(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Evidence of Germany’s Stealth Protectionism

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Angela Merkel, consumers, consumption, developing countries, Financial Times, Germany, Global Imbalances, globalization, imports, Matthew C. Klein, protectionism, savings, taxes, Trade, Trump, value-added taxes, VATs, wage suppression, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

President Trump’s charges that the United States has signed terrible trade deals in recent decades, and that foreign economies have been the main beneficiaries, inevitably have triggered a potentially useful debate over which major countries are most open to trade and which are tightly closed. Unfortunately, such arguments won’t actually be useful until “open” and “closed” are properly defined, and a new Financial Times column on Germany’s economic policies nicely illustrates how remote that goal remains.

I’ve previously made the case that accurately measuring protectionism – and thus accurately gauging which countries are contributing adequately to global prosperity and which are free-riding – entails much more than adding up individual trade barriers. Such simple counts also mislead on the equally important question of which countries the United States can reasonably hope to trade with for mutual benefit, and which countries can’t possibly qualify.

And because Germany’s government has both taken trade fire from Mr. Trump and vigorously replied, I’ve used it to illustrate the above points. In a short op-ed for USA Today and a much more detailed RealityChek post, I’ve noted that, as with many other leading foreign economies, the main problem with Germany as a promising trade partner stems at least as much from its overall national economic strategy as from its specific trade practices. That is, countries like Germany, which heavily emphasize growing by saving, producing, and exporting, can’t possibly be good trade matches for countries like the United States, whose priorities have been the diametric opposites.

Of course, those national economic strategies manifest themselves in specific practices and policies. (How else could their focus be established?) But the links to trade flows aren’t always clear. For example, there’s widespread reluctance to acknowledge the trade impact of value-added taxes (VATs), which promote exports and penalize imports. The role played by other German policies, like suppressing wages or skimping on infrastructure spending, has been even less apparent.

What the new Financial Times post adds to the mix is a generally neglected form of wage suppression: Germany’s taxes on low-wage workers – which author Matthew C. Klein describes as “among the highest in the world” since at least the turn of the century.

These taxes inflict an outsized blow on Germany’s imports – and on the the world economy as a whole – in at least two important respects. First, economists tend to agree that the lower an individual’s or household’s income, the higher the share of that income will be spent (as opposed to saved). If they’re right, then these taxes ave been hitting Germany’s overall consumption and import levels especially hard. Therefore, these levies look like notable contributors to the bloated German trade and current account surpluses that are not only detrimental to America, but that could threaten the entire world’s financial stability.

Second, as supporters of pre-Trump U.S. trade policies constantly point out, much of what low-income consumers buy is produced and exported by low-income countries (e.g., apparel or school supplies or furniture). So since high taxes on low-wage workers in Germany prevent them from importing as much from the developing world as they could, third world countries need to focus more on customers in more promising markets – like America’s.

Germany and its leader Angela Merkel lately have been basking in the glow of praise from the political classes in the United States and abroad, which have anointed them as among the new, post-Trump champions of free trade and all its purported benefits. (China’s another alleged globalization champion, but that’s another story.) Its lofty taxes on low-wage workers add to the evidence that these titles are wildly premature.

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Has the Fed Gotten Savings Incentives Completely Wrong?

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Baby Boomers, banks, consumers, debt, deposit rates, federal funds rate, Federal Reserve, finance, Financial Crisis, housing, incomes, interest rates, recession, retirees, savings, savings rate, seniors, spending, The Economist, zero interest rate policy, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As many of you may know, the Federal Reserve yesterday raised the interest rate it directly controls above an effective zero level for the first time in seven years. So it’s especially interesting and important that a post from The Economist just before the rate hike made a strong case that one of the main rationales for keeping interest rates so low has backfired big-time on ordinary Americans and on the consumer spending still driving most U.S. economic activity.

Just after the height of the financial crisis, the Fed lowered its so-called funds rate to zero (actually, it was a range of zero to 0.25 percent) in part to make sure that the carnage that was spreading from housing to Wall Street and increasingly to the rest of the economy wouldn’t scare households into closing their wallets,and therefore choke off even more growth. The federal funds rate doesn’t directly set consumer borrowing rates – it’s the rate offered by the central bank to the country’s biggest banks. But the Fed was hoping that super-easy money would have twin stimulative effects.

