(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Score Another Victory for Trump’s Tariffs – on Metals

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aluminum, Bob Tita, China, metals, overcapacity, steel, tariffs, The Wall Street Journal, Trump, World Steel Association, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Wall Street Journal manufacturing reporter Bob Tita, who knows his stuff, more than earned his paycheck with a new story on how all the coronavirus-related disruption to the global economy is worsening a chronic global glut of key metals – especially steel – that’s likely to keep ballooning thanks to continued over-production from glutter-in-chief China.

Especially alarming seems to be this Tita finding: As the PRC’s economy and manufacturing sector have slowed markedly due to the outbreak, and reduced demand for metals,

“many of the country’s steel mills and aluminum smelters have continued to operate because stopping and starting equipment handling molten metal is expensive and risky. Millions of tons of steel and aluminum produced during what is now the worst manufacturing slump on record in China have created a surplus of metal that will take months to shrink, even if the epidemic is contained and demand recovers later this year in China and beyond.

“As a result, the global stockpile of steel and aluminum threatens to push down prices and put new pressure on producers in the U.S., Western Europe and elsewhere. Many of those companies were already struggling to earn a profit on steel and aluminum because of lower prices and weakening demand from manufacturers.”

Indeed, he quotes a U.S. scrap steel broker as fearing that “We could see China swamp the entire world with steel.”

Yet Tita – and the broker – seem to be missing something crucial about the steel glut’s recent past, present, and likely future: The situation then, now, and going forward would’ve been much worse if not for the global nature of President Trump’s steel tariffs. And the latest global output data from the World Steel Association have just proven this point yet again.

When first imposed, in March, 2018, the levies were blasted as catastrophic mistakes by globalist and free trade conventional wisdom-mongers in politics, the Mainstream Media, big metals-using industries, and their hired guns in the think tank world. Yes, they acknowledged, China has been guilty of dumping its bloated steel (and aluminum) output overseas at artificially low prices, thereby exporting not only metals but a metals recession and unemployment around the world. But the United States was an exception, because of steel tariffs already imposed under the Obama administration.

The new U.S. duties were hitting America’s trade partners indiscriminately, including supposedly loyal allies in Europe and East Asia (along with Mexico and Canada). What could be dumber or more short-sighted – especially since these countries had joined with the United States to start putting multilateral pressure on China to cease and desist?

But as RealityChek regulars know, none of these complaints held even a drop of water. For the rest of the world was likely to continue responding to the metals flood from China the way it always had – by ramping up their own exports to the United States, and/or putting the Chinese metals inundating their own markets into new boxes with their own labels and sending them state-side – a practice known as transshipping (and involves committing customs fraud).

Moreover, after achieving exactly nothing since it was created in September, 2016, the multilateral steel talks seem doomed because China has decided it’s had it even with pretending to be interested in cutting its capacity meaningfully.

Yet thanks to the global scope of the Trump tariffs, the U.S. economy is no longer serving as the world’s steel buyer of last resort – and manufacturing punching bag. I first documented their effectiveness in this May, 2019 op-ed. And I’m pleased to report that as of January, 2020, the World Steel Association’s figures show that they’re still working exactly as intended.

The Association tracks output for 64 countries that comprise the vast bulk of global production. And its new figures show that on a January-January basis, China’s steel production rose in tonnage terms by 7.2 percent. That’s considerably faster than world production growth of 2.1 percent.

But the American industry expanded output by more than the global industry, too – by 2.5 percent. And much of this relative improvement stemmed from the poor production performances of other regions and countries that traditionally viewed the United States as the world’s big steel dumping ground. For example, during this year-long stretch, steel tonnage production in Japan rose by only 1.3 percent. For South Korea and Taiwan, it actually fell – by eight percent and 14.6 percent, respectively. And overall European Union production sank by twelve percent.

This success contrasts sharply with the pre-tariffs situation, when the United States was clearly the world’s biggest steel production loser as the result of gluts not only in China but created by many other economies.  

At the same time, the battle to safeguard American domestic metals producers hasn’t been won once and for all. As Tita notes, although “Tariffs have made many types of metal made in China uncompetitive in the U.S.,” China’s still “large steel-and-aluminum output drives up supply and weighs on prices around the world. Excess metal in China could create more competition for U.S. steel exports or enter the U.S. indirectly as imports from Canada and Mexico” – where the American levies have been lifted in connection with the signing of the new U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement (USMCA), the follow-on to the North American Free Trade agreement (NAFTA).

But the new U.S. and global production numbers also show indisputably that Mr. Trump was right and his critics wrong about his sweeping approach to the metals tariffs. Just don’t expect any of the critics to admit it.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Productivity Data Further Debunk “Tariffs Hurt” Claims

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aluminum, aluminum tariffs, China, durable goods, fabricated metals products, inputs, Labor Department, labor productivity, manufacturing, metals, metals tariffs, multi-factor productivity, productivity, steel, steel tariffs, tariffs, Trade, trade law, World Trade Organization, WTO, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The Trump administration’s announcement last Friday of new tariffs on some metals-using manufactures imports was greeted with the predictable combination of chuckles and gloating from the economists, think tank hacks, and Mainstream Media journalists who keep insisting that all such trade curbs are self-destructive whenever they’re imposed.

If the critics bothered to look at the new official data on multi-factor productivity, however, they’d stop their victory laps in their tracks. For the Labor Department’s latest report on this broadest productivity measure utterly trashes their claims that the tariffs slapped on metals in early 2018 – which unofficially launched the so-called Trump trade wars – have backfired by undercutting most domestic American manufacturing.

In fairness, the Trump administration itself gave the trade and globalization cheerleaders lots of evidence for their triumphalism. Specifically, the levies were justified with statistics showing that various categories of goods made primarily of tariff-ed steel and aluminum had seen major surges of imports since the duties began. The obvious conclusion? Foreign-based producers of these products were capitalizing on their cheaper metals available to their factories to undersell their U.S.-based competition.

As a result, Mr. Trump decided to tariff some of these final products, too – to erase the advantage created for imports from less expensive steel and aluminum.

So in one sense, it’s tough to blame tariff critics for feeling vindicated about predictions that the metals levies might boost the metals-producing sectors themselves, but injure the far larger metals-using sectors. Ditto for their warnings that in an economy with so many connected industries, protection for one or a few would inevitably spur calls for such alleged favoritism by others, threatening a consequent loss of efficiency for all of manufacturing and even the entire economy.

