(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The New U.S. Trade Figures Validate Trump’s (Previous?) Hard Line

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aircraft, Boeing, China, civilian aircraft, goods exports, goods imports, goods trade, manufacturing, merchandise exports, merchandise imports, merchandise trade, Mexico, North America, services trade, soybeans, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The new U.S. monthly trade data, which bring the story up through November, are teaching President Trump and the rest of the country a crucial lesson about his total trade strategy and his approach to China trade, along with their impact on the economy as a whole. Specifically, the hard line he was pursuing with the People’s Republic before the announcement of the “Phase One” trade agreement was working like a charm.

The new numbers also make clear that many of U.S. domestic manufacturing’s troubles this year, including its mediocre trade performance, have had nothing to do with the Trump tariffs whatever – whether on Chinese products or foreign aluminum and steel. Instead, they owe to the (apparently mounting) safety woes of aircraft giant Boeing.        

The initial Phase One announcement (on October 11) revealed that the United States would hold off on an increase of tariffs from 25 percent to 30 percent on $250 billion worth of goods imports from China (largely advanced manufactures inputs) that was scheduled to go into effect on October 15. On December 13, Mr. Trump added that new levies scheduled to go into effect on December 15 on an additional $160 billion worth of merchandise imports would be canceled as well.

In return, according to the President, Beijing has agreed to “many structural changes and massive purchases of Agricultural Product, Energy, and Manufactured Goods, plus much more.” Moreover, 7.5 percent tariffs would remain on most of the rest of China’s imports along with the two governments agreeing to follow-on negotiations to address further China’s wide range of predatory trade and broader economic practices.

The new trade figures show that U.S. merchandise exports to China have indeed risen since October – by 13.69 percent month-to-month. Also up sequentially (by 21.89 percent) are total worldwide U.S. exports of soybeans – a crop whose trade performance was damaged severely by Chinese retaliatory tariffs since the latest phase of the bilateral trade war broke out.

But whether the Phase One deal and the related prospects for an enduring U.S.-China trade truce deserve much, if any, credit is open to serious doubt. For example, American goods exports to China rose sequentially four times in 2018 through September – before even the initial Phase One announcement. And two of these increases (in March and May) were bigger in percentage terms than the November improvement.

Moreover, although the November monthly shrinkage of the China’s huge bilateral goods trade surplus with the United States was substantial (15.65 percent), the surplus fell at faster rates in February and March.

Yet the cumulative success of Mr. Trump’s tariff-centric policies are clear from the new year-to-date results. On a January-through-November basis, U.S merchandise exports to China are indeed off 11.94 percent. But the much larger amount of American goods imports from China have fallen by 15.22 percent. As a result, the year-to-date merchandise trade deficit is down 16.17 percent.

Further, this progress has been made as the growth of the American global goods deficit has actually been reversed – indicating that attacking the prime source of the U.S. worldwide goods deficit is indeed helping address the global shortfall effectively.

On a year-to-date basis, the global goods deficit is down fractionally. If the trend continues for a month more, the merchandise trade gap will have narrowed on an annual basis for the first time since 2013 – a year during which the overall economy grew at a considerably slower pace (1.8 percent after inflation) than it’s been growing this year (well in excess of two percent so far in real terms).

Much of this improvement is due to America’s emergence as an oil trade surplus country (which has almost nothing to do with trade deals or other elements of trade policy, since oil trade is rarely directly affected by trade policy decisions). Yet the massive U.S. global deficits in goods other than oil have been shrinking steadily since August – from $72.75 billion that month to $63.82 billion in November, the lowest monthly total since June, 2018).

Just as important, the makeup of the remaining American merchandise deficit is becoming concentrated in North America – which benefits the United States significantly, since Mexico’s economic problems in particular often become America’s problems. And year-to-date, the total U.S. goods deficit with North America (Canada and Mexico), widened by 27.05 percent, led by a 27.64 percent rise in the Mexico gap.

Nonetheless, the merchandise deficit with Pacific Rim countries excluding China has grown by 22.47 percent year-to-date, so much more regionalization progress can clearly be made.

In other important developments revealed by today’s November trade report, the monthly U.S. combined goods and services deficit shrank sequentially by 8.31 percent to $43.09 billion from a downwardly adjusted $46.94 billion. The November figure was the lowest monthly total since October, 2016 ($42.00 billion).

