer behavior could wipe out this progress. But you know what they say about a journey of a thousand miles.

Had this milestone not been reached, I’d have led off this post by noting that although some really unusual seasonal factors in the volatile automotive sector definitely juiced the excellent July sequential output gain, U.S.-based industry outside automotive performed impressively during the month as well.

Specifically, as the Fed’s press release noted, the whopping 11.24 percent jump in the price-adjusted output of vehicles and parts contributed about half of overall manufacturing’s 1.39 percent growth. That automotive figure was the best monthly improvement since the 29.39 percent rocket ride the sector generated in July, 2020 – when the whole economy was staging its rebound from that spring’s deep but brief virus-induced recession. And that overall real on-month production advance was the best for manufacturing in general since the 3.39 percent achieved in March – earlier in the initial post-pandemic recovery.

But in July, the rest of domestic industry still expanded by a strong 0.70 percent after inflation – its best inflation-adjusted growth since the 3.31 percent also recorded in March.

The revisions in this morning’s Fed data for the entire manufacturing sector were mixed. June’s initially reported 0.05 percent decline is now judged to be a 0.10 percent increase, and April’s previously reported 0.39 percent drop now stands as a 0.21 percent decrease. But May’s last reported increase – upgraded slightly to a strong 0.92 percent – is now estimated at just 0.65 percent.

Looking at broad industry categories, the big real output July winners in domestic manufacturing’s ranks aside from automotive were electrical equipment, appliances, and components (up 2.31 percent); plastics and rubber products (up 2.02 percent); machinery (1.91 percent); the broad aerospace and miscellaneous transportation sector (think “Boeing”), which rose by 1.90 percent; textiles (up 1.67 percent); and miscellaneous durable goods, which includes but is hardly confined to many pandemic-related medical supplies (up 1.55 percent).

As I keep noting, good machinery growth is especially encouraging, since its goods are used both throughout manufacturing and the economy as a whole, and strong demand signals optimism among manufacturers about their future prospects – which tends to feed on itself and impart continued momentum to industry.

The list of significant losers was much shorter, with real fabricated metal products output 0.42 percent lower than June levels and petroleum and coal products shrinking by 0.60 percent.

Turning to narrower manufacturing categories that remain in the news, despite Boeing’s still serious manufacturing and safety problems, and ongoing CCP Virus-created weakness in air transport, inflation-adjusted production of aircraft and parts continued its strong recent run. June’s initially reported 5.24 percent monthly output surge was revised down to 3.57 percent. But that’s still excellent by any measure. And July saw production climb another 2.78 percent. As a result, real output in this sector is now 9.95 percent higher than it was just before the pandemic’s arrival in the United States in February, 2020.

Real output in the pharmaceuticals and medicines sector (which includes vaccines) grew by 0.77 percent sequentially in July, and its real output is now 11.35 percent greater than just before the pandemic. But those revisions!

June’s initially reported 0.89 percent increase is now judged to be a 0.34 percent decrease, and May’s previously downgraded 0.15 percent rise has now been upgraded all the way to 1.54 percent.

An even better July was registered by the vital medical equipment and supplies sector – which includes virus-fighting items like face masks, face masks, protective gowns, and ventilators. Monthly growth came in at 1.71 percent. But revisions here were puzzling, too.

June’s initially reported 0.99 percent sequential real production improvement is now seen as a major 1.54 percent falloff. And May’s monthly constant dollar growth, already upgraded from 0.19 percent to 1.18 percent, is now pegged at 1.86 percent.

I’m still optimistic about domestic manufacturing’s outlook, and that’s still based on domestic manufacturers’ own continued optimism – which as shown by the two major private sector monthly manufacturing surveys remained strong in July. (See here and here.)

But I also continue to view U.S. public health authorities’ judgment as suspect when it comes to the balance that needs to be struck between fighting the virus and keeping the economy satisfactorily open. So as long as new virus variants pose the threat of higher infection rates (though not at all necessarily of greater damage to Americans’ health), my own optimism has become more tempered.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New U.S. Figures Show Inflation is Looking More Transitory

11 Wednesday Aug 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, deflation, Delta variant, Federal Reserve, inflation, interest rates, lockdowns, monetary policy, QE, quantitative easing, recession, recovery, reopening, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Normally, a 5.28 percent annual U.S. inflation rate for July reported today by the Labor Department wouldn’t be seen as good news. Ditto a comparable 4.24 increase in prices excluding food and energy (the so-called core rate, which strips out these categories supposedly because they’re so unusually volatile and don’t necessarily reflect the forces influencing prices overall).

