Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The Ultimate Iraq Policy Absurdity

Tags

forever wars, Iraq, Iraq war, Middle East, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, sanctions, Trump

If you still have any doubts that American policy in the Middle East has become completely bonkers, just think about recent threats made by the United States to punish Iraq economically if it kicks U.S. troops out of the country – a decision its parliament has approved in a nonbinding resolution.

Iraq, you might recall, is a country that the United States has invaded no less than twice in the last three decades, and where it’s lost the lives of thousands of servicemen (let’s not forget the maimed, either) and spent more than a trillion dollars – first reversing the late Iraq dictator Saddam Hussein’s invasion of neighboring Kuwait, then overthrowing Saddam himself, then occupying the country and trying to stamp out various insurgencies, then fighting the jihadist group ISIS.

America still keeps thousands of troops in Iraq and keeps spending hundreds of billions of dollars annually trying to secure the country militarily and rebuild it economically. And these policies have continued under President Trump, even though he has stated repeatedly that he’d like nothing better than to end such “forever wars” – at some point.

So it’s fair to say that Mr. Trump considers Iraq’s security and prosperity to be awfully important American interests.

And if so, why has the President warned Iraq that it would face “very big sanctions” and “sanctions like they’ve never seen before” if the Americans are forced to leave? And how on earth could reports be true that his administration has told Iraq that it would lose access to billions of dollars of vitally important oil earnings it has no choice but to keep in an account at the Federal Reserve system’s New York branch?

Sure, making good on these threats would produce disaster for Iraq. And Mr. Trump has backed his words with deeds several times during his presidency – on tariffs on metals and on China, on tariffs on Mexico to achieve more immigration enforcement cooperation, and of course on Iran’s attacks on American assets.

But these Trump actions weren’t taken against countries the President wants to help, including for self-interest-based reasons. By contrast, his Iraq policies demonstrate that self-interest is exactly why he wants to stay in that country militarily – despite continued cost and risk. Why, therefore, would any Iraqi with a working brain believe the President? Unless Mr. Trump has been converted that perverse Vietnam-era logic that he has to “destroy the town to save it”? Or unless (at least many) Iraqis and their politicians really doubt Trump-ian suggestions that he would indeed be comfortable withdrawing soon, or fervently hope they’re not true, and are simply playing to their more skeptical countrymen?

Yet even the possibility (and indeed the likelihood) that Iraqis are playing political games with their – again, nonbinding – resolutions presents a problem for the United States. For how smart is it to stay dangerously and expensively mired in a country whose leaders believe such shams are needed simply to stay in power?

Finally, if Mr. Trump really could take Iraq or leave it, then why not leave now? If it’s ultimately so expendable, then why expose a single further American soldier to danger, or spend a single additional taxpayer dollar, there?

If the United States was at the beginning of a deep involvement in Iraq, a respectable argument could be made for these latest Trump-ian threats and other statements. Sometimes such good cop/bad cop tactics can help governments walk tricky tightropes that are worth walking. But even those who tend to see value in such acrobatics have to concede that, after nearly two decades, precious little progress has been made toward creating an Iraq that can handlie its major challenges (which clearly are internal) by itself, and therefore supporters of the status quo need at least to consider the possibility that the policy’s a fool’s quest.

As for those of us who have long argued that current Iraq policies have been doomed and that the United States should wash its hands of the country, and indeed the entire hopelessly dysfunctional Middle East – the latest jumble of Trump words and deeds can only leave us more convinced than ever.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Signing the Hong Kong Democracy Bill Should be a No-Brainer for Trump

Tags

China, Congress, democracy, Hong Kong, Hong Kong protests, human rights, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, sanctions, trade deal, trade talks, Xi JInPing

Full disclosure: I don’t believe that promoting human rights and democracy abroad should be a high priority for U.S. foreign policymakers. (My most detailed explanation comes in this late-1994 article in FOREIGN POLICY magazine, which is available on-line here and here.) All the same, there’s no doubt in my mind that President Trump would be making a big political and substantive mistake if he, as he’s (very obliquely, to be sure) hinted that he might veto the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 just passed overwhelmingly by both the House and Senate.

Don’t get me wrong: I’m under no illusion that the legislation will do anything in the foreseeable future to promote human rights and democracy in Hong Kong – and you shouldn’t be, either. In fact, there’s every reason to believe that it’s a classic example of political virtue-signaling. For example, even the sponsors of the bill don’t seem to believe that any plausible official American words or deeds can affect the fate either of Hong Kong generally or of the huge numbers of protesters who have been challenging China’s determination to keep eating away at the special freedoms enjoyed by its residents since its hand over by the United Kingdom to Beijing in 1997.

If they did, you’d think that they’d have included in the bill some economic sanctions against the Chinese economy. But not only are such provisions entirely missing. The only measures resembling economic sanctions or potential sanctions are directed against the economy of Hong Kong – in the form of requirements that the various ways in which U.S. policies and other laws that treat Hong Kong differently from China (based on the assumption that this “Special Autonomous Region,” as Beijing calls it) really still is autonomous – remain justified by the facts on the ground in Hong Kong.

The bill does contain some sanctions instructions directed at China – but not at any sectors of its economy. Instead, they’re to be applied against “foreign persons” determined to be “knowingly responsible” for any “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights in Hong Kong.”