Examine the issue in more detail, though, and you see that it’s entirely possible to arrive at radically different conclusions. For example, the new tariffs appear to be imposed on a limited set of products, and none of them (e.g., nails, tacks, wires, cables, even aluminum auto stampings) qualifies as a major industry. In other words, the chief metals-using industries, like motor vehicles and parts overall, aerospace, industrial machinery (many of which have been complaining loudly about the metals tariffs, even though their overall operational costs have been barely affected) were left out.

Finally in this vein, and as the critics imply, the new Trump tariffs also make the case for trade curbs on any final products whose significant inputs receive duties. Why indeed strap otherwise competitive domestic producers with higher prices for materials, parts, and components? This practice has been a major flaw in the U.S. trade law system, which has prioritized legal over economic and industrial considerations, since its founding. And in fact, my old organization, the U.S. Business and Industry Council, has been urging this reform since at least 2008.

Even better – to prevent cronyism from influencing such trade policy decisions, impose a uniform global tariff on all manufactures, or all non-energy goods.

But it’s just as important to point out a gaping hole in the longstanding argument that cheap imported inputs (including subsidized, and therefore artificially cheap imported inputs) are essential for the overall global competitiveness of U.S. domestic manufacturing. And the hole has been opened (or perhaps it’s more accurate to say, reopened, given this previous RealityChek analysis of earlier data) by those new multi-factor productivity statistics.

They only go through 2018 (such time lags explain why multi-factor productivity trends aren’t followed as closely as labor productivity trends). But they’re the broader of the two productivity measures, as they gauge the effect of many inputs other than hours worked. And via the table below, they make clear that even the wide open access domestic manufacturers enjoyed to artificially cheap metals and other imported inputs have played absolutely no evident role in improving industry’s health. In fact, there’s reason to conclude that the more access domestic industry had to such materials, parts, and components, the less productive it became.

                                                               Total mfg   Durable goods   fabr metals

1990s expansion (91-2000):                   +23.40%       +38.76%         +4.79%

bubble decade expansion (02-07):          +11.74%      +16.61%          +7.62%

current expansion (10-present):                -4.84%         -0.84%           -4.51%

pre-China WTO (87-2001):                   +22.18%      +37.72%           -3.32%

post-China WTO (02-present):               +6.72%      +17.17%           -2.05%

As usual, the time periods chosen to illustrate these trends consist (with one exception) of recent economic expansions (because they enable the best apples-to-apples comparisons to be made). And the 1990s expansion is the first one examined because the relevant Labor Department data only go back to 1987. The products chosen consist of all manufactured goods, durable goods industries (the super-category containing most of the big metals users), and fabricated metals products (the most metals-intensive sectors of all).

The table demonstrates that multi-factor productivity growth across-the-board has weakened dramatically from the 1990s expansion through the current – ongoing – expansion. The slowdown between the 1990s expansion and the previous decade’s expansion was moderate (and multi-factor productivity actually grew faster during the second in fabricated metals, though in absolute terms its improvement lagged badly). But during the current recovery, multi-factor productivity growth has been replaced in all three instances by multi-factor productivity decline. And crucially, during none of this time did any of these manufacturing categories face any shortage of imported inputs of any kind – subsidized or not.

Indeed, one event in 2001 greatly increased the supply of subsidized inputs – China’s admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO). For once China joined, the difficulty of using U.S. trade law to keep these Chinese products out of the U.S. economy became much greater.

Yet at the same time, as shown below, productivity growth was considerably weaker after China’s WTO entry than before in manufacturing overall, and in durable goods. And although its performance actually improved in fabricated metals, that industry’s performance was much worse in absolute terms.

Nor does the inclusion of the 2007-2009 Great Recession in the post-2002 China-related data (which violates the “apples-to-apples rule”) seem to have been a game changer – because the worst performances of all in each case, and by a mile, have been registered during the current expansion. Moreover, since the data stop in 2018, those current expansion results are dominated by the period preceding both the Trump metals tariffs and the Trump China tariffs (most of which target industrial inputs, as opposed to final products).

It’s entirely possible that, for various reasons, the multi-factor productivity statistics would have been even worse if not for the widespread availability of cheap imports. Or maybe multi-factor productivity isn’t much of a measure of manufacturing’s health? Both alternative explanations, however, seem pretty far-fetched (especially given the pre- and post-China WTO results).

Much likelier – as I argued in that post linked above – the availability of cheap inputs has helped retard productivity growth by enabling businesses to achieve cost-savings without investing in research and development into new products and especially processes, and without buying more efficient equipment (including software).

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Manufacturing’s (Latest) Recession Looks Like It’s Over

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aluminum, China, Commerce Department, Federal Reserve, Great Recession, industrial production, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, manufacturing production, metals tariffs, recession, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Let’s do something a little different this time in RealityChek‘s monthly examination of the Federal Reserve’s latest domestic U.S. manufacturing output figures – which came out this morning and bring the story through December and therefore through full-year 2019 (at least preliminarily).

Instead of focusing on the industries most seriously affected by President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade policies (mainly the metals tariffs, given big measurement problems with the China duties), let’s look at the question of whether manufacturing remains in recession – which has big, trade war-related implications because this Trump campaign is widely blamed for many of manufacturing’s recent weakness.

There’s considerable evidence that the answer is “Yes” – that industry’s inflation-adjusted production (the measure used by the Fed) is back in growth mode, though just barely.

But the question remains an open one. That’s partly because the answer depends on which baseline date you use for the start of the manufacturing recession, which unit of time you use (along with which particular manufacturing output gauge you favor).

Among that evidence tilting toward “Yes” – today’s Fed data.  Specifically, December’s 0.16 percent monthly increase in constant dollar manufacturing output means that, since June, such production is up. Now it’s only up by 0.04 percent. But since that’s a cumulative increase over the last six months (i.e., two consecutive quarters), the technical definition of recession no longer applies.

Or does it? The same Fed figures show that, between December, 2018 and December, 2019, after-inflation manufacturing output was down – by 1.26 percent. So the recession is still on, right?

Maybe. But use another baseline – April, 2018. As RealityChek regulars know, that’s the first full month in which significant Trump tariffs went into effect (on imports of aluminum and steel). Since then, though, price-adjusted manufacturing production has grown by 0.38 percent. This result, therefore, indicates that, although the President’s trade policies seem to have delivered a hit to domestic manufacturing, it was pretty negligible, and it’s already over (at least for now).