First, when these banks’ borrowing costs fall, they can offer cheaper loans to both consumer and business borrowers and stay just as profitable. And the more affordable credit becomes, the more borrowers were expected to use. Second, the Fed was hoping that super-low rates would penalize saving. A rock-bottom federal funds rate would drive way down the returns on such popular consumer savings vehicles as money market funds and certificates of deposit and savings bonds, and convince Americans that they were better off spending existing savings and incoming income rather than receive literally no reward for thriftiness.

The Economist, though, has argued that the Fed’s penalize-savings strategy was misbegotten. And it looks like it should have been obvious even then. As the magazine points out, the biggest reason Americans save is to ensure a comfortable retirement. For any retirees or those nearing that age who already have substantial savings, even very low-yielding assets can together spin off enough income to ensure the golden years living standards they want.

But then ask yourselves how many Americans were in this situation when the financial crisis and recession struck. Inflation-adjusted incomes for the typical household had been stagnating. Thrift became a forgotten virtue; in part because of those stagnant incomes and in part because perpetually rising home values were hyped as an acceptable substitute, the nation’s personal savings rate hit historic lows and in fact briefly fell below zero. Then, of course, home values began cratering and the stock market went into free fall. So safe but low-yielding assets looked like the only viable savings game in town.

Unfortunately, the lower the return, the bigger the pot needed to guarantee that comfortable retirement. As a result, more and more of the aging American population has felt greater and greater pressure to salt away any new income not needed to cover ongoing living expenses.

Nor do you need to take The Economist‘s analysis on faith. For nothing has been clearer during this weak economic recovery than the continued consumer caution so responsible for holding it back. Many analysts attribute this behavior to a simple – possibly excessive – “once burned-twice shy” fear. But The Economist‘s treatment at least points to another important factor: For Americans with stagnant incomes and meager liquid savings – along with continuing debt – returning to pre-crisis and recession-level spending simply hasn’t been an option. In fact, evidence is accumulating that growing numbers of seniors, including recently retired baby boomers, are feeling these pressures, too – especially on the debt front.

Not that the Fed’s quarter-point rate hike will change matters much. In fact, signs haven’t even appeared yet that it’s a step in the right direction, as those banks that have raised the rates they’re charging for borrowers haven’t raised those that they’re paying to depositors. Until rates rise high enough to reward savings significantly again, most Americans will have ample reason to view recent Fed policies as lose-lose propositions.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Can Greece Ever Bounce Back?

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Asia, Austan Goolbee, competitiveness, currency, devaluation, education, European Union, Eurozone, exports, Gary P. Pisano, Greece, Harvard Business School, human capital, industrial commons, manufacturing, Marc Champion, productivity, recovery, savings, technology, trade surpluses, Willy C. Shih, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Trying to cover the Greece crisis is the analytical equivalent of driving through a very small town. If you blink, you might miss the latest development. So rather than try to keep up with each new twist and turn, let’s look at the most important economic question raised by the country’s predicament: Is there any hope for a return to decent, healthy growth rates?

The textbook economics conventional wisdom seems to be Yes, albeit with great difficulty. I’m a lot less sure, for reasons that reveal many fundamental flaws with textbook economics – mainly its inability to eliminate political, social, and cultural differences.

That conventional wisdom was recently summed up by the University of Chicago’s Austan Goolsbee, who served as President Obama’s chief White House economist. As Goolsbee told the Washington Post, Greece’s main problem is a woeful lack of price competitiveness. Its costs to produce goods and provide services – and especially its labor costs – are way too high, and its productivity and quality levels are way too low to give its businesses much hope of outselling foreign rivals. In other words, unless you ignored economics completely, or there was simply no choice (as with many personal services), you’d have to be an idiot to Buy Greek in most cases.

Goolsbee proceeded to note that countries in this situation can generally at least hope to gain competitiveness by devaluing their currencies. This step makes the price of anything turned out by the devaluing country cheaper than foreign counterparts (all else, like productivity, equal). But since Greece is a member of the Eurozone, it lacks this option. Its price gap can only be closed if enough of its fellow Eurozone members stoke inflation in their own economies, or if it boosts its own productivity by slashing wages (and/or in principle other business costs, like excessive regulations).

