Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Still on Globalist Auto-Pilot

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Bloomberg.com, China, foreign policy establishment, globalism, internationalism, Iran, Islamic terrorism, Israel, Middle East, Noah Feldman, North Korea, nuclear weapons, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Rex Tillerson, Russia, Trump, Trump administration, Ukraine

Clearly, the holiday week between Christmas and New Year’s has brought Americans no respite from transparently witless foreign policy-related Trump-bashing by the Mainstream Media. Hot on the heels of The New York Times‘ classic of fake history spotlighted yesterday in RealityChek came this Bloomberg.com piece accusing Secretary of State Rex Tillerson (and by extension the entire Trump administration) with two of the worst diplomatic sins imaginable – not recognizing instances where the United States lacks the leverage to achieve its goals, and lacking a strategy to solve this problem.

But Noah Feldman’s December 28 column at least boasted one (unintended) virtue: If the president and his top aides read it intelligently, they’ll realize that in many cases, they’re making an even more fundamental, but eminently correctable, mistake. Just like Feldman – and the internationalist/globalist (choose your adjective) foreign policy establishment he’s part of – they keep failing to ask first-order and even second-order questions about America’s role in the world. And strangely, these are exactly the kinds of questions that President Trump often asked when he was candidate Trump.

Feldman, an international law professor at Harvard, correctly observes that the Trump administration has taken on the tasks of ending the North Korean nuclear weapons program, pressuring China to help out in a significant way, persuading Russia to back off in some unspecified way from its campaign to control neighboring Ukraine, weakening Iran’s ability to boost its influence throughout the Middle East, and pushing Pakistan to stop supporting Islamic radicals in the region.

The author also mentions that “Neither [Tillerson] nor Trump is responsible for limits to U.S. leverage” – though maybe he could have made this crucial point before the next-to-last sentence in his article?.

But like the Trump administration, Feldman never bothers to ask exactly why the United States needs to seek these objectives (the first-order question) or whether, if they are essential or desirable, the standard forms of international engagement chosen by the Trump administration (and all of its predecessors as long as they were faced with these issues) are the best responses.

Ukraine policy is the most glaring example of neglecting first-order questions. Whatever you think of Russian revanchism or Putin, it’s inexcusable to overlook that American leaders have never considered Ukraine’s independence to be anything close to a vital or even important interest for two very good reasons. First, it was actually part of the old Soviet Union from 1924 until the end of the Cold War, with absolutely no impact on U.S. security, independence, or welfare. Second, it is located so close to Russia, and so far from the United States, that there is absolutely no prospect that American or NATO military actions could defend or liberate it without resorting to the (possibly suicidal) use of nuclear weapons.

So however tragic that country’s fate has been, the only sane conclusion possible from the standpoint of U.S. interests is that the best Ukraine policy is no Ukraine policy at all. And given this structural American inability to do Ukraine much good, steps like the recent Trump administration decision to supply defensive weapons to the Ukrainians sound like suspiciously like an American decision to fight to the last Ukrainian.

The other three foreign policy challenges obviously can’t be ignored. But the common assumption – especially in the ranks of the country’s bipartisan foreign policy establishment – that the answer involves some mixture of more military pressure or smarter diplomacy (more foreign aid is usually included as well, though it hasn’t figured very prominently in the North Korea, Iran, or Pakistan debates) urgently needs reexamination.

For as I’ve often written, in many cases, Americans could well find it much less dangerous, much cheaper, and much more effective to capitalize on the country’s matchless combination of military strength and geographic isolation to neutralize these particular threats.

To summarize briefly, if Washington pulls U.S. troops out of South Korea, it would eliminate any rational need for North Korea to strike U.S. territory with nuclear weapons (which is all too likely to result from a new Korean war that engulfs those units), and with its own massive nuclear forces, the United States could credibly threaten to obliterate the North if it sent its missiles against America for any other reason. North Korea’s nuclear weapons would still be a problem for its immediate neighbors. But all those countries (including South Korea) are more than powerful and wealthy enough to deal successfully with the North on their own and even singly.