Since these times aren’t normal, due to the CCP Virus pandemic, and since they may well not return to normal for quite a while, due to alarm over the latest, highly infectious Delta strain, times may not become normal any time soon, “We’ll take it for now” strikes me as the only reasonable reaction.

In terms of how U.S. leaders, including the Federal Reserve, should react, tentativeness is justified, too. But the new figures add to the evidence that the recent surge in U.S. inflation is likely to be a “transitory” phenomenon (as Fed-speak calls it) that doesn’t warrant any significant monetary policy moves to cool off the economy (like raising interest rates or moderating or reducing the central banks’ monthly bond purchases – the so-calle Quantitative Easing, or QE, program).

As I’ve argued previously (see, e.g. here), the year-on-year numbers actually prove little – because the virus and the recession and curbs on economic activity it prompted weakened prices to such a remarkable degree, and because the relatively quick reopening starting in late spring, 2020, and the historically explosive growth it ignited, generated such strong catch up. Think of a coiled spring getting released.

Skeptical? From February through July, 2020, overall prices in America dropped on net, and such deflation marked core prices from February through June.

That’s why I look instead at the month-to-month price increases this year. And they definitely point to a significant recent slowing inflation by both measures. Here are the sequential numbers for the overall rate reported today (known as the “Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers,” or CPI-U for short);

December-January: 0.26 percent

January-February:   0.35 percent

February-March:     0.62 percent

March-April:           0.77 percent

April-May:              0.64 percent

May-June:               0.90 percent

June-July:                0.47 percent

What’s at least as important as recent signs of inflation slowing is the absence of signs of inflation taking off. They matter because expectations of inflation themselves can become major inflation fuel by causing businesses to boost purchases of inputs above normal rates to avoid greater expenses down the road. The resulting spiral effect can be difficult to halt without the Fed literally slamming the brakes on the entire economy and even producing a recession.

Now here are the monthly increases for core inflation:

December-January: 0.03 percent

January-February:   0.10 percent

February-March:     0.34 percent

March-April:           0.92 percent

April-May:              0.74 percent

May-June:               0.88 percent

June-July:               0.33 percent

The pattern isn’t identical to that for overall inflation, but it’s pretty similar.

The other main body of evidence arguing for abnormally high inflation turning out to be temporary has to do with some of the main engines of the recent price increases. As noted in last month’s post, the surge-y June inflation figures were led by products and services like used cars and trucks (up 10.5 percent month-to-month), vehicle rentals (up 5.2 percent), and hotel and motel rates (up 7.9 percent). These results could be traced either to the stop-start nature of the economy during the pandemic period and consequent bottlenecks and shortages, or to the arrival of the vacation season to a nation long afflicted with cabin fever and hoping that the virus was being beaten.

The July monthly price changes for these items? Used vehicle prices inched up a bare 0.2 percent, vehicle rental prices actually sank by 4.6 percent, and hotel and motel room prices cooled to 6.8 percent. Clearly the latter remain high. But airline fares, whose monthly price increases had already fallen from 10.2 percent in April to seven percent in May to 2.7 percent in June became 0.1 percent cheaper in July.

There’s no guarantee of course that the July numbers will continue the inflation-slowdown trend. But the bad news is that the main reason is anything but good. It has to do with the distinct possibility that the rapid Delta-induced increase in CCP Virus cases will keep prompting a return to business restrictions and behavior curbs that will undermine economic growth. In turn, that would greatly complicate business’ efforts to pass on whatever cost increases they’re dealing with.

If this pattern takes hold, the rising price spiral dynamic could shift into reverse, bringing the economy back to the deflationary days of 2020. And even worse – this kind of spiral can be harder to break than inflationary spirals. For in these circumstances, consumers and businesses hold off on many purchases because they believe prices will drop even further – and production and hiring therefore fall off, too.

In addition, if robust growth continues, along with inflation it views as unacceptably high, the Fed could seek to stabilize prices by slamming on those economic brakes.   

For now, though, the July inflation numbers should be seen as encouraging.  They may amount to favors that are small (and transitory themselves), but they’re still worth being grateful for. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Dangerous New Bubbles or a Virus Mirage?