But let’s say Greece takes one of these two basic roads. Does anyone honestly think it will start winning in global markets, or even its home market, even once a respectable stretch of time passes? If so, they shouldn’t. To begin understanding why, let’s recall that Greece got into its mess in the first place largely because a big macro-economic prediction failed. Specifically, Greece’s entry into the European Union (in 1981, long before the Eurozone currency area was born in 1999) didn’t bring nearly enough durable convergence with its more prosperous and better run neighbors.

As required, Greece brought its laws and standards in line with the new European norms. And it made non-trivial economic progress – particularly after it began receiving huge injections of foreign aid. But that’s about where convergence worthy of the name stopped. Bloomberg’s Marc Champion tells the story well. Unlike most of the rest of the European Union, Greece collectively took the money and ran, embarking on a huge spending and stealing (literally) spree rather than investing in productive activity. The Euro’s creation wound up simply giving Greece many more resources to waste, as it enabled Greeks to borrow at the kinds of low rates much more appropriate for a much better-run economy. And for good measure, Greek governments for years lied massively about the nation’s finances – with a helping hand from Wall Street.

That is, Greece squandered nearly all the economic opportunities that macro-economics had predicted from its membership in Europe because – like the rest of the currency union in particular – it was free to remain largely autonomous politically. In every way other than economic, Greece was free to remain Greece, and too much of that identity had become a formula for profligacy.

But just as macro-economics can’t come close to adequately explaining Greece’s descent into economic degeneracy, it struggles at best to illuminate a plausible path to real recovery. For Greece needs much more than competitive prices to return to some semblance of economic viability. It needs a reliable legal and regulatory environment, to persuade domestic capital to stay home for productive use and to persuade foreign capital to give it a chance. Even if it had noteworthy natural comparative advantages in any sectors other than some farm products that are hardly staples, it would need the kind of scale that few of its extractive and especially manufacturing industries boast.

And to achieve that end, it would need what Harvard Business School professors Gary P. Pisano and Willy C. Shih and Samuel P. Pisano have called an industrial commons – the “R&D know-how, advanced process development and engineering skills, and manufacturing competencies” needed to produce the high value products and services upon which first world living standards ultimately depend. Countries without these capabilities are doomed to lengthy servitude in what’s called the low-value ghetto – simple, labor-intensive activity that pays very low wages, fosters very little learning or innovation, and, by the way, is an awfully crowded neighborhood in today’s global economy.

As numerous Asian countries have demonstrated, the low-value ghetto can be left behind by economic strategies that (to simplify a bit) successfully encourage very high rates of domestic saving and a laser-like focus on quality education that can create the wherewithal needed to advance up the value and skills ladder. In some cases, such progress has been able to start attracting – and effectively absorb – the foreign capital and knowhow that can provide a vital boost. Does that sound like spendaholic Greece today? Of course, as the Asian experience also demonstrates, it’s also essential to have a robustly growing global economy that can accommodate ever greater exports and indeed trade surpluses. Does that sound like the wheezing global economy today?

Greece does boast formidable human capital – just take a look at the math, science, and engineering faculties of any number of major American colleges and universities. That suggests potential in fields like software development, as well as lower value tech work like call centers (which are much likelier to create significant job opportunities). The country’s geography also suggests continuing possibilities in logistics (which is why shipping has always been strong).

But it’s precisely these kinds of changes that will have to begin and take hold for Greece to escape basket-case status. If they don’t, expect to keep hearing nonsense on the order of “If enough wealthy Germans and other Europeans would just take more vacations there, Greece’s problems would be solved.” That may make macro-economists feel good, but it represents a cruel hoax on Greece.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Increasingly Disposable Workers Become Increasingly Wary Consumers

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benefits, bubbles, consumers, debt, Employment, Federal Reserve, growth, incomes, Jobs, JPMorgan Chase, Robert Samuelson, salaries, savings, savings rate, spending, temporary jobs, volatility, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

After his last clunker attempting to debunk claims of a U.S. employment recovery led by lousy jobs, Washington Post columnist Robert Samuelson owed us a good piece. I’m pleased to say he’s delivered with this morning’s effort examining the roots of the consumer caution witnessed since the Great Recession ended.

