(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Glass Half-Empty or Half-Full Government Report on Manufacturing?

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China, manufacturing, manufacturing trade deficit, tariffs, Trade, trade war, value added, {What's Left of) Our Economy

A total stunner – that’s the best way to describe the manufacturing and trade results of this morning’s Commerce Department report on economic growth during the first quarter broken down by industry. Unfortunately, they provide causes for both optimism and pessimism about whether President Trump’s tariff-centric trade policies will strengthen or weaken U.S. domestic industry over any analytically respectable period of time. And one big reason may be that manufacturers are still in the process of adjusting their business models to cope with the new policy environment.

The case for optimism rests on the quarterly growth (albeit a measly 0.03 percent) registered by American-located manufacturing despite a steep (20.25 percent) plunge in the sector’s huge and longstanding trade deficit. That kind of nosedive in the shortfall hasn’t been seen since the depths of the Great Recession – when manufacturing production was plummeting, too. (In this case, growth is measured by current-dollar “value-added,” which eliminates much of the double-counting that can result when economists calculate the production increases of final products without stripping out the previous output of the parts, components, and materials comprising them.)

The new data also contrasts with the last time of comparably meager quarterly manufacturing growth – 2016. During that final year of the Obama administration, industry grew sequentially by 0.63 percent in the second quarter, flat-lined in the third quarter, and 0.02 percent in the fourth quarter. The manufacturing trade deficit changes back then? In the second quarter, it grew by 8.96 percent, in the third quarter it increased by 7.52 percent, and in the fourth quarter is shrank – but by a bare 0.52 percent.

In fact, the last time a double-digit sequential decline in the manufacturing trade deficit took place (during the first quarter of 2016, when it sank by 10.17 percent), manufacturing production actually dropped – by 1.42 percent.

Manufacturing’s performance looks better when examined on an annual basis. Between the first quarter of 2018 and the first quarter of 2019, manufacturing value-added grew by 4.99 percent, while the manufacturing trade gap widened by only 1.55 percent. That’s greatly improved over last year’s yearly statistics by quarter.

Between the second quarter of 2017 (the first full data quarter under President Trump), and the second quarter of 2018, manufacturing production rose by 8.08 percent, while the trade deficit widened by 7.83 percent. The third quarter numbers: 7.23 percent and 12.45 percent. The fourth quarter numbers: 6.21 percent and 17.80 percent.

The second and third quarter results were clearly distorted by “tariff front-running” – businesses’ decisions to procure as much in the way of imports from China before major duties were imposed. That’s evident from the dramatic slowdown in the manufacturing trade gap’s first quarter annualized increase.

But for both sets of data, there’s a rub that should be obvious: Both between the fourth quarter of 2018 and the first quarter of 2019, and over the past year, the drop-off in the manufacturing trade deficit was accompanied by a drop-off in manufacturing’s growth rate itself. And that first quarter sequential 0.03 percent production increase was the worst such result since the fourth quarter, 2016’s 0.02 percent.

Optimists can take heart from industry’s ability to eak out growth despite continuing and even greater supply chain disruptions, and despite unusual inventory buildups triggered by tariffs and especially by their anticipation.  Also arguably encouraging manufacturing growth that’s ever less reliant on foreign inputs. Pessimists can observe out that the minimal growth indicates that adequate rates of manufacturing expansion still depend on robust net imports.

Both vantage points should recognize that domestic manufacturing remains in a state of uncertainty (as the current narrative holds) and sometimes outright confusion and turmoil – and that the threat of much more widespread China tariffs and increases on current China tariffs will greatly limit clarity going forward. Which means that both should agree that a valid verdict on the President’s trade policies won’t be possible for many months into the future.

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Making News: Back on i24News on the Trade War…& More!

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China, i24News, Making News, tariffs, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, trade war

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to return to the U.S.-Israeli TV network i24News tonight to help update the U.S. trade conflict with China.  The network’s programs are normally available only to paying subscribers, but you can watch the segment, slated to start at 7:40 PM EST, if you sign up in time for a free trial at this link.

If that’s not possible, as soon as I get it, I’ll post a link that will enable you to watch a video of the segment.

Speaking of podcast-like items, here’s the recording of last night’s interview on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show covering the same ground.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New Signs of Life in U.S. Manufacturing Output – Including in Tariff-Affected Industries

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aluminum, China, Federal Reserve, industrial production, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, real growth, steel, tariffs, Trade, tradewar, {What's Left of) Our Economy

This morning’s Federal Reserve industrial production report provided further evidence that domestic U.S. manufacturing is moving past a spring rough patch. Rebounding also – output in many of the metals-using industries supposedly being decimated by President Trump’s tariffs on aluminum and steel.

As usual, though, because reliable data is so difficult to come by, the impact of U.S. duties on imports from China is much harder to gauge. But certainly there’s no reason to believe claims that industries using tariff-ed Chinese inputs are experiencing anything close to the damage widely reported.

Not that U.S.-based manufacturing is out of the woods. Its real output in June did improve on a monthly basis by 0.43 percent – its best such performance since December’s 0.64 percent gain. But domestic industry remains in a technical recession, with inflation-adjusted production down 0.36 percent since August – a stretch longer than the two straight quarters of cumulative decline that qualify as a downturn for most economists.

The table below presents the output data for the major metals-using sectors for the period since April, 2018 – the first full month in which the steel and aluminum tariffs were in place. As usual, the numbers for manufacturing overall are used as a control group.

