(What’s Left of) Our Economy: More Evidence of the Crucial U.S. Role in China’s Tech Rise

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Broadcom, China, Daniel Strumpf, Huawei, Intel, Qualcomm, Silicon Valley, tech, tech transfer, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

If you need any further evidence that American technology firms have played vital roles in China’s transformation into a major technology power capable of threatening U.S. national security as well as economic interests, check out Dan Strumpf’s article in The Wall Street Journal today. In the process, he inevitably exposes gaping holes in President Trump’s China strategy that need to be closed up pronto if the President is serious about checking China’s dangerous rise.

Here are just some of the highlights of Strumpf’s piece – which is limited to U.S. tech firms’ contributions to the emergence of Huawei, whose CFO (and founder’s daughter) was arrested in Canada a week ago on charges of helping the entity use fraud to evade U.S. sanctions on Iran. (As always, I refuse to use words like “company” or “business” in describing Chinese economic actors, since they have nothing in common with corporate organizations in free market economies.)

>”Silicon Valley giants from Intel Corp. to Broadcom Inc. and Qualcomm Inc. are top suppliers of Huawei, which buys their components to make equipment such as base stations and routers and Huawei mobile phones.”

>”Qualcomm and Intel are also working with Huawei on its development of next-generation 5G technologies, a field in which the Chinese company’s aim to be a global leader has alarmed some in Washington.”

>”Huawei still relies on imports from U.S. chip companies such as Broadcom, Xilinx Inc. and Analog Devices Inc. for components used in its telecom equipment…Huawei buys equipment from data-storage equipment maker Seagate Technology PLC for use in its enterprise business, and uses memory chips made by Micron Technology Inc. in its smartphones….”

>”Intel and Qualcomm, which draw huge revenue from China, are seen by Huawei as more than suppliers. In Huawei’s annual report, Intel is described as a ‘strategic partner,’ and the companies work together in a range of areas, including next-generation 5G technology.”

>”In 2015, Qualcomm, Huawei and China’s largest chip maker, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp., launched a joint venture in Shanghai to work on next-generation chip technology.”

And lest you think it’s just Huawei, click here and here for numerous examples of similar assistance rendered by such American corporations to other Chinese entities and industries.

Strumpf’s article also makes clear the flip side of these American companies’ operations: Chinese entities like Huawei have become major customers and sources of revenue for the U.S. tech sector.

Nonetheless, it’s inconceivable that any Trump administration policy to address the China tech threat can succeed if these sales and partnerships are allowed to continue. Silicon Valley will of course cite these earnings in its inevitable campaign to any attempted curbs on its China activities (while simultaneously urging Washington to “do something” about the Chinese intellectual property theft- and extortion-fueled tech ambitions that has these companies scared silly for their own selfish reasons). And that’s why the President urgently needs to get on TV from the Oval Office, explain comprehensively how the tech firms’ massive giveaway of critical knowhow has undermined their country’s future, how his globalist predecessors’ indulgence has enabled this risky business, why the course change he’s engineering in China policy is so essential, and what his end-game is.

Trade wars may not be easy to win, contrary to the President’s recent boast. But can anyone reasonably doubt that this message will be easy to sell?

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(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A Pundit’s China Policy Delusions

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2016 election, artificial intelligence, big government, China, Holman Jenkins, incomes, Jobs, Jr., national security, offshoring, tech transfer, The Wall Street Journal, Trade, Trump, Welfare State, {What's Left of) Our Economy

Holman Jenkins, Jr. did make one important and useful point in his Wall Street Journal column yesterday on U.S.-China trade policy (which puts him far ahead of most of the punditocracy): He’s absolutely right to call on President Trump to “lay out for the American people just how thoroughly [he] intends to shake up the hugely important U.S.-China economic relationship.”

For weeks, I’ve offered Mr. Trump exactly the same advice – to explain his China end game comprehensively to the American people in a prime-time Oval Office address (though unlike the free trade-obsessed Jenkins, I believe such a speech would boost public support for the Trump China agenda by describing the compelling long-term stakes of what I view as an effort to disengage economically from the PRC – and why they’re more than worth short-term sacrifices).

