Im-Politic: On Biden’s New Plan for Medical & Other Supply Chain Security

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alliances, Biden, CCP Virus, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, Defense Department, Defense Production Act, DPA, election 2020, health security, healthcare goods, Im-Politic, manufacturing, offshoring, Pentagon, pharmaceuticals, PPE, supply chains, tariffs, taxes, Trade, Wuhan virus

Joe Biden’s plan for rebuilding U.S. supply chains to ensure American access to critical products like healthcare goods came out yesterday, and any fair reading would have to conclude that these proposals are about as serious as the presumptive Democratic Presidential nominee’s proposals in related areas – like China policy. That is to say, they’re not terribly serious at present.

As with China policy, the first concern entails credibility. In 2011, when Biden was Barack Obama’s Vice President, the Commerce Department issued a report detailing all sorts of dangerous vulnerabilities in U.S. supplies of all manner of vital healthcare goods. The “Obama-Biden administration” did absolutely nothing in response – unless you count avidly pursuing offshoring-friendly trade deals, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that were bound to worsen these vulnerabilities. You could also throw in a record of continually coddling the trade and broader economic predation practiced by China, which surely fostered similar results.

As a result, it’s legit to ask whether any of these proposals will survive Day One of a Biden presidency.

In this vein, it’s more than a little disturbing that Biden proposes to use the Defense Department’s policies to minimize supply chain vulnerabilities as his model for addressing such problems for a wide variety of products –not just healthcare-related goods. These include “energy and grid resilience technologies, semiconductors, key electronics and related technologies, telecommunications infrastructure, and key raw materials.”

Unfortunately, the principal lessons taught by the Defense Department’s record on supply chains are how to duck the problem or define it out of existence, and the administration in which Biden served was no exception. Some of the biggest specific problems (as made clear in this Obama administration report):

>The Pentagon’s overall assessments prioritized financial metrics, not specific domestic production capabilities, as measures of the defense manufacturing base’s health.

>Its treatment of globalization’s challenges placed major emphasis on taking “advantage of emerging capabilities, regardless of where they originate,” not maximizing domestic production capabilities.

>Although specific vulnerabilities – and the related need to maintain or rebuild adequate domestic capabilities – were acknowledged, this vulnerabilities were consistently portrayed as isolated holes that could somehow be plugged without taking into account the dependence of these narrowly defined products on their own supply chains. Indeed, Biden’s new plan seems to reveal a similar flaw when it describes itself as “a set of targeted proposals to ensure the United States has the domestic manufacturing capacity necessary for critical supply chains.”

>Moreover, the Department has long supported objectives such as interoperability with allies’ armed forces and maintaining traditional – pre-Trump – global systems of what it defined as free trade, both of which often clashed with the goal of incentivizing domestic production. These goals were explicitly stated in this George W. Bush administration report, and here’s no evidence that the Obama-Biden Pentagon ever disagreed.

Indeed, the new Biden blueprint indicates that the former Vice President’s definition of supply chain security is pretty global, instead of national, as well:

“Instead of insulting our allies and undermining American global leadership, Biden will engage with our closest partners so that together we can build stronger, more resilient supply chains and economies in the face of 21st century risks. Just like the United States itself, no U.S. ally should be dependent on critical supplies from countries like China and Russia. That means developing new approaches on supply chain security — both individually and collectively — and updating trade rules to ensure we have strong understandings with our allies on how to best ensure supply chain security for all of us.”

If America’s allies were proven reliable suppliers of these products themselves, Biden’s perspective would make sense. But the list of countries that have recently hoarded medical goods for themselves as soon as the CCP Virus pandemic’s full dangers became apparent included most of these allies – meaning that the U.S. vulnerability problem far exceeds “China and Russia.”

Nor is it entirely evident how clearly Biden has thought though the tax policy provisions of his plan. Tax policy’s role is clearly viewed as crucial, as the plan emphasizes that

“Pharmaceutical offshoring has been heavily driven by tax code provisions that have encouraged companies to locate pharmaceutical production in low-tax countries even where those countries have labor and other costs comparable to the U.S.”

Consequently, Biden says he will “eliminate Trump Administration tax incentives for offshoring and pursue other tax code changes that will encourage pharmaceutical production in the U.S.”

At the same time, Biden favors raising the overall U.S. corporate tax rate from the 21 percent to which it has recently been lowered to 28 percent, along with a 15 percent “minimum tax” on large corporations. So good luck to drug companies – or any other companies making goods deemed critical by Biden – gleaning clear reshoring or domestic production ramping signals from this combination.

Perhaps any confusion will be cleared up by other alleged Biden measures to boost U.S.-based production – like “new targeted financial incentives, including tax credits, investments, matching funds for state and local incentives, R&D support, and other incentives to encourage the production of designated critical materials such as semiconductors in the United States”? At best, business will surely need to see many more details along these lines before committing the needed capital.

