(What’s Left of) Our Economy: You Bet that Mass Immigration Makes America Less Productive

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amnesty, Bureau of Labor Statistics, construction, demand, Donald Trump, economics, Forward.us, hotels, illegal aliens, immigrants, Immigration, labor productivity, productivity, restaurants, supply, total factor productivity, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

An archetypical Washington, D.C. swamp denizen thought he caught me with my accuracy pants down the other day. Last Sunday’s post restated a point I’ve made repeatedly – that when countries let in too many immigrants, their economies tend to suffer lasting damage because businesses lose their incentives to improve their productivity – the best recipe for raising living standards on a sustainable, and not bubble-ized basis, as well as for boosting employment on net by fostering more business for most existing industries and enabling the creation of entirely new industries.

The reason mass immigration kneecaps productivity growth? Employers never need to respond to rising wages caused by labor shortages by buying labor-saving machinery and technology or otherwise boost their efficiency. Instead, they continue the much easier and cheaper approach of hiring workers whose pay remains meager because immigrants keep swelling the workforce.

It’s a point, as I’ve noted, strongly supported by economic theory and, more important, by evidence. But Todd Schulte, who heads a Washington, D.C.-based lobby group called Forward.us, wasn’t buying it. According to Schulte, whose organization was founded by tech companies like Facebook with strong vested interests in keeping U.S. wages low, “the decade of actual [U.S.] productivity increases came directly after the 1986 legalization AND 1990 legal immigration expansion!”

He continued on Twitter, “giving people legal status and… expanding legal immigration absolutely has not harmed productivity in the last few decades in the US.”

So I decided to dive deeper into the official U.S. data, and what I found was that although there are bigger gaps in the productivity numbers than I’d like to see, there’s (1) no evidence that high immigration levels following the 1986 amnesty granted by Washington to illegal immigrants and the resulting immigration increase mentioned by Schulte improved the national productivity picture over the pre-amnesty period; and (2) there’s lots of evidence that subsequent strong inflows of illegal immigrants (who Schulte and his bosses would like to see amnestied) have dragged big-time on productivity growth.

First, let’s examine the productivity of the pre-1986 amnesty decades, which provides the crucial context that Schulte’s claim overlooks.

According to U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics figures, during the 1950s, a very low immigration decade (as shown by the chart below), labor productivity grew by an average of 2.63 percent annually. Significantly, this timespan includes two recessions, when productivity normally falls or grows unusually slowly.

Figure 1. Size and Share of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 1850-2019

During the 1960s expansion (i.e., a period with no recessions), when immigration levels were also low, the rate of labor productivity growth sped up to an annual average of 3.26 percent.

The 1970s were another low immigration decade, and average labor productivity growth sank to 1.87 percent. But as I and many other readers are old enough to remember, the 1970s were a terrible economic decade, plagued overall by stagflation. So it’s tough to connect its poor productivity performance with its immigration levels.

Now we come to the 1980s. Its expansion (and as known by RealityChek regulars, comparing economic performance during like periods in a business cycle produces the most valid results), lasted from December, 1982 to July, 1990, and saw average annual labor productivity growth bounce back to 2.24 percent.

As noted by Schulte, immigration policy changed dramatically in 1986, and as the above chart makes clear, the actual immigant population took off.

But did labor productivity growth take off, too? As that used car commercial would put it, “Not exactly.” From the expansion’s start in the first quarter of 1982 to the fourth quarter of 1986 (the amnesty bill became law in November), labor productivity growth totalled 10.96 percent. But from the first quarter of 1987 to the third quarter of 1990 (the expansion’s end), the total labor productivity increase had slowed – to 5.76 percent.

The 1980s are important for two other reasons as well. Nineteen eighty-seven is when the Bureau of Labor Statistics began collecting labor productivity data for many U.S. industries, and when it began tracking productivity according to a broader measure – total factor productivity, which tries to measure efficiency gains resulting from a wide range of inputs other than hours put in by workers.

There’s no labor productivity data kept for construction (an illegal immigrant-heavy sector whose poor productivity performance is admitted by the sector itself). But these figures do exist for another broad sector heavily reliant on illegals: accommodation and food services. And from 1987 to 1990 (only annual results are available), labor productivity in these businesses increased by a total of 3.45 percent – worse than the increase for the economy as a whole.

On the total factor productivity front, between 1987 and 1990 (again, quarterly numbers aren’t available), it rose by 1.23 percent for the entire economy, for the construction industry it fell by 1.37 percent, for the accommodation sector, it fell by 2.30 percent, and for food and drinking places, it increased by 2.26 percent. So only limited evidence here that amnesty and a bigger immigrant labor pool did much for U.S. productivity.

As Schulte pointed out, the 1990s, dominated by a long expansion, were a good productivity decade for the United States, with labor productivity reaching 2.58 percent average annual growth and total factor productivity rising by 10.87 percent overall. But when it comes to labor productivity, the nineties still fell short of the 1950s (even with its two recessions) and by a wider margin of the 1960s.

But did robust immigration help? Certainly not in terms of labor productivity. In accommodation and food services, it advanced by just 0.84 percent per year on average.

Nor as measured by total factor productivity. For construction, it actually dropped overall by 4.94 percent. And although it climbed in two other big illegal immigrant-using industries, the growth was slower than for the economy as a whole (7.17 percent for accommodation and 5.17 percent for restaurants and bars).

