Our So-Called Foreign Policy: A Call to Return to Failed U.S. China Strategies

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alliances, allies, Barack Obama, Biden, China, Donald Trump, engagement, FOREIGNPOLICY.com, George W. Bush, Indo-Pacific, intellectual property theft, Michael J. Green, national security, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Paul Haenle, tech transfer, TPP, Trans-Pacific Partnership, World Trade Organization, WTO

When it comes to China-related issues in particular, supposed American experts who have long completely missed the mark have developed a head-exploding habit of assuming that they have anything useful to say on the matter going forward. Here’s a recent example.

Now these failed economic and foreign policy establishmentarians have hit new heights (or is is “depths”?) of chutzpah. As laid out in this article last week on FOREIGN POLICY magazine’s website, two typical figures are now attacking President Biden’s approach to the People’s Republic for taking too Trump-ian a turn, and blaming his alleged mistakes on learning the wrong lessons from the records of pre-Trump Presidents.

Whereas both the Biden and Trump teams, they write, have accused their predecessors of naively assuming that “engagement would lead to a democratic and cooperative China,” in fact, since the initial Nixon Era opening to Beijing, American leaders have fully understood that China’s democratization could never be a foregone conclusion, and have always “combined engagement with strategies to counterbalance China through alliances, trade agreements, and military power.” In other words, far from being disastrously pathetic failures, America’s pre-Trump China policies were actually as successful as was humanly possible,  And current leaders should emulate some of their principal choices. 

Even the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, they continue, which faced a China whose wealth and power had begun growing stunningly, had foreseen the possibility of Beijing turning more aggressive, and responded to warning signs exactly as events prescribed. Further, their decisions to stay on an engagement track as well were entirely shrewd and responsible. After all, major potential benefits could still plausibly be expected – because during those years, “the question of how China would use its growing power was open to shaping.”

Indeed, say authors Michael Green (a former Bush-ie) and Paul Haenle (previously both a Bush-ie and Obama-naut), a harder line at that time would have amounted to a policy of “strangling China” that also would have been opposed by major allies and the American people, “both of whom mainly saw China as a partner [and] would not have supported containment and decoupling.“

All that went wrong was that that darned current Chinese dictator Xi Jinping assumed power and, well, just ruined everything with his belligerently expansionist aims and actions, and his reversal of much Chinese economic liberalization. The 2008-09 financial crisis didn’t help, either, according to Geen and Haenle, because it convinced Beijing that “the West was declining and the East is rising.”

All the same, say Green and Haenle, the Biden administration should

>recognize that the two immediate pre-Trump presidents had the security side of China policy fundamentally right with their strategy of maintaining and strengthening U.S. alliances with major Asian countries (an odd recommendation since that’s what Mr. Biden is already trying to do); and

>on the economic side, “reconstruct some of the economic statecraft that underpinned U.S. strategies toward China in the past” – principally reviving the World Trade Organization (WTO) as “an important tool to hold China to account” for its predatory practices and joining the current version of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which can “bring the weight of almost two-thirds of the world economy to the table in demanding reciprocal agreements from China” and “force Beijing to play by the rules or lose hundreds of billions of dollars in trade as tariffs and market barriers among the rule-abiding economies went down.”

But these arguments only strengthen the case that Green, Haenle and their ilk should be kept as far away as possible from U.S. policymaking toward China.

Regarding security issues, their contention that Bush-Obama hedging was responsible and understandable ignores all the ways in which China had been undercutting U.S. national security interests long before the Age of Xi began in 2012. For example, it played a key role in creating Iran’s nuclear weapons program starting in the mid-1980s. It’s been a major supporter of North Korea’s economy – and therefore an enabler of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons development for decades. And it’s beefed up its military presence in the South China Sea – including island grabs that violate international law – for nearly as long.

And Green and Haenle seem to need some improved calendar-reading skills, as financial crisis-borne hubris to which they attribute much of Beijing’s recent bellicosity dates from 2008-09 – three to four years before Xi became China’s top leader. Against this backdrop, it’s glaringly obvious that, judged by actual results, the various hedging statements and even counter-measures mentioned by Green and Haenle counted for exactly squadoosh.

In addition, there’s compelling evidence that the Chinese thought so, too. As I reported in 2018, a former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations (the Navy’s senior-most officer) has stated that his Chinese counterpart told him that “he thought the United States would have a more forceful reaction when China began” one of its key island-building phases during the former’s tenure – during the Obama years.

P.S. – this behavior doesn’t exactly jibe with the notion that Beijing was blown away by Bush-Obama alliance-rallying, either.    

If anything, the Bush and Obama China economic policies were worse, at least in terms of long-run security impact. Both presided virtually passively as

>China’s economic predation helped produce trade surpluses that put literally trillions of dollars at Beijing’s disposal to devote to its military buildup and prevent any guns versus butter tensions from emerging;

>China stole intellectual property seemingly at will, which supercharged weapons development, too; and

>U.S. multinational companies felt perfectly free to transfer cutting-edge defense-relevant technology to Chinese partners that were first and foremost agents of the Chinese state, and to teach perhaps hundreds of thousands of Chinese employees and students how to use this knowhow – and ultimately how to develop more on their own.

As for the authors’ economic recommendations, they’re simply laughable. The TPP, after all, contained a wide-open back door through which goods with lots of Chinese content could enter the proposed free trade – largely because none of the other TPP signatories wanted to disrupt production chains in which China plays a key role.