November’s $63.90 billion global goods deficit (which includes oil) also represented its lowest level since October, 2016 ($62.02 billion).

Yet U.S. services trade continued to experience a weak year, as the surplus decreased sequentially in November (by 0.19 percent) and is running 4.72 below 2018’s total so far.

Total U.S. exports advanced by 0.66 percent on month in November, but are so far down fractionally on a year-to-date basis. (During the previous January-through-November period, they’d risen by 6.98 percent.)

Total U.S. imports dropped by 0.98 percent sequentially in November, and so far are down 0.14 percent year-to-date. (During the previous January-through-November period, they’d increased by 8.20 percent.)

Encouraging news came on the manufacturing trade front, too, as this sector’s enormous, longstanding deficit fell on month by 12.70 percent, to $80.93 billion. That was the lowest monthly level since March’s $76.96 billion and the biggest monthly percentage drop since February’s 20.00 percent.

U.S. manufactures exports declined by 3.81 percent on month in November, but the much greater amount of imports sank by 8.16 percent.

Year-to-date through November, the manufacturing trade deficit is up 1.69 percent – from $935.74 billion to $951.55 billion. In other words, another $1 trillion annual trade deficit is almost certainly in store for U.S. domestic manufacturing.

At the same time, this rate of increase is much slower than that from the same period in the year before: 10.98 percent.

In addition, this manufacturing progress has been recorded despite a major deterioration in U.S. civilian aircraft trade fueled undoubtedly and largely by the safety problems experienced by Boeing. 

The company – America’s only producer of wide-body civilian jetliners – has long been a major export and trade surplus champion.  But U.S. exports of civilian aircraft dropped by 5.77 percent on month in November, and have nosedived by fully 21.77 percent year-to-date.  Civilian craft imports declined at an even faster rate sequentially in November – fully 39.59 percent.  But the numbers are much smaller, and year-to-date through November, they’ve soared by 19.39 percent.

As a result, the U.S. civilian aircraft trade surplus last year through November stood at only $27.22 billion.  That’s a 33.02 percent plunge from 2018’s comparable total of  $40.64 billion.  And it means that, all else equal, if this sector’s 2019 trade performance simply equalled that of the year before, the overall manufacturing trade deficit would have barely grown at all.   

 

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy? Did Trump Trade National Security for Soybeans with China?

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agriculture, China, election 2016, election 2020, export controls, extradition, farmers, G20, G20 Summit, Huawei, Meng Wangzhou, national security, Osaka G20 Summit, rural areas, soybeans, tariffs, technology, telecommunications, Trade, trade war, Trump, Xi JInPing, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Did President Trump sell U.S. national security down the river at his meeting with Chinese dictator Xi Jinping in order to make American farmers happy and, he hopes, ensure his reelection? Could be – even though there’s still much that’s not known about the U.S.-China deal reached between the two leaders on the sideline of a big international economic summit meeting in Osaka. In fact, I haven’t even seen any official U.S. government documents describing the agreement in detail. (A further complication: Whatever official Chinese documents come out describing the deal could differ significantly from the American portrayal.)

At the same time, I’ll venture that the major, and from the U.S. standpoint, urgently, needed course change in China policy begun by Mr. Trump hasn’t yet been altered fundamentally. And I still don’t consider that outcome likely, even though events of the last few days reveal that some important loopholes in America’s approach need to be closed, pronto. 

From what I can glean from the just-released official White House transcript of the President’s Osaka press conference is that (as I predicted), Mr. Trump and Xi agreed to resume formally negotiations that fell apart in early May, apparently because China began reneging on commitments it had already made. The quid pro quo that seems to have revived the talks evidently comes down to this:

The President agreed to refrain from imposing threatened tariffs on U.S. imports from China that don’t already face duties or new duties (a little more than half of Chinese goods entering the American market fall into this category), and to make it easier for American tech companies to sell, seemingly on an ongoing basis, parts and components vitally needed by Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei.

In return, China agreed to boost greatly purchases of agricultural products that it had all but shut out of its own large market to retaliate for Trump tariffs, thereby denying U.S. farmers major rivers (not just streams) of revenue. Since rural America went so notably for Mr. Trump in 2016, the political appeal of that approach is easy to see.