To which the only serious response is “So what?” The Hong Kong officials who give the specific orders to the police to fire tear gas or crack some heads or shoot rubber bullets into crowds are nothing more than tools of the dictators in Beijing. Concentrating punishment on them amounts – knowingly – to punishing the little fish and letting the prize catches get away. And P.S. – they’re as easily replaceable and interchangeable as any ordinary functionary.

Unless you can think of many U.S. politicians in either party who would back imposing sanctions on Chinese kingpin Xi Jinping or any of his senior cronies? Fat chance – assuming you could even locate any of their assets vulnerable to America’s reach. After all, how many American elected officials genuinely doubt that China’s top leaders are ultimately responsible for the harsh repression of the Hong Kong protests – or for the extradition law that triggered this uprising?

Nonetheless, the politics alone argue compellingly for presidential signing of the Hong Kong measure. It attracted nearly unanimous support on Capitol Hill, so a veto override is likely. And although the President won’t win much praise for enacting the bill into law, he’ll generate a hail of brickbats for any opposition.

And for what? As I argued in the article cited at the beginning, human rights interests generally should take a back seat in U.S. foreign policy for any number of reasons, but chiefly because other interests are usually more important for America’s security or prosperity (since foreign governments’ human rights practices as are almost completely incapable of undermining these objectives). Moreover, American actions can sometimes backfire, and it’s far from far-fetched to worry that a Trump approval of the Hong Kong bill and more frequent and stronger expressions of official outrage will only further convince China’s dictators (and much of the nationalistic Chinese public) that the unrest in Hong Kong stems from foreign meddling, not legitimate concerns.

Yet U.S.-China relations these days are so bad that it’s difficult to imagine a Trump signature on the Hong Kong legislation significantly worsening them. It’s possible that Beijing could retaliate with still higher tariffs or other curbs on American exports, especially farm products, but China remains much more vulnerable to U.S. economic pressure than vice versa. Nor is the President likely to suffer much politically from such measures during the upcoming election year, since nearly all of his political opponents have spoken out much more emphatically against China’s record in Hong Kong than he has. As for “outside agitator” claims – the Chinese are already making them, including against the United States.

Which leaves us with the one stated presidential reason for considering a veto of the Hong Kong bill – that an obstacle could be created to reaching a trade deal. The problem here is that a trade deal that serves U.S. interests (as opposed to a cosmetic deal that, e.g., results in increased American exports to China in exchange for American tariff reductions with no commitments from Beijing to end its most important predatory trade practices) simply isn’t possible. As I’ve written repeatedly, even a complete Chinese cave-in on paper to every demand the administration has ever made can’t possibly be verified adequately – because the Chinese government is so big and so secretive.

In fact, if there’s any relationship between trade policy and Hong Kong policy, it surely works the other way: More human rights pressure from Mr. Trump would be added to the economic pressure that’s already making Xi’s life hard enough. And whatever throws the Chinese off balance by definition helps the United States. For it would force Beijing to spend more time putting out fires and playing defense generally across the board, and leaves less time for pursuing offensive economic and geopolitical goals that undermine American interests.

As I’ve always seen it, claims that these interests (properly defined, of course) and ideals are always ultimately compatible are among the most fatuous made by practitioners, scholars, and historians of American foreign policy. But especially for a country with America’s range of geopolitical and economic choice (by dint of its high degree of built-in security and economic self-sufficiency, and potential for even more), there’s also no question that the United States can afford to promote its admirable values on a regular basis.

Hong Kongers’ struggle for more freedom and democracy represents one such case, meaning that a Trump-ian failure to sign the Hong Kong bill would call into question not only his support for these ideals, but his pragmatic instincts as well.

Im-Politic: Muddled Iran Deal Messages from the Democrats

Tags

allies, Amy Klobuchar, Cory Booker, Democratic Party, Democrats, election 2020, foreign policy, Im-Politic, Iran, Iran deal, Iran nuclear deal, JCPOA, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Kamala Harris, McClatchy News Service, Obama, oil, Persian Gulf, sanctions, Trump

The usual gang of political observers and commentators (apologies to the soon-to-be-departed Mad magazine) seem to agree that this year’s Democratic candidates for President haven’t been paying much attention yet to foreign policy. Here’s my explanation: The more many of them say about the subject, the clearer their ignorance and incoherence will become, and the last few weeks have just provided a splendid example – public positions stake out on whether to rejoin the 2015 international deal aimed at curbing and slowing Iran’s nuclear weapons development.

You’ll recall that the Iran deal (officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) was signed by the Islamic Republic on the one hand, and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States on the other. Under its terms, Iran agreed to certain restrictions on its nuclear program in return for substantial relief from various, mainly economic, sanctions imposed by some of these individual countries, along with the United Nations as a whole, in retaliation both for Iran’s nuclear and some other activities deemed unacceptable threats to international security.

Even the deal’s backers conceded some serious flaws, but insisted that its terms were the best possible given divisions among the United States, its allies, and Russia and China about how hard to press Iran (generally due to differences over the value of resuming commerce as usual with Iran). I initially bought this line, too. But as I recently wrote, ensuing developments – mainly the devastating impact on Iran’s economy of unilateral U.S. sanctions reimposed by Washington once President Trump withdrew from the agreement in May, 2018 – makes clear that Iran’s interlocutors had much more leverage than they (including then President Obama) claimed, and that a better deal was always possible.

