Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The Other Scary Ukraine War Threat

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energy, energy prices, global financial crisis, globalism, hunger, Lehman Brothers, Lehman moment, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Russia, Taiwan, Ukraine, Ukraine War, Vietnam War, vital interests, Western Europe

Take it from me – the words “Lehman” and “moment” are words that no one should ever want to see in the same sentence ever again. Yet they’ve been making a collective comeback lately (see, e.g., here, here, and here), signaling in the process that the determination of the United States and other countries to help Ukraine achieve its goal of expelling Russia from the territory it’s lost could backfire disastrously.

This specific risk has emerged not because the conflict could spread beyond Ukraine’s borders and embroil the big new concentrations of U.S. and other NATO military forces right next door – and therefore all too easily escalate to the nuclear level. It’s also emerged because of the growing economic hardship and potential political instability in major world regions created by the disruption of global energy and food trade triggered by Russia’s invasion and the sanctions it’s triggered.  

The phrase “Lehman moment” refers to the time when the national and global financial systems and economies nearly collapsed because so many of the world’s major banks and other lenders had engaged in such reckless practices, and because they were so interconnected that the failure of one – America’s Lehman Brothers – threatened to topple the whole house of cards that had been created.

Today’s Lehman moment is feared to be coming in Europe’s energy sector – also dominated by huge, closely connected institutions and also endangered by contagion. But this time the culprit hasn’t been greedy executives or asleep-at-the-switch regulators. It’s been the price of natural gas. The Russian invasion of Ukraine itself, the duration of the fighting, Russian supply curbs and threats of cut-offs have pushed it so high that many European utilities have been forced to buy the increasingly scarce fuel on the very expensive spot market and sell it to customers at the much lower prices stipulated by the contracts they’ve signed. (See here for a useful explanation of all of the above.)

As with the original Lehman moment, government bailouts are likely to save the day – at least for the foreseeable future. But the costs are shaping up to be astronomical, and even if they’re paid by all of the continent’s well- and less well-off countries alike, enormous national debts are sure to grow. Moreover, Europe’s near-term energy, and overall economic, future looks so grim because major shortages and towering prices this winter seem both inevitable and bound to bring on a serious recession and all the suffering and anxiety that accompany such downturns.

That sure sounds like a formula for even more political instability than Europe has already seen lately, including a loss of public faith in national and regional establishments and institutions of all kinds, and a further strengthening of the sort of political movements – on the right end of the political spectrum in particular – that globalists keep warning are grave dangers to the democracy and even the peace the continent has enjoyed until Russia’s attack on Ukraine.

Nor is Ukraine War-rooted turmoil confined to Europe. As the Biden administration has just warned, “protracted conflicts – including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine” have been developments that have “disrupted global supply chains and dramatically increased global food prices.” As a result, “world leaders [need] to act with urgency and at scale to respond…and avert extreme hunger for hundreds of millions of people around the world.”

Sub-Saharan Africa, one of the areas of greatest risk, has (rightly) never been seen as a high U.S. foreign policy priority. The other area, though, is the Middle East, which has become much less important even to America’s economic well-being because of the energy production revolution at home, but which continues to attract considerable attention from globalist U.S. leaders.

Hence the backfire risk – and a gigantic irony. Globalist backers of the current Ukraine strategy justify it as necessary to protect what they call a “rules-based international order” they believe has been essential for preventing great power conflict, as well as for promoting impressive degrees of prosperity and democracy around the globe. I’d give far more credit to the balance of nuclear terror that’s prevailed for nearly all of that period, but that’s not the main point.  The main point is that, along with great power conflict, the widespread international turbulence being fueled by the duration of the Ukraine War per se is another major geopolitical nightmare that globalism has striven to avert.  