As for the rest of his column? It’s useful only for reminding Americans how internally contradictory and dangerous (not to mention downright ditzy) the case remains for retaining most of the pre-Trump China policy status quo. Just a few key examples:

>Jenkins insists that rather than pursue a “shakeup” that would amount to “following [Chinese leader] Xi Jinping down the path of seeking foreign scapegoats for failure and heavy-handed intervention at home,” the United States should be “building up our military and alliances.”

But what would be the point of sending more troops and equipment to East Asia while Washington returned to trade policies that have transferred literally trillions of dollars to the Chinese state and helped fuel a rapid military buildup, and investment policies that have ignored the massive export of advanced defense-related knowhow to Chinese entities, and for too long overlooked Chinese acquisitions of similar assets in the American economy?

>According to Jenkins, “China’s avid pursuit of artificial intelligence” shouldn’t worry Western experts because it’s “likely to be employed mainly in destroying the creativity and initiative of its own people.” But capabilities even remotely that massive won’t threaten any major U.S. strategic interests?

>In Jenkins’ view, central to strengthening the U.S. economy sufficiently to meet the Chinese threats he doesn’t laugh off is “dealing with the fiscal challenge of our welfare state.” But good luck with the politics of shrinking social safety nets under an American approach to globalization that kept sending valuable opportunities to earn middle- and even living-wage working- class incomes to China and other penny-wage and regulation-free production and export platforms.

Jenkins isn’t entirely wrong in his overall conclusion that “American prosperity is still made at home.” But the impact of purely domestic reforms is bound to be seriously diluted after decades of Jenkins and his crowd at the Journal (along with most of the rest of the nation’s punditocracy, the pre-Trump Republican party, and the Clinton-ite Democrats) focusing like laser beams on building a truly globalized economy.

And finally – about that headline calling for a “vote on a China Cold War”  (even though the article’s body only glancingly mentions the point): During his successful White House run, President Trump made no secret of his determination to overhaul America’s China trade policy. From the standpoint of democratic legitimacy, the Trump 2016 election victory was all the mandate his administration’s China policy measures need.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: A New China Bill – & Trade Policy Realist? – Worth Watching

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China, currency manipulation, economic nationalism, Fair Trade with China Enforcement Act, foreign direct investment, Gang of Eight, Immigration, Made in China 2025, Marco Rubio, national security, Populism, Republicans, subsidies, tech transfer, Trade, trade law, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

One of the biggest questions surrounding the future of the Republican Party, and in turn of American politics, is how many leading GOP politicians learn the main lessons of the Trump victory in 2016. In my view, these include the political appeal and real-world imperative of a nationalist approach to American economic policy, especially in the realms of international trade and immigration.

President Trump’s capture of even most of his party’s establishment on the latter could not be clearer. But signs of populism’s growing appeal are also emerging in the former, and one of the biggest has just come courtesy of Marco Rubio. In fact, legislation recently introduced by the Florida Republican and Trump rival for the 2016 GOP presidential nomination strongly indicates that, when it comes to the crucial issue of China, Rubio is out-Trumping Mr. Trump.

Rubio’s journey has been a far as it has been high-speed. His voting record on trade policy overall has been awful – at least from an economic nationalist/populist standpoint. In fact, according to the libertarian Cato Institute, the only blemishes on his record so far have come from his support for federal subsidies for sugar – a crop grown in his home state. As a result, in the fall of 2015, I dismissed him as a typical Republican pseudo-hawk on China.

That is, he talked tough about the need to confront China’s expansionism in the East Asia/Pacific region. But he seemed oblivious to how decades of American trade policy had showered the People’s Republic with literally trillions of dollars worth of hard currency, along with cutting-edge technology voluntarily transferred by, and extorted with impunity from, American companies. In other words, he did and said nothing about U.S. decisions that unmistakably had helped China become a formidable military as well as economic power.

Fast forward to this year, and what a change – at least on China. In addition to criticizing President Trump for backing away from his own Commerce Department’s initial decision to all-but shut down the Chinese telecoms firm ZTE for (repeat) sanctions busting, he’s just introduced legislation that represents the most comprehensive effort I’ve yet seen to deal holistically with the intertwined Chinese threats to America’s economy and national security.