Following an eight month recession, the economy engineered another recovery at the end of 2001 that lasted until the end of 2007. This period was marked by such high legal and illegal immigration levels that the latter felt confident enough to stage large protests (which included their supporters in the legal immigrant and immigration activist communities) demanding a series of new rights and a reduction in U.S. immigration deportation and other control policies.

Average annual labor productivity during this expansion grew somewhat faster than during its 1990s predecessor – 2.69 percent. But annual average labor productivity growth for the accommodation and food services sectors slowed to 1.19 percent, overall total factor productivity growth fell to 1.19 percent, and average annual total factor productivity changes in accommodations, restaurants, and construcion dropped as well – to 6.36 percent, 2.67 percent, and -9.08 percent, respectively.

Needless to say, productivity grows or shrinks for many different reasons. But nothing in the data show that immigration has bolstered either form of productivity, especially when.pre- and post-amnesty results are compared. In fact, since the 1990s, the greater the total immigrant population, the more both kinds of productivity growth deteriorated for industries relying heavily on illegals. And all the available figures make clear that these sectors have been serious productivity laggards to begin with.

And don’t forget the abundant indirect evidence linking productivity trends to automation – specifically, all the examples I’ve cited in last Sunday’s post and elsewhere of illegal immigrant-reliant industries automating operations ever faster — and precisely to offset the pace-setting wage increases enjoyed by the lowest income workers at least partly because former President Trump’s restrictive policies curbed immigration inflows so effectively. 

In other words, in the real world, changes in supply and demand profoundly affect prices and productivity levels – whatever hokum on the subject is concocted by special interest mouthpieces who work the Swamp World like Todd Schulte.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The New U.S. Inflation Figures Still Look Pretty Transitory to Me

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hotels, inflation adjusted wages, labor shortage, leisure and hospitality, non-supervisory workers, private sector, production workers, real wages, restaurants, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s official U.S. inflation figures made it somewhat more difficult to argue that the recent strong price increases recorded in the American economy are “transitory,” as the Federal Reserve and many observers (like me) have been claiming. But they don’t make these contentions that much harder, and that goes at least double for warnings about rampant wage inflation – which today’s related real wage figures debunk in an especially powerful way.

At the same time, the price surges that have taken place deserve to be emphasized in another, generaly neglected sense: However temporary, they represent another cost of the unprecedentedly powerful and not-surprisingly chaotic, bottleneck-ridden U.S. economic reopening – and one that’s followed unprecedentedly sudden CCP Virus-related lockdowns that in retrospect look to have been needlessly sweeping because the pandemic’s worst health effects were so highly concentrated among vulnerable groups like the elderly.

The most troubling development revealed in the new inflation report was the May-June acceleration in price increases overall – from 0.74 percent to 0.88 percent. That was indeed the largest monthly rise in absolute terms since June, 2008 (1.05 percent). But that May figure represented a deceleration from April’s 0.92 percent. So it looks way too early to claim that we’re seeing even the start of one of the most dangerous threats posed by inflation – a pickup in its momentum created by cost rises in various parts of the economy fueling efforts in other sectors to compensate with price increases in a process that eventually ripples widely, and with lasting effects, as in the 1970s.

(As with previous posts, I’m not too concerned with the year-on-year comparisons, since pricing trends in lockdown-y 2020 were so – artificially – weak.)

More evidence for the transitory faction: Leading the price increase charge in June were products and services like used cars and trucks (up 10.5 percent month-to-month), vehicle rentals (up 5.2 percent), and hotel and motel rates (up 7.9 percent). The first is a clear result of the stop-start nature of the economy during the pandemic period (see here for a cogent explanation), and the second and third just as obviously spring from the cabin fever-spurred burst of vacation travel in which Americans are engaged with the arrival of summer and the waning of the virus.  

Even in sectors like these, moreover, signs of weakening inflation can be seen. For example, the monthly rate of hotel and motel inflation was much higher than May’s 0.4 percent. But it was lower than April’s 8.8 percent. As for airline fares, their monthly price increases have fallen from 10.2 percent in April to seven percent in May to 2.7 percent in June.

As for wages – they keep falling in real terms in most of the economy. That is, they’re rising more slowly than inflation for goods and services. According to this morning’s data (which also cover June), after-inflation wages both for all private sector workers and for private sector production and other non-supervisory employees fell sequentially for the sixth straight month. And for both groups, the monthly June declines (0.53 percent for the former, 0.62 percent for the latter), were the biggest in roughly a year (June for the former, July for the latter).

(As known by RealityChek regulars, the U.S. government doesn’t track real or pre-inflation wages in the public sector because pay levels there are determined largely by politicians’ decisions, and therefore say relatively little about the status of the labor market.)

These new June wage figures are even more striking because the declines last year stemmed largely from businesses letting go less of experienced and usually therefore lower-paid staff as the economic outlook remained highly uncertain, and pushing up the average pay levels of remaining employees even though actual raises were rarely handed out.

It’s true that real wage increases continued in June in the leisure and hospitality super-category – whose eating and drinking establishments and hotels and motels and resorts were hit so hard during the peak pandemic months. But the June sequential increase for all employees in this sector inched up at the lowest rate (just under 0.15 percent) since January (just over 0.15 percent).

Leisure and hospitality production and non-supervisory workers fared better last month – their constant dollar wages rose by 1.16 percent, a big speed up from May’s 0.50 percent. But the April (1.87 percent) and February (1.21 percent) hourly inflation-adjusted pay hikes were stronger still. So again, it seems awfully premature to talk about raging wage inflation even here.