It’s true that incurring great risks to protect specific, concrete interests the U.S. considers vital – like the security of Western Europe and, more recently, Taiwan (because of its leadership in manufacturing the world’s most advanced semiconductors) – by definition are worth running. This logic also holds for objectives like fostering and maximizing stability the world over, even though they’ve always been more dubious because they’re so much gauzier and less realistic. For whatever the damage possible from attempting to safeguard any of these interests, the term “vital” means that failure can generate even greater dangers – particularly national survival and independence.

But running such risks on behalf of Ukraine’s independence – which was never seen as remotely vital U.S. interest even at the height of the Cold War, which was habitually described as a Manichean struggle for the entire world’s future – is a different matter altogether, and indeed makes no sense at all.

During the Vietnam War, a U.S. Army officer is supposed to have told a reporter after one battle that “It became necessary to destroy the town to save it.” The Lehman moment references and mounting signs of tumult in several major regions long seen by Washington as bearing at least significantly and even vitally on America’s safety and well-being indicates how close U.S. Ukraine policy – even if it simply prolongs heavy but geographically contained fighting – is moving toward achieving that absurdly self-destructive goal.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Official Data Show U.S. Trade Remains on a Winning Streak

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China, exports, goods trade, imports, Made in Washington trade flows, manufacturing, semiconductors, services trade, Taiwan, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The official U.S. trade figures for July that came out this morning continued June’s encouraging pattern of smaller deficits amid continued (if subdued) American economic growth – but with a twist. The previous trade report showed that the overall goods and services shortfall shrank because exports rose healthily while imports slipped just slightly.

The July release showed a smaller trade gap due largely to lower imports. Exports improved, too, but just negligibly.

Yet the bottom line remained the same: an economic expansion that’s gotten a little healthier, because the nation is earning its way in the world to a modestly greater extent.

The specific numbers: The total trade deficit sank month-to-month by 12.65 percent in July – from $80.88 billion to a level of $70.65 billion that was the lowest for a single month since last October’s $68.16 billion. The drop, moreover, was the fourth straight – the longest such stretch since the six-month period between May and November, 2019 – months before the CCP Virus pandemic arrived state-side in force.

The only negative here: That June number was revised up a big 1.59 percent from the initially reported $79.61 billion.

Monthly shrinkage was also reported for goods trade – which comprises the lion’s share of total U.S. trade. Here in July the gap also declined for the fourth straight month – by 8.23 percent, from $99.26 billion to $91.09 billion, and the level was the lowest since October ($98.26 billion), too. And as with the overall deficit, this winning streak was the longest since that May-November span in 2019.

Meanwhile, the long-time U.S. services surplus – which has deteriorated dramatically during the pandemic era due to mandated and voluntary behavioral curbs that hammered industries like travel and tourism – widened by 11.19 percent sequentially in July, from $18.38 billion to $20.44 billion. The monthly increase was the third straight, the level was the highest since last December’s $21.66 billion, and the monthly jump the biggest since last November’s 12.22 percent.

A degree of skepticism may be in order, though, because the June services surplus was revised down a huge 7.47 percent.

Total exports edged up 0.20 percent on month in July, from $258.76 billion to $259.29 billion. However meager, the increase still produced the sixth straight monthly record and the sixth straight increase – matching the performance of Februay-August, 2021. But a sizable revision should be noted here, too, as June’s total was downgraded by 0.73 percent.

Goods exports dipped in July for the first time since January – by 0.16 percent, from an upwardly revised record $183.29 billion to $182.99 billion. But the figure is still the second ever and impressive considering the sluggish growth in which the global economy is mired and the multi-decade highs achieved by the U.S. dollar against most global currencies – which harms the price competitiveness of U.S.-made products.

Yet services exports climbed 1.10 percent, from a downwardly revised $75.47 billion to a record $76.30 billion. This increase was also the sixth in a row, and although June’s results were revised down by a substantial 2.94 percent, it remains the second best monthly performance ever.