To complicate matters still further, as RealityChek reported last July, according to the Fed’s figures, manufacturing has suffered several recessions since the current economic recovery began (in the middle of 2009).  Indeed, as of this morning, it  still hasn’t recovered from the Great Recession that began at the end of 2007!

At the same time, another set of U.S. government data support the conclusion that there has been no trade war-related manufacturing recession during the Trump years – or manufacturing recession of any kind.

These statistics come from the Commerce Department’s “GDP [Gross Domestic Output] by Industry” reports. They use the same measure used by the Fed for tracking manufacturing growth (or contraction), but they’re kept on a quarterly, not monthly, basis. As a result, these numbers aren’t issued as frequently.

Yet the latest results came out January 9, and although they stop at the third quarter of last year, they show that in real terms, domestic manufacturing under Mr. Trump never shrank on net for two straight quarters, much less over any longer time frame. Here are the quarterly change figures:

2Q 16-1Q 17 :+0.32%

1Q 17-2Q 17: -0.7%

2Q 17-3Q 17: +0.35%

3Q 17-4Q 17: +1.22%

4Q 17-1Q 18: +0.38%

1Q 18-2Q 18: +0.09%

2Q 18-3Q 18: +1.38%*

3Q 18-4Q 18: +0.38%

4Q 18-1Q 19: +0.43%

1Q 19-2Q 19: -0.38%

2Q 19-3Q 19: +0.67%

*those Trump metals tariffs began in this quarter

Indeed, what comes through loud and clear from them is that not only has there been no manufacturing recession on President Trump’s watch, but there hasn’t even been an output slowdown.

It’s always possible to point to the counter-factual – that is, in this instance, to try to figure out how matters would look without any Trump tariffs, or similar Trump efforts to transform U.S. trade policy. And it’s certainly conceivable that domestic industry would have fared even better had Trump abjured all tariffs.

But that’s not the only counter-factual. For example, what if the rest of the world had been able to deal with the pressure created by China’s steel dumping by dumping its own steel into the United States (which hasn’t happened because the Trump metal tariffs were global)? What if China itself had remained completely free to send artificially low-priced (because heavily subsidized) product into the US market? What if President Trump had kept the United States in the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement (TPP), with its wide open back door for imports with lots of Chinese content, while China remained under no obligation whatever to open its market to U.S. products? It’s easy to see that U.S.-based manufacturing could have gone on the critical list.

What’s certain, however, is that according to the most authoritative data available, claims of tariffs-led disaster for U.S. manufacturing have been either much ado about nothing, or much ado about very little. Could the coming months finally bear out the worst fears of cheerleaders for pre-Trump trade policies and other globalists? Of course. But that’s simply speculation, which counts much less than facts.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is Manufacturing Employment Being Undercut by Boeing Along with Trade Wars?

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737 Max, aerospace, aircraft, aluminum, Boeing, China, Jobs, manufacturing, metals, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, supply chain, tariffs, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

One of the biggest questions raised by the new (lousy) manufacturing results of this morning’s monthly U.S. jobs report concerns whether industry’s dismal recent performance is being impacted more by President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade policies or by Boeing’s aircraft safety woes. The bulk of the evidence released this morning seems to point to the trade wars as the continuing main culprit, but also to some Boeing-related puzzles. 

Overall, the sector lost 12,000 jobs on month in December – its worst such result (excluding October, whose figures were distorted by the General Motors strike) since August, 2016’s 23,000 decrease).  Moreover, the year-end annual manufacturing jobs gain of 46,000 was the lowest such figure since 2016’s 7,000 loss.  (For comparison’s sake, 2018’s annual manufacturing employment increase of 264,000 was the best such result since 1997’s 304,000.  

The trade wars evidence for the recent deterioration comes in the form of comparisons between the major metals-using industries during the early months following the imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum, and afterwards (when many Trump critics argue that the trade curbs’ impact began sinking in). As always, the impact of Mr. Trump’s levies on imports from China remain too diffused throughout the manufacturing sector – and too unevenly so – to be gauged reliably. For good measure, they’ve also been threatened and applied in a confusing, on-and-off manner, and the recent Phase One trade deal and announcement of follow-on negotiations looks unlikely to end much of the measurement uncertainty.

First, here are the data on employment changes in those metals-using sectors from April, 2018 (the first full month during which the tariffs were in effect) through last month. Figures for the U.S. private sector overall, manufacturing overall, and manufacturing’s durable goods super-sector (in which most of the main metals users are classified) are included for comparison’s sake. Keep in mind that the results for household appliances also reflect a separate set of tariffs for large household laundry machines that have been in place since February, 2018.

                                                  Old thru Nov      New thru Nov       Thru Dec

entire private sector:                +2.82 percent      +2.81 percent    +2.92 percent

overall manufacturing:            +1.83 percent      +1.84 percent    +1.75 percent

durable goods:                         +1.99 percent      +2.02 percent    +1.94 percent

fabricated metals products:     +1.51 percent       +1.45 percent   +0.96 percent

non-electrical machinery:       +1.26 percent       +1.56 percent   +1.37 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:   -0.45 percent        -0.73 percent    -0.81 percent

household appliances*:            not available        -5.84 percent     not available

aerospace products & parts*:  not available        +9.02 percent     not available

*data are one month behind

There’s no mistaking that net new hiring in the metals-using sectors has been slower than in the rest of manufacturing and the private sector. As is clear from the table below, that’s a substantial change from the early post-metals tariffs period (presented here as April, 2018 through December, 2018 and January, 2019), when most metals-users were leaders in boosting payrolls:

                                                                Thru December           Thru January

entire private sector:                                +1.36 percent            +1.60 percent

overall manufacturing:                            +1.39 percent            +1.49 percent

durable goods:                                         +1.72 percent            +1.97 percent

fabricated metals products:                     +1.57 percent            +1.78 percent

non-electrical machinery:                        +2.33 percent           +2.57 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:                   +1.07 percent           +1.15 percent

household appliances:                              -2.05 percent –           2.52 percent

aerospace products & parts:                    +5.47 percent           +5.87 percent

But what about the Boeing effect – which figures to be considerable given the major role played by the aircraft and aerospace giant not only in American industry but the entire economy? As the data below show, the impact of the company’s production slowdown and more recent suspension of the previously best-selling but flawed 737 Max model (not to mention worldwide groundings) is anything but clear-cut. Presented here are the job change figures for aircraft and related parts industries, along with the numbers for other major supplier industries and the usual comparison sectors for the eight months preceding and following the announcement of global 737 Max groundings last March. The latest available data for the aerospace-specific industries only go through November, so that’s the final month used for the entire table.

