Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Why America’s Stakes in East Asia’s Security are Looking Vital Again

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allies, America First, China, East Asia, East Asia-Pacific, extended deterrence, free-riding, globalism, Intel, Japan, Joe Biden, manufacturing, Michele Flournoy, nuclear weapons, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, protectionism, Samsung, semiconductors, South Korea, Taiwan, Trump, TSMC

News flash! This past week I read a newspaper column by George F. Will that didn’t prompt me to say “What an ignoramus!’ In fact, not only did I learn something. I learned something so important that, in conjunction with some other recent developments, is causing me to rethink some long and deeply held ideas I’ve had about America’s grand security strategy in the East Asia-Pacific region.

Specifically, although Will’s own focus in the September 8 piece was who Joe Biden would pick as Secretary of Defense, the piece itself described some ominous changes in the U.S.-China military balance in Asia that call into question my main concerns about America’s approach to region, and especially what I’ve depicted as an increasingly dangerous reliance on nuclear weapons to deter Chinese aggression. Meanwhile, as I’ll detail in a forthcoming freelance article, two U.S. Asian allies – Taiwan and South Korea – whose value to the United States I’ve long insisted doesn’t remotely justify running such risks, are looking for now like critical assets.

To review, since the Cold War began, the United States has resolved to defend its East Asian allies in large part by using the threat of nuclear weapons use to persuade potential attackers to lay off. Presidents from both parties agreed that the conventional military forces needed to fight off China and North Korea (and early on, the Soviet Union) were far too expensive for America to field. Moreover, the Korean War convinced the nation that fighting land wars in Asia was folly.

Before China and North Korea developed nuclear weapons able to reach the U.S. homeland, or approached the verge (the case, it seems, with the latter), this globalist policy of extended deterrence made sense whatever the importance to America of Asian allies. For the United States could threaten to respond to any aggression by literally destroying the aggressors, and they couldn’t respond in kind.

As I noted, however, once China and North Korea became capable of striking the continental United States with nuclear warheads, or seemed close to that capability, this U.S. policy not only made no sense. It was utterly perverse. For nothing about the independence of South Korea and Taiwan, in particular, made them worth the incineration of a major American city – or two, or three. The security of much larger and wealthier Japan didn’t seem to warrant paying this fearsome price, either.

Greatly fueling my opposition to U.S. policy and my support for a switch to an America First-type policy of military disengagement from the region was the refusal of any of these countries to spend adequately on their own defense (which, in combination with U.S. conventional forces, could deter and indeed defeat adversaries without forcing Washington to invoke the nuclear threat), and their long records of carrying out protectionist trade policies that harmed the American economy.

As Will’s column indicated, though, the threat, much less the use, of nuclear weapons is becoming less central to American strategy. Excerpts he quotes from recent (separate) writings by a leading Republican and a leading Democratic defense authority both emphasize dealing with the Chinese threat to Taiwan in particular with conventional weapons. The nukes aren’t even mentioned. Especially interesting: The Democrat (Michele Flournoy) is his recommended choice to head a Biden Pentagon – and she’s amassed enough experience and is well regarded enough among military and national security types to be a front-runner. I also checked out the journal article of hers referenced by Will, and nuclear weapons don’t come up there, either.

Moreover, neither Flournoy nor her Republican counterpart (a former aide the late Senator John McCain) shies away from the obvious implication – accomplishing their aim will require a major U.S. buildup of conventional forces in East Asia (including the development of higher tech weapons). In fact, they enthusiastically support it.

Any direct conflict involving two major powers has the potential to escalate beyond the expectations of the belligerents. But certainly bigger and more capable American forces in East Asia would reduce the chances that war with China will go nuclear. So in theory, anyway, the nuclear dimensions of my concerns could be reduced.

Moreover, my willingness to run greater risks to safeguard Taiwan and South Korea in particular, and pay the needed economic price – even if they keep free-riding on defense spending – is growing, too. That’s because of the theme of that forthcoming article I mentioned: Intel, the only major U.S.-owned company left that both designs and manufactures the most advanced kinds of semiconductors, has run into major problems producing the last two generations of microchips. In fact, the problems have been so great that the company has lost the technological lead to South Korea’s Samsung and in particular to Taiwan’s TSMC, and their most advanced facilities are in South Korea and Taiwan, right on China’s rim.