Combined goods and services imports were down for a second straight month – by 2.86 percent from a downwardly revised $339.64 billion to $329.94 billion. This total was the lowest total since February’s $320.53 billion and the back-to-back decrease was the first such fall-off since the March-May, 2020 period – the peak of the CCP Virus’ first wave.

Goods imports also fell for a second straight month – by three percent, from $282.55 billion to $274.08 billion. And this back-to-back decrease was the first since March-May, 2020 as well.

Services imports in July experienced their first decline since January, weakening by 2.15 percent, from $57.09 billion to $55.86 billion. Even better: The June figure was revised down by a hefty 1.38 percent.

As known by RealityChek regulars, the non-oil goods deficit is a good global barometer for U.S. trade policy’s performance, because the oil and service trade flows it leaves out have rarely been the focus of U.S. trade agreements or other initiatives. This “Made in Washington” deficit tumbled for the fourth straight month too – by $100.29 billion to $89.96 billion.

As with some of the other trade flows, this deficit was the lowest since last October ($84.37), and the monthly fall-off was 10.93 percent. Moreover, the four straight months of improvement were the longest such stretch since June-October, 2007 – when the economy was approaching its worst downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Made in Washington exports in July increased for the sixth straight month, too – by 0.96 percent, from $151.841 to $153.301 billion. These overseas sales also set their sixth consecutive record, and the winning streak was the longest since the eight-month period between June, 2020 and January, 2021 – during the recovery from the virst virus wave.

These non-oil goods imports in July sank for the fourth straight month, and the 3.52 percent sequential drop brought the level to its lowest – $243.26 billion – since February’s $242.25 billion. This winning streak was the longest since the five-month stretch between peak pandemic-y December, 2020 to May, 2020.

Manufacturing’s huge and chronic trade gap narrowed on month in July, too, and for the second straight time. The drop was 6.12 percent, from Jue’s $130.05 billion to $122.09 billion, and this level was the lowest since February’s $106.49 billion.

Manufactures exports fell back from June’s record $114.78 billion to $109.50 billion. The 4.60 percent retreat left these sales at their lowest level since April’s $109.36 billion.

Manufactures imports fell faster – by 5.41 percent, from $244.83 billion to $231.59 billion. This total was also the lowest since April ($233.50 billion).

On a year-to-date basis, manufactures exports are up by 16.10 percent (from $643.07 billion to $746.62 billion. But the much greater amount of manufactures imports have surged by 18.38 percent (from $1.37285 trillion to 1.62524 trillion).

As a result, the year-to-date manufacturing trade shortfall has already hit $876.62 billion – a 20.12 percent jump from last year’s $729.78 billion, and as early as next month’s trade report, industry’s deficit could pass the trillion-dollar annual level for the fifth year in a row.

The also huge and chronic U.S. goods trade deficit with China decreased for the first time since April, dropping 6.90 percent from $36.95 billion (the highest figure since November, 2018) to $34.40 billion.

American goods exports to China advanced month-to-month in July by 5.04 percent, from $11.68 billion to $12.27 billion. And the much greater volume of imports slumped by 4.03 percent, from $48.63 billion (the third highest monthly total on record) to $46.66 billion.

But on a year-to-date basis, the China goods deficit has worsened by 26.42 percent. Since its growth rate is now faster than the 21.75 percent of the Made in Washington gap (its closest global proxy), it looks as if the impact has faded of the sweeping Trump tariffs (which the Biden administration has just announced it will keep in place).  

One likely reason: the 8.41 percent devaluation of China’s currency, the yuan, versus the U.S. dollar engineered by Beijing so far this year.

And a final July U.S. trade development worth noting: the 25.10 percent monthly burst of the goods deficit with global semiconductor manufacturing technology leader Taiwan to a new record $4.74 billion.

American merchandise imports of microchips and other products from the island grew by 15.71 percent on month in July, from $7.33 billion to an all-time high of $8.48 billion. But U.S. goods exports (which include much semiconductor manufacturing equipment) were up as well in July. The 5.64 percent increase produced the second best monthly total ever ($3.74 billion – behind only March’s $3.89 billion).