The chief uncertainty remaining: What exactly will Huawei be able to buy from U.S. firms? The issue is crucially important to China because, notwithstanding its commanding position in many global markets for advanced telecommunications systems, these Huawei products still depend vitally on information technology hardware and software from American-owned tech companies that have no adequate (if any) substitutes from other suppliers. And if, as was likely, Huawei suffered major damage because these U.S.-origin goods and services weren’t available, a major blow would be dealt to China’s ambitions to gain preeminence in a wide range of advanced technologies – and turn itself into a military superpower in the process.

Factors contributing to the uncertainty? To start, the so-called U.S. ban on selling to Huawei wasn’t technically a ban. It was an announcement that any proposed U.S. sales to Huawei needed to be approved by the American government because Huawei had been placed on a list of “entities” deemed dangerous to U.S. national security. So in principle, some American firms’ products and services could still be sold to Huawei (and several dozen affiliated entities also added to the list). But presumably, the truly valuable inputs would be denied.

Second, President Trump told the Osaka press conference that Huawei would only be permitted to buy from American-owned business “equipment where there’s not a great national-emergency problem with it.” That’s somewhat comforting, but only somewhat. The reasons? First, there’s reason to believe that, even before the Trump-Xi agreement, Huawei could have bought even equipment that did raise national security concerns as long as those computer chips or whatever else consisted mainly of foreign content (which is often the case because production of these goods has become so globalized, and because – irony alert! – some of the non-U.S. content now comes from China itself).

That qualification was shaping up as a huge problem because, if it’s present, then Huawei would still retain access to many of the high tech products it needs; and because the result could be even stronger incentives for American high tech companies to manufacture and develop even more of their most sophisticated offering offshore, including in China.

Third, as Mr. Trump specified, Huawei has not been taken off the “bad entities” list. Nor has there been any change in the U.S. extradition request to Canada for Meng Wangzhou, the CFO of Huawei (and daughter of its founder) to enable her trial for violating America’s export control laws. Why, then, do anything to make life easier for this entity?

Fourth, the Huawei-centric nature of this policy could signal that the President is falling into a China policy trap: Assuming that measures focused on specific entities (remember: nothing in China that’s routinely called a “business” or “company” deserves that label, in terms of how they’re used in most of the rest of the world, because China’s economy is so thoroughly controlled by the state) are adequate to cope with the intertwined China tech and national security challenge.

In fact, such episodic approaches seem doomed to fail because the China challenge is a systemic challenge. The exact names of specific instruments comprising this China challenge don’t matter in the slightest. For instance – let’s say that a truly total Huawei ban did sink this organization. In time, what’s to stop Beijing from simply slapping another name on the same units, facilities, and employees? Would Americans really want their government to have to wait to impose an embargo on this new entity until it began endangering their national security? Wouldn’t it be much better to understand that every Chinese entity big enough to be permitted by the Chinese government to play in global markets is by definition an agent of Beijing’s and of its (distinctly dangerous) ambitions? And to treat the Chinese high tech sector – for starters – accordingly?

As for the Chinese promises of greater imports of U.S. farm products, they’re problematic, too, even if Beijing does keep its promises. Hopefully, American farmers will be smart enough to respond in a measured way, not by simply assuming that they’ve won a free pass back into China forever, and recklessly supercharging and distorting their planting patterns to satisfy this new demand (as was the case especially for soybeans). Instead, hopefully, they’ve learned that Beijing can close the doors whenever it wants to – and that President Trump is kind of mercurial itself.

The President also could well be selling his agricultural record short. For although farmers clearly don’t like the Chinese tariffs on their exports prompted by the Trump levies, they also no doubt recognize how they’ve benefited from his tax and regulatory policies. And those that are culturally and socially conservative probably like what they hear from the President on those subjects – and/or don’t like many Democrats’ statements. Finally, the passage of the Trump administration’s revamp of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – the U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) deal could ease many farmers’ trade worries. 

In fact, the volatile Trump temperament – and his reelection hopes – look like the best guarantors that this shortsighted high-tech-for-soybeans trade-off won’t last long. Because the main obstacle to the kind of overarching trade deal the President still talks about still remains – the impossibility of verifying China’s compliance adequately. So the longer the Chinese hold out, and deny the President the chance he so clearly covets to claim a big victory, the more irritated with them he’s likely to become, and the greater the odds that some hammer comes down again.

