Glad I Didn’t Say That! The U.S. Is and Isn’t America First-y on Green Energy Subsidies

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subsidies, supply chains, America First, Glad I Didn't Say That!, John Podesta, green energy, Biden administration, clean energy, Inflation Reduction Act, Jennifer Grandholm, climate, European Union n

“We don’t want to see any trade rivalry. And we’re in discussion with our [European Union] counterparts about how to make sure we can [build clean energy supply chains] in a way that lifts all.”

–U.S. Energy Secretary Jennifer Grandholm, March 9, 2023

 

“We make no apologies for the fact that American taxpayer dollars ought to go to American [clean energy] investments and American jobs.”

– White House Senior Advisor for Clean Energy Innovation and Implementation John Podesta, February 24, 2023

 

(Sources: “US energy secretary offers olive branch to EU in green subsidies row,” by Derek Brower, Financial Times, March 10, 2023, US energy secretary offers olive branch to EU in green subsidies row | Financial Times (ft.com) and “US makes ‘no apologies’ for prioritising American jobs, clean energy tsar tells EU,” by Aime Williams and Derek Brower, Financial Times, February 24, 2023, US makes ‘no apologies’ for prioritising American jobs, clean energy tsar tells EU | Financial Times (ft.com) )

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: 2022 Saw More U.S. Trade Deficits but More Secure Supply Chains

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Advanced Technology Products, ATP, Biden adminstration, Canada, Central America, Dominican Republic, European Union, friendshoring, Germany, Immigration, Japan, manufacturing, Mexico, offshoring, South Korea, supply chains, Taiwan, Trade, Trade Deficits, U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, USMCA, Vietnam, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Sometimes the best-laid plans of mice and men etc etc. So this second look by RealityChek at the final (for now) year-end 2022 official U.S. trade figures is coming out today, rather than yesterday, as I expected.

The big takeaways: First, record deficits were set practically everywhere the eye can see – and on top of sizable increases – when it comes to trade flows in manufacturing, advanced technology products (ATP), and with nearly all of America’s major trade partners (except China, which was covered Friday).

Second, and more encouragingly, regionalization of U.S. trade within the Western Hemisphere kept growing, which is (a) surely making supply chains more secure; and (b) creating more economic opportunity in countries that have long sent the United States large numbers of migrants. In other words, the Biden administration goal of “friendshoring” keeps becoming a thing. 

The biggest absolute numbers were turned in by U.S. manufacturing, which saw its huge, chronic deficit rise by 13.46 percent, from $1.32544 trillion to a twelfth straight record $1.50379 trillion. (Unless otherwise specified, all figures in this post will be in pre-inflation dollars, which are the trade data most closely followed by students of the economy.)

And in context, these figures look just as bad. Although full-year, 2022 results won’t be available until late March, when the pre-inflation manufacturing output numbers come out, as of the third quarter, the manufacturing shortfall stood at 53.09 percent of its value-added production (a measure that avoids significant double counting for complex goods made up of lots of parts and components). That marks the first time this number has topped fifty percent.

Moreover, it could well climb further, since in inflation-adjusted terms, manufacturing output has weakened significantly in the fourth quarter.

The only remotely optimistic development: The growth rate of the manufacturing trade deficit last year slowed from 2021’s 18.84 percent.

The trade gap in advanced technology products widened even faster last year – by 24.58 percent, from $195.95 billion to a sixth consecutive all-time high $244.11 billion.

An even stronger goods trade deficit increase was registered by America’s partners in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) – the successor to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This shortfall worsened by 34.12 percent, from $158.19 billion to a second straight record .$212.17 billion.

The most dramatic USMCA deficit change came in U.S-Canada goods trade. Here, the gap soared by 63.14 percent, from $50.03 billion to $81.62 billion. That new record deficit was the highest since 2005’s $78.49 billion..

The goods trade deficit with Mexico surged more slowly – by 20.73 percent. But 2022’s $130.55 billion total was a new all-time high as well, surpassing 2020’s $112.08 billion.

American trade with the European Union (EU) was an exception to the 2022 pattern. The goods shortfall fell by 6.78 percent, from $218.74 billion to $203.91 billion, largely reflecting supercharged American exports of natural gas to the continent to make up for reduced post-Ukraine war Russian supplies.

But the goods deficit with the EU’s largest economy, Germany, increased by 5.44 percent, from $69.88 billion to $73.69 billion.

Turning to U.S. goods trade with Asia, the deficit with Japan grew by 12.80 percent on year, from $60.30 billion to $68.01 billion.

The gap with South Korea jumped by 51.39 percent, from $28.98 billion to a third straight record $43.87 billion.

In swelling by 19.65 percent, from $40.23 billion to $48.13 billion, the goods shortfall with Taiwan set recorded its fourth consecutive all-time high.

And consistent with its growing role as an alternative to offshoring export-oriented production to China, the U.S. goods deficit with Vietnam ballooned by 27.77 percent, setting a thirteenth straight record in the process.

At the same time, these geographic trade statistics show that despite the emergence of Asia altenatives to China, U.S. goods trade is becoming increasingly concentrated within the Western Hemisphere.