Rubio’s “Fair Trade with China Enforcement Act” contains numerous important measures to staunch the flow of money and defense-related tech to China. (Here’s a summary from his office.) Provisions that represent major and needed advancements in America’s strategy are:

> a prohibition on the the voluntary corporate transfer of technology to a wide range of explicitly named technologies subsidized by the Chinese government, including in the Made in China 2025 program aiming to achieve Chinese predominance in numerous economically and militarily critical technologies. That is, Rubio recognizes that tech extortion (conditioning access to the Chinese market on a company’s willingness to share knowhow with Chinese partners) isn’t the only way that Beijing has been closing the tech gap with the United States. American companies seeking to curry favor with China on their own, or simply recognizing the importance of locating R&D and related activities in close proximity to their manufacturing, have also fueled China’s power.

> a requirement that U.S. trade law recognize that any Chinese product headed for the American market that’s from an industry mentioned in any Chinese document even related to the Made in China 2025 plan is ipso facto receiving subsidies the kinds of subsidies that these statutes consider illegal; and that this same body of trade law just as automatically assume that such goods are actually injuring or threatening to injure U.S.-based competitors when they enter the American market. Translation into plain English: Rubio’s bill would dramatically lower the bar for imposing tariffs on imports from China deemed to be unfairly traded. Which would be one heckuva lot of imports from China.

> a ban on investors from China owning more than fifty percent of any American company producing goods targeted by Made in China 2025 – which would restrict another major channel of tech transfer to China;

> and a new tax on Chinese investments in the United States – including levies on Chinese purchases of American Treasury debt. The latter measure, in particular, would discourage China from buying excessive levels of U.S. government debt, which keeps China’s yuan weak versus the American dollar and therefore helps to put U.S.-made goods at price disadvantages versus their Chinese made counterparts wherever they compete.

Incidentally, a proposal along these lines was first made, to my knowledge, by Raymond, Howard, and Jesse Richman in their 2008 book Trading Away our Future. So they deserve a big shout-out.

Rubio’s bill isn’t perfect. For example, it should be clear by now that any Chinese entity permitted to bid for American assets is tightly controlled by the Chinese government. Therefore, I would favor banning all such takeovers. Even if existing acquisitions were permitted, Washington would at least be freezing the Chinese state’s economic footprint in the United States, and thereby preventing ever more American businesses from having to compete with rivals whose operations have nothing to do with the free market values the nation rightly values.

In addition, Rubio’s bill says nothing about American tech companies’ growing predilection for investing in Chinese tech “start-ups” and similar entities. Some of these investments are surely extorted, but others seem to be voluntary. But since all of them can help strengthen China’s tech capabilities, they should be banned as well if the recipients have any connection with Made in China 2025.

Finally, Rubio still seems pretty comfortable with the rest of America’s longstanding trade liberalization policies except for the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on Florida produce growers. 

At the same time, China policy inevitably shapes so much of trade policy that Rubio’s single-minded focus to date can’t reasonably be criticized. Further, he seems to understand that it’s not enough simply to introduce a bill. Rubio’s been taking it the next step by lobbying for it, and for related China policy changes, actively in the media – both broadcast and print. He still needs to show a willingness to buttonhole his colleagues actively – the most important form of Capitol Hill lobbying. But (paradoxically) his leadership on 2013’s decidedly non-nationalist or populist Gang of Eight immigration bill at least indicates he recognizes the importance of this test. 

I’ve often wondered whether American politics can produce a leader with both the populist leanings of an outsider and the insider-type institutional expertise and contacts needed to turn these impulses into actual change. Rubio’s China bill and the policy migration it represents looks like major grounds for optimism.       

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Trump’s China Trade Deal May be Even Worse Than it Looks

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China, Financial Times, intellectual property, intellectual property theft, Lucy Hornby, Made in China 2025, manufacturing, national security, subsidies, tech transfer, Trade, trade deficit, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

So much is so obviously wrong so far with the trade agreement just reached by the Trump administration and China that even Mainstream Media reporters have correctly identified many major flaws. As the joint statement released by the U.S. and Chinese governments made embarrassingly clear, Beijing has not made a single commitment that’s comprised of any specifics, that creates any time-frames for compliance, or that entails any penalties for non-compliance (although the United States considers the tariffs threatened to punish China for intellectual property theft to have only been “suspended”).

Despite the importance placed by almost everyone involved in America’s China policy inside or outside the government on doing something about that intellectual property theft, and about the Made in China 2025 program aimed at creating Chinese global dominance in numerous high tech industries crucial to prosperity and national security, Beijing pledged exactly nothing concrete on the former, and the only possible reference to the latter was a pledge by both countries “to strive to create a fair, level playing field for competition.”