                                             April thru April      April thru May      April thru June

overall manufacturing:          -0.14 percent        +0.11 percent         +0.54 percent

durables manufacturing:       +0.60 percent        +0.68 percent         +0.98 percent

fabricated metals products:   +1.93 percent        +1.14 percent         +1.09 percent

machinery:                             -1.28 percent        +0.91 percent          +0.12 percent

automotive:                            -3.94 percent         -1.75 percent          +1.05 percent

major appliances:                   -8.89 percent         -1.64 percent           -5.99 percent

aircraft and parts:                  +3.25 percent        +1.17 percent           +2.37 percent

These figures make clear that better constant-dollar output has been achieved during the last two months for manufacturing as a whole, for durable goods manufacturing (the super-category that contains most of the main metals-using sectors) and for three of the five leading specific metals-users. Especially interesting are the comeback being staged by major appliances (which face both metals tariffs and separate levies on large household clothes washers and dryers that began in February, 2018), and the deterioration apparent in aerospace (which arguably is being undercut by the safety problems experienced by Boeing).

Nonetheless, applause should be muted. For earlier in the post-metals tariffs periods, these metals users were clear production out-performers.

Statistics related to the China tariffs (whose first full month in effect was last August, 2018) continues to be plagued by great variations concerning the tariff-ed goods’ role as inputs for a wide range of domestic U.S. industries, uncertainties stemming from the differing classification systems used in the U.S. Trade Representative’s official tariff list and by the Federal Reserve in classifying manufacturing industries, and both the shorter duration of the levies and the increase in coverage since the first tranche was announced.

Keeping these enormous caveats in mind, here are results for a handful of sectors reasonably certain to have faced tariff pressure since last August. Each column measuring real output changes since last August.

                                                Aug thru April       Aug thru May      Aug thru May

overall manufacturing:            -1.03 percent         -0.79 percent        -0.36 percent

ball bearings:                           -1.77 percent         -2.62 percent        -2.89 percent

industrial heating equip:          -8.00 percent         -4.13 percent        -9.04 percent

farm machinery & equip:      -10.27 percent         -7.51 percent        -6.44 percent

oil/gas drilling platform pts:  +2.41 percent         +3.93 percent       +2.13 percent

On the one hand, these numbers provide the tariff opponents with some ammunition for claiming harmful effects from the levies, but not much. Two of the four specific sectors have lost momentum compared with the rest of manufacturing (ball bearings and industrial heating equipment), one has gained (farm machinery and equipment), and once has displayed a slight momentum loss – but also major monthly variation.

On the other hand, given that widespread (though highly uneven) use of Chinese inputs, the recent bounce-back in overall manufacturing production indicates that, if the China duties have been holding industry back – because of increased uncertainty or whatever other reasons have been offered – the impact has been both minimal and offset by other sources of strength. If true, that’s hardly a trivial consideration in judging the wisdom of and prospects for the Trump China trade war – since with each new batch of its own data, China is finding it more difficult to make that claim about its own economy.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Tariffs-Led Consumer Inflation Grows…from Non-Existent to Slight

Tags

aluminum, Bureau of Labor Statistics, China, consumer price inflation, consumer prices, core inflation, inflation, metals, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, steel, tariffs, Trade, tradewar, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

After a several-month lapse, I finally had a chance to review in detail the latest batch of official U.S. consumer price data, which came out yesterday. The big takeaway seems as follows: Whereas through April there was no evidence that President Trump’s tariffs per se were pushing up consumer prices, now there’s some. But the evidence certainly doesn’t paint a picture of the American shopper’s living standards tumbling steeply because of Mr. Trump’s various trade wars.

As usual, let’s examine the metals-using industries, since the Trump tariffs on steel and aluminum have been in place for a relatively long period (April, 2018 was their first full month) and for reasons to be explained below, because it’s much easier to identify these sectors than those presumably impacted by the China tariffs.

The table below presents the relevant figures for major metals-using industries sequentially for the latest data month (June), since the duties’ onset, and year-on-year for the two latest data months. In addition, the results for control groups (like for overall core inflation, and for foods sometimes packaged in metal cans in their fresh forms):

                             May-June        Since April, 2018       y/y May           y/y June

core inflation:   +0.22 percent      +2.39 percent        +1.99 percent   +2.13 percent

fresh fruits         -1.67 percent      +0.31 percent        +1.85 percent   +0.87 percent

  & vegs:

fresh fruits:        -2.06 percent      -2.85 percent         -0.95 percent     -1.85 percent

fresh vegs:         -1.24 percent     +4.10 percent        +5.20 percent    +4.09 percent

processed          +0.39 percent     +1.61 percent        +1.28 percent    +1.70 percent

  fruits & vegs

canned fruits:     -0.38 percent     +4.47 percent        +4.04 percent    +3.93 percent

& vegs

canned fruits:     -0.09 percent     +2.11 percent        +1.00 percent    +2.02 percent

canned vegs:     +1.26 percent     +6.04 percent        +5.49 percent    +5.28 percent

soups:                +0.26 percent     +2.59 percent        +0.37 percent    +0.30 percent

malt bevgs          -0.62 percent     +1.77 percent        +0.84 percent    +1.84 percent

  at home:

alcoholic bevgs  +0.20 percent     +1.34 percent        +2.17 percent    +1.46 percent

  away from hom:

non-frozen, non- -0.21 percent     +1.96 percent        +3.09 percent    +3.03 percent

  carbonated non-

  alcoholic rinks

carbted drinks:     -1.95 percent    +3.33 percent        +5.75 percent    +2.71 percent

  juices & non-     -0.96 percent    +2.49 percent        +4.16 percent    +2.86 percent

  alcoholic drinks

new cars/trucks:  +0.17 percent    +1.13 percent        -1.61 percent    +0.74 percent

motor vehicle      +0.07 percent    +2.60 percent       +1.94 percent    +1.91 percent

  parts:

appliances:          +0.21 percent    +2.93 percent       +2.43 percent    +2.56 percent

major                   -1.40 percent    +3.95 percent        +3.80 percent    +2.94 percent

  appliances:

laundry                -0.70 percent    +4.00 percent        -1.55 percent      -3.98 percent

  equipment:

non-electric         +0.73 percent –   4.07 percent        -5.22 percent      -1.94 percent

  cookware & tableware:

tools, hardware,   +0.06 percent   +0.12 percent       +0.88 percent     +1.22 percent

  outdoor equipment:

