(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Good News About Manufacturing Reshoring to the U.S.

Tags

(What's Left of) Our Economy, automotive, Canada, China, domestic content, Foley & Lardner, manufacturing, Mexico, quotas, reshoring, rules of origin, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA

President Trump’s critics have often complained that even if his trade war with and tariffs on China have prompted many U.S.-owned and other companies to move production out of the People’s Republic, relatively few are relocating back to the United States. (See, e.g., here.) So it was especially interesting to come across a survey of mainly America-headquartered firms indicating that the Trump policies actually deserve pretty high marks for benefiting domestic industry.

The study was conducted by the legal and business advisory firm Foley & Lardner, and involved 143 executives (presumably from 143 companies). Fully 78 percent were “primarily based in the U.S.” and most of the rest were from Mexico. And their businesses ranged throughout the manufacturing sector, with the two biggest industries represented being automotive and general manufacturing (22 percent each). These companies’ sizes and places in global supply chains varied significantly, too.

When it comes to China production and sourcing strategies, Foley found that 21 percent of these respondents “have already” moved “some” of their facilities out of the People’s Republic, 22 percent were “currently in the process of doing so,” and 16 percent are “considering” this option. Of the remaining 39 percent of respondents, 16 percent have rejected leaving China, and 23 percent say they haven’t considered such a move to date.

These numbers roughly correspond with the results of other, similar surveys and reports. (E.g., this one.) But the real eye opener came from answers to the question “To what other countries are you moving, or considering moving, production or sourcing of goods and/or services?” Of the companies that said they’re moving production or sourcing from China, 74 percent mentioned the United States. The next most popular option was Mexico (47 percent), followed by Canada (24 percent), and Vietnam (12 percent).

These percentages (and others) add up to more than 100 because, as the question implied, firms can be leaving China for more than one country, in order to hedge their bets against dangers like tariffs, pandemics, and the like. But they make clear that the United States has been prominently in the mix, and so has the Western Hemisphere – which helps U.S.-based manufacturing because goods made in Mexico and Canada tend to have relatively high levels of American-made parts and components and other industrial inputs.

To be sure, there’s some evidence that these levels have been falling in recent years. But there’s also reason to expect that the Trump administration’s U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA – its rewrite of the North American Free Trade Agreement), will reverse these trends at least in part because its provisions require that goods receiving tariff-free treatment in the tri-national trade zone contain higher levels of North American content overall, and because of quotas on U.S. automotive imports from Mexico (which haven’t kicked in yet but which seem likely to in the not-too-distant future).

I’d be the last one to claim that the Foley report settles the argument over how effective the Trump trade policies have been in encouraging manufacturing reshoring. But when all the hard data showing U.S. domestic manufacturing’s resilience both during the current pandemic (in terms of both jobs and output), and during a disruptive event like a trade war, are considered, the Foley findings look anything but fanciful.

Advertisement

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A New North American Trade Study’s Crucial Footnote

Tags

automotive, Canada, Center for Automotive Research, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, regional content, rules of origin, tariffs, trade bloc, Trump, U.S. International Trade Commission, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USITC, USMCA, {What's Left of) Our Economy

That was some footnote Commissioner Jason E. Kearns apparently insisted be inserted into the U.S. International Trade Commission’s (USITC) recent report on the economic impact of the Trump administration’s attempt to rewrite the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In fact, it contains the key to giving this Congressionally mandated study of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) a passing or failing grade. And a special bonus – it indicates why all three countries should have followed my advice and turned North America into a genuine trade bloc.

The particular Kearns-related footnote I’m talking about (number 66, on p. 57) dealt with the USITC’s analysis of one of the most controversial (and in my view, most promising) provisions of the new framework for North American trade – which has been signed by the continent’s three governments but not yet ratified by any of their legislatures. It’s the agreement’s attempts to restructure automotive industry trade among the signatories. These proposed new arrangements matter greatly because trade in vehicles and parts represents such a big share of overall North American trade (more than 20 percent of America’s total goods trade with Canada and Mexico, according to this study).

In brief, at the Trump administration’s instigation, USMCA increases the share of a vehicle’s content that needs to be made somewhere inside the free trade zone in order to qualify for tariff-free treatment, and includes other measures aimed at curbing and even reversing the movement of U.S.-owned auto production and the related jobs from the United States to much lower wage and overall lower cost Mexico, along with the resulting flows of Mexican-assembled vehicles and parts into the American market.

The USITC concluded that although the new NAFTA would produce slight benefits for the American economy overall, including for domestic U.S. manufacturing, the new content measures (called “rules of origin,” or “ROO” for short) themselves would drag on overall economic performance. In fact, they would even slightly depress U.S. vehicle production, not increase it.

As always the case with such projections, these conclusions are based on numerous assumptions, and as almost always the case, at least some of these assumptions can be pretty dodgy. Two that I have special problems with: First, when it comes to auto parts, the USTIC only examines only trade and investment in engines and transmissions; and second, the Commission doesn’t take into the jobs multiplier of vehicle and parts manufacturing.

These assumptions surely skew the conclusions to the downside because, as important as engines and transmissions are, the report itself acknowledges that other parts nowadays represent about 37 percent of total domestic parts output; and because the auto industry’s multiplier effect is really high. Indeed, according to a 2015 report by the Center for Automotive Research, for each American job created in domestic auto or light truck manufacturing, seven other jobs are created in the rest of the economy. That finding is significant because the Center has claimed that the new origin rules would exact exorbitant costs, and because it gets significant funding from an auto industry that has expressed major reservations about them.