Moreover, there’s an important difference within leisure and hospitality between real wages in the restaurants etc sector and those in the hotels etc sector. Specifically, the latter have been growing faster for production and non-supervisory employees – and especially for June alone (0.94 percent versus 0.52 percent).  

The January-June results are even more striking for these service workers as a whole, since during this period, real wages for their counterparts in the overall private sector are actually down 1.83 percent.

Good luck to you if you believe these numbers describe a crisis-level national labor shortage, or even close.  And as I see it, it’s nearly as much of a stretch to argue on the basis of these hot June numbers that comparably hot inflation is here to stay.   

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Can the U.S. Really Eliminate All Its Lousy Jobs?

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automation, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Daniel Alpert, elder care, Ezra Klein, hospitality, hotels, Jobs, low-wage jobs, productivity, restaurants, seniors, technology, The New York Times, wages, workers, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Over the last month, two noted and anything-but-radical economics commentators have voiced an idea that’s really radical. How radical? It could produce much more fundamental change in the U.S. economy than any actual or even potential effects of the CCP Virus if its policy implications (which they may not be fully aware of) are acted on.

The idea is that the pre-virus economy (they didn’t specify for how long, but there’s no reason to believe the development began recently) was highly dependent on creating huge numbers of crappy, dead end, low-wage jobs, and that a combination of labor cost-boosting factors – like worker shortages created largely by sudden economic reopening, higher minimum wage requirements, and mandates for businesses to adopt more family-friendly practices – is bringing that era to an end.

The implications: Enormous numbers of the companies and even critical masses of entire industries relying on such jobs may go under, and that nothing should be done to restore the previous status quo because in economic terms (which are also reflecting the public’s non-economic preferences) those exploitative business models are simply becoming thoroughly uncompetitive.

In other words, especially in sectors like restaurants, retail, hospitality, and elder care, where the quality of personal service is valued by customers (not that they always get the quality they want), many and even most employers simply may find significantly higher labor costs unaffordable. And many may not be able to persuade enough customers to pay the higher prices they’d need to charge to stay afloat. So they wouldn’t – and good riddance.

The analyst who first led me to these thoughts was Daniel Alpert, a Cornell University Law School fellow, economist, and Wall Street investor. In a June 1 New York Times op-ed article, he argued that:

“The chronic problem we face as we put Covid-19 in the rearview mirror is that the U.S. economy before the pandemic was incredibly dependent on an abundance of low-wage, low-hours jobs. It was a combo that yielded low prices for comfortably middle-class and wealthier customers and low labor costs for bosses, but spectacularly low incomes for tens of millions of others.”

Less than two weeks later, The Times published another article, by columnist Ezra Klein, that similarly contended:

“The American economy runs on poverty, or at least the constant threat of it. Americans like their goods cheap and their services plentiful and the two of them, together, require a sprawling labor force willing to work tough jobs at crummy wages….We discuss the poor as a pity or a blight, but we rarely admit that America’s high rate of poverty is a policy choice, and there are reasons we choose it over and over again.”

Klein also wrote about some of the likely tradeoffs of mandates that created higher labor costs: “[S]ome small businesses would shutter if they had to pay their workers more. There are services many of us enjoy now that would become rarer or costlier if workers had more bargaining power.” But this prediction seems greatly to low ball the downsides and the collateral damage.

For example, according to this normally reliable source, the number of restaurants in the United States numbered about 660,000 in 2018. That’s more than 18 percent of all the 3,618,550 businesses with more than five employees that the Census Bureau says existed in the United States as of 2019 (the last pre-pandemic year). Since some dining establishments are very small and employ between one and five staff, the percentage of all U.S. businesses that are restaurants is probably somewhat lower. And surely not all of these would close their doors if labor costs rose meaningfully. But it should be obvious that lots of nationwide economic disruption would surely result.

As I’ve repeatedly written, (e.g., here) there’s an alternative to employers offsetting these higher labor costs. Rather than raise their prices significantly (a tactic that may not accomplish all or most of is goal), they could increase productivity. After all, many of these labor-intensive industries are labor-intensive because they’ve been such laggards on the productivity front. For example, between 1987 (the first year such data are available) and 2019 (the last pre-pandemic year), overall labor productivity in U.S. businesses outside the financial sector grew by 71.74 percent, in non-casino hotels and motels by just 51.33 percent, and in restaurants and other eating places, a mere 18.34 percent. And as known by RealityChek regulars, this period hasn’t exactly been a bang-up time for U.S. productivity growth.

There’s no doubt that more automation in particular would wind up displacing jobs – which certainly wouldn’t leave many workers better off on net. It’s entirely possible, though, that even greater net national employment opportunities could be created by these more efficient companies’ greater ability to service more customers affordably, thereby spurring the need to hire to staff expanded operations in other capacities. And in theory, anyway, more automation and use of new technologies could create entire new industries – and impressive employment opportunities. That’s certainly been the case with the internet. But there’s a big rub: Not all the displaced workers might possess the skills or other qualifications to handle any of these new positions.

Moreover, as suggested by my reference to the quality of service, for non-economic reasons, boosting productivity may not be enough to save many of these businesses. For many customers might be turned off by the prospect of dealing with machines rather than courteous and personable human beings, and decide not to patronize these businesses even if automation etc restored affordability.