The most revealing comparison is that between the post-tariffs (April, 2018) rate of core inflation (which excludes the historically volatile categories of food and energy) and the inflation rates for the metals-using sectors. And they show that for the 15 metals-using industries tracked, prices rose faster than core inflation in ten – a sign of tariff-led price-hiking.

At the same time, as previously noted, the figures for three of these 10 groups – soups, carbonated drinks, and juices and non-alcoholic drinks – need to be viewed cautiously, because their packages are hardly restricted to metals. Thus my conclusion that the tariff effects have been modest.

And another interesting conclusion emerging from these statistics: the price of laundry equipment is dropping dramatically after surging following the imposition in February, 2018 of a separate set of levies on large household clothes washers and driers. These prices are still way up (by 13.75 percent) since the tariffs began. But the May and June data show unusually rapid price drops. And these decreases are much greater than the slight reduction in these tariffs that began this year.

As for the China tariffs, definitive conclusions remain difficult to draw for several reasons. Chiefly, the first full data month for the relevant duties (for consumer products) is only last October. The goods on the U.S. Trade Representative’s list for those levies are categorized with a classification system different from that used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in measuring inflation – so the match-ups are far from exact. And the scale of tariff price effects can differ dramatically from product to product because China’s presence in a particular market can vary so greatly.

Another complicating factor (though clearly trade war-related): Some of the China categories have also been affected by the metals tariffs (e.g., auto parts). Further, the appliance categories have been impacted by the separate household laundry equipment duties.

Nonetheless, here’s the China data for May-June, since last October, and year-on-year for this June and last June. As with the metals tariff table, they include figures for control categories like the core inflation rate:

                            May-June       Since Oct.    June y/y 2017-18     June y/y 2018-19

core inflation: +0.22 percent  +1.59 percent   +2.13 percent           +2.26 percent

food:                -0.02 percent   -0.12 percent   +1.43 percent           +1.91 percent

frozen/freeze-  -0.42 percent  +0.52 percent    -0.23 percent            -0.09 percent

  dried prepared foods:

fish/seafood:    -0.74 percent  +0.89 percent   +1.43 percent           +1.66 percent

processed fish/ -0.98 percent         0 percent   +0.39 percent            +2.13 percent

  seafood:

frozen fish/      -1.32 percent   -0.61 percent    -0.91 percent            +1.68 percent

  seafood:

fruits/vegs:      -1.24 percent   +0.03 percent   +0.25 percent             +1.04 percent

fresh fruits/    +1.67 percent    -0.63 percent   +0.62 percent             +0.87 percent

  vegetables:

fresh fruits:      -2.06 percent   -2.49 percent   +1.87 percent             -1.85 percent

fresh vegs:       -1.24 percent   +1.54 percent    -0.82 percent           +4.09 percent

processed        +0.39 percent   +2.49 percent    -1.04 percent           +1.70 percent

  fruits/vegs:

frozen fruits/   +1.84 percent   +0.54 percent    -3.88 percent           +0.24 percent

  vegetables:

non-carb/          -0.21 percent   +0.61 percent   -0.37 percent           +2.71 percent

  non-frozen juices/drinks:

personal care    -0.27 percent    -0.59 percent   -0.30 percent            -0.60 percent

  products:

household         -0.11 percent    +0.13 percent  -7.87 percent            -0.03 percent

  furnishings:

recreation         -0.34 percent     -2.49 percent   -8.22 percent           -5.60 percent

  goods:

men’s                -1.24 percent     -2.94 percent   -0.69 percent          +1.53 percent

  sportswear:

women’s           -2.01 percent     -1.25 percent   -1.33 percent           -0.03 percent

  sportswear

computers,        -1.91 percent    -4.09 percent    -3.70 percent          -5.86 percent

  peripherals, etc.:

window/floor    -1.19 percent    -5.03 percent   +0.43 percent          -2.75 percent

  coverings:

furniture &       +0.82 percent   +2.64 percent   +0.02 percent         +3.15 percent

  bedding:

appliances:       +0.21 percent     -0.37 percent  +1.15 percent         +2.56 percent

major                 -1.40 percent    +0.33 percent  +5.62 percent         +2.94 percent

  appliances:

laundry              -0.70 percent     -0.22 percent +13.12 percent         -3.98 percent

  equipment

misc                 +1.19 percent      -0.84 percent    -1.05 percent        +2.28 percent

  appliances:

non-electric      +0.73 percent      -2.78 percent    -2.64 percent         -1.94 percent

  cookware/tableware:

tools/                +0.06 percent     +1.27 percent    -0.74 percent          +1.06 percent

  hardware &

  outdoor equip:

household          -0.14 percent     +1.14 percent  +0.60 percent          +1.52 percent

  cleaning products:

televisions:        -1.23 percent    -14.25 percent  -19.09 percent        -19.65 percent

misc video         -1.98 percent      -1.19 percent    -2.53 percent          -2.17 percent

  equipment:

pets &               +0.08 percent     +2.72 percent   +0.67 percent         +2.84 percent

  pet products:

sporting           :+0.39 percent     +2.79 percent   +0.07 percent         + 0.66 percent

  goods:

photo equip       +0.24 percent     -2.04 percent    -6.29 percent          +2.72 percent