                                                 July, 2018 thru March           March thru Nov

entire private sector:                     +1.38 percent                    +1.03 percent

overall manufacturing:                 +0.98 percent                    +0.28 percent

durable goods:                              +1.17 percent                    +0.11 percent

fabricated metals products:          +0.89 percent                     -0.31 percent

non-electrical machinery:            +1.38 percent                     -1.16 percent

aerospace products & parts:        +4.34 percent                    +2.27 percent

aircraft:                                        +6.59 percent                    +2.09 percent

aircraft engines & engine parts:  +1.04 percent                    +3.67 percent

non-engine aircraft parts/equip: +3.06 percent                     +1.22 percent

The pattern seems to show employment slowdowns nearly across the board. But the two non-aerospace-specific supplier industries – fabricated metals and non-electrical machinery – saw net hiring increases turn into net hiring decreases. Moreover, in aircraft engines and engine parts, payroll improvements actually accelerated.

At least some of this apparent paradox might result from the November end date used here. Boeing didn’t decide to suspend outright production of the troubled model until December 16, and the decision won’t even go into effect until sometime this month. Indeed, the company initially announced that no layoffs were accompanying the halt, although significant workforce reduction plans were finally made public yesterday. In this vein, reports of actual supply chain employment effects didn’t begin appearing until mid-December. Moreover, it’s possible that employment pain has been felt by the non-aerospace-specific companies in Boeing’s vast domestic supply chain before it spread to the aerospace-related firms.

So the safest bottom line so far seems to be this: Contributors to manufacturing’s recent jobs slump might now include both trade war- and non trade war-related developments. And anyone singling out one or the other deserves considerable skepticism.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: GM and Boeing Effects Still Affecting U.S. Manufacturing Output

Tags

737 Max, aircraft, aluminum, Boeing, China, durable goods, Federal Reserve, General Motors General Motors strike, GM, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, manufacturing production, metals-using industries, steel, supply chain, tariffs, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Like its immediate predecessor, this morning’s Federal Reserve release on inflation-adjusted U.S. manufacturing output made clear how the recent strike at General Motors have grossly distorted the latest results, as well as how Boeing’s mounting 737 Max aircraft safety woes remain difficult to identify from these production statistics.

First, let’s look at the overall numbers. According to the Fed, constant dollar American manufacturing output in November jumped sequentially by 1.15 percent. That was the best such increase since October, 2017’s 1.36 percent, and quite the turnaround from October’s 0.70 percent monthly drop-off (which was revised slightly downward).

These figures still left domestic industry in a recession, but not much of one. Since July, 2018, its price-adjusted output is down by 0.14 percent.

But the big role of the GM strike’s end in November’s turnaround couldn’t be clearer. In October, combined U.S. combined vehicle and parts output sank by 5.98 percent after inflation from September’s total. That decline was considerably less than the 7.65 percent nosedive reported last month, but still the worst such performance since the 7.18 percent decrease in January.

Last month, however, thanks to the return of the striking workers, real automotive production skyrocketed by a whopping 12.45 percent – the best monthly performance since the 29.95 percent surge of July, 2009 – as the last recession (which was especially woeful for auto and parts makers) came to an end.

Another way to look at the automotive effect: Without the GM strike, October’s 0.70 percent overall manufacturing after-inflation production decrease would have been a much better (but by no means great) 0.28 percent decline. And without the GM strike’s end, the 1.15 percent jump in price-adjusted manufacturing output would have been only 0.25 percent.

But the impact of Boeing’s safety troubles is as unclear as those of the GM strike are obvious. In November, American aircraft and parts production rose another 0.40 percent on month in real terms. Moreover, since March (when governments around the world began grounding the 737 Max or banning it from their airspace), such production is only down a total of 0.34 percent. Since April (the first full data month since that March flood of bad news), it’s actually up by 2.32 percent.

Therefore, as has been the case recently, the aircraft sector as such has kept outgrowing many of the biggest industries making up its domestic supply chain (which extends way beyond finished parts and into the materials they’re made from). Here’s how these big supplier industries’ output has changed since April, with the overall manufacturing sector’s performance and that of the durable goods super-category in which most are found included for comparison’s sake:

overall manufacturing: +0.68 percent

durable goods: +1.25 percent

primary metals: -1.13 percent

fabricated metals products: -0.54 percent

machinery: +0.16 percent

The above results also indicate that at least some of the economy’s biggest metals-using industries still lack the relative production strength they displayed for the first several months after steel and aluminum tariffs were imposed in March, 2018. Here are their latest numbers from April (the first full data month affected by these levies) through November, also with the overall manufacturing and durable goods results included:

                                          Old Ape thru Oct    New Apr thru Oct    April thru Nov

overall manufacturing: –      0.54 percent            -0.81 percent         +0.33 percent

durables manufacturing:    -0.32 percent            -0.40 percent         +1.75 percent

fabricated metals prods:   +1.42 percent           +1.26 percent         +1.48 percent

machinery:                        -0.81 percent            -0.77 percent          -1.02 percent

automotive:                    -12.24 percent           -11.34 percent          -0.30 percent

major appliances:             -9.14 percent            -9.08 percent          -6.31 percent

aircraft and parts:            +3.59 percent           +4.37 percent         +4.79 percent

One interesting bright spot apparent from the above – a nice improvement for production of major appliances, a sector that’s been dealing since February, 2018 with an additional set of product-specific tariffs. But in machinery and fabricated metals products in particular, where output tends to be less volatile than it’s been in automotive and appliances, recent performance clearly has been worse than that from April, 2018 through, say, this past January:

                                                          April, 2018 through January

overall manufacturing:                               +1.07 percent

durables manufacturing:                            +1.74 percent

fabricated metals prods:                            +3.42 percent

machinery:                                                +3.69 percent

automotive:                                               -3.32 percent

major appliances:                                      -1.43 percent

aircraft and parts:                                     +4.19 percent

Will the new “Phase One” trade deal announced with China make it any easier to gauge the impact of tariffs on most of the imports heading to the United States from the PRC? That’s already been difficult enough, because Chinese products have been used so widely, and to such varying extents, as inputs for so many manufacturing industries). And chances are this challenge will become more difficult, given both that it’s far from clear when follow-on talks will begin; and given Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin’s suggestion that the next phase may consist of many different phases.