And in fields such a elder care, it’s doubtful that machines could safely replace humans in quality terms for many years – and that seniors and their family members would find them acceptable on any grounds for many more years. Given America’s aging population, that of course portends a problem transcending economics. One way out: Much greater government subsidies for elder care businesses, or even outright nationalization of this sector. But don’t expect such proposals to uncontroversial.

Another possible way out of this dilemma for business owners generally in low-pay sectors where wages are surging is to accept much lower profits. But any industries that experience such a shift seem doomed to stagnation and even gradual extinction. For how many would want to invest their capital and effort in sectors where the best or even likeliest possible return is scraping by?

The cumulative effect of all these developments on society, as opposed to the economy, wouldn’t be trivial, either. For example, before the CCP Virus’ arrival, dining out and taking out in particular had surged in popularity in the United States for decades. One indication: “In 1955, 25 cents of every $1 spent on food went to restaurants. Today, it’s more than half.” One reason of course is the rise of the two-income household, and the resulting decrease in hours available for food preparation.

In addition, though, as more Americans patronized dine-in restaurants in particular, more surely came to value their particular pleasures. Could they find an adequate substitute if they needed to? And how would such a shift change the rest of their home and work lives? As for society itself, what would the impact be of the disappearance or great scaling back of one major form of communal activity?

The situation is potentially even more dire for the nation’s bars. Between 1987 and 2019, their labor productivity actually plunged by 14.50 percent. Will elevated labor costs spell the end, at least in America, of an institution that’s been around and central to human life for…how many centuries? Millennia? Or will customers get used to robot bar-tenders?

The answers to all the questions posed here are definitely above my pay grade. But something I do know: Despite the pressing need to improve the earnings and lives of low-wage workers, some significant and possibly unprecedented tradeoffs will emerge. And it will be far from easy to make sure that a genuinely New Normal is better on net for these workers and the country at large than the Old.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Reopening, Not Endless Money, is Now the Best Jobs Strategy

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African Americans, American Rescue Plan, Biden, CCP Virus, coronavirus, COVID 19, Covid relief, education, Employment, Federal Reserve, Hispanics, hotels, Jerome Powell, Jobs, Latinos, leisure and hospitality, lockdowns, recovery, restaurants, shutdown, stay-at-home, stimulus package, unemployment, wages, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

There’s no doubt that the American jobs market has suffered an out-and-out disaster since it got hit by the CCP Virus and the follow-on lockdowns and other restrictions. There’s also no doubt that many workers and their families are still suffering greatly, and will need government aid to make it to the Other Side, and the Biden administration’s American Rescue Plan legislation that the President will likely sign into law soon will help fill this gap.

Plenty of doubt remains, however, about whether all, or close to all, of the massive funds approved in this measure are actually needed to cure the economy’s remaining employment woes, and one of the main reasons is the nature of the jobs blow that’s been delivered. Because it’s been so heavily concentrated in the country’s leisure and hospitality industries (encompassing eateries and drinking places of all kinds, plus hotels and motels, and entertainment and cultural venues), it’s entirely possible that nowadays, the most effective way to fix the jobs market fastest would be to lift the lockdowns and other mandated curbs that have fallen so hard on sectors that depend on serving in-person customers.

The case for relying on a virus-relief/stimulus package this big, at this stage of the economy’s recovery from its pandemic-induced recession, has been eloquently stated by President Biden and by Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell. The former warned just before the legislation passed that the U.S. economy “still has 9.5 million fewer jobs than it had this time last year. And at that rate, it would take two years to get us back on track.”

The latter has stated that he won’t be satisfied that full employment has returned until he sees what one reporter has called “broad-based gains in employment, and not just in the aggregate or at the median.” As a result, the Fed Chair is paying particular attention to (the reporter’s words again) “Black unemployment, wage growth for low-wage workers and labor force participation for those without college degrees, categories that historically have taken longer to recover from downturns than broader metrics.”

But it’s precisely these less fortunate portions of the workforce that would be helped disproportionately – and then some – by focusing on reopening steps that would surely affect the leisure and hospitality industries just as disproportionately.

If you doubt the importance of leisure and hospitality job loss over the last year in terms of overall U.S. jobs loss, here’s what you need to know. Of the 8.068 million positions shed by the country’s private sector between last Februrary (the final month of pre-CCP Virus normality for the American economy), fully 3.451 million have come in the leisure and hospitality industries. That’s nearly 43 percent.

Put differently, during that final normal economic month, leisure and hospitality workers represented just 13.04 percent of all private sector workers. Yet their employment plunge was more than three times as great relatively speaking.

Moreover, leisure and hospitality’s progress in getting back to pre-pandemic square one has been slower than that of the private sector overall. Since the April employment trough, leisure and hospitality has regained 4.955 million of the 8.224 million jobs lost during the worst of the pandemic, or 60.25 percent. For the private sector in toto, 13.267 million of the 21.353 million jobs lost in March and April have come back since – 62.13 percent.

It’s also clear that many of the kinds of workers about which Fed Chair Powell has been most concerned are concentrated in leisure and hospitality. For example, in 2019, (America’s last pre-CCP Virus full year), 13.1 percent of these sectors’ workers were African American versus 12.3 percent for the entire U.S. economy (including government workers at all levels), and 24 percent were Hispanic or Latino versus 17.6 percent for the entire economy.

Leisure and hospitality companies tend to employ Americans with low levels of formal education, too. According to the Labor Department, in 2019, 79.9 percent of the nation’s “first-line supervisors of house-keeping and janitorial workers” 25 years and older lack even an associate’s degree, and 76 percent of their food preparation and service counterparts fall into this category. The shares are even higher for the workers they supervise. Meanwhile, only 51.5 percent of all U.S. workers haven’t taken their education beyond high school.