Enter the 2020 Democrats. Understandably, they’re seeking to criticize the Trump foreign policy record whenever they can, and many have attacked his decision to pull out of the JCPOA. But most of these attackers have implicitly expressed agreement with the Trump view that the deal can and must be improved.

Take Flavor of the Month Kamala Harris. According to the first-term California Senator, Mr. Trump deserved the blame for the recent rise in tensions in the Persian Gulf that culminated in alleged Iranian attacks on oil tankers and an American drone because he “put in place a series of events that led to” those moves. By this she of course meant Iran’s apparent decision to follow through on its threats to defend legitimate interests it sees as threatened by (a) the United States’ overall economic “maximum pressure” campaign aimed at ending Tehran’s alleged regional aggression, and (b) more specifically by the Trump administration’s cancellation of sanctions waivers that had permitted other countries to buy some of the oil Iran desperately needs to sell in order to stay afloat economically.

As the Islamic Republic stated, it would seek to press the other signatories to convince the United States to back off the sanctions by pulling out of several provisions of the nuclear deal (chiefly, those limiting its ability to create bomb-grade uranium) and by preventing any other countries from importing any Persian Gulf oil themselves.

How would Harris respond? She told a CBS News reporter, “Well frankly, I believe that we need to get back into the Iran nuclear deal.” That’s certainly logical, since respecting the deal’s terms would require that Washington drop its sanctions, presumably granting Iran the economic support it’s seeking and eliminating any reason for attacking Gulf shipping.

But she then (unwittingly, it seems) endorsed the position of the President and other critics that deal improvements are urgently needed – and possible: “I would strengthen it. I would include ballistic- ballistic missile testing. I think that we can strengthen what we do in terms of monitoring and verification, of progress.” Never mind, of course, that there’s no sign to date that any of the other signatories agree.

And to compound the confusion, Harris proceeded to pivot back to praise for the agreement as-is: “But there’s no question that a lot of negotiation with a great deal of depth took place over a long period of time to reach that agreement, and it was it was an agreement that was being complied with by all parties.”

My head is spinning, and yours should be, too.

But evidently Senators Cory Booker of New Jersey and Amy Klobuchar of Minnesota understand Harris’ message perfectly. Because it’s their message, too.

In their initial presidential debate appearances, both these supporters of the original deal attacked the Trump pull-out but their support for reentry seemed linked to implementing changes.

Said Booker ““It was a mistake to pull out of that deal. Donald Trump is marching us to a far more difficult situation.” But he then promised, “If I have an opportunity to leverage a better deal, I’m going to do it.”

Klobuchar charged that the Trump pullout “made us less safe” because although the agreement “was imperfect…it was a good deal for that moment.” But apparently she now worries that – just a few years later – the moment has passed. For she suggested that (according to the McClatchy News Service summary cited above) “the agreement’s ‘sunset periods’ – caps on Iran’s enrichment and stockpiling of fissile material set to expire five to 10 years from the next inauguration– [are] a potential point of renegotiation.” Of course, the short duration of these caps was cited by deal critics as a major weakness.

A common aphorism holds that it’s “Better to remain silent and be thought a fool than to speak and to remove all doubt.” If these Iran deal stances are any indication, most Democratic candidates are demonstrating major political smarts, at least, by avoiding foreign policy issues.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The Iran Crisis’ Real Lessons on Multilateralism

Tags

allies, America First, Barack Obama, foreign policy, globalism, Iran, Iran deal, Iran nuclear deal, Iran sanctions, JCPOA, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, multilateralism, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, sanctions, Trump, unilateralism

If you think about it seriously, the main sequence of events that’s led up to the latest surge in U.S.-Iran tensions has dealt a hammer blow to the mainstream U.S. foreign policy idea that going it more or less alone is a formula for failure in world affairs, and that closely cooperating with allies is one of the biggest keys to success.

To remind: The mainstream (in the case of Iran, overwhelmingly its left-of-center wing) has been charging that the two countries have moved close to major conflict because, over allies’ objections, an America First-oriented President Trump pulled out of the deal negotiated during President Barack Obama’s administration with the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom, Russia, and China and Iran to restrain Tehran’s nuclear weapons development. And Washington then proceeded to antagonize Iran gratuitously by ramping up its own economic sanctions. As a result, Iranian leaders have threatened to start violating some of its nuclear agreement commitments, and has further protested these actions by lashing out regionally – including (as seems to be the case) attacking tankers transporting vital oil supplies through the Persian Gulf and its narrow Straits of Hormuz.

So if only Mr. Trump had listened to the allies and stayed in the agreement – i.e., if he followed an approach called multilateralism – all would be (reasonably) well in the volatile and oil-rich Gulf region. And to be fair, I myself initially bought the multilateralist reasoning when the nuclear deal (officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) was finally reached, agreeing that without allied buy-in, the United States could never create enough pressure on Iran on its own (i.e., “unilaterally”) to prevent Tehran from going nuclear for any length of time.

And yet, as I eventually realized, this narrative held no water whatever. For the United States has proved eminently capable of inflicting major pain on Iran’s economy all by itself – by dint of its ability to deny companies that do business with Iran (including companies from allied and other foreign countries) access to the U.S. dollar-dominated global banking and payments system. America’s unilateral power, in turn, strongly reinforces the argument that the Obama administration (and the allies) could have secured much better terms from Iran than the deal currently contains.

