Following Up: Why the U.S.-South Korea Summit Was Incredibly Weird II

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Biden administration, burden sharing, deterrence, Donald Trump, Following Up, North Korea, nuclear weapons, semiconductors, South Korea, tripwire, Yoon Suk Yeol

Yesterday’s post described how the mounting policy challenges that framed last week’s U.S.-South Korea summit drove one major globalist pundit to write a column that was nothing less than bananas policy-wise. With major tensions almost inevitably appearing between major goals sought by the two countries, he insisted both that these frictions exist only because of American selfishness and, as is globalists’ wont, that all good objectives actually are easily attainable simultaneously in this instance.

Today’s subject is thinking that in its own way is just as off-kilter. Worse, it’s positively dangerous because it’s official thinking from both of the above capitals, and its only conceivable effect can be to turn the already tinderbox-y Korean peninsula even more potentially explosive.

The reasons? It’s resulted in President Biden and his South Korean counterpart Yoon Suk Yeol just having sent – unwittingly to be sure – a twin message to scarily belligerent and nuclear-armed North Korea that (1) they have no faith in the strategy followed by their alliance for decades to deter aggression from the North; and (2) they haven’t yet come up with anything besides transparently symbolic moves to address the problem.

What other conclusions can legitimately be drawn from the official description of the summit’s accomplishments? According to the White House, among other decisions, the two governments agreed to give South Korea a role (but not the final say) in the process of deciding whether Washington would use nuclear weapons in a new Korean War; to deploy American nuclear weapons delivery systems “more visibly” in the peninsula’s vicinity; and to give South Korea’s military more training in preparing for and coping with “nuclear threat scenarios.”

Viewed in isolation, there’s nothing necessarily wrong with any of these measures. But no one should forget the context – because North Korea certainly hasn’t. The United States, as I’ve explained repeatedly, has already for decades not only vowed to use nuclear weapons to defend the South if necessary. To strengthen the credibility of this promise, it’s also stationed tens of thousands of American troops right up against the Demilitarized Zone dividing the two Koreas – that is, right in the invaders’ paths. The idea is that a U.S. President would face no real political choice but to use nukes to save them from total destruction by the North’s vastly superior conventional forces – and probably go on to vaporize the North – and that these prospects would prevent any attack in the first place.

Again, that’s been the U.S. plan for decades. It may as well be written in stone. (Although former President Trump expressed major reservations during his first campaign for the White House.) But last week, Mr. Biden and Yoon made clear their belief that it’s no longer deterring North Korea effectively enough. Why else would the new steps have been announced at such a high profile meeting?

At the same time, why would any thinking person believe that consulting more systematically with the South and sailing nuclear submarines in Korean waters more often will put the needed extra fear of God into North Korea? Similarly, how could these measures resolve the doubts about U.S. reliability that even staunch backers of the alliance in its longstanding form fear are developing in the South. Such qualms could either lead it to conduct foreign policies more independent of America’s (especially concerning curbing China’s technology development), or to create its own nuclear forces, or both.

The problem with the first two potential outcomes is that, as explained in a post last week, South Korea’s semiconductor manufacturing prowess has turned its security into a genuinely vital interest of the United States’; and that North Korea’s own steadily improving nuclear capabilities mean that fulfilling the defense commitment could soon expose the U.S. homeland to nuclear-armed missile strikes. 

A South Korea deterrent would greatly reduce this danger, particularly if it led Washington to remove from the South the “tripwire” ground units whose mission is to boost the odds that a Korean military conflict becomes nuclear, and thus probably suicidal for the North . But the consequent shrinkage of U.S. leverage over the North could leave a gaping hole in Washington’s efforts to contain China technologically.

Couldn’t Washington push wealthy South Korea to create a strong enough military to deter much poorer North Korea without going nuclear? In principle, yes, but the South’s very importance to American well-being have created the conditions for continued free-riding, because by definition, Washington couldn’t afford to impose consequences for its refusal. And a South Korea capable of defending itself without nuclear weapons would be just as capable of defying U.S. wishes on China and other foreign policy fronts as one armed with nukes.   

Perhaps most disturbing of all, the new tweaks to U.S. Korea strategy amount to a tacit but obvious admission of weakness – which countries of course should never telegraph, especially when faced with a seemingly volatile adversary like North Korea, and especially when their leaders clearly have no clue how to escape or resolve in any satisfactory way the dilemmas confronting them. 

Which is why I’m now worried that, for all the justified fears that before too long the United States and China could go to war – which could escalate to the nuclear level – the situation on the Korean peninsula is becoming a bona fide national security nightmare, too.   

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Following Up: Why the U.S.-South Korea Summit Was Incredibly Weird I

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Alan Beattie, alliances, allies, Biden, China, deterrence, extended deterrence, Financial Times, Following Up, Indo-Pacific, North Korea, nuclear weapons, realism, reciprocity, sanctions, semiconductors, South Korea, technology, Yoon Suk Yeol

Consistent with cutting-edge astro-physicis – and the last few decades of Marvel comics story-telling – I’m sure that among all the infinite number of universes in a “multi-verse” comprising creation, there’s one in which South Korea somehow genuinely has no reason to believe it has any obligation to comply with U.S. wishes in exchange for protection against complete destruction or enslavement by fanatically totalitarian North Korea.

I’m also sure that that universe isn’t the one we inhabit. Which is why it’s so whacko that Financial Times columnist Alan Beattie begs to differ, and that his editors evidently had absolutely no problem with this argument. And that’s only the lesser of two jaw-dropping new developments related to last week’s summit between President Biden and his South Korean counterpart Yoon Suk Yeol, which I analyzed in this post. Nonetheless, that’s the focus of today’s post. Tomorrow’s will deal with the second.

To be clear, I’m not contending that the South Koreans should be grateful to Washington for anything.

As a self-styled foreign policy realist, I’ve long held that countries can be counted on to act first and foremost in their own self-interest, and indeed should – in fact, unapologetically. I’ve taken many of my cues here from the Founding Fathers, who also considered the world to be far too dangerous to ground strategy in considerations of sentiment. So that puts me in pretty good company IMO. 

Moreover, South Korea is emphatically no exception, first because it lives in an exceptionally dangerous neighborhood; and second, because as I explained last week, its semiconductor manufacturing prowess gives it some clout vis-a-vis the United States.