  & supplies:

sewing              +0.41 percent     +8.21 percent   +7.54 percent          +4.63 percent

  machines/

  fabrics:

motor               +0.14 percent      +2.09 percent   +0.29 percent          +1.91 percent

  vehicle parts:

tires:                 +0.15 percent     +2.09 percent     -1.56 percent          +2.03 percent

stationery/        +0.59 percent     +4.95 percent    +1.16 percent           -1.31 percent

  gift wrap:

Even given the above uncertainties, the bases for claims that the China levies are creating a tariff-mageddon for American consumers look awfully weak, though they’re not nonexistent. Chiefly, since the tariffs’ onset last October, only eight of the 30 affected products saw prices rising faster than core inflation.

At the same time, more product categories seem to be displaying such characteristics. This conclusion seems clear from the two sets of year-on-year statistics. Between June, 2017 and June, 2018, prices were stronger in only three of the 30 categories (including products for which prices were falling at a slower rate). Between the following Junes, their number grew to eight.

Similarly, forgetting about comparisons with the core, 23 of the 30 groups experienced higher inflation rates during the June, 2018-June, 2019 period (largely post-China tariffs) than during the June, 2017-June, 2018 period (entirely pre-China tariffs).

Of course, Mr. Trump’s trade policy, especially regarding China, has never been about economics alone. The administration has repeatedly emphasized that national security is at stake as well. But these new consumer price figures make clear that the economic costs paid by Americans have so far been meager. And especially with overall inflation so weak, they hardly look like reasons for the President to ease up on the trade front.

Making News: Podcast of Last Night’s China Trade War Radio Interview Now On-Line!

Tags

China, Making News, tariffs, tech, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, tradewar, Trump

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast of my interview last night on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show is now on-line.  Click here for a stimulating, timely discussion of the U.S.-China trade war, the tech conflict that’s also erupted between the two countries, and the latest on their recently resumed trade talks.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

Making News: Back on National Radio Tonight with a Trade War Update

Tags

China, Gordon G. Chang, Making News, tariffs, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, trade war, Trump

I’m pleased to announce that I’m scheduled to return tonight to John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show to help update the course of the U.S.-China trade conflict.  The segment, slated to start at 9 PM EST, is sure to cover the resumed bilateral trade talks, the new sanctions regime against Chinese tech giant Huawei, and possibly the impact of the Hong Kong protests.  Listen live on-line at this link.

As usual, if you can’t tune in, or want to review the session – which will also feature co-host Gordon G. Chang – I’ll post a link to the podcast as soon as one’s available.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

 

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: The Latest Trump Tariff Debunkers Debunked

Tags

Benjamin Della Rocca, Benn Steil, China, Council on Foreign Relations, goods imports, imports, merchandise imports, n, Peter Navarro, tariffs, Trade, tradewar, Trump, Washington Post, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Only in the free trade-worshiping American Mainstream Media could an op-ed piece titled “Debunking Trump’s Tariff Claims” be published that’s chock full of easily debunk-able claims itself.  

The first such allegation in the article, which came out on the Washington Post’s website yesterday, holds that the administration’s view that China “bears most of the burden of the tariffs” imposed by the President over the last year is based solely on adviser Peter Navarro’s explanation that China is lowering the prices of its goods in order to offset them. Authors Benn Steil and Benjamin Della Rocca of the Council on Foreign Relations note, correctly, that U.S. government data show that prices of Chinese imports haven’t fallen by nearly as much as they’ve been increased by Trump tariffs.

What Steil and Della Rocca have left out, though, could fill a book. For instance, the tariffs still only cover $250 billion worth of America’s total goods purchases of China – which last year totaled just under $540 billion. So that’s well under half. In addition, the vast majority of these levies have been in place for considerably less than a year.

Moreover, the prices of imports from China – which stem from numerous influences aside from tariffs (U.S. and other foreign market conditions for the various products involved, levels of Chinese subsidies – including value-added tax rebates that were increased last September) – have definitely shifted gears. During the pre-tariff period May, 2017-May, 2018, they rose 0.40 percent. During the largely post-tariff period May, 2018-2019 (encompassing the latest available data), they fell by 1.4 percent.

Equally interesting: Those May China import prices hit their lowest absolute level since September, 2007, nearly 12 years ago. Coincidence? Overall non-fuel import prices are down, too – but stand only at a post-September, 2017 low.

Perhaps more important, though, Navarro has in fact not staked his stance only on import prices. As he told Fox Business on June 21 (before the Steil-Della Rocca article), “China producers pay for these tariffs in the language of economics, they bear the burden of the tariffs through lower prices, lower exports, lower profits.” And there’s abundant evidence to back him up.

Notably, since July, 2018 (when the first, $50 billion, tranche of Trump tariffs were imposed), America’s goods purchases from China fell on a monthly basis by 16.66 percent. The comparable results for the previous year – an increase of 0.92 percent. Over that span, U.S. non-oil goods imports (the best global control group for goods imports from China) weakened, too, but kept growing. The slowdown was from 6.65 percent to 1.82 percent.

Another way to look at these changes is to compare U.S. goods imports from China from January-May of this year with those purchases from the same five-month stretch in years past. During the first such Trump period (covering 2016-2017), before any tariffs were imposed, these merchandise imports from China increased by 8.10 percent. The purchases went up during the following five-month stretch –  to 9.54 percent.