And the sectoral priorities were discouraging from a U.S. standpoint – at least if you believe (as you should) that manufacturing actually or potentially creates outsized economic (not to mention national security) benefits for the nation in terms of productivity growth, jobs and output multipliers, and capital and technological intensiveness. For whereas “Both sides agreed on meaningful increases in United States agriculture and energy exports,” they simply “discussed expanding trade in manufactured goods and services.”

Possibly worse still: For all the references to “[working] out the details” and “[continuing] to engage at high levels on these issues,” the economic engagement between the two countries is not even being called a “negotiation.” Instead, it’s been termed a “consultation.”

But perhaps most troubling of all about the Trump approach is that even if the President’s core aims remained intact, and tariffs were imposed in order to halt China’s intellectual property theft, combat the Made in China 2025 program, and slash the trade imbalance, it’s unclear at best how effective they would be.

Leave aside the question of whether President Trump could convince affected chunks of the American economy ranging from agriculture to high tech to support any tariffs, and accept any short-term costs and disruptions in order to achieve China trade-related goals that all these industries consider crucially important. In the case of intellectual property and China 2025, how would Beijing’s concessions, or even outright capitulation, be measured? And what difference would actually be made?

For instance, would the tech companies whose knowhow is being stolen or extorted (via threats to cut off their access to the Chinese market if they don’t cooperate) really start pointing publicly to ongoing Chinese transgressions, after decades of lying low and hoping against all reason that the problem would simply go away or at least not worsen?

Even if they did grow spines and/or believe that the Trump or successor administrations would back them up by imposing prompt and severe punishments, would these companies suddenly become more careful about the technology that they transfer voluntarily? That sounds far-fetched because it would involve these firms backing away substantially from their longstanding strategy of supplying the world with their increasingly sophisticated products and services from China – and sacrificing the immense sunk costs they have already incurred in developing the Chinese supply chains needed to accomplish this goal.

Acquiring cutting edge intellectual property by hook or by crook is also central to the Made in China 2025 program. However unlikely in practice, smart and tough enough U.S. policies can in principle overcome the above obstacles to halting tech theft and extortion. But what about another aspect of this Chinese program – massive government subsidies for the industries involved? Is it the slightest bit realistic to believe that Washington will even be able to track these funds as they make their way from China’s secretive bureaucracies to its equally opaque production entities (which don’t really deserve to be called “companies” or “businesses” because they’re all to varying degrees arms of the state)? How on earth would that work? And when has the United States succeeded in halting subsidization in other Asian countries where the government’s role is equally pervasive?

Moreover, as the Financial Times‘ Lucy Hornby has just pointed out, ending yet another objectionable feature of the Made in China 2025 program – strong preferences for Chinese participants and various forms of harassment and discrimination for their foreign-owned rivals – would kneecap two other major and related Trump administration China goals: reducing the bilateral trade deficit and curbing the offshoring of American production and jobs to the PRC.

For if China becomes an easier place to do business, U.S.- and other foreign-owned multinationals would become that much more likely to use China as their global production bases.

President Trump correctly understood that a critical mass of U.S. voters were fed up with his predecessors’ Offshoring Lobby-dominated China policies and hankering for a strategy that put domestic production and employment first. He was also right in insisting that such a course change would strengthen the nation’s long run economy and its national security. But the latest trade agreement he’s reached with China, however tentative, makes painfully clear either that the President and his main advisers don’t yet know how to achieve these vital goals, or that he hasn’t yet been able to choose between competing approaches with which he’s been presented.

(What’s Left of) Our Economy: Why Trump was Still Right to Nix Obama’s TPP Trade Deal

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Asia, Barack Obama, bilateral trade agreements, China, export-led growth, mercantilism, multilateral trade agreements, non-tariff barriers, rules of origin, subsidies, tariffs, tech transfer, TPP, trade surpluses, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Trump, {What's Left of) Our Economy

At first I was irritated with President Trump for his expressions of interest this year in reviving U.S. efforts to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – the Pacific Rim-wide trade agreement that former President Barack Obama couldn’t persuade Congress to ratify, and that Mr. Trump removed from America’s policy agenda during his first week in office.