But much more fundamental issues are raised by that footnote 66, especially considering these questionable assumptions. Here it is in full:

“Commissioner Kearns notes that, as described above, the model appears to suggest that the trade restrictiveness of a ROO is inversely related to its positive impact on the U.S. economy. Carried to its logical conclusion, this would appear to suggest that the best ROO is a very weak or nonexistent ROO. In turn, this would result in other countries, which do not incur any obligations to import U.S. products, obtaining unilateral, duty-free access to the U.S. market. If, on the other hand, we were to compute an ROO that optimizes regional content while recognizing that there may be slack in the economy, we may estimate a gain to the overall economy from the automotive ROO.”

Kearns first observation not only makes perfect sense. It’s the only sensible macro-conclusion that can be drawn about rules of origin. Because their complete absence (the counter-factual the Commission seems to have ignored) would indeed permit non-North American producers to reap all the gains generated by the USMCA (mainly, unfettered access to the immense continental market) without incurring any of the obligations. That’s supposed to result in a net plus for the American economy, the predominant market prize in North America?

The second observation is even more interesting. It notes that much more stringent rules (those that would “optimize regional content”) could be expected to leave the overall economy better off than the current rules. And as I’ve observed, the low tariff penalties (2.5 percent) imposed on non-North American auto producers for ignoring the origin rules are guaranteed to minimize the gains they produce. Therefore, much higher tariff penalties – which would approximate those commonly associated with trade blocs aimed at minimizing imports – would come closest to maximizing that what the USITC calls “the gain to the economy from the automotive ROO.”

President Trump claims that an “America First” approach to trade policy distinguishes him sharply from his predecessors. Footnote 66 in the USTIC report makes as possible that a genuine “North America First” strategy would have best advanced that goal – and that in this case, anyway, there was no reward for timidity.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: So Far, Trump’s New NAFTA Only Deserves an “Incomplete”

Tags

automotive, China, currency manipulation, dispute resolution, domestic content, exports, globalization, imports, light trucks, NAFTA, non-market economy status, North American Free Trade Agreement, passenger cars, rules of origin, SUVs, Trade, Trump, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA, value-added taxes, VATs, {What's Left of) Our Economy

“What was all the fuss about?” is a question that supporters and especially critics of conventional, pre-Trump trade policies are entitled to ask after reading the text of the new “U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement” – the brand new revamp of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) just agreed to by the three signatories.

Although President Trump has repeatedly called NAFTA “the worst trade deal ever,” the new pact seems to retain the previous deal’s fatal flaw. Interestingly, though, the very modesty of “USMCA’s” departures from NAFTA means that, because U.S. trade is so worldwide in scope, the best chance for Mr. Trump to keep his campaign promises to turn U.S. trade policy into an engine of domestic growth and employment rather than of offshoring depends on two additional steps. The first is following through with his threat to impose stiff tariffs on automotive imports from the rest of the world. The second is expanding his already substantial tariffs on imports from China.

As I’ve explained repeatedly, that fatal NAFTA flaw entailed the treaty’s failure to provide significant incentives to producers outside the free trade zone to supply U.S., Canadian, and Mexican customers with goods – mainly in the automotive sector – produced in the United States, Canada, and Mexico, not in Europe, Asia, or elsewhere.

USMCA does create stricter “rules of origin” governing trade in vehicles and parts – by phasing in increases in the share of inputs provided from inside North America that vehicles and parts will need to contain in order to qualify for tariff-free treatment when traded among the three countries. The new treaty also mandates that a certain percentage of these products be made in factories paying workers wages much higher than prevail in Mexico currently. But the penalties non-North American producers face for ignoring these requirements, at least for duty-free treatment in the U.S. market, by far North America’s largest, are exactly the same sorely inadequate tariffs imposed by NAFTA – 2.5 percent for passenger cars and nearly all parts, and 25 percent for sport-utility vehicles (SUVs) and light trucks.

In other words, non-North American companies and entities (such as are found in China) will find it just about as easy to absorb or evade the costs of exporting to rather than investing in North America – through increased subsidies, currency devaluation, or accepting slightly lower profits – as they have for NAFTA’s entire 24-year history.

Automotive-wise, as previously reported in the news media, USMCA does differ from NAFTA in one seemingly important respect:  The Trump administration won the right to increase greatly tariffs on passenger cars, SUVs, and light trucks from Mexico if these shipments to the United States exceed certain levels (1.6 million vehicles) and on auto parts if these shipments exceed $108 billion per year. Interestingly, no such limits are imposed on automotive imports from Canada.

The catch is that these thresholds significantly exceed current American import levels, so they’ll provide no noteworthy relief for U.S. autoworkers and domestic production facilities for the time being.

The good news for these beleaguered American workers and companies is that major incentives to move non-North American production to the continent can still emerge.  But their fate will turn on whether President Trump imposes stiff tariffs on automotive products from outside North America under Section 232 of U.S. trade law, and whether he keeps curbing American trade with China.