Unless maybe as President, Biden will simply mandate that the needed new facilities will be built when all else fails (as well as in tandem with those other policies)? That’s obviously the implication of his promise to use the Defense Production Act (DPA) “to its fullest extent to rebuild domestic manufacturing capacity in critical supply chains, using the lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic and applying them to our national needs.”

Or does Biden actually view the DPA as his primary tool for “generating the domestic mobilization we need”? That seems like a reasonable conclusion, especially given that it’s the first specific measure he mentions. Maybe instead he’s really talking about using the Act simply “to direct U.S. companies to ramp up production of critical products that will be needed over the near-term.”

Regardless of Biden’s real intentions, though, it’s anything but clear how Biden believes the DPA can be used to increase U.S. production in many of the industries he mentions as vital where such output has largely migrated overseas That’s especially true for the “semiconductors, key electronics and related technologies, [and] telecommunications infrastructure” he specifies. It’s sure going to be far more difficult than, say, ordering auto companies, to make ventilators.

It’s just as unclear how these Biden’s ideas can succeed without a much stronger trade policy dimension – and specifically, continued and even expanded tariffs. And it shouldn’t be limited to straightening out the muddled views mentioned above. 

Specifically, maintaining levies on chronically subsidized and dumped products like metals, along with sweeping tariffs on systemically protectionist China (and on other similar countries) would send the all the companies and sectors concerned an invaluable message. Bipartisan endorsement of these protections would demonstrates that they really can have confidence that new investments won’t be decimated by trade and broader economic predation. Just as important, an enduring commitment to tariffs would help convince overseas competitors (domestic and foreign owned) that if they want to sell the products in which they have big edges to Americans, they’ll need to make these products in America.

The good news is that at least some of these mysteries may be cleared up “soon,” when this Biden plan promises the former Vice President will release his “comprehensive strategy to create American jobs through modern American manufacturing.” The bad news is that if he what he’s said and written so far is any indication, he’ll have a lot of rewriting to do.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: U.S. Manufacturing Keeps Gaining Independence

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Commerce Department, decoupling, GDP-by-industry, health security, healthcare goods, manufacturing, manufacturing production, manufacturing trade deficit, Obama, tariffs, Trade, trade war, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Like a strike-shortened sports season’s champion, the conclusion in today’s RealityChek post needs an asterisk. The conclusion stems from this morning’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Industry report from the Commerce Department, which shows that U.S. domestic manufacturing continues to become ever more self-reliant. In other words, it’s reducing its dependence for growth on foreign-made industrial goods of all kinds generally speaking.

The asterisk is needed because the new data covers the first quarter of this year, and therefore it includes March – when much of the U.S economy was shut down by government order or recommendation due to the CCP Virus. As a result, a chunk of the results say nothing about how manufacturing or the rest of economy would have performed in normal times.

Still, this morning’s evidence that U.S.-based industry is becoming more autonomous comes from several different findings calculable from the GDP by Industry’s raw data.

For example, again, due partly to the shutdowns’ effects, the report shows that according to a widely followed measure called value-added, domestic manufacturing’s output dipped by 0.99 percent between the first quarter of 2019 and the first quarter of this year. At the same time, the manufacturing trade deficit during this period shrank by 7.31 percent – more than 13 times faster. During the last comparable period (fourth quarter, 2018 to fourth quarter, 2019), manufacturing production grew by 0.70 percent, and its trade gap narrowed by 7.59 percent – a somewhat better performance on both scores.

At this point it’s vital to note that these growth rates are by no means good. In fact, they’re the worst by far since the final year of the Obama administration – when on a calendar year basis, domestic industry shrank by 1.19 percent. Yet during that same year 2016, despite this contraction, the manufacturing trade shortfall expanded by 4.66 percent. So if you value self-sufficiency (as you should in a world in which the United States has found itself painfully short of many healthcare-related goods, and in which dozens of its trade partners were hoarding their own supplies), it’s clear that during 2016, the nation was getting the worst of all possible manufacturing worlds.

Also important: there’s no doubt that the same Trump administration tariffs and trade wars with which domestic manufacturing has been dealing over the past two years have slowed its growth. In other words, industry has been adjusting to policy-created pressures to adjust its global, and in particular China-centric, supply chains. That’s bound to create inefficiencies.

If you don’t care about significant American economic reliance on an increasingly hostile dictatorship, you’ll carp about paying any efficiency price for this decoupling from China (and other unreliable countries). If you do care, you’ll recognize the slower growth as an adjustment cost needed to correct the disastrous choice made by pre-Trump Presidents to undercut America’s economic independence severely.

Moreover, during the last year, domestic manufacturing output was held back by two developments that had nothing to do with President Trump’s trade policy: the strike at General Motors in the fall of 2019, which slashed U.S. production both of vehicles and parts, and of all the components and materials that comprise dedicated auto parts; and the safety problems at Boeing, which resulted in the grounding of its popular 737 Max model worldwide starting in March, 2019, and in a suspension of all that aircraft’s production this past January.