Meanwhile, that robust China-Asia/Pacific trade and investment, plus the difficulty that Mr. Biden has run into in mobilizing support outside Europe against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is telling all but the willfully deaf that the United States will suddenly become able to increase the WTO’s effectiveness against China’s mercantilism. 

As Green and Haenle suggest, being able to learn from both mistakes and successes is one of life’s most valuable skills.  Sadly, all that their article demontrates is either that they can’t tell the difference, or that they stubbornly refuse to.

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Big New Victim of China’s Tech Blackmail

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automotive, China, electric vehicles, EVs, FDI, foreign direct investment, free trade, Stellantis, tariffs, tech transfer, {What's Left of) Our Economy

For many years (see, e.g., here), it’s been obvious to me that China’s strategy toward foreign businesses allowed to operate within its borders has been to chew them up and spit them out as soon as they’re not needed. In particular, Beijing has been happy to welcome these businesses if they possessed technologies China hadn’t yet mastered, and then to make life miserable enough to force their exit once this knowhow had been shared with Chinese partners in return for (temporary) access to Chinese customers.

(P.S. Beijing began pursuing this approach long before the advent of current dictator Xi Jinping and his emphasis on boosting China’s economic and technological self-sufficiency.) 

This stategy isn’t exactly consistent with the central tenet of the academic theory that long supported the bipartisan U.S. policy of recklessly expanding trade and investment policy with China. You know – the one holding that the whole world is better off if countries permit market forces to determine where goods and services should be generated.  But aside from the U.S. workers whose jobs were wiped out, or never created to begin with, who in Washington or Corporate America cared as long as the U.S. tech lead seemed insurmountable?

Those days of course are long gone, and now it looks like (a) the multinational auto manufacturing company Stellantis is falling victim to this Chinese strategy; and that (b) others in this industry might be next.

As reported by Reuters yesterday, Stellantis – the product of a merger between Fiat Chysler and Peugot – announced that its Jeep-making joint venture (JV) with a Chinese partner would file for bankruptcy. In July, Stallentis decided to exit this operation in China.

The latest iteration of an investment in China that began way back in 1984 as Beijing Jeep, Stellantis itself deserves much blame for this failure. As noted by Reuters, the company was far too slow in adjusting to a change in Chinese consumer tastes away from conventionally powered sport utility vehicles to electric cars and light trucks – a shift that’s been encouraged by the Chinese government (and more recently by the Biden administration for American consumers).

But echoing complaints heard more and more often from China’s foreign business community, Stellantis’ CEO Carlos Tavares has griped about growing “political” interference in working with its various Chinese partners and about the tariffs Beijing uses to protect its auto market. Further, as Tavares noted, Chinese-made vehicles don’t face such barriers in the European market, meaning they can enjoy scale economies denied outside competitors.

More important, at the root of the troubles suffered by Stellantis in China, and its other foreign-owned counterparts, has clearly been Beijing’s policy of requiring the foreign companies to form JVs with Chinese-owned entities in order to sell to the Chinese market, and to transfer their knowhow to those new partners. (Tesla has been an exception – so far.)

This extortion – which has been Chinese policy for its entire economy – can’t be blamed/credited for China’s success in electrification. But it can absolutely be blamed for enabling Chinese-owned automakers to reach the point at which they could make fully competitive vehicles and then proceed to electrification.

And it’s not like Stellantis is the only foreign auto company being bitten by submission to such blackmail. The total foreign share of the Chinese auto market (now the world’s largest) fell well below 50 percent last year.

The bottom line? As observed by an industry consultant quoted by Reuters, thanks to decades of tech blackmail, Chinese auto entities are more “confident that they have closed the gaps with or even surpassed their foreign partners” and therefore, “we have to expect more JVs to unwind in the coming years.” In other words, the entire foreign-owned auto sector may be in the process of being spit out of China by the rivals it helped create.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Has Intel Been Cutting its Own Throat in China?

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America Competes Act, China, Digitimes, Intel, microchips, national secuity, semiconductors, subsidies, tech, tech transfer, Vladimir Lenin, {What's Left of) Our Economy

There’s one crucial fact missing from this crucial news item – which features an Intel executive’s prediction that, within five years, strong Chinese rivals will emerge to the giant U.S.-owned semiconductor manufacturer. This development, which has massive implications for America’s national security and economy, will stem in no small measure from Intel’s own major transfers of technology to the Chinese economy.

Just as important: Intel’s tech transfers are continuing even though the company has been lobbying hard to secure huge U.S. government subsidies it claims it needs to build more advanced microchip production in the United States – in order to improve its competitiveness versus China. But since money is fungible, these taxpayer dollars could indirectly find their way into China’s tech sector if – as likely – a big legislative package of support for American technology development is approved by Congress.

Like many big U.S. tech companies, Intel has been helping strengthen China’s technology prowess for literally decades. In 1998, the company announced plans to build a $50 million research center in Beijing, and by 2007, had opened another in Shanghai. According to the above linked account, Intel was focusing on developing software, not semiconductors. But the same piece reported that this work aimed at helping Chinese programmers “get ready for processors wih multiple cores,” and that “Some of the work surrounding Intel’s so-called terascale research–most recently showcased through its 80-core chip prototype–is also being done” in Beijing.

More broadly, an Intel China executive said that “The company is spending a lot of time and money working with the local university education system on science and technology education” – including electrical engineering programs.

Since then, as RealityChek has reported, Intel’s research and development operations in China have expanded significantly. A 2014 post contained the news that the company was working with a state-owned Chinese partner to produce microchips “for the cheapo but technologically advanced phones selling so well in low-income countries like China.” Its involvement in this venture, moreover, built on its “establishment earlier this year of a Smart Device Innovation Center and $100 million venture fund in the same field, and tie-up with a Chinese fabless chip-maker.” Although the semiconductors in question were not cutting-edge, who can doubt that teaching Chinese engineers how to build so-called legacy semiconductors was bound to increase their ability to build more advanced devices down the road?