Re Middle Eastern threats, the United States should focus much more on securing its own borders to keep terrorists and much less on defeating them on foreign battlefields – let alone on “fighting their ideology” by encouraging economic development and democracy. The region’s massive dysfunction on every conceivable level (including the cultural) will keep practically guaranteeing that new jihadist or other extremist forces will replace any that are crushed militarily, and that reform efforts will go exactly nowhere.

Further, by now it should be clear to any fair-minded person that the United States has more than enough energy to marginalize the power of Middle East oil producers over its economy and the world economy. And if you don’t like fossil fuels, let’s work harder to boost the use of alternatives. Finally, as with North Korea, America’s own deterrent is the best counter to any Iranian nuclear threat to the U.S. territory.  (And for those concerned with Israel’s security, the Jewish state of course has its own nuclear capabilities.)

The point here is not that any of these more domestic focused substitute strategies will be easy to put into effect or accelerate. The point is that they will be far easier to put into effect or accelerate than their more traditional counterparts, principally because America’s government, society, business community etc will have much more control over these measures than over events abroad.

During this first year of the Trump administration, no one should be the slightest bit surprised that establishmentarians like Feldman (and The New York Times‘ Landler) can’t even conceive that America’s foreign policy is stuck in a box, much less that it’s increasingly and dangerously obsolete. But President Trump ran in large measure as a foreign policy disrupter, and on many critical issues displayed impressive iconoclastic instincts. Why he hasn’t acted on more of them is one of the biggest mysteries of his presidencies so far. It could also be one of his biggest regrets.

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Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Trump’s China Strategy Seems Troublingly Silo-ed

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CFIUS, China, Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, Diplomatic and Security Dialogue, foreign direct investment, industrial policy, James Mathis, mercantilism, national security, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Rex Tillerson, semiconductors, Steven Mnuchin, super-computing, technology transfer, Trump, Wilbur Ross

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defense James Mathis are meeting with Chinese counterparts today in Washington, D.C. to conduct a “Diplomatic and Security Dialogue” – a stripped down Trump administration version of some of the ginormous official bilateral sessions the two countries have held periodically in recent years.

It’s unclear whether these talks will turn out to be more than the elaborate gabfests their predecessors quickly became. But it’s much clearer that their potential to contribute significantly to America’s security will be limited unless the administration starts taking many more urgently needed steps to move the nation’s Asia grand strategy into the twenty first century. And the major missing piece of this effort continues to be a serious effort to deny China the advanced technologies it will need to continue becoming a more formidable military competitor.

Some promising decisions have been taken, or are being considered. For example, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross is thinking of launching a national security review of U.S. trade in semiconductors with an eye toward fending off what he describes as an increasingly dangerous Chinese challenge in this defense-critical sector. Mathis and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin have both publicly called for updating the interagency U.S. government process for screening prospective Chinese and other foreign investments in all defense-related companies (the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS). And they along with Ross have strongly suggested that they’re thinking of redefining the relevant statute’s mandate to include economic dimensions of national security. Just as encouraging, prominent members of Congress are drafting legislation along these lines.

And most recently, the administration has announced a big new effort to ensure continued American leadership over China in super-computing (although the semiconductor industry isn’t happy with some other features of Mr. Trump’s stance on federally sponsored research and development).

Moreover, the Trump administration is responding to the Chinese challenge much more promptly than its predecessor, which prioritized this cluster of problems very late in its tenure. Its proposed responses to mercantile Chinese industrial policies in technology industries were especially weak beer.

But as with the Obama administration, Team Trump seems to be paying little attention to the continued outflow of cutting-edge defense-related American knowhow to China – including to entities that are unquestionably controlled by the Chinese government. It’s unmistakably paying much less attention to these investments than to spending billions more to upgrade American military forces in East Asia – which of course could wind up facing Chinese weapons based on U.S. tech advances.

Today’s U.S.-China talks in Washington are due to be followed up later this summer by a session devoted to economics. Maybe by then, President Trump and his advisers will be pursuing the comprehensive, integrated approach that meeting the China challenge adequately requires?