It’s true that weakening Iran economically is no guarantee that it will turn from the nuclear weapons path. But neither is the agreement. The strongest argument made on its behalf is that it pushes back any possible nuclear-ization by roughly fifteen years. Even strong supporters, though, acknowledge it contains important verification loopholes. And had the United States remained in the JCPOA, and imposed none or few of its own sanctions, when Iran did “break out,” it would have surely been much stronger economically than otherwise – which couldn’t serve the interests of anyone worried about the Islamic Republic.       

Even more important than my own evolving views: Iran itself clearly understands the United States’ matchless leverage, too. That’s why it’s been so enraged by the American withdrawal from the nuclear agreement – even though all the other signatories remain part of the pact. Its leaders apparently understand that, in this instance, U.S. allies’ words and even deeds don’t matter much.

And as for the allies augmenting American power and influence in this episode – because their top priority (rightly or wrongly) is preserving the nuclear deal, they’re trying to frustrate American aims nowadays, not support them.

Multilateralism certainly can be a useful, effective U.S. approach to various international challenges. But contrary to the impression created by its staunchest champions, allies need to do their part, too. If consensus among all parties is lacking, multilateralism can too easily become a recipe for paralysis and inaction. In other words, like all other tools or tactics, it’s simply a tool or tactic. It mustn’t be treated as an end in and of itself.

And this caveat, of course, goes double for the United States. For as the Iran situation shows, it’s unique among the world’s major powers in having many, and robust, unilateral options.

Making News: Back Tonight on Nationally Syndicated Radio on the Trade War & Huawei

Tags

China, Huawei, Iran, Making News, national security, sanctions, tech, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, trade war, Trump

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to return tonight to John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show to help provide an update on the U.S.-China trade conflict.  The segment, which is slated to begin at 9 PM EST, will also deal with the arrest in Canada of a senior Chinese technology executive for allegedly violating U.S. national security sanctions on Iran.

You can listen live on-line at this link, and as always, if you can’t tune in, I’ll post a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: What Does the Public Think of Khashoggi, Trump, and the Saudis?

Tags

Axios.com, Democrats, Harris, independents, Jamal Khashoggi, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, partisanship, Rasmussen, Republicans, sanctions, Saudi Arabia, Survey Monkey, The Hill, Trump

If you follow the news, you know that there are few if any stories bigger Saudi Arabia’s killing of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi, a legal U.S. resident, and President Trump’s unwillingness to hold the kingdom’s top leaders accountable – at least according to America’s tightly intertwined national political classes and Mainstream Media.

At the same time, if anything’s clear from recent domestic political trends – especially the rise of populism – it’s that the priorities of these national elites and the general public don’t always coincide. And the polling on this issue makes pretty clear that the Khashoggi killing and the Trump reaction is one of those instances.

The sample size isn’t big (three surveys) and all of them predate Mr. Trump’s full, November 20 explanation of his final decision on Khashoggi and his Saudi policy. But none point to reactions that would even come close to justifying the amount of time and space being devoted to the issue by the political and media kingpins.

Two of the polls came out on October 24. The first, by Rasmussen, found that by a 57 percent to 33 percent margin, “likely U.S. voters” believed that Khashoggi’s (then) “disappearance and suspected murder was “important to U.S. national security. Eleven percent were undecided. Those results don’t exactly indicate the peasants were reaching for their pitchforks. Nor does the fact that 68 percent of those likely voters favored American sanctions on Saudi Arabia if the monarchy’s involvement was “proven.” After all, “sanctions” can encompass a wide range of measures.

That same day, an Axios/Survey Monkey sounding reported that 56 percent of U.S. adults polled considered the President’s “response to Saudi Arabia for the Khashoggi murder” as “not tough enough.” Just under a third viewed it as “about right” and five percent deemed it “too tough.”

Repeating a pattern often found in recent polling, opinion was sharply divided along partisan lines. A much higher share of Democrats (78 percent) than Republicans (37 percent) chose the “not tough enough” answer. Independents fell right in the middle, with “not tough enough” prevailing in their ranks by 55 percent to 32 percent.

Somewhat different results came from a posting in The Hill newspaper from a survey it conducted along with the Harris organization. Their poll found that by a 49 percent to 29 percent margin, “registered voters” favored waiting on anti-Saudi sanctions until after an independent investigation determines if the Saudi Arabian government is responsible for the killing of Jamal Khashoggi” rather than impose such measures beforehand. And 16 percent of respondents said that the United States “should not be involved in the matter.”

Nonetheless, the partisan split story remained intact, with many more Democrats (38 percent) than Republicans (20 percent) favoring “sanctions now” and somewhat more Republicans (57 percent) than Democrats (46 percent) wanting an investigation first. Twenty eight percent of independents supported sanctions before an investigation whereas 45 percent wanted to wait.

In fact, the partisan split results lend some credence to the proposition (believed by yours truly), that views of the Khashoggi murder and the best U.S. response reveal more about Americans’ views of Mr. Trump than anything else. That is, if you generally like the President or his job performance, you’re likely to at least cut him some slack on Saudi policy, and make the point to a pollster; if you don’t, you’re not.

Some more evidence for this belief: In the Hill/Harris poll, independents were significantly more likely (22 percent) than either Republicans (16 percent) or Democrats (11 percent) to back American non-involvement in the Khashoggi affair.