The following year, I summarized a post from the Taiwanese tech website Digitimes.com (also the source for the Intel prediction leading off this piece) that detailed how Intel had committed a total of nearly $1.8 billion to help Chinese entities develop advanced new products and services. They included unmanned aerial vehicles, smart devices, robotics, cloud computing services, artificial intelligence, machine vision, three-dimensional modeling, virtual reality technologies, and advanced optics.” None of these could ever be relevant to semiconductor production – or advanced weapons systems – could they?

And just last November, I mentioned a Wall Street Journal piece finding that Intel is ntel “is among the active investors, backing a Chinese company now called Primarius Technologies Co., which specializes in chip-design tools that U.S. companies currently lead in making.”

As I’ve written repeatedly, such activities amount to U.S. companies – and U.S. administrations that ignored or approved them – selling China the rope with which to hang America (paraphrasing the famous prediction of Vladimir Lenin, leader of the Bolshevik Revolution that created the Soviet Union). In Intel’s case (and it’s not alone here), the companies keep undercutting their own fortunes. And unless Washington conditions handouts for Intel and other tech companies on halting these giveaways, American taxpayers will finance much of it.

Full disclosure:  Investment-wise, I’m neither long nor short Intel, though I am long TSMC – the Taiwanese chip manufacturer that’s Intel’s top competitor, and that recently replaced it as the world leader in semiconductor production technology. 

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: America’s Latest China Spy Conviction Might Not Even Be Tokenism

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aircraft, Aviation Industry Corporation of China, AVIC, avionics, China, Clyde V. Prestowitz, FBI, Gary Locke, GE, General Electric, Justice Department, manufacturing, Obama administration, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, spying, tech transfer, technology

Sorry, but I only gave a cheer or a cheer-and-a-half upon learning on Friday that a Chinese national was convicted in a federal court of trying to steal “trade secrets” relating to a key aviation technology from General Electric (GE).

Don’t get me wrong – it’s great that this spy was caught. But anyone knowing anything about the relationship between way too many other U.S.-owned advanced manufacturing and information technology companies and China would surely be asking why Beijing even bothered to send him into the field. Because the amount of sophisticated technology – and even clearly defense-related knowhow – that such companies have transferred to China voluntarily has clearly been more than enough to help the People’s Republic narrow the military gap with the United States substantially. (See, e.g., this piece I wrote for Bloomberg.com from 2013.) 

And even though the Justice Department says GE was working with the FBI to catch Yanjun Xu, it’s been a prime culprit. Notably, as recounted by long-time U.S. trade official and Asia watcher Clyde Prestowitz in his outstanding recent study of Sino-American relations The World Turned Upside Down, in November, 2009, the company announced the merger of its avionics division with China’s Aviationcons Industry Corporation (AVIC) and headquartering the new entity in Shanghai.

As Prestowitz explained, the deal was bad enough from a U.S. economic standpoint because standard commercial considerations had nothing to do with the resulting offshoring of high value manufacturing and employment. Instead, GE recognized that it wouldn’t be selling much in the way of avionics to China unless it made lots of them in China. In other words, it was victimized by extortion.

But the national security implications were even worse. For avionics are the electronics systems used in aircraft and missiles, and AVIC isn’t just another aerospace company, but an organization owned and controlled lock, stock, and barrel by the Chinese state, and one that has a “monopoly on military aircraft manufacturing and maintenance.” So it had to be clear from the get-go that any breakthroughs in avionics generated by GE would ultimately be available to AVIC and deployed in weapons that could well be used against American soldiers, sailors, and pilots in a future conflict between the two countries. Yet good luck trying to find any federal government opposition to the transaction. You won’t.

Indeed, when the new arrangement was formalized in 2011, the signing ceremony was attended by Gary Locke, former President Obama’s Commerce Secretary – who apparently didn’t even blink an eye when GE proudly declared that the new venture “will develop and market integrated, open architecture avionics systems to the global commercial aerospace industry for new aircraft platforms. This system will be the central information system and backbone of the airplane’s networks and electronics and will host the airplane’s avionics, maintenance and utility functions.”

And apparently Locke – and Obama – were just fine with GE’s avowed aim of developing with AVIC “a world-class engineering organization” with “the JV itself…creating new IP [intellectual property] and new technology.”

I guess they thought that the technology for developing civilian avionics and military avionics are fundamentally different, and that AVIC’s interests are purely commercial.

The technology that Yanjun Xu was seeking isn’t avionics-related. It has to do with engine parts made from composite materials – which the Justice Department says “no other company in the world has been able to duplicate.” And GE’s cooperation obviously means that the company wants to maintain ths monopoly over all actual and potential competitors, including from China.

But since it succumbed to blackmail over avionics, it’s far from a sure bet that it will keep drawing a line in the sand on composites – or anything else. Indeed, as the company boasts, its cooperation with AVIC on “technical training, manufacturing, spare parts distribution, and…maintenance and overhaul” for engines is already substantial. As a result, it’s equally unlikely that American regulators will be able to keep this knowhow in American hands.