Canada and Mexico have won major exemptions in the USMCA from these threatened levies (see here and here for the relevant side letters), but such new barriers to imports from Germany, Japan, South Korea, China, and others should create plenty of new work and sales opportunities for facilities in all three USMCA countries.

Section 232 auto tariffs alone wouldn’t achieve my own favored goal of turning all of North America and its economy into a genuine trade bloc, which would require non-continental industries across the board to supply North America from North America. In one fell swoop, this approach would solve nearly all of America’s longstanding trade problems with all of the aforementioned non-North American countries along with a host of others. But given the prominence of automotive products in the North American trade and broader economic landscape, it would be an important first step. And more China-specific levies would help as well, given the huge and rapidly growing shares of U.S. manufacturing markets grabbed by the People’s Republic in the last 25 years.

To be sure, other features of USMCA look worrisome to me. Principally, the deal does nothing to eliminate the problems caused by the Canadian and Mexican use of value-added taxes (VATs) and America’s lack thereof. These levies serve as hidden barriers to the Canadian and Mexican markets, and hidden subsidies for exports from Canada and Mexico to the United States.

The Trump administration also has granted Canada’s demand to preserve the old NAFTA’s dispute-resolution process, which greatly helps Canada and also Mexico to frustrate U.S. efforts to curb dumped and illegally subsidized imports from those countries.

On the plus side, the agreement contains enforceable prohibitions against currency manipulation – a first for an American trade deal.  And the administration won for the United States the right to withdraw from the trilateral USMCA and substitute a bilateral deal if one of the parties signs a separate trade agreement with a “non-market economy.”  Since that clearly means, “China,” it’s one more barrier to non-North American economies enjoying some of the benefits of the free trade agreement without incurring any of the obligations.   

But the origin rules have always been central to the promise of integrating the three North American economies for truly mutual benefit. And since the auto tariff decision has now become the development that can make or break the effectiveness of these rules, the only grade merited so far by President Trump’s NAFTA rewrite is “incomplete.”

Following Up: Still Lots of Unanswered Questions About that Trump NAFTA Revamp

Tags

auto parts, autos, Canada, domestic content, Following Up, Mexico, NAFTA, national security, North American Free Trade Agreement, rules of origin, Trade, Trump, World Trade Organization, WTO

In recent days, the Trump administration has reached a trade deal with Mexico that either may or may not fundamentally rework the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). I say “may or may not” because above and beyond the question of whether the third NAFTA signatory, Canada, will actually go along, and whether Congress will agree to consider a bilateral as opposed to a trilateral deal, some of the most important provisions of the bilateral U.S.-Mexico pact remain unknown to the public.

In particular, it’s completely unclear what the United States and Mexico have agreed to regarding the rules of origin for automotive products traded within the NAFTA zone. In fact, it’s completely unclear whether what they reportedly have agreed to is an agreement at all.

To remind: The rules of origin specify how much of a product (in this case, most motor vehicles as well as all automotive parts) needs to be made inside North America in order to qualify for tariff-free treatment when its sold in any of the signatory countries. The idea – totally reasonable, in my opinion – is to make sure that as many of the benefits of a trade deal as possible flow to the signatories (which of course, legally need to incur all of the obligations) and don’t leak out to non-signatories (which of course legally need to incur none of the obligations).

Automotive trade is crucial in this respect because vehicles and parts combined last year made up nearly a third of all U.S. merchandise imports from Mexico, and (revealingly) 9.65 percent of the considerably smaller amount of U.S. goods exports to Mexico.

As I’ve repeatedly observed, the original NAFTA failed to achieve this objective. And the main problem was not the level of North American content required for duty-free treatment (62.5 percent). The main problem was that the penalty for ignoring the rules was so negligible (a 2.5 percent tariff). And it appears that even though the content requirement has been increased (to 75 percent), the meager penalty remains. Reportedly, it’s also the only obstacle to automakers ignoring the new requirement that 40 to 45 percent of a vehicle be made by workers earning at least $16 per hour.

So it’s entirely reasonable to finish most news accounts and conclude that the new U.S.-Mexico treaty will do little to achieve its stated goal of inducing automakers based outside North America to move production and jobs inside North America.

Complicating matters, though, are some wrinkles in the U.S.-Mexico deal that have been reported in the days since the agreement was first announced. Principally, according to some news accounts, much higher 25 percent tariffs will be imposed on vehicles assembled in Mexico and sent to the U.S. market once the number of those vehicles exceeds 2.4 million. Therefore, the actual automotive rules of origin may well have been genuinely toughened.

Nevertheless, for several reasons, this conclusion, too, needs to be qualified. For Mexico exported only 1.8 million passenger cars and sport-utility vehicles to the United States last year. So its sales would need to rise considerably before that genuine toughening kicks in. Second – and again, reportedly – this provision of the agreement is contained in a side letter. The apparent failure to include it in the core text of the agreement raises questions about its enforceability – especially since the same reports indicate that under it, Mexico retains the right to challenge those higher tariffs at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Moreover, I’ve seen absolutely nothing about any quotas for imports of auto parts as such from Mexico – which are currently running at an annual rate topping $16 billion.