Moreover, if the overall American economy and especially its manufacturing sector wind up slowing down, as some key indicators already suggest they are, increases in tariffs on Chinese manufactures could be the difference between Trump victories in the manufacturing-heavy Midwest states that (narrowly) helped key his 2016 triumph, and defeats.

In addition, it’s critically important to note that the Chinese products still facing tariffs are much more important to China’s economic future than the products that remain entirely or largely duty-free. That’s because the first group overwhelmingly consists of parts and components of industrial products that in turn are pretty advanced goods themselves. They’re the kinds of products that matter crucially to America’s industrial future as well.

So, as observed by this perceptive New York Times article, the China-links to the global supply chains that face such mortal threats from these tariffs still remain endangered, and the more-than-decent odds that these levies will remain in place, and even get raised further, will surely keep prompting multinational companies the world over to move at least partly out of China. And any developments that weaken China economically are by definition good for the United States.

Moreover, despite widespread predictions that Trump tariffs on these so-called intermediate goods would wind up raising consumer prices because their corporate buyers would need to pass along the tariffs’ cost to their final customers, little of such inflation has emerged, for numerous reasons I’ve written on previously.

By contrast, the still un-tariffed goods are consumer goods – like shoes and toys and apparel and consumer electronics products. For various reasons I’ve written about, their prices weren’t likely to budge much even with new Trump tariffs. But for now, the President has foreclosed any such possibility completely. The only drawback for the United States to leaving these goods largely duty-free – because they’re generally very labor-intensive products, they employ unusually large numbers of Chinese workers – is that any movement of production from China to anywhere else (even even it’s Chinese companies themselves doing the moving) would result in greatly increased Chinese unemployment. The regime has long viewed high joblessness as a mortal threat to its survival. So China’s labor-intensive industries, and by extension China’s dictators, have been let off the hook, too.

In all, then, so far it seems fair to conclude that President Trump handed the Chinese some genuinely important concessions in exchange for precious little from Beijing. But it’s also distinctly possible that this trade-off makes so little sense economically, national security-wise, and politically, that it will badly flunk the test of time. And at least as important, nothing in its seems capable of stopping or even greatly slowing the U.S.-China economic disengagement that, as I’ve written, is bound to serve America’s long-term interests, and that’s already underway.

Im-Politic: So Farmers (Especially Soybeans Growers) Were Going to Punish Trump on Trade?

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2018 elections, agriculture, China, farmers, Im-Politics, midterms 2018, soybeans, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump

Since I’ve long followed U.S. trade policy, since it’s long been one of President Trump’s signature issues, and since for months the President’s tariffs had been widely described as a major danger to the coalition that carried him and other Republicans to victory in 2016, I thought one of the most useful post-midterms exercises I could conduct would be to see if these analyses held up. The verdict: Anything but.

At the heart of this narrative were America’s farmers, and especially its soybean growers. In brief, the Trump China tariffs sparked retaliatory Chinese levies on a wide range of U.S. exports, including soybeans. Soybeans had become the nation’s leading agricultural export to China, and China exports represented a large share of total American soybean production. And since those soybean exports to the People’s Republic were endangered (and have in fact plummeted), the soybean farmers (along with the rest of U.S. agriculture, since its exports were threatened by various foreign retaliatory tariffs, too) were likely to take their anger out on Republican candidates for the House and Senate this year, and reward Democrats with significant wins.  (See here, here, and here for some examples.)

Last night’s midterm results, however, make clear that nothing of the kind happened. To see how off-base the “Republican Soy-Mageddon” (“Soy-Pocalypse”?) predictions were, let’s first look at the returns from the Top Twenty districts in the House of Representatives in terms of total agricultural output. Republicans held sixteen and Democrats four when the evening began.

When it ended, the number of those seats flipped by the Democrats (i.e., where one of their candidates beat a Republican incumbent) totaled one: the First District of Iowa. The other three Democratic victories were scored by Democratic incumbents.

Republicans flipped none of these 20 seats. But they held on to 15. Moreover, three of these seats were open seats – that is, a Republican incumbent had retired. So all else equal, the Democratic candidate’s chances of winning were increased.