Surely adding to the complications will be the Boeing effect, which seems certain to start appearing more conspicuously in the data now that the company has announced that 737 Max production will be suspended starting next month, as well as its failure to say how long the halt will last.

So just about all that can be said for sure is that domestic manufacturing had a good month in November – however unclear it remains whether this improvement has legs.

Glad I Didn’t Say That! The Epic Fail of Tariff Fear-Mongering

Tags

aluminum, China, consumer price index, consumers, core inflation, Glad I Didn't Say That!, inflation, manufacturing, metals, metals-using industries, Producer Price Index, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump

“Trump’s trade war may soon hit consumers’ wallets and paychecks.”

–NBC News, July 18, 2018

“Tariffs will surely lead to higher prices for imported goods and, to a lesser extent, prices for non-imported goods that use imported materials.”

–Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania, July 18, 2018

“Tariffs are about to hit consumers, and it won’t be pretty.”

–CNBC, July 25, 2018

“Trade restrictions, by their nature, result in price increases for the goods in question. If the price of steel and aluminum goes up, manufacturers will be forced to pass those costs onto American consumers.”

–The Heritage Foundation, March 2, 2018

U.S. core consumer price* index year on year, November: +0.1 percent

U.S. core producer price index** year on year, November: +0.5 percent

*commodities less food and energy

**final demand goods less food and energy

(Sources: “Trump’s trade war may soon hit consumers’ wallets and paychecks,” by Ben Popken, NBC News, July 18, 2018, https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/trump-s-trade-war-may-soon-impact-consumers-wallets-paychecks-n890576: “Tariff Troubles: Will Consumers Feel the Pinch?” Public Policy, Knowledge@Wharton, Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania, July 30, 2018, https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/trumps-tariffs-will-impact-average-consumer/; “Tariffs are about to hit consumers, and it won’t be pretty,” by Jeff Cox, CNBC, July 25, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/25/tariffs-are-about-to-hit-consumers-and-it-wont-be-pretty.html; “3 Reasons Why Trump’s Tariffs Would Hurt American Workers,” by Tori K. Smith and Jay Van Andel, Commentary, The Heritage Foundation, March 2, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/trade/commentary/3-reasons-why-trumps-tariffs-would-hurt-american-workers. All compiled in “Christmas Miracle: Rising Wages and Low Inflation Promise a Very Merry Holiday Season,” by John Carney, Breitbart.com, December 11, 2018, https://www.breitbart.com/economy/2019/12/11/low-inflation-christmas/. “Consumer Price Index – November 2019, USDL-19-2144, News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, December 11, 2018, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cpi.pdf; and “Producer Price Indexes – November, 2019, USDL 19-2146, News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, December 12, 2018, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ppi.pdf)

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New U.S. Jobs Data Show a Continued Trade Punch for Manufacturing – & Industry Resilience

Tags

aircraft, aluminum, automotive, Boeing, Bureau of Labor Statistics, China, General Motors, General Motors strike, GM, manufacturing, manufacturing jobs, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, tariffs, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For observers of U.S. domestic manufacturing, this morning’s new jobs report (for November) could not have made clearer how the recent strike at General Motors (GM) have bollixed up the recent monthly totals for reasons having nothing to do with the underlying state of the economy or with President Trump’s trade wars. Nonetheless, even with the strike’s effects filtered out, industry’s job creation this year continues to lag behind last year’s strong pace, and damage from Mr. Trump’s metals tariffs in particular is still apparent – if anything but calamitous.

Moreover, in a continuing mystery, although Boeing’s safety woes are kneecapping domestic manufacturing’s trade performance, their impact on manufacturing employment is still nowhere to be seen.

Because of the GM strike’s impact, the overall manufacturing job figures for November (along with the revised October numbers) are pretty worthless. What does matter are the results with motor vehicles and parts stripped out (although even taking this step fails to account for the strike’s effects on all the industries making up the domestic automotive supply chain).

Ex-automotive, the previously reported October U.S. manufacturing monthly jobs change would have come to a 5,600 net monthly gain, rather than a 36,000 net loss. The revised October manufacturing jobs change reported today was somewhat better – without the GM strike, a net sequential employment loss pegged at a higher 43,000 would have been a net gain of 6,800. (And another revised October figure will come out next month, along with a new November number.)

For its first read on November’s performance, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that domestic industry’s payrolls rose by 54,000 on net. Removing from that total the 41,300 jump in automotive employment stemming from the return to work of GM workers and of employees at parts companies who may have been laid off, and you get a 12,700 monthly increase in manufacturing jobs.

Encouragingly, that’s the best such performance since January’s 17,000 payroll advance. But the year-on-year improvements remain humdrum even taking out the automotive distortions.

For example, without the automotive distortions, October’s stand-still manufacturing jobs total would only have been 56,000 higher than that of October, 2018. Between the previous Octobers, manufacturing employment surged by 275,000. The comparable November numbers? A 32,000 improvement between 2018 and 2019, as opposed to 228.000 between 2017 and 2018.

The November jobs report’s news for so-called trade hawks wasn’t good, either. As usual the impact of the Trump administration’s steel and aluminum tariffs are relatively easy to gauge, and it remains the case that the metals-using sectors’ employment performance has lost notable momentum versus the rest of manufacturing and the rest of the private sector overall.

Below are the latest figures for employment changes at major metals-using industries starting with the April, 2018 – the first full month in which these levies were in effect, and run through October. For comparison’s sake, the results for manufacturing overall are also included, along with those of the durable goods super-sector in which most of the big metals-users are grouped:

                                                       Old thru Oct       New thru          Thru Nov

entire private sector:                    +2.58 percent   +2.62 percent    +2.82 percent

overall manufacturing:                +1.40 percent   +1.40 percent    +1.83 percent

durable goods:                            +1.48 percent    +1.43 percent    +1.99 percent

fabricated metals products:        +1.57 percent    +1.49 percent    +1.51 percent

non-electrical machinery:          +1.74 percent    +1.65 percent    +1.26 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:      -4.89 percent    -4.60 percent      -0.45 percent

household appliances*:               not available    -6.31 percent      not available

aerospace products & parts*:     not available   +8.98 percent       not available

*data are one month behind

The end of the GM effect is clear from the big differences between the October and November overall manufacturing and durable goods jobs changes. But by the same token, November was a lousy employment month for the big machinery and fabricated metals sectors. Look at that aerospace products and parts increase, though – job creation in this Boeing-heavy sector continues to excel.