That could actually be good news for the United States – because the auto tariffs (again, reportedly) would be based on the U.S. trade law that authorizes Washington to impose levies based on national security considerations. Such trade curbs are legal under WTO rules because the creators of even this sovereignty-impinging arrangement recognized that no major powers would ever surrender their right to assess and act on their national security interests. It’s plausible, therefore, to believe that today’s WTO majority would shy away from challenging this kind of decision by Washington, however damaging it might be to their exports, for fear of provoking a U.S. walkout and thus the organization’s demise.

But there’s no guarantee of this outcome – especially if or when a more WTO-friendly administration replaces Mr. Trump’s in Washington.

It’s true that an eventual Trump decision to impose lofty national security-justified auto tariffs on non-North American auto-makers would render many of these questions moot – because even if Mexico was exempted, and those companies therefore could keep supplying the American market through that channel, they’d quickly run up against the quota (assuming of course that one exists).

Yet this auto tariff decision seems to lie pretty far down the road. In the meantime, the NAFTA decision continues to look pretty confusing. I’m just hoping that this post will make your confusion a little more informed.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Case that Trump Has Blown a Big NAFTA Opportunity

Tags

autos, Bloomberg.com, Canada, domestic content, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, rules of origin, Trade, Trump, U.S. Transportation Department, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Suppose the U.S. government punished certain types of tax cheating with the financial equivalent of a wrist slap (and no reimbursement requirement), and then announced that some more types of tax cheating would be punished with that same wrist slap. Chances are, unless you had moral qualms about any kind of tax cheating, you’d keep on cheating because even if you were caught every year, your gains would be well worth a marginal fine.

Now let’s suppose that Washington announced that all tax cheating would result in a truly massive and mandatory fine. Chances are you’d become a model taxpayer, or close to it, if your chances of being caught were relatively small.

If this makes sense to you, then you understand one of the main problems that’s plagued the United States since the advent of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and chances are you recognize why what we know of President Trump’s new NAFTA revamp agreement with Mexico leaves that problem almost fully intact.

Although it seems like a big deal that the revised terms require that 75 percent of an automobile be made within the NAFTA free trade zone to qualify for duty-free treatment rather than the current 62.5 percent, as I’ve repeatedly explained, the decision to keep the tariff punishment for noncompliance at 2.5 percent still renders these “rules of origin” toothless. For any automaker whose home base is either inside of outside North America and that’s worth his or her salt should be able to find 2.5 percent cost-savings to offset the levy, or remain plenty profitable even without such offsets. And the high levels of non-North American content that continue to characterize so many vehicles sold inside North America make clear these companies have succeeded in one or both respects.

In other words, because non-compliance is so relatively painless, the existing rules of origin were not stringent or smart enough to achieve their stated aim of luring much automotive production and employment from outside North America to inside North America, and the new rules are no likelier to work any better.

P.S. – the national governments of these non-North American auto producers have always been able easily to help their companies cope with the NAFTA content requirements through a variety of policies – e.g., providing them with new or bigger tax breaks or subsidies, or devaluing their currencies. And because the external NAFTA tariff remains so low, these tactics, too, remain as capable as ever of frustrating the intent of the origin rules.

Even more frustrating for those who hoped for a game-changing NAFTA rewrite, the exact same flaw sandbags the Trump administration’s win with Mexico concerning its separate proposal that duty-free treatment inside North America apply only to vehicles containing 40-45 percent content from factories paying hourly wages greater than $16.

A new piece on Bloomberg.com helpfully confirms the general point about the pointlessness of such a low external tariff, but even more helpfully (if less wittingly) underscores what an immense opportunity has been missed by the administration’s failure to boost these levies.

The article uses U.S. Transportation Department data to show that only three vehicle models currently assembled in Mexico of the 39 sold to Americans would be tariff-ed under the new origin rules regime – and that only one of these is a significant seller in the American market. For Canadian-assembled vehicles, the number that would be affected by the new origin rules is higher – but it’s still only six of the 19 total.

But these Transportation Department data also make clear how likely a much higher tariff would be to shift automotive output and employment to North America. The key is how many of those Mexico-and Canada-assembled vehicles exported to the United States would fall below the 75 percent threshold. and therefore would cost lots more to sell to Americans (say, the 25 percent suggested by Mr. Trump for proposed national security-based automotive tariffs). For Mexico, the number would be 25, or some 64 percent of the number of models its assemblers send to the United States. For Canada, it’s twelve of the 19, or 63 percent.

These numbers as such don’t tell us how many actual vehicles exported from both countries would face these much higher tariffs. But according to the authors, although that figure is a significantly lower than the model percentage number would indicate, it would still represent nearly a third of U.S. vehicle imports from Mexico. Therefore, the costs of noncompliance with the origin rules would be far from chump change for the non-North American producers. (This one-third number also counts cars that would be affected by a separate requirement that 40 to 45 percent of the content of an vehicle come from factories paying at least $16 per hour in order to avoid tariffs.) Exact statistics for Canadian exports aren’t provided, but the authors describe it as “likely” to be similar.

None of the above contradicts the observation that NAFTA external tariffs greater than 2.5 percent would violate America’s World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments. But since when has the Trump administration had use for that regime – or for the previous U.S. trade policies that spearheaded its creation? In addition, why has President Trump not recognized that much higher NAFTA external tariffs – applied, along with universal rules of origin – would solve most of the biggest and chronic U.S. trade problems he’s complained about with foreign rivals like China, Germany and the European Union, Japan, and South Korea.