30 Friday Jul 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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bubbles, business investment, CCP Virus, consumer spending, coronavirus, COVID 19, Financial Crisis, GDP, Great Recession, gross domestic product, housing, lockdowns, logistics, nonresidential fixed investment, real GDP, recession, recovery, reopening, Richard F. Moody, semiconductor shortage, toxic combination, transportation, West Coast ports, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Here’s a great example of how badly the U.S. economy might be getting distorted by last year’s steep, sharp, largely government-mandated recession, and by the V-shaped recovery experienced since then.as CCPVirus-related restrictions have been lifted. Therefore, it’s also a great example of how the many of the resulting statistics may still be of limited usefulness at best in figuring out the economy’s underlying health.

The possible example?  New official figures showing that, as of the second quarter of this year, the U.S. economy is even more dangerously bubble-ized than it was just before the financial crisis of 2007-08.

As RealityChek regulars might recall, for several years I wrote regularly on what I called the quality of America’s growth. (Here‘s my most recent post.) I viewed the subject as important because there’s broad agreement that a big reason the financial crisis erupted was the over-reliance earlier in that decade n the wrong kind of growth. Specifically, personal spending and housing had become predominant engines of expansion – and therefore prosperity. Their bloated roles inflated intertwined bubbles whose bursting nearly collapsed the U.S. and entire global economies, and produced the worst American economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

As a result, there was equally broad agreement that the nation needed to transform what you might call its business model from one depending largely on borrowing, spending, and paying for them by counting on home prices to rise forever, to one based on saving, investing, and producing. As former President Obama cogently put it, America needed “an economy built to last.”

Therefore, I decided to track how well the nation was succeeding at this version of “build back better” by monitoring the official quarterly reports on economic growth to examine the importance of housing and consumption (which I called the “toxic combination”) in the nation’s economic profile and whether and how they were changing.

For some perspective, in the third quarter of 2005, as the spending and housing bubbles were at their worst, these two segments of the economy accounted for 73.90 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP – the standard measure of the economy’s size) adjusted for inflation (the most widely followed of the GDP data. By the end of the Great Recession caused by the bursting of these bubbles, in the second quarter of 2009, this figure was down to 71.55 percent – mainly because housing had crashed.

At the end of the Obama administration (the fourth quarter of 2016), the toxic combination has rebounded to represent 72.31 percent of after-inflation GDP. So in quality-of-growth terms, the economy was heading in the wrong direction. And under President Trump, this discouraging trend continued. As of the fourth quarter of 2019 (the last quarter before the pandemic began significantly affecting the economy), this figure rose further, to 73.19 percent.

Yesterday, the government reported on GDP for the second quarter of this year, and it revealed that the toxic combination share of the economy in constant dollar terms to 74.24 percent. In other words, the toxic combination had become a bigger part of the economy than during the most heated housing and spending bubble days.

But does that mean that the economy really is even more, and more worrisomely lopsided than it was back then? That’s far from clear. Pessimists could argue that recent growth has relied heavily on the unprecedented fiscal and monetary stimulus provided by Washington since spring, 2020. Optimists could point out that far from overspending, consumers have been saving massively. Something else of note: Business investment’s share of real GDP in the second quarter of this year came to 14.80 percent – awfully lofty by recent standards.  During the 2005 peak of the last bubble, that spending (officially called “nonresidential fixed investment”) was 11.62 percent. 

My own take is that this situation mainly reflects the unexpected strength of the reopening-driven recovery and the transportation and logistics bottlenecks it’s created. An succinct summary of the situation was provided by Richard F. Moody, chief economist of Regions Bank. He wrote yesterday that the new GDP data “embody the predicament facing the U.S. economy, which is that the supply side of the economy has simply been unable to keep pace with demand.” The result is not only the strong recent inflation figures, but a ballooning of personal spending’s share of the economy.

Moody expects that both problems will end “later rather than sooner,” and for all I know, he (and other inflation pessimists) are right. But unless you believe that West Coast ports will remain clogged forever, that semiconductors will remain in short supply forever, that truck drivers will remain scarce forever, that businesses will never adjust adequately to any of this, and/or that new CCP Virus variants will keep the whole economy on lockdown-related pins and needles forever, the important point is that these problems will end. Once they do, or when the end is in sight, we’ll be able to figure out just how bubbly the economy has or hasn’t grown – but not, I’m afraid, one moment sooner.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Automotive’s Still in the U.S. Manufacturing Growth Driver’s Seat

19 Monday Jul 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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aircraft, aluminum, appliances, automotive, CCP Virus, China, coal, coronavirus wuhan virus, COVID 19, Delta variant, electrical equipment, facemasks, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted growth, inflation-adjusted output, infrastructure, lockdowns, machinery, manufacturing, masks, medical devices, metals, petroleum refining, pharmaceuticals, PPE, real growth, recovery, reopening, steel, stimulus, tariffs, Trump, vaccines, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Talk about annoying! There I was last Thursday morning, all set to dig into the new detailed Federal Reserve U.S. manufacturing production numbers (for June) in order to write up my usual same-day report, and guess what? None of the new tables was on-line! Fast forward to this morning: They’re finally up. (And here‘s the summary release.) So here we go with our deep dive into the results, which measure changes in inflation-adjusted manufacturing output.