The growth rate during the first five-month period featuring tariffs, in 2019? There was no growth. In fact, they sank by 12.34 percent. And interestingly, the overall U.S. economic growth rate during these spans was almost unchanged. 

Since the federal government doesn’t keep monthly figures on the gross domestic product (GDP), I’ve used the next best measure — the quarterly data kept by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. On a pre-inflation basis (the same gauge as used by the trade figures), during the first between the first two quarters of 2018, the economy grew by 2.93 percent. During the first two quarters of 2019, the pace quickened only to 2.95 percent. (Because the first results for second quarter GDP aren’t in yet, I’ve used the average of these widely followed “tracking figures” as a substitute.) 

An even clearer idea of Chinese losses can be gleaned from considering what U.S. merchandise imports from China might have been without any tariffs. These kinds of exercises are anything but precise, of course. But had they increased at the same 9.54 percent rate as between January-May, 2017 and 2018 rather than shrinking by 12.34 percent, they’d have totaled $224.97 billion during the first five months of this year – a swing of nearly $45 billion.

Steil and Della Rocca didn’t bother to look at the impact on China’s global exports, either – even though it looks sizable. Between July, 2018 and May, 2019 (from that first full month of U.S. tariffs through the latest data month), China’s global overseas merchandise sales fell by 0.80 percent on a monthly basis. From July, 2017 to May, 2018 (pre-any tariffs), they expanded by 8.94 percent. 

China’s overall economic growth took a big hit, too. On an annual basis, in the third quarter of 2018, (when those initial American tariffs were slapped on), Chinese GDP expanded by 6.5 percent. (And yes, I realize these numbers can be very dodgy.) By the first quarter of this year, it had dipped to 6.4 percent. From the pre-tariff third quarter of 2017 to the first quarter of 2018, China’s growth rate remained the same – a considerably higher 6.8 percent.

President Trump and his aides certainly can and should be much more precise when they talk about the trade war’s costs. But examining these claims using partial quotes and isolated figures is surely a much greater sin. In other words, the bigger the picture examined, the better the Trump administration’s contention that the Chinese economy is suffering a much greater burden from U.S. tariffs than America’s

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: New U.S. Trade Figures Reflect More Policy Noise, but Reveal More Underlying Improvement

Tags

China, exports, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, non-oil goods deficit, tariffs, Trade, Trade Deficits, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

As with last month’s numbers, this morning’s U.S. trade figures need to be taken with a big grain (or boulder?) of salt due to President Trump’s on-again, off-again tariff decisions with major foreign economies like Mexico and especially China. The big takeaway, IMO: These May data show that the portion of the nation’s trade deficit most affected by trade policy decisions is still growing much more slowly this year than it did last year – even though the pace of overall U.S. economic growth looks to be just slightly weaker. And that’s clearly good news if you share my belief that humongous and ballooning trade deficits are bad news for the economy.

Specifically, I’m talking about the non-oil goods trade deficit – the shortfall which strips out oil (which is rarely dealt with by trade policymakers anywhere) and services (where liberalization remains in its infancy). 

On a monthly basis, this trade gap (which I like to call the Made in Washington trade deficit) jumped by 3.02 percent in May – the biggest such rise since last December’s 9.07 percent, when importers were “front-running” – that is, scrambling to bring in foreign product ahead of threatened and imminent tariffs. And its $70.85 billion level was the highest since December’s $78.06 billion.

But for the first five months of this year, this deficit is up just 6.76 percent – much less than the 11.14 percent increase registered between January and May last year. And although the second quarter’s economic growth figures aren’t yet in, the gross domestic product (GDP) for the first half of this year seems set to expand at a rate that’s eminently respectable compared with last year’s first half.

In addition, the May figures show that the United States continues making progress in reducing its chronic and huge goods trade deficit with China – a major Trump goal.

As with the non-oil goods deficit overall, the U.S. merchandise shortfall with China grew sequentially in May – by 12.24 percent. The increase was the biggest in percentage terms since the 20.64 percent monthly surge last May, during the tariffs front-running period.

U.S. goods exports to the People’s Republic were up fully 14.92 percent on month in May – their best such performance since February’s 18.21 percent improvement. Yet the much larger amount of goods imports from China shot up by 12.85 percent – the biggest such increase since last May’s 14.78 percent.

Interestingly, though, given the seasonal factors that shape so much trade with China, this month’s May U.S. merchandise trade deficit with China was the lowest May total since 2016 – when overall American growth was much slower.

On the manufacturing trade front, another major Trump priority, the longstanding and huge monthly deficit climbed by 6.08 percent sequentially in May – from $86.78 billion to $92.06 billion. The May level is also the highest since January’s $89.13 billion.

On month, May manufacturing exports advanced by 5.30 percent, from $92.62 billion to $97.53 billion. But the much larger amount of imports increased by 5.67 percent, from $179.41 billion to $189.59 billion.

These new figures brought the year-to-date manufacturing trade deficit up to $416.23 billion in May – 5.28 percent higher than last year’s comparable total ($395.36 billion). Manufactures exports are actually down 1.93 percent this year so far while imports are up 1.33 percent.

Overall, the combined U.S. goods and services trade deficit widened by 8.39 percent on month in May – from an upwardly revised $51.22 billion to $55.52 billion. The May level was the highest and the sequential rise were both the highest since December ($60.81 billion and 13.35 percent, respectively).

On a January-May basis, the total trade deficit has worsened by 6.38 percent – a somewhat slower rate than the previous year’s 7.70 percent.