Not surprisingly, therefore, leisure and hositality jobs pay poorly. In February, 2020, just before the arrivals of the pandemic and the lockdowns, their average hourly wages were only 59.28 percent those of all private sector workers. Last month, this figure had fallen to 57.58 percent. (See Table B-3 here.) 

For most of the pandemic period, the U.S. government at all levels pursued a mitigation strategy that aimed mainly at curbing economic and other forms of human activity across-the-board. Now, even with vaccinations and growing population-wide immunity showing strong signs of bringing the pandemic under control, the Biden administration and the Democratic Congress are just as determined to stimulate the economy that’s still significantly shut down by with an American Rescue Plan that seems just as indiscriminate.

As I’ve been writing (see, e.g., here), it should have been clear since late last spring that the anti-virus fight would have much more effective (and less harmful to the economy and other dimensions of public health) had it targeted protecting especially vulnerable populations. I strongly suspect that, with the fullness of time, it will become just as clear that a stimulus and jobs strategy emphasizing accelerating reopening, and thus aiding sectors and workers hardest hit by the remaining shutdowns, will prove a much more effective employment cure than the indiscriminate spending approach on which Washington has just doubled down.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Blaming the Restaurant Crisis on…Trump’s Tariffs

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Europe, food, imports, productivity, restaurants, spirits, tariffs, The Washington Post, Trade, Trump, wine, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s like the Washington Post, and especially the folks who run its op-ed page, will do anything to slam President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies. Example number 4,369,589? A piece not from an Offshoring Lobby mainstay, or one of this pressure group’s hired gun think tank hacks, or an academic economist with his or her head stuck in the clouds – but from two of America’s leading chefs and restaurateurs.

I’ll give Post editors and the authors – Kwame Onwuachi and Alice Waters – style points for creativity at least. The article contends that a great way for apparent President-elect Joe Biden to provide some desperately needed help for a national restaurant sector decimated by the CCP Virus would be to lift a set of tariffs imposed by Mr. Trump on European food products. The tariffs, they contend, are adding 25 percent to the costs of restaurants that use these products exactly at a time when few establishments in this usually low-margin sector can afford such burdens.

Unfortunately, all the piece makes clear is that chefs and restaurateurs should stick to cooking and serving and running their own businesses rather than advising the nation on trade, and that the folks at the Post should try requiring their authors to meet some minimal standards of credible argumentation.

After all, as Onwuachi and Waters themselves point out, these Trump tariffs were imposed last October 19. And the nation’s restaurants seemed to be doing just fine until…the pandemic and the lockdowns came along. So blaming the trade curbs for any significant contribution to the restaurant crisis seems a major stretch.

No doubt dining establishments that rely heavily on sales of products stressed by the authors like “wine from France, Spain and Germany, whiskey from Ireland and Scotland, and Spanish olives and olive oil, along with cheeses from all over the continent, pork, and much more” are now seeing their remaining (post-lockdowns) earnings suffering.

But nowhere in the piece are readers given the bigger picture. For example, what share of the nation’s restaurants even serve any of these foods or beverages? And what share of their total costs do such imports from Europe represent? Further, what percentage of these restaurants have closed for good, meaning that tariff elimination won’t provide them with a speck of relief at all? As RealityChek regulars know, presenting economic data in isolation is the first refuge of an intellectual scoundrel.

The authors – and their editors – also seem unaware that lots of domestic substitutes are available for these European products. For instance, on the eve of the pandemic, U.S.-produced wine accounted for about two-thirds of all the wine sold in the country both by value and by volume. I’m no oenophile, but I keep hearing that many measure up quite well against their foreign counterparts – and often better. In addition, not all the imports, or even the choice imports, come from Europe, as connoisseurs of Australian, South American, and South African wines can attest.

It’s a shame that the Trump tariffs won’t enable the restaurants that do maintain an extensive European wine menu to offer their customers exactly what they want, at exactly the prices to which they’re accustomed. But I strongly suspect that diners today are in a pretty supportive, accomodating mood. And if restaurateurs are indeed desperate – which so many clearly are – they won’t gripe excessively about switching to non-tariffed wines.

Moreover, any restaurateur worth his or her salt should have the marketing chops to encourage customers to expand their palates. Heaven knows they’ve succeeded extraordinarily in persuading Americans to sample all sorts of new, exotic, and often downright weird dishes and drinks containing equally new, exotic, and often downright weird ingredients and combinations thereof.

Since wine and other spirits play an outsized role in restaurant sales and profits, it’s that alcohol trade picture that counts most, and it’s enough to refute in large measure the case for saving or even meaningfully boosting the dining industry by rescinding the tariffs. But as opposed to my indifference to wine, I am a cheese lover, and can personally attest that many outstanding domestic varieties are available, too, for gourmet chefs to place on appetizer or dessert plates.

Finally, both the authors and the Post editors ignore the economics maxim holding that businesses facing cost increases can absorb them without raising prices by boosting their productivity. And although cooking, serving, and dining probably don’t strike many as an activities where efficiency can be greatly raised, the industry itself admits that its productivity growth is unacceptably low and needs to get on the stick.

Just as important, unless Unwuachi, Waters, any other spokes folks for their sector, or Post editors can come up with more convincing evidence that U.S. trade policy has decisively impacted their fortunes, focusing on improving productivity would sure be a better use of their time than whining about Mr. Trump’s tariffs.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Green Shoots of Recovery in New York City?