The American journalist Michael Kinsley once famously wrote that “the scandal isn’t what’s illegal, the scandal is what’s legal.” You don’t need to look much further than GE’s deep, longstanding, and officially sanctioned ties with China’s state-run aerospace industry to see how right he was.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Brazen U.S. Corporate Collusion with China

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aerospace, Belt and Road, China, globalization, Honeywell, human rights, manufacturing, multinational companies, multinationals, national security, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, steel, tech, tech transfer, The Wall Street Journal, Uighurs, Xinjiang

Usually, it’s not a terrific idea to begin a piece of writing with a phrase like, “If you want to see something that’ll make you sick to your stomach….” But I think you’ll agree that this recent article from The Wall Street Journal justifies an exception. For its portrayal of the China operations of U.S.-owned multinational manufacturer Honeywell depicts a big company actively helping the dangerous thug dictatorship in Beijing endanger often-intertwined American security and economic interests, and evidently doing so without even a peep of protest from Washington – including during the Trump years.

Journal reporter Trefor Moss’ piece dealt with the question, “How can an American company thrive in China at a time when tensions between the two countries are running high?” His answer: Under Honeywell’s long-time head of China operations, it pursued a strategy of fully immersing “the company in Chinese business and culture—and [not shying] away from helping Chinese companies achieve strategic goals set by Beijing.”

This approach was worrisome enough when this executive, Shane Tedjarati, launched Honeywell China down this path in 2004. By that time, Beijing was not only gutting America’s domestic manufacturing base with a wide range of predatory trade and broader economic practices. But it had also compiled a record of challenging American national security interests through policies like supplying countries like Iran and North Korea with technologies vital to developing weapons of mass destruction and the missiles needed to deliver them.

Now that the People’s Republic has since at least early 2018 been seen as a threat to critical American interests in the Indo-Pacific region requiring a “whole-of-government” response, and that President Biden has declared that “We’re in competition with China and other countries to win the 21st Century. We’re at a great inflection point in history” and that “we’ll maintain a strong military presence in the Indo-Pacific…not to start a conflict, but to prevent one,” activities like Honeywell’s in China look alarmingly like colluding with an enemy.

What else can be made of Tedjarati’s position as “a visiting professor at Shanghai’s China Executive Leadership Academy, an elite school that provides leadership training to the Communist Party’s rising stars.”

Or of Honeywell’s sale of industrial automation equipment to one of the state-owned Chinese steel companies that for years been glutting global markets with dumped and artificially cheap product that’s hammered America’s own sector?

Or of its “open” support for the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese global infrastructure plan widely seen as a way for Beijing to expand its worldwide influence, and that’s got the Biden administration concerned enough to be mounting a U.S. response?

Or of these Honeywell actions (which didn’t make the Journal piece) “[T]he company repeatedly, between 2011 and 2018, sent drawings of parts of US military aircraft to suppliers in foreign countries, including China, asking for price quotes, according to a Department of State charging letter. The manufacturer voluntarily disclosed the violations.

“The engineering prints showed layouts, dimensions and geometries for manufacturing castings and finished parts for military aircraft and engines, as well as other hardware and weaponry. Drawings for parts within the Lockheed Martin F-35 and F-22 stealth fighters, Boeing B-1B supersonic bomber and Pratt & Whitney F135 turboshaft engine were included.”

For good measure, Honeywell has also supplied protective equipment to Chinese security forces operating in western Xinjiang province, where Beijing has been harshly persecuting the Muslim Uighur minority group.

Honeywell did pay a (tiny) fine for its seven years of sharing those drawings. But overall, according to Moss, Tedjarati told him that “No U.S. or Chinese officials have ever told him the company should do, or should avoid doing, specific things in China.”

Honeywell has by no means been the only U.S. multinational to enrich China and strengthen it militarily and technologically for decades. (See, e.g., here and here.) But it may have just won the award for the most brazen. And until these kinds of operations are halted completely, it’ll be hard to describe America’s China policy with the word “serious.”

Full disclosure:  I have no financial positions whatever in Honeywell, other than possibly through index funds or exchange-traded funds, and other such vehicles, and have no plans to acquire any.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Evidence that the Multinationals Really Did Sell the U.S. Out to China

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capital spending, chemicals, China, computers, electronics, health security, healthcare goods, information technology, investment, Lenin, manufacturing, multinational companies, national security, offshoring, offshoring lobby, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, pharmaceuticals, research and development, supply chains, tech, tech transfer, U.S-China Economic and Security Review Commission, USCC, World Trade Organization, WTO

RealityChek readers and anyone who’s familiar with my work over many years know that I’ve often lambasted U.S. multinational companies for powerfully aiding and abetting China’s rise to the status of economic great power status – and of surging threat to U.S. national security and prosperity. In fact, the dangers posed by China’s activities and goals have become so obvious that even the American political and policy establishments that on the whole actively supported the policies – and that permitted money from this corporate Offshoring Lobby to drive their decisions – are paying attention.

If you still doubt how these big U.S. corporations have sold China much of the rope with which it’s determined to hang their own companies and all of America (paraphrasing Lenin’s vivid supposed description of and prediction about the perilously shortsighted greed of capitalists), you should check out the latest report of the U.S-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC). As made clear by this study from an organization set up by Congress to monitor the China threat, not only have the multinationals’ investments in China figured “prominently in China’s national development ambitions.” They also “may indirectly erode the United States’ domestic industrial competitiveness and technological leadership relative to China.”

Worst of all, “as U.S. MNE (“multinational enterprise) activity in China increasingly focuses on the production of high-end technologies, the risk that U.S. firms are unwittingly enabling China to achieve its industrial policy and military development objectives rises.”

And a special bonus – these companies’ offshoring has greatly increased America’s dependence on China for supplies of crucial healthcare goods.