The big takeaway is that, as with last month’s report for May, the semiconductor shortage-plagued automotive sector was the predominant influence. But there was a big difference. In May, domestic vehicles and parts makers managed to turn out enough product to boost the overall manufacturing production increase greatly. In June, a big automotive nosedive helped turn an increase for U.S.-based industry into a decrease.

The specifics: In May, the sequential automotive output burst (which has been revised up from 6.69 percent in real terms to 7.34 percent) helped push total manufacturing production for the month to 0.92 percent after inflation (a figure that’s also been upgraded – from last month’s initially reported already strong 0.89 percent). Without automotive, manufacturing’s constant dollar growth would have been just 0.47 percent.

In June, vehicle and parts production sank by an inflation-adjusted 6.62 percent , and dragged industry’s total performance into the negative (though by just 0.05 percent). Without the automotive crash, real manufacturing output would have risen by 0.40 percent.

Counting slightly negative revisions, through June, constant dollar U.S. manufacturing production in toto was 0.60 percent less than in February, 2020 – the economy’s last full pre-pandemic month.

Domestic industry’s big production winners in June were primary metals (a category that includes heavily tariffed steel and aluminum), which soared by 4.02 percent after inflation; the broad aerospace and miscellaneous transportation sector, which of course contains troubled Boeing aircraft, (more on which later), and which turned in 3.75 percent growth, its best such performance since January’s 5.62 percent pop; petroleum and coal products (up 1.36 percent); and miscellaneous durable goods, which includes but is far from limited to CCP Virus-related medical supplies (up 1.21 percent).

The biggest losers other than automotive? Inflation-adjusted production of electrical equipment, appliances, and components, which dropped sequentially by 1.73 percent in real terms; the tiny, remaining apparel and leather goods industry (1.44 percent); and the non-metallic minerals sector (1.07 percent).

Especially disappointing was the 0.55 percent monthly dip in machinery production, since this sector’s products are used so widely throughout the rest of manufacturing and in major parts of the economy outside manufacturing like construction and agriculture.

But in one of the biggest surprises of the June Fed data (though entirely consistent with the aforementioned broad aerospace sector), real output of aircraft and parts shot up by 5.24 percent – its best such performance since January’s 6.79 percent. It’s true that the May production decrease was revised from 1.47 percent to 2.61 percent. But with Boeing’s related and manufacturing and safety-related woes continuing to multiply, who would have expected that outcome?

And partly as a result of this two-month net gain, after-inflation aircraft and parts output as of June is 7.83 percent higher in real terms than in pre-pandemicky February, 2020 – a much faster growth rate than for manufacturing as a whole.

The big pharmaceuticals and medicines sector (which includes vaccines) registered a similar pattern of results, although with much smaller swings. May’s originally reported 0.22 percent constant dollar output improvement was revised down to 0.15 percent. But June saw a 0.89 percent rise, which brought price-adjusted production in this group of industries to 9.33 percent greater than just before the pandemic.

Some good news was also generated by the vital medical equipment and supplies sector – which includes virus-fighting items like face masks, face masks, protective gowns, and ventilators. Its monthly May growth was upgraded all the way up from the initially reported 0.19 percent to 1.18 percent. And that little spurt was followed by 0.99 percent growth in June.

Yet despite this acceleration, this sector is still a mere 2.27 percent bigger in real terms than in February, 2020, meaning that Americans had better hope that new pandemic isn’t right around the corner, that the Delta variant of the CCP Virus doesn’t result in a near-equivalent, or that foreign suppliers of such gear will be a lot more generous than in 2020.

As for manufacturing as a whole, the outlook seems as cloudy as ever to me. Vast amounts of stimulus are still being pumped into the U.S. economy, which continues to reopen and overwhelmingly stay open. That should translate into strong growth and robust demand for manufactured goods. The Trump tariffs are still pricing huge numbers of Chinese goods out of the U.S. market. And the shortage of automotive semiconductors may actually be easing.