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(What's Left of) Our Economy, CCP Virus, consumer spending, coronavirus, COVID 19, election 2020, healthcare, Jobs, New York City, restaurants, stimulus package, subsidized private sector, The Partnership for New York City, Wuhan virus

Since I’m a New York City native, I’m a New York City fan. (At least I think that logically follows!) Therefore, one of the most disturbing trends I’ve followed in the CCP Virus era concerns the especially serious troubles the City has suffered this year, economically as well as medically.

I still haven’t made up my mind about whether New York has been pushed by the virus into a period of long-term decline, or whether we’ll see a return to normal once the pandemic has been brought under control (insert your own definition of this goal).

Yet for the last two months, whenever the case for pessimism seems to become conclusive (see, e.g., so much of the evidence in this recent New York Times piece), an email appears in my inbox from a friend who sends me the regular updates on the City’s economy from the Partnership for New York City.

The organization, comprised of hundreds of New York’s most prominent business leaders, says it seeks to “build bridges between the leaders of global industries and government, drawing on the resources and expertise of business to help solve public challenges, create jobs and strengthen neighborhoods throughout the five boroughs.”

Whatever you think of its sincerity or effectiveness or overall objectivity, the data it regularly releases tracks with statistics I monitor from other sources, so it seems reliable to me. And some of the figures it’s presented lately have been major stunners.

For example, as early as late July, the Partnership reported, consumer spending in the City had nearly returned to 2019 levels. In late March, it had plunged to 53 percent below them. Just as unexpected – the big laggards were New York’s wealthiest boroughs, Manhattan and Brooklyn (although maybe the Manhattan results weren’t so surprising, given its dependence on business from office workers, so many of whom weren’t commuting to their offices).

According to a late-September bulletin from the Partnership, not only had New York’s private sector employment increased on month, but “the city has outpaced U.S. private sector job growth for three consecutive months.” The leader here was the healthcare sector – which RealityChek regulars know are only partly private sector jobs, given the industry’s massive dependence on government subsidies. (See, e.g., here.) But the same problem distorts the national figures, so this finding still legitimately counts as a pleasant surprise.

Even more surprising: “209 business licenses were issued in September, up 11% from 189 licenses issued in August. The number of new business licenses has increased for four consecutive months and is up 260% since May.”

Of course, this number of businesses is less-than-tiny for such a gargantuan metropolis. But any signs of entrepreneurship these days are encouraging, and support the even more encouraging possibility that the City remains a powerful magnet for individuals with talent and drive.

No one can doubt that New York still faces massive challenges going forward, especially since the onset of winter, and the growth of lockdown fatigue, means that a second virus wave may hit. Moreover, the colder the weather gets, the greater the struggles of a hugely important restaurant sector that’s been able collectively to hang on with its fingernails thanks to regulatory reforms that helped eateries expand outdoor dining since late spring.

The fiscal situation seems dire as well – unless Democrats sweep to power in next week’s national elections and approve the kind of big aid package for cities and states that Republicans have generally resisted. (The continuing deadlock over a broader relief bill, which could drag on if Republicans retain the White House and/or Senate, obviously could remain a big problem, too.)

Even then, the City will be hard-pressed going forward to fund needed services adequately without the kinds of tax increases that tend to drive taxpayers away, cuts in more controversial outlays that tend to antagonize powerful constituencies like public employee unions, or some combination of both.

For now, however, these Partnership reports have been revealing impressive resilience in the New York City economy. And it bears remembering that, over any significant period of time, so far no one has ever made any serious money betting against it.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Restaurant Nation and its Consequences

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(What's Left of) Our Economy, CCP Virus, coronavirus, drinking places, food services, Jobs, Manhattan Institute, New York City, private sector, private sector jobs, recession, restaurants, The New York Daily News, wages, Wuhan virus

If you’re interested in New York City and its economy, and how it’s been affected by the CCP Virus, and major changes in the nation’s economy and family life, Howard Husock’s op-ed piece in The New York Daily News last month dealing with all these subjects is a must-read. In fact, it’s so interesting and important that it led me to investigate how the rise of the restaurant sector in the City – his prime focus – has played out nationally.

As shown by the author, a researcher at the Manhattan Institute, the restaurant industry has become nothing less than vital to the city’s economy. The wallop it’s taken from the virus and resulting shutdowns has thrown its full recovery – at least for the foreseeable future – into serious doubt. And therefore its sagging fortunes and seemingly gloomy prospects are strongly influencing the debate over how fast the City should return to business-as-usual.

At least as consequential, Husock argues convincingly that the burgeoning importance of the broad food service industry in recent decades reflects a major New York economic and social trend: Restaurants “can no longer be understood as the luxury it once was but, rather, as both a prerequisite for a successful economic recovery and an indicator that one is underway.”

When I looked into the national data (some of which Husock presents), I found that something like this conclusion is warranted for the country as a whole as well – and that it’s worrisome news at best economically.

Husock’s national data goes way back to the early 20^th century, and it looks at the U.S. labor market measured in terms of the types of occupations Americans hold. I’ve looked at the data measuring employment by sector of the economy, and although the restaurant figures only begin with 1990, they picture they draw looks comparable. (RealityChek regulars will note that I’m not using my usual method of comparing economic expansions to economic expansions, or recessions to recessions. My reason: the trends described here seem to hold during all kinds of economies – as I’ll indicate below.)

