• About

RealityChek

~ So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time….

Tag Archives: sourcing

Glad I Didn’t Say That: Intel Struggling to Handle the Truth on the Trade War

21 Friday Jun 2019

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Glad I Didn't Say That!

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

China, Glad I Didn't Say That!, global value chains, Intel, manufacturing, semiconductors, sourcing, supply chain, tariffs, tech, trade war, Trump

“Intel Corp. is reviewing its global supply chain amid the growing trade war between the U.S. and China, Chief Executive Officer Bob Swan said.”

–Bloomberg.com, June 16, 2019 

“‘Intel doesn’t believe tariffs are an ‘effective way to drive global trade,’ Swan said.”

– Bloomberg.com, June 16, 2019

 

(Source: “Trade War Has Intel Reviewing Global Supply Chain, CEO Says,” by Gwen Ackerman, Bloomberg.com, June 16, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-16/trade-war-has-intel-reviewing-global-supply-chain-ceo-says )

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trade and Supply Chain Disruption Myths are Getting Disrupted by Apple

20 Thursday Jun 2019

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Apple Inc., Breitbart.com, China, deadweight loss, design, engineering, global value chains, John Carney, manufacturing, marketing, Nikkei Asian Review, production, research and development, sourcing, supply chains, tariffs, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Yesterday’s report from Japan’s Nikkei Asian Review (NAR), on how the U.S.-China trade war is affecting Apple Inc.’s sourcing plans, was stunning not only for claiming that the company is studying moving up to 30 percent of the China production capacity it uses out of the People’s Republic. It also greatly undermined three of the most pervasive myths surrounding the decision by such companies to concentrate so much manufacturing in China, and the resulting impact on the American economy.

Since Apple’s production in China and elsewhere is handled almost entirely by independent contract manufacturers like Taiwan’s Foxconn, its reported decision to ask them to start estimating the costs of partly leaving China speaks volumes about why multinational companies place various links in their supply chains in the countries decided on.

The first myth? That production and sourcing decisions are based overwhelmingly on the kinds of free market forces and developments that supposedly dominate the current world trade system, and that explain its root assumption that any government interference will reduce – to every country’s detriment – trade’s ability to maximize global efficiency.

According to the NAR piece, however, a team of 30 Apple employees has begun “discussing production plans with suppliers and negotiating with governments over financial incentives they might be willing to offer to attract Apple manufacturing, as well as regulations and the local business environment.” In other words, Apple’s decisions won’t solely, or even mainly reflect the principle of comparative advantage – which holds that economic activity naturally flows and should flow to locations where it’s most efficiently conducted.

The NAR article also hints at a point that’s become crucial in today’s trade war-spurred debate – about whether trade barriers like the Trump administration’s recent tariffs create major “deadweight losses” for the world economy by forcing companies to spend precious time and resources coping with government interference, rather than on continuing to improve their products and processes. For as the NAR piece states, among the advantages China has offered manufacturers for so long have been “lighter labor rules.” That’s a euphemism for a government policy of ruthlessly repressing worker’s rights to organize freely.

NAR could have also added practices such as government-encouraged technology extortion (which forces foreign businesses to hand over their knowhow to Chinese partners in return for the ability to operate in China), value-added taxes (which fosters producing inside China by penalizing importing and rewarding exporting), an artificially depressed currency (which has effects similar to those value-added taxes), explicit requirements that goods made in China contain certain levels of Chinese content, and all manner of tariffs and subsidies that are illegal under World Trade Organization rules.

Moreover, as detailed in my 2002 book on globalization, The Race to the Bottom, foreign government distortion of trade is hardly confined to China. It’s long represented the way much manufacturing-related business has been done around the world.

In other words, the deadweight loss issue, and government interference in trade flows, is nothing new, and raised few hackles among economists until the United States under President Trump started imposing serious trade barriers of its own. (See this article by Breitbart.com‘s John Carney for an excellent discussion of the issue and the hypocrisy of Trump tariff opponents.)