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The Deaf Leading the Blind on U.S. China Policy

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China, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, technology, national security, Mainstream Media, Barack Obama, Washington Post, Fareed Zakaria, George W. Bush, Biden, South China Sea, Taiwan, Donald Trump, globalism, Blob, privacy

Is “beyond clueless” or “beyond intellectually dishonest” the best way to describe Fareed Zakaria’s latest column for the Washington Post? It’s tough to tell. And you could ask the same of the editors at the Post‘s opinion pages, who clearly saw nothing wrong with letting this apologia for the United States’ thoroughly discredited (at least for those blessed with working and/or uncorrupted brains) pre-Trump China policies see the light of day.

Zakaria’s missive, from this past Thursday, suffers two glaringly obvious flaws. First, like America’s most influential leaders from both parties for decades before 2017 the author insists on the importance of Washington building and maintaining “a serious working relationship” with a regime that has developed (with oceans of reckless American assistance) into one of the world’s “two most powerful actors.”

And former President Donald Trump’s greatest sin (which Zakaria accuses President Biden of following)? Adopting a policy toward Beijing of “open hostility and criticism” that has caused the “collapse” of “communications channels for managing tensions,” and especially during crises or near crises such as that which appears to be developing over Taiwan.

But nothing could be clearer by now than the delusional nature of these procedure-obsessed and substance-free views (which of course despite Zakaria’s claim have continually been parroted by the Biden administration.) For by now it should go without saying that China’s top priority isn’t avoiding conflict with the United States. In particular, it lacks any interest in the President’s oft-stated  objective of creating clear “guard rails” and other rules of the road that result in a safe and orderly “competition” for goals like “winning the twenty-first century” whose definition seems just as vapid, utopian – and distracting – as his administration’s “liberal global order” references.

Instead, China’s top priority is specific and concrete: increasing its power (in all dimensions) and reducing America’s in every way possible. The reason? Eliminate the greatest obstacle to its plans to ensure its decisive control over every major trend shaping the globe’s future – whether the field is military prowess or technological advance or wealth creation or the evolution of society and culture (especially through privacy-threatening progress in cyber-hacking and facial recognition technology).

Not that the Chinese are eager for conflict or even any kind of frontal challenge or showdown – especially when prevailing is still anything but guaranteed. But the ultimate objective is prevailing, and the means entail building the domestic, regional, and global conditions needed to prevail, either without firing a shot or when clashes do break out.

And not that American leaders shouldn’t make sure to maintain those communication lines with Beijing. With both countries possessing vast nuclear arsenals, lowering the odds of accidental conflict is clearly imperative.

But communication, much less broader engagement, mustn’t become an end in and of itself. History too often has shown that they encourage the (1) U.S. acceptance of empty promises; (2) rationalization of failure to achieve or preserve particular valued objectives in the here and now for the sake of payoffs stemming from a sense of mutual obligation that could be entirely unilateral and imaginary, over a time frame that tends to keep lengthening; and (3) the substitution of wishful thinking about attainable goals for gaining and maintaining the ability to deter or successfully counter specific, dangerous Chinese initiatives.

The second glaringly obvious flaw in Zakaria’s column is its exclusive reliance on former Obama administration officials to support his analysis – which makes as much as sense as citing former Carter administration officials as inflation-fighting experts.

After all, it was under Trump’s immediate predecessor that the Chinese began running wild throughout the South China Sea, pushing aggressive territorial claims and literally building islands with military facilities capable of controlling those commercially vital waters – and according to one senior U.S. admiral at the time, precisely because Beijing concluded that Obama would keep sitting on his hands.

It was also Obama who continued enabling China to pursue the predatory economic policies that badly damaged numerous manufacturing industries vital to American national security, and who turned a blind eye to the massive transfer by U.S. and foreign companies of advanced, defense-related techology to the People’s Republic.