Also encouraging from a self-reliance standpoint. During the first quarter of 2019, the manufacturing trade deficit as a percentage of domestic manufacturing output sank from just under 43 percent in the fourth quarter of 2019 (and 43.36 percent for the entirety of last year) to 37.27 percent. That’s the lowest level since full-year 2013’s 35.82 percent.

These figures should make clear that the manufacturing trade deficit’s share of manufacturing output kept growing during the final Obama years and into the Trump years. Indeed, on an annual basis, this number peaked at 47.01 percent in the third quarter of 2019. To some extent, blame what I’ve previously identified as tariff front-running (the rush by importers throughout the trade war to bring product into the United States before threatened tariffs were actually imposed) along with those supply chain-related adjustment costs.

To complicate matters further, as suggested above, that very low first quarter result stemmed partly from the nosedive taken by manufacturing and other U.S. economic activity in March. Since that level is clearly artificially low, it’s probably going to bob up eventually – but hopefully not recover fully.

In all, though, the first quarter GDP by Industry report points to a future of more secure supplies of manufactured goods for Americans. And unless you believe that domestic manufacturers have completely lost their ability to adjust successfully to a (needed) New Normal in U.S. trade policy, the release points to a return of solid manufacturing output growth rates as well.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Confusing but Overall Downbeat News on U.S. Manufacturing Productivity

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aluminum, CCP Virus, China tariffs, coronavirus, COVID 19, durable goods, lavbor productivity, manufacturing, metals tariffs, metals-using industries, multifactor productivity, productivity, steel, tariffs, trade war, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

I wish I could say that the detailed U.S.manufacturing labor productivity statistics for 2019 that came out late last week provided a clear, pre-CCP Virus picture of domestic industry’s health, and especially insights into how well manufacturing was holding up during the ongoing U.S.-China trade war. Unfortunately, the sector-by-sector data add up to a confusing mix of halfway decent and bad news.

First a reminder: Productivity is an important measure of efficiency, and labor productivity is the narrower of the two sets of productivity statistics tracked by the Labor Department. But although it only measures output per hour by individual workers (as opposed to examining the usage and output results for a wide-ranging combination of inputs), the labor productivity figures are released on a timelier basis than the more comprehensive multifactor productivity numbers.

Also important to remember: For all their importance, the productivity data represent the statistics in which economists have the least confidence, although the problem is much more difficult in services than in goods like manufactured products.

Nevertheless, most economists do agree that raising productivity levels is any economy’s best way to boost living standards on a sustainable basis, and so it’s discouraging to report that the overall context for manufacturing last year was pretty dreary. Another productivity series from the Labor Department judged that labor productivity in industry shrank by 0.56 percent. In 2018, it rose by 0.64 percent. Moreover, this general result certainly doesn’t indicate that American manufacturers made much progress compensating for higher costs created by metals and China tariffs by figuring out how to make their workers more efficient.

At the same time, last year, labor productivity fell in 54 of the 86 manufacturing sectors monitored by the Labor Department. As bad as that sounds, this result was actually better than that for 2018, when labor productivity decreased in 67 of those sectors.

Although the so-far-pervasive but widely varying use of Chinese materials, parts, and components makes identifying the China tariffs’ impact on labor productivity, figuring out the effects of the metals tariffs is much easier, and here the news is more encouraging still.

In durable goods – the super-sector that contains the major U.S. industries that use tariff-ed steel and aluminum – labor productivity fell in 31 of the 51 sectors examined. That’s a genuine improvement on 2018, when labor productivity decreased in 41 out of 51.

Even more revealing: Most of the big metals users themselves stepped up their productivity game somewhat in 2019, though in absolute terms (as shown in the table below), their yearly performances weren’t by any means impressive.

                                                                        2018                       2019

fabricated metals products:                    -1.4 percent             -0.1 percent

machinery:                                                  0 percent             -0.2 percent

household appliances:                           +1.6 percent            +2.0 percent

motor vehicles:                                       -7.6 percent            -2.1 percent

motor vehicle parts:                                -1.2 percent            -0.6 percent

aerospace products & parts:                   -8.1 percent            -2.2 percent

As long as the CCP Virus keeps affecting the American and global economies (an especially important point for manufacturing, since in 2019, its exports represented nearly 18 percent of its total gross output), it’ll be tough to get a handle on underlying trends in manufacturing labor productivity and other performance indicators. But on the labor productivity front, last week’s figures sadly make clear that a return to pre-virus levels won’t be terribly difficult to achieve.

Im-Politic: Bolton’s China Derangement Syndrome

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China, decoupling, election 2020, Huawei, Im-Politic, John R. Bolton, Lighthizer, Made in China 2025, national security, Phase One, Robert M. Lighthizer, sanctions, tariffs, tech, Trade, trade enforcement, trade war, Trump

How are John R. Bolton’s new kiss-and-tell revelations to date about his tenure as President Trump’s national security adviser truly deranged? In at least three big, related ways when it comes to China.