Here’s just a sampling of the evidence presented (and taken directly by the Commission from U.S. government reports):

> U.S. multinationals “employ more people in China than in any other country outside of the United States, primarily in the assembly of computers and electronic products.” Moreover, this employment skyrocketed by 574.6 percent from 2000 to 2017.

> “China is the fourth-largest destination for U.S. MNE research and development (R&D) expenditure and increasingly competes with advanced economies in serving as a key research hub for U.S. MNEs. The growth of U.S. MNE R&D expenditure in China is also comparatively accelerated, averaging 13.6 percent yearon-year since 2003 compared with 7.1 percent for all U.S. MNE foreign affiliates in the same period. This expenditure is highest in manufacturing, particularly in the production of computers and electronic products.”

> “U.S. MNE capital expenditure in China has focused on the creation of production sites for technology products. This development is aided by the Chinese government’s extensive policy support to develop China.”

> The multinationals’ capital spending on semiconductor manufacturing assets “has jumped 166.7 percent from $1.2 billion in 2010 (the earliest year for which complete [U.S government] data is available) to $3.2 billion in 2017, accounting for 90 percent of all U.S. MNE expenditure on computers and electronic products manufacturing assets in China.”

> “China has grown from the 20th-highest source of U.S. MNE affiliate value added in 2000 ($5.5 billion) to the fifth highest in 2017 ($71.5 billion), driven primarily by the manufacture of computers and electronic products as well as chemicals. The surge is especially notable in semiconductors and other electronic components.”

> “[P]harmaceutical manufacturing serves as the largest chemical sector in terms of value-added [a measure of manufacturing output that seeks to eliminate double-counting of output by stripping out the contribution of intermediate goods used in final products]…” And chemicals – the manufacturing category that include pharmaceuticals – has become the second largest U.S-owned industry in China measured by the value of its assets (after computers and electronic products).

Incidentally, the report’s tendency to use 2000 as a baseline year for examining trends is no accident. That’s the year before China was admitted into the World Trade Organization (WTO) – and the numbers strongly reenforce the argument that the multinationals so avidly sought this objective in order to make sure that the value of their huge planned investments in China wouldn’t be kneecapped by any unilateral U.S. tariffs on imports from China (including those from their factories). For the WTO’s combination of consensus decision-making plus the protectionist natures of most of its members’ economies created a towering obstacle to Washington acting on its own to safeguard legitimate American domestic economic interests from Chinese and other foreign predatory trade and broader economic activity.

At the same time, despite the WTO’s key role in preserving the value of the multinationals’ export-focused China investments, the USCC study underestimates how notably such investment remains geared toward exporting, including to the United States. This issue matters greatly because chances are high that this kind of investment (in China or anywhere else abroad) has replaced the multinationals’ factories and workers in the United States. By contrast, multinational investment in China (or anywhere else abroad) that’s supplying the China market almost never harms the U.S. domestic economy and in fact can help it, certainly in early stages, by providing foreign customers that add to the domestic customers of U.S.-based manufacturers.

There’s no doubt that the phenomenal growth of China’s own consumer class in recent decades has, as the China Commission report observes, generated more and more American business decisions to supply those customers from China. In other words, the days when critical masses of Chinese couldn’t possibly afford to buy the goods they made in U.S.- and other foreign-owned factories are long gone.

But the data presented by the USCC does nothing to support this claim, and the key to understanding why is the central role played by computer, electronics, and other information technology-related manufacturing in the U.S. corporate presence in China. For when the Commission (and others) report that large shares of the output of these factories are now sold to Chinese customers, they overlook the fact that many of these other customers are their fellow entities comprising links of China-centric corporate supply chains. These sales, however, don’t mean that the final customers for these products are located in China.

In other words, when a facility in China that, for example, performs final assembly activities on semiconductors sells those chips to another factory in China that sticks them into computers or cell phones or HDTV sets, the sale is regarded as one made to a Chinese customer. But that customer in turn surely sells much of its own production overseas. As the USCC documents, China’s consumer market for these goods has grown tremendously, too. But China’s continually surging share of total global production of these electronics products (also documented in the Commission report) indicates that lots of this output continues to be sold overseas.

Also overlooked by the USCC – two other disturbing apects of the multinationals’ activities in China.

First, it fails to mention that all the computer and electronics-related investment in China – which presumably includes a great deal of software-related investment – has contributed to China’s economic and military ambitions not only by transferring knowhow to Chinese partners, but by teaching huge numbers of Chinese science and technology workers how to generate their technology advances. The companies’ own (often glowing) descriptions of these training activities – which have often taken the form of dedicated training programs and academies – were revealed in this 2013 article of mine.

Second, the Commission’s report doesn’t seem to include U.S. multinationals’ growing investments not simply in high tech facilities in China that they partly or wholly own, but in Chinese-owned entities. As I’ve reported here on RealityChek, these capital flows are helping China develop and produce high tech goods with numerous critical defense-related applications, and the scale has grown so large that some elements of the U.S. national security community had been taking notice as early as 2015. And President Trump seems to be just as oblivious to these investments as globalist former President Barack Obama was.