Nor am I arguing that the U.S. commitment to defend the South has ever stemmed from anything other than a regard for its own security or independence or prosperity – even though I’ve disagreed until very recently (because of semiconductor manufacturing-related national security issues) with this characteristically globalist definition of national interest.

Instead, I’m arguing that, given the decision by Washington to protect the South even though its strategy of extended deterrence has recently exposed the United States to the risk of nuclear attack on the American homeland, it’s entirely reasonable for America to seek some South Korean help in meeting a different challenge. In this case, it’s helping Washington limit the technological progress that could enable China to attain military parity – and at some point even superiority – over the United States, and thereby undercut declared vital U.S. national interests throughout the Indo-Pacific region and even beyond.

But Alan Beattie? He writes that it’s “galling when Washington expects you to take economic hits for geopolitical gains when it’s not always willing to do the same itself.”

One fatal flaw in Beattie’s argument is the claim that the United States is asking South Korea to sacrifice some earnings (resulting from the major revenues it earns by supplying semiconductors and other high-value inputs to China’s huge electronics industry) without offering to pay any price for containing China itself.

What he ignores is how the Biden administration tough’s curbs on the investment and operations of America’s own semiconductor and chip-making equipment companies are costing them economically, too. Instead, he focuses on the electric vehicle manufacturing provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act, which require South Korean auto companies to produce key components in the United States in order to qualify for subsidies.

Yet these provisions apply not only to all foreign auto-makers, but to America’s as well.  And even if they were being applied in a blatantly discriminatory manner, however, it’s not as if South Korea wouldn’t still be getting a heckuva deal from its alliance with the United States. Beattie blandly describes the benefits to the South as “maintaining relations with the US….” Of course, as I stated above, it’s really about its national freedom and very survival.

Again, as a realist, I respect South Korea’s right to define its own interests however it wishes, and to act accordingly. But should I – or anyone – agree with Beattie that Washington’s desire for some South Korean reciprocity is “galling,” or excessively steep? It sounds like Beattie’s actual position is that any U.S. effort to leverage its commitment to defend South Korea is unreasonable – especially if it might interfere with the decades of hyper-globalization that the author tends to lionize uncritically, even though they’ve unmistakably fueled the dangerous rise of Chinese power. Can that be a serious basis for conducting diplomacy?

But from Beattie’s scathing tone, it’s also apparent that he’s condemning this kind of transactional approach to foreign policy for deeply personal reasons as well – likely the transparently childish view that the United States, or maybe just the Anglo-phone countries, should be above this sort of crassness, and that even if international relations aren’t comparable to a sporting event, where the real world stakes are modest, they should act as if they are – whatever the risks.

Thankfully, the Biden administration is steadily (though not fast enough for my tastes) thinking in more adult terms and recognizing – like the Trump administration before it – that one-way-street alliances no longer make sense from America’s standpoint (if they ever did). In this instance, moreover, South Korea could easily conclude that containing the tech prowess of a gigantic totalitarian and increasingly aggressive neighbor serves its own interests quite handily, too.

Tomorrow’s post will describe that aforementioned even more befuddling – and possibly more worrisome – consequence of the Biden-Yoon summit.

P.S. Full disclosure:  Beattie has blocked me on Twitter because he believed that my stances on immigration policy partly reflected anti-Muslim prejudices. So clearly he’s not my favorite journalist.  

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: U.S. Microchip Failures Have Now Worsened its Korea Nuclear Dilemmas

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allies, Biden, China, deterrence, extended deterrence, North Korea, nuclear weapons, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, semiconductors, South Korea, Taiwan, tripwire

As needs to become clear to U.S. leaders as South Korea’s president visits the United States, America’s loss of global leadership in the knowhow needed to make the world’s most advanced semiconductors now could expose the United States to nuclear attack from not one but two adversaries in East Asia.

The first threat of course comes from China, and stems from the possibility that it invades Taiwan. Because the island is the undisputed champ in manufacturing the most powerful chips, a Beijing victory could give it access to technology that’s crucial for making state-of-the-art weapons today, and for generations to come. And because that prospect, rightly in my view, is seen in Washington as an unacceptable threat to U.S. security, independence, and prosperity, the Biden administration has apparently decided to defend the island if the Chinese military moves.

The huge problem with this policy – which hasn’t been announced formally but has been mentioned in various seemingly off-the-cuff statements by Mr. Biden – is that success may require U.S. nuclear weapons use, and the Chinese have the forces to retaliate by attacking the American homeland with their own nukes. Maybe the possibility of a U.S. counter-strike on China would deter Beijing from pressing its nuclear buttons. But maybe it wouldn’t.

The threat that’s come into focus in recent days comes from North Korea and the target is South Korea – which unlike Taiwan is a full-fledged U.S. treaty ally that enjoys a longstanding and clearly stated American nuclear guarantee. Moreover, as is also not the case with Taiwan, the United States will find it exceedingly difficult to avoid nuclear weapons use if the North invaded the South. Worse, that’s so even if America ultimately concludes that South Korea’s security isn’t worth risking nuclear attack from a Pyongyang arsenal that’s smallish but could be able right now to reach American soil.

That’s because, as I’ve described repeatedly, American leaders have decided to bolster the credibility of the U.S. deterrent by stationing tens of thousands of American ground troops right in the way of any North Korean attack. The idea is to convince the North that to prevent its superior conventional forces from overwhelming the Americans, a U.S. President would launch his own nukes to destroy the invaders and likely the whole of North Korea.

This aim of intimidating the North with nuclear threats made sense when the United States had an enormous nuclear arsenal and Pyongyang was nuke-less. It even made sense when North Korea’s stockpile was even smaller than at present, and much less impressive. But due to the North’s recent progress and consequent current or imminent ability to vaporize an American city – or two or three – the U.S. nuclear guarantee, and the continuing presence of U.S. forces in the South whose vulnerability could force Washington into a damaging nuclear exchange, looks positively masochistic.

As a result, I’d argued for many years at least for withdrawing the tripwire and thereby increasing the odds that an American President would initiate a nuclear conflict with the North. Yes, South Korea could well be lost. But the United States itself would be saved from catastrophe. And of course South Korea could eventually respond by building up its own conventional military and going nuclear itself. Am I eager to see the roster of foreign nuclear weapons states expand? Of course not. But would this be better than the annihilation of Los Angeles or San Francisco or Seattle? That’s even a question?