First, (according to this most comprehensive statement of his views) Bolton apparently was too busy marketing this policy potboiler to have bothered reading the text of the trade deal with China Mr. Trump signed in mid-January. Rather than the agreement entailing “less…than met the eye,” it entailed much more. Not only did the Phase One deal require China greatly to boost its purchases of U.S.-made advanced manufactures (in addition to the agricultural products on which Bolton obsesses). It also created dispute resolution procedures – meaning an enforcement mechanism – completely tilted in America’s favor.

As I’ve explained, when all procedures are exhausted, China is only entitled to pull out of the entire agreement if it’s unhappy with the results – an extreme unlikelihood given China’s heavy reliance on selling to the U.S. market to maintain growth and employment that Beijing sees as being both political and economically important. The United States has the same ultimate option, but its threats to do so would be highly credible, given the huge net losses it suffered from pre-Trump China trade policies.

Moreover, the President secured these benefits while maintaining steep U.S. tariffs on literally hundreds of billions of dollars worth of prospective Chinese exports to America – and especially on those high value manufactures that have benefited most from the Made in China 2025 program and other Chinese predatory economic policies, and whose development pose the greatest threats to U.S. national security as well as prosperity. Also crucial – Bolton criticizes his former boss for agreeing to China’s insistence that he refrain from imposing new tariffs in return for restarting the trade talks. But the structure of the trade agreement leaves this option entirely open to the United States – and, in effect, with impunity. 

By the way, the results of the trade talks also demolish Bolton’s uber-claim that President Trump’s China policies stemmed solely from his desire for reelection, and the related suggestion that Mr. Trump believed that a purely cosmetic agreement would serve his political purposes much more effectively than reaching a deal heavily favoring U.S. interests.

They similarly leave as a smoking ruin Bolton’s allegation that the President continued to flatter Chinese leader Xi Jinping after the CCP Virus broke out because he was desperate to preserve the trade agreement. If anyone felt such desperation, it was Xi – whose regime hasn’t even tried to use the virus’ damage to China’s own economy as an excuse for at least temporarily ignoring Phase One’s import requirements.

Bolton’s second deranged claim follows on directly from that last point. On the one hand, he accuses the President of being completely indifferent to his master plan of fitting “China trade policy into a broader strategic framework,” and complains that “we struggled to avoid being sucked into the black hole of U.S.-China trade issues.”

On the other hand, he credits Mr. Trump with appreciating “the key truth that politico-military power rests on a strong economy. Trump frequently says that stopping China’s unfair economic growth at America’s expense is the best way to defeat China militarily, which is fundamentally correct.”

Yet as just detailed, Bolton heaps scorn on major Trump achievements that have gone far toward weakening China’s economy vis-a-vis America’s. Moreover, such Trump moves also include punishing sanctions on Chinese telecoms giant Huawei that Bolton bizarrely views as undeserving of mention.

The final evidence of Bolton’s derangement: his whining about the President’s decision-making style. According to the author, Americans should be up in arms because Mr. Trump’s advisers have been “badly fractured intellectually” and because “Trade matters were handled from day one in a completely chaotic way.” Indeed, the Trump leadership style, Bolton moans, “made my head hurt.”

To which any minimally intelligent and/or adult reader should respond “So what?” Leaving aside that it was never the President’s job to please whatever otherwordly expectations Bolton (a longtime Washington operator who obviously knows better) claims to have had about policymaking processes, the results have been entirely coherent and clear to anyone caring actually to look. Whatever uncertainties Mr. Trump may have had about choosing China trade tactics and whose advice to follow, he has plainly put U.S. Trade Representative Robert E. Lighthizer and other so-called hawks in command, and the results have been a wide variety of measures that have both gut-punched China’s economy (see, e.g., here) and steadily decoupled America’s economic fortunes from this dangerous dictatorship. (See, e.g., this post.)

Unless the rest of Bolton’s forthcoming book is completely different and indeed vastly more coherent than the portions made public to date (and why would he and his publicists want to lead with any material they believed wasn’t bullet-proof), his tell-all will only be important for shedding light on a single question: Will the author be best remembered as a dangerously incompetent armchair warhawk who helped lead the United States into a major disaster in Iraq, or as a wildly flailing freelance wannabe hitman who tried to sabotage an urgently needed turnaround in America’s approach to China?

Following Up: Podcast Now On-Line of National Radio Interview on U.S.-China Decoupling

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China, decoupling, FDI, Following Up, foreign direct investment, investment, manufacturing, pensions, public employees, retirement, tariffs, The John Batchelor Show, Trade, Trump

I’m pleased to announce that the podcast is now on-line of my interview yesterday on John Batchelor’s nationally syndicated radio show.  Click here for a timely update on dramatic new evidence that the U.S. and Chinese economies keep steadily – and in some cases quickly – disengaging.