The answers to date remain unclear at best. What’s perfectly clear, though, is that although President Trump is often portrayed as a disrupter, his new NAFTA deal with Mexico is anything but.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is Trump Finally Getting It on NAFTA?

Tags

automotive, Bill Clinton, Canada, Inside U.S. Trade, Mexico, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, Politico, Ronald Reagan, rules of origin, tariffs, Trade, Trump, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s still unconfirmed, but if true, a development reported in the (usually reliable) newsletter Inside U.S. Trade would reveal that the Trump administration is finally recognizing a major weakness in its approach to revising the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). And special bonus – the proposal in question would also go far toward solving the trade problems with China and most of the rest of the world that have been rightly identified by the administration.

Here’s a good summary of the scoop provided Tuesday by Politico:

“Three sources close to the [NAFTA] talks said the U.S. has demanded that Mexico, and possibly Canada, accept a higher tariff rate for autos that don’t meet the pact’s new content rules. That would essentially force companies that build cars in Mexico to agree to have exports to the U.S. that don’t conform to the rule be subject to a tariff beyond the 2.5 percent rate Washington bound itself to at the World Trade Organization. USTR [the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative] also declined to confirm this development….”

The key here is the point about higher tariffs. The three NAFTA signatories have now come to agree that the treaty’s regional content rules need to be made more strict. So far, in order to qualify for tariff-free treatment anywhere inside North America, autos and light trucks (which comprise an outsized share of intra-North American trade, and have attracted the most attention in the talks) need to be made of 62.5 percent North American parts and components. The aim, at least ostensibly, has been to encourage producers outside North America to relocate production and jobs inside the free trade zone.

The Trump administration has been pressing to raise the content levels needed for such tariff-free treatment to at least 70 percent for passenger vehicles, and reportedly Mexico is now on board in principle (though the exact number has yet to be agreed on). But so far, the administration has not demonstrated much, if any, awareness that higher mandated local content levels alone won’t bring many new factories or jobs to the signatory countries – and have under-performed on this front so far – for a very simple reason. As I’ve noted repeatedly, the penalty that non-North American producers need to pay for non-compliance is only 2.5 percent – an extra cost they can easily absorb.

The Inside U.S. Trade item suggests that this point has been taken, which would be great news for all three NAFTA countries if the eternal tariff is raised high enough to foster North American production and discourage imports. Even better, this proposal – which would essentially turn North America into a genuine trade bloc if extended to all traded goods and services – would by definition limit American imports from all the countries long regarded in Washington as troublesome trade partners (like China, Germany, and Japan). For they would all find it much more difficult to supply the United States – along with Canada and Mexico – with exports, and would face great pressure to serve North American customers instead with products overwhelmingly made in the free trade zone by North American workers.

It’s true that an increase in the external NAFTA tariff would violate WTO rules and would therefore expose all three North American economies to retaliation from outside the continent. But all three countries have run chronic trade deficits with the rest of the world, so they stand to come out ahead if a full-fledged trade conflict actually resulted. And as former President Ronald Reagan emphasized when he originally broached the subject (back in 1979), North America is self-sufficient, or could easily become so, in every significant product or service used by a prosperous economy.

Indeed, Reagan subsequently and explicitly contended that NAFTA was needed as a trade bloc to fend off the challenges posed by regional consolidation in Europe and East Asia. (The Wall Street Journal article in which this argument was made is now behind a pay wall, but the quote is found in my Marketwatch.com op-ed linked above.)  So did former President Bill Clinton. Both were known – and rightly so – as free trade supporters. Donald Trump, a decided free trade skeptic, should settle for no less.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Deepening Mystery of Trump’s NAFTA Strategy

Tags

autos, Canada, light trucks, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, Nick Carey, North American Free Trade Agreement, Reuters, ROO, rules of origin, tariffs, Trade, Trump, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Trump administration’s approach to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) keeps getting murkier. And although I agree that keeping the other parties to a negotiation off balance from time to time, and holding cards close to one’s vest, can be excellent tactics, the latest apparent twist in American policy doesn’t appear to be explained by such considerations.

Let’s start with the excellent insight contained in a Reuters article today about one of the centerpieces of NAFTA reform identified by the administration – the rules of origin (ROO) for autos and other light-duty passenger vehicles. These treaty provisions have been rightly targeted by Team Trump negotiators from the standpoint of U.S. interests because motor vehicles and parts comprise such a large percentage of the goods exchanged throughout North America, and because since NAFTA went into effect, contrary to its supporters’ promises, the American automotive sector has become less, not more globally competitive.

The NAFTA ROO are ostensibly aimed at encouraging automotive manufacturing inside North America and currently require that 62.5 percent of a vehicle’s value come from within the free trade zone in order to be exempted from tariffs. The administration’s response is widely described as a toughening of these rules because it would raise this threshold to 75 percent.

But there’s always been one huge catch that I’ve been tweeting about consistently: Unless the tariff penalty imposed on vehicle and parts-makers outside North America is greatly increased, boosting the duty-free content threshold will have little impact on these companies’ production and employment decisions. The reason? The current NAFTA external tariff on these products is only 2.5 percent. (Just FYI, this point was first made during the original NAFTA debate, in this Economic Strategy Institute study to which I contributed modestly.)