But at least Obama “upgraded” the George W. Bush-era “Senior Dialogue” and “Strategic Economic Dialogue” in order to merge “the economic and security tracks” to “break down the barriers inside both the U.S. and Chinese governments to more effectively tackle cross-cutting issues such as climate change, development, and energy security.” Which accomplished exactly what to advance and defend American interests?

And this is where Zakaria’s editors at the Post come in. Evidently none of them thought to say something like, “Hey, Fareed. Maybe quote someone on China policy whose advice isn’t widely seen as a proven failure?”

Maybe they’re just supposed to look for stray commas and dangling participles?  I suspect that the real reason is that they’re part of the same group-thinking, self-perpetuating globalist Blob that keeps working overtime to ensure that the American public is never exposed to any genuinely fresh ideas about promoting the United States’ security, prosperity, and optimal place in the world – and whose  decades-long record of squandering the nation’s blood and treasure on behalf of one grandiose goal after another is its only claim to success.

Following Up: Podcast Now On-Line of National Radio Interview on Pelosi Taiwan Visit and U.S. Stagflation Prospects

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Asia-Pacific, China, decoupling, Following Up, geopolitics, Indo-Pacific, inflation, manufacturing, Market Wrap with Moe Ansari, Nancy Pelosi, national security, Pelosi, recession, sanctions, semiconductors, stagflation, Taiwan, tech, Trade, trade deficit

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of my interview last night on the nationally syndicated “Market Wrap with Moe Ansari.” Click here for a timely conversation on two headline issues:  how U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s controversial visit to Taiwan could hit U.S.-China economic relations and America’s access to Taiwan’s world-class semiconductor manufacturing prowess; and why what’s in store for the U.S. economy could be even worse than the recession that’s now widely forecast.

And keep on checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Making News: Back on National Radio Tonight on the Pelosi Taiwan Trip and the U.S. Economic Outlook

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China, Making News, manufacturing, Market Wrap with Moe Ansari, Pelosi, recession, Taiwan, Trade

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to return tonight on the nationally syndicated “Market Wrap with Moe Ansari.” Our subjects: the economic fallout from U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s controversial visit to Taiwan, how recession-y America’s economic future looks, and the outlook for the U.S. manufacturing sector.

“Market Wrap” airs weeknights between 8 and 9 PM EST, these segments usually begin midway through the show, and you can listen live on-line here.

As usual, if you can’t tune in, I’ll post a link to the podcast of the inteview as soon as it’s available.

And keep on checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Following Up: Podcast Now On-Line of National Radio Interview on the Biden-Xi Jinping Phone Call

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Asia-Pacific, Biden, CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, China, Following Up, Gordon Chang, Indo-Pacific, innovation, national security, semiconductors, Taiwan, tech, Xi JInPing

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of my interview last night on the nationally syndicated “CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor.”

Click here for a timely discussion, with co-host Gordon G. Chang, of what President Biden should have said today in his telephone conversation with Chinese dictator Xi Jinping, and whether or not the United States can avoid going to war with the People’s Republic to keep Taiwan’s world-leading semiconductor manufacturing prowess out of Beijing’s hands.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Making News: Back on National Radio Tonight on the Biden-Xi Jinping Phone Summit

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Biden, CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor, China, Gordon G. Chang, Making News, semiconductors, Taiwan, Xi JInPing

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to return tonight to “CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor.” I’m told that the segment we just finished taping will probably air at either 10:15 PM or 11:15 PM EST. But you’ll surely want to listen to the entire program, which is on weeknights between 10 PM and midnight EST for two reasons: first, because the content is always compelling;  and second, because this particular conversation (which will also include co-host Gordon G. Chang) deals with President Biden’s upcoming telephone call with Chinese dictator Xi Jinping just when a Taiwan-related crisis seems to be brewing.