But the spread of the Delta variant has spurred fears of a new wave of local and even wider American lockdowns. This CCP Virus mutation is already spurring sweeping economic curbs in many key U.S. export markets. Progress in Washington on an infrastructure bill seems stalled. And for what they’re worth (often hard to know), estimates of U.S. growth rates keep coming down, and were falling even before Delta emerged as a major potential problem. (See, e.g., here.)

I’m still most impressed, though, by the still lofty levels of optimism (see, e.g., here)  expressed by U.S. manufacturers themselves when they respond to surveys such as those sent out by the regional Federal Reserve banks (which give us the most recent looks). Since they’re playing with their own, rather than “other people’s money,” keep counting me as a domestic manufacturing bull.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Chip Derangement Syndrome

10 Saturday Jul 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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CCP Virus, Chad Bown, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, East Asia, export controls, fabless, Foreign Affairs, Huawei, infotech, lockdowns, Mainstream Media, manufacturing, metals, offshoring lobby, Peterson Institute for International Economics, reopening, semiconductor shortage, semiconductors, supply chains, tariffs, Trade, Trump Derangement Syndrome, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As some RealityChek regulars may have noted, I’m spending somewhat less time lately batting down ill-conceived, off-base, and downright incoherent individual books or articles etc on key subjects like trade and globalization, foreign policy, and immigration. It’s not that there’s any less “nonsense out there” these days. Goodness knows there remain enough mouthpieces of the Offshoring-, Forever Wars-, and Cheap Labor-Lobbies in and out of the Mainstream Media paid handsomely cranking out this bilge.

It’s just that they’re clearly so much less important these days, as the American political system has so markedly been ignoring their missives. I mean, even a longtime China coddler and offshoring trade deal supporter like President Biden knows – at least politically – that these stances don’t fly any more. Not that enough progress has been made. But champions of what I think can fairly be called the pre-Trump conventional wisdom in these areas are increasingly giving off those “wrong side of history” vibes – and lashing out at Trump policies in ever more desperate and arguably deranged ways.

I’m making an exception today, however, because Chad P. Bown’s new article in Foreign Affairs blaming the former president significantly for the global semiconductor shortage, appeared in such a (still) influential publication, and is such a thoroughly pathetic example of the marginalized trade policy establishment’s Get Trump and Trumpism obsession.

For the last few years, Bown has served as the MSM’s go-to economist for swipes at Trump’s tariffs and trade wars – every single one of them. As a result, it’s almost inevitable that, with Trump out of power, and Mr. Biden now having retained for months the principal Trump China and metals tariffs – every single one of them – that he’d be looking for new ways to show how mistaken these measures have been.

Although Bown admits that the unprecedened stop-start nature of the CCP Virus-era U.S. economy, the suddently booming demand for microchip-intensive infotech products during the pandemic, and weather-related production disruptions all contributed substantially to the shortage, he also claims that Trump’s trade and tech policies also “squeezed supply” – by definition enough to write about.

His main arguments: First, Trump’s tariffs on semiconductors made in China reduced U.S. imports on net because American purchases from other countries didn’t make up for those chips. Second, his restrictions on the sale of American-made semiconductors to Huawei led the Chinese telecommunications gear giant and other Chinese tech companies to start hoarding chips from everywhere for fear of inadequate overall supplies, and left fewer semiconductors for other users to buy. Third, these curbs on sales of U.S.-made semiconductor to such an enormous customer discouraged chip-makers from all over the world from investing in production capacity in the United States in favor of building factories that could supply China from elsewhere.

But even though, as noted above, Bown admits that other culprits deserve responsibility as well, he not only downplays their effects. He completely ignores the impact of much more fundamental, indeed root, causes. Highly conspicuous, for example, are the consequences of decades of the kinds of offshoring-happy trade policies so strongly supported by Bown and his Offshoring Lobby-funded think tank, the Peterson Institute for International Economics. These policies persuaded U.S.-owned semiconductor manufacturers to move to China and the rest of East Asia much production capacity that could have been installed in America – in large part because they sent to China and the rest of East Asia so much production of the infotech hardware production that buys so many semiconductors.

Nor does Bown mention the dangerously shortsighted decisions of so many U.S.-owned semiconductor companies to eschew manufacturing for a “fabless” business model of researching and designing chips and then farming out the production “foundries” run by separate contract companies – mainly in Asia. Largely as a result, the growth of inflation-adjusted American semiconductor output fell by fifty percent between the U.S. economic expansion of 2001-2007 and the longer expansion of 2009-2019. (See my National Interest article on the subject from last October for the statistics presented above and below.) 