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Trump was Still Right to Nix Obama’s TPP Trade Deal

Tags

Asia, Barack Obama, bilateral trade agreements, China, export-led growth, mercantilism, multilateral trade agreements, non-tariff barriers, rules of origin, subsidies, tariffs, tech transfer, TPP, trade surpluses, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

At first I was irritated with President Trump for his expressions of interest this year in reviving U.S. efforts to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – the Pacific Rim-wide trade agreement that former President Barack Obama couldn’t persuade Congress to ratify, and that Mr. Trump removed from America’s policy agenda during his first week in office.

I still wish the President had kept the TPP consigned to the proverbial ash heap of history. But I do see one silver lining in his apparent about-face: the new opportunity it creates to remind how awful the Obama TPP was, and in particular how cynical the case that it represented a masterful ploy to contain the rise of Chinese power regionally and globally, and even shape it to serve America’s goals of sustaining an open world trading system.

In fact, it’s entirely possible that Mr. Trump’s apparent new openness to TPP results at least partly from widespread claims from mainstream politicians and analysts that its multilateral nature endowed the deal with much more potential to curb China’s trade predation than the unilateral tariffs he’s announced.

Yet this contention is the one that’s most easily refuted. First, the version of the treaty signed by Obama contained a wide open back door for many Chinese exports by allowing goods that contained high levels of content produced outside the TPP zone to be traded freely within the zone. Given how central China is to Asia-wide production chains, these loose rules of origin were bound to enable China to enjoy crucial benefits created by the TPP without incurring any of the obligations.

Second, until the eve of its departure from office, neither the Obama administration nor any TPP supporters in Congress or the mainstream media or the think tank world lifted anything more than the occasional pinky even to protest perhaps the principal source of China’s rising economic and military power – the massive transfer of cutting edge knowhow, along with capital, from U.S. tech companies to Chinese business partners or other institutions, either voluntarily (including through shortsighted training programs and investments in Chinese entities) or involuntarily (due to Beijing’s widespread practice of linking access to the China market to the handover of critical technology).

The sudden transformation of these corporate panda-huggers and their hired American guns into China skeptics and even hawks has demonstrated nothing more than that national security is the last refuge of a trade policy scoundrel – especially since by all accounts, U.S. technology and investment continue pouring into China – including defense-related tech. (See here and here for some evidence.)

Third, there’s no reason to believe that most of the other key TPP members have any interest in turning China into a free-trading economy. Quite the contrary. Whether it’s Japan or Singapore or Vietnam or Malaysia, most of the treaty’s most important countries have followed China-style economic development models (except when they’ve borrowed from Japan’s somewhat different but of course much earlier blueprint). And economic openness emphatically isn’t in the recipe. What’s central to these strategies is amassing trade surpluses with the United States and the rest of the world to help generate adequate levels of growth and employment.

The bottom line: Most TPP countries knew that effective disciplines on the trade predation largely responsible for China’s surpluses could be used against their own subsidies and non-tariff barriers. Conversely, it’s surely the reason that these economies accepted the paper curbs on mercantilism that are mandated by TPP. They’re rightly confident that thanks to the secretive bureaucracies that keep their economies effectively closed – and their barriers difficult for outsiders even to identify, much less litigate – none of these curbs is remotely enforceable.

Even better for TPP’s mercantile majority, the treaty’s dispute-resolution system ensured that the United States would be repeatedly outvoted when it sought to advance or defend its interests.

That’s why the TPP was so likely to supercharge America’s already enormous and economically damaging trade deficits. The TPP mercantilists’ liberalization promises would do nothing substantial to open their markets and increase U.S. export opportunities. But America’s TPP commitments, carried out by a government characterized by transparency, would be very effective guarantees that the American market would remain wide open to the TPP majority’s products.

President Trump has demonstrated that he recognizes many of these fatal flaws in the Obama TPP. His stated preference for bilateral over multilateral trade deals suggests an understanding that the former give the United States much more legal authority in dispute resolution. Moreover, he has explicitly tweeted that he’d only back rejoining the TPP if major fixes were made.

Precisely because he’s the only American President in recent memory to show any interest in changing the nation’s ill-considered trade status quo, and any awareness that the United States retains ample leverage to achieve its trade objectives unilaterally, I can’t rule out the possibility that Mr. Trump might turn TPP into a winner for the U.S. domestic economy (as opposed to the importing and offshoring lobbies).

But the main lesson that should be taken from decades of American trade diplomacy with Asia is that economies structured to promote exports and limit imports are going to stay substantially closed no matter what promises they make. Therefore the best course for the United States to make is to expend its energy and resources on reducing its economic engagement with Asia, rather than trying to remake the region in anything like its own image.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Flunking the NAFTA Laugh Test

Tags

American Automobile Labeling Act, American Automotive Policy Council, auto parts, autos, Canada, domestic content, GDP, ImpactEcon, Jobs, light trucks, Mexico, Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association, NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement, rules of origin, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Remember the wonderful David Letterman show feature “Stupid Pet Tricks”? I couldn’t help but think of it while reading various news reports and analyses claiming that the demise of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will bring apocalyptic consequences to three signatory countries: the United States, Canada, and Mexico. But my parents always told me never to use the (needlessly harsh) word “stupid.” So instead, I’ll call them, “Silly NAFTA Studies.” Examining two that have attracted major attention will make clear why.