The second Apple- (and broader offshoring-related-) myth debunked by the article is that the reshuffling of global supply chains already being prompted by the Trump tariffs will devastatingly disrupt worldwide manufacturing and economic fortunes. But here’s what one Apple supplier representative told NAR: “It’s really a long-term effort and might see some results two or three years from now. It’s painful and difficult, but that’s something we have to deal with.” In other words, rather than whining and/or throwing in the towel, such companies are apparently rolling up their sleeves and getting to work.

P.S. – So, reportedly, is Apple. Not that the company hasn’t whined about the Trump tariffs. But according to the NAR article, its examination of diversifying away from China – where currently more than 90 percent of its worldwide manufacturing is located – began “at the end of last year” to “expand [the aforementioned] capital expense studies team.”

Moreover, the trade war evidently wasn’t the only issue on Apple’s mind. Said “one executive with knowledge of the situation,” a “lower birthrate, higher labor costs and the risk of overly centralizing its production in one country. These adverse [China] factors are not going anywhere. With or without the final round of the $300 billion tariff, Apple is following the big trend [to diversify production].” The biggest implication – which should have always been obvious – is that because countries and their economies, societies, and demographics are constantly changing independent of government policies, no smart business would ever view its supply chains as being set in stone.

The final myth – that performing nearly all Apple manufacturing in China has enormously strengthened the U.S. economy, and that this proposition holds for much China production by U.S.-owned multinational companies.

Because Apple products sell for so much more than the cost of their materials, it’s clear that most of the value they create comes from the company’s mainly U.S.-based research and development, engineering, design, software development, and marketing operations. So its slogan “Designed by Apple in California, Assembled in China” is not only accurate but extremely important economically.

Nonetheless, the company itself has maintained that a significant number of its goods suppliers have been U.S.-owned (though not necessarily American-located). Yet the NAR article found that this number has been shrinking steadily since 2012 – and that the number of China- and Hong Kong-owned suppliers has been rising so strongly that last year they exceeded the number of their American counterparts for the first time.

In fact, as I’ve reported, the China content of most goods produced in China been increasing so significantly for so long that the notion of the People’s Republic as a simple assembler of products that add little value to the Chinese economy is becoming rapidly outmoded. Further, this development has always been a prime objective of the Chinese government, as is especially obvious from its technology extortion and local content requirements.

It’s true that these developments per se don’t affect the aforementioned “white collar” manufacturing activities vital to creating Apple products. But it’s legitimate to ask whether, without the Trump trade war, this extremely high value work would long remain mainly in the United States. After all, even in a world of instant global communications, manufacturers have found it highly advantageous to locate functions like research and development etc close to their factories – because the two broad aspects of manufacturing tend to interact with each other so continuously, and because big differences in time zones means that there’s still nothing as easy and convenient as contacting a colleague by driving a few blocks away or phoning or texting or emailing from there, much less by walking down the hall.

To listen to economists and pundits and even many beat reporters even nowadays (or especially nowadays?), the emergence of the kinds of global value chains epitomized by Apple’s operations has been as much a force of nature, or technology, as economic globalization itself has been portrayed. They’ve ignored how the Trump trade policy revolution reminds invaluably that these trends have also stemmed from human decisions that are anything but givens. The reaction of Apple, and all the other companies that have either left China or are contemplating leaving because of the President’s actual and threatened tariffs, is a welcome sign that the folks who deal with these problems in real life, and not simply in the abstract, have finally been getting this message.

Following Up: Trump Hit .500 on Trade at the Debate – Which Isn’t Nearly Good Enough

11 Wednesday Nov 2015

Posted by Alan Tonelson in Following Up

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Asia-Pacific, Associated Press, China, Donald Trump, Fox Business Debate, Japan, Mainstream Media, minimum wage, multinational companies, Obama, punditocracy, rules of origin, sourcing, TPP, Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you think a .500 batting average represents as good a performance in presidential debates as in baseball, then you’re going to be pretty pleased with Republican candidate Donald Trump’s performance on trade-related issues in the GOP Milwaukee main event last night. If you’re wondering how the Republican front-runner (co-front-runner?) could have gotten one answer so mind-bogglingly wrong, and one just as completely on target, chances are you’re more downbeat.