And keep checking in with RealityChek for news of upcoming media appearances and other developments.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Great New Developments on the U.S.-China Decoupling Front

Tags

CCP Virus, Census Bureau, China, coronavirus, COVID 19, decoupling, FDI, foreign direct investment, GDP, goods trade, gross domestic product, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Rhodium Group, supply chain, tariffs, Trade, Trump, venture capital, Wuhan virus, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Amid the flood of terrible news that’s been engulfing the U.S. economy because of the CCP Virus and its shutdown effects, there’s a decidedly positive development to report: Major evidence has just come in showing that the decoupling of the U.S. economy from China’s keeps proceeding. And, even better, the data make clear that the United States is amply capable of prospering without extensive ties with (and resulting vulnerabilities to) the increasingly hostile and dangerous regime in Beijing.

The latest evidence for such conclusions about the so-called decoupling process comes from a study just jointly released by a research firm called the Rhodium Group and a pillar of the Offshoring Lobby called the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. The real work was done by the folks at Rhodium, and the big takeaways are:

>that the value of Chinese “foreign direct investment” (FDI) in the United States (i.e., Chinese takeovers or acquisition of stakes in existing non-financial assets in the United States, and creation of new non-financial assets) fell slightly on year last year to its lowest annual level ($4.78 billion) since 2010, and is now nearly 90 percent below its peak annual level of $46.49 billion in 2016;

>that the value of Chinese “venture capital” investment (a strange term for originating in the state-controlled Chinese economy) going into the United States fell from its all-time high of $4.67 billion in 2018 to $2.57 billion last year;

>that the value of U.S. FDI made into the Chinese economy edged up sequentially last year, from $12.89 billion to $14.13 billion, but still remains well below its peak of $20.94 billion in 2008;

>and that the value of U.S. venture capital investment going into China plummeted from its all-time high of $19.57 billion in 2018 to $4.98 billion in last year.

Even if you’re not concerned about greater integration with a country that’s threatened cut off vital medical supplies to the United States during the current pandemic, or about the national security threat posed by Chinese access to defense- or surveillance- or hacking-related tech, this is great news for anyone valuing the benefits of free markets. For any participation by China’s state-controlled system in the U.S. economy can only distort the workings of free markets, and in particular, force U.S. businesses (which until the CCP Virus invaded needed to rely on private sources for their capital) to compete with Chinese rivals (which can rely on the Chinese treasury).

Rhodium’s research also found that Chinese investment flows into the United States plunged even further during the first quarter of this year (the first pandemic quarter) while U.S. flows into China remained pretty stable. But the pre-CCP Virus results are undoubtedly more revealing of the underlying longer-term trends.

Decoupling is proceeding even faster on the trade front. Last week’s monthly U.S. trade report from the Census Bureau (for March) showed that the two-way value of U.S.-China trade in goods (the sum of imports and exports) sank by 42.49 percent between the first quarter of 2019 and the first quarter of 2020. That’s the lowest quarterly level since the $72.16 billion level recorded for the first quarter of 2006.

More revealing, though: At that point, two-way goods trade represented 0.53 percent of the total U.S. economy. In the first quarter of 2020, the proportion was down to 0.35 percent.

Of course, the first quarter 2020 results have been distorted by the CCP Virus’ effects (and greater distortion surely lies ahead). More specifically, gross domestic product (GDP) decreased from the fourth quarter of last year to the first quarter of this year, and it grew a measly 2.10 percent before adjusting for inflation over the fourth quarter of 2019. (This and the following growth figures are different, and higher, than the growth figures featured in the most widely tracked GDP figures, which are adjusted for price changes. I’m using the pre-inflation GDP figures here because inflation-adjusted country-specific trade figures aren’t available.)

For more “normal” data, let’s check out the figures for the year preceding the fourth quarter of 2019. During that timespan, the value of two-way U.S.-China goods trade dropped by 19.48 percent – from $171.57 billion to $138.15 billion. But pre-inflation growth hit a solid 3.98 percent.

Slightly shifting the time periods examined produces the same pattern. Between the first quarter of 2018 and the first quarter of 2019, the value of two-way U.S.-China goods trade nosedived by 46.40 percent. In other words, it was cut nearly in half. Yet current dollar growth during that period hit 4.64 percent.

At this point, it’s necessary to point out that this big 2018-19 decline in the value of two-way goods trade came right on the heels of a huge 77.58 percent increase between 2017 and 2018. But this rise stemmed mainly from the major adjustments made by businesses on both sides of the Pacific – especially what’s called U.S. tariff “front-running” – to deal with President Trump’s steadily escalating increases in tariffs on imports from China.

The justification for confidence that, but for the virus’ impact, the New Normal in U.S.-China trade would be reflecting more decoupling comes from examining the trends before and after President Trump’s January, 2017 inauguration. From the time Mr. Trump entered office through the end of last year, the economy grew by a total of 13.23 percent. But the value of two-way bilateral goods trade became 0.32 percent higher. In other words, for all intents and purposes, it didn’t grow at all.