These criticisms aside, though, the USCC has performed a major public service with this survey of the multinationals’ China activities. It should be must reading in particular for anyone who still believes that these companies – whose China operations have so greatly enriched and therefore strengthened the People’s Republic at America’s expense – deserve much influence over the U.S. China policy debate going forward.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: How a U.S.-China Huawei Tech Disaster Unfolded

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5G, antitrust, AT&T, Bell Labs, China, espionage, Huawei, Lucent, national security, networking, offshoring, privacy, semiconductors, surveillance, tech transfer, technology, telecommunications, {What's Left of) Our Economy

It’s hard to think of a worse mess that Washington has gotten the country into than the loss of global leadership in advanced telecommunications knowhow to China. With the world on the cusp of a transition into the so-called 5G standard, the United States boasts exactly zero companies capable of creating complete networks based on this technology, which will increase by orders of magnitude the speed with which individuals, organizations of all kinds, and governments can send and receive digital information, and thereby bring much closer all kinds of game-changing breakthroughs. In particular, 5G can enable the creation of truly “smart” electronic networks that will greatly boost the efficiency of public transportation and energy infrastructure, healthcare, manufacturing, and so much more. (Here’s a good primer.)

Even worse, the world’s pace-setter in terms of both quality and price is Huawei, and Chinese entity with unusually close ties with China’s dictatorial and belligerent government.  Moreover, its lead over its other two 5G competitors (Finland’s Nokia and Sweden’s Ericsson) is enormous. Huawei’s dominance matters a lot because the advent of an effectively networked world also means the advent of a world in which hacking becomes much more dangerous – and the power to hack will translate into decisive strategic and economic leverage. Just think of the possibilities of national security and economic spying alone, let alone the implications for everyone’s privacy. And because of Huawei’s 5G leadership, Beijing holds entirely too many of these cards.

All is by no means lost yet. In particular, Huawei and other Chinese technology entities still rely heavily on U.S.-based companies for state-of-the-art parts and components – especially semiconductors – along with software. But thanks to 5G’s vast potential alone, Americans can’t assume that, before too long, China won’t be able to use it to cut into their lead in these information technology manufacturing and services sectors.

So how did this dangerous U.S. failure come about? When I first briefly answered this question posed by a Twitter follower, I emphasized the U.S.’ reckless pre-Trump administration China policies. These both greatly incentivized Americans businesses to offshore production and jobs to the People’s Republic even in the advanced manufacturing sectors in the public was assured the United States would always maintain matchless superiority, and turned a blind eye to China’s practice of extorting cutting edge knowhow from these U.S.-based firms in exchange for access to China’s huge and potentially huge-er market.

But as the author of an article last year focusing on the weird – and arguably perverse – relationship between recent American trade policies like these, and recent American antitrust policies, I was especially grateful to this Financial Times article for reminding me that the latter helped create this disaster as well.

Here are the key passages explaining the lack of a US telecom equipment manufacturer capable of producing the full-range of 5G kit:

“To understand how this came about, it is necessary to go back to the mid-1990s when the US passed a Telecommunications Act that weakened US champions such as Lucent Technologies by enticing a flurry of new entrants into the market. With its profit margins under pressure at home, Lucent targeted sales in a fast-growing Chinese market to prop up a flagging share price.

“But Chinese authorities insisted that all foreign equipment makers would — as the price of admission — be obliged to hand over technology and knowhow to state research labs and business partners. One by one, the chief executives of the largest telecoms equipment companies trooped through Beijing in the early 2000s pledging to localise their technologies and production bases.”

Neither American Presidents nor Congresses displayed any serious interest in the consequences. Yet submitting to China’s blackmail failed even to save Lucent. In 2006, it found itself in desperate straits, “and was sold to a French rival, leaving North America without a heavyweight telecoms equipment player. The company that was once the technology champion behind Bell Labs is now part of Finland’s Nokia.”

My trade/antitrust article focused on the bizarre situation that had prevailed in the pre-Trump decades, during which the U.S. leaders from both major parties seemed hell-bent on maximizing the competition faced by U.S.-based businesses from foreign economies (via offshoring-friendly and similar one-way trade deals and policies) even as they seemed equally determined to reduce the domestic competition faced by U.S.-based businesses by greatly weakening antitrust enforcement.

The Financial Times article shows that exceptions periodically appeared to this indulgent antitrust policy. But more troubling, it indicates that no national security or even global economic competitiveness considerations (and of course the two are closely related) ever significantly affected antitrust policy. That’s an indictment just as serious as simple neglect or actual encouragement of ever greater levels of corporate concentration.

It’s important to point out, moreover, that this telecommunications disaster’s roots run much deeper. Specifically, the federal government began back in 1949 to pressure AT&T’s ancestor Bell Telephone, which had dominated American telecommunications from its 19th century beginnings, to divest it manufacturing and research and development activities on the one hand from its services activities. And this even though that research arm, Bell Labs, invented the world’s first semiconductor device – the transistor.

First AT&T and then Lucent made plenty of their own mistakes, too. It’s a really complicated story, though, and two good short accounts can be found here and here. Nonetheless, clearly the voices in Washington during these decades that might have been encouraging a more comprehensive strategy to preserve U.S. dominance – or even competitiveness – in this crucial technology were way too weak. And now, for the near-term future in any event, the nation is dependent for this knowhow on a distant regime whose benign intentions can by no means be assumed.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Evidence of the Crucial U.S. Role in China’s Tech Rise

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Broadcom, China, Daniel Strumpf, Huawei, Intel, Qualcomm, Silicon Valley, tech, tech transfer, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you need any further evidence that American technology firms have played vital roles in China’s transformation into a major technology power capable of threatening U.S. national security as well as economic interests, check out Dan Strumpf’s article in The Wall Street Journal today. In the process, he inevitably exposes gaping holes in President Trump’s China strategy that need to be closed up pronto if the President is serious about checking China’s dangerous rise.