Between 2021 and 2022, two-way U.S. goods trade with Canada and Mexico combined as a share of total U.S. goods trade rose from 28.76 percent to 29.33 percent. And in 2019, the last full-year before the pandemic’s arrival state-side, this share was just 25.71 percent.

The numbers for Dominican Republic and Central America are much smaller but the trends more dramatic. Between 2021 and 2022, their share of total U.S. goods trade improved from 5.25 percent to 5.34 percent, but since 2019, it’s way up from 1.23 percent.   

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why the U.S. Inflation Outlook Just Got Even Cloudier

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CCP Virus, China, consumer price index, consumers, core CPI, coronavirus, cost of living, COVID 19, CPI, energy prices, Federal Reserve, food prices, inflation, Jerome Powell, prices, recession, stagflation, stimulus, supply chains, Ukraine War, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If the big U.S. stock indices didn’t react enthusiastically to yesterday’s official American inflation figures (which were insensitively released the very day I had a minor medical procedure), that’s because they were too mixed to signal that consumer prices were finally being brought under control.

Lately, good news on inflation-fighting has been seen as good news for stock investors because it indicates that the Federal Reserve may at least pause its campaign to hike interest rates in order to slow economic growth significantly– and even trigger a recession. That’s because a weaker economy means consumers will have less money to spend and that businesses therefore will find it much harder to keep raising prices, and even to maintain prices at currently lofty levels. And all else equal, companies’ profits would take a hit.

So already softening inflation could convince the central bank that its efforts to date have been good enough, and that its goal of restoring price stability can be achieved without encouraging further belt tightening – and more downward pressure on business bottom lines.

Of course, stock investors aren’t always right about economic data. But their take on yesterday’s figures for the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which cover December. seems on target.

The data definitely contained encouraging news. Principally, on a monthly basis, the overall (“headline”) CPI number showed that prices actually fell in December – by 0.08 percent. That’s not much, but this result marks the first such drop since July’s 0.02 percent, and the biggest sequential decline since the 0.92 percent plunge recorded in April, 2020, when the economy was literally cratering during the CCP Virus’ devastating first wave. Further, this latest decrease followed a very modest 0.10 percent monthly increase in November.

So maybe inflation is showing some genuine signs of faltering momentum? Maybe. But maybe not. For example, that CPI sequential slip in July was followed by three straight monthly increases that ended with a heated 0.44 percent in October.

Moreover, core CPI accelerated month-to-month in December. That’s the inflation gauge that strips out food and energy prices because they’re supposedly volatile for reasons having little or nothing to do with the economy’s underlying inflation prone-ness.

December’s sequential core CPI rise was 0.30 percent – one of the more sluggish figures of the calendar year, but a rate faster than a November number of 0.27 percent that was revised up from 0.20 percent. Therefore, these last two results could signal more inflation momentum, not less.

In addition, as always, the annual headline and core CPI numbers need to be viewed in light of the baseline effect – the extent to which statistical results reflect abnormally low or high numbers for the previous comparable period that may simply stem from a catch-up trend that’s restoring a long-term norm.

Many of the multi-decade strong year-to-year headline and core inflation rates of 2021 came after the unusually weak yearly results that stemmed from the short but devastating downturn caused by that first CCP Virus wave. Consequently, I was among those (including the Fed) believing that such price rises were “transitory,” and that they would fade away as that particular baseline effect disappeared.

But as I’ve posted (e.g., last month), that fade has been underway for months, and annual inflation remains powerful and indeed way above the Fed’s two percent target. The main explanations as I see it? The still enormous spending power enjoyed by consumers due to all the pandemic relief and economic stimulus approved in recent years, and other continued and even new major government outlays that have put more money into their pockets (as listed toward the end of this column).

(A big hiring rebound since the economy’s pandemic-induced nadir and rock-bottom recent headline unemployment rates have helped, too. But as I’ll explain in an upcoming post, the effects are getting more credit than they deserve.)

And when you look at the baselines for the new headline and core CPI annual increases, it should become clear that after having caught up from the CCP Virus-induced slump, businesses still believe they have plenty of pricing power left, which suggests at the least that inflation will stay high.

Again, here the inflation story is better for the annual headline figure than for the core figure. In December, the former fell from November’s 7.12 percent to 6.42 percent – the best such number since the 6.24 percent of October, 2021, and the sixth straight weakening. The baseline 2020-2021 headline inflation rate for December was higher than that for November (6.83 percent versus 7.10 percent), and had sped up for four consecutive months. But that November-December 2020-2021 increase was more modest than the latest November-December 2021-2022 decrease, which indicates some progress here.

At the same time, don’t forget that the 6.24 percent annual headline CPI inflation of October, 2020-2021 had a 2019-2020 baseline of just 1.18 percent. Hence my argument that businesses today remain confident about their pricing power even though they’ve made up for their pandemic year weakness in spades.

In December, annual core inflation came down from 5.96 percent to 5.69 percent. That was the most sluggish pace since December, 2020-2021’s 5.48 percent, but just the third straight weakening. But the increase in the baseline number from November to December, 2021 was from 4.59 percent to that 5.48 percent – bigger than the latest November-December decrease. In other words, this trend for core CPI is now running opposite it encouraging counterpart for headline CPI.