First, however, let’s specify that “caution” is a relative concept here. Yes, Americans are spending much less of their income these days than they did during the bubble decade – when it hit all-time lows. In fact, in July, 2005, the personal savings rate, which measures that relationship, sank to 1.9 percent, and some news reports back in those days said that it actually went negative that whole year (though it seems that figure has been revised). All the same, even the 1.9 percent figure showing up in the government’s tables now is much lower than the 5.6 percent for last month reported this morning by the Commerce Department.

Yet although it’s clear that savings have been growing on a monthly basis since late 2013, they’re still not close to their highs earlier in the recovery, when the rate regularly hit high single digits. And for decades until the last massive spending and housing bubble, high single-digit savings rates were the American norm.  In other words, the nation knew how to expand the economy in ways other than launching shopping sprees.

Nonetheless, since U.S. growth is still so spending-heavy, any sign of slackening is at least a short-term cause for concern. And Samuelson’s column today presented a great explanation. On top of still being burdened by accumulated debts and understandably gun-shy after the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, Americans are facing a labor market in which employers increasingly treat them as more disposable than ever before. Principally, more and more businesses are looking at their employees as variable costs, which they can and should reduce whenever possible even in normal times to boost profits, rather than as fixed costs, which they’re stuck with except when economic conditions worsen significantly.

The resulting move toward using temporary workers has lowered employers’ costs both by giving them more flexibility and by enabling them to use more workers who can’t command significant benefits. But as Samuelson observes, these trends also creates much more economic insecurity for those workers, and logically a greater reluctance to spend.

In addition, Samuelson points out, this insecurity is being reinforced by ever more flexible compensation practices. Fewer and fewer workers are earning wages and salaries that are regularly and predictably increased (when possible via some combination of their bargaining power and their employers’ finances). Compensation increases that are handed out increasingly consist of various one-time payments that don’t need to be added to base wage and salary structures, and therefore can be withdrawn at the drop of a hat.

I’d just add two points. First, it looks very much like increasingly flexible employment and pay practices by business are showing up in statistics on how much Americans are earning. According to a recent major study from JPMorgan Chase, between October, 2012 and December of last year, 84 percent of Americans saw their incomes change by more than five percent month-to-month. Even year-to-year, when smaller fluctuations would be the norm, 70 percent of Americans still experienced such large income swings.

Even more noteworthy, 26 percent of the 2.5 million Americans examined by JPMorgan Chase saw their incomes rise or fall (mainly rise, fortunately) by more than 30 percent between 2013 and 2014. Forty-four percent experienced swings of between five and 30 percent. And this volatility was somewhat greater among higher income Americans than among lower.

Second, although U.S. businesses may see their workers are increasingly disposable, the American economy can’t afford nowadays to see consumers – most of whom are workers – in this dismissive light. Indeed, as I’ve just written, personal consumption is just about as great a share of the economy these days as it was during the bubble decade.

Combine an economy that remains consumption-heavy with income sources that are becoming less and less reliable, and it’s no mystery why what meager growth the nation can still generate remains so greatly fueled by ever greater indebtedness – and why the Federal Reserve is so reluctant to end America’s addiction to easy money.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Expect Imports to Keep Preventing Lift-Off

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consumer spending, consumers, demographics, Employment Cost Index, health care, imports, manufacturing, medical equipment, National Institutes of Health, personal income, pharmaceuticals, recovery, retirement, savings, subsidies, Trade, Trade Deficits, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Three new government reports have put the spotlight back on American consumers, and especially on whether they can quicken a U.S. recovery that continues to disappoint the conventional wisdom (though not me!). I’m no expert on consumer trends. But I do feel confident that whatever new vigor American shoppers start showing will provide only a limited growth boost – because so much of what they buy will continue to come from abroad.  As a result, this spending will generate more production and job creation overseas than at home.

The three reports I’m talking about were:

(a) yesterday’s preliminary reading on first quarter gross domestic product, which showed the economy slogging along at a pathetic 0.25 percent real annual rate;

(b) today’s reading on first quarter employment costs, which showed a decent (at least by recent standards) gain in wages and salaries (numbers that aren’t adjusted for inflation); and

(c) today’s report on March consumer spending and incomes, which showed the former up and the latter flat month-to-month. That made for the first monthly fall in the personal savings rate since November.