That marks a major turnaround from the eight years under former President Obama, when the only first-quarter-to-first-quarter shrinkage in two-way trade (7.35 percent, between 2015 and 2016) was accompanied by weak 2.45 percent GDP growth. Moreover the only Obama first-quarter-to-first-quarter period when strong GDP growth (5.14 percent) was accompanied by only relatively modest growth in two-way bilateral trade (5.28 percent) came between 2014 and 2015. For the rest of his term in office, the growth of two-way U.S.-China goods trade significantly topped the growth of the economy, before taking inflation into account.

One of the most important concepts in free market-oriented economics is that of trade-offs, often expressed with the phrase, “There’s no such thing as a free lunch.”  Decoupling America’s economy from China’s will no doubt entail further disruption and costs related to the inevitable inefficiencies of supply chain rejiggering.  But the U.S.’ ability to grow strongly even as its economic engagement with China shrivels adds to the evidence that this lunch, if not exactly free, is a terrific value.

Im-Politic: Evidence that Trump Would Be Foolish Not to “Run on China”

Tags

2020 election, CCP Virus, China, climate change, coronavirus, COVID 19, cybersecurity, Democrats, environment, Gallup, human rights, Im-Politic, Jobs, Joe Biden, Pew Research Center, polls, public opinion, Republicans, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, trade war, Trump, Wuhan virus

Monday I laid out the case that presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden has cheer-led every major Washington policy decision in recent decades that has enabled the rise of a wealthy, powerful, and worst of all, hostile and dangerous China. So it’s at least awfully interesting that the day after, a new poll was released making clear that the Trump campaign’s decision to brand the former Vice President as “soft on China” is not only on the mark substantively, but a smart political move.

The poll, conducted by the Pew Research Center, shows that Americans of all political stripes have turned into strong China critics. And especially important – there’s much more going on here than blaming Beijing for the CCP Virus outbreak. Respondents across-the-board now strongly agree that China poses a major threat to a wide range of U.S. interests – including on the trade front, where President Trump’s tariffs were widely reported to be devastating pretty much every major group of actors in the American economy, from businesses to consumers, and from farmers to manufacturers.

P.S. It’s not like Pew has ever itself shown any signs of being critical of China. Indeed, its introduction to the results includes this moral equivalence-friendly assessment: “…with the onset of an unprecedented pandemic, the stage has been set for both sides to cast aspersions on the other.”

The finding Pew emphasizes is a dramatic rise in unfavorable American views of China since Mr. Trump’s inauguration. When he entered office at the beginning of 2017 , the respondents Pew interviewed disapproved of China, but only by a narrow 47 percent to 44 percent margin. The most recent results show unfavorable ratings thumping favorable by 66 percent to 26 percent. The latest negative reviews garnered by Beijing, moreover, represent its worst such showing since Pew began asking the question in 2005.

And as Pew points out, looking at this divergence over time makes clear that China’s ratings began deteriorating long before the virus appeared. In fact, the sharpest increases in Beijing’s unfavorables and sharpest decreases in its favorables started in 2018 – when the administration began announcing and imposing steep levies on huge amounts of prospective imports from China.

Indeed, China’s image among Americans is now so bad that it’s shared among Democrats and Republicans alike. Frustratingly, the survey doesn’t measure the attitudes of declared political independents, but the latest figures show that 72 percent of Republicans and those “leaning” Republican hold unfavorable views of China, and that 62 percent of Democrats and their “leaners” agree. And both negatives are up sharply since the trade war began – or more accurately, since the United States started fighting back.

Not that trade is the only China-related concern expressed in the Pew survey, or even the strongest. Pew gauged U.S. opinion on several China-related issues, and the biggest worries were voiced over “China’s impact on the global environment.” Fully 91 percent of respondents labeled it as a “very serious” or “somewhat serious” problem for the United States, the former responses hitting 61 percent. Next came “cyberattacks from China,” rated as problems by 8 percent of those surveyed, and as “very serious” problems by 57 percent.

Coming in third and fourth were the economic issues. Eighty five percent saw the U.S. trade deficit with China as a problem, including 49 percent calling it serious. And for “the loss of U.S. jobs to China,” the numbers came in at 85 percent and 52 percent, respectively. Interestingly, those latter results nearly matched those for the issue of “China’s growing military power” (84 percent and 49 percent, respectively).

Important to note, however, is evidence that, high as they are, the economic concerns have been leveling off in recent years, while the environmental concerns have been rising (along with those centered on human rights). That’s not necessarily great news for Mr. Trump, whose focus has been on the jobs and overall economy impact (along with the technological threat from China – which is a major source of public China-related concern).

Much better news for the President – Americans aged 50 and older (whose voter turnout rates have long been high) – hold the most negative views of China. Yet this year, Beijing’s image has turned negative for Americans in the 18-29 age class for the first time ever. And for both groups, disapproval of China surged starting in 2018.

Of course, China’s not the only issue on which Americans will be voting this fall. But the latest Gallup results, for example, show that virus-related issues have surged to the top of their rankings for the “most important problem facing the U.S.” If the President can link the virus with the overall China challenge in voters’ minds, his odds of reelection would seem to be pretty good. His biggest obstacle? Possibly the companion Gallup finding that right behind the virus on the list of national problems is “The government/poor leadership.”