All of this might change when we start getting polls based on research following the President’s big Khashoggi statement – which represented an unusually blunt,  arguably narrow, and arguably cockeyed, version of realpolitik. But overall the strongest reason for concluding that this issue doesn’t – and won’t – mean remotely as much outside elite political and media circles as inside is probably this Axios/Survey Monkey finding: Only four percent of their respondents considered foreign policy “their top issue.” As I’ve repeatedly written, that’s also a leading sign of the public’s superior common sense.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The Real Trump-Kim Summit Danger

Tags

alliances, de-nuclearization, Kim Jong Un, North Korea, nuclear weapons, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, sanctions, Trump, Trump Kim summit

I’m still skeptical about the prospects for the upcoming summit between President Trump and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un – but not mainly for the slew of reasons trotted out by the Never Trump chattering class since this historic meeting began taking shape.

For example, it’s true that the President has little international negotiating experience. But which of the so-called experts expounding endlessly on the summit in recent weeks – especially those who worked in previous U.S. Administrations – has any record of dealing with the North Koreans that can be accurately described as anything else but abject failure? In fact, if Kim is as unconventional (to put it diplomatically) a leader as he’s commonly described, maybe Mr. Trump’s decades of dealing in the dog-eat-dog New York City real estate world will be much more useful background than anything that can be provided by CIA briefing books.

Has the President already handed North Korea an unearned, unreciprocated victory by agreeing to meet with Kim in the first place? This charge assumes that face-to-face talks with an American leader greatly adds to his North Korean counterpart’s legitimacy. But it’s hard to see how. Kim’s rule in North Korea isn’t based on any form of popular consent. Like his father and grandfather, his hold on power owes exclusively on repression. And in terms of global opinion, this indictment leaves two crucial questions unanswered. First, why on earth is Kim’s global image the slightest bit relevant to U.S.-North Korea diplomacy? And second, what thinking person would fundamentally change his or her views on Kim’s stature or record, or whatever criteria is chosen, solely, or to any extent, because he’s photographed side-by-side with a U.S. President?

Will Mr. Trump turn out to be over-anxious for success and agree to a cosmetic or outright bad deal just to boost his ego, or his domestic poll numbers – and Republicans’ chances in this fall’s midterm elections? This concern actually resembles my own principal fear, but my underlying reasons are fundamentally different (and much more coherent) than those of run-of-the-mill Trump critics. And more important, the policy conclusions I draw remain fundamentally different.

The Trump critics seem to define a bad deal as one in which the President makes concrete concessions to North Korea (say, some relaxation of economic sanctions, or the withdrawal of some U.S. military forces) in return for vague or misleading or unenforceable promises by Kim to take some steps to start dismantling his nuclear arsenal. In addition, it’s argued that if this pattern drags on, North Korea could pocket valuable gains (a stronger economy, an improved military position on the Korean peninsula, more time to make more covert progress on its nuclear program) at the expense of the United States and its South Korean and Japanese allies. And don’t forget the alarms expressed at the prospect that, if Mr. Trump concludes he’s been snookered, he’ll angrily cut off the negotiations and – much worse – his administration could resume military threats that eventually, whether intentionally or not, trigger real conflict.

The main problem with the critics’ warnings isn’t that they’re far-fetched. Indeed, they’re all too plausible. Instead, the main problem is that the bulk of the critics have urged North Korea policies that would create many of the same dangers – principally, American agreement to relax the sanctions, and/or to military steps like halting certain exercises condemned as needlessly provocative by the North but essential for maintaining readiness, in exchange for moves by Kim that would fall way short of complete, verifiable de-nuclearization.

In other words, the critics, like the over-anxious Trump of their purported nightmares, seem to be willing to live for quite some time with a North Korea that remains a formidable nuclear power, and with one that might keep on perfecting a weapon that could destroy one or more American cities in the event of a peninsular war. As I’ve explained, this arsenal, along with the ongoing presence of a U.S. tripwire military force, could easily produce a White House decision to enter a war that might result in almost unimaginable damage to the American homeland.

I’m not saying that this terrifying scenario will unfold inevitably. Nor am I completely pessimistic about the stars aligning for success over time – such as Kim’s reported determination to develop North Korea’s primitive economy (for reasons that include a self-interested calculation that more domestic prosperity is his best bet for regime survival), the Trump administration’s promise to maintain its intensified sanctions in the absence of major de-nuclearization progress, and Kim’s possible fear that the administration’s talk about preemptive or preventive war isn’t just bluster.

What I am saying is that the uncertainties are still so great, and the stakes (a nuclear attack on American soil) are so high, that it remains reckless to assume any needless risk to the nation at all. And the best way by far to eliminate needless risk from the Korea nuclear crisis, as I’ve written repeatedly, is to remove American troops from the peninsula and to allow North Korea’s neighbors to deal with its nuclear arsenal however they wish.

Such a withdrawal would remove any rational reason for Kim to attack the United States with his nuclear weapons in the event of a peninsular war. And an American threat to retaliate massively for an attack on its own territory would be almost infinitely more credible than a threat to retaliate for an attack on another country – especially if and when North Korea develops intercontinental nuclear strike capabilities.