It’s possible, however, that semiconductor-wise, South Korea might be as valuable as Taiwan. And if it’s still behind, it’s semiconductor manufacturing capabilities certainly aren’t far behind. (See this post for a sense of how complicated it is to determine who’s ahead.) Much more certain – the South is considerably ahead of American industry.

I’m not so much concerned that if the South felt abandoned, its microchip prowess would fall into the hands of the North Koreans. I’m much more concerned that a South Korea that’s decoupled from the United States security-wise would keep helping China develop its own semiconductor industry by building more and more advanced chip factories in the People’s Republic. It’s not just a distinct possibility, it’s a virtual certainty because China’s immense electronics industry is an immensely important customer for these South Korean chip manufacturers – just as it is for the U.S. semiconductor companies and chip equipment manufacturers that are equally guilty of strengthening China.

But the U.S. firms’ China operations and plans are now significantly restricted by the Biden administration’s tough sanctions. Even though it’s a U.S. treaty ally, South Korea has enacted no such curbs, and is still resisting American pressure to join Washington’s containment campaign. If the South feels cut loose by America, it’s not likely to sell China its crown jewel microchip tech. But as noted above, keeping on its current course could be damaging to major U.S. interests, too.

And that’s not even the end of the Biden administration’s current dilemmas. For there’s plenty of evidence that, despite the tripwire U.S. forces on their soil, South Korea’s leaders and its people no longer believe the Americans will ride to their rescue, or ride hard enough to risk nuclear war. So in principle, the United States could be stuck with the worst of all possible worlds – forced to maintain its current, nuclear war-risking approach to defending South Korea in hopes of preserving some semiconductor leverage with the South, but lacking the clout to gain meaningful South Korean support for limiting China’s tech progress. Reportedly, President Biden has decided to handle the situation with more energetic efforts to reassure the South.

Alternatively, South Korea could decide that it still doesn’t trust Washington, build its own nuclear weapons anyway, and feel even freer to go its way on China.

I can envision various scenarios in which all these needles are threaded to America’s advantage for the time being – and perhaps longer. But there are no guarantees. Meaning that the big takeaway is that when it comes to critical technologies, there’s no substitute for a Do It Yourself determination to maintain American leadership to avoid needing to rely on the kindness of strangers (and even allies) – or as is the case now, to restore it.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: 2022 Saw More U.S. Trade Deficits but More Secure Supply Chains

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Advanced Technology Products, ATP, Biden adminstration, Canada, Central America, Dominican Republic, European Union, friendshoring, Germany, Immigration, Japan, manufacturing, Mexico, offshoring, South Korea, supply chains, Taiwan, Trade, Trade Deficits, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA, Vietnam, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Sometimes the best-laid plans of mice and men etc etc. So this second look by RealityChek at the final (for now) year-end 2022 official U.S. trade figures is coming out today, rather than yesterday, as I expected.

The big takeaways: First, record deficits were set practically everywhere the eye can see – and on top of sizable increases – when it comes to trade flows in manufacturing, advanced technology products (ATP), and with nearly all of America’s major trade partners (except China, which was covered Friday).

Second, and more encouragingly, regionalization of U.S. trade within the Western Hemisphere kept growing, which is (a) surely making supply chains more secure; and (b) creating more economic opportunity in countries that have long sent the United States large numbers of migrants. In other words, the Biden administration goal of “friendshoring” keeps becoming a thing. 

The biggest absolute numbers were turned in by U.S. manufacturing, which saw its huge, chronic deficit rise by 13.46 percent, from $1.32544 trillion to a twelfth straight record $1.50379 trillion. (Unless otherwise specified, all figures in this post will be in pre-inflation dollars, which are the trade data most closely followed by students of the economy.)

And in context, these figures look just as bad. Although full-year, 2022 results won’t be available until late March, when the pre-inflation manufacturing output numbers come out, as of the third quarter, the manufacturing shortfall stood at 53.09 percent of its value-added production (a measure that avoids significant double counting for complex goods made up of lots of parts and components). That marks the first time this number has topped fifty percent.

Moreover, it could well climb further, since in inflation-adjusted terms, manufacturing output has weakened significantly in the fourth quarter.

The only remotely optimistic development: The growth rate of the manufacturing trade deficit last year slowed from 2021’s 18.84 percent.

The trade gap in advanced technology products widened even faster last year – by 24.58 percent, from $195.95 billion to a sixth consecutive all-time high $244.11 billion.

An even stronger goods trade deficit increase was registered by America’s partners in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) – the successor to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This shortfall worsened by 34.12 percent, from $158.19 billion to a second straight record .$212.17 billion.

The most dramatic USMCA deficit change came in U.S-Canada goods trade. Here, the gap soared by 63.14 percent, from $50.03 billion to $81.62 billion. That new record deficit was the highest since 2005’s $78.49 billion..

The goods trade deficit with Mexico surged more slowly – by 20.73 percent. But 2022’s $130.55 billion total was a new all-time high as well, surpassing 2020’s $112.08 billion.

American trade with the European Union (EU) was an exception to the 2022 pattern. The goods shortfall fell by 6.78 percent, from $218.74 billion to $203.91 billion, largely reflecting supercharged American exports of natural gas to the continent to make up for reduced post-Ukraine war Russian supplies.

But the goods deficit with the EU’s largest economy, Germany, increased by 5.44 percent, from $69.88 billion to $73.69 billion.

Turning to U.S. goods trade with Asia, the deficit with Japan grew by 12.80 percent on year, from $60.30 billion to $68.01 billion.

The gap with South Korea jumped by 51.39 percent, from $28.98 billion to a third straight record $43.87 billion.

In swelling by 19.65 percent, from $40.23 billion to $48.13 billion, the goods shortfall with Taiwan set recorded its fourth consecutive all-time high.

And consistent with its growing role as an alternative to offshoring export-oriented production to China, the U.S. goods deficit with Vietnam ballooned by 27.77 percent, setting a thirteenth straight record in the process.

At the same time, these geographic trade statistics show that despite the emergence of Asia altenatives to China, U.S. goods trade is becoming increasingly concentrated within the Western Hemisphere.