Finally, as far as baseline arguments go, that 5.48 percent December, 2021 annual core CPI increase followed a baseline figure the previous year of a mere 1.28 percent. Since the new annual December rate of 5.69 percent comes on top of a rate more than four times higher, that’s another sign of continued business pricing confidence.

But the inflation forecast is still dominated by the question of how much economic growth will sink, and how the Fed in particular will react. And the future looks more confusing than ever.

The evidence for considerably feebler expansion, and even an impending recession, is being widely cited. Indeed, as this Forbes poster has reported, “The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters indicates the highest probability of a recession over the next 12 months in the survey’s 55-year history.”

If they’re right, inflation may keep cooling modestly for a time but still remain worrisomely warm. And the Fed may react either by keeping interest rates lofty for longer than expected – as Chair Jerome Powell has already said – or even raise them faster. 

Nonetheless, although the recession that did take place during the first and second quarters of last year convinced numerous observers that worse was yet to come, the third quarter saw a nice bounceback and the fourth quarter could be even better. So if a downturn is coming, it will mean that economic activity will need to shrink very abruptly. Hardly impossible, but hardly a sure thing.

And if some form of economic nosedive does occur, it could prompt the Fed to hold off or even reverse course to some extent, even if price increases remain non-trivial. A major worsening of the economy may also lead Congress and the Biden administration to join the fray and approve still more stimulus to cushion the blow.

Complicating matters all the while – the kind of monetary stimulus added or taken away by the central bank takes months to ripple through the economy, as the Fed keeps emphasizing.  Some of the kinds of fiscal stimulus, like the pandemic-era checks, work faster, but others, like the infrastructure bill and the huge new subsidies for domestic semiconductor manufacturing will take much longer.

Additionally, some of the big drivers of the recent inflation are even less controllable by Washington and more unpredictable than the immense U.S. economy – like the Ukraine War’s impact on the prices of energy and other commodities, including foodstuffs, and the wild recent swings of a range of Chinese government policies that keep roiling global and domestic supply chains. 

My own outlook? It’s for a pretty shallow, short recession followed by a comparably moderate recovery and all accompanied by price levels with which most Americans will keep struggling. Back in the 1970s, it was called “stagflation,” I’m old enough to remember that’s an outcome that no one should welcome, and it will mean that the country remains as far from achieving robust, non-inflationary growth as ever.  

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: A Wall Street Kingpin Lays a Grand Strategy Egg

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America First, China, climate change, ESG, fossil fuels, globalism, globalization, Immigration, industrial policy, Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan Chase, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, productivity, supply chains, The Wall Street Journal, Ukraine War, Wall Street, woke capitalism

In several senses, it’s not entirely surprising that The Wall Street Journal recently allowed Jamie Dimon to share his thoughts on the domestic and especially global grand strategies the United States should pursue in the post-Ukraine War world.

After all, Dimon heads JPMorgan Chase, the nation’s biggest and most important bank. As a result, he clearly needs to know a lot about the U.S. economy. And as Wall Street’s biggest poohbah, he surely must know a lot about the state of the world overall – in particular since he’s had extensive contacts with the heads of state, senior officials, and business leaders of many countries.

What is somewhat surprising, then, is how little of Dimon’s analysis and advice is new or even interesting, and how much of it could well put America ever further behind the eight-ball.

Dimon’s article wasn’t completely devoid of merit. Since he’s dabbled in some (symbolic) woke-ism himself, it was good to see him seemingly take a shot at what’s become mainstream liberal as well as radical lefty dogma by urging the education of “all Americans about the sacrifice of those who came before us for democracy at home and abroad.”

Given the strong support by the Biden administration and by some finance bigwigs for influential for encouraging and even requiring lenders to take climate change risks into account when extending credit, it was encouraging to read his pragmatic position that “Secure and reliable oil and gas production is compatible with reducing CO2 over the long run, and is far better than burning more coal.”

Dimon showed that, unlike many on Wall Street, he supports some forms of industrial policy to make sure that “we don’t rely on potential adversaries for critical goods and services.”

And he endorsed the larger point that the neoliberal globalization-based triumphalism that undergirded the policies of globalist pre-Trump Presidents needs to be buried for good:

“America and the West can no longer maintain a false sense of security based on the illusion that dictatorships and oppressive nations won’t use their economic and military powers to advance their aims—particularly against what they perceive as weak, incompetent and disorganized Western democracies. In a troubled world, we are reminded that national security is and always will be paramount, even if it seems to recede in tranquil times.”

But on most of the biggest issues and just about all specifics, Dimon either punted or retreated into the same globalist territory that proved as profitable for Big Finance as it was too often dangerously naive for the nation as a whole.

For example, he wants Washington to “fix the immigration policies that are tearing us apart, dramatically reducing illegal immigration and dramatically increasing legal immigration.” Completely ignored is the depressing impact the latter would have on wages that have already been falling recently in inflation-adjusted terms, and on desperately needed productivity growth – as a bigger supply of cheap labor is bound to kill many incentives for businesses to improve their efficiency by innovating technology-wise or devising better management approaches.