Glad I Didn’t Say That: Chicken Little Warnings About Tariffs & Sanitizer Shortages

Tags

CCP Virus, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, coronavirus, COVID 19, disinfectants, Glad I Didn't Say That!, hand sanitizers, Mainstream Media, MSM, soap, tariffs, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, Trump, water, Wuhan virus

“Widespread shortages of hand sanitizer, disinfectants and other products needed to combat the spread of the coronavirus are being exacerbated by the Trump administration’s tariffs on Chinese imports, according to public filings by companies asking for exemptions from the levies.”

– The Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2020

“CDC recommends washing hands with soap and water whenever possible because handwashing reduces the amounts of all types of germs and chemicals on hands. But if soap and water are not available, using a hand sanitizer with at least 60% alcohol can help you avoid getting sick and spreading germs to others.”

– Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, March 3, 2020

(Sources: “U.S. Tariffs Hamper Imports of Sanitizer, Disinfectants,” by Katy Stech Ferek and Josh Zumbrun , The Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-tariffs-hamper-imports-of-sanitizer-disinfectants-11586683800?mod=hp_lead_pos5 and “Show Me the Science – When & How to Use Hand Sanitizer in Community Settings,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,” as updated through March 3, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/handwashing/show-me-the-science-hand-sanitizer.html)

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Yes, These New (Pre-CCP Virus) U.S. Trade Figures Really Matter

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Atlanta Fed, Boeing, Census Bureau, China, exports, GDP, gross domestic product, imports, Made in Washington trade deficit, manufacturing, New York Fed, Pacific Rim, real GDP, tariffs, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

There’s no doubt that the pre-CCP Virus U.S. economic data that still keep coming out (and that will continue coming out for months) has at best strongly limited utility nowadays – with one gigantic caveat. They speak volumes about how the economy was faring before the virus’ invasion, and the message they’re sending is especially important for evaluating the effects of President Trump’s tariff-heavy trade policies.

Specifically, they make abundantly clear that the economy was humming along just (and in many ways, increasingly) fine even though steep Trump levies have remained on literally hundreds of billions of dollar worth of potential goods imports – mainly on products from China and steel and aluminum from numerous countries. So you can take the mountain of claims that these duties would wreck American prosperity and throw them on the trash heap. And new reinforcement for this analysis has appeared this morning in the form of the latest official monthly U.S. trade figures (for February) from the Census Bureau.

First, let’s look at the growth numbers, as reported in terms of a measure called “gross domestic product” (GDP). It gauges the nation’s output of goods and services, and the most closely watched figures are those adjusted for inflation.

There’s no doubt that real growth slowed from the time the first Trump-specific tariffs (on metals) were imposed in March, 2018. That year, after-inflation GDP expanded by a healthy 2.93 percent. But the rate slowed notably during that year, certainly at least coinciding with the impact of the tariffs taking hold. It’s also important to point out that China duties began in mid-year, were increased, and plans for many more were announced. (See the timeline linked immediately above for the specifics). 

Growth slowed in full year, 2019, but just to 2.33 percent – still solid by recent U.S. (meaning post-2008 financial crisis) standards. And the nation was dealing not only with trade war fallout, but the safety problems plaguing aircraft giant Boeing and its vast national supply chain.

We don’t have constant dollar GDP results for the first quarter of this year yet, but two regional branches of the Federal Reserve system try to track growth on a timely, ongoing basis. And the pre-virus grades they both gave the economy were encouraging. According to the Atlanta Fed, first quarter after-inflation growth was proceeding at a better-than-three percent annual pace through late March – even though virus infections and deaths were rising troublingly.

(It’s crucial to note, especially in light of shockingly bad recent virus-era growth – and in fact contraction – estimates from private sector economists, that such annualized figures describe growth rates as if the quarterly results lasted for an entire year. That is, the growth or contraction they describe does not represent actual GDP change for that quarter – and as a result, they shouldn’t be taken to revealing that the increases or decreases that are forecast will take place all at once.)

The New York Fed’s estimates tend to be lower than Atlanta’s, but they still predicted an annualized 2.14 percent inflation-adjusted first quarter growth rate as late as February 28. By March 27, that estimate had fallen to 1.68 percent annualized.

And what’s happened to the U.S. trade deficit for the first two months of 2020 – in other words, the first two-thirds of the first quarter of the year? By the broadest measure, which counts both goods and services, it’s down 18.71 percent year-on-year. (This and the following trade numbers are presented in pre-inflation terms, since such figures dominate the detailed results contained in the monthly trade reports.) Better yet, decline has been accelerating. Between December and January, the total trade gap fell by 6.44 percent – from $48.61 billion to $45.48 billion. From January to February, it sank by another 12.20 percent – nearly twice as fast – to $39.93 billion. (The initially reported January number was revised up slightly today.)

