Im-Politic: Dumping on Trump by Trashing History

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arts, culture, Francisco Franco, Im-Politic, John F. Kennedy, Kennedy Center, Mainstream Media, Pablo Casals, Philip Kennecott, Spain, Trump, Washington Post

Since Philip Kennicott has won a Pulitzer Prize, and has been writing on architecture and music and culture for the Washington Post since 1999, I’m sure he knows a lot about these subjects. What he doesn’t seem to know anything about is American diplomatic history, but neither he nor his editors let that failing prevent him from writing about the intersection of the arts, politics, and foreign policy as long as the objective was dumping on President Trump.

These biases could not have been clearer in Kennicott’s article yesterday dealing with the President’s recent decision to pass up attending this year’s Kennedy Center Honors ceremony for fear of distracting from the upcoming December awards to “five artists whose talent and ingenuity have enriched and shaped cultural life in America.” As the author noted, Mr. Trump is slated to become only the third chief executive in the ceremony’s 39-year history to sit the event out.

Kennicott rightly observes that this Kennedy Center controversy – which also featured three of the five honorees declaring their refusal to attend a traditional pre-ceremony White House reception – demonstrates that ‘”the rift between the administration and the larger arts world is now total” in large part because major arts figures believe that the President has “embodied a leadership style antithetical to values that have become sacred within most contemporary arts communities, including tolerance, service and egalitarianism.”

The author also makes clear his own view that Mr. Trump is largely to blame for this rupture because he won the White House “based on divisive and racist rhetoric” and has largely continued down this dangerous road – as so many Americans believe.

Although Kennicott can be faulted for overlooking the big racism and sexism and political tolerance problems that the American entertainment community itself has failed to deal with – at least judging by critics in its own ranks – he’s also made some compelling points about the President’s leadership failings so far. In particular, as revealed just this month by his various remarks since the Charlottesville demonstrations and violence (and as I’ve also suggested), he has fallen short when it comes to “sustaining social bonds” and “dramatizing the presidency as service to the nation, not a perk of electoral victory.”

But Kennicott is deeply wrong in assuming that the arts community’s views on these subjects always or even often deserve to be taken seriously, and totally off base in viewing an episode from the days of John F. Kennedy’s presidency as an example of how well artists judge matters of public life.

The author began his article with a description of an evening in November, 1961, when the President and First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy hosted a White House performance by renowned Spanish cellist Pablo Casals. In Kennicott’s words:

“For years, Casals had boycotted performing in the United States in protest of the nation’s support for the brutal right-wing Spanish dictator Francisco Franco, but he was heartened by Kennedy’s election campaign and finally accepted an invitation to the White House.” For Kennicott, his appearance before the First Couple and “a glittering crowd of political and cultural leaders” would “become a defining moment in the administration’s embrace of both the arts and the image of elegant cosmopolitanism.”

Certainly the Camelot image fostered so successfully by the Kennedys and their cheerleaders proves that Kennicott is right about the visual message sent by that star-studded evening – about a political world and a cultural world jointly prodding the nation and humanity overall toward greater enlightenment. But Casals’ judgment about Kennedy’s Spain intentions and policy turned out to be as pathetically wrongheaded as Kennicott’s myopic Kennedy worship.

It would have been great had Kennicott mentioned at least in passing Kennedy’s gaping flaws, which ranged from out-of-control womanizing that might have presented national security risks to anti-communist hawkishness that verged on the catastrophically reckless (Google “Missile Crisis, Cuban”). But he could counter that this dimension of the Kennedy record is well known. For his article to stand as journalism, however, or even opinion journalism, Kennicott needed to tell readers at least something about the former President’s dealings with the Spanish fascist leader. Because it would have revealed that Kennedy was a Franco-phile before his truncated term in office, and as President continued the exactly same U.S. policies that Casals considered so unacceptable.

As a Congressman in the 1950s, he supported military aid to Franco. As President, he maintained tight security ties and the only concerns he expressed about the country’s internal affairs focused on the increasing the odds of a smooth transition of power once the then-septuagenarian caudillo passed from the scene. During his years in office, his top foreign policy aides often actually emphasized in meetings with Franco’s representatives how pleased the Kennedy administration was that relations had im. (See here and here for examples.) Indeed, in a May 3, 1963 meeting with the Spanish ambassador, Kennedy himself asked the envoy “to convey his best wishes to” the dictator and emphasized “the interest of the United States in maintaining and promoting close, friendly and cooperative relations with Spain.”