The drawbacks of withdrawal should by now be familiar – destabilization and possibly war in East Asia, and a missed opportunity to end finally a frightening, decades-long threat to this region of big populations and economies. But the advantages – which are not nearly familiar enough because the nuclear risks of America’s alliances policies have been obscured from the public for so long – entail minimizing the chances of what would be by orders of magnitude the worst catastrophe in the country’s history. What a tragedy – and indeed scandal – that this question is still open.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Can America Finally Stop Playing Uncle Sucker on North Korea?

Tags

alliances, allies, America First, China, core deterrence, deterrence, extended deterrence, Kim Jong Un, Moon Jae-in, North Korea, Northeast Asia, nuclear weapons, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, sanctions, South Korea, Ted Galen Carpenter, The National Interest, tripwire, Trump

What comes after “patently absurd” – and maybe masochistically so? Whatever the phrase, it’s what would perfectly describe the point reached by U.S. policy toward North Korea and its nuclear forces over the last week. And the developments responsible are making it clearer than ever that, without further delay, President Trump needs to shift his Korean peninsula policy focus to getting the tens of thousands of American troops and their families stationed there far out of harm’s way.

First, South Korea’s newish President Moon Jae-in has once again just reminded anyone willing to listen that his top priority isn’t the declared U.S. imperative of eliminating North Korea’s nuclear forces – and in a verifiable way. It’s avoiding any kind of conflict in Korea, and counting on the combination of America’s own nuclear and conventional military forces to accomplish that goal.

Given the likely horrific costs of even a conventional conflict on the peninsula, that’s completely understandable on his part. In fact, if I were Moon, that’s what I’d be doing. And this need explains his enthusiastic response to a pretty modest (even by North Korean standards) diplomatic initiative from dictator Kim Jong-un. It also explains the South’s long-time failure to build armed forces able to handle the North’s armies on their own. Far better to rely on the more powerful threat posed to the North by U.S. nuclear forces to deter the North from even contemplating an attack. And far cheaper, too!

The problem is that whereas Moon’s strategy would have been acceptable in the period before North Korea developed nuclear weapons able to hit the American homeland, those days are either gone, or nearly gone. As a result, his strategy now poses completely unacceptable risks for the United States.

Not that Moon may not be entirely right in believing that a little more patience and a little more flexibility from Seoul and especially Washington can resolve the nuclear crisis peacefully. But what if he’s wrong, and North Korea simply uses any delay (and especially any resulting relief from economic sanctions) to make further nuclear weapons progress – including building more, improving their performance, and hiding them more effectively?

In that case, the odds rise that something goes wrong in this powder keg region and fighting breaks out after all. And since a conflict could easily result in North Korea destroying a major American city or two with its nuclear weapons, those odds are way too high for any sensible U.S. leader to accept. Even worse, as I’ve written previously, the American troops are stationed in South Korea, right near the border with the North, precisely to force a president to unsheathe U.S. nukes and risk retaliation in kind from the North. Can we all agree that American decisions to use nuclear weapons and run these risks should always be a matter of choice and not necessity? (For an excellent discussion of the dangers of such “tripwire” forces, see this first of three articles on the subject by the excellent foreign policy analyst – and my good friend – Ted Galen Carpenter.)

That’s precisely the truly vital U.S. goal that pulling the American troops out will accomplish – along with eliminating any rational need for Kim Jong-un even to consider using nuclear weapons against the vastly superior United States. Special bonus: A pledge from Washington to use nuclear weapons to prevent attack on its own soil (which political scientists call “core deterrence”) is infinitely more credible than a pledge to use these arms to protect another country (which is termed “extended deterrence”).

Once this unnecessary and unacceptable American vulnerability is removed, Washington should wish the South Koreans well with whatever diplomacy, or combination of diplomacy and a hedging military buildup, they wish to pursue.

Ditto for the policies of Northeast Asia’s other powerful countries, which brings us to the second reason for an American military withdrawal from Korea. Two of the peninsula’s neighbors – China and Russia – have taken indirectly free-riding off the U.S. nuclear pledge to South Korea to new heights. In recent weeks, both have been credibly accused of secretly shipping oil to the Kim Jong-un dictatorship in violation of UN sanctions that they both supported. (See, e.g., here and here.)

Breaking international commitments is hardly praiseworthy, but the obvious implication is that China and Russia are both OK with the status quo on the Korean peninsula. They may even be enjoying it – in the sense of the crisis fraying American nerves and tying down American forces. Or Beijing and Moscow may be struggling to prevent damaging fall-out from a North Korean economic collapse.

Either of these also would be perfectly reasonable judgments, and the Russians and Chinese should feel completely free to handle the North however they wish – maybe in tandem with South Korea, or some UN initiative. But only if the American troops are gone.

In this vein, especially interesting was this piece in The National Interest, which portrays Northeast Asia as a region marked by growing economic cooperation among major powers that historically have often been at each other’s throats. If so, why is the United States, located thousands of miles away, bearing such outsized risks for preserving peace – and the chances that the region could flourish?

The author, a professor at the U.S.’ Naval War College, seems to be saying, “Let Northeast Asia be Northeast Asia”. That sounds great to me – and like an idea that’s entirely compatible with “America First.”

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: What to do about North Korea

Tags

China, embargo, Japan, Kim Jong Un, missile defense, missiles, Nikki Haley, North Korea, nuclear weapons, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, sanctions, Shinzo Abe, South Korea, Trade, Trump, United Nations

Tuesday’s post explained my reasons for concluding that, contrary to the emerging conventional wisdom in the U.S. foreign policy establishment that North Korea’s use of its growing and increasingly powerful arsenal of nuclear weapons can be deterred with the same kind of policies that the United States used to keep the nuclear peace during the Cold War.