The growth during the latter period (73.68 percent) seems impressive in isolation. But it wasn’t nearly enough to prevent the U.S. share of global semiconductor manufacturing capacity from sinking to 12 percent – less than half the percentage in 1990. And it’s not like the growth of this global capacity has been killing it lately, especially considering it’s an archetypical “industry of the future.”

You wouldn’t know this if you if you were relying solely on Bown, but by one key measure, this capacity’s 2013-2019 cumulative expansion (14.29 percent, as shown in the chart below (which comes from the main trade association of the global semiconductor manufacturing equipment industry) was actually slower than the after-inflation growth of total global output of everything (18.29 percent). And if that’s not a surefire formula for a global shortage to me, tariffs and export controls or not, I don’t know what is. Nor do Chad Bown, or the Foreign Affairs editors who published a diatribe that’s factually unhinged even by the rock bottom standards of Mainstream Media coverage of U.S. trade policy.      

200mm Fab Outlook Chart

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Latest Figures Leave the U.S. Trade Picture as Foggy as Ever

06 Tuesday Jul 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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aerospace, aircraft, Boeing, Canada, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Donald Trump, exports, goods trade, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, non-oil goods deficit, reopening, services trade, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

With huge Chinese ports newly suffering the kind of congestion that’s clogged America’s West Coast ports for months, the U.S. and other national economies reopening at widely varying rates from their CCP Virus-induced shutdowns, and a worldwide shortage of semiconductors still undermining production throughout the world’s manufacturing industries, it’s tougher than ever to figure out what to make of the latest monthly U.S. trade figures (for May).

Oh, and I almost forgot: America’s long-time export and trade surplus standout, Boeing, keeps making bad news on the intertwined manufacturing and safety fronts, which means that its domestic and overseas sales could be depressed for months more.

So since they’re of such little help in figuring out the two biggest trade policy questions facing the country – about how different a post-pandemic trade normal may look from its pre-virus counterpart, and whether and how well the Trump tariffs are still working – it seems the best course to follow is simply reporting the highlights of the May report from the Census Bureau (and voicing some very tentative analyses where I have the courage).

These new data, which came out last Friday, revealed that the combined U.S. goods and services trade deficit increased by 3.14 percent between April and May – from $69.07 billion to $71.24 billion. The total was the second highest ever, trailing only March’s $75.03 billion.

The same general pattern characterized the goods trade gap, which widened by 2.76 percent (from $86.78 billion to $89.17 billion), also hit the second highest total on record, and also fell short of a March all-time high ($92.86 billion).

The best trade balance-related news came on the services side – which has been especialy hard hit by the virus and its effects, and where the surplus widened by 0.74 percent (from $17.80 billion to $17.93 billion) and improved for the first time since January.

Total exports advanced for the fourth straight month in May (by 0.64 percent, from $204.70 billion to $206.02 billion), and attained their highest level since December, 2019, just before the CCP Virus seems to have begun spreading from China.

Goods exports were something of a laggard – growing sequentially in May by just 0.30 percent (from $145.09 billion to $145.28 billion. More encouragingly, this level set its second straight monthly record.

Services exports fared better, up 1.47 percent on-month in May (from $59.62 billion to $60.49 billion) and producing their best monthly total since semi-pandemic-y March, 2020’s $60.62 billion.

But on all counts, U.S. imports rose faster.

The total import amount reached $277.26 billion in May, rising 1.27 percent from April’s $273.78 billion and representing the second highest total ever. Only the $277.69 billion figure from…yes…March has been higher.

Goods imports rose by a slower 1.18 percent, from $231.96 billion to $234.70 billion. And the total was another second highest, lagging only March’s $236.52 billion.

Despite their surplus growing, services imports rose considerably faster, by 1.77 percent, from $41.84 billion to $42.56 billion. That total was the highest since February, 2020 ($47.06 billion) – just before the virus’ arrival.

To a noteworthy degree, the worsening of the overall and goods deficits in May looks like a Boeing story. The narrowing of the U.S. civilian aircraft trade surplus (by $1.388 billion) accounted for nearly 64 percent of the increase deterioration in the overall trade balance, and 58.05 percent of the monthly growth of the goods trade gap.

Boeing’s troubles can’t be blamed for the entire year’s lofty deficit numbers. Far from it. In fact, between the January-to-May periods last year and this year, the $917 million shrinkage of the aircraft surplus has equalled less than one percent of the overall deficit’s increase during this time and just slightly more of the goods deficit. Aircraft trade numbers can be pretty volatile, too. But is the Boeing effect on the May data a portent of things to come? Stay tuned.