Between 2021 and 2022, two-way U.S. goods trade with Canada and Mexico combined as a share of total U.S. goods trade rose from 28.76 percent to 29.33 percent. And in 2019, the last full-year before the pandemic’s arrival state-side, this share was just 25.71 percent.

The numbers for Dominican Republic and Central America are much smaller but the trends more dramatic. Between 2021 and 2022, their share of total U.S. goods trade improved from 5.25 percent to 5.34 percent, but since 2019, it’s way up from 1.23 percent.   

 

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Is Biden Learning the Limits of Multilateralism?

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Afghanistan, alliances, allies, America First, ASML, Biden, Biden administration, Blob, China, Chips Act, Europe, export controls, Japan, multilateralism, NATO, North Atlantic treaty Organization, oil, oil price, OPEC, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Saudi Arabia, semiconductors, South Korea, Taiwan, Ukraine War

Remember the buzz worldwide and among the bipartisan globalist U.S. foreign policy Blob that Donald Trump’s defeat in the 2020 presidential election heralded the start of a new golden age of America’s relations with its longstanding security allies?

Remember how President Biden himself pushed this line with his claim that “America is back” and that Washington would end the supposed Trump practice of denigrating and even rupturing these relationships, and resume its post-World War II strategy of capitalizing on these countries’ strengths and fundamental agreement with vital American interests to advance mutually beneficial goals?

Fast forward to the present, and it’s stunning how thoroughly these American globalist hopes – and the assumptions behind them – have been dashed.

The latest example has been Saudi Arabia’s rejection of Mr. Biden’s request to delay an increase in oil prices announced by Riyadh and other members of the OPEC-Plus petroleum producers cartel. It’s true that few Americans currently view the Saudis as ideal allies. Continuing human rights abuses and especially evidence that its leaders ordered the assassination of a dissident Saudi-American journalist – and coming on top of revelations of Saudi support for the September 11 terrorists and Islamic extremism more broadly – will do that. Indeed, candidate Biden had even promised to make Saudi Arabia as a “pariah.”

But follow-through? Forget it – largely for fear of antagonizing the Saudis precisely because of their huge oil production and reserves, and because the President evidently still viewed them as a key to countering Iran’s hegemonic ambitions in the energy-rich region.

As for Saudi Arabia, it and much closer allies (including in Europe) were far from enthralled with how Mr. Biden pulled U.S. forces out of Afghanistan – which they charge took them by surprise and seemed pretty America First-y.

Under President Biden, the United States appears to have performed better in mustering allied support for helping Ukraine beat back Russia’s invasion. But look beneath the surface, and the European contribution has been unimpressive at best, especially considering that Ukraine is located much closer to the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) than is the United States.

In particular, according to Germany’s Kiel Institute for the World Economy, which has been tracking these developments since the war began, to date,

 “The U.S. is now committing nearly twice as much as all EU countries and institutions combined. This is a meagre showing for the bigger European countries, especially since many of their pledges are arriving in Ukraine with long delays. The low volume of new commitments in the summer now appears to be continuing systematically.”

In fact, European foot-dragging has reached the point at which even Mr. Biden’s Treasury Secretary, Janet Yellen, has just told them (in diplospeak of course) to get on the stick.

Apparently, America’s allies in Asia as well as Europe have hesitated to get behind another key initiative as well: Slowing China’s growing technological progress in order to limit its potential militar power.

In a September 16 speech, White House national security advisor Jake Sullivan confirmed that the United States had officially doubled down on this objective:

“On export controls, we have to revisit the longstanding premise of maintaining “relative” advantages over competitors in certain key technologies.  We previously maintained a “sliding scale” approach that said we need to stay only a couple of generations ahead. 

“That is not the strategic environment we are in today. 

“Given the foundational nature of certain technologies, such as advanced logic and memory chips, we must maintain as large of a lead as possible.”

And on October 7, the United States followed up by announcing the stiffest controls to date on doing business with Chinese tech entities – controls that will apply not only to U.S.-owned companies, but to other countries’ companies that use U.S.-owned firms technology in high tech products they sell and high tech services they provide to China.

Including these foreign-owned businesses in the U.S. sanctions regime – as well as in parallel efforts to rebuild American domestic capacity and marginalize China’s role in these sectors – is unavoidable for the time being, since the domestic economy long ago lost its monopoly and in some cases even its presence in the numerous products vital to semiconductor manufacturing in particular.

But as the Financial Times reported last month, a year after Washington drew up plans to create a “Chip 4” initiative to work with Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea to achieve these goals, “the four countries have yet to finalise plans even for a preliminary meeting.”

The prime foot-dragger has been South Korea, which fears Chinese retaliation that could jeopardize its massive and lucrative trade with the People’s Republic. But the same article makes clear that Japan harbors similar concerns.

Also unenthusiastic about the U.S. campaign is the Dutch manufacturer of semiconductor production equipment ASM Lithography (ASML). ASML’s cooperation is crucial to America’s anti-China ambitions because it’s the sole global supplier of machines essential for making the world’s most advanced microchips.

So far it’s been playing along. But similar complants about possibly losing business opportunities in China – which may account for nearly half of the world’s output of electronics products along with much of its production of less advanced semiconductors – have already persuaded the Biden administration to give some South Korean and Taiwanese microchip manufacturers a one-year exemption from the new export curbs. Could ASML try to win similar leniency?

In fairness, the Biden administration hasn’t wound up placing all its foreign policy bets on alliances and securing multilateral cooperation. Indeed, its new National Security Strategy re-states the importance of rebuilding American economic strength as a foundation of foreign policy success; the legislation it successfully sponsored to bolster the United States’ semiconductor and other high tech capabilities put considerable money behind that approach; and to its credit, it announced the new China tech curbs even after it couldn’t initially secure adequate allied cooperation – assuming, correctly, that an act of U.S. leadership could bring start bringing them in line.

Hopefully, a combination of these rifts with allies and its recognition of the importance of maintaining and augmenting national power mean that President Biden at least is learning a crucial lesson: that supporting multilateralism and alliances can’t be ends of a sensible U.S. foreign policy in and of themselves. They can only be means to ends. And although they can obviously be valuable in many instances, the best ultimate guarantor of the nation’s security, independence, and prosperity are its own devices.       

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is the New (April) U.S. Trade Report a False Dawn?