I still wish the President had kept the TPP consigned to the proverbial ash heap of history. But I do see one silver lining in his apparent about-face: the new opportunity it creates to remind how awful the Obama TPP was, and in particular how cynical the case that it represented a masterful ploy to contain the rise of Chinese power regionally and globally, and even shape it to serve America’s goals of sustaining an open world trading system.

In fact, it’s entirely possible that Mr. Trump’s apparent new openness to TPP results at least partly from widespread claims from mainstream politicians and analysts that its multilateral nature endowed the deal with much more potential to curb China’s trade predation than the unilateral tariffs he’s announced.

Yet this contention is the one that’s most easily refuted. First, the version of the treaty signed by Obama contained a wide open back door for many Chinese exports by allowing goods that contained high levels of content produced outside the TPP zone to be traded freely within the zone. Given how central China is to Asia-wide production chains, these loose rules of origin were bound to enable China to enjoy crucial benefits created by the TPP without incurring any of the obligations.

Second, until the eve of its departure from office, neither the Obama administration nor any TPP supporters in Congress or the mainstream media or the think tank world lifted anything more than the occasional pinky even to protest perhaps the principal source of China’s rising economic and military power – the massive transfer of cutting edge knowhow, along with capital, from U.S. tech companies to Chinese business partners or other institutions, either voluntarily (including through shortsighted training programs and investments in Chinese entities) or involuntarily (due to Beijing’s widespread practice of linking access to the China market to the handover of critical technology).

The sudden transformation of these corporate panda-huggers and their hired American guns into China skeptics and even hawks has demonstrated nothing more than that national security is the last refuge of a trade policy scoundrel – especially since by all accounts, U.S. technology and investment continue pouring into China – including defense-related tech. (See here and here for some evidence.)

Third, there’s no reason to believe that most of the other key TPP members have any interest in turning China into a free-trading economy. Quite the contrary. Whether it’s Japan or Singapore or Vietnam or Malaysia, most of the treaty’s most important countries have followed China-style economic development models (except when they’ve borrowed from Japan’s somewhat different but of course much earlier blueprint). And economic openness emphatically isn’t in the recipe. What’s central to these strategies is amassing trade surpluses with the United States and the rest of the world to help generate adequate levels of growth and employment.

The bottom line: Most TPP countries knew that effective disciplines on the trade predation largely responsible for China’s surpluses could be used against their own subsidies and non-tariff barriers. Conversely, it’s surely the reason that these economies accepted the paper curbs on mercantilism that are mandated by TPP. They’re rightly confident that thanks to the secretive bureaucracies that keep their economies effectively closed – and their barriers difficult for outsiders even to identify, much less litigate – none of these curbs is remotely enforceable.

Even better for TPP’s mercantile majority, the treaty’s dispute-resolution system ensured that the United States would be repeatedly outvoted when it sought to advance or defend its interests.

That’s why the TPP was so likely to supercharge America’s already enormous and economically damaging trade deficits. The TPP mercantilists’ liberalization promises would do nothing substantial to open their markets and increase U.S. export opportunities. But America’s TPP commitments, carried out by a government characterized by transparency, would be very effective guarantees that the American market would remain wide open to the TPP majority’s products.

President Trump has demonstrated that he recognizes many of these fatal flaws in the Obama TPP. His stated preference for bilateral over multilateral trade deals suggests an understanding that the former give the United States much more legal authority in dispute resolution. Moreover, he has explicitly tweeted that he’d only back rejoining the TPP if major fixes were made.

Precisely because he’s the only American President in recent memory to show any interest in changing the nation’s ill-considered trade status quo, and any awareness that the United States retains ample leverage to achieve its trade objectives unilaterally, I can’t rule out the possibility that Mr. Trump might turn TPP into a winner for the U.S. domestic economy (as opposed to the importing and offshoring lobbies).

But the main lesson that should be taken from decades of American trade diplomacy with Asia is that economies structured to promote exports and limit imports are going to stay substantially closed no matter what promises they make. Therefore the best course for the United States to make is to expend its energy and resources on reducing its economic engagement with Asia, rather than trying to remake the region in anything like its own image.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Now the Establishment Media is Praising the Perps on China Policy

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artificial intelligence, Barack Obama, China, Eric Schmidt, Evan Osnos, Financial Times, Google, Jake Sullivan, John Reed, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, tech transfer, The New Yorker, Tom Mitchell, Trump

As RealityChek‘s slogan surely makes painfully clear, the interlocking worlds of politics and policy and media are so shot through with outright hogwash that producing it now looks like standard operating procedure. But every now and then, I come across items that, even by the debased standards of our time (which, contrary to establishment conventional wisdom, loooong predated the Trump era) belong in a class by themselves. And in the last week alone, that category has grown by two statements.