And on China, Dimon’s clearly determined to talk his company’s book, insisting that “We should acknowledge that we have common interests in combating nuclear proliferation, climate change and terrorism.” and blithely predicting that “Tough but thoughtful negotiations over strategic, military and economic concerns—including unfair competition—should yield a better situation for all.”

But most important, Dimon fully endorses the foundations of the very globalist strategy that for decades perversely ignored the distinctive and paramount advantages the United States brings to world affairs and has thereby created many of the dangers and vulnerabilities with which the nation has been struggling.

The way Dimon seems to see it, there’s no reason to pay any attention to the extraordinary degree of security the America enjoys merely by virtue of its geographic isolation and powerful military; or to its extraordinary degree of economic self-sufficiency thanks to its immense and diverse natural resource base, its technological prowess, and its dynamic free market-dominated economic system. And evidently, it’s just as pointless to concentrate foreign and economic policy on the nation’s equally formidable potential to build on these advantages.

Instead, like other globalists, Dimon flatly rejects the idea that “America can stand alone,” or should seek to maximize its ability to do so. Instead, it should keep defining nothing less than “global peace and order” as “a vital American interest” – the standard globalist recipe for yoking the country’s fate to an agenda of more open-ended military interventions, more hastily approved and usually wasteful foreign aid, and more nation-building in areas lacking any ingredients of nation-hood.

Asa result, it would anchor America’s safety and prosperity on efforts to shape foreign conditions (over which is has relatively little control), rather than on efforts to shape domestic conditions (over which is has much more control). (For a much fuller description of this America First strategy and its differences with globalism, see this 2018 article.) 

In fact, and revealingly, Dimon’s piece was titled “The West Needs America’s Leadership.” If only he and other globalists would start thinking seriously about what America really needs. 

(Full disclosure:  I own several JPMorgan bond and preferred stock issues.)    

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: What a U-Turn for the U.S. Trade Deficit!

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CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, expansion, exports, Federal Reserve, GDP, goods trade, gross domestic product, imports, inflation, manufacturing, non-oil goods trade deficit, pandemic, recession, services trade, supply chains, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As this morning’s stunning official U.S. international trade figures (for November) made clear, the CCP Virus pandemic really wasn’t over yet near the end of last year – at least when it came to China. The steep monthly drop in the November overall trade gap stemmed largely from the Chinese dictatorship’s erratic response to a new tidal wave of virus cases. Beijing at first ordered a series of new shutdowns in numerous major cities, and then abruptly tried reversing course following widespread protests from an outraged and pandemic-and lockdown-exhausted Chinese citizenry.

The resulting turmoil and confusion depressed the Chinese economy – including the export-focused sectors that had led the country to serve as the “world’s factory.”

At the same time, the renewed disruption of China-centric global supply chains only accounted for a little less than half of the November U.S. trade balance’s sequential improvement. And at least as strikingly, the combined goods and services shortfall cratered even though by most accounts the U.S. economy’s growth accelerated late last year. More surprising still, growth appears to have sped up in November – and during the rest of the quarter – even as imports fell off the table.

As known by RealityChek regulars, it’s been rare for the deficit to tumble when the gross domestic product (GDP – the standard measure of the economy’s size) increases, and largely because American expansion typically means that both U.S. consumers and businesses are stepping up their historically robust importing. Much more common are deficit drops mainly due to the economy sagging and this importing tailing off.

As the U.S. recession during the first half of last year came to an end, America’s trade performance racked up a short winning streak during which the trade gap shrank and – even better – exports increased and imports decreased. That’s “even better” because an economy that’s importing less and exporting more is one that’s growing less because of borrowing and spending and more because of producing.  Early in the third quarter, though, the return of growth seemed to start reproducing the standard pattern during which rising imports boosted the deficit.

November’s results sharply reversed that latest trend – to put it mildy. The overall deficit sank month-to-month in November by a whopping 20.93 percent. That’s the biggest fall-off since February, 2009’s (26.85 percent), when the economy was still mired in the Great Recession triggered by the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08. And the $61.51 billion level (down from October’s $77.85 billion) is the lowest monthly figure since the $59.11 billion in September, 2020, when the economy was recovering from the first CCP Virus wave.

Total exports were off sequentially in November, but only by two percent, from $256.996 billion to $251.864 billion. That was the third straight decline, the biggest since January’s 2.01 percent, and the lowest monthly figure since April’s $244.230 billion. But given the sluggishness of the rest of the global economy, and the unusually level of the U.S. dollar then (which undermines the price competitiveness of U.S.-origin goods and services at home and abroad), this decrease seems pretty modest.

The bigger move by far was in total imports, which plunged by 6.41 percent, from $334.843 billion to $313.374 billion. The decrease was the biggest in percentage terms since the 13.16 percent nosedive of April, 2020, when the pandemic and its economic effects were at their worst in the United States.

The China effect was certainly a huge contributor. The U.S. goods gap with the People’s Republic (country-specific services data take much longer to release) slumped by fully 26.23 percent, from $28.87 billion to $21.30 billion. This $7.57 billion difference represented 46.33 percent of the $16.34 billion monthly improvement in the total trade deficit in November. For good measure, the sequential plunge was the greatest since the 38.93 percent nosedive of February, 2020 (when China was still struggling with the first virus outbreak), and the monthly total the lowest since April, 2020’s $22.30 billion.