Tags

Advanced Technology Products, Biden, Census Bureau, China, Donald Trump, exports, goods trade, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, non-oil goods trade deficit, services trade, South Korea, stimulus, supply chains, Switzerland, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Zero Covid, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although today’s new official figures showed a major dropoff in the U.S. trade deficit between March and April, and the results came from a normally encouraging combination of more exports and fewer imports, the Census data also show that big caveats and questions are hanging over these results and how enduring they might be.

First and foremost, the improvement in the combined goods and services deficits, and all virtually all the trade balances comprising it, could be resulting from a dramatic slowdown in U.S. economic growth. Second, the latest decline in the chronic and huge U.S. goods trade gap with China surely stems from Beijing’s recent over-the-top (but surely temporary) Zero Covid policies, which have further snagged already tangled up supply chains. And third, large revisions in some of the numbers (especially for services trade) inevitably cast some doubt as to their reliability lately.

In fact, these features of the report – along with the still-near historic levels of many of these trade deficits and other usually typical gap-widening developments like a strong U.S. dollar and still-astronomical levels of economic stimulus from Washington – are telling me that my prediction last month of higher deficits to come will age pretty well.

Not that the narrowing of the trade gap in April was bupkis. The combined goods and services deficit fell 19.11 percent from March’s all-time high of $107.65 billion (which itself was revised down a hefty 1.96 percent) to $87.08 billion. This level was the lowest since December’s $78.87 billion and the nosedive the biggest since December, 2012’s 19.85 percent.

And as just mentioned, the improvement came from the right combination of reasons. Total exports hit their third straight monthly record, rising 3.49 percent from an upwardly revised (by 0.99 percent) $244.11 billion to $252.62 billion

Overall imports, meanwhile, tumbled 3.43 percent from their record $351.79 billion to $339.70 billion. The total was the second biggest ever, but the decrease was the greatest since the 13.16 shrinkage during pandemic-y and recession-y April, 2020.

The trade shortfall in goods was down 15.04 percent from a downwardly revised (by 1.04 percent) $126.81 billion in March to $107.74 percent in April. This level, too, was the lowest since December’s $100.52 billion, and the 15.04 percent sequential tumble the biggest since April, 2015’s 15.09 percent.

Goods exports rose sequentially by 3.57 percent in April, from 170.04 billion to a third consecutive record of $176.11 billion. And U.S. purchases of foreign goods sank by 4.38 percent on month in April, from a downwardly revised (by 0.65 percent) record $296.85 billion to $283.84 billion (as with total imports, the second highest result of all time). The decrease was the biggest since the 12.79 percent drop in that pandemic-y April, 2020.

But even the above sizable revisions paled before those made for services trade. The March surplus was upgraded fully 4.48 percent, from $18.34 billion to $19.16 billion, and the April figure grew by another 7.83 percent to $20.66 billion – the highest level since December’s $21.66 billion.

Services exports (apparently) deserve much of the credit. They reached an all-time high of $76.52 billion. This total bested May, 2019’s previous record of $75.41 billion by only 1.46 percent, but the milestone is significant given the outsized hit suffered by the service sector worldwide during the pandemic period.

April services exports, moreover, rose 3.30 percent from March’s $74.07 billion – a total that itself was revised up by 4.23 percent.

Services imports set their third consecutive monthly record in April, rising 1.73 percent, to $55.86 billion, from March’s upwardly revised (by 4.19 percent) $54.19 billion.

A big April fall-off also came in the non-oil goods trade deficit – known to RealityChek regulars as the Made in Washington trade deficit, because by stripping out figures for oil (which trade diplomacy usually ignores) and services (where liberalization efforts have barely begun), it stems from those U.S. trade flows that have been heavily influenced by trade policy decisions.

This shortfall decreased by 14.72 percent in April, to $108.68 billion, from March’s downwardly revised record $127.42 billion. The drop was the biggest since March, 2013’s 16.74 percent.

The enormous and persistent manufacturing trade deficit retreated in April from record levels, too. But even though the month’s $124.41 billion shortfall was 12.71 percent lower than March’s all-time high $142.22 billion, and even though the monthly decline of 12.71 percent was the biggest since pandemic-y February, 2020’s 23.09 percent, this deficit was still the second biggest ever.

April’s manufactures exports of $109.36 billion were 4.03 percent lower than March’s record $113.96 billion, but were still the second best total on record. Ditto for the month’s manufactures imports, which tumbled 8.85 percent from their March record of $256.18 billion to $233.50 billion.

Another April fall-off from a record monthly deficit came in advanced technology products (ATP). After ballooning by 73.65 percent sequentially in March, to $23.31 billion, the recently volatile gap narrowed in April by 21.50 percent, to $18.30 billion.

Both the better manufactuing and ATP trade figures surely stemmed at least in part from the Zero Covid policies that interfered with so much industrial production from China. The U.S. goods deficit with the People’s Repubic, however, narrowed by just 10.02 percent on month in April, from $34 billion to $30.57 billion. Even so, the level was the lowest since last July’s $28.56 billion.

U.S. goods exports to China were down on month in April by 16.25 percent (their biggest drop since February, 2021’s 278.85 percent), from $13.38 billion to $11.20b. This total is the lowest since last September’s $11.03 billion.

The much greater amount of U.S. goods imports from China plummeted 11.82 percent n month in April, from $47.37 billion to $41.77 billion – the lowest level since last July’s $40.32 billion.

Also notable – breaking a pattern going back several years — the 10.02 percent April monthly drop in the U.S. goods deficit with China was smaller than the month’s sequential decline in the non-oil goods deficit (14.72 percent). And on a yar-to-date basis, the China deficit is up only slightly less (27.59 percent) than the non-oil deficit (28.95 percent). So the next few months’ worth of data may shed some light on whether the Trump (now Biden) tariffs on China are losing their effectiveness, or whether the last few months’ numbers are anomalies.

Other significant April results for individual U.S. trade partners: The goods deficit with South Korea set a new record of $4.09 billion – 23.79 percent higher than March’s total of $3.30 billion and 21.70 percent greater than the old record of $3.36 billion set last September.