The race for the twentieth seat on this list – Minnesota’s First District – was too close to call at the time of this writing. It’s an open seat also, but the previous incumbent was a Democrat. So no sign of any blue wave, or any notable Democratic strength in this group of Districts, whatever.

But what about the soybeans-dominated Districts? The results from this Top Twenty show nothing like a Republican Soy-Mageddon, either.

During the previous Congressional session, Republicans held 16 of these seats as well, and the Democrats four. The Democrats flipped two of these Districts – that First in Iowa, along with that state’s Third. The Democrats’ four other victories in this group were by incumbents.

The Republicans, again, didn’t flip any Democratic soybeans seats. But they held onto 15 of their original 16 seats. In addition, three of those seats were open, so again, the GOP candidates’ advantage was smaller than it would have been had the incumbent run. The election in the twentieth District in this soybeans group – Minnesota’s First – is that still-undecided race.

Again no Soy-Mageddon for Republicans.

These developments won’t come as a major surprise to careful news buffs. Several reports (see, e.g., here, here, and here) have been published in recent weeks containing evidence that, however worried they were about their own individual prospects, many American farmers continued to support Mr. Trump – and in principle even his efforts to use pressure to extract more equitable terms of trade from China and other foreign economies. But you had to be quite the careful news buff.

At the same time, last night’s results by no means give Mr. Trump a free pass on trade policy from American agriculture. Before too long, unless his efforts start delivering results for U.S. farmers, or removing the trade threats they still face, or unless other administration policies open up new opportunities (at home or abroad), their patience could well run out. For now, however, ag is hanging tough with an America First trade approach at the grassroots level.  It’s high time that its whiny Inside the Beltway spokespeople start paying attention. 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The August U.S. Trade Report – All Soybeans Edition!

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agriculture, Census Bureau, China, exports, farming, intellectual property theft, soybeans, tech, Trade, trade war, Trump, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. International Trade Commission, USDA, USITC, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This belated report on last Friday’s U.S. trade figures (for August) focuses on soybeans for what should be glaringly obvious reasons. They make up by far the most important sector of the American economy, and any President, like Donald Trump, who risks its well-being for a trifling objective like preventing China’s domination of the world’s industries of the future – via rampant intellectual property theft, extortion, and other predatory practices – must have rocks in his head.

OK, I’m now pulling my tongue from my cheek. But given the massive coverage of U.S. soybean farmers’ woes resulting from Chinese retaliatory tariffs that are ruining their sales in their biggest foreign market by far, it seems appropriate to see what the numbers say. Especially because so far, they’re showing nothing close to a trade-led Soy-Mageddon for American growers.

The latest Census report pegs the August year-to-date current dollar soybeans exports increase at a robust 39.16 percent (from $13.10 billion to $18.75 billion). I’d like to provide the comps for the previous years, but they don’t seem to be terribly consistent with each other.

This rapid growth could well reflect the export front-loading in advance of expected tariffs that’s been widely reported. (For a compelling contrarian view, see here.) As a result, it could disappear completely, or even shift into reverse during the rest of the year. But if soybeans exports do tank between now and year-end, no one would be more surprised than the analysts at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). They keep raising their full-year 2018 export forecasts (measured in quantity, not value, terms). So why are prices so weak? Largely because even though they professed to be worried about China tariffs, America’s farmers just kept planting ever more soybeans. And planting. And planting. In fact, this year’s harvest is expected to be the biggest ever.

And speaking of the Agriculture Department, the soybeans story doesn’t end with the Census reports data. Why not? Because they differ dramatically from those calculable from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s (USITC) interactive Trade Dataweb search engine. And since the USITC statistics are the ones used by USDA, they’re worth looking at, too.

These year-to-date figures only go up to July so far, but they don’t point to any tariffs-led Soy-Mageddon, either. As with the Census data, the numbers are in current dollars, and rates of change are to their right:

2016:  $10.062 billion (+25.67 percent)

2017:  $9.076 billion (-10.86 percent)

2018:  $8.452 billion (-6.87 percent)

So yes, soybeans exports are down this year, according to the USITC. But they fell during the same period last year too – at a faster rate, even though no China tariffs or threats thereof were on the horizon. Moreover, prices this year have been falling faster than in years past for various reasons – including the actual and threatened tariffs, but as made clear above, not solely because of them.