Of course, it also needs to be noted that apparently no one in the Mainstream Media knows enough about trade, and specifically about President Obama’s Pacific Rim trade deal, to have recognized the accuracy of Trump’s answer about China’s relation to the agreement. But in defense of the scribblers, they’re not competing for the authority to press policy buttons.

Trump’s wrong answer was his first (here’s a debate transcript), and although it came on a question concerning the minimum wage, not trade, it bears directly on America’s approach to the global economy. Explaining why he opposed government-mandated hikes in pay floors, Trump told the audience that with U.S. “taxes too high, wages too high, we’re not going to be able to compete against the world. I hate to say it, but we have to leave it the way it is. People have to go out, they have to work really hard and have to get into that upper stratum. But we can not do this if we are going to compete with the rest of the world. We just can’t do it.”

What was completely weird about this response was that, as with other critics, a main reason for Trump’s opposition to current U.S. trade policies is that they benefit offshoring interests at the expense of American workers by forcing the latter into a no-win competition with much more poorly paid foreign counterparts. Indeed, although Trump never mentioned “wages” explicitly in his new China trade paper, he did charge that the status quo approach exclusively serves the interests of “Wall Street insiders that want to move U.S. manufacturing and investment offshore.” And he asked how “American manufacturers, who must meet very high standards, [can] possibly compete with Chinese companies that care nothing about their workers or the environment?”

So Trump’s position that the minimum wage can’t be raised because of this (presumably unacceptable) low-wage foreign competition amounts to a version of blaming the victim.

And it would have been so easy for Trump to have had his policy cake and eaten it, too, on this front. He could have expressed sympathy with the idea of raising minimum wages – especially because of penny-wage foreign competition. And he could have gone on to insist that a better way to raise living standards was to fix the trade policies largely responsible. Trump did suggest that his tax policy reforms would get the job done by super-charging America’s growth and job-creation. But if so, why put so much emphasis on the need to overhaul trade policy?

By contrast, Trump’s critique of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) revealed genuine mastery of typical and major U.S. trade policy failings. As he contended (inter alia), “The TPP is horrible deal. It is a deal that is going to lead to nothing but trouble. It’s a deal that was designed for China to come in, as they always do, through the back door and totally take advantage of everyone.”

The commentariat seemed to agree that Trump had displayed his ignorance by claiming that China is one of the TPP signatories. That’s what one of Trump’s rivals, Kentucky Senator Rand Paul, claimed. So did the Associated Press.

But of course, that’s not what the candidate said. He said it was designed for China to participate covertly, not that China is one of the members. And anyone who’s read the TPP’s rule of origin provisions (here, here, and here) knows that this is exactly the case. The deal would extend duty-free treatment within the new integrated market to a long list of products that could be made largely outside the TPP zone. Indeed, many goods with levels of content from TPP signatories well under 50 percent would be so favored.

Nor did these TPP features appear in the deal by accident. They reflect the clear desire of U.S., Japanese, and other multinational companies from TPP signatory countries to enjoy maximum flexibility in sourcing their production, in order to secure the lowest cost levels. Not only does such sourcing leeway greatly water down the TPP’s potential benefits for the domestic economies of the signatory countries. But it flies completely in the face of promises by Mr. Obama and other backers of the deal that it would both contain the rise of Chinese economic power and influence globally and in the Asia-Pacific region specifically, and that it would create powerful incentives for China to clean up its economic act and become eligible for membership.

Trump remains the only Republican candidate to mount a serious and sustained challenge to today’s American trade policies. And as his China paper made clear, his diagnoses and prescriptions are every bit as substantive as those embodied in numerous bills introduced to overhaul Washington’s longstanding approach. But Trump’s crusade faces obstacles aplenty already – including the establishment-coddling media’s determination to keep branding him an ignoramus even when this accusation is wildly off base. He can’t afford to give them any real ammunition.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is Walmart Really Changing its Offshoring Spots?