You can listen live at links like this one, and as always, if you can’t, I’ll post a link to the podcast as soon as it’s available.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: What Biden Should Say to China on Taiwan on his Call with Xi

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Biden, China, Indo-Pacific, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, semiconductors, Shanghai Communique, South China Sea, Taiwan, Taiwan Relations Act, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Xi JInPing

President Biden says he’s likely to talk to Chinese dictator Xi Jinping by phone within a week, and no doubt there’ll be no shortage of advice from both inside and outside his administration about what he should say. Here’s my two cents for the text of a private letter that Mr. Biden should send to Xi in advance of the call. Its purpose would be to prepare Beijing for his agenda:

“Dear Mr. President,

First of all, thank you again for your wishes for my speedy and complete recovery from Covid. I’m glad to report that I’m feeling just fine.

“Second, if we are indeed to converse person-to-person soon, I need to make something clear. If your plan for our call is simply to repeat the kinds of talking points that keep coming out of Beijing, then we might as well call the telephone call off. That kind of approach has gotten us nowhere at best to date, and will get us nowhere now and in the future.

“My main focus, and the reason I wanted to speak with you directly, concerns our differences regarding Taiwan. I believe there’s a clearcut way for us to avoid a war over this issue that would serve no one’s interest, and indeed threaten disaster for all parties concerned.

“My administration has said before that it remains U.S. policy to abide by the Shanghai Communique approved by our two governments in 1972, which states that ‘The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.’

“As a result, I can tell you categorically that the United States opposes Taiwan declaring independence, and will continue to do so. The United States has supported increased Taiwanese participation in international organizations and other fora strictly for practical reasons – mainly, the island is undoubtedly a major regional and global economic actor. In fact, that’s of course why the People’s Republic has permitted trade and investment ties between your two economies to grow so robustly.

“For as long as I’m President, the United States will continue to pursue this approach. I also reserve the right, claimed and acted upon by all of my predecessors since Congress’ passage of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, and consistent with the Shanghai Communique’s reference to America’s support for ‘a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves’ to ‘provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character’ and ‘to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.’

“I also want to emphasize that preserving and enhancing peace and stability in the Taiwan neighborhood has recently become an objective of paramount importance to the United States because of the island’s world leadership in semiconductor manufacturing technology. That is, my country’s commitment to Taiwan now stems from concrete, specific considerations that are absolutely vital to U.S. national security, and I am determined that this prowess will not become available to the People’s Republic.

“This conclusion should come as no surprise to you. For many years, including under my administration, U.S. export control policy has aimed to deny China the ability to make the world’s most advanced microchips. So I’m certainly not going to stand by and see the full suite of advanced semiconductor production technologies, materials, and equipment possessed by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company in particular fall into your country’s hands.

“At the same time, I recognize Taiwan’s special importance to the population of the People’s Republic and to your government. So in the interests of peace and stability, I am willing to declare the United States’ opposition to Taiwanese independence in public, along with its continued opposition to Taiwan joining organizations and arrangements in which its voice lacks any special importance – such as the United Nations. I am also willing to make these points forcefully in private to Taiwan’s leaders.

“In addition, I will privately pressure U.S. legislators not to visit the island. And although I lack the authority to ban those trips, I will publicly announce that executive branch visits to Taiwan will be limited to those needed to address specific issues in bilateral commercial relations and other non-political spheres. Further, I will publicly urge other countries not to take any actions that could encourage Taiwan’s leaders to try to change the political status quo unilaterally. Finally, for now, I will reduce the number of annual U.S. Navy vessel trips through the Taiwan Strait in half, back to 2017 and 2018 levels as well.

“But I will not take any of these new steps unless China immediately reduces flights by its military aircraft over Taiwan’s air defense identification zone back below mid-2020 levels, and halts all effots to interfere with those U.S. Navy transits of the Taiwan Straits.