And goods imports from China fell sequentially in November by $7.70 billion, from $44.57 billion to $36.88 billion. That decrease of 17.27 percent was steepest since the 31.47 percent collapse in February, 2020, and the monthly total the most modest since March, 2020’s $19.64 billion.

But as a result, more than half of the spectacular monthly drop in the November combined goods and services deficit came from other trade flows, as did 64.13 percent of the month’s total import decline of $21.47 billion.

More evidence that the monthly trade shortfall’s decrease was spurred by much more than China’s troubles: The U.S..global non-oil goods trade gap, the closest proxy to U.S.-China goods trade, was off by $15.21 billion on a monthly basis in November (more than twice the amount of the $7.57 billion decline in the U.S.-China deficit). And non-oil goods imports tumbled by $19.87 billion month-to-month in November – some two and a half times the amount of the $7.70 billion drop in goods imports from China.

In other noteworthy November trade developments, the U.S. goods deficit drooped by 15.44 percent on month, from $99.40 billion to $84.05 billion. That figure is the lowest since December, 2020’s $83.20 billion and the decrease the biggest relatively speaking since the 20.79 percent in Great Recession-y February, 2009.

The long-time surplus in services, the biggest sector of the U.S. economy, and a cluster of industries hit especially hard by the pandemic and its resulting economic damage, rose 4.60 percent, from $21.55 billion to $22.54 billion.  That monthly total was the highest since February, 2021’s $23 billion.

The November slippage in goods exports of 3.03 percent, from $176.16 billion to $170.82 billion, was the largest in percentage terms since the 3.34 percent of September, 2021.

Goods imports dropped 7.51 percent, from $275.56 billion to $254.87 billion. That total was the lowest since October, 2021’s $243.85 billion and the percentage decline the greatest since the 12.79 percent in pandemic-y April, 2020.

Services exports inched up by just 0.26 percent sequentially in November, but the $81.05 billion total was the eighth straight record, and the monthly advance the tenth in a row.

The huge, chronic trade deficit in manufacturing sank from $134.73 billion in October to $115.72 billion, with that November level the best since February’s $106.49 billion – when the last economic downturn had begun. And the sequential retreat of 14.11 percent was the greatest since the 23.09 percent in Great Recession-y February, 2020.

Manufacturing exports were down 4.71 percent on month, from $110.44 billion to $105.24 billion, and manufacturing imports plummeted by 9.88 percent, from October’s $245.17 million (the second worst monthly total ever, behind March’s $256.18 billion), to $220.95 billion.

On a year-to-date basis, however, the manufacturing deficit of $1.3902 trillion has already passed last year’s annual record of $1.3298 trillion, and is running 15.49 percent ahead of the 2021 pace.

Even by CCP Virus-era standards, the November U-turn taken by the trade deficit has rendered the U.S. economic outlook awfully fuzzy. Economists seem pretty confident that the economy is headed for a recession soon, but the latest prominent forecast shows that growth heated up notably between last year’s third and fourth quarters. So if a downturn really is imminent, it’s going to come incredibly abruptly.

That should improve the trade deficit further. But what if the Federal Reserve chickens out and decides to halt or just pause its strategy of cooling inflation by slowing growth significantly because…it becomes clear that the tightening it’s already pursued has begun slowing growth? What if all the money Washington has put into consumers’ pockets continues to fuel robust spending – which tends to pull in more deficit-widening imports? But if so, how come growth has been so much better in the second half of the year even as Americans’ purchases from abroad now look like they’re tanking?

And will China finally get control over the pandemic, and return its economy to some semblance of normalcy?

The answers to those questions seem to be way above any mortal’s pay grade.  And although I’m in the “recession’s coming” camp, so far, the economy doesn’t seem to care.  As a result, I’ll be following the incoming trade and other economic data unusually closely – and with unusual humility.      

Making News: Back on National Radio Tonight on Apple and China, & a New Podcast On-Line

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Apple, CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, decoupling, Employment, friend-shoring, Jobs, Making News, Market Wrap with Moe Ansari, recession, subsidized private sector, supply chains, Zero Covid, Zero Covid protests

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to be back tonight to the nationally syndicated “CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor.” Our subject – an update to Saturday’s report on Apple’s potentially game-changing decision to move production out of China at a faster pace. 

I don’t know yet when the pre-recorded segment will be broadcast but John’s show is on between 9 PM and midnight EST, the entire program is always compelling, and you can listen live at links like this. As always, moreover, I’ll post a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

Speaking of podcasts, the recording is now on-line of yesterday’s interview on the also-nationally syndicated “Market Wrap with Moe Ansari.” The segment focused on my post yesterday on the worsening quality of many of America’s newly created jobs, the political and economic impact of Chinese protests against the regime’s Zero Covid policy, and the latest signs of an impending U.S. recession.

To listen, click here, and scroll down a bit till you see my name on the left.  The segment begins at about the 21:30 mark.