Chiefly, the numbers make clear that from 1990 to the end of 2019 (just before the virus struck), on a December-to-December basis, total U.S. employment in the private sector grew by 42.58 percent. But in the food services and drinking places category, the increase was 86.48 percent – more than twice as great. In food service businesses alone (excluding bars), the growth was 89.52 percent. That is, the workforces in these sectors, white- and blue-collar employees combined, nearly doubled during this period.

Particularly noteworthy – during the 2000s (which include the 2007-09 Great Recession), total private sector jobs fell by 2.99 percent. For the food service and drinking places, they increased by 14.44 percent, and for eating places alone, by 16.24 percent. So as I just stated, these trends seem to have unfolded during booms and bust alike.

Viewed through another statistical lens, in 1990, food services and drinking places employees represented 7.22 percent of all private sector workers. In December, 2019, this share was 9.44 percent. For eating places alone, the 1990-2019 rise was from 6.44 percent to 8.56 percent.

Also crucial to note: However, increasingly convenient dining or taking out has become for Americans, the rapid relative growth of restaurant-type jobs doesn’t look like a plus for their economy. The main reason? Restaurant industry jobs really do pay poorly.

In December, 2019, the average hourly wage in the private sector was $28.37 before adjusting for inflation. For food services and drinking places in toto, it was $15.34 (not much more than half the private sector average) and for eating places alone, only $15.09.

The only real bright spot in this picture: wages in restaurant-type jobs have been rising faster lately than those for the private sector overall. The data here only date from 2006, but during the 2010-2019 period examined above, on a December-to-December basis, pre-inflation-dollar hourly wages in the private sector advanced by 24.65 percent. For all food service and drinking places, the improvement was 32.12 percent, and for eating places, 31.68 percent.

So the wages gap is closing, but not dramatically.

Precisely because the U.S. workforce was steadily turning into Restaurant Nation until the CCP Virus arrived, as with the New York City economy (though not quite so heavily), the entire economy’s return to a pre-virus normal will depend on financing that will enable a critical mass of this sector to survive. But someone needs to ask whether whether Restaurant Nation is a healthy and sustainable structure for the national economy over the longer haul

Making News: New Daily Caller Piece On-Line on the CCP Virus and the Economy

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bankruptcies, CCP Virus, consumers, coronavirus, COVID 19, DailyCaller.com, deflation, economy, exports, Im-Politic, Jobs, manufacturing, public health, real estate, recession, recovery, rent, reopening, restart, restaurants, retail, small business, testing, travel, unemployment, vaccines, Wuhan virus

I’m pleased to announce that my latest freelance article has just been published on the popular DailyCaller.com news site.  The title pretty much says it all:  “Don’t Expect A V-Shaped Recovery From Coronavirus,” and you can read it at this link.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Respectable Case for Optimism?

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CCP Virus, China, consumer confidence, consumers, coronavirus, COVID 19, Federal Reserve, Jerome Powell, lockdown, recovery, reopening, restart, restaurants, retail, second wave, shutdown, social distancing, Sweden, testing, vaccines, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

At the risk of being (undeservedly) tarred as a CCP Virus pollyanna, I can’t help but being struck by the some new evidence that the U.S. economy’s recovery from its pandemic-induced swoon will be faster than widely feared. In fact, I still share these fears to some degree. But I can’t ignore increasing signs to the contrary.

To be clear, this evidence has little to do with the subject of yesterday’s post. Just because data can be cited showing significant national progress in beating back the virus threat doesn’t necessarily mean that a more so-called “V-shaped” economic rebound is on the way. The same goes for the impact of this progress on the economy reopening decisions of individual U.S. states – even though the more decline seen in numbers of new cases (despite gains in testing that should be revealing much more infection), numbers of deaths, and numbers of virus-related hospitalizations, the more reopening obviously will be seen.

Nor are my views being shaped by the strong rebound seen in U.S. stock markets so far (including today so far), or by the newly bullish recovery views voiced last night on “Sixty Minutes” by Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell. And this post isn’t even driven by the latest news about vaccine progress (though such reports will clearly help as long as the results continue being validated).

The reason: I’ve been convinced that the key to the recovery’s strength will be Americans’ willingness to start patronizing businesses in an economy where most activity – and most income earning opportunities – depend on consumer spending. So I’ve put considerable stock in predictions that, even though all the objective conditions can show that a return to normality will be safe, too many Americans will remain too fearful to boost the economy significantly.

I also take seriously the idea that all the restrictions on visiting retail stores (including restaurants) and personal service businesses will limit their customer flow either simply by forcing them to operate substantially below capacity, or by dissuading many customers from visiting in the first place, and thereby sharply reducing impulse consuming. Further, I’m well aware that the much more modest shock administered to Americans by the Great Recession triggered by the 2007-08 financial crisis was painfully slow to wear off. (See here and here where I write about reasons for recovery pessimism.)

In addition, the experiences of other countries that started reopening earlier has reenforced consumer caution concerns. Sweden, for example, has imposed fewer economic restrictions than any other major country. But this survey by the consulting firm McKinsey & Co. reports that consumer spending has dropped significantly anyway, and may not recover for months. China claims that it’s beaten the virus and its regime has been easing factory lockdowns since February. But as of late April, retail sales were still way down.

Finally, there’s the second wave threat, which could kneecap the economy as temperatures start dropping in the fall even if summer does witness a decent bounce back toward pre-virus consuming.