“Moreover, if China does not agree to this quid pro quo, which will unmistakably shrink the odds of an accidental outbreak of hostilities that I trust you would like to avoid as much as I, I will have no choice but to respond to China’s overflights and other provocations with ever more supplies of increasingly advanced defensive weapons to Taiwan. I will also see to it that any other regional countries alarmed by China’s more aggressive actions toward Taiwan receive all the conventional arms they believe they need to ensure their own security. Further, I will encourage these countries to increase their military cooperation programs with the United States and each other. Finally, I will make sure that the United States military’s regional presence will be sufficient to contribute decisively to Taiwan’s successful defense should I decide such action is needed.

“In other words, Mr. President, I am presenting you with a choice. You can either lower the military temperature in Taiwan’s vicinity, and benefit both from the considerable help I can provide in damping down Taiwan’s independence impulses, and from the maintenance of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region that has been so crucial to your own country’s impressive economic development and rise to great power status. Or you can keep increasing tensions, and find yourself not only faced with a more militarily powerful Taiwan, but increasingly encircled by much warier but better armed neighbors as well.

“Incidentally, China faces much the same choice due to its recent expansive territorial claims and follow-up actions in the South China Sea more generally. But because the Taiwan situation is currently more dangerous now, my intention is to defuse that situation first if possible.

“As I stated at the outset, if you plan to respond to these positions with longstanding talking points, then our converation will serve no purpose. If, however, you’re willing to respond substantively and constructively, I’ll be all ears, as a popular English expression goes. I look forward to your reply. And please accept my sincere hope that you and those near and dear can stay Covid-free.

Sincerely,

Joe Biden

Following Up: Podcast Now On-Line of TNT Radio Interview

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abortion, border security, Capitol riot, China, Following Up, Hvorje Moric, Immigration, inflation, January 6 committee, jihadists, Middle East, national security, partisanship, politics, recession, semiconductors, stagflation, Taiwan, terrorism, TNT Radio, tribalism, `

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of my interview last night on “The Hrjove Moric Show” on the internet radio network TNT Radio. Click here for a discussion on headline issues that ranged from the Ukraine war to the U.S. economy’s prospects to China’s future to U.S. immigation and anti-terrorism policies to the January 6^th Committee to growing tribalism in American politics.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Still ISO a Coherent Biden China Strategy

Tags

Antony J. Blinken, Asia-Pacific, Biden, Biden administration, China, climate change, Cold War, decoupling, Indo-Pacific, Jimmy Carter, national interests, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, rules-based global order, Soviet Union, strategic ambiguity, Taiwan

In June, 1978, then President Jimmy Carter laid out in a speech the tenets that were going to guide his strategy toward the Soviet Union at a time when East-West tensions were mounting. His clear aim during this key juncture of the Cold War was telling Moscow what kinds of actions it could take to make sure that superpower rivalry was “stable” and even “constructive,” and what kinds would be sure to place it on a “dangerous and politically disastrous” path.

Unfortunately, the speech was widely considered to be such a confusing word salad that rumors quickly spread claiming that what Carter read were drafts from the hawkish and dovish groups of his advisors that he simply stapled together. This rumor turned out to be untrue (at least according to this study of Carter’s foreign policy), but the fuzziness of Carter’s bottom line surely helped ensure that U.S.-Soviet relations continued worsening for most of the remainder of his one-term presidency, largely because the Soviet Union became more aggressive – especially when it invaded Afghanistan.

I bring up this historical episode because Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken just gave a speech laying out the tenets of the Biden administration’s strategy toward China. It, too, seeks to ensure that today’s superpower relationship becomes more stable rather than move ever closer to conflict, but it looks just as incoherent as Carter’s address – and just as likely to produce the outcome it’s trying to prevent.