Given the importance of cutting edge semiconductors to developing cutting edge tech products in general, and ultimately cutting-edge weapons (including advanced non-weapons electronic gear and cyber warfare capabilities), acquiring the knowhow to produce these microchips by whatever means – outright conquest, or various forms of pressure – would make China an even more formidable, and even unbeatable challenge for the U.S. military, at least over time.

So until Intel, whose most advanced factories remain in the United States, figures out how to regain its manufacturing chops, or some other U.S.-owned entrant rides to the rescue, there will be a strong argument on behalf of protecting South Korea and Taiwan against Chinese designs at very high risk and cost. And as noted above, Americans may even have to tolerate some more military free-riding along with, in the case of South Korea, fence-sitting in the overall U.S.-China competition for influence in East Asia.

At the same time, because of the military (including nuclear) risks still involved, seizing back control of the semiconductor manufacturing heights ultimately is the best way out of this bind for Americans. So shame on generations of U.S. leaders for helping this vulnerability develop by swallowing the kool-aid about even advanced manufacturing’s obsolescence and replacement by services. But this grave mistake can’t be wished away, or overcome instantly, either – though efforts to regain this lost tech superiority need to be stepped up dramatically. So shame on current leaders, their advisers, and wannabe advisers – whatever their favored foreign policy strategy – if they fail to acknowledge that dangerous new circumstances may be upon the nation, and the sharp imperatives they logically create. And that includes yours truly.

Following Up: A Big China-Related National Security Hole May Get Plugged, and Trade Derangement Syndrome Keeps Spreading

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CFIUS, China, Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, consumers, East Asia-Pacific, Following Up, foreign direct investment, LG Electronics, manufacturing, Samsung, South Carolina, tariffs, technology, Tennessee, Trade, washing machines

Yesterday alone produced a news item that provides important grounds for hope that America’s policy toward China might finally be getting coherent, and one that shows that Mainstream Media coverage of international trade issues remains almost determinedly brain-dead. And conveniently, both items concern developments recently reported on by RealityChek.

The first came in The Wall Street Journal, and describes some important new provisions in legislation proceeding through Congress that would update the federal government’s standards for approving or blocking prospective foreign proposals to take over U.S. businesses with defense-related implications. The current process for screening such investment enables Washington to nix (and this is just an obvious hypothetical example) a Russian or Chinese proposal to buy a company that makes jet fighter craft.

Most cases examined by the inter-agency group that makes recommendations to the President for final action (the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS) aren’t such easy calls, which is precisely why lawmakers seem determined to expand the grounds for blocking potentially dangerous takeovers. That’s an idea I’ve long favored.

But at least as important is a provision in the bill that addresses a problem I’ve written on, but that Washington has been slow to recognize – even under the Trump administration. That’s the growing tendency of American technology companies to share their best knowhow with partners in places like China. In some cases, the U.S. firms voluntarily hand over the keys to these kingdoms. In others, they invest capital in Chinese start-ups and other ventures.

It’s true that the United States maintains a system for controlling exports of national security-related technology to problematic countries like China. But the proliferation of these corporate transfers and investments makes clear it’s too sieve-like. And plugging holes is particularly important now because China has so aggressively challenged America’s position as the lead power in the economically vibrant East Asia-Pacific region.

I’ve long opposed the U.S. strategy of maintaining major military forces in this far-off area decades after the Cold War’s end in order to fend off the Chinese and North Koreans. But if American leaders stay determined to ignore my advice (!), it’s nonsensical to keep pushing for bigger and bigger military budgets and stronger forces (in part to buttress its East Asia strategy) while allowing American companies in effect to help China strengthen the military against which Americans may fight. So let’s hope Congress sends a CFIUS reform bill to President Trump’s desk tout de suite.

The second, more dispiriting news item came from Reuters, and dealt with those tariffs Mr. Trump last week imposed on certain imported washing machines from South Korea. As I wrote on January 24, these actions seemed to infect officials in South Carolina with a case of Trade Derangement Syndrome – the utter mindlessness produced by announcements or fears of even small-scale restrictions on trade flows. In this case, South Carolina officials were criticizing the tariff decision even though it undoubtedly led one South Korean manufacturer – Samsung – to announce that it would begin producing washing machines in the Palmetto State, thereby avoiding the tariffs and creating hundreds of jobs for South Carolinians.