First, let’s look at findings released in August by a Colorado consulting firm called ImpactEcon, and revised in October, that was mindlessly written up by The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, CNN.com, The Los Angeles Times, and many other big news organizations. According to this report:

“Overall, the results show that the US’s reversal of NAFTA leads to a decline in real GDP, trade and investment in the US, Canada and Mexico, with most of the losses resulting from Canada and Mexico’s reciprocation. The losses in low skilled employment are most significant, with employment declining by 256,000, 125,000, and 951,000 in the US, Canada and Mexico respectively. Production and specialization of production across the NAFTA region declines, particularly in those sectors with the highest levels of vertical specialization across NAFTA. The motor vehicles and services sectors in all three NAFTA countries decline, along with production of US meat, food, and textiles; Canadian chemicals and metals; and Mexican textiles, wearing apparel, electronics and machinery.”

Sounds awful, right? And especially dumb for President Trump, who won the votes of many American workers without glitzy high tech skills.

But buried here – glossed over in the press accounts – are results that should be screamingly obvious to anyone knowing anything about intra-NAFTA trade balances, the Canadian and Mexican economies, and in particular their heavy dependence on exporting to the United States: Canada and Mexico take much greater growth and employment hits from NAFTA’s termination than does America.

The passage quoted above shows a major gulf between the projected job impacts.  But the differential effects on real growth rates are even greater – and more threatening to Mexico and Canada. (The researchers assume that all three countries return their tariffs to pre-NAFTA levels.)

Real GDP:

U.S.: -0.09 percent

Canada: -0.48 percent

Mexico: -0.88 percent

And keep in mind two other considerations: The Canadian and Mexican economies are much smaller than the U.S.’ So the jobs losses are much more important for them, relatively speaking. Moreover, Mexico is still a developing country with real political stability problems. Growth and employment shocks like this would spell big, and possibly fatal, trouble for its ruling classes.

In fact, the damage to Canada and Mexico is so great that the (closely related) policy conclusions couldn’t be clearer (except to economics reporters). First, America’s NAFTA partners simply can’t afford to retaliate against the United States if the treaty is terminated; and second, as a result, a walk-out by them is wildly improbable unless Washington’s demands are positively draconian.

The second silly study (and related press coverage) comes from the Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA) – the trade association of an industry that has moved massive amounts of production and jobs to Mexico (much of it from the United States), largely to serve the American market, not the Mexican market or third country markets.

So obviously, the group’s findings should be viewed skeptically. Additionally, however, MEMA assumes (along with the ImpactEcon findings and another study – from another offshorers’ organization – the American Automotive Policy Council), that higher NAFTA requirements for origin rules will leave external tariffs low enough to enable auto manufacturers to ignore the standards and keep shipping product with lots of content from outside the hemisphere all around the free trade zone. Worse, without higher enforcement tariffs, the auto industry might also supply American customers to an even greater extent from even lower-cost economies, like those in Asia.

It’s true that the Trump administration hasn’t discussed raising those tariffs to levels that would bite. It’s also true that these moves would violate all three NAFTA countries’ World Trade Organization commitments on bound tariffs, and similar promises they’ve made in their other trade deals. But the folly of preserving that status quo is so clear cut that it’s entirely reasonable to expect a Trump-ian learning curve. And the President does prize his reputation as a disrupter.

Moreover, all he needs to do is look at the situation for sport utility vehicles and other so-called “light trucks.” Since their non-NAFTA U.S. tariff remains at 25 percent, even staunch opponents of a major treaty rewrite conceded that factories will return stateside if this status quo ante comes back. And P.S.: These products are increasingly dominating American passenger vehicle markets.

A second substantive reason for discounting this study concerns the auto parts makers’ claim that “Raising the automotive content thresholds and forcing automakers to verify the North American origin of more electronics and other parts now sourced from Asia would cause some parts manufacturers to forego NAFTA benefits.”

As just mentioned, the second fear is warranted if tariffs for the origin rules stay where they are. But the point about forcing the companies to verify where their inputs come from? Vehicle makers have already required to provide exactly this information for NAFTA’s entire life by the American Automobile Labeling Act. And they clearly view NAFTA as a huge success. Many companies in the parts supply chain are much smaller, and detailed reporting could indeed become an unreasonable burden for them. But many parts makers are plenty big enough to assume this responsibility easily (unless they don’t know where they themselves manufacture?). Much more important: The information would greatly aid policymakers and the public in (finally!) evaluating the impact of trade agreements and related policy decisions with a critical mass of precision.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trump’s NAFTA Rewrite Blueprint is an Encouraging Start

Tags

bubbles, Buy American, Canada, dispute resolution, environmental standards, GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, government procurement, labor standards, manufacturing, Mexico, NAFTA, national treatment, non-discrimination, North American Free Trade Agreement, reciprocity, rules of origin, tariffs, TPP, Trade, trade deficit, trade enforcement, trade laws, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trump, value-added taxes, VATs, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Trump administration is out with its detailed statement of renegotiation objectives for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and if you’ve favored turning U.S. trade policy from an engine of debt-creation and offshoring into one of production-fueled growth and domestic job creation, you should be pretty pleased.