Total exports in May increased by 2.05 percent – their biggest such increase since last May’s 2.13 percent. But this improvement followed April’s 2.37 percent sequential decline – the worst such performance since January, 2016’s 2.66 percent.

Total imports, though, soared by 3.31 percent sequentially in May – from $257.64 billion to $266.16 billion. That total is the third highest ever (after last October’s $266.82 billion and last December’s $266.47 billion – during the tariffs front-running period). The monthly increase was the biggest since March, 2015’s 6.69 percent. But it also followed s big April monthly fall-off – 2.16 percent, the greatest since January’s 2.40 percent.

Im-Politic: On the Democrats’ Debates

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African Americans, Amy Klobuchar, Barack Obama, Bernie Sanders, Beto O'Rourke, China, Cory Booker, debates, Democratic Party, Democrats, Democrats debates, economy, election 2020, Elizabeth Warren, Im-Politic, Joe Biden, Kamala Harris, Michael Bennet, Pete Buttigieg, race relations, tariffs, Trade, Trump

So thanks to last week’s two debates, we’ve now seen most of the Democratic presidential candidates in, as sportscasters like to say, “limited action,” and have had some time to ruminate about the results. Here’s my sense of some of the biggest takeaways.

>The Democrats generally are in denial about the health of the economy. This problem became clear immediately, as the first question on Night One, posed to Massachusetts U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren, noted that her “many plans” for the economy come “at a time when 71 percent of Americans say the economy is doing well, including 60 percent of Democrats. What do you say to those who worry this kind of significant change could be risky to the economy?”

Warren’s response? Ignore the cited polling data and claim – presenting no evidence – that “Who is this economy really working for? It’s doing great for a thinner and thinner slice at the top.” For good measure, sharing her fact-free perspective at the outset were her Minnesota Senate colleague Amy Klobuchar, and former Texas Congressman Beto O’Rourke. And don’t forget former Vice President Joe Biden’s charge on Night Two that “Donald Trump has put us in a horrible situation” economically. Or California Senator Kamala Harris’ view that the economy is great only for those who own stocks.

No one is saying that too many Americans aren’t still being left behind in an economy that’s unmistakably shifted into a somewhat higher gear under President Trump. No one is saying that the economy hasn’t shown some signs of slowing. (See, e.g., this recent post.) No one is saying that the economy is going to be a decisively winning Trump issue in 2020. (This new poll throws lots of cold water on that proposition.) And no one is saying that because the economy is so far performing pretty well, Americans are especially happy about the overall state of the union. (Survey results like these make clear that they’re not.)

But no one should be feeling too great about so many politicians remaining so deeply in denial (or at least pontificating as if they are) about a state of affairs that is so easy to document.

>Kamala Harris is simply race-baiting. Let’s assume that all of the California U.S. Senator’s allegations about former Vice President Joe Biden’s record on school busing decades ago are completely accurate. How can the conclusion be avoided that she’s trying to portray Biden as remaining deficient as racial issues today, and in the process, stir up the worst kinds of national divisions? After all, he served as the second-in-command to the nation’s first African-American president. Black politicians, and especially long-serving black politicians, have publicly praised him as a long-time trusted ally.

In other words, whatever Biden’s past shortcomings on race, nothing could be more obvious than that they’ve vanished in every meaningful way, and in every way relevant to policymaking. It’s no longer possible accurately and responsibly to depict him as a problem for the African-American community. Harris’ indictment also indicates a refusal to acknowledge that individuals can learn, evolve, and grow, and to give them any credit when they do.

I recently spoke about this privately with an African-American friend who argued that the real Biden race problem that’s emerged recently stemmed from his indignant response to similar allegations and insinuations by New Jersey Senator Cory Booker, another 2020 African-American Democratic hopeful. In other words, Biden’s refusal to apologize for comments about racist southern Senators signaled an insensitivity to racial slurs (like describing African-American men as “boys”) that could well prompt younger blacks to stay at home in the fall of 2020, and boost Mr. Trump’s odds of reelection.

I don’t disagree with that political analysis at all (though I don’t consider it a foregone conclusion, either). But politics aside, that would point to the same type of intolerance, censoriousness, and sanctimony being displayed by Harris. More of this, America these days clearly doesn’t need.

>Biden performed better than I expected. The former Vice President and still 2020 Democratic front-runner has widely been declared a major loser in his debate exchange with Harris, and poll results reinforce that conclusion. I agree that Biden was poorly prepared for attacks on racial issues that he must have known would come that evening from someone. In particular, his substantive defense of his busing record – that he only opposed a sweeping federal mandate – did indeed (as Harris charged) ignore the decisive role that the Federal government has regularly needed to play in advancing civil rights when state government were either hostile or indifferent to the cause.

Nevertheless, Biden certainly didn’t act like the “Sleepy Joe” he’s been labeled as by President Trump, and that seemed like an apt description for some of his more disjoint moments in these early phases of the 2020 election (for example, this rambling discussion of the China challenge). He flashed temper (or at least indignation), he sounded articulate, he stood tall, his energy level didn’t notably flag. In fact, assuming that his health holds up (he turns 77 in November), Biden looked like a candidate who could mix it up with Trump on a debate stage. As demonstrated by the race relations storm he’s kicked up, however, he’s as gaffe-prone as ever.

>The Democrats have no grip on China issues. Sure, they generally acknowledge that China poses problems for the United States (but there’s some disagreement as to what they are). But few so far have offered realistic solutions to these problems.