As known by RealityChek regulars, the best measure of how tariffs and similar trade policies are influencing U.S. trade flows is non-oil goods trade, which strips out oil (which hardly ever comes up in trade policymaking) and services (where global trade liberalization remains modest). And in this context, what jumps out right away from the May trade results (or what should jump out) is that this portion of the trade deficit rose much more slowly on month (0.33 percent) than the combined goods and services deficit (3.14 percent) or the total goods deficit (2.76 percent). And interestingly, without the poor civilian aircraft numbers, the “Made in Washington” trade deficit would have fallen month-to-month.

Moreover, on a January-to-May year-to-date basis, the non-oil goods trade deficit worsened just about half as much (by 23.99 percent) as the overall deficit (45.82 percent), and somewhat more slowly than the goods deficit (26.44 percent). Given that the Trump China tariffs alone of some $350 billion amounted to some 15.21 percent of total U.S. non-oil goods imports in 2019 (and remain in place today), that could be a sign that the levies have succeeded in restraining that deficit’s growth. When it comes to the Boeing effect, however, it’s negligible here, too.

May was an especially bad month for U.S. manufacturing trade, as its chronically huge shortfall jumped by 3.01 percent, from $103.60 billion to 106.72 billion. Huge as that sounds, it was only the fifth worst such figure ever. Exports increased by 0.91 percent while the much greater amount of imports climbed by 2.01 percent. Again, the Boeing effect generated much (nearly 45 percent) of the monthly deficit worsening but less than one percent of the $116.57 billion year-to-date difference.

May was also a bad month for China tariff supporters. The U.S. goods deficit with the PRC grew by 1.90 percent on month – much faster than the 0.33 percent increase in the non-oil goods deficit that’s its closest worldwide proxy. U.S. goods exports to the PRC advanced by a healthy 5.54 percent. May monthly imports grew much more slowly (3.04 percent), but they’re more than three times greater.

On a year-to-date basis, moreover, the Sino-American trade gap is 26.92 percent wider than last year, which stands not only as faster growth than that of the non-oil goods deficit (23.99 percent), but another sign that of tariff failure, as the China deficit by this measure has been rising faster non-oil goods deficit since March. Still, it’s difficult drawing firm conclusions, since the recovery of China’s export-heavy economy from its pandemic experience has been faster than that of most other (often also export-reliant) U.S. trade partners. Moreover, the difference between the growth rates of the two deficits has narrowed dramatically since March, so it’s possible that the pre-pandemic pattern – which reflected much better on the tariffs – is steadily returning.

And let’s end on an unexpected note: In May, the U.S. goods deficit with Canada surged by 56.98 percent sequentially, to $3.69 billion. That’s the highest level since December, 2019’s $4.95 billion and the fastest monthly increase since January’s 74.04 percent. This monthly rise, moreover, was driven by U.S. imports, which reached $29.08 billion – the biggest monthly total since October, 2014 ($30.72 billion). The monthly increase: a strong but hardly record breaking 5.86 percent. American goods exports to its northern neighbor, however, rose by just 1.09 percent, to $25.39 billion. And year-to-date, the U.S. goods deficit with Canada has more than doubled, soaring by a 108.93 percent.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A “Gentleman’s C” for the New Manufacturing Jobs Numbers

02 Friday Jul 2021

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

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aircraft, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, automotive, Boeing, CCP Virus, electronics, Employment, fabricated metals products, facemasks, food products, furniture, housing, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, masks, metals, pharmaceuticals, ports, PPE, printing, productivity, protective gear, recession, recovery, reopening, semiconductor shortage, tariffs, vaccines, {What's Left of) Our Economy

June’s gains weren’t nearly enough to overcome the latest trend in U.S. manufacturing employment: From a job growth leader earlier during the CCP Virus pandemic, domestic industry has turned into a laggard. It’s not lagging by a big margin, but given significant net headwinds it should still be enjoying, recent results are clearly disappointing.

This morning, the Labor Department reported that U.S.-based manufacturers created 15,000 net new jobs in June – a modest number given the 662,000 increase in total private sector employment on month. At least revisions were positive. May’s initially reported 23,000 monthly improvement is now judged to be 39,000, but April’s already downwardly revised 32,000 sequential job loss is now pegged at 35,000.

In many of the nation’s supposedly prestige colleges, the grade earned by this kind of result would be called a “Gentleman’s C.”