These results all reinforce a picture of the economy that’s gained traction in recent months – of workers doing somewhat better after years of stagnant, at best, incomes, and in fact getting a nice filip from falling energy prices but remaining cautious shoppers nonetheless. As a result, most analysts foresee a solid increase in spending and therefore growth for the rest of the year, as Americans open their wallets wide again.

As ever, though, and especially in recent years, the fly in the lift-off ointment is imports, whose scale and robust growth has greatly weakened the longstanding relationship between what Americans consume and how fast the economy grows. For despite the endless talk of the United States being a “consumer-driven economy,” it’s production that fuels GDP growth, not shopping.

As I wrote yesterday, the trade shortfall has grown fast enough to take a big bite out of growth since the last recession ended, in the middle of 2009. But yet another news item today helps illustrate how the process works. It’s a Fiscal Times piece claiming that fully 20 percent of U.S. household spending now goes to health care services and medicines – up from six percent in 1960. According to another calculation, that works out to more than $8,000 for every man, woman, and child in the country.

Since most health care spending winds up on the services side, that’s actually good news as far as growth itself is concerned, since nearly all of these services are supplied domestically. Yet when it comes to health care products, it’s another story entirely – as can be demonstrated by looking at trade balances in these sectors.

In a phrase, they’ve worsened greatly since 2000. In fact, a $9.71 billion deficit more than quadrupled to $46.78 billion by the end of last year. Some health care-related products have excelled – e.g., surgical and medical equipment and laboratory instruments, which improved on smallish surpluses. But others, often thought to be among the nation’s technological and industrial crown jewels, have fallen flat on their faces – notably electro-medical equipment. At the beginning of the millennium, America ran a $1.21 billion trade surplus in devices like CAT-scan and MRI machines. But by 2014, this trade had turned into a $2.03 billion deficit. And the 800-pound gorilla in the health care manufacturing category is the pharmaceutical sector, which saw a $955 million trade shortfall balloon to $31.52 million during this period.

Even worse, demand for all these health care products is heavily subsidized by government. And the nation wouldn’t even boast a world-class pharmaceutical industry without the research and development performed by the federal government’s National Institutes of Health. So increasingly, Americans’ tax dollars are being used to create and expand markets for products supplied by foreign factories and workers, and in many cases to create products themselves whose manufacture is offshored by U.S.-owned firms.

To add insult to this injury, thanks to a combination of those government subsidies and an aging population (in many foreign countries, too), health care is among the most promising future manufacturing growth markets. If the vast majority of these products were made in America, the employment, wages, and output would stay in the United States, and fuel more growth that’s healthy. On top of a recovery that’s faster and more sustainable, the resulting health care manufacturing boom could take some of the expected economic and financial sting out of the nation’s looming demographic crisis.

But because of Washington’s indifference to where goods are produced, and widespread ignorance over what really fuels prosperity, much of this golden opportunity will be squandered, and health care will be yet another sector where America’s spending bucks keep generating less and less vital growth bang.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Gallup Shows Americans’ Views are (All of the Above)

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college costs, confidence, debt, Gallup, healthcare, household finances, inflation, Jobs, living costs, polls, retirement, savings, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although I post a lot on public opinion polls, that doesn’t mean I take them as gospel, even when they don’t deal with trade policy (where, as I’ve shown, they tend to be incompetently constructed). These new sets of survey results from Gallup – a pioneer in the business – show us why.

Gallup consistently has been reporting that Americans’ views of the nation’s economy and of their own economic circumstances have improved significantly in recent months. Notably, since these questions started being asked in 2008, record high shares of Americans now consider themselves to be “thriving” and record low shares believe that they’re “struggling.” Not surprisingly, as a result, the greatest percentage of respondents since the recession began told Gallup that their own financial situations have strengthened in the last year, and the share stating that they’re worse off financially over the last 12 months is approaching pre-recession lows.

The public is more optimistic about the future, too – at least according to Gallup. After languishing in negative territory throughout the recession (often deeply so), the company’s economic confidence reading has turned slightly positive over the last month, and has stayed above zero (neutral) since. Pretty encouraging, right?

But then how can we explain Gallup’s new results on how Americans perceive their greatest financial problems?

Actually, the first problem with this poll is that it’s not clear whether respondents are being asked about their own family’s biggest financial problems or the nation’s as a whole. Even so, however, the answers are still pretty weird given those results above.