Now it’s possible that much of the damage being done to the company, and manufacturing more generally, is being done in its own vast domestic supply chain. But the employment numbers for narrower sectors like aircraft and their parts show nothing of the kind, and the effects on companies in other supplier sectors (e.g., machinery, metals, and fabricated metals products) simply can’t be teased out.

But even worse for the metals-using industries generally, whereas most were job creation leaders last year, they’ve turned into job creation laggards this year. This deterioration is made clear from comparing the previous table with the following table, which shows their employment performance from the metals tariffs advent through the end of last year and the beginning of this year:

                                                          Thru December               Thru January

entire private sector:                         +1.36 percent                +1.60 percent

overall manufacturing:                     +1.39 percent                +1.49 percent

durable goods:                                  +1.72 percent                +1.97 percent

fabricated metals products:              +1.57 percent                +1.78 percent

non-electrical machinery:                +2.33 percent               +2.57 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:          +1.07 percent               +1.15 percent

household appliances:                     -2.05 percent                -2.52 percent

aerospace products & parts:           +5.47 percent               +5.87 percent

Of course, President Trump’s tariffs on several hundred billion dollars worth of imports heading America’s way from China are affecting domestic manufacturing as well. But because of these products ubiquity throughout domestic industry, the greatly varying levels of their U.S. market share, and the duties’ on-again-off-again nature (prominently on display in recent days), I continue to despair of quantifying the impact usefully.

And speaking of Mr. Trump, there’s no doubt that, contrary to his confidence, trade wars are not “easy to win” – and can be highly disruptive even for countries like the United States with ample leverage to prevail. That’s inevitable when you’re trying to reverse several decades of policy. All the same, U.S. domestic manufacturing’s employment performance, even in leading victim industries, has held up pretty well since the President began responding to foreign predation in earnest. Whether the manufacturing interests he’s counting on to win reelection will agree is another question entirely.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trade War(s) Update

Tags

Argentina, Bloomberg.com, Brazil, business investment, China, CNBC, consumption, currency manipulation, debt, Democrats, digital services tax, election 2020, EU, European Union, export controls, Financial Crisis, France, Huawei, internet, investors, manufacturing, production, steel, steel tariffs, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, trade enforcement, trade war, Trump, Wall Street, Wilbur Ross, Xi JInPing, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The most important takeaway from this post about the current status of U.S. trade policy, especially toward China, is that it may have already been overtaken by events since I began putting these thoughts together yesterday.

What follows is a lightly edited version of talking points I put together for staffers at CNBC in preparation for their interview with me yesterday. I thought this exercise would be useful because these appearances are always so brief (even though this one, unusually, featured me solo), and because sometimes they take unexpected detours from the main subject. .

Before presenting them, however, let’s keep in mind this new Bloomberg piece, which came on the heels of remarks yesterday by President Trump signaling that a trade deal with China may need to await next year’s U.S. Presidential election, and plunged the world’s investors into deep gloom. This morning, however, the news agency reported that considerable progress has been made despite “harsh” rhetoric lately from both countries. It seems pretty thinly sourced to me, and the supposed course of the trade talks seems to change almost daily, but stock indices are up considerably all the same.

Moreover, even leaving that proviso aside, what I wrote to the CNBC folks yesterday seems likely to hold up pretty well. And here it is:

1. The President’s latest comments on the China trade deal – which he says might take till after the presidential election to complete – seriously undermines the claim that he considers a deal crucial to his reelection chances because it’s likely to appease Wall Street and thereby prop up the economy. Of course, given Mr. Trump’s mercurial nature, and negotiating style, this latest statement could also simply amount to him playing “bad cop” for the moment.

2. His relative pessimism about a quick “Phase One” deal also seems to reinforce a suggestion implicitly made yesterday by Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross when he listed verification and enforcement concerns as among the obstacles to signing the so-called Phase One deal. I have always argued that such concerns are likely to prevent the conclusion of any kind of trade deal acceptable to US interests. That’s both because of China’s poor record of keeping its commitments, and because the Chinese government is too secretive and too big to monitor effectively even the most promising Chinese pledges to change policies on intellectual property theft, illegal subsidies, discriminatory government procurement, and other so-called structural issues.

3. Recent reports of the United States considering tightening (or expanding) restrictions on tech exports to Chinese entities like Huawei also support my longstanding point that the US and Chinese economies will continue to decouple whatever the fate of the current or other trade talks.

4. In my opinion, the President is absolutely right to play hard-to-get on China trade, because Chinese dictator Xi Jinping is under so much pressure due to his own weakening economy, and because of the still-explosive Hong Kong situation.

5. I’ll be especially interested to learn of the Democratic presidential candidates’ reactions to Mr. Trump’s latest China statement, as well as the announcement of the reimposed steel tariffs on Argentina and Brazil, and the threatened tariffs on French “digital services” [internet] taxes. With the exception of Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren and Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, the candidates’ China policies seem to boil down to “Yes, we need to get tough with China, but tariffs are the worst possible response.” None of them has adequately described an alternative approach. The reactions of Democratic Congress leaders Nancy Pelosi in the House and Charles Schumer will be worth noting, too. The latter has been strongly supportive of the Trump approach in general.

6. The new steel tariffs, as widely noted, are especially interesting because they were justified for currency devaluation reasons, with no mention made of the alleged national security threats originally cited as the rationale. Nonetheless, I don’t believe that they represent a significant change in the Trump approach to metals trade, because the administration has always emphasized the need for the duties to be global in scope – to prevent China from transshipping its overcapacity to the US through third countries, and to prevent third countries to relieve the pressures felt by their steel sectors from Chinese product by ramping up their own exports to the US. Obviously, all else equal, countries with weakening currencies (for whatever reason) will realize big advantages in steel trade, as the prices of their output will fall way below those of competitors’ steel industries.