And keep on checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Making News: Podcast Now On-Line of National Radio Interview on “Friend-shoring” & Reshoring from China

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CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, friend-shoring, Gordon G. Chang, Making News, manufacturing, national security, offshoring, reshoring, resilience, supply chains, Trade

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast of an interview conducted with me on the nationally syndicated “CBS Eye on the World” with John Batchelor is now on-line. The segment focused on whether U.S.-owned manufacturing that’s been offshored to China is either coming back state-side or moving to countries deemed friendlier and more reliable suppliers. Click here to listen to the discussion with John and co-host Gordon G. Chang.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Evidence That Stimulus-Bloated Demand is the Main U.S. Inflation Driver

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CCP Virus, China, consumer price index, consumers, coronavirus, COVID 19, Covid relief, CPI, demand, inflation, Jobs, population, retirement, stimulus, Sun Belt, supply, supply chains, The New York Times, Ukraine War, workers, Wuhan virus, Zero Covid, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The New York Times just provided some important evidence on the big role played by super-charged consumer demand in super-charging inflation – this article showing that the Sun Belt has been the U.S. region where prices have been rising fastest.

The finding matters because a debate has been raging among politicians and economists over the leading causes of multi-decade high inflation rates with which Americans have been struggling over the last year and a half or so.

On one side are those who claim that overly generous government stimulus spending is the main culprit, because it’s increased U.S. buying power much faster than the supply of goods and services has grown. On the other side are those who focus on the inadequate amount of goods and services that companies are turning out, stemming from supply chain disruptions rooted in the stop-and-go nature of the American economy from successive waves of pandemic downturns and slowdowns to the Ukraine war to China’s ridiculously draconian Zero Covid policies.

Clearly, all these developments deserve blame, but the regional disparities in inflation rates provide pretty convincing support for emphasizing bloated demand.

Here’s the latest annual disparity in the headline Consumer Price Index as presented in the Times article:

U.S. total:    8.5 percent

South:          9.4 percent

Midwest:     8.6 percent

West:          8.3 percent

Northeast:   7.3 percent

It correlates roughly, by the way, with the data in this report last spring from the Republican members of Congress’ Joint Economic Committee.

And here’s a principal, demand-related reason: The Sun Belt states of the South and West have been the U.S. states that have gained the most population during the pandemic period. Indeed, according to the latest U.S. Census data, eight of the ten states with the fastest overall population growth between July, 2020 and July, 2021 was a southern or southwestern state, and the same holds for five of the ten states with the fastest population growth in percentage terms.

It’s true that population growth often increases supply, too – by boosting numbers of workers. The U.S. government doesn’t break out job creation along the above regional lines, but a look at individual state totals doesn’t conclusively brand the Sun Belt as an national employment leader. On average, relatively speaking, Arizona, California, Florida, Nevada, and Texas have created more jobs from the pandemic-period bottom in April, 2020 through last month, as shown in this table:

U.S. total:    +16.87 percent

California:   +17.98 percent

Florida:        +21.05 percent

Texas:          +17.31 percent

Arizona:       +16.02 percent

Nevada:        +30.92 percent

But don’t forget – many of these states have outsized travel and tourism sectors, and you know what happened to those activities during the worst of the pandemic. So in part, their employment bounced back so quickly because they had plummeted so dramatically as the CCP Virus’ first wave spread.

Moreover, many of these states are big retirement destinations, too, and as their overall population increase makes clear, this trend has intensified since the pandemic arrived. Of course, the workers in any given state don’t only sell goods and services to that state’s population, and a given state’s residents don’t only buy goods and services from providers in that state. Yet it’s certainly noteworthy that the number of the Sun Belt states’ consumers rose faster relative to the national average than the number of Sun Belt workers.

And in this vein, Sun Belt inflation probably is also particularly hot partly because so many of the newcomers are wealthy. Indeed, one recent study found that, early in the pandemic, “Of the 10 states with the largest influx of high-earning households, nine are located in the Sun Belt, including the six-highest ranked states, starting with Florida.”

Because they bring so much spending power to their new home states, these wealthier Americans naturally tend to drive prices up unusually fast.

As the Times article notes, some prominent reasons for scorching Sun Belt inflation are unrelated to population-driven demand growth – notably much lower population densities that generate more gasoline-using driving.  But the impact of population movement and all the disproportionately high inflation it’s clearly creating is hard to ignore.  And if a consumption shock has spurred so much inflation in the Sun Belt, why wouldn’t it be affecting prices this way in the rest of the nation, too?          

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Another Dreadful U.S. Consumer Inflation Report

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Commerce Department, consumer price index, consumers, core inflation, cost of living, CPI, demand, energy, Federal Reserve, food, inflation, Labor Department, monetary policy, PCE, personal consumption expenditures index, prices, supply chains, Ukraine War, Zero Covid, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Optimism about U.S. inflation took another blow yesterday morning – though it shouldn’t have been unexpected – with the release of the latest data on the Federal Reserve’s favorite measure of price changes. I said “shouldn’t have been unexpected” because, as Fed Chair Jerome Powell and others have noted, this gauge and the higher profile Consumer Price Index (CPI) put out by the Labor Department normally track each other pretty closely over the long run, and those CPI results were deeply discouraging.

Nonetheless, latest results from the Price Indexes for Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) monitored by the Commerce Department matter because they strongly confirmed the latest CPI figures – which were pretty awful – starting with the month-to-month changes for the entire economy.