Here are just some of the highlights of Strumpf’s piece – which is limited to U.S. tech firms’ contributions to the emergence of Huawei, whose CFO (and founder’s daughter) was arrested in Canada a week ago on charges of helping the entity use fraud to evade U.S. sanctions on Iran. (As always, I refuse to use words like “company” or “business” in describing Chinese economic actors, since they have nothing in common with corporate organizations in free market economies.)

>”Silicon Valley giants from Intel Corp. to Broadcom Inc. and Qualcomm Inc. are top suppliers of Huawei, which buys their components to make equipment such as base stations and routers and Huawei mobile phones.”

>”Qualcomm and Intel are also working with Huawei on its development of next-generation 5G technologies, a field in which the Chinese company’s aim to be a global leader has alarmed some in Washington.”

>”Huawei still relies on imports from U.S. chip companies such as Broadcom, Xilinx Inc. and Analog Devices Inc. for components used in its telecom equipment…Huawei buys equipment from data-storage equipment maker Seagate Technology PLC for use in its enterprise business, and uses memory chips made by Micron Technology Inc. in its smartphones….”

>”Intel and Qualcomm, which draw huge revenue from China, are seen by Huawei as more than suppliers. In Huawei’s annual report, Intel is described as a ‘strategic partner,’ and the companies work together in a range of areas, including next-generation 5G technology.”

>”In 2015, Qualcomm, Huawei and China’s largest chip maker, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp., launched a joint venture in Shanghai to work on next-generation chip technology.”

And lest you think it’s just Huawei, click here and here for numerous examples of similar assistance rendered by such American corporations to other Chinese entities and industries.

Strumpf’s article also makes clear the flip side of these American companies’ operations: Chinese entities like Huawei have become major customers and sources of revenue for the U.S. tech sector.

Nonetheless, it’s inconceivable that any Trump administration policy to address the China tech threat can succeed if these sales and partnerships are allowed to continue. Silicon Valley will of course cite these earnings in its inevitable campaign to any attempted curbs on its China activities (while simultaneously urging Washington to “do something” about the Chinese intellectual property theft- and extortion-fueled tech ambitions that has these companies scared silly for their own selfish reasons). And that’s why the President urgently needs to get on TV from the Oval Office, explain comprehensively how the tech firms’ massive giveaway of critical knowhow has undermined their country’s future, how his globalist predecessors’ indulgence has enabled this risky business, why the course change he’s engineering in China policy is so essential, and what his end-game is.

Trade wars may not be easy to win, contrary to the President’s recent boast. But can anyone reasonably doubt that this message will be easy to sell?

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Pundit’s China Policy Delusions

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2016 election, artificial intelligence, big government, China, Holman Jenkins, incomes, Jobs, Jr., national security, offshoring, tech transfer, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, Trump, Welfare State, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Holman Jenkins, Jr. did make one important and useful point in his Wall Street Journal column yesterday on U.S.-China trade policy (which puts him far ahead of most of the punditocracy): He’s absolutely right to call on President Trump to “lay out for the American people just how thoroughly [he] intends to shake up the hugely important U.S.-China economic relationship.”

For weeks, I’ve offered Mr. Trump exactly the same advice – to explain his China end game comprehensively to the American people in a prime-time Oval Office address (though unlike the free trade-obsessed Jenkins, I believe such a speech would boost public support for the Trump China agenda by describing the compelling long-term stakes of what I view as an effort to disengage economically from the PRC – and why they’re more than worth short-term sacrifices).

As for the rest of his column? It’s useful only for reminding Americans how internally contradictory and dangerous (not to mention downright ditzy) the case remains for retaining most of the pre-Trump China policy status quo. Just a few key examples:

>Jenkins insists that rather than pursue a “shakeup” that would amount to “following [Chinese leader] Xi Jinping down the path of seeking foreign scapegoats for failure and heavy-handed intervention at home,” the United States should be “building up our military and alliances.”

But what would be the point of sending more troops and equipment to East Asia while Washington returned to trade policies that have transferred literally trillions of dollars to the Chinese state and helped fuel a rapid military buildup, and investment policies that have ignored the massive export of advanced defense-related knowhow to Chinese entities, and for too long overlooked Chinese acquisitions of similar assets in the American economy?

>According to Jenkins, “China’s avid pursuit of artificial intelligence” shouldn’t worry Western experts because it’s “likely to be employed mainly in destroying the creativity and initiative of its own people.” But capabilities even remotely that massive won’t threaten any major U.S. strategic interests?

>In Jenkins’ view, central to strengthening the U.S. economy sufficiently to meet the Chinese threats he doesn’t laugh off is “dealing with the fiscal challenge of our welfare state.” But good luck with the politics of shrinking social safety nets under an American approach to globalization that kept sending valuable opportunities to earn middle- and even living-wage working- class incomes to China and other penny-wage and regulation-free production and export platforms.

Jenkins isn’t entirely wrong in his overall conclusion that “American prosperity is still made at home.” But the impact of purely domestic reforms is bound to be seriously diluted after decades of Jenkins and his crowd at the Journal (along with most of the rest of the nation’s punditocracy, the pre-Trump Republican party, and the Clinton-ite Democrats) focusing like laser beams on building a truly globalized economy.

And finally – about that headline calling for a “vote on a China Cold War”  (even though the article’s body only glancingly mentions the point): During his successful White House run, President Trump made no secret of his determination to overhaul America’s China trade policy. From the standpoint of democratic legitimacy, the Trump 2016 election victory was all the mandate his administration’s China policy measures need.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A New China Bill – & Trade Policy Realist? – Worth Watching

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China, currency manipulation, economic nationalism, Fair Trade with China Enforcement Act, foreign direct investment, Gang of Eight, Immigration, Made in China 2025, Marco Rubio, national security, Populism, Republicans, subsidies, tech transfer, Trade, trade law, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

One of the biggest questions surrounding the future of the Republican Party, and in turn of American politics, is how many leading GOP politicians learn the main lessons of the Trump victory in 2016. In my view, these include the political appeal and real-world imperative of a nationalist approach to American economic policy, especially in the realms of international trade and immigration.