7. Regarding the tariffs threatened in retaliation for France’s digital services tax, they’re consistent with Trump’s longstanding contention that the US-European Union (EU) trade relationship has been lopsidedly in favor of the Europeans for too long, and that tariff pressure is needed to restore some sustainable balance. In this vein, I don’t take seriously the French claim that the tax isn’t targeting U.S. companies specifically. After all, those firms are the dominant players in the field. Second, senior EU officials have started talking openly about strengthening Europe’s “technological sovereignty” – making sure that the continent eliminates its dependence on non-European entities in the sector (including China’s as well as America’s). The digital tax would certainly further the aim of building up European champions – and if need be, at the expense of US-owned companies.

By the way, this position of mine in no way reflects a view that more taxation and more regulation of these companies isn’t warranted. But it’s my belief that these issues should be handled by the American political system.

Also of note: Trump’s suggestion this morning that the French tax isn’t a big deal, and that negotiations look like a promising way to resolve the disagreement.

Finally, here are two more points I wound up making. First, I expressed agreement that the President’s tariff-centric trade policies have created significant uncertainties in the economy’s trade-heavy manufacturing sector in particular – stalling some of the planned business investment that’s essential for healthy growth. But I also noted that much of this uncertainty surely stems from the on-again-off-again nature of the tariffs’ actual and threatened imposition.

As a result, I argued, uncertainty could be significantly reduced if Mr. Trump made much clearer that, whatever the trade talks’ fate, the days of Washington trying to maximize unfettered bilateral trade and investment are over, and a new era marked by much more caution and many more restrictions (including tighter export controls and investment restrictions, as well as tariffs), is at hand.

Second, at the very end, I contended that President Trump deserves great credit for focusing public attention on the country’s massive trade deficits in general. For notwithstanding the standard economists’ view that they don’t matter, reducing them is essential if Americans want their economy’s growth to become healthy, and more sustainable. For as the last financial crisis should have taught the nation, when consumption exceeds production by too great a margin, debts and consequent economic bubbles get inflated – and tend to burst disastrously.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Thoroughly Muddled Manufacturing Production Figure

Tags

aluminum, Boeing, China tariffs, Federal Reserve, General Motors, General Motors strike, industrial production, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, recession, steel, supply chains, tariffs, trade war, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The latest U.S. inflation-adjusted manufacturing output numbers (for September) are now out, and they leave more muddled than ever the matter of how much (if any) damage American industry has suffered from President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade policies.

And it’s not just because of ongoing uncertainties about the effects of President Trump’s current and threatened China tariffs, and all the fluctuations in coverage and rates. It’s not just because of the month-long General Motors strike – which could end soon if the union rank-and-file approve the settlement agreed on by their leaders, and which the Federal Reserve itself (which tracks manufacturing output) fingered as a big culprit behind September’s lousy read. It’s also because of the impact of Boeing aircraft’s continuing safety woes (a subject on which the Fed has been strangely silent).

As I’ve reported, the Boeing effect finally showed up in the latest U.S. trade data – which is especially important given the aerospace giant’s reliance on exports. But it hasn’t appeared anywhere else, including the new manufacturing production figures, even though orders for Boeing jets have been dramatically slashed, and even though the company is a huge consumer of materials, parts, and components from other manufacturing sectors.

With all those cautions out on the table, here’s what the new Fed statistics showed. After-inflation domestic manufacturing output slid by 0.48 percent sequentially in September, the worst such result since April’s 0.87 percent decrease, and more than enough to keep industry overall in recession. Since July, 2018, its real output is down a total of 0.38 percent.

GM’s labor troubles clearly dragged the total number down. Constant dollar vehicles and parts production in September sank by 4.22 percent on month, its worst such performance since January’s 7.18 percent nosedive (when the federal government was still shut down, surely depressing consumer confidence).

The Fed made clear that “Excluding motor vehicles and parts, [its] overall [industrial production] index and the manufacturing index each moved down 0.2 percent.” (More precisely, the real manufacturing decline would have been only 0.15 percent without automotive.) Oddly, though, the Fed didn’t mention that any development that depresses vehicle and parts production is bound to ripple through all the industries making up its extensive supply chain, too.

Yet despite the export troubles revealed in the trade figures, the Fed’s statistics show that aircraft and parts production enjoyed a terrific September. Indeed, the 1.82 percent sequential jump was the biggest since March, 2014’s 2.42 percent.

Nor do sectors comprising the aerospace supply chain (which broadly overlaps considerably with automotive’s) seem to be lagging significantly, except for primary metals. For example, below are the inflation-adjusted output figures for some big supplier sectors and control groups since April (the first full data month following actions the world over grounding or banning from various air spaces Boeing’s 737 Max jets):

overall manufacturing: +0.44 percent

durable goods: +0.75 percent

primary metals: -3.38 percent

fabricated metals products: -0.17 percent

machinery: +1.19 percent

As for the impact of the trade wars, as usual, the consequences of the President’s tariffs on aluminum and steel are easiest to gauge, since they’ve been on the longest, and the major metals-using industries (the presumed leading victims) are so easy to identify. The table below represents the changes in their real output since April, 2018 (the first full month in which the levies were in effect), with the data for manufacturing overall used as a control group, and durable goods included because it’s the super-category in which most of the main metals-using industries are located:

                                           Old Apr thru Aug   New Apr thru Aug   April thru Sept

overall manufacturing:        +0.54 percent          +0.57 percent       +0.09 percent

durables manufacturing:     +1.98 percent          +2.00 percent       +1.25 percent

fabricated metals prods:     +1.88 percent          +2.07 percent       +1.85 percent

machinery:                         +0.67 percent          +1.39 percent           0 percent

automotive:                        +0.17 percent          +0.30 percent        -3.92 percent

major appliances:               -2.04 percent           -1.22 percent        -2.19 percent

aircraft and parts:              +4.39 percent          +3.54 percent        +5.43 percent

The results are mixed – and obviously the most recent automotive number has little to do with the metals duties. Otherwise, three of the remaining four metals users have gained momentum versus the rest of manufacturing (durables, appliances, and aircraft), although their output performances remain subdued in absolute terms, and machinery has lost momentum.