So the case against a relatively quick recovery with real legs is still awfully strong.

But don’t overlook reasons for more optimism. One that’s nothing less than amazing: The piece in this morning’s Washington Post reporting that even though virus testing is now much more widely available in the United States than previously, Americans are far from rushing to capitalize on these opportunities. Even accepting the various reasons offered in this article (e.g., not enough Americans know that the situation has changed; there’s too much mistrust of medical providers in some U.S. communities, particularly African-Americans), it’s difficult at least for me to conclude anything else but that many in the United States simply aren’t concerned enough about the pandemic to take this precaution. After all, if they were panic-stricken, wouldn’t they be following every bit of news about the supply of tests with baited breath?

Perhaps more important, the more news that emerges that the CCP Virus is much less lethal than early reports suggested, the (understandably) less concerned about infection more and more Americans seem to be.    

Then there are all the reports of Americans, whether in states that have eased lockdowns more vigorously and those that haven’t, violating social distance guidelines, either by not wearing masks where they’re supposed to, or seemingly ignoring social distancing rules in public place – and indeed returning to restaurants and bars and beaches in pretty impressive numbers. These reports are anecdotal, and therefore should be viewed with lots of caution. Also, please don’t assume that I’m endorsing this behavior! But there sure seems to be a lot of it, these reports also seem related to growing evidence of the virus’ relatively modest death rates, and and as an old adage goes, when enough anecdotes appear, they become data. 

Finally are several indicators pointing to an actual, non-trivial comeback in economic activity, and for a variety of sectors. This account mentions encouraging signs from the tech sector to the automotive industry. This article presents evidence of bottoming even in hard-hit bricks and mortars retail stores and restaurants. And click here for information on the housing industry.

Of course, the references above to “bottoming” could still be entirely consistent with pessimistic predictions of a painfully slow climb back to pre-virus prosperity. But I still find myself wondering if, having seen the overpoweringly depressive effect of various official edicts literally to halt and outlaw much economic activity, Americans might experience a reasonably powerful growth effect from their withdrawal – not to mention declining fears that infection is a death sentence.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Industries Claiming Labor Shortages are Productivity as Well as Wage Laggards

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compensation, Labor Department, labor productivity, labor shortages, productivity, restaurants, trucking, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The labor shortage claims from American businesses keep filling the media (even though wages, which are supposed to rise sharply in such circumstances, are improving only sluggishly). So it was more than a little interesting to look over the latest statistics on labor productivity released by the Department of Labor.

After all, companies and industries really facing dire labor shortages, and unwilling or unable to raise wages, are supposed to boost their productivity (generally by introducing labor-saving devices and practices). But the new Labor Department numbers show that they’re doing surprisingly little on this front, either.

Let’s examine two sectors of the economy that say with special vigor that they’re running out of workers: trucking and restaurants.

According to a typical account (from yesterday’s Washington Post), American trucking companies are facing “an extraordinary labor shortage” and their CEOs (including industry veterans) are saying things like “I’ve never seen it like this, ever….It doesn’t matter what the load even pays. There are just not drivers.”

The sector does appear to be raising pay. But not until the last two years have its overall employment costs been rising faster than those for the private sector overall – and the latter’s increases have hardly impressed. These data cover the entire transportation and warehousing sector, but after shooting up from a 2.1 percent annual pre-inflation pace to four percent (between the fourth quarters of 2011 and 2012), total compensation advances slowed to 2.3 percent annually during the next two years, and then to 2.2 percent in 2015 before accelerating.

Moreover, trucking industry productivity growth hasn’t been world-beating, either. The Labor Department reported last week that its overall gain in labor productivity (the narrower of two productivity growth measures tracked by Labor, but the one whose data is more up to date) in 2017 was 0.8 percent. A comparable figure for services industries in general isn’t available, but the Department does track labor productivity for non-farm businesses and for manufacturing.

Since labor productivity productivity for the former increased by 1.3 percent in 2017 and only 0.4 percent in manufacturing, it seems safe to conclude that services sector labor productivity grew by more than 1.3 percent – and therefore much more than trucking’s 0.8 percent. Nor does this picture change much going back to 2013.

Further, a remarkably similar pattern emerges upon examining the restaurant business. Labor shortages are widely claimed and reported, along with examples of the industry starting to improve compensation practices. New technologies are also apparently being tried to improve efficiency in the sector. But according to the data, these responses to the purported shortage of workers have been belated at best.

For example, as with trucking, annual total compensation gains in the accommodation and food services sectors (no restaurant-specific numbers are available) trailed those for the overall private sector for several years until 2016. And their owners and lobbyists have been making labor shortage claims for at least that long.

Data for restaurants (and bars) specifically are available for their labor productivity, and their performance here is only roughly comparable to the dreary results for non-manufacturing non-farm businesses.

Industries like trucking and restaurants may indeed not be able to choose their employees from as many applicants as they would like, or from numbers to which they’ve become accustomed. But if they haven’t been doing anything special, at least until recently either to hike pay, improve productivity, or both, then several explanations are possible. Maybe they’re waiting for another wave of wage-depressing legal and illegal immigrants to save their days without the need to fatten paychecks of invest in new plant and equipment. Maybe they’re don’t know how to improve productivity in particular, in which case, their businesses simply may not be viable, or they’re simply lousy managers.

But unless the Labor Department figures are completely off-base, one explanation we can rule out completely is that, as groups, they’re utterly desperate for workers.