As critics have noted, yesterday’s statement does lack numerous important details about how the administration intends to achieve its goals, and some of these omissions (as will be explained) raise legitimate questions about the depth of the president’s commitment to these changes. But the statute requiring the release of such statements doesn’t mandate disclosure of every – or any – specific strategy for reaching these goals. Moreover, the talks haven’t even started, and these tactics naturally tend to change with circumstances. So those accusing the administration of excessive vagueness should start holding their fire.

As indicated in yesterday’s post, the most important change needed in NAFTA is the addition of teeth to the agreement’s existing rules of origin – the requirements that goods sold within the NAFTA free trade zone comprised of the United States, Mexico, and Canada be made overwhelmingly of parts, components, and materials made inside the zone.

After all, manufacturing dominates trade not only inside NAFTA, but between the NAFTA countries and the rest of the world. Without imposing teeth, non-NAFTA countries will have no meaningful incentive to invest in new NAFTA-area facilities to produce the intermediate goods that comprise the content of final products, like automobiles. And the economies, businesses, and workers in the three countries will be denied immense opportunities to boost production and employment. Indeed, this is precisely this opportunity that’s been missed under the current NAFTA.

It’s difficult to imagine these teeth taking a form other than steep tariffs on goods imports from outside NAFTA, and the Trump blueprint never mentions that “t” word. But it does contain a call to “Update and strengthen the rules of origin, as necessary, to ensure that the benefits of NAFTA go to products genuinely made in the United States and North America.” And it specifies that these improved origin rules must “incentivize the sourcing of goods and materials from the United States and North America.” How could anyone supporting more U.S. manufacturing production and employment not be heartened?

Also impressive – as widely reported, the administration has prioritized preserving America’s ability to “enforce rigorously its trade laws, including the antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard laws” chiefly by eliminating the NAFTA provisions that established international tribunals as the last word in resolving trade complaints among the signatories, rather than the U.S. trade law system. The Trump administration is also seeking to reestablish America’s unfettered authority to impose “safeguard” tariffs on imports from Mexico and Canada when they begin to surge into the United States. So if you’re worried that NAFTA and other recent U.S. trade agreements have needlessly undermined American sovereignty, this blueprint is for you.

Similarly, critics have long complained about NAFTA’s overriding of the Buy America provisions of U.S. public procurement regulations aimed at maximizing the American taxpayer dollars used to purchase goods and services for government agencies. The Trump strategy laid out in the blueprint seeks to preserve these and other key domestic preference programs.

It’s true, as is being contended, that in areas ranging from promoting high labor rights and environmental standards, to dealing more effectively with the trade distortions created by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the Trump NAFTA blueprint looks a lot like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal that the president condemned as a candidate and withdrew from on his first day in office.

It’s just as true, however, that formidable obstacles were bound to prevent effective enforcement of those proposed TPP rules. These loom as large as ever – notably, the huge numbers of U.S. government officials that would be needed to monitor the even huge-er Mexican manufacturing sector on anything close to an ongoing basis. But the final TPP text demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that the Obama administration failed to address these concerns adequately. Maybe the Trump administration will come up with viable answers.

Finally, the Trump NAFTA blueprint contains two conceptual objectives that have never been prioritized since the current world trading system was created shortly after World War II, and that trade policy critics should be applauding vigorously. The first is the endorsement of reciprocity as a lodestar of American trade strategy. The second is an emphasis on reducing America’s mammoth trade deficits.

Although reciprocity (i.e., America opens its markets to certain trade partners only to the extent that their markets are open to U.S.-origin goods and services) seems like an uncontroversial trade goal for Washington to seek, and is often presumed to be the goal, nothing until now could be further from the truth. In particular, the foundational principles of the world trade system under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are national treatment and non-discrimination.

National treatment simply insists that countries deal with foreign enterprises the same way they deal with their own domestic enterprises. Non-discrimination simply mandates that countries treat imports from all trade partners’ identically. The big problems? They enable closed economies to maintain way too many trade barriers. For instance, countries that favor certain companies over others for either political reasons (as with China’s state-owned sector) or reasons of national economic strategy (as with Japan’s efforts to limit entrants into certain industries to prevent excessive domestic competition) can continue discriminating in similar ways against foreign competitors. And countries can maintain high trade barriers as long as they apply equally to all imports.

As for trade deficit reduction, it’s a great way to promote healthy, production-led American growth, rather than the kind of debt-led, bubble-ized growth that’s been engineered arguably going back to the 1990s. But here’s where the Trump blueprint can be faulted. Especially if the new NAFTA contains better rules of origin, it’s likeliest to reduce the U.S. trade deficit with non-NAFTA countries, not with the treaty signatories that the blueprint targets. And nothing would be wrong with that result at all.

Two other aspects of the NAFTA objectives deserve comment – and merit genuine concern. First, although it’s good that the administration has included on the list currency manipulation, critics are right to note that specifics are urgently needed. Their development, moreover, is important not mainly because Canada and Mexico have been important culprits (they haven’t been) but because this is a challenge that President Trump needs to meet in connection with countries that clearly have manipulated in the past and could well do so again.

Second, the Trump blueprint makes no mention of value-added taxes (VATS). Mexico’s is 16 percent, Canada’s is five percent at the federal level and eight percent at the provincial level. As with all other VATs, these levies act as barriers to imports and subsidies for exports. Candidate Trump rightly called for American countermeasures in order to level the trade playing field inside NAFTA. President Trump should take heed.