For example, Senator Michael Bennet of Colorado, “I think the president’s been right to push back on China but he’s done it in completely the wrong way. We should mobilize the entire rest of the world who all have a shared interest in pushing back on China’s mercantilist trade policies and I think we can do that.”

What a shame that he was never asked why countries like Germany, Japan, and South Korea, which profit enormously from selling sophisticated industrial machinery to China, would want to see any slowing in U.S.-China trade when so many of those machines are used in factories that supply the American market?

Mayor Pete Buttigieg of South Bend, Indiana agrees that the China challenge “is a really serious one,” but seemed most concerned that the Chinese are “using technology for the perfection of dictatorship.” He endorsed the stale and misleading “tariffs are taxes” trope, and insisted that “the biggest thing we’ve got to do is invest in our own domestic competitiveness.” He never explained if he’s OK with the infrastructure the nation unmistakably needs being manufactured in China and elsewhere abroad, or why “education” is so critical when children in China and everywhere else have the same capacity to capitalize on their learning as children in America – even though population considerations will long ensure that their wages stay orders of magnitude lower no matter how advanced the work they do.

Interestingly, Sanders is the only Democratic hopeful with a lengthy record of voting in Congress on China trade and related economic issues – always correctly (in my view) opposing reckless expansion. That explains CNBC’s ironic but on-target recent observation that “Sanders in particular has targeted Trump because his trade views overlap with the president’s.” And hence mushy Sanders statements like “I think we do need new trade policies that are fair to the working people of this country not just to the CEOs, but as usual, I think Trump gets it wrong in terms of implementation,”

Warren seems equally conflicted, agreeing with Mr. Trump that “tariffs are one part of reworking our trade policy overall” but lamely chiding him for engaging in “tariff negotiation by tweet” instead of “fighting back” with “strength and a coherent plan, not with chaos.”

Indeed, Warren has a detailed-looking plan for implementing a strategy of “economic patriotism.” It contains some good features, like what seem to be industrial policy proposals (with no real specifics), tightening up Buy American government procurement policies, and requirements that production that results from (amped up) taxpayer-funded research and development programs take place in the United States. But it’s unclear whether she realizes that tariffs are going to be central to their success. In addition, she appears quite enamored with devaluing the dollar as a trade policy panacea. And she puts considerable stock in government-run training and reeducation programs that, to date, have been proven failures and that have long (as noted above) evidently assume that Americans are the most educable and train-able people on earth.

If you’re a Democrat, or any American who wants to see elections held between the most qualified candidates possible, the good news is that the party’s hopefuls will have eleven more debate chances to up their games. Unfortunately, it might also turn out that the nation will simply witness eleven more events marked by hollow, and too often angry, grandstanding.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy? Did Trump Trade National Security for Soybeans with China?

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agriculture, China, election 2016, election 2020, export controls, extradition, farmers, G20, G20 Summit, Huawei, Meng Wangzhou, national security, Osaka G20 Summit, rural areas, soybeans, tariffs, technology, telecommunications, Trade, trade war, Trump, Xi JInPing, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Did President Trump sell U.S. national security down the river at his meeting with Chinese dictator Xi Jinping in order to make American farmers happy and, he hopes, ensure his reelection? Could be – even though there’s still much that’s not known about the U.S.-China deal reached between the two leaders on the sideline of a big international economic summit meeting in Osaka. In fact, I haven’t even seen any official U.S. government documents describing the agreement in detail. (A further complication: Whatever official Chinese documents come out describing the deal could differ significantly from the American portrayal.)

At the same time, I’ll venture that the major, and from the U.S. standpoint, urgently, needed course change in China policy begun by Mr. Trump hasn’t yet been altered fundamentally. And I still don’t consider that outcome likely, even though events of the last few days reveal that some important loopholes in America’s approach need to be closed, pronto. 

From what I can glean from the just-released official White House transcript of the President’s Osaka press conference is that (as I predicted), Mr. Trump and Xi agreed to resume formally negotiations that fell apart in early May, apparently because China began reneging on commitments it had already made. The quid pro quo that seems to have revived the talks evidently comes down to this:

The President agreed to refrain from imposing threatened tariffs on U.S. imports from China that don’t already face duties or new duties (a little more than half of Chinese goods entering the American market fall into this category), and to make it easier for American tech companies to sell, seemingly on an ongoing basis, parts and components vitally needed by Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei.

In return, China agreed to boost greatly purchases of agricultural products that it had all but shut out of its own large market to retaliate for Trump tariffs, thereby denying U.S. farmers major rivers (not just streams) of revenue. Since rural America went so notably for Mr. Trump in 2016, the political appeal of that approach is easy to see.

The chief uncertainty remaining: What exactly will Huawei be able to buy from U.S. firms? The issue is crucially important to China because, notwithstanding its commanding position in many global markets for advanced telecommunications systems, these Huawei products still depend vitally on information technology hardware and software from American-owned tech companies that have no adequate (if any) substitutes from other suppliers. And if, as was likely, Huawei suffered major damage because these U.S.-origin goods and services weren’t available, a major blow would be dealt to China’s ambitions to gain preeminence in a wide range of advanced technologies – and turn itself into a military superpower in the process.

Factors contributing to the uncertainty? To start, the so-called U.S. ban on selling to Huawei wasn’t technically a ban. It was an announcement that any proposed U.S. sales to Huawei needed to be approved by the American government because Huawei had been placed on a list of “entities” deemed dangerous to U.S. national security. So in principle, some American firms’ products and services could still be sold to Huawei (and several dozen affiliated entities also added to the list). But presumably, the truly valuable inputs would be denied.