And the goods deficit with Switzerland cratered in April by 67.63 percent, to $2.89 billion, from March’s $8.93 billion level. The percentage shrinkage of this bilateral trade gap was the biggest since September, 2018, when a $1.22 billion U.S. deficit turned into a $149 million surplus.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Will a Russian Victory Really Bring On a World at War?

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Antony J. Blinken, Biden, China, Council on Foreign Relations, East China Sea, globalism, Japan, Kim Jong Un, national interests, North Korea, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, South China Sea, South Korea, Taiwan, The Wall Street Journal, Ukraine, Ukraine-Russia war, Vladimir Putin, war, Xi JInPing

Not only do American leaders seem pretty united on the need for the nation to do much more to help Ukraine defend itself from Russian invaders. They and the (overwhelmingly globalist) American political and chattering classes seem largely in agreement on one of the main consequences either of permitting Russia to win, or permitting him to win without inflicting major, lasting damage on Russia’s economy – a return to a world in which aggressive dictators like Russia’s Vladimir Putin will feel much freer than they have for decades to attack their neighbors.

That fear definitely has a troubling ring of reasonableness – and all the more so since, unlike previous historical eras in which such attacks and invasions were much more common, some of the actors possess nuclear weapons.

But there’s something these warnings are overlooking. However vivid such dangers are in principle, it’s hard to identify actual places around the world where potential conquerors have been bidng their time until receiving just the kind of signal that a Russian success in Ukraine allegedly would send.

If you doubt the prominence of this argument for greater U.S. involvement in the conflict, you haven’t been paying attention. For example, in his first public remarks after the invasion, President Biden claimed that “Putin’s actions betray his sinister vision for the future of our world — one where nations take what they want by force.”

In a speech a month earlier, his Secretary of State, Antony J. Blinken, asserted that one of the post-World War II global order’s guiding principles was a rejection of

“the right of one country to change the borders of another by force; to dictate to another the policies it pursues or the choices it makes, including with whom to associate; or to exert a sphere of influence that would subjugate sovereign neighbors to its will.

“To allow Russia to violate those principles with impunity would…send a message to others around the world that these principles are expendable, and that, too, would have catastrophic results.”

The conservatives on the Wall Street Journal editorial board, who don’t agree with the Biden administration on much of anything, similarly contended that “Whether the West admits it or not, the invasion is setting a precedent for what the world will tolerate in the 21st century.”

But check out this assessment of worldwide hot spots from the Council on Foreign Relations, often called the seat of America’s globalist foreign policy establishment. Where exactly are the Putins of tomorrow whose will to international power would be even be sharpened by a Russian victory in Ukraine?

Certainly not on the Korean peninsula or in the East China Sea. North Korea no doubt has designs on neighboring South Korea, but they’ve existed for decades. Ditto for China and Taiwan. It’s true that Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping might be emboldened by an inadequate U.S. and international response to Putin’s war. But not from any relief that global norms of behavior that had been holding them back had weakened, or that a Russian victory had set some a kind of precedent – with binding power? Because they take the idea of rule of law more seriously in their treatment of foreigners than they do in their treatment of their own people? Please.

Other than these Asian conflicts – which also include China’s expansionism in the South China Sea, but which also long predate the Ukraine war – where are the aggressors-in-waiting who may feel freer to attack their neighbors? Should we include the other East China Sea dispute, where China is involved, too – even though U.S. allies Japan and South Korea are also contesting each other’s claims to some miniscule islands?

More important, where are the global hot spots where current or potential territorial rivalries could explode into conflict that would imperil global peace and security – including America’s? Nagorno-Karabakh (on the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan, unless you’ve been following this tiff closely)? As Mr. Biden would say, “Come on, man.”

I’m sure that there are flashpoints in sub-Saharan Africa that could eventually embroil entire regions in warfare. But it’s as cold-blooded as it is true that these are regions so chronically dysfunctional (and therefore largely disconnected from the wider world) that even complete chaos has no potential to spread much further – or inspire conqueror wannabees in regions of greater concern.

Closer to home for the United States, according to the Congressionally founded U.S. Institute of Peace, some small countries in Latin America have been quarreling with neighbors over territory since 1990, and if they did ignite conflict, refugees would of course come streaming to U.S. borders. But only once – in 1995 – did one of these feuds result in war (between Ecuador and Peru). And I’m glad I don’t have to make the argument that revanchists in either country are chomping at the bit to get a symbolic green light from a Russian victory in Ukraine.

The big takeaways here clearly are (1) that the world isn’t a tinderbox likely to burst into a series of truly dangerous international conflicts depending on the outcome of Russia’s war on Ukraine; and (2) that the potential conflicts that can affect the United States consequentially are and have long been driven by their own dynamics (including current and longstanding American approaches to these situations).

So as has been the case since Russian policy toward its neighbors became more belligerent, what should be driving the U.S. response should be examinations concerning the nature of concrete, specific U.S. interests that are or are not at stake. Claims that Ukraine’s continued independence and full sovereignty are all that stand between today’s relative calm among countries (if not in terms of civil conflicts) and an entire globe engulfed in war deserve the same fate as previous alarmist concotions like the domino theory – getting tossed onto what former President Reagan memorably called the “ash heap of history.”

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Time for a Nuclear-Armed Taiwan?

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alliances, allies, Asia, China, East Asia, geopolitics, Indo-Pacific, Japan, national interests, national security, nuclear proliferation, nuclear weapons, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Porcupine Theory, semiconductors, South Korea, Taiwan, vital interests

Since early in the nuclear age, students of international relations scholar from time to time have advanced a dramatically heretical idea: that a world in which more than a few countries possessed nuclear weapons would be safer than a world in which such arms were limited to those countries that already had them. The  reasoning: Attacking nuclear-armed countries is a lot riskier for the aggressor than attacking non-nuclear countries, so the risk of wars breaking out would fall. If you think about the success of the little mammal with big quills, you can see why this notion has become known as the “Porcupine Theory”.

I bring up the subject because I increasingly find myself wondering whether encouraging Taiwan to build a nuclear arsenal would be the best way for the United States to safeguard interests in the island’s independence that have become vital recently because Taiwan has become the world leader in manufacturing advanced semiconductors – which are so crucial to the national security and prosperity of every country, including the now lagging United States.