In June, headline PCE inflation shot up sequentially by a full one percent – much faster than May’s 0.6 percent and indeed the fastest rate not only throughout this latest high-inflation period, but the fastest since it increased by one percent in September, 2005.

But another observation should make even clearer how unusual that monthly headline increase was. The Commerce Department has been keeping these data since February, 1959. That’s 749 months worth of results through last month. How many times has monthly headline PCE inflation been one percent or higher? Twelve. And the all-time record is just 1.2 percent, hit in March, 1980, and February and March, 1974.

The annual figures were no better, and RealityChek regulars know that they’re more reliable than the monthlies because they measure changes over a longer time period, and therefore smooth out short-term fluctations.

June’s 6.8 percent rise was the strongest of the current high inflation era, and a significant pickup from May’s 6.3 percent. And it looks even worse when the fading baseline effect is taken into account. The June yearly jump in headline PCE came off a June, 2020-21 increase of four percent. So that year’s June PCE rate was already twice the Federal Reserve’s two percent annual inflation target.

By comparison, headline PCE this March was only a little lower than the June result – 6.6 percent. But the baseline figure for the previous March was only 2.5 percent. That rate was still higher than the Fed target, but not by much. So arguably unlike the price advances of June, this March’s inflation reflected some catching up from price increases that were still somewhat subdued due to the economy’s stop-go recovery from earlier during the pandemic.

Core PCE was lower by both measures, because it strips out the food and particularly energy prices that have spearheaded much headline inflation, and that are excluded supposedly because they’re volatile for reasons having little to do with the economy’s fundamental vulnerability to inflation. But here the monthly figures revealed new momentum, with the June seqential increase of 0.6 percent twice that of May’s 0.3 percent, and the highest such number since May and June of 2021.

Before then, however, core inflation hadn’t seen a monthly handle in the 0.6 percent neighborhood since September and October of 2001, which registered gains of 0.6 and 0.7percent, respectively.

On an annual basis, June’s core PCE increase of 4.8 percent was slightly higher than May’s 4.7 percent, but well below the recent peak of 5.3 percent in February. But the baseline effect should dispel any notions of progess being made. For June-to-June inflation for the previous year was 3.5 percent – meaningfully above the Fed’s two percent target. Core annual PCE inflation for the previous Februarys was just 1.5 percent – meaningfully below the Fed target.

As with most measures of U.S. economic perfomance, an unprecedented number of wild cards that can affect both PCE and CPI inflation has rendered most crystal balls (including mine) pretty unreliable. To cite just a few examples: Will China’s Zero Covid policy keep upending global supply chains and thus the prices of Chinese exports? Will the ongoing Ukraine War have similar impacts on many raw materials, especially energy? Will the Federal Reserve’s tightening of U.S. credit conditions per se bring inflation down significantly in the foreseeable future by dramatically slowing the nation’s growth? Will high and still soaring prices, coupled with vanishing savings rates, achieve the same objective if the Fed’s inflation-fighting zeal wanes? Or will the still huge amounts of money in most consumers’ bank accounts along with continuing robust job creation keep the demand for goods and services elevated for the time being whatever the Fed does?

Here’s what seems pretty certain to me: As long as that consumer demand remains strong, and as long as producer prices keep jumping, businesses will pass these rising costs on to their customers and keep consumer inflation worrisomely high. That seemed to be precisely the case in the last two months, with a torrid May read on producer prices being followed by the equally torrid June consumer inflation reports. So unless this wholesale inflation cooled a great deal this month, I’d expect at least another month of red hot consumer inflation. That producer price report is due out August 11.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Is the U.S. Trade Deficit’s Latest Dip More than Recession-y?

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CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, economic growth, exports, GDP, goods trade, gross domestic product, imports, inflation-adjusted growth, real GDP, real trade deficit, recession, services trade, supply chains, Trade, trade deficit, Ukraine War, Zero Covid, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Although yesterday’s official figures show that the U.S. economy has now shrunk for the second straight quarter, the nation’s chronic and immense trade deficit played a diametrically different role in producing the final results. Whereas during the first quarter of this year, the trade gap’s widening was the difference between expansion and contraction of the gross domestic product (GDP – the standard measure of the economy’s size), during the second quarter (at least according to the new advance figures), its narrowing kept the drop in GDP from being considerably worse.   

The tumble of 0.94 percent at annual rates revealed in GDP after inflation (the most widely followed measure, and the GDP gauge that will be used throughout this post unless otherwise specified) came on top of a 1.58 percent decrease in the first quarter. As many have observed, two consecutive quarters of real GDP decline has long been a common definition of a recession.

This time around, however, a 4.53 percent fall-off in the inflation-adjusted trade shortfall, from a record $1.5447 trillion at annual rates to $1.4747 trillion, generated 1.43 percentage points of sequential growth in the second quarter. Although the new deficit was still the second biggest on record, the improvement prevented the quarter’s GDP drop from reaching 2.37 percent – which would have been the worst such performance since the nearly 36 percent crash dive recorded between the first and second quarters of 2020, when the CCP Virus pandemic and its impact on the economy were at their worst.