Second, President Trump told the Osaka press conference that Huawei would only be permitted to buy from American-owned business “equipment where there’s not a great national-emergency problem with it.” That’s somewhat comforting, but only somewhat. The reasons? First, there’s reason to believe that, even before the Trump-Xi agreement, Huawei could have bought even equipment that did raise national security concerns as long as those computer chips or whatever else consisted mainly of foreign content (which is often the case because production of these goods has become so globalized, and because – irony alert! – some of the non-U.S. content now comes from China itself).

That qualification was shaping up as a huge problem because, if it’s present, then Huawei would still retain access to many of the high tech products it needs; and because the result could be even stronger incentives for American high tech companies to manufacture and develop even more of their most sophisticated offering offshore, including in China.

Third, as Mr. Trump specified, Huawei has not been taken off the “bad entities” list. Nor has there been any change in the U.S. extradition request to Canada for Meng Wangzhou, the CFO of Huawei (and daughter of its founder) to enable her trial for violating America’s export control laws. Why, then, do anything to make life easier for this entity?

Fourth, the Huawei-centric nature of this policy could signal that the President is falling into a China policy trap: Assuming that measures focused on specific entities (remember: nothing in China that’s routinely called a “business” or “company” deserves that label, in terms of how they’re used in most of the rest of the world, because China’s economy is so thoroughly controlled by the state) are adequate to cope with the intertwined China tech and national security challenge.

In fact, such episodic approaches seem doomed to fail because the China challenge is a systemic challenge. The exact names of specific instruments comprising this China challenge don’t matter in the slightest. For instance – let’s say that a truly total Huawei ban did sink this organization. In time, what’s to stop Beijing from simply slapping another name on the same units, facilities, and employees? Would Americans really want their government to have to wait to impose an embargo on this new entity until it began endangering their national security? Wouldn’t it be much better to understand that every Chinese entity big enough to be permitted by the Chinese government to play in global markets is by definition an agent of Beijing’s and of its (distinctly dangerous) ambitions? And to treat the Chinese high tech sector – for starters – accordingly?

As for the Chinese promises of greater imports of U.S. farm products, they’re problematic, too, even if Beijing does keep its promises. Hopefully, American farmers will be smart enough to respond in a measured way, not by simply assuming that they’ve won a free pass back into China forever, and recklessly supercharging and distorting their planting patterns to satisfy this new demand (as was the case especially for soybeans). Instead, hopefully, they’ve learned that Beijing can close the doors whenever it wants to – and that President Trump is kind of mercurial itself.

The President also could well be selling his agricultural record short. For although farmers clearly don’t like the Chinese tariffs on their exports prompted by the Trump levies, they also no doubt recognize how they’ve benefited from his tax and regulatory policies. And those that are culturally and socially conservative probably like what they hear from the President on those subjects – and/or don’t like many Democrats’ statements. Finally, the passage of the Trump administration’s revamp of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – the U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) deal could ease many farmers’ trade worries. 

In fact, the volatile Trump temperament – and his reelection hopes – look like the best guarantors that this shortsighted high-tech-for-soybeans trade-off won’t last long. Because the main obstacle to the kind of overarching trade deal the President still talks about still remains – the impossibility of verifying China’s compliance adequately. So the longer the Chinese hold out, and deny the President the chance he so clearly covets to claim a big victory, the more irritated with them he’s likely to become, and the greater the odds that some hammer comes down again.

Moreover, if the overall American economy and especially its manufacturing sector wind up slowing down, as some key indicators already suggest they are, increases in tariffs on Chinese manufactures could be the difference between Trump victories in the manufacturing-heavy Midwest states that (narrowly) helped key his 2016 triumph, and defeats.

In addition, it’s critically important to note that the Chinese products still facing tariffs are much more important to China’s economic future than the products that remain entirely or largely duty-free. That’s because the first group overwhelmingly consists of parts and components of industrial products that in turn are pretty advanced goods themselves. They’re the kinds of products that matter crucially to America’s industrial future as well.

So, as observed by this perceptive New York Times article, the China-links to the global supply chains that face such mortal threats from these tariffs still remain endangered, and the more-than-decent odds that these levies will remain in place, and even get raised further, will surely keep prompting multinational companies the world over to move at least partly out of China. And any developments that weaken China economically are by definition good for the United States.

Moreover, despite widespread predictions that Trump tariffs on these so-called intermediate goods would wind up raising consumer prices because their corporate buyers would need to pass along the tariffs’ cost to their final customers, little of such inflation has emerged, for numerous reasons I’ve written on previously.

By contrast, the still un-tariffed goods are consumer goods – like shoes and toys and apparel and consumer electronics products. For various reasons I’ve written about, their prices weren’t likely to budge much even with new Trump tariffs. But for now, the President has foreclosed any such possibility completely. The only drawback for the United States to leaving these goods largely duty-free – because they’re generally very labor-intensive products, they employ unusually large numbers of Chinese workers – is that any movement of production from China to anywhere else (even even it’s Chinese companies themselves doing the moving) would result in greatly increased Chinese unemployment. The regime has long viewed high joblessness as a mortal threat to its survival. So China’s labor-intensive industries, and by extension China’s dictators, have been let off the hook, too.

In all, then, so far it seems fair to conclude that President Trump handed the Chinese some genuinely important concessions in exchange for precious little from Beijing. But it’s also distinctly possible that this trade-off makes so little sense economically, national security-wise, and politically, that it will badly flunk the test of time. And at least as important, nothing in its seems capable of stopping or even greatly slowing the U.S.-China economic disengagement that, as I’ve written, is bound to serve America’s long-term interests, and that’s already underway.