This history is so easy to look up that it’s hard to escape three conclusions. First, like most of the Mainstream Media, Kennicott loathes President Trump fundamentally for an intertwined combination of stylistic and anti-populist prejudices. Second, he reveres Kennedy because, like most of the bipartisan national political and cultural establishment for decades, he’s mistaken glamour and sophistication for decency and accomplishment. And third, as soon as someone clued him in on the Casals performance, he jumped to blurt out his preconceived conclusions – without caring whether they were remotely accurate or not.

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Our So-Called Foreign Policy: First Thoughts on the Post-Brexit World

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2016 election, Brexit, Catalonia, David Cameron, Donald Trump, EU, European Union, Eurozone, Federal Reserve, France, globalization, Greece, Hillary Clinton, Im-Politic, Immigration, interest rates, Janet Yellen, NATO, North Atlantic treaty Organization, Obama, Scotland, Spain, terrorism, The Netherlands, TPP, Trade, Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Trans-Pacific Partnership, TTIP, United Kingdom

I sure as heck was surprised by the United Kingdom’s decision yesterday to leave the European Union (EU). Were you? And now that “Brexit” will indeed take place, what’s in store for America and the world? My crystal ball has never worked perfectly, and much of Brexit’s ultimate impact will depend on how London executes the move, and how the EU and financial markets respond. America’s reactions of course will matter as well. Here are some initial reactions. 

>The unexpected Brexit verdict significantly changes the narratives about the global economy’s evolution, about the future of international trade and related economic policies, and about the fate of international political integration.

As recently as 48 hours ago, the safest bet was that British voters would behave similarly to voters elsewhere in Europe who have had the chance to change fundamental political arrangements. In September, 2014, the Scots voted to remain a part of the United Kingdom. Although Greek anti-EU sentiment runs high for reasons that are easily understandable given that country’s prolonged economic crisis, a much-feared (by those who were not hoping for it) “Grexit” vote never took place. Catalonia is still part of Spain, despite a strong separatist movement in the region – and a terrible Spanish economy. And in 2005, the French and Dutch electorates voted down a proposed new EU constitution that would have accelerated political and economic integration – chiefly by streamlining decision-making via greater powers for pan-European institutions. But the issue of departing the Union has not yet come up.

As with Scottish devolution in particular, I thought that instincts for caution would steadily overcome nationalist or ethnic (take your pick) feelings as election day approached, and that the British would ultimately reject a leap in the dark. And of course, my confidence was reinforced by my view that the UK is hardly an economic superpower, and that its prospects outside the EU objectively are iffy.

The British public’s refusal to back down – despite an unmistakable fear-mongering campaign by (now caretaker Prime Minister) David Cameron’s government and even the country’s central bank – signals that Europeans at least may be willing to shift integration into reverse, not simply keep it in place

>In that vein, one of the biggest worries of Brexit opponents entailed the possibilities of contagion – a “Leave” verdict encouraging similar EU opponents throughout the Union. And copycat Brexit votes are clearly back on the table, given widely acknowledged structural defects in the eurozone (a common currency area that includes 19 of the 28 – counting the UK – EU members, and that Britain never joined), Europe’s especially weak recent economic performance, and controversial EU decisions to admit large numbers of Middle East refugees.

Their success would be a genuinely historic, and indeed seismic, development, as Europeans themselves since the end of World War II have generally acknowledged that closer, more regularized economic ties were essential for breaking their centuries-old cycle of major conflict. It’s possible concerns about keeping Europe peaceful are overblown. For all the importance of economic integration, the main pacifier of the continent has been the American commitment to European defense embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Brexit per se does nothing to change the UK’s role in the alliance.

Nevertheless, economic and security issues are never, or even often, completely separate. Therefore, particularly over the longer term, Brexit and other withdrawals from the EU could well turn Europe into a much less stable place than it’s been for the last 70 years. More uncertainty could be added to the European security scene if presumptive Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump, an outspoken critic of America’s NATO policy, won the presidency.

I’ve strongly critical of continued U.S. NATO membership, too – especially of what looks to me like a possibly suicidal nuclear security guarantee. Indeed, the risks created for America by its continued NATO role convinces me that fundamental changes in the alliance’s structure are inevitable anyway, since the U.S. promise to risk its existence on Europe’s behalf has become ever less credible. If Brexit brings the EU’s dissolution, or significant weakening, closer, then Washington will face fateful NATO choices it has long tried to avoid sooner rather than later. And the foreign policy establishment’s demonization of all proposals for proactively dealing with these dilemmas has left the nation completely unprepared for their growth to critical mass.

>Economically, Brexit carries disruptive potential, too. Just look at the financial and currency markets today. But epochal political events inevitably create short-term costs; any other expectations are completely unrealistic. Especially inane have been claims on social media (e.g., by The New Yorker‘s Philip Gourevitch) over the last twelve hours that the initial turbulence touched off by Brexit proves it a failure.