There can’t be any doubt that the burgeoning importance of Taiwan’s independence and the apparently burgeoning determination of China to reestablish control over what it views as a renegade province, have produced a situation that’s increasingly dangerous for the United States. China, after all, is a power whose conventional military forces may now be strong enough to defeat America’s if it decides to help Taiwan fight off a Beijing attack.

In principle, Washington could resolve to turn the tide by using its own weapons of mass destruction in a battle for Taiwan. But China’s own arsenal is now so powerful that the result could be a full-scale nuclear exchange that brings disaster to the U.S. homeland. In other words, as I’ve written for years, America arguably has lost escalation dominance in Asia, and may have no choice but to acquiesce in China’s takeover of the island and its world class tech capabilities.

Nonetheless, this dire threat so far hasn’t deterred U.S. leaders from moving closer to declaring their intent to defend Taiwan militarily (notably, e.g., as reported here), and ending the posture of “strategic ambiguity” that has so far helped keep the peace in the region. So no one can responsibly rule out push coming to shove in this intensifying crisis.

To date, the United States has opposed countries like Taiwan from crossing the nuclear weapons threshhold mainly because Washington has rejected the Porcupine Theory. In addition, however, this anti-proliferation stance, especially toward allies and quasi-allies like Taiwan, has stemmed from the nuclear weapons parity that the United States enjoyed vis-a-vis the old Soviet Union and today toward Russia, and the overwhelming superiority of its nuclear forces versus those of China and North Korea in Asia. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, the Asian nuclear balance has deteriorated from the U.S. standpoint.

The United States has also always viewed its security alliances with Germany and Japan in particular to be essential to preventing their reversion to the disastrously militaristic ways of the 1930s and 1940s. Nuclear weapons controlled by these two countries were therefore completely out of the question. (Interestingly, a revealing difference of opinion between then President Barack Obama and then presidential candidate Donald Trump was sparked by these issues in 2016.)    

Reliability concerns, however, have also dominated Washington’s position on nuclear weapons spread outside the U.S. alliance network. Specifically, American leaders have always worried about these devices being acquired by unstable governments (which supposedly are less capable of securing them against terrorists and other extremists) and so-called rogue states (which supposedly would be more likely to use them or threaten their use).

A nuclear-armed Taiwan could resolve the prime dilemma for the United States by letting it off the hook for the island’s defense. After all, if China hasn’t yet pulled the trigger on a Taiwan without nukes, it makes sense to believe that it would be much less likely to attack the island if a conflict could bring Taiwanese nuclear warheads falling on Chinese soil.

It’s true that, as I’ve heard various observers argue, that the semiconductor problem may be exaggerated – because, for example, the United States could keep the relevant technology out of Chinese hands by bombing the factories and labs. In theory, the Taiwanese may have plans to blow up these facilities themselves. But it’s also true that these speculations could be way too optimistic – especially since the most crucial knowhow resides in the heads of Taiwanese scientists and engineers, who would need to be protected somehow against a Chinese roundup.

An American endorsement of a nuclear Taiwan could also bring benefits throughout Asia, signaling to Beijing that continuing its bellicose behavior could convince the United States to give a nuclear green light to Japan and South Korea.

Moreover, the longstanding main U.S. anti-proliferation rationales look a lot weaker today. Taiwan is clearly neither a rogue state nor a country with an unstable government. Ditto for Japan and South Korea, for that matter. Besides, precisely because of the weakening U.S. military position in East Asia, and consequently growing worries about Washington’s willingness to make good on its nuclear commitments, many observers believe that all three countries are already latent nuclear powers. (See, e.g., here.) That is, they could build nuclear weapons quickly whenever they wished.

Yet encouraging Taiwan to go nuclear would hardly be risk-free. If and when openly announced, it could spur the Chinese to attack – to enable them to capture the island before its nuclear-ization was completed. A nuclear Taiwan would also be less deferential to American wishes. In fact, its semiconductor superiority has already enabled it to resist some U.S. demands related to plans for increasing microchip production and supply chain security cooperation between the two countries. (The same has held for South Korea, as reported in the linked article immediately above.)

More broadly, nuclear weapons acquisition by Japan and South Korea would certainly undermine America’s post-World War II status as kingpin of East Asia, and all the benefits it ostensibly creates for Americans in one of the world’s most economically important regions.

But even if those benefits were nearly as great as widely believed (and continuing U.S. difficulty opening Asian markets to American exports makes clear that they haven’t been), a nuclear-armed Taiwan would create much bigger benefits: dramatically reducing the odds that China acquires some of the world’s most important technology, and that the risk of a Chinese nuclear attack on the United States if Beijing resulting from a conflict over Taiwan.

The key, as suggested above, would be supporting nuclearization without provoking all-out Chinese aggression – suggesting that this goal deserves more attention in Washington than it’s receiving these days.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Biden’s Anti-China Coalition is Flunking an Olympian Test

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allies, Australia, Beijing Olympics, Biden, boycotts, Canada, China, European Union, Germany, Indo-Pacific, Italy, Japan, multilateralism, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, semiconductors, South Korea, Taiwan, United Kingdom, Winter Olympics

One of President Biden’s main foreign policy aims has been to create an international coalition to resist continually mounting belligerence by China, and to curb the massive, decades-long flows of foreign capital and technological knowhow that have done so much to strengthen and enrich the People’s Republic. And whatever promise is held by this anti-China strategy has become vitally important lately because of Beijing’s intensifying intimidation campaign against Taiwan, whose autonomy has become a vital U.S. interest due to its world leadership in semiconductor manufacturing processes.

That’s why it’s so discouraging to report that, as of this morning, so few of the allies on which Mr. Biden is counting have been willing even to take so limited a step as joining the U.S. diplomatic boycott of the Winter Olympics scheduled to be held in China’s capital Beijing in February.

Australia and the United Kingdom signed on this morning. And a bit later, so did Canada. But so far, that’s it. According to this Reuters article, Japan is considering not sending cabinet members to the Games but South Korea isn’t even thinking about this step. The New York Times reports that New Zealand had previously decided not to send any officials to China but cited CCP Virus-related health concerns as the reason; that the European Union’s (EU) European Parliament has passed a resolution backing a boycott barring “verifiable improvement” in China’s human rights situation, but one that’s non-binding; that the EU’s separate policymaking arm has declined to support the U.S. action; EU member France is hiding behind this EU skirt so far; fellow EU member Italy has said it’s not on board; and Olaf Scholz, the new leader of another EU member, Germany, clearly doesn’t want to be.