12 Friday Sep 2014

Posted by Alan Tonelson in (What's Left of) Our Economy

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

assembly, competitiveness, Made in America, manufacturing, manufacturing renaissance, offshoring, procurement, productivity, sourcing, trade policy, wages, Walmart, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Walmart is such a huge player in the U.S. economy that any evidence of the retail giant markedly shifting its sourcing strategy toward buying American-made goods could be significant positive for domestic manufacturing. And an article in the excellent publication Manufacturing & Technology News reports signs that such a shift is in the making.

At the same time, there’s a big cautionary note included in the piece indicating that whatever manufacturing gains result from more Walmart domestic sourcing would represent a decidedly pyrrhic victory.

Among the encouraging facts presented in the August 31 article: According to the company’s website, its Made in the USA manufactured offerings have increased from 500 to 15,000, and the number of domestic manufacturers selling it goods has quadrupled. Moreover, in the 18 months since Walmart announced its intention to purchase $250 billion in additional American-made goods by 2023, the company says that suppliers have begun moving production back state-side.

Some caveats must be kept in mind here. For example, by “goods,” Walmart could also mean not only manufactures, but farm products sold by its grocery operations. Also, Walmart’s claim that it’s now selling American-made television sets shows that its definition of Made in the USA also includes “assembled in the USA” – which adds much less value to the U.S. economy.

But there’s a much bigger problem. Walmart execs keep telegraphing to reporters that they now understand the importance of U.S. job creation – especially for working class Americans – because without adequate incomes, these folks increasingly can’t afford to shop robustly even at low-price stores like Walmart. That dawning realization is of course not only encouraging, but also hugely ironic, since Walmart’s massive overseas sourcing over the years has pushed so much manufacturing output and so many industrial jobs abroad to begin with.

At the same time, Walmart CEO insists that the company “will not change its strategy of generating low margins on high volume,” and the article made clear that “the China price” (and other third world prices) will remain the standard governing Walmart procurement policy.

That would be fine if U.S.-based manufacturers could meet this challenge overwhelmingly by improving their productivity. Trouble is, although manufacturing still leads the American economy in productivity by a wide margin, there’s no evidence showing any acceleration recently in the sector’s efficiency gains when measured by the broadest productivity indicator – multifactor productivity. In fact, according to the latest available Labor Department data, multifactor productivity in manufacturing has been improving at a slower rate since the Great Recession began (0.4 percent compounded annually through 2012) than before the downturn 1.9 percent from 2000 to 2007).

Moreover, other Labor Department figures make a strong case that, rather than taking that productivity-enhancing “high road” to maintaining and improving efficiency and therefore competitiveness, U.S.-based manufacturers are taking the “low road” of cutting wages. These data show that inflation-adjusted wages in American manufacturing have fallen nearly 13 times faster than wages for the entire American private sector during the dreary recovery that ostensibly began in mid-2009.

Worse, as long as Walmart and the rest of American business retain the option of overseas sourcing, they’ll have strong incentives to stay on the low road even if they use more domestic suppliers – by holding a totally credible offshoring threat over their heads. As a result, even if firms such as Walmart deserve considerable credit for good intentions, there’s still no reasonable denying that a genuine U.S. manufacturing renaissance will remain impossible until the offshoring option is eliminated – which will require a top-to-bottom transformation of U.S. trade policy.

Blogs I Follow

  • Current Thoughts on Trade
  • Protecting U.S. Workers
  • Marc to Market
  • Alastair Winter
  • Smaulgld
  • Reclaim the American Dream
  • Mickey Kaus
  • David Stockman's Contra Corner
  • Washington Decoded
  • Upon Closer inspection
  • Keep America At Work
  • Sober Look
  • Credit Writedowns
  • GubbmintCheese
  • VoxEU.org: Recent Articles
  • Michael Pettis' CHINA FINANCIAL MARKETS
  • New Economic Populist
  • George Magnus