But I’ll start with a problem that was only barely detectable in Carter’s speech but that’s bound to undermine Mr. Biden’s efforts to deal with China successfully: a failure to identify American interests precisely and concretely. To be sure, the Carter speech wasted a great deal of verbiage on Soviet activity that never held any potential to endanger U.S. security or prosperity – especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Eventually, however, the President specified that “We and our allies must and will be able to meet any forseeable challenge to our security from either strategic nuclear forces or from conventional forces.”

These kinds of specific objectives were at best secondary themes of Blinken’s. Instead, his emphasis from the get-go was on defending and reforming “the rules-based international order – the system of laws, agreements, principles, and institutions that the world came together to build after two world wars to manage relations between states, to prevent conflict, to uphold the rights of all people.”

Not only can this definition of U.S. interests way too easily turn into a formula for wasting America’s considerable but ultimately finite resources on an infinite number of international troubles having nothing to do with the nation’s safety or well-being. But good luck motivating the American population and its military to fight or even sacrifice for an objective this gauzy.

At the same time, the kind of ambivalence so broadly conveyed by Carter toward the Soviet Union permeates the picture drawn by Blinken of China. For example, the Secretary argued that China

>”is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.  Beijing’s vision would move us away from the universal values that have sustained so much of the world’s progress over the past 75 years”:

>rather than using its power to reinforce and revitalize the laws, the agreements, the principles, the institutions that enabled its success so that other countries can benefit from them, too…is undermining them.  Under President Xi, the ruling Chinese Communist Party has become more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad”:

> “has announced its ambition to create a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world’s leading power”;

> is “advancing unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea, undermining peace and security, freedom of navigation, and commerce….”

> “wants to put itself at the center of global innovation and manufacturing, increase other countries’ technological dependence, and then use that dependence to impose its foreign policy preferences.  And Beijing is going to great lengths to win this contest – for example, taking advantage of the openness of our economies to spy, to hack, to steal technology and know-how to advance its military innovation and entrench its surveillance state”;  and

> is “trying to cut off Taiwan’s relations with countries around the world and blocking it from participating in international organizations.  And Beijing has engaged in increasingly provocative rhetoric and activity, like flying PLA aircraft near Taiwan on an almost daily basis.”

In all, according to Blinken, “The scale and the scope of the challenge posed by the People’s Republic of China will test American diplomacy like nothing we’ve seen before.”

So given these malign aims and actions, how could Blinken also insist that

> “We don’t seek to block China from its role as a major power, nor to stop China…from growing their economy….”;

> “We know that many countries – including the United States – have vital economic or people-to-people ties with China that they want to preserve.  This is not about forcing countries to choose.  It’s about giving them a choice….”;

> ”The United States does not want to sever China’s economy from ours or from the global economy – though Beijing, despite its rhetoric, is pursuing asymmetric decoupling, seeking to make China less dependent on the world and the world more dependent on China.”; and that

> “as the world’s economy recovers from the devastation of the pandemic, global macroeconomic coordination between the United States and China is key – through the G20, the IMF, other venues, and of course, bilaterally.”

That last point, and a companion Biden administration argument about climate change, seem compelling – at least superficially. But think about it for a moment: Why would anyone holding the view of China’s hostile actions and intentions laid out by Blinken expect any meaningful cooperation from Beijing on anything?

Even on climate – that supposedly quintessential threat that respects no bordes – it logically follows that the kind of Chinese leadership depicted by Blinken will be working overtime to ensure that China minimizes any sacrifices it makes to prevent dangerous warming, and maximize those required of everyone else. Consequently, the most effective way to spur China to do its share and therefore boost the odds that the climate problem actually gets solved is to deny Beijing the economic power to stay off the hook.

There’s a big (and in my view, legitimate) debate currently underway over whether the United States should continue its longstanding policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding defending Taiwan from China, or explicitly pledge to do so, as President Biden may or may not have done a week ago (and not for the first time). But there shouldn’t be any debate over whether America’s underlying strategy toward the People’s Republic should be as completely ambiguous – not to mention as nebulous – as the approach just articulated by Blinken.