It’s not that joining the American initiative will produce any meaningful changes in China’s behavior. Indeed, official foreign participation in and attendance at Olympics isn’t exactly the norm.

It’s true, moreover, as The Times mentioned, that many of these countries and the EU collectively have imposed human rights sanctions on China; that some have begun thinking about how to shield their economies from Beijing’s power and influence (see, e.g., here and here); and that some have begun to increase their own defense spending in response to China’s own buildup and provocations (see, e.g., here and here), or become more active militarily in the Indo-Pacific region (see, e.g., here).

At the same time, boosting military budgets and even sending warships on port calls and other East Asian missions is a far cry from credibly pledging to come to the U.S.’ and Taiwan’s aid if China moves against the island. (It’s also important to note that an American military response, or at least a prompt one, is far from certain, either, since the United States is not yet obliged by treaty to come to Taiwan’s defense.)

And if countries are reluctant to take even a symbolic step like diplomatically boycotting the Beijing Olympics, which doesn’t even entail further sanctions, can they really be counted on to enter hostilities against China?

President Biden is fond of saying that “America is back” in its role as free world leader following an alleged Trump administration abdication. But leaders by definition need followers, and when it comes to confronting China meaningfully, it’s not clear right now that he has many that are reliable.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Biden’s Dangerously Loose Lips on Nuclear Weapons Policy

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alliances, allies, Baltics, Biden, Biden administration, China, deterrence, globalism, no first use, North Korea, nuclear weapons, Obama, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, semiconductors, South Korea, Soviet Union, Taiwan, Trump, Ukraine

As usual, headline news is coming so fast and furiously from so many different direections that lots of major developments get neglected (including by me). One of the most important pretty stunningly shows once again that those American leaders who most loudly proclaim themselves to be champions of the globalist approach to foreign policy, and of the U.S. security alliances they view as one of its greatest achievements (both for the United States and the globe at large) have once more been flirting seriously with ideas certain to destroy those alliances.

Specifically, I’m referring to recent reports (e.g., here) that the President Biden is considering endorsing a “no first use” (NFU) policy for America’s nuclear weapons arsenal.

The shift hasn’t yet been approved. A rethink hasn’t even been officially announced. And some of the anonymous sources who leaked this news to reporters (no doubt from inside the Biden administration, and no doubt as a trial balloon) claim that what’s being contemplated is changing to something similar to NFU but not identical to it.

But of course, trial balloons are floated precisely to evoke reactions to something that someone awfully high up in government (or whatever organization is doing the floating) thinks is a swell idea, and who’s confident that his or her boss thinks or would think so, too. Moreover, the difference between NFU and the variant being considered seems pretty academic at best.

Most important about this possible new Biden approach to national security is that it reveals this administration to be every bit as cynical and therefore unserious about the globalism and alliances it pretends to prioritize – and about its indignant and sanctimonious portrayals of the more skeptical views of critics like former President Trump as proof of their dangerous ignorance – as the Obama administration.

For as I explained five years ago when Obama entertained NFU right after slamming Trump literally as a foreign policy and specifically nuclear weapons know-nothing, even mulling such a new nuclear doctrine could undermine the very alliances that globalists like him exalted.

And the reason is simple: First use of nuclear weapons is the policy that for decades has enabled the United States to deter attacks on the allies credibly in the first place – and that has held these arrangements together. For long ago, Washington dismissed as impractical trying to match adversaries like the old Soviet Union, China, and North Korea in conventional forces. The first two could draw on populations that would always exceed America’s, and even when it came to relatively small antagonists like the latter, fielding such forces was considered too expensive to be sustained financially and politically.

Nuclear weapons, however, were relatively cheap, and American leaders judged that declaring their intent to respond to purely conventional attacks on allies by these countries by launching the nukes if non-nuclear forces proved inadequate would put the fear of God even in a nuclear superpower like the Soviet Union. And first use would even more effectively deter countries with tiny or non-existen nuclear forces of their own, like China and North Korea for decades.

Even when Beijing and Pyongyang built nuclear forces big and capable enough to call this U.S. bluff successfully at least in theory (because they could now wreak impressive nuclear destruction on the American homeland, too), American leaders put their trust in NFU. And if indeed protecting allies was the overriding priority of U.S. foreign policy, this judgement was at least defensible.

A NFU policy, though, or even trial balloons, could bring disastrous consequences. Either would risk emboldening the enemies of the United States and its allies by signaling that Washington would at the least hesitate to play its most formidable military card. Just as important, it’s hard to imagine a worst recent time than the present for indulging in such speculation. After all, not only does the United States no longer enjoy overwhelming nuclear edges over China and North Korea. But China and Russia have displayed ever greater interest in establishing or reestablishing effective control over small neighbors like Ukraine and the Baltic states and of course Taiwan.

In addition, a NFU policy or talk thereof could frighten allies into bailing on the United States and cutting the best deals they could with Moscow or Pyongyang or Beijing while they still had the chance. Alternatively, because sizable American forces remain right at or near the front lines at all three of these flashpoints, the absence of a first use policy could result in them getting caught up in unwinnable battles even if a U.S. President wanted to stay on the sidelines.

Finally, when we’re talking about Taiwan, of course, we’re talking about the place that now makes the world’s most advanced semiconductors – products that are central to both future American prosperity and national security. So as is not the case with Russia’s neighbors or even South Korea (an impressive semiconductor manufacturer in its own right), adopting NFU could result in the loss of a genuinely vital U.S. interest.

I’ve long favored fundamental changes in U.S. alliance and overall foreign policy and national security strategy. But that’s not the point here. If you like alliances, it’s really pretty simple: At a minimum, you either keep first use, or you greatly beef up U.S. conventional forces, or you convince the allies to fill whatever non-nuclear military force gaps you face, or you do all three or some combination of them. If you adopt NFU and fail to take offsetting steps on the conventional force front, be ready to kiss these arrangements goodbye.

From all accounts (see, e.g., here) the allies themselves recognize this. So does China. What’s scary is that even if the supposed adults-in-the-room and master strategists in the Biden administration eventually realize the stakes involved (as their Obama predecessors eventually did), they may have greatly undermined the nation’s safety – along with boosting the risks of conflict the world over.