Sure to be complicated greatly, however, are efforts to conclude a major trade agreement between the United States and the EU. This Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has been a long slog anyway. But since such negotiations always entail achieving a delicate balance of interests, and since the UK is a significant part of the overall EU economy, any important compromises that have been struck in the talks would seem to be threatened.  

President Obama has already concluded with eleven other countries a Pacific rim-centered trade agreement called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but it’s doubtful that Brexit will do much to dispel Congressional skepticism that has prevented Mr. Obama from formally submitting it for approval.

Keep in mind, though, that trade – including with Europe – is still a pretty minor part of the U.S. economy. The channel through which the biggest Brexit impact is likeliest to be transmitted to America is monetary policy – the province of the Federal Reserve. At the Fed’s June 15 meeting, Chair Janet Yellen made clear that the possibility of Brexit, and especially its impact on financial markets, was one factor behind the central bank’s decision to keep interest rates on hold. Until business-as-usual in the world economy resumes, don’t expect any rate hikes – good news if you believe that the U.S. desperately needs super-easy credit to sustain its current feeble recovery, and bad if you believe that prolonged near-zero rates have prevented the post-financial crisis adjustments needed to restore real health to the economy.

>In fact, such existing skepticism around these trade issues, as well as around immigration policy, makes me doubt that Brexit will have a notable effect on American politics and policy. Sure, the same kinds of economic anxieties that have fueled Trump’s campaign helped lead to victory for “Leave.” But his followers won’t be able to cast more votes for him as a result of the British decision.

Supporters of his presumptive rival, Democrat Hillary Clinton, are surely horrified by the resistance to unlimited immigration and massive refugee admissions signaled by Brexit, so they wouldn’t seem headed for the Trump camp. And it’s difficult to imagine many independent voters marking their ballots in November based on the British vote. Indeed, this poll tells us that Brexit isn’t even on the screens of most U.S. voters. Rightly or wrongly, that choice will be overwhelmingly Made in America.

One possible exception – but one that’s largely independent of Brexit: A wave of overseas terror attacks could easily heighten American anxieties about their own security, whether an Orlando or San Bernardino repeat occurs or not. Ditto for some major military success by ISIS or a similar group abroad, or an unrelated international crisis. More terrorism-related developments could favor Trump. Something like a showdown with Russia over Eastern Europe or China over the South or East China Seas could break in Clinton’s direction (due to judgment and experience considerations). In the process, these contingencies could also remind us how quickly Americans might forget all about Brexit.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Evidence that Greece’s Former Prosperity Really was Built on Sand

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bubbles, consumption, Europe, Eurozone, France, Greece, incomes, Ireland, Italy, Spain, {What's Left of) Our Economy

A new Pew Research Center report is a gold mine of information that I’ll be returning to in the next few days and weeks. But given the intensification of the Greece crisis this weekend, it seems especially important to note briefly what it shows about that country’s experience in the Eurozone. It’s especially revealing on how the easy access to credit made possible by Greece’s membership created one of history’s most stunning examples of false prosperity.

Among other statistics, Pew’s study of global incomes over the last decade presents figures on the shares of many national populations that could be classified as “high income” in 2001 and 2011. And the Greece numbers are mind-blowing. In 2001, 10.8 percent of Greeks belonged in the category with family per person income (or consumption) of $50 or more per day. (These figures are expressed in 2011 dollars adjusted for differences in price levels across countries.) By 2011, this share had more than doubled – to 23.8 percent. Moreover, the share of “upper middle income” ($30-$50 per capita per day) Greeks by this measure increased from 49.8 percent to 54.2 percent.

Even given the relatively low base from which Greek incomes began, it has to be significant that the only other countries in Western Europe that saw anything close to this progress were the continent’s other problem debtors. In Italy, for example, the high income share of the population just about doubled, from 17.1 percent to 34.8 percent. Spain saw 18.4 percent to 27.3 percent growth in this category, and the numbers were 21.2 percent to 36.2 percent in Ireland. (Pew did not present any figures for Portugal.)

Among economically and financially healthier Western European countries, oil rich Norway’s high income residents rose from 56.3 percent of the population to 77.2 percent, while the comparable numbers for France were 27.3 percent and 37.9 percent.

Moreover, Greece was a major out-performer in the Upper Middle class as well. In Italy, Spain, and Ireland, this group fell as a share of the population from 2001 to 2011. Ditto for France.

In case you’re wondering, the United States is one of the few wealthy countries studied that saw a decline in its share of the population living on more than $50 per day between 2001 and 2011 – from 58.2 percent to 55.7 percent. The Upper Middle class increased only from 31.4 percent of the American people to 31.9 percent. And therein hangs many a tale, as I’ll be reporting.