As a result, domestic manufacturing has now regained 904,000 (66.32 percent) of the 1.363 million jobs lost during the pandemic. The numbers for the private sector overall are 72.98 percent of the 21.353 million lost jobs that have been recovered, and for the total non-farm economy (the definition of the American employment universe used by the U.S. government, which includes government jobs) 69.75 percent of the 22.362 million jobs lost.

A manufacturing optimist (and I’ve been one of them) can note that industry took less of an employment hit during the pandemic-loss months of March and April, 2020. Manufacturing employment sank by 10.65 percent, versus 16.46 percent for the private sector and 14.66 percent for the whole non-farm economy.

But nowadays, domestic manufacturers are still benefiting from major tariffs plus massive government stimulus on both the fiscal and monetary fronts, and from the huge ramp up in vaccine production. Reopening-related bottlenecks clearly are causing problems, but according to the major national surveys that measure how manufacturers themselves believe they’re faring, production and new orders for their products keep growing strongly. (For the newest ones, see here and here.) Even given equally widespread reports that new workers are hard to find, I expected hiring to remain much more robust than it has.

One explanation may be higher productivity, which enables businesses to turn out more goods with fewer workers. But given the longstanding difficulties of gauging this measure of efficiency, and undoubted pandemic-era distortions, I’m reluctant to put too much stock in this argument.

The shortages issues have been once again illustrated by the dominance of the automotive sector in the June manufacturing jobs picture. Payrolls of vehicles and parts companies fell by 12,300 – the biggest individual sector decreases by far – and surely stem from the continuing global shortage of the computer chips that have become ever more important parts of cars and trucks of all kinds.

One small bright spot in the June figures – the 300 jobs increase in the machinery sector. It’s an important indicator of the overall state of industrial hiring, since its products are used throughout industry (as well as in non-manufacturing sectors like agriculture and construction). At the same time, these new positions represented machinery’s weakest sequential performance since January’s 3,200 employment decrease.

Other big June manufacturing net hiring winners were furniture and related products (up 8,500, no doubt reflecting still strong home sales and remodeling activity), fabricated metals products (up 5,700, which is noteworthy given still widespread whining about the ongoing U.S. tariffs on metals), and miscellaneous durable goods manufacturing (up 3,300 – encouraging since this category includes many pandemic-related medical supplies).

The biggest losers other than automotive were food products (down 4,100 and continuing an employment slump that began in January), electronic instruments (down 2,100 and possibly related to the semiconductor shortage), and printing and related activities (down 1,400).

Pandemic-related industries turned in a mixed hiring performance, according to the latest jobs report. Job creation accelerated significantly in the surgical appliances and supply sector, which contains protective gear like face masks, gloves and surgical goans. Its payrolls grew by 1,700 on month in May (its data are one month behind, as is the case with the other sectors examined below), up from April’s 1,200 and its best monthly total since last July’s 3,000. This surgical category’s workforce is now 11.50 percent bigger than in February, 2020 – the last pre-pandemic month.

But the May figures revealed a job creation setback in the overall pharmaceuticals and medicines industry. April’s hiring was revised down slightly, from 2,700 to 2,500, but the number was still solid. In May, however, its payrolls shrank by 400, its worst such performance since pandemicky April, 2020. And its workforce is only 3.82 percent greater than in February, 2020.

Better news came out of the pharmaceuticals subsector containing vaccines, but not that much better. This industry added one thousand workers on net in May, but April’s initially reported 1,300 jobs increase was revised down to 1,100. Still, this vaccines-heavy sector now employs 9.20 percent more workers than just before the pandemic.

And in aircraft, Boeing’s continuing manufacturing and safety issues surely helped produce this industry’s worst jobs month – consisting of a 5,500 payroll decrease – since June, 2020’s 5,800. This sector has now lost 9.39 percent of its jobs since the final pre-pandemic month.

Interestingly, the aircraft engines and parts, and non-engine parts categories weren’t nearly as hard-hit job-wise in May. (The former even maintained employment levels.) But payrolls in each are down since February, 2020, by roughly twice as much proportionately as in aircraft.

Major uncertainties still hang over the domestic manufacturing jobs scene, and in one important respect – big new backups in Chinese ports – they’ve become murkier. Nor do Boeing’s problems seem ready to end any time soon. I’m still bullish on U.S.-based manufacturing’s employment outlook, at least in the short and medium terms mainly because American policy remains so overwhelmingly stimulative and its effects are still coursing through the economy. But I’m getting a little impatient for the numbers to start backing me up once again.

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