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The Establishment’s Hypocritical China Cassandras

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allies, cabinet, China, confirmation hearings, East Asia, island building, national security, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Rex Tillerson, Secretary of State, South China Sea, tech transfer, Trade, Trump

Since Donald Trump’s cabinet choices appeared at their Senate confirmation hearings last week, critics have rightly observed that the president-elect and his picks to run his foreign and national security policies seem to disagree sharply on some major issues.

Less noticed is how the Trump nominees’ statements have revealed worse incoherence in the ranks of most critics – who sit overwhelmingly in the nation’s bipartisan foreign policy establishment. An unusually worrisome example has been the near-firestorm over Secretary of State-designate Rex Tillerson’s statement that “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops, and second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.”

Tillerson’s remarks referred to an especially brazen aspect of Beijing’s expansionism in the South China Sea – centered on territorial claims that no one else in the region accepts. In an apparent effort to create irreversible realities “on the ground,” China has been capitalizing on the local topography literally to turn existing rocks and similar features into mini islands. Beijing has gone on to place various kinds of facilities – including some with military capabilities – on them, and to declare the immediately surrounding waters to be Chinese territory.

As widely noted, there’s at best considerable tension between Tillerson’s warning and several suggestions made by the president-elect during the campaign that he’s worried that America’s security relationships in the East Asia/Pacific region have become too dangerous militarily (since its adversaries are developing increasingly potent nuclear forces) and too one-sided economically (since the United States runs huge trade deficits with most regional countries).

Also completely weird, however, have been the alarm bells set off in establishment ranks to the effect that Tillerson had suddenly moved America dramatically closer to war with China over the South China Sea. For many of these voices have thoroughly upbraided Mr. Trump for failing to appreciate the crucial importance of U.S. alliances for safeguarding American and global security.

Establishment voice FOREIGN POLICY magazine ran a piece ominously asking, “Is Tillerson Ready to Go to War Over the South China Sea?” Only slightly less melodramatic was this Wall Street Journal sub-headline: “If carried out, Tillerson’s proposal to bar Beijing from some South China Sea islands would likely trigger military battle, experts say.”

A Christian Science Monitor headline sounded a similar alarm, and its article reported that “[T]he policy would dramatically reshape US thinking on Chinese expansionism, drawing a hard new territorial line in China’s backyard and, experts say, invite a military confrontation with Beijing.”

And even though they weren’t predicting imminent conflict, the experts interviewed by The Los Angeles Times still apparently fretted that Tillerson, “without diplomatic experience, had engaged in a flight of hyperbole in keeping with the tough rhetoric about China favored by Trump.”

These would all be defensible views except for one consideration: The American security strategy in the East Asia/Pacific region that all these experts have endorsed as a group for decades depends first and foremost on a credible threat to use military force to deter the kind of aggression in which China is engaged.

It is completely legitimate to question whether or not China’s island-building is the best casus belli, or circumstance for drawing a “red line.” But it is the height of hypocrisy to condemn – or even tut-tut over – a statement emphasizing that the United States has long considered maintaining freedom of the seas in East Asia to be a vital security interest (including by the Obama administration), and that China is on a course that will require U.S. military responses unless Beijing stops or changes direction sharply.

Or are all these American Asia experts confident that China will even slow its land and sea grab at some point down the road without firmer U.S. counter-moves than have been seen to date? If so, it’s time that they explained their reasons why – and how these rationales relate to their long-time insistence that major American military deployments in this region are essential to maintain peace and stability.

So the incoming administration looks to be a house divided on dealing with China’s strategic ambitions in Asia. That’s disturbing, but at least from the little known so far, the leading factions will be internally consistent (though the hawks still need to show that they understand the need to stop adding to China’s wealth and power through dangerously shortsighted trade and tech transfer policies, and Mr. Trump needs to understand more completely that even greater defense burden-sharing by the Asians could still leave America with unacceptable nuclear risks).

But the outside critics have just about disqualified themselves from any role in this debate – unless they can offer something more than hopelessly scattershot whining.