(What’s Left Of) Our Economy

  • (What's Left of) Our Economy
  • Following Up
  • Glad I Didn't Say That!
  • Golden Oldies
  • Guest Posts
  • Housekeeping
  • Housekeeping
  • Im-Politic
  • In the News
  • Making News
  • Our So-Called Foreign Policy
  • The Snide World of Sports
  • Those Stubborn Facts
  • Uncategorized

Our So-Called Foreign Policy

  • (What's Left of) Our Economy
  • Following Up
  • Glad I Didn't Say That!
  • Golden Oldies
  • Guest Posts
  • Housekeeping
  • Housekeeping
  • Im-Politic
  • In the News
  • Making News
  • Our So-Called Foreign Policy
  • The Snide World of Sports
  • Those Stubborn Facts
  • Uncategorized

Im-Politic

  • (What's Left of) Our Economy
  • Following Up
  • Glad I Didn't Say That!
  • Golden Oldies
  • Guest Posts
  • Housekeeping
  • Housekeeping
  • Im-Politic
  • In the News
  • Making News
  • Our So-Called Foreign Policy
  • The Snide World of Sports
  • Those Stubborn Facts
  • Uncategorized

Signs of the Apocalypse

  • (What's Left of) Our Economy
  • Following Up
  • Glad I Didn't Say That!
  • Golden Oldies
  • Guest Posts
  • Housekeeping
  • Housekeeping
  • Im-Politic
  • In the News
  • Making News
  • Our So-Called Foreign Policy
  • The Snide World of Sports
  • Those Stubborn Facts
  • Uncategorized

The Brighter Side

  • (What's Left of) Our Economy
  • Following Up
  • Glad I Didn't Say That!
  • Golden Oldies
  • Guest Posts
  • Housekeeping
  • Housekeeping
  • Im-Politic
  • In the News
  • Making News
  • Our So-Called Foreign Policy
  • The Snide World of Sports
  • Those Stubborn Facts
  • Uncategorized

Those Stubborn Facts

  • (What's Left of) Our Economy
  • Following Up
  • Glad I Didn't Say That!
  • Golden Oldies
  • Guest Posts
  • Housekeeping
  • Housekeeping
  • Im-Politic
  • In the News
  • Making News
  • Our So-Called Foreign Policy
  • The Snide World of Sports
  • Those Stubborn Facts
  • Uncategorized

The Snide World of Sports

  • (What's Left of) Our Economy
  • Following Up
  • Glad I Didn't Say That!
  • Golden Oldies
  • Guest Posts
  • Housekeeping
  • Housekeeping
  • Im-Politic
  • In the News
  • Making News
  • Our So-Called Foreign Policy
  • The Snide World of Sports
  • Those Stubborn Facts
  • Uncategorized

Guest Posts

  • (What's Left of) Our Economy
  • Following Up
  • Glad I Didn't Say That!
  • Golden Oldies
  • Guest Posts
  • Housekeeping
  • Housekeeping
  • Im-Politic
  • In the News
  • Making News
  • Our So-Called Foreign Policy
  • The Snide World of Sports
  • Those Stubborn Facts
  • Uncategorized

Create a free website or blog at WordPress.com.

Current Thoughts on Trade

Terence P. Stewart

Protecting U.S. Workers

Marc to Market

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Alastair Winter

Chief Economist at Daniel Stewart & Co - Trying to make sense of Global Markets, Macroeconomics & Politics

Smaulgld

Real Estate + Economics + Gold + Silver

Reclaim the American Dream

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Mickey Kaus

Kausfiles

David Stockman's Contra Corner

Washington Decoded

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Upon Closer inspection

Keep America At Work

Sober Look

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Credit Writedowns

Finance, Economics and Markets

GubbmintCheese

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

VoxEU.org: Recent Articles

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Michael Pettis' CHINA FINANCIAL MARKETS

New Economic Populist

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

George Magnus

So Much Nonsense Out There, So Little Time....

Privacy & Cookies: This site uses cookies. By continuing to use this website, you agree to their use.
To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: Cookie Policy