The first came in a January 3 Financial Times report on China’s growing power and influence in Asia and around the world. Authors Tom Mitchell and John Reed seemed bent on making the case that President Trump’s policies and statements had created or threatened to create vacuums around the world that Beijing is (brilliantly) moving to fill – an allegation that’s fact free but now so commonplace that it’s no longer newsworthy or comment-worthy.

Here’s what is – and jaw-droppingly so: letting a former senior Obama administration foreign policy adviser get away with making a statement like this: “There is a sense in Asia that Trump’s election may portend a dramatic power shift.”

The aide, Jake Sullivan, was not only a foreign policy adviser to Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign and to Obama’s Vice President Joe Biden. He was the head of the State Department’s policy planning staff under Obama. So surely he had something of a hand in making U.S. policy toward China during the Obama years.

And what were the hallmarks of this policy? Doing nothing of consequence to halt the predatory Chinese trade policies that helped Beijing stockpile literally trillions in hard currency that have come in awfully handy for financing a major military buildup and government-sponsored research into advanced defense-related technologies. Doing nothing of consequence to stop China from stealing this knowhow from American companies, or to stop U.S. tech firms from handing it over voluntarily, in exchange for favorable treatment by Beijing. Doing nothing of consequence to stop China’s expansionism in the South China Sea. And doing nothing of consequence to halt or even slow North Korea’s drive to develop state-of-the-art nuclear weapons – including nuclear-capable missiles capable of striking American territory, and thereby of undermining Washington’s commitments to the defense of major allies like South Korea and even Japan.

And Sullivan has the nerve to insinuate that say that Trump’s election is responsible for tilting power balances in China’s favor? That’s like Neville Chamberlain blaming Winston Churchill for giving Nazi Germany the confidence to invade Poland.

The second example concerns the aforementioned U.S. corporate tech transfer to China, and comes from a ballyhooed January 8 New Yorker piece devoted to the same mission (#amazing!) as the Financial Times piece – blaming Mr. Trump for giving away the global store to China.

Catching my attention in particular was author Evan Osnos’ decision to quote the former chairman of Google follow-on company Eric Schmidt’s warning that (in Osnos’ words) “reductions in the funding of basic-science research will help China overtake the U.S. in artificial intelligence (AI) within a decade.” Osnos also let Schmidt speak for himself: By 2030, they will dominate the industries of A.I.”

I have no problem with Schmidt’s opposition to the funding cuts. In fact, I strongly agree. I also take especially seriously his prediction about China’s rapid tech progress. Why? Because under Schmidt, Google was a prime China tech enabler. As I wrote in a Bloomberg View column in 2012, Google products have helped China perfect its (highly effective) internet censorship programs, and its “China University Relations” program had by then established relationships with no less than 15 Chinese institutions. In addition, in 2005, it set up its own research and development center in Beijing.

In other words, Google (and most of the rest of Silicon Valley) has been actively helping China develop the tech capabilities about which its former head is now ostensibly worried.

But it gets much better: Somehow, Schmidt forgot to tell Osnos – and somehow the latter’s own wide-ranging reporting in China missed the fact that – Google has just decided to set up another research facility in China. And its focus? Artificial intelligence. According to its director,

“Besides publishing its own work, the Google AI China Center will also support the AI research community by funding and sponsoring AI conferences and workshops, and working closely with the vibrant Chinese AI research community.”

You’ve heard of “blame the victim?” These two articles could reveal a growing media tendency to “praise the perp.” And evidently if the result is to exalt the establishment, and discredit its critics (especially Trump-ian), so much the better.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Why Establishment Thinking About Containing China Remains Far from Serious

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allies, American Enterprise Institute, Asia, burden sharing, China, Daniel Blumenthal, defense budget, East Asia, entitlements, foreign policy establishment, free-riding, Japan, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, RealClearPolitics.com, South Korea, taxes, tech transfer, Trade

Congratulations to the American Enterprise Institute’s Daniel Blumenthal for coming up with some genuinely new insights into the U.S.-China balance of power and especially its relationship with the evolving economies of the two countries. Unfortunately, Blumenthal’s new essay for RealClearPolitics.com also shows that gaping blind spots remain in establishment thinking about the China challenge its members claim to be analyzing seriously.