That February figure was the lowest since the $39.92 billion registered in April, 2016 – when the economy was growing only a bit more slowly, but when there were no serious problems facing then-export standout Boeing. Moreover, the February monthly drop was the biggest since March, 2018 (12.34 percent) – just as the first Trump metals tariffs were coming into effect.

As known by RealityChek regulars, the best way to judge how trade policy decisions have affected the trade figures is to look at the data measuring the nation’s trade flows minus oil and services (which have never been greatly affected by trade agreements or tariffs). For the first two months of this year, this Made in Washington trade deficit is off by 9.64 percent in pre-inflation terms. Here, too, the rate of decrease is getting faster, with February’s sequential 7.97 percent plummet the biggest such decrease since the 9.45 percent nosedive that took place in January, 2019 – as the China trade war was peaking in terms of tariff impositions. And the $60.76 billion February total is the lowest for a single month since September, 2017’s $60.65 billion.

Speaking of China, a combination of Beijing’s widespread CCP Virus lockdowns and Trump tariffs brought the February U.S. goods trade gap with the People’s Republic all the way down to $16 billion. That’s the lowest such total since the $15.65 billion recorded in Great Recession-ary March, 2009. And the monthly falloff (38.62 percent) was the biggest since December, 1993’s 39.46 percent. That was more than 26 years ago!

Moreover, even though U.S. merchandise exports to China slipped by 5.55 percent on month, U.S. goods imports from China dropped by 31.45 percent. The actual U.S. export level of $6.82 billion was indeed the lowest since June, 2010’s $6.73 billion. But the import level of $22.81 billion was the lowest monthly total since Great Recession-ary May, 2009’s $22.73 billion. And the sequential import drop was the biggest since the 34.07 percent of April, 1986 – nearly 34 years ago, when the much smaller volumes of U.S.-China trade made big percentage moves much easier to produce.

Also important – even as the China year-to-date goods trade deficit has declined by 28.99 percent, the U.S. goods trade gap with Pacific Rim countries (a grouping that does not include Western Hemisphere countries like America’s U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement partners) is off by 25.30 percent. So say so long to the claim that the Trump tariffs have simply shifted the deficit to other Asian countries.

The news was equally good on the manufacturing trade front. America’s mammoth manufacturing trade deficit shrank on month in February from $81.93 billion to $63.01 billion. The February total is the lowest such figure since February, 2017’s $60.47 billion. Meanwhile, the 23.09 percent monthly drop is the biggest since December, 2012’s 27.11 percent decrease.

Further, the deficit fell for all the right reasons. Despite the continued overall economic growth, U.S. manufacturing imports were off 8.98 percent, to $153.07 billion while exports actually grew – by 4.42 percent, to $90.06 billion.

As a result, the manufacturing trade shortfall is down year-to-date so far as well – by 9.65 percent, from $160.43 billion to $144.94 billion.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Winning Trade War Message from the Last Pre-China Virus Manufacturing Figures

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aerospace, aircraft, Boeing, China, China virus, coronavirus, inflation-adjusted output, manufacturing, manufacturing production, metals, supply chains, tariffs, Trade, trade wars, {What's Left of) Our Economy

The new Federal Reserve industrial production figures are now out, and although they only bring the story up through February, they contain two vital messages: First, taking into account ongoing safety problems with aerospace giant Boeing (and its vast domestic supply chain), they’re very solid – and reinforce the case that the pre-China Virus manufacturing and overall U.S. economies were faring well despite widespread slowdown fears. Second, they also show that, despite the equally widespread tariff alarmism being mongered throughout the Trump years, domestic manufacturing wound up handling the so-called trade wars just fine.

According to the Fed, inflation-adjusted manufacturing output increased by 0.12 percent month-to-month and remained down on a year-on-year basis (by 0.18 percent). January’s monthly constant dollar production dip was revised down from 0.09 percent to 0.23 percent. Yet this real output is up on net by 1.33 percent since its last low point (last October) and by 0.36 percent since the first full month of significant Trump tariffs (April, 2018).

At the same time, these production levels remain 1.28 percent below those of manufacturing’s last peak – in December, 2018. So these are by no means salad days for domestic industry.

Take a look, however, at the main Boeing-related figures. Aircraft production and parts sank by 5.12 percent sequentially in February. It reached its lowest level since October, 2011 and this drop followed January’s 11.36 percent monthly nosedive.

Moreover, although impossible from the Fed figures to quantify precisely, the production halt of Boeing’s popular 737 Max model that began in January is clearly dragging down output in sectors ranging from metals to industrial machinery to plastics to electronics and instruments.

The rapid recent spread of the coronavirus throughout the United States will start generating very different and much worse manufacturing production and other data going forward. But these latest data show domestic industry’s performance even as tariffs on literally hundreds of billions of dollars worth of tariff on Chinese and metals inputs used by manufacturers remained firmly in place. And if that doesn’t signal loud and clear that both American producers and consumers were withstanding the Trump trade wars – a New Normal that’s likely to survive the passing of COVID 19 – quite nicely, and in fact that the entire economy had been winning it, what could?