Yesterday, Reuters reported similarly looney reactions on the part of the other South Korean company fingered – LG Electronics. LG, too, clearly has been convinced by the prospect of tariffs to manufacture some of its products in the United States – in this case, in Tennessee. But the company clearly is not thrilled with the prospect. It’s grousing that, because of the tariffs, it will need to raise the prices it charges American consumers.

That’s pretty par for the course – though has anyone who’s bought a major appliance lately seen many producers or retailers that are full of confidence that they can charge more? But what was completely doofy was what the company spokesperson quoted by Reuters reporter David Lawder (with a figurative straight face) said next. He fretted that the price increase could cost the company market share, therefore reducing the demand for the new Tennessee factory’s products and for local workers. And then he noted that the costs could be long-lasting: “If you lose floor space at retail, it can take years to get it back.”

I don’t blame the LG spokesperson for trying to drum up American opposition to the tariffs any way possible. But maybe Lawder could have asked him why on earth the company would take actions that it’s admitting would lose it money – for “years”? Or pointed out that these adverse consequences do a great job of explaining why LG is not remotely likely to raise prices? Instead, Lawder simply permitted the LG flack to get away with arrant nonsense – and reinforced my claim that nothing, but nothing, is as badly, and as tendentiously covered by the media as anything having to do with international trade.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trade Derangement Syndrome

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American Enterprise Institute, consumers, establishment, Henry McMaster, Mark J. Perry, Samsung, solar panels, South Carolina, South Korea, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The immediate aftermath of the Trump administration announcement of tariffs on imports of foreign government-subsidized solar panels and modules and washing machines once again made clear that such developments trigger among the silliest comments heard in the economics world. Let’s call this behavior “Trade Derangement Syndrome.”

Exhibit One: Several South Carolina politicians, including Governor Henry McMaster, expressed agreement with Samsung, one of the South Korean companies hit with the washing machine tariffs, that the duties “are a great loss for American consumers and workers.” The consumers part is understandable – though not very credible unless you believe that it’s easy for companies to raise prices significantly in current and foreseeable U.S. economic conditions. But the workers part is completely off the wall.

After all, Samsung is now completing construction of a washing machine factory in the Palmetto State. Further, the company has admitted that the likelihood of the tariffs led it to begin producing in the United States. One of its senior executive American executives, John Herrington, stated earlier this month that, “Because we are committed to supplying the U.S. market from Newberry [South Carolina], no [tariff] remedy is necessary,” Locating the new factory in South Carolina was a separate decision, but Samsung’s rationale couldn’t be more clear. Ditto for the win for South Carolina and its economy.

So what’s with the state’s complaints? According to Herrington, although Samsung intends to supply most of its U.S. needs from the South Carolina facility, “We can’t supply all of those needs immediately in January. We will need to import washers so that we can supply a full range of products to our retailers and consumers during the ramp-up period.

“If we are unable to offer our full range of products to retailers and consumers, we will lose floor space and sales, impacting the success of our South Carolina operation. So the ultimate impact of the proposed tariff is a lose-lose scenario for U.S. production, U.S. employers and U.S. consumers.”

But this explanation makes absolutely no sense – unless you believe that Samsung will cut production even after the factory is running full tilt, and even permanently. What doubtless will happen is that the company will keep importing some products until that point; due to the tariffs, it will absorb lower profits in the process; and then they’ll be restored as the ramp up is completed.

So either the state’s politicians are completely ignorant about manufacturing realities, or they’ve decided that their bottom line is serving as Samsung spokespersons – not promoting South Carolina’s economic fortunes. I.e., maybe they’re not really deranged after all?

The second example of tariff derangement syndrome comes from American Enterprise Institute economist Mark J. Perry. In a post yesterday on the think tank’s blog, Perry blasted the Trump tariffs as an example of the administration’s “American Consumers Last” trade policy. That’s entirely reasonable.

What was entirely goofy was Perry’s claim that the “voice of the American consumer” has been “unheard” as the administration considered the solar and washing machine cases. Can anyone doubt that that’s been a major argument made by the plethora of politicians, lobbyists, academics, think tankers, and editorial writers who opposed the tariffs?

It’s probable that what’s thrown Perry’s compass off is not the absence of pro-consumer arguments in the trade policy debate, but the fact that the President’s decisions could indicate that a multi-decade period of overwhelmingly and singlemindedly pro-consumer American trade policies is ending. If that’s the case, then expect ever greater disorientation in establishment ranks. But what a negligible price to pay for restoring reasonable balance to the nation’s approach to the global economy.