As I’ve argued, the resulting dangers mean that the best way to serve America’s paramount interest (by a long shot) of preventing a nuclear attack on its own territory is to pull U.S. forces out of the immediate area, and letting Northeast Asia’s powerful, wealthy countries deal with dictator Kim Jong Un as they see fit. This move would both ensure that the governments with the greatest stake in keeping North Korea’s missiles in their silos, and even eliminated, bear the costs and risks of handling the problem, and that the only plausible pretext for Pyongyang attacking the United States itself is eliminated.

Of course, Washington has chosen not to take this route. But America’s response so far to the escalating North Korea threat is turning into a major failure based even on its own criteria for success. After all, the latest North Korean missile overflew Japanese territory. Although the overflight was brief, the combined U.S. and Japanese response could not help but send a message of weakness and egg on Kim further.

According to Japan’s defense minister, Tokyo decided not to shoot down the missile because the government determined it wasn’t intended to land on Japanese territory. I don’t know how to say “Baloney!” in Japanese, but complete contempt is the only justifiable reaction. For despite this stated confidence, as the missile approached, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government sent out regular early morning alerts to the public – including in far off Tokyo – warning it to “seek cover” and describing the situation as “very dangerous.”

Another nonsensical rationale for the inaction from both Japanese and U.S. forces, this from a staunch defender of America’s Asia policy status quo: “If we shoot and miss, it would hand Kim Jong-Un an incalculable propaganda victory.” That’s of course true – because as this former official has noted, anti-missile technology is anything but proven. But of course, keeping the defensive missiles in their launchers also winds up telling North Korea that the United States and its allies have little faith in their systems.

Moreover, the Pentagon and its foreign counterparts can conduct all the tests they want, but adequate confidence in missile defenses won’t be legitimately justified until they’ve shown they can work in real-world situations. And better to try shoot-downs sooner rather than later – both because North Korea’s offensive capabilities will only improve as time passes, and because its better to find out about the real-world shortcomings of allied systems ASAP.

So if I’m Kim Jong Un, I’m looking at the U.S. and Japanese failure even to try a shoot-down and asking myself, “Let’s see what else I can get away with?” And when he develops reasonably reliable intercontinental missiles capable of hitting American territory and destroying American cities, he could easily conclude that the “what else” includes major threats against South Korea that would be entirely credible, and that could move him closer to effective mastery over the entire peninsula.

How, then, can Washington and its regional allies send some credible messages themselves? The following list is meant to start a (long overdue) serious discussion:

>First, the allies can actually try to shoot down North Korean missiles judged on a flight path anywhere near some of their territories. Again, even if they miss, they’ll at least get some truly reliable data on their systems’ capabilities.

>Second, they could urge the United Nations to authorize a total ban on trade and commerce with North Korea. The United States, Japan, and South Korea could also announce that they will enforce the ban with punitive measures against violators. The North’s business partners would then face a clear – and no-brainer – choice: They can continue trading with economically miniscule North Korea or they can continue trading with three of the world’s largest economies, but they can’t do both.

It’s true that North Korea’s biggest trade partner is China, that all three allies have extensive economic ties with the PRC, and that even the United States – a clear loser in China trade – has been reluctant to disrupt these relations significantly. But now the subject is war and peace and the core security of Japan and South Korea. If this reluctance continues even after North Korea has sent missiles over Japanese territory, Kim will inevitably conclude that his main adversaries lack the stomach to resist further provocations.

>The United States, Japan, and South Korea could blockade air and sea trade with North Korea. China’s overland trade would continue – but ever-stronger economic sanctions on China finally could persuade Beijing to halt this commerce once and for all.

>The United States could further pressure China by deciding to sell all of its neighbors – including Taiwan – any conventional weapons they wanted, and to provide whatever training they needed to operate them effectively. (President Trump is thinking along these lines regarding South Korea, but the new policy should go much further.) This step of course would also help deal with China’s aggressiveness in the South China and East China Seas, and boost America’s own production and export of these advanced manufactures. So Beijing would need to decide whether coddling North Korea was worth seeing Asia’s other countries – including many bearing major historic and/or current grudges against China – become much stronger militarily

>Finally – for now – the United States could announce a full-scale review of its nuclear non-proliferation policies in Asia, with a special focus on whether it would continue opposing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan and South Korea. As with the previous proposal, China would need to decide whether coddling North Korea was worth seeing one of its major national security nightmares – nuclear arms possessed by the same Japan that launched devastating attacks against it in 1894 and 1937 – come to life.

Shortly after the latest North Korea launch, American envoy to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, declared, “No country should have missiles flying over them like those 130 million people in Japan. It is unacceptable. They (North Korea) have violated every single UN Security Council Resolution that we’ve had. So I think something serious has to happen.”

She’s absolutely right in implying that neither the United States nor the so-called world community has done anything “serious” yet regarding the threat posed by North Korea. Options like the above would qualify. If Washington genuinely wants to maintain its current North Korea and broader East Asia strategies, they need to be actively, and urgently, considered.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Sense and Nonsense on Russia’s Hacking

Tags

2016 election, Amy Klochubar, China, cyber-security, cyber-war, defense spending, Democrats, hacking, Hillary Clinton, intelligence, John McCain, Middle East, NATO, Obama, Office of Personnel Management, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Putin, Republicans, Russia, sanctions, terrorism, Trump

What could be more predictable? The growing uproar over charges that Russia’s government waged a cyber-focused disinformation campaign to influence the last U.S. presidential election has let loose a flood of positively inane statements and arguments on both sides that show politics at its absolute worst.