This year’s second quarter, moreover, marked the first time that America’s trade flows had added to growth, and the biggest such contribution in absolute terms, since that spring of 2020, when the pandemic and related mandated and voluntary curbs on economic activity greatly depressed U.S. imports. In relative terms, the second quarter’s trade contribution to growth was the best since the second quarter of 2009, near the end of the Great Recession that followed the global financial crisis. During that quarter, real GDP sank at an annual rate of 0.68 percent, but trade generated 1.53 percentage points of growth.

By contrast, during the first quarter, the trade deficit’s expansion subtracted a whopping 3.23 percentage points from the change in GDP – which turned what would have been a 1.65 percent sequential increase into that 1.58 percent shrinkage.

The reduction in the trade deficit also enabled the shortfall to decrease as a percentage of the entire economy from the first quarter’s all-time high of 7.83 percent to 7.49 percent. Further, the 4.34 percent sequential decrease represented by this progress was the biggest since the 9.45 percent decline in the fourth quarter of 2019 – just before the pandemic arrived state-side in force.

At the same time, at 7.49 percent of real GDP, the second quarter trade deficit was still the second highest ever, and since that immediately pre-pandemic-y fourth quarter of 2019, the trade shortfall has ballooned by 73.99 percent. As of the first quarter, it had swollen during this period by 82.24 percent.

Ordinarily, the reasons for this trade deficit decline would be a clearcut positive:  Even though the gap usually narrows as the economy weakens, it stemmed from  total exports (counting goods and services) advancing much faster than the much larger amount of imports. But as the nation and world are still in the CCP Virus and in the middle of the Ukraine War, with all the supply chain turbulence they’ve both brought on and will surely keep bringing, drawing strong conclusions still seems unusually hazardous.   

Those total U.S. exports improved by 4.22 percent on quarter, from $2.3613 trillion at annual rates to $2.4410 trillion – the highest such total since the $2.5533 trillion recorded in the fourth quarter of 2019, just before the pandemic hit the U.S. economy. The results were especially encouraging since total exports fell sequentially in the first quarter (by 1.23 percent), and given the global economic slowdown and the dollar’s strengthening to roughly 20-year highs versus nearly all currencies. This move in and of itself put U.S.-origin goods and services at a price disadvantage versus foreign competitors the world over.

Combined goods and services exports are now down just 3.61 percent since that fourth quarter of 2019, versus the 7.52 percent calculable last quarter.

Total imports inched up just 0.76 percent, although the new $3.9357 trillion annualized level did amount to a sixth straight record and an eighth consecutive quarterly increase. These purchases have now climbed by 15.37 percent during the pandemic era, versus the 14.85 percent calculable last quarter.

The goods trade deficit, meanwhile, declined by 3.96 percent sequentially, from the first quarter record total $1.6572 trillion annualized to $1.5916 trillion. This drop was the first since the peak pandemic-y second quarter of 2020, and the biggest since the 6.52 percent shrinkage in the fourth quarter of 2019. The goods trade gap, consequently, has grown by 48.55 percent since the end of 2019, as opposed to the 54.68 percent calculable last quarter.

Goods exports in the second quarter rose 3.69 percent from the first quarter’s $1.7577 trillion at annual rates to a new record $1.8225 trillion – surpassing the previous all-time high of $1.8046 trillion set in the first quarter of 2019. These new results also mean that goods exports have finally exceeded pre-pandemic levels (by 2.24 percent). After the first quarter ended, they were still down 1.39 percent since the fourth quarter of 2019.

Goods imports, however, recorded their first quarterly decrease since the third quarter of 2021 – though only from a worst ever $3.4149 trillion annualized to $3.4141 trillion. But these imports are still 19.63 percent higher than in that immediate pre-pandemic fourth quarter of 2019.

The services trade surplus improved by 8.60 percent between the first and second quarters, from $109.3 billion at annual rates to $118.7 billion. Reflecting the unusually hard hit delivered by the pandemic to the service sector, however, this surplus is still 47.64 percent lower than its level just before the virus began seriously affecting the U.S. economy. That is, it’s been nearly cut in half.

Services exports in the second quarter actually increased sequentially for the third straight time. And the 5.56 percent advance, from $631.5 billion annualized to $666.6 billion was the strongest since the 5.83 percent jump in the fourth quarter of 2006. Nonetheless, services exports remain 13.84 percent off their immediate pre-pandemic level, versus the 18.38 percent calculable last quarter.

Services imports are now back above their pre-pandemic levels, too (by 1.65 percent), having risen 4.92 percent sequentially in the second quarter, from $522.2 billion at annual rates to $547.9. The improvement, moreover, was the fastest since the 7.80 percent recorded in last year’s third quarter.

As mentioned above, usually it’s unambiguously good news for both trade, and to a lesser extent, the entire economy, when the trade deficit diminishes because exports are up considerably faster than imports. It’s normally even better news when these kinds of results are delivered in challenging international and exchange rate environments. But with the Ukraine War and China’s Zero Covid policy still distorting U.S. and global trade flows and unlikely to end anytime soon, unbridled optimism is hard to justify. So like the Federal Reserve, RealityChek will remain data dependent as it tries to detemine the outlook for U.S. trade’s fortunes.