As mentioned, these USITC figures don’t adjust for these changing prices. But the Commission helpfully provides quantity numbers as well. Here they are for the same seven-month time period, in metric tons, along with the percentage changes:

2016:  20,113 (+9.96 percent)

2017:  22,366 (+11.20 percent)

2018:  24,635 (+10.14 percent)

That is, adjusted for falling prices, soybeans exports have been rising a little more slowly this year than last, but faster than in 2016. And the rates of increase haven’t changed markedly. 

Farming is a tough business, and with a genuine U.S.-China trade war having broken out, with no end in sight, no one can legitimately blame American soybean producers for feeling nervous about the fallout.  But the evidence keeps getting clearer and clearer that, even in the mixed U.S. economy, supply and demand still play a big role in determining prices, and that soybean growers jacked up the supply enormously in recent years. If they want to get out of their current fix, they’d do well to stop complaining so much about the Trump tariffs and start getting that message.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Mainstream Media Trade Coverage that’s a Public Service

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agriculture, China, exports, Heidi Heitkamp, Meg Kelly, soybeans, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, Washington Post, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Mainstream Media is so often accused these days by President Trump and others (sometimes rightly) of propagating “fake news” that it seems only fair to point out an important example of such news organizations fighting fake news: a Washington Post article yesterday exposing the phoniness underlying key claims that the Trump administration’s tariff-heavy China policies either have nothing to do with the woes being experienced lately by America’s soybean farmers, or that they’ve already devastated cultivators of this key crop.

At first glance it seems odd that the fate of soybeans growers has moved to center stage in the China trade debate. It’s true that this crop has become America’s second-leading export to China, and that a huge share (25 percent) of the annual U.S. harvest has relied on the Chinese market. At the same time, it’s hard to think of a time since the Great Depression Dust Bowl when America’s leading journalists paid nearly this much attention to American farmers.

As the Post‘s Meg Kelly (unsurprisingly, in my view) noted, President Trump got it wrong when he responded to soybean-focused critiques of his China trade policies by contending that “Farmers have been on a downward trend for 15 years. The price of soybeans has fallen 50% since 5 years before the Election. A big reason is bad (terrible) Trade Deals with other countries.”

In all fairness, though, soybean prices did begin sinking dramatically in mid 2012 – more than four years before he was even elected President.

More noteworthy, given the rash of soybean stories and widespread fears of soy-mageddon, was Kelly’s debunking of a claim by North Dakota Democratic Senator Heidi Heitkamp (also communicated by tweet) that “A study shows that corn, soybean and wheat farmers across the U.S. have already lost $13 billion because of the administration’s trade war. We need trade policies that make sense for North Dakota, protect farmers and ranchers, and open up markets.”

Thanks to Kelly, we now know that there was no such study – or even close. Let’s allow the author’s words show how flimsy this claim really was:

“When the [Post] asked to see the study, Heitkamp’s office pointed us to an op-ed from the National Farmers Union that was referenced in a New York Times article. But the National Farmers Union said the calculation was not its work. Instead, it said, it obtained the factoid from a quote in an article in the Wall Street Journal.”

Kelly further explains that the source of the quote was eminently respectable – an agricultural economist from Purdue University. But she also made painfully clear how shoddy his methodology was: His soybean crop loss estimates never distinguished between the impact of tariffs and the impact of weather. That’s like a sportswriter examining an athlete’s performance and never disclosing whether he or she plays for a good or a bad team.

But the importance of Kelly’s diligent reporting goes far beyond soybeans, or even trade. For Heitkamp-type sleights of hand take place in the American political and policy world’s all the time. Here’s another example, reported here about a year ago, about the popular meme that the beneficiaries of former President Obama’s “Dream Act” granting amnesty to many illegal immigrant children brought to this country by their parents were an unusually well educated group – and that therefore, revoking their amnesty would backfire on an economy that urgently needed highly knowledgeable workers.

Heitkamp, however, deserves some credit for taking down her misleading tweet. President Trump hasn’t – which is disappointing since, as made clear above, and is so often the case, he could have made a completely valid point by displaying just a moderately greater respect for accuracy.