In particular, every single one of the top ten problems listed makes clear that Americans don’t have the money they need. They are (in descending order): health-care costs, inadequate wages and “money”, too much debt, college expenses, retirement costs, housing costs, overall living costs, job loss, taxes, and inadequate savings. In fact, if you add up all the percentages of respondents identifying these problems – which all look pretty serious to me – as their biggest, you get 75 percent. That strikes me as an awfully high level of financial distress.

Over the last year, the results in four of the ten possibilities worsened, they remained the same in one (retirement savings), and improved significantly only on the inflation, jobs, and college costs fronts. At the same time, the share of respondents who specified no top financial problems (the answer possibilities were open-ended) rose from 12 to 17 percent, and made up the largest single answer.

If you can make head or tail of this crazy quilt of responses, let me know. Till then, I’ll be taking the expression “United States of Confusion” a lot more seriously.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Paul Krugman’s a Fake-onomist on Trade

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Financial Crisis, macroeconomics, Paul Krugman, savings, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

We’ve just gotten another example of international trade’s unique ability to turn even a Nobel Prize-winning economist ignorant or deceitful (take your pick) on a fundamental maxim of economics. 

The latest know-nothing (or con man)?  Nobelist and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman.  In a post yesterday, Krugman repeated a claim about the chronic U.S. trade deficit that is as widely made as it is flat wrong:  “[T]he trade balance is a macroeconomic phenomenon, determined by the excess of savings over investment.”  http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/20/america-as-a-lousy-exporter/

This may sound incredibly boring and technical, but the savings canard explains much of (a) Washington’s decades-long habit of letting its trade deals and broader trade policies off the hook as engines of the trade deficit’s growth, and (b) its determination to keep staying the trade policy course and thus worsening the damage these measures inflict on the economy.

Instead, the savings claim enables the bipartisan economic policy establishment to insist that all of the nation’s trade-related problems stem from America’s deeply ingrained spend-aholic ways.  As a result, all would be well on the trade front if consumers and government alike would simply put away their credit cards and begin some nest-egg building.  But since both keep living beyond their means, the gap between what they buy on the one hand, and what they produce and sell on the other, inevitably is filled by products from abroad.

This story is perfectly plausible.  But it’s not the story told by the macroeconomic/mathematical relationship between excess saving and the trade balance referred to by Krugman and so many others.  The reason?  That relationship is a mathematical identity.  It simply says that, mathematically speaking, the trade deficit will equal the savings shortfall.  It does not say that the savings shortfall “determines” (i.e., causes) the deficit, or that the trade deficit causes the shortfall.  It says nothing about causality at all.

In fact, it’s easy to explain how the trade deficit could cause the savings shortfall, especially in a democracy like America’s.  Since it’s overwhelmingly concentrated in manufacturing – a high-wage sector of the economy – the deficit depresses the income-earning opportunities of all Americans not lucky enough to be born with a silver spoon or otherwise to be living off their investments.   As the persistent trade gap destroys jobs and lowers wages in manufacturing, the effects ripple throughout the entire economy.  Displaced manufacturing workers are forced to compete for jobs elsewhere in the economy, add to the labor supply outside manufacturing, and force down these wages.

Because these ever-poorer workers can all vote, they eventually communicate their unhappiness to elected politicians, and confront them with a difficult choice.  Presidents and members of Congress can either change U.S. trade policies – and risk angering the multinational businesses that benefit from these policies.  Or they can keep the trade policies and mollify voters by enabling them to replace their lost incomes with more credit.   But since the easier money for consumers does nothing to boost the nation’s production, the purchases it makes possible need to come from overseas in the form of imports.  So the trade deficit increases.

The main point is not that my interpretation is indisputably right and that of Krugman et al is equally wrong (although mine corresponds terrifically well with the U.S. economy’s steady march last decade toward an historic financial crisis fueled by unheard-of levels of debt).  The main point is that both these interpretations are simply interpretations that are entirely separate from the mathematical relationship between the national savings rate and the trade deficit.  Whenever you read an economist, politician, or pundit failing to acknowledge this uncertainty, and peddling what’s actually fakeonomics, feel free to ignore them.  But make sure to hold onto your wallet, too.