President Trump’s capture of even most of his party’s establishment on the latter could not be clearer. But signs of populism’s growing appeal are also emerging in the former, and one of the biggest has just come courtesy of Marco Rubio. In fact, legislation recently introduced by the Florida Republican and Trump rival for the 2016 GOP presidential nomination strongly indicates that, when it comes to the crucial issue of China, Rubio is out-Trumping Mr. Trump.

Rubio’s journey has been a far as it has been high-speed. His voting record on trade policy overall has been awful – at least from an economic nationalist/populist standpoint. In fact, according to the libertarian Cato Institute, the only blemishes on his record so far have come from his support for federal subsidies for sugar – a crop grown in his home state. As a result, in the fall of 2015, I dismissed him as a typical Republican pseudo-hawk on China.

That is, he talked tough about the need to confront China’s expansionism in the East Asia/Pacific region. But he seemed oblivious to how decades of American trade policy had showered the People’s Republic with literally trillions of dollars worth of hard currency, along with cutting-edge technology voluntarily transferred by, and extorted with impunity from, American companies. In other words, he did and said nothing about U.S. decisions that unmistakably had helped China become a formidable military as well as economic power.

Fast forward to this year, and what a change – at least on China. In addition to criticizing President Trump for backing away from his own Commerce Department’s initial decision to all-but shut down the Chinese telecoms firm ZTE for (repeat) sanctions busting, he’s just introduced legislation that represents the most comprehensive effort I’ve yet seen to deal holistically with the intertwined Chinese threats to America’s economy and national security.

Rubio’s “Fair Trade with China Enforcement Act” contains numerous important measures to staunch the flow of money and defense-related tech to China. (Here’s a summary from his office.) Provisions that represent major and needed advancements in America’s strategy are:

> a prohibition on the the voluntary corporate transfer of technology to a wide range of explicitly named technologies subsidized by the Chinese government, including in the Made in China 2025 program aiming to achieve Chinese predominance in numerous economically and militarily critical technologies. That is, Rubio recognizes that tech extortion (conditioning access to the Chinese market on a company’s willingness to share knowhow with Chinese partners) isn’t the only way that Beijing has been closing the tech gap with the United States. American companies seeking to curry favor with China on their own, or simply recognizing the importance of locating R&D and related activities in close proximity to their manufacturing, have also fueled China’s power.

> a requirement that U.S. trade law recognize that any Chinese product headed for the American market that’s from an industry mentioned in any Chinese document even related to the Made in China 2025 plan is ipso facto receiving subsidies the kinds of subsidies that these statutes consider illegal; and that this same body of trade law just as automatically assume that such goods are actually injuring or threatening to injure U.S.-based competitors when they enter the American market. Translation into plain English: Rubio’s bill would dramatically lower the bar for imposing tariffs on imports from China deemed to be unfairly traded. Which would be one heckuva lot of imports from China.

> a ban on investors from China owning more than fifty percent of any American company producing goods targeted by Made in China 2025 – which would restrict another major channel of tech transfer to China;

> and a new tax on Chinese investments in the United States – including levies on Chinese purchases of American Treasury debt. The latter measure, in particular, would discourage China from buying excessive levels of U.S. government debt, which keeps China’s yuan weak versus the American dollar and therefore helps to put U.S.-made goods at price disadvantages versus their Chinese made counterparts wherever they compete.

Incidentally, a proposal along these lines was first made, to my knowledge, by Raymond, Howard, and Jesse Richman in their 2008 book Trading Away our Future. So they deserve a big shout-out.

Rubio’s bill isn’t perfect. For example, it should be clear by now that any Chinese entity permitted to bid for American assets is tightly controlled by the Chinese government. Therefore, I would favor banning all such takeovers. Even if existing acquisitions were permitted, Washington would at least be freezing the Chinese state’s economic footprint in the United States, and thereby preventing ever more American businesses from having to compete with rivals whose operations have nothing to do with the free market values the nation rightly values.

In addition, Rubio’s bill says nothing about American tech companies’ growing predilection for investing in Chinese tech “start-ups” and similar entities. Some of these investments are surely extorted, but others seem to be voluntary. But since all of them can help strengthen China’s tech capabilities, they should be banned as well if the recipients have any connection with Made in China 2025.

Finally, Rubio still seems pretty comfortable with the rest of America’s longstanding trade liberalization policies except for the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on Florida produce growers. 

At the same time, China policy inevitably shapes so much of trade policy that Rubio’s single-minded focus to date can’t reasonably be criticized. Further, he seems to understand that it’s not enough simply to introduce a bill. Rubio’s been taking it the next step by lobbying for it, and for related China policy changes, actively in the media – both broadcast and print. He still needs to show a willingness to buttonhole his colleagues actively – the most important form of Capitol Hill lobbying. But (paradoxically) his leadership on 2013’s decidedly non-nationalist or populist Gang of Eight immigration bill at least indicates he recognizes the importance of this test. 

I’ve often wondered whether American politics can produce a leader with both the populist leanings of an outsider and the insider-type institutional expertise and contacts needed to turn these impulses into actual change. Rubio’s China bill and the policy migration it represents looks like major grounds for optimism.