Unfortunately, this kind of analysis not only remains much more difficult for the impact of the China tariffs. But every twist and turn in the trade talks saga only increases the challenge. Primarily because of uncertainties stemming from differences between the manufactured goods classification systems used by the U.S. Trade Representative’s office (which publishes the lists of tariff-ed items) and the main system used by other U.S. government agencies (like the Fed), the sectors below are among the handful that are reasonably certain to have faced tariff pressure since the first duties were placed in imports from China in July, 2018. Each column shows the real output changes since their first full month in effect through July, August, and September of this year:

                                                  Aug thru July      Aug thru Aug      Aug thru Sept

overall manufacturing:             -0.89 percent       -0.33 percent       -0.81 percent

ball bearings:                            -2.32 percent       -2.26 percent       -2.30 percent

industrial heating equip:          -4.58 percent       -1.72 percent       -1.01 percent

farm machinery & equip:        -6.91 percent      +9.71 percent       -0.69 percent

oil/gas drilling platform pts:   -0.86 percent       -1.38 percent       -1.38 percent

As is clear, these results are even more mixed than for the metals-using industries – to which all of these products belong. And with the President’s trade policies all too likely to stay ragged as the 2020 elections come closer, “more confusion” looks like the safest prediction possible regarding American manufacturing production 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Trade Wars’ Bite on Manufacturing Jobs Looks Deeper

Tags

2020 elections, aluminum, China, Jobs, Labor Department, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, private sector, steel, tariffs, Trade, trade war, wages, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Today’s U.S. jobs report (for September) contained much better news for President Trump and his supporters in terms of the economy’s overall performance than it did in terms of his trade policies. American employment on net rose by a decent 136,000 sequentially last month, and the revisions (which boosted the July and August numbers by a total of 45,000) were especially encouraging.

But payrolls in domestic manufacturing – a sector heavily exposed to trade – shrank month-to-month by 2,000. That decline was the first such dip since March’s 3,000. And despite the big positive revisions in overall employment, manufacturing’s left its modest recent hiring record virtually unchanged.

Worse for the President, manufacturing’s metals-using industries in September continued their worrisome recent transition from employment out-performers for the first half year or so after the first duties on steel and aluminum were levied to employment laggards.

Moreover, although manufacturing employment does face two obstacles having nothing to do with the Mr. Trump’s trade wars – Boeing’s safety woes and the strike that began last month against General Motors – damage from the former isn’t yet evident in the jobs data, and the latter probably began too recently to be showing up in the numbers yet.

The impact of the much broader China tariffs remained as elusive as ever, largely because of the on-again, off-again nature of the President’s policies, along with changes and threatened changes in tariff rates on so many goods. But even if Mr. Trump was a model of consistency on this score, the China levies’ effects would be fiendishly difficult to gauge because manufacturing inputs from China are used so broadly but so unevenly by domestic manufacturers.

By contrast, the trends for the metals-using industries look clear enough. This time, I’ll present not only their employment changes since April, 2018 (the first full month in which the metals levies were in effect) and September, but the same employment changes for an earlier post-tariff period. First, the latest numbers:

                                                   Old thru Aug     New thru Aug      Thru Sept

entire private sector:                  +2.30 percent    +2.31 percent    +2.40 percent

overall manufacturing:              +1.73 percent    +1.73 percent    +1.71 percent

durable goods:                           +2.10 percent    +2.10 percent    +2.05 percent

fabricated metals products:        +1.58 percent   +1.56 percent    +1.36 percent

non-electrical machinery:          +2.19 percent    +2.20 percent   +1.95 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:        0 percent         -0.23 percent    -0.69 percent

household appliances*:               not available     -6.31 percent    not available

aerospace products & parts*:      not available    +8.38 percent    not available

*data are one month behind

The loss of the metals-using sectors’ employment momentum in relative and absolute terms can be easily seen. But the more important comparison is between the above figures and those below, which present these trends for the first 10 months of the metals tariffs.

                                                   Old thru Dec    New thru Dec      Thru Jan

entire private sector:                 +1.37 percent   +1.36 percent   +1.60 percent

overall manufacturing:             +1.45 percent   +1.39 percent   +1.49 percent

durable goods:                          +1.67 percent   +1.72 percent   +1.97 percent

fabricated metals products:      +1.75 percent    +1.57 percent   +1.78 percent

non-electrical machinery:        +2.20 percent    +2.33 percent   +2.57 percent

automotive vehicles & parts:  +0.77 percent     +1.07 percent   +1.15 percent

household appliances*:            not available      -2.21 percent     not available

aerospace products & parts*:   not available     +5.51 percent    not available

*data are one month behind

This table shows that except for the household appliances sector (which has faced a separate, product-specific set of tariffs on large household laundry equipment since February, 2018), and automotive, the metals-using sectors were creating new employment at a considerably faster pace than both the overall private economy and overall manufacturing. And automotive was closing the gap.

Aside from trade, the White House, and everyone seeking the best for the U.S. economy, should also be troubled by the drop in September in the year-on-year manufacturing jobs increase to 117,000. That’s the worst such performance since August, 2017’s 112,000 and less than half the rate of the previous September annual improvement (266,000).

Better news for Trump-ers? Manufacturing job creation during the first 31 months of the Trump presidency is still much better (464,000) than during the last 31 months of former President Barack Obama’s administration (198,000).

Matters look better for the President (and manufacturing workers) on the wages front. Although industry’s pre-inflation hourly pay only inched up on month by 0.07 percent, that result beat the 0.04 percent dip for the overall private sector. (The Labor Department, which tracks the employment and wages figures, doesn’t monitor public sector wages since they’re set largely by politicians’ decisions, not largely by market forces. Therefore, they say almost nothing about the state of the labor market or the economic in general.)

Moreover, this relatively good manufacturing’s wage performance continued a slow relative catch up trend that began this year. Since January, current-dollar private sector pay is up 1.92 percent, versus 2.20 percent for manufacturing workers.

All the same, since the current economic recovery began, in mid-2009, private sector wages have risen by 26.87 percent. Manufacturing’s increase? Only 21.03 percent. And these manufacturing wages rose faster during the last 31 months of the Obama presidency (6.04 percent) than during the first 31 months of the Trump administration (5.53 percent). 

The safest economic conclusion seems to be that manufacturing hiring is hardly in the dumps – as suggested by the latest (also September) soft data from the Institute for Supply Management.  Nor does this looks like a “Tariff-mageddon” is upon us. But manufacturing job creation is also well off 2018’s robust pace, and the more so in major trade-affected industries . And its underlying situation will as more difficult to describe the Boeing and General Motors effects become visible (assuming the auto strike isn’t settled quickly).

But as cautious as that analysis is, the political implications as the 2020 presidential campaign heats up are even murkier. For barring a dramatic change in the manufacturing picture, they’ll depend on voters deciding whether the Trump manufacturing, trade, and overall economic record are good enough.