Even worse, unless both Democrats and Republicans – and the various conflicting camps within the two major parties – get their act together quickly, the odds of further attacks and all the damage they can cause to American governance will only keep shooting up.

Let’s start with those who have expressed skepticism about these allegations, including regarding the substance of yesterday’s intelligence community report concluding that “President Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election. Russia’s goals were to undermine confidence in the democratic process, denigrate [former] Secretary [of State Hillary] Clinton [the Democratic nominee], and harm her electability and potential presidency.”

Can they really be serious in contending that the intelligence agencies’ publicly expressed judgments don’t pass the credibility test because no smoking gun or any other compelling evidence has been published? Do they really want the CIA etc to reveal whatever human and technical sources and methods they rely on? Do they really believe that any effective counter-hacking strategy can be developed or continued after disclosing that information?

The insistence on definitive proof, moreover, amounts to terrible advice for making foreign and national security policy generally. It seeks to apply to the jungle realm of international affairs the standards of the American legal system. President Obama’s years in office should have taught Americans how dangerously childish it is to believe that relations among sovereign countries are governed by commonly agreed on rules and norms, that the world is on the verge of this beatific state of affairs, or even that significant progress is being made. And Americans should hold shadowy world of spying and counter-spying to a simon-pure standard?

A more defensible rationale for doubting the intelligence community’s work emphasizes its past major blunders. And from what’s been made public, they have indeed been all too common and all too troubling.  (Please keep in mind, though, that successes often cannot be made public.)

Nevertheless, if a president or president-elect has no faith in a high confidence judgment of this importance from his intelligence agencies, then it’s clearly time to clean house. If the next administration does indeed decisively reject the community’s work on this matter, it will have no legitimate choice but to replace it leaders.

Back to the genuinely ditzy positions: statements that the Russian hacking failed to influence the course of the election. I personally believe this, and shame on those partisans who keep insisting that this interference prevented former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton from winning the White House or that it delegitimizes to any extent Donald Trump’s victory.

But should the United States count on Moscow – or any other actor – continuing to fail? Should it wait to respond forcefully until a U.S. adversary succeeds? Shouldn’t Washington capitalize on its adversaries’ current evident shortcomings in this regard and focus on punishment and deterrence? Simply posing these questions should make clear how obvious the answers are.

A final major objection to hammering the Russians represents another more reasonable judgment call, but it’s still fatally flawed. It’s the argument that Washington needs to softpedal the hack attack because the United States has a vital interest in improving relations with Moscow.

As I’ve written, opportunities for better ties with Russia abound, and they should be pursued. But that’s no reason to let Moscow off lightly for its cyber-aggression. In the first place, in any mutually beneficial relationship, boundaries need to be drawn. This is especially true given how much stronger and wealthier than Russia the United States is. If an effort to subvert America’s democratic processes doesn’t qualify, count on further, even worse provocations by Moscow.

Just as important, this approach overlooks a crucial reality: Clear indications that Russia has an incentive to cooperate with the United States in fighting Islamic extremism and terrorism haven’t appeared because Moscow is in a charitable, or even helpful, mood. They’ve appeared because these are vital interests as well for Russia, which both borders the dysfunctional Middle East and rules over its own Muslim populations.

In other words, Moscow has plenty of incentive to play ball with Washington on the Middle East whether the United States retaliates sharply for the hacking or not. And if the Russians don’t understand that, then there’s little hope of any form of meaningful cooperation.

Yet the actual and potential inconsistencies and hypocrisies of those urging tough retaliatory measures are equally troubling. Some are exclusive to Democrats. For example, the sanctions imposed on Moscow by the Obama administration for the hacking seem pretty modest for actions that it claims “demonstrated a significant escalation” of Russia’s “longstanding” efforts “to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order.”

And at the same time, the outrage voiced at Moscow contrasts conspicuously with reactions to China’s successful attack on the federal Office of Personnel Management, in which the records of some 22 million U.S. government employees – including classified and confidential information – were compromised. Indeed, President Obama never publicly blamed China’s government nor announced any responses.

Most important, however, is the question of whether Russia hardliners in both major parties old and new will act on the logical implications of their views of Russian actions and intentions – including on Moscow’s efforts to expand its influence along its own European borders. If for instance the hacking, as per Arizona Republican Senator John McCain, is truly an “act of war,” then will the call go out to cut off economic and diplomatic relations with Moscow?

If Russia’s moves against Crimea or Ukraine or the Baltics mean, in the words of Minnesota liberal Democratic Senator Amy Klochubar, that “Our commitment to NATO is more important than ever,” will today’s hawks – especially the noveau liberal variety – call for more U.S. defense spending and bigger American military deployments in endangered countries? And will they demand that American treaty allies in Europe finally get serious collectively about contributing to the common defense – which is first and foremost their own defense?

The answers to these questions will speak volumes to the American people as to whether their government is truly determined to defend interests declared to be major against foreign threats. And you can be sure they’ll convey the same vital information to America’s foreign friends and foes, too.