For the purposes of this post, let’s grant Blumenthal’s mainstream assumption that it matters greatly to the United States which great power dominates East Asia politically. I disagree, but the point here is that if America does want to fend off a China challenge, greater policy changes will be needed than Blumenthal and other conventional wisdom-mongers seem ready to contemplate.

The author’s main theme is that the United States has no legitimate reason to doubt its economic capacity to prevent China from becoming Asia’s kingpin, and his new wrinkle involves measuring economic power by looking more at national wealth, and less at national economic growth. Since the U.S. wealth levels are both much greater than China’s, and since the gap has just resumed growing according to statistics he cites, America can easily afford the military forces needed to put China back in its place. And he blames China’s recent and impressive catch-up on this score on Americans’ recent (Blumenthal doesn’t specify the time frame) political decision to skimp on military spending while continue to devote exorbitant sums to entitlement spending – which has indeed long dominated the budget outlays (along with, as he’s noted, interest payments on the resulting ballooning national debt).

According to Blumenthal, Americans and their leaders as a result have chosen to elevate “the intergenerational transfer of wealth” over national security. Strictly speaking, he’s right. But other interpretations of national priorities seem just as legitimate.

For example, as the author briefly notes, the U.S. population is aging. So a major national retirement funding challenge will face even the most defense-minded politicians. That doesn’t let American leaders or the recipients of these entitlements off the hook in terms of making sacrifices needed to safeguard national security. But it’s bound to raise the question of whether the burden of sacrifice should be limited to middle class Americans. The great increase in national wealth mentioned by Blumenthal makes clear that the nation has many other resources on which it can draw to fund a bigger military – especially since the private economy’s wealth has led the surge. In other words, why not tax the rich or corporations more heavily to pay for new personnel and weapons?

One obvious rejoinder is that modest levels of taxes on wealthy Americans and on American companies are needed to ensure the economic growth needed to keep national wealth levels robust. But even accepting the doctrinaire trickle-down economics underlying this assumption, should upper-level individual incomes and business profits be completely exempted from any responsibility to pay for the military? If so, why? And wouldn’t that policy greatly loosen the relationship between national wealth and military capability emphasized by Blumenthal?

The author also neglects another big pool of resources that can be brought to bear on countering China: the wealth of America’s regional allies. Stunningly, after decades of American pleading for greater burden-sharing, countries with a far greater stake than the United States in resisting Chinese regional domination continue free-riding on U.S. defense guarantees. Why should American entitlements recipients see any reduction in benefits before Japanese and South Koreans pay at least as much for their own security (relatively speaking) as the much more geographically distant United States does? And their contributions could be immense. Japan alone, for example, is the world’s third largest national economy (behind the United States and China, respectively). 

Finally, as with nearly all the rest of the establishment, Blumenthal completely neglects the opposite side of the U.S.-China defense resources equation: The decisive extent to which American economic policy continues enriching China, and therefore continuing to enable it to afford lots of both “guns and butter” (as economists and political scientists have dubbed military and social spending). Thanks in part to literally trillions of dollars of earnings from the trade surpluses it’s long run with the United States, the Chinese pie keeps expanding strongly (that’s the economic growth whose importance Blumenthal softpedals). As a result, more new resources are generated for whatever priorities or combination of priorities the Chinese government chooses.

Even worse, as I’ve long noted, recklessly lax tech transfer policies on America’s part have for decades given the Chinese much of the knowhow needed to turn out increasingly advanced weapons and other military systems. Some signs of official concerns about this outflow have appeared in Washington lately, but U.S. leaders (and the rest of the establishment) remain woefully behind the curve.

When America’s East Asia security strategy stops bolstering the Chinese threat it depicts as such a huge concern, when it insists that local countries act like they have at least as great a stake in remaining independent of China as does the United States, when the wealthiest Americans are required to devote more of their recent immense windfalls to the common defense, and if all of those changes still leave China closing fast on the combined forces of the United States and its neighbors, it would become legitimate to ask Main Street Americans to start shouldering greater burdens. Until then, the U.S. working and middle classes will be entirely justified in demanding that the nation’s Asia strategy pass a minimal seriousness test first.

Our So-Called Foreign Policy: The Establishment’s Hypocritical China Cassandras

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allies, cabinet, China, confirmation hearings, East Asia, island building, national security, Our So-Called Foreign Policy, Rex Tillerson, Secretary of State, South China Sea, tech transfer, Trade, Trump

Since Donald Trump’s cabinet choices appeared at their Senate confirmation hearings last week, critics have rightly observed that the president-elect and his picks to run his foreign and national security policies seem to disagree sharply on some major issues.

Less noticed is how the Trump nominees’ statements have revealed worse incoherence in the ranks of most critics – who sit overwhelmingly in the nation’s bipartisan foreign policy establishment. An unusually worrisome example has been the near-firestorm over Secretary of State-designate Rex Tillerson’s statement that “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops, and second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.”

Tillerson’s remarks referred to an especially brazen aspect of Beijing’s expansionism in the South China Sea – centered on territorial claims that no one else in the region accepts. In an apparent effort to create irreversible realities “on the ground,” China has been capitalizing on the local topography literally to turn existing rocks and similar features into mini islands. Beijing has gone on to place various kinds of facilities – including some with military capabilities – on them, and to declare the immediately surrounding waters to be Chinese territory.

As widely noted, there’s at best considerable tension between Tillerson’s warning and several suggestions made by the president-elect during the campaign that he’s worried that America’s security relationships in the East Asia/Pacific region have become too dangerous militarily (since its adversaries are developing increasingly potent nuclear forces) and too one-sided economically (since the United States runs huge trade deficits with most regional countries).

Also completely weird, however, have been the alarm bells set off in establishment ranks to the effect that Tillerson had suddenly moved America dramatically closer to war with China over the South China Sea. For many of these voices have thoroughly upbraided Mr. Trump for failing to appreciate the crucial importance of U.S. alliances for safeguarding American and global security.

Establishment voice FOREIGN POLICY magazine ran a piece ominously asking, “Is Tillerson Ready to Go to War Over the South China Sea?” Only slightly less melodramatic was this Wall Street Journal sub-headline: “If carried out, Tillerson’s proposal to bar Beijing from some South China Sea islands would likely trigger military battle, experts say.”

A Christian Science Monitor headline sounded a similar alarm, and its article reported that “[T]he policy would dramatically reshape US thinking on Chinese expansionism, drawing a hard new territorial line in China’s backyard and, experts say, invite a military confrontation with Beijing.”

And even though they weren’t predicting imminent conflict, the experts interviewed by The Los Angeles Times still apparently fretted that Tillerson, “without diplomatic experience, had engaged in a flight of hyperbole in keeping with the tough rhetoric about China favored by Trump.”

These would all be defensible views except for one consideration: The American security strategy in the East Asia/Pacific region that all these experts have endorsed as a group for decades depends first and foremost on a credible threat to use military force to deter the kind of aggression in which China is engaged.

It is completely legitimate to question whether or not China’s island-building is the best casus belli, or circumstance for drawing a “red line.” But it is the height of hypocrisy to condemn – or even tut-tut over – a statement emphasizing that the United States has long considered maintaining freedom of the seas in East Asia to be a vital security interest (including by the Obama administration), and that China is on a course that will require U.S. military responses unless Beijing stops or changes direction sharply.

Or are all these American Asia experts confident that China will even slow its land and sea grab at some point down the road without firmer U.S. counter-moves than have been seen to date? If so, it’s time that they explained their reasons why – and how these rationales relate to their long-time insistence that major American military deployments in this region are essential to maintain peace and stability.

So the incoming administration looks to be a house divided on dealing with China’s strategic ambitions in Asia. That’s disturbing, but at least from the little known so far, the leading factions will be internally consistent (though the hawks still need to show that they understand the need to stop adding to China’s wealth and power through dangerously shortsighted trade and tech transfer policies, and Mr. Trump needs to understand more completely that even greater defense burden-sharing by the Asians could still leave America with unacceptable nuclear risks).

But the outside critics have just about disqualified themselves from any role in this debate – unless they can offer something more than hopelessly scattershot whining.